

Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax*

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Abstract

We study a reform of the French wealth tax that dramatically reduced the amount of information that taxpayers must report below a certain level of wealth. Using a new dynamic bunching approach and administrative wealth and income tax microdata, we find large behavioral responses to this switch to a low-information regime. The switch caused a 0.5 percentage points reduction in the annual growth rate of wealth reported on average by treated taxpayers each year after the reform. This fall is likely due to increased evasion facilitated by the lower reporting requirements, as suggested by the sharp responses in self-reported wealth but the lack of response in third-party-reported labor and capital incomes. The wealth tax base becomes much more elastic in the low-information regime, illustrating the first-order role of policy choices related to reporting and information for tax base elasticities.

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1 Introduction

There has been abundant research on behavioral responses to taxes over the last decades. Following the work of [Feldstein \(1995\)](#) and [Gruber and Saez \(2002\)](#), a large literature has estimated the elasticity of taxable income. More recently, studies have estimated the elasticity of taxable wealth (e.g., [Seim, 2017](#); [Duran-Cabr e et al., 2019](#); [Jakobsen et al., 2020](#); [Agrawal et al., 2020](#); [Br ulhart et al., 2021](#); [Londo no-V elez and Avila-Mahecha, 2022](#)). These estimates are critical for formulating empirically-grounded statements about optimal tax policy and to inform the public debate on core policy issues, such as the desirability of taxing wealth.

A key difficulty in mapping empirical tax elasticities to optimal policy is that tax base elasticities are not structural parameters: they can be affected by how taxes are designed. Policy choices such as the stringency of reporting requirements and enforcement strategies can make tax bases more or less elastic ([Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002](#); [Keen and Slemrod, 2017](#)). These tax design features vary over time and across countries, making it difficult to generalize elasticities estimated in specific contexts to other situations. To address this issue, ideally one would want to isolate the causal effect on behavior of key features of tax design. Empirically, however, this estimation is difficult for a number of reasons. First, while tax rates often change, sharp changes in tax design occur less frequently, making it hard to find compelling sources of variation. Second, when fundamental changes to tax design occur, these reforms are often paired with rate changes, blurring the identification of causal effects. Third, in the specific context of wealth taxation, few countries collect individual-level administrative data on wealth.

This paper tackles these challenges by providing evidence on the effects of changes in information reporting requirements—a key dimension of tax design—on taxpayer behavior. We study an unusual reform of the French wealth tax that considerably scaled back reporting requirements for some taxpayers. This reform allows us to isolate the effects of changing information reporting requirements while keeping most other features of the tax schedule constant. Leveraging new, exhaustive longitudinal data on the universe of French wealth taxpayers matched to their income tax returns,¹ we uncover large behavioral responses to the switch to a low-information regime, dramatically larger than the effect of wealth tax rates themselves.

¹These data are used in contemporaneous papers to study the effects of the French wealth tax on entrepreneurs' investment behaviors ([Bach et al., 2020](#)) and charitable giving ([Cage and Guillot, 2021](#)).

France has had a progressive wealth tax since the 1980s, based on self-reported net wealth. Until 2011, all taxpayers had to report detailed information about their wealth on their wealth tax return, asset type by asset type. In 2011 simplified reporting requirements were introduced, allowing taxpayers with less than €3 million in wealth (a threshold reduced to €2.57 million in 2013) to file a simplified return reporting only total gross assets and liabilities, with no breakdown by components. This drastically reduced the amount of information reported to the tax authority. Because the reform only affected information reporting requirement without affecting tax rates, this natural quasi-experiment allows us to estimate the causal effect of the information regime on taxpayer behavior keeping tax rates fixed.

To analyze this reform, we develop a new method of dynamic bunching. Our approach offers advantages over both the classic static bunching approach and standard difference-in-differences bunching. It relies on studying discontinuities in the distribution of (appropriately normalized) wealth growth rates for different groups. The counterfactual distributions are derived from a control group of similar but unaffected taxpayers. This method allows us to map our bunching estimator to the causal identification framework of [Angrist et al. \(1996\)](#) and to identify compliers (i.e., “bunchers”) within the bunching segment who took advantage of the reform. In turn, this enables us to estimate the local average treatment effect of reducing reporting requirement, in addition to the intent-to-treat effects. We confirm our findings using a second research design, a difference-in-differences analysis comparing taxpayers just below the simplification threshold pre-reform to taxpayers just above. Our main approach yields more precise estimates and allows us to estimate the share of compliers directly.

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the reform led to substantial reductions in the growth of wealth reported by treated taxpayers. The estimated average annual growth rate reduction is equal to 0.5 percentage points. These responses are driven by 15% of compliers in 2012, who experience a growth rate reduction of 4 percentage points, and 24% of compliers in 2016. Behavioral responses are more pronounced among individuals located just below the information discontinuity threshold prior to the reform. However, responses are also significant for taxpayers significantly below that threshold. Furthermore, there is an asymmetry whereby taxpayers who were already above the threshold (and who as such would have to report negative growth

rates in order to locate below the threshold) exhibit much smaller responses to the reform. Wealth growth rates are systematically lower below the simplification threshold than above post-reform, showing that not all responses are bunching responses, and suggesting increased misreporting in the low-information regimes.

Second, we explore how taxpayers react to the reduced reporting requirements by using our comprehensive administrative dataset linking wealth taxpayers to their income tax returns. We show that taxpayers who react to the reform do not experience any corresponding change in their (third-party) reported labor and capital income. Combined with the sharp bunching and rapid adjustment to changes in the simplification threshold, this finding lends support to the hypothesis that behavioral responses to the reform appear to be driven by evasion rather than real changes in wealth.

