

### Aggregate Uncertainty, HANK, and the ZLB

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#### Introduction

Simple Model

HANK Model

Solution Approach

Results

Other Applications

Conclusions

#### Figure 1: Mon. Policy, Micro-Macro uncertainty



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- 3. What about idiosyncratic risk at the ZLB?
  - We are interested in understanding this interaction...
  - via HANK-DSGE-model









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- 4. HANK + ZLB + Aggregate Uncertainty: Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2021), Kase et al. (2022), Schaab (2020)



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- In practice: take standard HANK, add ZLB, add tractable AU, compare to PF
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Het. Agents	А	А	D	Е



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- 2. Quantify effect of aggregate uncertainty in RANK at the ZLB (C vs B)
- 3. Decompose the role of HA in the amplification (E-D vs C-B)



- Novel solution strategy...
- but not limited to ZLB, can accomodate more general non-linearities (kinky PC, aggregate borrowing constraints/financial accelerator, downward wage rigidity...)



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  - c: constrained, no access to financial markets, earn  $z_c Y_t$
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$$Y_{t}^{-\sigma} = \frac{\beta_{t}R_{t}}{\beta R_{ss}} \mathbb{E}_{t} Y_{t+1}^{-\sigma}, \qquad (1)$$

$$R_{t} = \max\left\{\underline{R}, R_{ss} Y_{t}^{\phi}\right\} \qquad (2)$$

$$R_{ss} = \frac{1}{\beta\left\{p\left(z_{u}^{-\sigma}\right) + (1-p)\left[\left(\frac{1-\lambda z_{u}}{1-\lambda}\right)^{-\sigma}\right]\right\}}$$



$$Y_{t} = f\left(\mathbb{E}_{t}Y_{t+1}^{-\sigma}, \beta_{t} \middle| \beta, \sigma, \phi, \underline{R}, R_{ss}\right)$$

$$= \begin{cases} \left(\frac{\beta_{t}}{\beta}\mathbb{E}_{t}Y_{t+1}^{-\sigma}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma+\phi}} & \text{if } \beta_{t} \leq \beta \left(\frac{R_{ss}}{\underline{R}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma+\phi}{\phi}} \left(\mathbb{E}_{t}Y_{t+1}^{-\sigma}\right)^{-1} \\ \left(\frac{\beta_{t}}{\beta}\frac{R}{R_{ss}}\mathbb{E}_{t}Y_{t+1}^{-\sigma}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$(3)$$

• Higher future MU (or larger discount factor) leads to larger recession

# Simple Model (3) - Shocks





#### 1. The economy is at steady state at t = 0.



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$$eta_t=eta$$
 for any  $t>1$ 

- AU)  $\beta_1 = \beta_L > \beta$  with probability  $\mu$ ,  $\beta_1 = \beta$  otherwise
- PF)  $\beta_1 = \beta_{DET}$  such that same effect absent ZLB (i.e.  $\underline{R} = -\infty$ )

### Simple Model (4) - Graphical Intuition



Figure 2: Equilibrium in the Simple Model



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- 1. ZLB amplifies effect of shock because interest rate higher than it would have been. True even with PF...
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- 3. So what is the role of HA in this amplification?
  - in the steady state (closer to the ZLB in the steady state because of precautionary savings - kink more to the left)
  - in the business cycle (lowers R<sub>t</sub> towards ZLB because of precautionary savings and MPCs - steeper slope)

# HANK Model (1) - Overview





- Standard one-asset HANK model (McKay et al. (2016), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)):
  - Demand side (idiosyncratic risk, borrowing constraint)
  - New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
  - Supply of bonds from government
  - Taylor rule + ZLB
  - Preference shock



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  - Preference shock
- $\bullet$  Calibration: standard parameter values + Great Recession





• Household *i* with assets  $a_{it-1}$  and shock  $z_{it}$  maximizes:

$$V_t(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \max_{c_{it}, a_{it} \ge \underline{a}} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{\beta_t}{\beta_t} \mathbb{E}_t V_{t+1}(z_{it+1}, a_t)$$

subject to:

$$c_{it} + \frac{a_{it}}{R_t} = \frac{a_{it-1}}{\Pi_t} + z_{it} \left( Y_t - t_t \right)$$



