Guaranteed Minimum Income and Fertility

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Motivation

- Low fertility rates have important socio-economic implications, e.g. an aging population, a shrinking workforce, and declining economic growth.
- The decision to have children crucially depends on household economic conditions.
- Cost of raising a child from birth through age 17 for a middle-income family: \$223,610 (2015 USDA Expenditures on Children by Families).
- Understanding how the demand for children reacts to income support is timely and policy relevant.

In this paper

- We study the effect of guaranteed minimum income on fertility decisions.
- We exploit the introduction in 2019 of the Italian "Reddito di Cittadinanza" (RdC), which provided a minimum income to all individuals with a level of income below a given threshold.
- Italy is a valuable setting as it has the lowest fertility rate (1.3) and the highest age at first childbirth (32) in Europe.
- We use administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) and exploit the threshold-based setting of the scheme in a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design.

Preview of results

- We find a positive effect for women living in the South, but a null effect for women living in the Centre-North.
- In the South, RdC recipients have a 1.3 percentage point higher probability of conceiving a child within two years.
- This corresponds to an increase in the mean fertility rate, computed over a two-year period, by 17%.
- Effect is driven by older women, women with pre-existing children and women living in rented houses; it is larger for women previously employed.

Related Literature & Contribution

- Income changes and fertility (Adsera, 2005; Lindo, 2010; Dettling and Kearney, 2014; Kearney and Wilson, 2018; Giuntella et al., 2022)
- Cash transfers and fertility in developed countries (Gauthier, 2007; Yonzan, 2020; González and Trommlerová, 2023).
- Income support and fertility in high-income countries (Cohen et al., 2013; González, 2013; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017; Raute, 2019).
- Welfare policies and fertility (Grogger and Bronars, 2001; Levine, 2002; Kearney, 2004, Jagannathan et al., 2004; Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Brewer et al., 2012).

The Italian RdC Program

- Since its introduction in April 2019, the program has benefited about 3 million individuals to date, with an average monthly benefit of about €500.
- The investment allocated by the Government amounts to €7.1 billion for 2019, €8 billion for 2020, €8.3 billion in 2021.
- Eligibility: income and wealth requirements + participation to an active labor market policy (not yet implemented) if unemployed.
- Eligibility requirements were unknown before April 2019.

The benefit

- Lasts for 18 months and is renewable after a 1-month break, with no limit to the number of renewals.
- Consists of two components:
 - a cash transfer (min €480) complementing household income up to a threshold and increasing with household size according to an equivalence scale (max €20,592);
 - a contribution towards rent or mortgage payments, up to a yearly cap of €3,360 for tenants and €1,800 for mortgagers.
- Is provided for an extra year after a beneficiary enters the labour market or increases labour supply, with an implied marginal tax for labor income of 80% within one year, which rises to 100% afterwards.

Requirements for 1-member households

| Requirement | Owned house | Rented house |
|------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| a. Household taxable income | €6,000 | €9,360 |
| b. Financial assets | €6,000 | €6,000 |
| c. Real estate (no main residence) | €30,000 | €30,000 |
| d. ISEE value | €9,360 | €9,360 |
| e. Luxury vehicles or boats | NO | NO |
| f. Residency-citizenship | YES | YES |
| g. Participation to ALMP | YES | YES |

Fulfilled requirements distribution

| Requirement | Ν | % |
|------------------------------------|-----------|------|
| a. Household taxable income | 4,108,165 | 73.6 |
| b. Financial assets | 5,177,167 | 92.7 |
| c. Real estate (no main residence) | 5,473,675 | 98.0 |
| d. ISEE value | 5,493,954 | 98.3 |
| e. Luxury vehicles or boats | 5,582,073 | 99.9 |
| f. Residency-citizenship | 5,441,751 | 97.4 |
| Requirements b-f | 5,038,235 | 90.2 |
| Requirements a-f | 3,920,244 | 70.2 |

Data and Sample

- We use data on the universe of RdC applicants between April and June 2019 and fertility data from the *Assegno Unico Universale*.
- We focus on female applicants aged 16-45 who fulfilled all requirements b-f and were either accepted of rejected by June 2019 based on requirement a (532,430 individuals).
- Household income was more difficult to compute as it was given by the sum of all the incomes gained in year t-2 by all household earners minus all welfare benefits received in year t-1 and in year t.