Our methodology allows us to document the dynamic longer-term effects of low information reporting. We show that the bunching at the simplification threshold is highly persistent within taxpayers over time, and remains sharp and large even four years after the reform. This reveals that the effect of the reform is cumulative over time: taxpayers under-report a growing fraction of their wealth year after year to stay in the low-information regime, implying that the change in tax design has growing revenue costs. Furthermore, we can track which asset categories play the most important role when adjusting to the simplification reform. We find that taxpayers who bunch below the simplification threshold end up crossing it after they experience large positive shocks to their financial assets. We find no such effects on real estate, suggesting that it is only when taxpayers experience shocks that become “too hard to hide” that they end up entering the detailed reporting regime again.

Third, the wealth tax base becomes much more elastic in the low-information regime. We show this by contrasting the elasticity of reported wealth at €2.57 million when this threshold was a pure kink in the schedule (i.e., before 2013) and when it is both a kink and an information reporting discontinuity (i.e., from 2013 on). The elasticity associated with the pure kink is very low. But it increases by more than an order of magnitude when the marginal tax rate kink is supplemented by the information discontinuity, illustrating the first-order importance of simple information policy choices for estimated tax base elasticities. Consistent with this finding, we also see different distributions at the same taxable wealth level when it is a pure tax kink versus

the exemption threshold. Only when it is an exemption threshold is there a significant behavioral response. Finally, we cannot detect any bunching at any of the pure tax kinks in any year.

Our findings highlight that to correctly interpret elasticities obtained using bunching methods, it is critical to disentangle the effect of tax design features (such as information reporting requirement) from the effect of marginal tax rates when there are joint discontinuities in both. For instance, while exemption thresholds have been widely used to analyze the impacts of wealth taxation on reported wealth, these thresholds are usually (by construction) associated with changes in reporting requirements too, complicating the interpretation of estimated elasticities and their implications for optimal policy.

Our results are consistent with a simple model of taxpayers behavior with dynamic misreporting. In this model, taxpayers value being in the simplified regime and try to remain in it by misreporting their wealth. Misreporting is costly and the cost is increasing in the amount of misreporting and decreasing in the reported growth rate from year to year. This is because when considering a stock, rather than a flow of income, changes in reported amounts—especially decreases—can raise a flag for the tax authority. Forward-looking taxpayers anticipate how their future ease of misreporting is affected by their current misreporting of wealth, leading to “misreporting smoothing.” This highlights the inter-temporal nature of wealth misreporting, and rationalizes why even taxpayers far below the threshold may engage in misreporting in anticipation.

There are several reasons why taxpayers may value being in the simplified regime, for instance because of lower hassle costs or reduced privacy concerns. If the simplified reporting reduced the burden of filing wealth taxes or the privacy concern associated with it, some taxpayers who would otherwise have remained below the wealth exemption threshold should be enticed to cross it after the reform. We find no support for this mechanism in our context. We show that allowing taxpayers to fill a simple tax return did not induce more taxpayers to enter the wealth tax reporting. Instead, misreporting around the exemption threshold remained substantial and at a similar level to that under the previous detailed reporting regime. Our findings thus indicate that the ease of misreporting may be the most important reason why taxpayers value the simplified regime. When taxpayers do not need to report a detailed breakdown of their portfolio, they may feel it is easier to hide specific assets or to report incorrect amounts, which leads to persistently higher under-

reporting of wealth in the low-information regime.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the literature. In Section 3 we describe the institutional framework and the administrative tax data we use. Section 4 provides graphical evidence of the effect of information reporting requirements vs. tax rates on reported wealth. We then present our dynamic bunching and difference-in-differences results in Section 5 before studying mechanisms in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 Related Literature

2.1 Literature on Tax Base Elasticities, Tax Design, and Tax Compliance

Our paper first relates to the literature on tax base elasticities and tax design. In seminal contributions, [Slemrod and Kopczuk \(2002\)](#) and [Keen and Slemrod \(2017\)](#) theoretically emphasize that behavioral responses to tax rates are closely related to the design of the tax system. Our contribution to this literature is to uncover and quantify the role of information reporting policies on tax base elasticities. Information policies are a key dimension of the design of any tax, and are especially important for wealth taxes which have historically been based on self-reported wealth. The combination of an unusual natural quasi-experiment with high-quality administrative wealth tax microdata allows us to overcome the traditional identification challenges in this field.

Our paper complements studies of how other dimensions of tax design, most importantly enforcement strategies, interact with tax base elasticities. [Fack and Landais \(2016\)](#) study a 1983 reform that tightened reporting requirements to claim charitable deductions for the individual income tax in France; they find that it led to a substantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. [Kopczuk \(2005\)](#) shows that elasticities with respect to US federal income tax rates depend on deductions available and cannot be considered as structural parameters. Recently, [Basri et al. \(2021\)](#) study the effect of a tax administration reform in Indonesia and find some evidence of a lower corporate income tax base elasticity for firms subject to stronger monitoring.

Our paper is also closely related to the literature on tax enforcement and tax evasion (e.g., [Kleven et al., 2011](#); [Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018](#); [Pomeranz, 2015](#); [Bachas and Soto, 2021](#); [Harju et al., 2019](#); [Brockmeyer et al., 2021](#)). A challenge in this literature is to identify

tax evasion responses by wealthy taxpayers. These responses matter a great deal because the wealthy account for a large fraction of tax revenues, but they are hard to estimate due to the lack of exogenous variations in enforcement at the top of the distribution.² The reform we exploit affects taxpayers at roughly the 99.5th percentile of the wealth distribution in France, allowing us to break ground on this issue. We show that behavioral responses are highly heterogeneous: 15% of affected taxpayers respond strongly to the switch to a low-information regime (by significantly increasing evasion) while 85% do not respond.