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  - ⇒ earnings risk is acyclical



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Aggregate Asset Demand

$$A_t = \int g_t^a(z,a) dD_t(z,a)$$

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• New Keynesian Phillips Curve (from Rotemberg):

$$\left(\Pi_{t} - \overline{\Pi}\right)\Pi_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{t}\beta_{t}\left(\frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_{t}}\right)^{1-\sigma} \times \left(\Pi_{t+1} - \overline{\Pi}\right)\Pi_{t+1} + \tilde{\kappa}\left[Y_{t}^{\omega+\sigma} - 1\right]$$

• Government Budget and Fiscal Policy

$$T_t + rac{b_t}{R_t} = rac{b_{t-1}}{\Pi_t}$$
  $b_t = \overline{b}$ 

• Market Clearing

$$b_{t}=\int g_{t}^{a}\left( a,z
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Monetary Policy

$$R_{t} = \max\left\{1, \overline{R}\left(\frac{\Pi_{t}}{\overline{\Pi}}\right)^{\phi_{\pi}}\left(\frac{Y_{t}}{\overline{Y}}\right)^{\phi_{Y}}\right\}$$

#### HANK Model (4) - Shock Structure







- economy at steady state (t = -1)
- time preference shock  $\beta$  materializes:  $\beta_0 = \beta_L$
- every period: probability  $1 \mu$  to revert (and a *contingency* realizes)
- Compare to deterministic shock:  $\beta_t^{DET} = \mathbb{E}_0 \beta_t$
- no restrictions on values, only on  $\mu$  (must be the same).

#### HANK Model (4) - Shock Structure



#### Graphical Representation of Deterministic and Stochastic Shocks



$$\beta_{t} = \begin{cases} \beta & \text{w.p.} = 1, \text{ if } \beta_{t-1} = \beta \\ \beta & \text{w.p.} = 1 - \mu, \text{ if } \beta_{t-1} = \beta_{L} \\ \beta_{L} & \text{w.p.} = \mu, \text{ if } \beta_{t-1} = \beta_{L} \end{cases} \qquad \beta_{t}^{PF} = \mu^{t} \beta_{L} + (1 - \mu^{t}) \beta \qquad (4)$$



#### Table 1: Calibration

Parameter	Value	Source	Note
σ	1.5	Smets and Wouters (2007)	EIS
eta	0.9805	Calibrated	Discount Factor
$\kappa$	0.01	Eggertsson et al. (2021)	NKPC
П	$1.02^{0.25}$	Standard	Inflation target
$\phi_{\pi}$	1.5	Standard	Monetary Policy
$\phi_{\mathbf{y}}$	0.125	Standard	Monetary Policy
Z		Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)	Idiosyncratic Shocks
Q		Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)	Idiosyncratic Shocks
$\mu$	0.9	Eggertsson et al. (2021)	Switching Probability
$\beta_L$	0.993	Calibrated	Shock
Т	300	-	Horizon Truncation
$ au^{max}$	100	-	Largest Contingency



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- We instead solve the model in the space of sequences
  - shock structure  $\implies$  finite # of paths the economy can follow

## Solution Approach (1) - Economy Overview





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Notes: x-axis is time t, y-axis is contingency  $\tau$ . Solution: large system of equations ( $\tau^{\max} \times (T+1) \times nX$ ). We split diagonal/contingencies  $_{16/33}$ 





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- Value functions become

$$V_{t}(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \max_{c_{it}, a_{it} \ge a} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta_{t} \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \frac{\mu}{V_{t+1}}(z_{it+1}, a_{t}) + (1-\mu)V_{t+1}^{t+1}(z_{it+1}, a_{t}) \right]$$
$$V_{t}^{\tau}(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \max_{c_{it}, a_{it} \ge a} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta_{t}^{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{t} V_{t+1}^{\tau}(z_{it+1}, a_{t})$$