Definition of Main Variables

- Outcome (Birth): dummy for women conceiving a child within two years since notification of the application outcome (June 2019-June 2021).
- Treatment (RdC recipient): women admitted into the program from April 2019 to December 2019, who received the income support for at least 6 months since start.
- Running (Distance from relative cut-off): difference to the relative household income threshold as of April-June 2019.
- IV (Below threshold): women who by June 2019 had a household income below the relative threshold.

Fuzziness

- Eligibility at baseline (i.e. by June 2019) does not guarantee that the individual will be treated over the sample period examined.
- Early recipients can be excluded ex-post due to subsequent administrative controls or changes in their economic conditions (3% in our sample)
- Applicants who were rejected by June 2019 can re-apply and become recipients afterwards (1% in our sample).

Empirical model

Main outcome equation:

 $Birth_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}RdC_{i} + \beta_{2}f(Distance_{i}) + \beta_{3}RdC_{i} * f(Distance_{i}) + \beta_{4}X_{i} + \varepsilon_{i} \quad (1)$

First stage equation:

$$RdC_{i} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}Below_{i} + \alpha_{2}f(Distance_{i}) + \alpha_{3}Below_{i} * f(Distance_{i}) + \alpha_{4}X_{i} + \mu_{i}$$
(2)

- We estimate the model using a Local Linear Regression approach with MSE-optimal (asymmetric) bandwidth around the cut-off.
- X_i includes age, age², HH size, n. of children, n. of disabled members, rented house, migrant, months worked in 2017-18, area of residence.
- Standard errors clustered at the level of the running variable.

Descriptive statistics

| | Full sampl | e | South | |
|----------------------------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Variable | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |
| Birth | 0.079 | 0.270 | 0.081 | 0.273 |
| RdC (recipient) | 0.743 | 0.437 | 0.774 | 0.418 |
| Below (relative threshold) | 0.688 | 0.463 | 0.731 | 0.444 |
| Distance (from relative cut-off) | 1621.386 | 2016.174 | 1799.311 | 1983.614 |
| South | 0.582 | 0.493 | 1.000 | 0.000 |
| Age | 31.394 | 8.897 | 31.202 | 8.730 |
| Household size | 3.762 | 1.528 | 3.746 | 1.466 |
| Migrant | 0.269 | 0.444 | 0.086 | 0.281 |
| No. of minors | 1.382 | 1.168 | 1.256 | 1.103 |
| No. of disabled | 0.168 | 0.440 | 0.174 | 0.448 |
| Rented house | 0.411 | 0.492 | 0.230 | 0.421 |
| Months worked in 2017-18 | 3.425 | 7.062 | 2.877 | 6.505 |

Treatment Probability vs Distance from Relative Cut-off



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First Stage Results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|
| | Full Sample | Centre-North | South |
| Below | 0.7346*** | 0.7275*** | 0.7537*** |
| | (0.0045) | (0.0061) | (0.0060) |
| Observations | 131,009 | 57,178 | 85,070 |

Second Stage Results - Full Sample

| | (1) No Controls | (2) +Demog controls | (3) +HH controls | (4) +Prior labor sup | (5) +Area dummies |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| RdC | 0.0050 (0.0047) | 0.0053 (0.0041) | 0.0033 (0.0040) | 0.0051 (0.0042) | 0.0045 (0.0042) |
| Observations | 109,423 | 136,259 [´] | 159,132 | 129,306 | 132,198 |
| Control mean | 0.0811 | 0.0815 | 0.0814 | 0.0815 | 0.0816 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,855 | -3,077 | -3,052 | -3,070 | -3,117 |
| Right bandwidth | +3,076 | +4,081 | +5,004 | +3,796 | +3,893 |

Second Stage Results - Centre-North

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-----------------|----------|----------|---------------------|-----------|
| | No | +Demog | +HH | +Prior |
| | Controls | controls | controls | labor sup |
| RdC | -0.0028 | -0.0064 | -0.0067 | -0.0066 |
| | (0.0065) | (0.0065) | (0.0059) | (0.0064) |
| Observations | 58,436 | 56,032 | 72,950 [´] | 56,688 |
| Control mean | 0.0816 | 0.0811 | 0.0810 | 0.0810 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,919 | -2,708 | -2,753 | -2,792 |
| Right bandwidth | +4,082 | +3,983 | +5,837 | +3,985 |