We also add to the literature on tax simplicity. This body of work mostly focuses on low-income taxpayers, as simplified tax returns tend to be available at the lower end of the income distribution.³ By contrast, we focus on behavioral responses to simplified tax regimes in the wealth tax context, which informs the ongoing debate about wealth taxation. In our setting, for plausible parameter values the reduced private filing costs for taxpayers benefiting from the simplified regime are far outweighed by the increase in social costs stemming from lower tax compliance. This result highlights the potential costs of simplification reform in the context of the taxation of top-end wealth.

2.2 Literature on Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes

Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on behavioral responses to annual wealth taxes, reviewed in [Scheuer and Slemrod \(2021\)](#). The sharp variations introduced by the French institutional setting allow us to disentangle behavioral responses to marginal tax rates (kinks), exemption thresholds, and information reporting requirements. We provide the first estimates of behavioral responses to changes in information reporting requirements, keeping everything else (included discontinuities in tax rates) constant. We also provide what are to our knowledge the first estimates of bunching responses at pure kinks (i.e., changes in marginal tax rates above the exemption threshold). Our findings suggest that a large part of the behavioral responses to wealth tax exemption thresholds estimated in previous studies may be driven by responses to reporting requirements

²Exceptions include [Johannesen et al. \(2020\)](#) who document reductions in tax evasion following improvements in information reporting in the United States; see also [Alstadsæter et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Guyton et al. \(2021\)](#).

³[Aghion et al. \(2017\)](#) study how French self-employed individuals react to tax simplicity and find that entrepreneurs bunch at the threshold to benefit from simplified income tax regimes. Other recent studies include [Benzarti \(2020\)](#), [Zwick \(2021\)](#), [Colombo et al. \(2014\)](#), [De Neve et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Blesse et al. \(2019\)](#).

rather than changes in the marginal tax rate.

2.3 Literature on Bunching

Methodologically, we contribute to the literature on bunching at kink points first proposed by [Saez \(2010\)](#) and extended to notches by [Kleven and Waseem \(2013\)](#). The standard bunching method has been widely applied to many contexts; see [Kleven \(2016\)](#) for a review. As discussed in the literature, bunching estimates rely on parametric assumptions ([Blomquist et al., 2021](#)) and may capture short-term responses, frictions, and avoidance as opposed to true, long-term responses to taxes ([Jakobsen et al., 2020](#)).⁴ [Marx \(2018\)](#) emphasizes that static bunching methodologies can be biased but could be improved by using longitudinal datasets.

We develop a new bunching estimator where we compare the wealth growth rates of taxpayers with different levels of pre-reform wealth. A novelty of our method is to build a counterfactual distribution using placebo wealth growth rates of taxpayers with different pre-reform wealth levels. We do not need parametric assumptions to build our estimator, and thus do not need to assume similar preferences in our treatment and control groups ([Blomquist et al., 2021](#)). Our methodology also allows us to map our bunching estimator to the causal identification framework of [Angrist et al. \(1996\)](#). This enables us to estimate the local average treatment effect of the reduction in reporting requirement and the share of taxpayers who took advantage of this reduction, i.e., the compliers.⁵ The dynamic dimension of our setting also allows us to verify whether our bunching estimator captures long-term real responses to changes in the wealth tax schedule. We show that the intent-to-treat effect estimated in a standard difference-in-differences design has similar magnitude and is not statistically different from the coefficient derived from our dynamic bunching methodology.

⁴[Pollinger \(2021\)](#) shows that bunching can capture participation and intensive margin response, and develops an alternative bunching estimator to measure these responses.

⁵Closely related to our contribution, [Diamond and Persson \(2016\)](#) and [Chen et al. \(2021\)](#) also derive estimators to distinguish intent-to-treat from local average treatment effects, but must rely on parametric assumptions when building their counterfactuals.

3 Institutional Framework and Data

3.1 Wealth Taxation in France

The *impôt sur la fortune* (ISF) was an annual progressive wealth tax implemented in France from 1989 to 2017.⁶ It applied to French tax residents with net taxable wealth above an exemption threshold. This exemption threshold varied over time, as we discuss below, but it was always located above the 97th percentile of the household wealth distribution during our period of study. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the features of the French wealth tax. We summarize here the key elements needed for our analysis.

Tax base. The base of the ISF was net wealth above an exemption threshold. Net wealth was defined as financial plus non-financial assets minus debts and was assessed as of January 1st of year t for fiscal year t . Thus, in calendar year t , taxpayers filled out income tax returns and paid income tax for income earned in $t - 1$, but filled out wealth tax returns and paid tax on wealth as of January 1st of year t . For French tax residents, the base included assets held worldwide.⁷ The exemption threshold ranged from around €800,000 in 2010 (roughly the top 2% of the wealth distribution) to €1.3 million after 2011 (roughly the top 1% of the wealth distribution).

As detailed in Appendix B, several major exemptions reduced the tax base. First and most importantly, the business wealth of owner-managers was exempt. Owner-managers were defined as sole proprietors and individuals owning 25% or more of the stock of a company, including listed firms. In addition, groups of individuals (e.g., family members or business partners) who collectively owned significant stakes in a company (of at least 20% or 34% depending on the business) could exclude three-quarters of the corresponding assets from their net wealth. Thus in practice, the vast majority of private business wealth and large stakes in public companies were exempt. Second, 30% of the value of a household's primary residence could be deducted from the tax base. Third, artwork was exempt.