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• (linearized) NK Phillips curve becomes

$$\begin{split} \hat{\Pi}_t &= \beta \left[ \mu \hat{\Pi}_{t+1} + (1-\mu) \hat{\Pi}_{t+1}^{t+1} \right] + \kappa \hat{Y}_t \\ \hat{\Pi}_t^\tau &= \beta \hat{\Pi}_{t+1}^\tau + \kappa \hat{Y}_t^\tau \end{split}$$

#### Solution Approach (3) - Equilibrium





• Numerically, an equilibrium is represented by systems of equations

$$0 = \mathbf{F}^{PF}(\mathbb{X}^{\tau}, \mathbb{Z}^{\tau}; X_{\tau-1}, D_{\tau}^{\tau})$$
(5)

$$0 = \mathbf{F}^{TS}(\mathbb{X}^{TS}, \mathbb{Z}^{TS}; \mathbb{V}_1^{PF}, \mathbb{X}_1^{PF})$$
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where X<sup>τ</sup> (Z<sup>τ</sup>) contains all the aggregate variables (shocks) in contingency τ
X<sup>TS</sup> (Z<sup>TS</sup>) contains all the aggr. variables (shocks) on the "uncertain" diagonal
V<sup>PF</sup><sub>1</sub>, X<sup>PF</sup><sub>1</sub> contain all the "forward looking" information relevant for the diagonal





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- 2. Solve the  $\tau^{\max}$  PF paths

$$0 = \mathbf{F}^{PF}(\mathbb{X}^{\tau}, \mathbb{Z}^{\tau}; X_{\tau-1}, D_{\tau}^{\tau})$$
$$d\mathbb{X}^{\tau} = \mathbf{F}_{X}^{PF-1} \left( F_{D}^{PF} dD_{\tau}^{\tau} + \mathbf{F}_{X_{\tau-1}}^{PF} dX_{\tau-1} \right)$$
$$\mathbf{F}_{D}^{PF} dD_{\tau}^{\tau} \approx \underbrace{\mathbf{F}^{PF} \left( \mathbb{X}_{ss}^{PF} | D_{\tau}^{\tau}, X_{ss} \right)}_{y_{ss}^{a}'(\Lambda_{ss}')^{t-\tau} dD_{\tau}^{\tau}} - \mathbf{F}^{PF} \left( \mathbb{X}_{ss}^{PF} | D_{ss} X_{ss} \right)$$

- use Sequence Space Jacobian + OccBin
- collect value functions and forw. looking vars at first period of PFs




- 1. Guess path of state variable(s) on uncertain path
- 2. Solve the  $\tau^{\max}$  PF paths
- 3. Given the value functions and forw. looking vars, solve the uncertain path\*

$$0 = \mathbf{F}^{TS}(\mathbb{X}^{TS}, \mathbb{Z}^{TS}; \mathbb{V}_{1}^{PF}, \mathbb{X}_{1}^{PF})$$
  
$$d\mathbb{X}^{TS} = (\mathbf{F}_{X}^{TS})^{-1} \left( \mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{Z}}^{TS} d\mathbb{Z} + \mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{X}}^{TS} d\mathbb{X}_{1}^{PF} + \mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{V}}^{TS} d\mathbb{V}_{1}^{PF} \right)$$
  
$$\mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{V}}^{TS} d\mathbb{V}_{1}^{PF} \approx \mathbf{F}^{TS} \left( \mathbb{X}_{ss}, \mathbb{Z}_{ss} | \mathbb{X}_{ss}, \mathbb{V}_{1}^{PF} \right) - \mathbf{F}^{TS} \left( \mathbb{X}_{ss}^{TS}, \mathbb{Z}_{ss} | \mathbb{X}_{ss}^{TS}, \mathbb{V}_{ss} \right)$$

use Sequence Space Jacobian (modified for AU) + OccBin
 recover new set of state variables





- 1. Guess path of state variable(s) on uncertain path
- 2. Solve the  $\tau^{\rm max}$  PF paths
- 3. Given the value functions and forw. looking vars, solve the uncertain path\*
- 4. Iterate until convergence