Second Stage Results - South

| | (1) No Controls | (2) +Demog controls | (3) +HH controls | (4) +Prior labor sup |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| RdC | 0.0148** (0.0069) | 0.0158** (0.0063) | 0.0134** (0.0060) | 0.0137** |
| Observations | (0.0005) 51,070 | 66,060 | (0.0000) 81,614 | (0.0000) 83,911 |
| Control mean | 0.0802 | 0.0802 | 0.0800 | 0.0801 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,295 | -2,259 | -2,240 | -2,262 |
| Right bandwidth | +2,681 | +3,723 | +4,707 | +4,827 |

Check for Random Assignment

- Identifying assumption: if unobservable characteristics do not vary discontinuously around the cutoff, the assignement rule provides exogenous variation in the treatment.
- This may be violated if individuals strategically change their family composition or employment status because they want to meet the household income threshold.
- This is unlikely in our setting: the household income requirement refers to year t-2.

Balance Checks



McCrary Test



Heterogeneity by Age - South

| | (1) Age<= 32 | (2) Age> 32 |
|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| RdC | 0.0061 (0.0082) | 0.0210** (0.0083) |
| Observations Control mean Left bandwidth Right bandwidth | 42,681 0.0905 -2,718 +4,451 | 34,373 0.0683 -2,151 +4,228 |

Heterogeneity by Parity - South

| | (1) No children | (2) Children $>= 1$ |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| RdC | 0.0025 | 0.0162** |
| | (0.0101) | (0.0072) |
| Observations | 20,272 | 57,798 |
| Control mean | 0.0751 | 0.0822 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,084 | -2,531 |
| Right bandwidth | +4,019 | +4,612 |

Heterogeneity by Home Ownership - South

| | (1) Owned house | (2) Rented house |
|-----------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| RdC | 0.0074 | 0.0226* |
| | (0.0076) | (0.0135) |
| Observations | 36,770 | 21,612 |
| Control mean | 0.0795 | 0.0835 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,436 | -2,020 |
| Right bandwidth | +2,360 | +5,380 |

Heterogeneity by Prior Employment Status - South

| | (1) Employed in 2017-18 | (2) Unemployed in 2017-18 |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| RdC | 0.0238* | 0.0147** |
| | (0.0133) | (0.0068) |
| Observations | 19,652 | 56,416 |
| Control mean | 0.0917 | 0.0780 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,281 | -2,353 |
| Right bandwidth | +4,626 | +4,233 |
| | | |

Conclusions

- We find that the Italian RdC increased fertility for women in the South but had no effects for women in the Centre-North.
- This might be explained by differences in social norms, which make women in the South more prone to have children and more responsive to improvements in their living conditions.
- The effect is driven by older women and women in more disadvantaged households, such as those in rented houses and with pre-existing children.
- The effect is larger for women who were previously employed.

Policy Implications

- The effect we estimate might be not only explained by the relatively small increase in income, but also by the reduced uncertainty and the increased level of self-confidence associated with inclusion into the program.
- Our results suggest that minimum income schemes, while designed to contrast poverty, may have indirect positive effects on fertility.
- This is especially relevant for the policy-making of Southern European countries, that are currently plagued by low fertility and high poverty rates.

THANK YOU!

Geographical distribution of applicants in the bandwidth

GMI application-population rate



The Equivalence Scale

- The equivalence scale is as follows: 1 (1 component); 1.57 (2 components); 2.04 (3 components); 2.46 (4 components); 2.85 (5 components).
- These values are incremented by 0.35 in case of each further component, 0.2 in case of 3 children, 0.35 in case of 4 children and 0.5 in case of 5 children.
- These values are further incremented by 0.2 and by 0.3 for the presence of children under the age of 18 and 3, respectively.

RD plot - South



Robustness - South



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Robustness - South

| | (1) + Region dummies | (2) MSE symm. | (3) Non-par. convent. | (4) Non-par. bias-corr. | (5) Non-par. robust |
|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| RdC | 0.0152** (0.0062) | 0.0112* (0.0068) | 0.0126** (0.0057) | 0.0116** (0.0057) | 0.0116 (0.0085) |
| Observations | 70,976 | 47,587 | 326,622 | 326,622 | 326,622 |
| Control mean | 0.0801 | 0.0807 | 0.0083 | 0.0083 | 0.0083 |
| Left bandwidth | -2,257 | -2,388 | -2,262 | -2,262 | -2,262 |
| Right bandwidth | 4,053 | 2,388 | 4,827 | 4,827 | 4,827 |