Tax credits for the wealth tax are also explained in Appendix B but are not relevant for the

⁶The first progressive annual wealth tax in France was implemented in 1982 and called the *impôt sur les grandes fortunes*. It was abolished in 1986 after the election of a new government. In 2018, the ISF was abolished and replaced by a progressive tax on real estate wealth, called the *impôt sur la fortune immobilière*.

⁷Non-residents could be liable for the wealth tax under certain conditions, as detailed in Appendix B. Non-residents represent 3% of our estimation sample. We exclude them from our benchmark analysis; results are unchanged if we include them.

analysis in this paper. They concern investments in small and medium enterprises, charitable giving, and a tax ceiling mechanism capping the amount of wealth tax owed by taxpayers as a fraction of their taxable income.

Tax schedule. The ISF had a progressive tax schedule, with five to six tax brackets over our study period, 2007 to 2017. For instance, marginal tax rates ranged from 0.5% for the first bracket to 1.5% for the top bracket in 2013. Panel B of Figure 1 depicts the marginal tax rates in each bracket from 2007 to 2017.

Reporting requirements. Wealth was self-reported by households, who were responsible for assessing whether their net wealth exceeded the exemption threshold. Taxpayers with wealth below the threshold did not have to file a wealth tax return, nor did they have to report their wealth to tax authorities anywhere else. As detailed in Appendix Table B.2, all taxpayers above the threshold had (until the reform we study in this paper) to file a wealth tax return listing the value of each component of their net taxable wealth such as primary residence, other real estate, stocks, bank deposits, etc.

There was no third-party reporting of assets to the tax authority and wealth tax returns were not pre-populated: taxpayers had to self-report each component of their net wealth. However, the tax administration provided detailed guidelines for taxpayers to properly estimate the value of their assets; the general principle was to use prevailing market prices. If noncompliance was uncovered upon audit, taxpayers could be required to file amended returns up to 10 years backwards.⁸

3.2 Wealth Tax Reforms Studied in This Paper

Changes to reporting requirements. Two reforms to information reporting requirements were implemented in 2011–2013. The first, enacted in June 2011, introduced a simplified wealth tax return for taxpayers with taxable wealth below €3 million.⁹ In this simplified return, taxpayers only report total net and gross taxable wealth, as well as three specific tax credits (charitable giving,

⁸Amended returns had generally to be filed up to 3 years backwards, but this was extended to 6 years in case the tax administration found an asset had not been reported at all (e.g., a taxpayer failed to report owning a secondary home, or failed to file a return), and to 10 years in case of unreported foreign assets (e.g., a taxpayer failed to report an offshore bank account).

⁹Because the reform was passed in June, the deadline for filing a 2011 wealth tax return was postponed from June to the end of September.

direct and indirect investment in small and medium-size enterprises). We call this threshold the “simplification threshold.” Households below that threshold do not have to send any justification of their self-assessed wealth to the tax authority, but must keep all information and intermediary steps used to estimate their net wealth.¹⁰ The 2011 reform also increased the wealth tax exemption threshold from €0.8 million to €1.3 million, which reduced the number of households subject to the tax by a factor of about two.

After the election of a new president in May 2012, a second reform was passed in July 2012. This reform lowered the simplification threshold from €3 million to €2.57 million, effective in 2013. Panel A of Figure 1 summarizes the changes in information reporting requirements over our period of study. Figure A.1 illustrates the simplification reform by showing copies of the pre-reform detailed wealth tax return (left panel) and the post-reform simplified wealth tax return (right panel). Appendix Table B.2 summarizes the changes in reporting requirements item by item. The 2013 reduction of the simplification threshold is particularly helpful for our purposes, because there is no other policy change occurring around this specific wealth level in the years before, in, or after 2013. This reform therefore allows us to estimate the effect of simplified reporting requirements on reported wealth.

Tax schedule changes. In addition to changes in reporting requirements, our period of study also features a number of changes in the tax schedule. Panel B of Figure 1 summarizes the different rate and bracket changes over the period 2007 to 2017. Among these reforms, we analyze the effect of the increase in the wealth tax exemption threshold from €0.8 million in 2010 to €1.3 million in 2011. This allows us to contrast behavioral responses at a pure marginal rate discontinuity (in 2010, the marginal tax rate jumps from 0.55% to 0.75% at €1.3 million, but nothing else changes at the threshold) vs. a marginal rate plus information discontinuity (in 2011, not only does the marginal rate increase at €1.3 million, but taxpayers must also file a tax return since they become subject to the tax).

To summarize, although several changes to wealth taxation happened between 2007 and 2017, we focus in this paper on two salient reforms that are not confounded by changes in other features of the tax, thus facilitating interpretation: the reduction of the simplification threshold from €3

¹⁰Starting in 2012, the simplified form could also be filed as part of the income tax return.

million to €2.57 million in 2013; the increase of the exemption threshold to €1.3 million in 2011.

3.3 Administrative Tax Data and Summary Statistics

Our analysis builds on a new administrative longitudinal dataset from the French tax administration (*Direction Générale des Finances Publiques* or DGFIP). This dataset contains the universe of wealth tax and income tax returns from 2006 to 2017. We can track individual taxpayers across years thanks to their unique tax identifier. For taxpayers subject to the wealth tax, the tax returns include the amount of gross and net taxable wealth, tax credits, and for taxpayers filing a regular (i.e., not simplified) return, assets broken down by type, itemized tax-exempt assets, and itemized tax deductions; see Appendix Table B.2. We also have detailed data on all entries of the income tax returns, including all capital and labor incomes, and basic demographic information.