- 1. Guess path of state variable(s) on uncertain path
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- 3. Given the value functions and forw. looking vars, solve the uncertain path\*
- 4. Iterate until convergence
- 5. (optional) Use quasi-Newton method for higher order









Measuring amplification due to uncertainty:

• Aggregate Uncertainty vs Deterministic Counterfactual





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- IRF-AU:  $\mathbb{E}_0 Y_t \overline{Y}$ , weighted average of all contingencies. IRF-PF:  $Y_t^{PF} \overline{Y}$





- Aggregate Uncertainty vs Deterministic Counterfactual
- Shocks with the same expected values from t = 0 perspective
- IRF-AU:  $\mathbb{E}_0 Y_t \overline{Y}$ , weighted average of all contingencies. IRF-PF:  $Y_t^{PF} \overline{Y}$
- Amplification if  $\left|\mathbb{E}_{0} Y_{t} Y_{t}^{PF}\right| >> 0$





- Aggregate Uncertainty vs Deterministic Counterfactual
- Shocks with the same expected values from t = 0 perspective
- IRF-AU:  $\mathbb{E}_0 Y_t \overline{Y}$ , weighted average of all contingencies. IRF-PF:  $Y_t^{PF} \overline{Y}$
- Amplification if  $\left|\mathbb{E}_{0} Y_{t} Y_{t}^{PF}\right| >> 0$
- Quantification with PDV:  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \mathbb{E}_0 Y_t \overline{Y} \right)$  vs  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( Y_t^{PF} \overline{Y} \right)$

## Results (1) - Uncertainty and Amplification



#### Figure 3: IRF - HANK - No ZLB









- AU vs PF in HANK without the ZLB
  - linear behavior to aggregate shocks

$$\blacksquare \mathbb{E}_0 Y_t \approx Y_t^{PF}$$

certainty equivalence



#### Figure 4: IRF - HANK - with ZLB









- AU vs PF in HANK at the ZLB
- certainty equivalence broken
  - $\blacksquare \mathbb{E}_0 Y_t < Y_t^{PF}$
  - amplification in PDV: 2x
- Uncertainty: ZLB binds for longer
  - On average, 10 quarters
  - vs. 4 quarters in PF

# Results (3) - Uncertainty and Amplification in RANK



#### Figure 5: IRF - RANK - without ZLB









- AU vs PF in RANK at the ZLB
- Calibrate shocks such that:
- RA economy exhibits same response as HANK w/o ZLB (Werning, 2015)

 $X_t(RANK) = X_t(HANK)$  $X_t^{ au}(RANK) = X_t^{ au}(HANK)$ 

# Results (3) - Uncertainty and Amplification in RANK



#### Figure 5: IRF - RANK - with ZLB









- AU vs PF in RANK at the ZLB
- Calibrate shocks such that:
- RA economy exhibits same response as HANK w/o ZLB (Werning, 2015)

 $X_t(RANK) = X_t(HANK)$  $X_t^{ au}(RANK) = X_t^{ au}(HANK)$ 

Introduce ZLB

# Results (3) - Uncertainty and Amplification in RANK



#### Figure 5: IRF - RANK - with ZLB









- AU vs PF in RANK at the ZLB
- Calibrate shocks such that:
- RA economy exhibits same response as HANK w/o ZLB (Werning, 2015)

 $X_t(RANK) = X_t(HANK)$  $X_t^{ au}(RANK) = X_t^{ au}(HANK)$ 

- Introduce ZLB
- Amplification in PDV:  $\pmb{1.6x}$

# Results (4) - Uncertainty and Amplification - Summary (Y)





	No ZLB		ZL		
	Perf. Fores.	Agg. Unc.	Perf. Fores.	Agg. Unc.	
Repr. Agent	А	А	В	С	C-B
Het. Agents	А	А	D	Е	E-D

# Results (4) - Uncertainty and Amplification - Summary (Y)





	No ZLB		ZL		
	Perf. Fores.	Agg. Unc.	Perf. Fores.	Agg. Unc.	
Repr. Agent	100	100	102.3	166.7	64.4
Het. Agents	100	100	104.5	225	120.5