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 reports summary statistics for taxpayers liable to the wealth tax in 2010 and 2012. The lower number of taxpayers in col. 2 relative to col. 1 is due to the increase in the exemption threshold in 2011. Wealth taxpayers are on average 66 years old. About 67% of them are retirees and around 70% are landlords. Their taxable income is on average €90,000 in 2010 and (following the increase in the exemption threshold) €120,000 in 2012. Their average wealth is €1.8 million in 2010 and €2.7 million in 2012. Figure A.3 plots the composition of gross taxable wealth by net wealth level (in the €790,000 to €3 million range) in 2010, the year before the simplification reform. Assets can be divided into financial assets, primary residence, and other real estate. Financial assets are always the largest category, but their importance increases from less than 40% for taxpayers with €790,000 in wealth to 60% for taxpayers with €3 million in net taxable wealth. Real estate assets other than primary homes account for a roughly constant share (30%) of taxable wealth. The value of the primary residence is around 30% at the lowest wealth levels and decreases to just 10% for taxpayers with €3 million in net taxable wealth.

4 Graphical Evidence on the Effect of Tax Rate Discontinuities, the Exemption Threshold, and the Simplification Threshold

This section presents graphical evidence of behavioral responses to three types of discontinuities in the schedule and design of the wealth tax: discontinuities in marginal tax rates, the exemption threshold, and the simplification threshold.

4.1 Bunching at Marginal Tax Rate Discontinuities

We start by graphically studying behavioral responses to changes in marginal wealth tax rates, which introduce “kinks” in the budget set of taxpayers. From 1989 to 2017, taxable net wealth was taxed at a progressive schedule above the exemption threshold (Panel B of Figure 1). To study behavioral responses to marginal rate changes, we focus on year 2010 in the main text—the year before the simplified filing regime was introduced, so that all taxpayers file the same detailed wealth tax return. Similar results hold for all years and across all tax brackets (see Figures A.5-A.7).

Figure 2 shows the responses to kinks in the wealth tax schedule in 2010. In each panel, we focus on a given tax bracket threshold (represented by the vertical red line). Each threshold is associated to a different percentage point increase in marginal tax rates: a 0.2 percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate at €1.2 million in Panel A; a 0.25 pp. increase at €2.53 million in Panel B; a 0.3 pp. increase at €3.9 million in Panel C; and a 0.35 pp. increase at €7.6 million. We group households into bins of taxable wealth and plot the bin counts around the kinks. The figure reveals that the distribution of taxpayers below and above all tax kinks is smooth.¹¹ Figure A.10 shows that the distribution of growth rates around the tax brackets is also smooth.

The lack of significant bunching at the kinks suggests that households do not massively manipulate their reported taxable wealth to stay below tax kinks. This finding is somewhat surprising: given the low level of wealth tax enforcement and lack of third-party reporting, one might expect stronger responses to discontinuities in tax rates, which are often interpreted as avoidance or evasion responses (Jakobsen et al., 2020). But as also noted in Jakobsen et al. (2020), the lack

¹¹This is also true for all other years and at all other marginal tax rates threshold as seen in Figures A.5-A.7.

of bunching at kinks does not mean that there are no behavioral responses to the wealth tax, or even no avoidance. For example, the whole distributions may be shifted to the left relative to a counterfactual of lower tax rates.

4.2 Bunching at the Exemption Threshold

Next, we study behavioral responses at the exemption threshold. Below that threshold, households pay no tax on wealth; above, they pay a marginal tax rate of 0.55% in 2010.

Panel A of Figure 3 groups households into bins of €10,000 of taxable wealth and plots the bin counts around the exemption threshold of €790,000 for each year in which this threshold was into force, 2006 to 2010.¹² Because households below the exemption threshold do not file wealth tax returns, we do not observe the distribution of wealth below €790,000. However, a pointed dome-shaped distribution, as in Panel A, suggests a missing mass just above the exemption threshold and indicates that many taxpayers who have wealth just a bit higher than the threshold level choose to “bunch” below the exemption threshold and to not file a wealth tax return. The distribution of taxpayers is distorted above the exemption threshold in all years and this distortion increases over time.

Because the exemption threshold of €790,000 remained constant between 2006 and 2010, one may nevertheless worry that the lack of mass in the wealth distribution documented in Panel A is due to other factors affecting this particular segment of the wealth distribution. To bolster the identification of the behavioral responses to the exemption threshold, we exploit the 2011 increase in the exemption threshold to €1.3 million. Before this reform, in 2009 and 2010, the €1.3 million threshold was a pure tax kink, not an exemption threshold. Panel B of Figure 3 shows that, consistent with the findings from Figure 2, there is no discontinuity in the wealth distribution at that wealth level in 2009 and 2010. In Panel C, we plot the distribution in year 2011. There is a clear drop in the number of taxpayers just above €1.3 million as compared to 2010, suggestive of a substantial share of households attempting to remain just below the exemption threshold. The distribution of taxpayers higher up in the wealth distribution, where declared taxable wealth is less likely to be affected by the 2011 reform, is similar in 2010 and 2011. Panel D shows the

¹²The exemption threshold varied marginally around €790,000: it was €760,000 in 2006, €770,000 in 2008, and €790,000 in 2009 and 2010. To simplify things, we round these values at €790,000.

distribution of taxpayers around the new €1.3 million exemption threshold for several years after the 2011 reform. The distortion in the distribution of taxpayers is persistent and grows over time.