#### Table 2: Running Times - Seconds

Specification	Benchmark		MNP		
Step	Time	Max. Err.	Tir	me Max. Err.	
Steady State	0.7	-	6	-	
All Jacobians	4	-	179	-	
Algorithm 1 - First-Order	20	0.5%	144	0.5%	
Algorithm 1 - Exact only on TS	26	0.008%	216	0.002%	
Algorithm 1 - Exact Equilibrium	116	0.0000006%	7735	0.0000002%	

• Matlab, ASUS laptop, 1.80Ghz processor, 16GB RAM, and 8 cores

• MNP: Mendicino et al. (2021), richer income risk

## Results (6) - Shock Size



Figure 6: Effects on Impact as a function of shock size



26 / 33

## Results (7) - Decomposition of Consumption Demand



• Define a consumption function:

$$\mathbb{C}^{PF} = \mathcal{C}^{PF} \left( \mathbb{X}^{PF}, \mathbb{Z}^{PF} \right)$$
(7)

$$\mathbb{C}^{TS} = \mathcal{C}^{AU}\left(\mathbb{X}^{TS}, \mathbb{Z}^{TS}, \{\mathbb{X}^{\tau}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}}, \{\mathbb{Z}^{\tau}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}}\right)$$
(8)

$$\mathbb{C}^{Interm} = \mathcal{C}^{PF} \left( IRF \left( \mathbb{X}^{TS}, \mathbb{Z}^{TS}, \{ \mathbb{X}^{\tau} \}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}}, \{ \mathbb{Z}^{\tau} \}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}} \right) \right)$$
(9)

- Which aggregate is driving the amplification?  $Y, \Pi, R, t, \beta$
- Is uncertainty important per se? Feed **IRF** of AU in a deterministic world (captures indirect effect via "average" aggregates).

## Results (8) - Decomposition of Consumption Demand







- What price is driving the amplification?
- Feed average prices of AU, in a deterministic world
- Aggregate income is largest driver.
- Expected aggregate income does most of it.

## Other Applications (1) - Forward Guidance

- One policy application: forward guidance
- Central bank announces to keep rates at ZLB for *q* quarters on top of what prescribed in main exercise
- FG powerful when there is uncertainty (6 quarters can revert recession)



#### 1. Households

- illiquid physical capital
- Calvo fairy for portfolio re-balancing
- $\Rightarrow$  heterogeneous in income, wealth, and portfolio composition
- 2. Other Blocks
  - intermediate-goods producer Cobb-Douglas production
  - Labor Union with adjustment costs (Wage Phillips Curve)
  - Capital production subject to adjustment cost

# Application (2.1) - Cyclical Income Risk



#### **Deterministic Shock**

#### **Stochastic Shock**





## Application (2.2) - Earnings Risk



Earnings risk as in Mendicino et al. (2021):





- $\bullet\,$  We study the interaction b/w aggregate uncertainty and household heterogeneity:
  - new methodology for HANK models with aggregate uncertainty and non-linearities
  - $\hfill \ensuremath{\,\bullet\)}$  simulations suggest that interaction is strong at the ZLB, even with acyclical risk
  - quantify the interaction in a simple way, during GR (55% amplification)
- Applications:
  - Forward Guidance
  - Two Asset HANK
- Methodology can be used for many applications involving HA, AU, aggregate non-linearities



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# Results (5) - Uncertainty and Amplification - Summary $(\Pi)$





	No Z	ĽLB	ZLB (y/Pi)		
	Perf. Fores.	Agg. Unc.	Perf. Fores.	Agg. Unc.	
Repr. Agent	100	100	100.45	167.3	
Het. Agents	100	100	101.9	227	



$$\mathbf{v}_t = \mathbf{v}^{TS} \left( \mathbf{v}_{t+1}, \mathbf{v}_{t+1}^{t+1}, X_t \right)$$
(10)

$$D_{t+1}^{t+1} = D_{t+1} = \Lambda^{TS} \left( \mathbf{v}_{t+1}, \mathbf{v}_{t+1}^{t+1}, X_t \right)' D_t$$
(11)

$$\mathcal{Y}_{t} = y^{TS} \left( \mathbf{v}_{t+1}, \mathbf{v}_{t+1}^{t+1}, X_{t} \right)^{\prime} D_{t}$$
(12)

$$\mathbf{v}_t^{\tau} = v\left(\mathbf{v}_{t+1}^{\tau}, X_t^{\tau}\right) \tag{13}$$

$$D_{t+1}^{\tau} = \Lambda \left( \mathbf{v}_{t+1}^{\tau}, X_t^{\tau} \right)' D_t^{\tau}$$
(14)

$$\mathcal{Y}_{t}^{\tau} = y \left( \mathbf{v}_{t+1}^{\tau}, X_{t}^{\tau} \right)' D_{t}^{\tau}$$
(15)





#### • A competitive equilibrium is

Aggregate variables

**a** sequence 
$$\{Y_t, \Pi_t, R_t, b_t, t_t\}_{t=0}^{\tau^{\max}-1} = \{X_t\}_{t=0}^{\tau^{\max}-1} = \mathbb{X}^{TS}$$
 $\tau^{\max}$  sequences  $\{\{Y_t, \Pi_t^{\tau}, R_t^{\tau}, b_t^{\tau}, t_t^{\tau}\}_{t=\tau}^{\tau+T}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}} = \{\{X_t^{\tau}\}_{t=\tau}^{\tau+T}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}} = \{\mathbb{X}^{\tau}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}}$ 

Individual agents objects (wealth distribution, value function)

• s.t. given exogenous processes  $\{\beta_t\}_{t=0}^{\tau^{\max}} = \mathbb{Z}^{TS}$  and  $\{\{\beta_t^{\tau}\}_{t=0}^{\tau^{\max}}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}} = \{\mathbb{Z}^{\tau}\}_{\tau=1}^{\tau^{\max}}$ , aggregate equations hold, agents solve their maximization problem, and  $D_t = D_t^t$ 



• Occasionally binding constraints sub-algorithm

- 1. Consider  $d\mathbb{X}^{TS} = (\mathbf{F}_X^{TS})^{-1} \left( \mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{Z}}^{TS} d\mathbb{Z} + \mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{X}}^{TS} d\mathbb{X}_1^{PF} + \mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{V}}^{TS} d\mathbb{V}_1^{PF} \right)$
- 2. Guess periods in which the constraint binds, place them in an binary vector  $I_{ZLB}$
- 3. Adjust the main matrix so that

$$d\mathbb{X}^{TS} = [(1 - I_{ZLB}) \times \mathbf{F}_{X}^{TS} + I_{ZLB} \times \widetilde{\mathbf{F}}_{X}^{TS}]^{-1} [(1 - I_{ZLB}) \times (\mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{Z}}^{TS} d\mathbb{Z} + \mathbf{F}_{\mathbb{X}}^{TS} d\mathbb{X}_{1}^{PF} + \mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{V}}^{TS} d\mathbb{V}_{1}^{PF}) + I_{ZLB} \times (\underline{R} - \overline{R})]$$
(16)

where  $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}_{X}^{TS}$  substitutes the Taylor rule with  $R_{t} = \underline{R}$ 

• Generate shadow rates by simply multiplying  $d\mathbb{X}^{TS}$  and  $\mathbf{F}_{X}^{TS}$ , is the guess is correct, stop. Otherwise go to 2 and update  $I_{ZLB}$ .

## Solution Approach (7) - Others





- We exploit:
  - fake news algorithm
  - expectations vector


- We exploit:
  - fake news algorithm
  - expectations vector
- We do not exploit:
  - DAG-part



- We exploit:
  - fake news algorithm
  - expectations vector
- We do not exploit:
  - DAG-part
- New Jacobian  $\frac{\partial A_t}{\partial Y_s}$ :
  - $\blacksquare$  different  $\mu$



## Results (6) - Shock Size



## Figure 8: Effects on Discounted IRF as a function of shock size