In addition to introducing a change in wealth tax rates, the exemption threshold is associated with a change in information disclosure requirements, as taxpayers below the exemption threshold do not report any information on their wealth to tax authorities. The distortion caused by the exemption threshold combined with the lack of distortions around kinks in marginal tax rates suggest that it is not responses to the marginal tax rate change that drive the behavioral responses. Because the missing mass of taxpayers above the €1.3 million threshold only appeared when this threshold became associated with a change in reporting requirements in 2011, discontinuities in information disclosure seem to play a key role in behavioral responses to the wealth tax.

4.3 Behavioral Responses at the Simplification Threshold

Last, we provide graphical evidence of behavioral responses to the introduction and the lowering of the simplification threshold.

Bunching in wealth at the simplification thresholds. In Figure 4, we group households into bins of €10,000 of taxable wealth and plot the bin counts around discontinuities in reporting requirements, depicted by the vertical dotted line. Panel A shows that the distribution of taxpayers around €3.0 million was smooth in 2010, but an excess mass appears in 2011 when the threshold becomes the simplification threshold. Panel B shows that the discontinuity is even larger in 2012. The larger response in 2012 could be due to the fact that the simplification reform was only announced in May 2011 and many taxpayers had already submitted their 2011 wealth tax returns prior to the reform.

In 2013, the simplification threshold was reduced to €2.57 million. Panel C shows that the distribution of taxpayers around €2.57 million was smooth in 2012. In 2013, the €2.57 million threshold becomes a simplification threshold and a large excess mass appears below the threshold. Meanwhile, bunching at the previous €3.0 million simplification threshold disappears: the excess mass moves with the changes in reporting requirements. Panel D shows that bunching at the simplification threshold persists and grows over time. The reduction in reporting requirement has long-term dynamic effects on reported wealth.

To quantify misreporting at the simplification threshold, we implement a standard static bunching approach following [Kleven \(2016\)](#), described in details in Appendix C and with results reported in Table B.3. The excess mass around the €2.57 million threshold increases from 8% of the counterfactual distribution at the kink in 2010 to 270% times the counterfactual in 2013, and continues to increase by another 60% until 2017.

Because there was no excess mass below €2.57 million before 2013 (when there was only a discontinuity in marginal tax rates at that wealth level, but not in information reporting requirements), bunching responses after 2013 appear to be entirely due to the change in reporting requirements. Our findings also suggest that wealthy taxpayers quickly learn about and adjust to wealth tax design changes, which stands in contrast to other types of taxpayers such as small business entrepreneurs ([Aghion et al., 2017](#)).

Average growth rates around the simplification thresholds. To further document behavioral responses to the simplification threshold, we report changes in average reported wealth growth rates around this threshold. We bin taxpayers with wealth between €2.0 and €3.5 million by bins of wealth of €20,000, and compute average annual wealth growth rates by bins. Figure 5 reports the results for three sub-periods: 2006–2010 (before the simplification reform), 2011–2012, and 2013–2017 (post-reform). Before the introduction of the simplification threshold in 2011, growth rates were roughly constant across wealth levels (Panel A). There was no visible discontinuity around the (future) simplification thresholds.¹³ Panel B shows that, after the introduction of the simplified returns in 2011, there is an immediate distortion in growth rates around the €3.0 million simplification threshold. For taxpayers with €2.0 to €3.0 million in wealth, growth rates decrease as we move closer to €3.0 million. For taxpayers with €3.0 to €3.5 million in wealth, growth rates are constant and similar to those of taxpayers located far below the threshold. When the simplification threshold is reduced to €2.57 million in 2013, the discontinuity in wealth growth rates moves to that new threshold (Panel C).¹⁴ Average growth rates decrease up until the €2.57

¹³While wealth growth rates tend to increase with the level of wealth across broad ranges of wealth (for instance, when comparing households in the top 10% and those in the top 1%), the taxpayers depicted in this figure are in the same percentile of the wealth distribution (between p99 and p99.1)

¹⁴For the distribution of growth rates around the simplification threshold year by year, see Figure A.12. This figure plots the reduction in growth rates of taxpayers below the simplification threshold normalized by the growth rates of those above €3.0 million to account for the fact that average growth rates differ from year to year. Figure A.11

million threshold; the discontinuity in wealth growth rates around €3.0 million disappears in 2013 and in subsequent years. The new simplification threshold is immediately salient and taxpayers quickly adjust their reporting behavior.

Distribution of growth rates around the simplification thresholds. Next, we study heterogeneity in growth rates at each taxable wealth level. Figure A.13 reports the share of taxpayers by quartiles of wealth growth, where quartiles are defined based on the sample of households with taxable wealth well above €3.0 million. The proportion of taxpayers with low growth rates (in the bottom quartile) increases right below the threshold and then falls above the threshold. The share of taxpayers with high growth rates (third or top quartile) sharply declines before the threshold, while the share in the second quartile increases. Taxpayers with high growth rates become rarer as one moves closer to the threshold. Figure A.14 shows the share of taxpayers with zero or negligible growth (growth rates between 0% and 0.1%). Whether in the cross-section (Panel A) or for cohorts defined in the years 2012–2016 (Panels B to F), there is a significant spike in the share reporting a zero growth rate right below the threshold.

Summary of graphical evidence. To summarize, we find no bunching at thresholds where only tax rates change (pure tax thresholds), but substantial bunching at information discontinuity thresholds (exemption and simplification thresholds). Furthermore, we find clear reductions in wealth growth rates below the simplification threshold. The immediate and sharp responses to changes in reporting requirements suggest that they are avoidance and misreporting responses rather than real (savings or investment) ones. Overall, these facts suggest that reporting requirements play a key role in driving behavioral responses to the wealth tax.

5 Dynamic Responses to Changes in Reporting Requirements

In this section, we exploit the panel dimension of our dataset to study the dynamic effects of reporting discontinuities. We focus on the lowering of the simplification threshold to €2.57 million in 2013, a clean variation in reporting requirements that kept tax liabilities unchanged.


reproduces Figure 5 by adding year fixed effects in order to correct for potential mean differences in years when pooling all observations. The results are unchanged.

To study the effect of this reform, we keep households for which we can observe growth rates at least once before and once after the reform (this reduces sample size by 9%). Second, we drop households who experience a change in family status such as a divorce or marriage (10.4% of the initial sample). Last, we exclude observations with extreme wealth growth rates (above the 99th or below the first percentile of each annual growth rate distribution, another 2% of the sample). In total, we drop 19.8% of the raw sample. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the full raw sample and of our analysis sample for the pre-reform years 2010 and 2012. Demographic characteristics, income composition, wealth tax payments and tax rates are similar in the two samples.

5.1 Motivation for a Dynamic Bunching Approach

Even absent behavioral responses, we would expect wealth to grow because of saving and valuation effects. A “classic” difference-in-differences bunching approach that considers the levels of wealth from year to year may therefore be misleading, unless it accounts for some normal growth rate. To address this issue, we study changes in the *distribution of wealth growth rates*.

We define groups of taxpayers based on their pre-reform distance to the simplification threshold of €2,570K. These groups are depicted in the diagram below. All households with taxable wealth close to the €2,570K threshold in 2012 are potentially treated by the change in reporting requirements in 2013. To capture potential heterogeneity in the responses, we split the treated group with taxable wealth in the [€2,360K, €2,710K[range into five treated groups by bins of €70K euros of taxable wealth.¹⁵ We select as our control group taxpayers with wealth between €2,710K and €2,850K in 2012. These taxpayers are simultaneously far enough above the €2,570K threshold and below the previous simplification threshold of €3,000K. Panel C of Figure 5 confirms that the wealth growth rates for these taxpayers exhibit no discontinuity.



¹⁵We pick this bin size to allow for sufficiently many treated groups (five), but also not slice the data too thinly and introduce excessive noise.

Figure A.16 plots the distribution of growth rates in our treatment and control groups, before and after the change in reporting requirements in 2013. Panel A shows that before the reform, all treated and control groups had similar distributions of growth rates (from 2011 to 2012). Panel B reveals that the distribution of wealth growth rates in the treatment group experienced a substantial change after the reform. For households located just below the simplification threshold in 2012, a spike in wealth growth rates appears around zero, mirrored by a missing mass of taxpayers with small positive wealth growth rates (between 1% and 5%). This is consistent with the intuition that taxpayers located very close to the simplification threshold in 2012 and who want to remain below the simplification threshold need to report a wealth level in 2013 that is almost identical to their wealth level in 2012, i.e., a wealth growth rate close to zero. The wealth of these taxpayers would otherwise potentially have grown at 1%–5% that year.

For treated taxpayers located further below the simplification threshold in 2012, the figure also reveals a substantial spike in wealth growth rates compared to the pre-reform year. The spike in wealth growth rate is, however, not centered around zero, but rather around small positive wealth growth rates. This suggests that households further away below the simplification threshold can report small positive wealth growth rates and still manage to remain right below the simplification threshold. This spike in the distribution of wealth growth rates induces a corresponding missing mass in the number of taxpayers with positive wealth growth rates that are between 5% and 10%. Conversely, for treated taxpayers located just above the threshold in 2012, there is a spike in growth rates centered around small negative rates. These taxpayers must report negative wealth growth rates if they wish to locate below the simplification threshold. For this group of taxpayers, the wealth growth rate distribution after the reform features a corresponding missing mass around zero and small positive growth rates.

Figure A.16 further sheds light on the nature of behavioral responses. We do not see a uniform downward shift in the distribution of growth rates for all households below the simplification threshold nor a spike at zero growth rates for all these groups. The different shapes of the growth rate distributions mean that we cannot directly compare across groups, unless we find a proper way to “normalize” these distributions, which is at the core of our dynamic bunching approach.

5.2 Dynamic Bunching Method

We develop an original dynamic bunching approach based on a causal effect framework as in [Angrist et al. \(1996\)](#). This method allows us to estimate: i) the growth rate reduction at the grotto study the effects of the simplification thresholdup level (an intent-to-treat or ITT effect); ii) the proportion of bunchers, i.e., the share of taxpayers who react to the 2,570K simplification threshold (the compliers); iii) the growth rate reduction among the bunchers (a local average treatment effect or LATE).

We proceed in three steps. First, we define and compute “normalized growth rates” around the simplification threshold for treated groups. Second, we use the control group to estimate an appropriate counterfactual distribution of normalized growth rates. Third, we present a causal effect framework based on the comparison of the observed and counterfactual distributions to estimate the ITT, the share of compliers, and the LATE.

5.2.1 Normalized growth rates

For taxpayers affected by the simplification threshold, we define the normalized growth rate as the growth rate in excess of growth rate that would make individuals cross the simplification threshold:

$$\tilde{g}_{i,t,2570} = \underbrace{\frac{W_{i,t+1} - W_{i,t}}{W_{i,t}}}_{\text{actual growth rate}} - \underbrace{\frac{2570K - W_{i,t}}{W_{i,t}}}_{\text{growth rate needed to be at threshold}} = \frac{W_{i,t+1} - 2570K}{W_{i,t}} \quad (1)$$

If $\tilde{g}_{i,t,2570}$ is zero, individual i locates exactly at the simplification threshold. When $\tilde{g}_{i,t,2570}$ is negative, this means that i locates below the 2,570K threshold. For instance, $\tilde{g}_{i,t,2570} = -0.015$ means that the individual reported a wealth growth rate 1.5 percentage points lower than the growth rate that would have allowed her to locate exactly at the simplification threshold. Henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, we abstract for the subscript t and label the normalized growth rate as $\tilde{g}_{i,2570}$. To generalize our notation, we denote $\tilde{g}_{i,S}$ the normalized growth rate defined relative to the threshold S for individual i with taxable wealth $W_{i,t}$ in year t . We define $f(\tilde{g}_{i,S})$ as the distribution of $\tilde{g}_{i,S}$ and $f_{T_j}(\tilde{g}_{i,S})$ as the distribution of $\tilde{g}_{i,S}$ for taxpayers belonging to one of our treated group T_j .

Figure 6 illustrates why the concept of a normalized growth rate allows us to resolve the issues

highlighted above in Figure A.16. Panel A depicts the distributions of normalized growth rates in 2013 for all the groups below the threshold. While the growth rate distributions have different means and shapes, the normalized growth rate distributions are directly comparable to one another. They exhibit clear excess mass just below 0 and missing mass right above zero (taxpayers with these small positive growth rates would end up just above the simplification threshold in 2013). There is excess mass just below the zero normalized growth rates, and bunching decreases with distance to the threshold. For instance, the group “very far below” the threshold seems only barely affected by the threshold. Panel B focuses on the groups above the threshold; results are similar. The normalized growth rate distributions are now shifted toward positive values with excess mass exactly at the wealth growth rates that would push these groups below the simplification threshold. The control groups’ normalized growth rate distribution appears unaffected and exhibits no discontinuity.

5.2.2 Counterfactual distribution and placebo threshold

In a second step, we use the control group to derive a counterfactual distribution for each treated group. We construct the difference between the observed growth rate of the control group and the growth rate that would make taxpayers in the control group locate at a placebo threshold. The placebo threshold needs to be at the same distance—according to some metric—from the control group as the actual simplification threshold is for each treated group. Therefore, this placebo threshold differs for each treated group considered. For any treated group $T_j = [a_j, b_j[$, the normalized growth rate of the control group C (taxpayers with wealth in the [2710K,2850K[interval in 2012) is defined as:

$$\tilde{g}_{i,c_j} = \frac{W_{i,t+1} - c_j}{W_{i,t}} \quad \text{with} \quad c_j = 2780K \times (2570K/b_j) \quad (2)$$

where c_j is the placebo threshold defined relative to each treated group T_j for individuals in the control group C . Under our benchmark assumption, the distance between the placebo threshold and the control group is the same as the difference between the treated group and the simplification threshold in percent terms.

Alternatively, the placebo threshold can be such that the distance between that threshold and

the control group is the same (in level) as the difference between the treated and control group. This amounts to using the additive form:

$$c_j = 2780K + 2570K - b_j \quad (3)$$

For instance, imagine we consider households in the treated group located with wealth in the $[2430K, 2500K[$ range in 2012. The distance between the upper bound $b = 2,500K$ of this interval and the simplification threshold is $70K (= 2,570K - b)$. To pick a placebo threshold for the control group $[2710K, 2780K[$ that is at the same distance, we need to choose $c_j = 2,780K + 70K$.

Figure A.15 shows that the additive approach yields similar results.

Identifying assumption and validation. Our identifying assumption is that control and treated groups should have the same distribution of normalized growth rates absent the reform. We explore the plausibility of this assumption with various tests. First, we define our treated and control groups in 2011 (or 2010) instead of 2012, and show in Figure 8 (or Figure A.17) that they have the same distribution of normalized growth rate in 2012 (or 2011). Second, we verify in Figure A.18 that our treated and control groups (defined in 2012) have the same distribution of growth rate in 2012 and before. Finally, our control group is not affected by the simplification threshold around 2,570K in 2013, as already showed in Panel B of Figure 6.

5.2.3 Conceptual Framework

We now provide a causal effect framework as in Angrist et al. (1996) to estimate the effects of the simplification threshold. For each treated group T_j (defined by an interval of wealth in 2012), we observe the distribution of normalized growth rates $f_{T_j}(\tilde{g}_{i,2570})$. We call bunching area or excluded range, denoted by $[a_L, a_U]$, the interval affected by the simplification threshold and where the distributions of the control and treated groups diverge. We explain how we compute the (unobserved) bounds a_L and a_U below. In the bunching area below the threshold, $[a_L, 0]$, there is an excess mass, mirrored by a corresponding missing mass in the bunching area above the threshold $[0, a_U]$. We first want to measure the impact of the 2,570K simplification threshold on the distribution f_{T_j} in the interval $[a_L, 0]$.

We define B_j as the share of bunchers in each treated group T_j :

$$B_j = \int_{a_L}^0 [f_{T_j}(\tilde{g}_{i,2570}) - f_{T_j}^{counterfactual}(\tilde{g}_{i,2570})] d\tilde{g}_{i,2570} \quad (4)$$

where $f_{T_j}^{counterfactual}(\tilde{g}_{i,2570})$ is the counterfactual distribution of the normalized growth rate in the treated group, i.e., the distribution that would arise absent the treatment. It cannot be observed directly in the data. To recover this counterfactual distribution, we use the control group's normalized growth rate distribution relative to the placebo threshold: $f_{T_j}^{counterfactual}(\tilde{g}_{i,2570}) = f_C(\tilde{g}_{i,c_j})$, with c_j the placebo cut-off adapted to the treated group T_j . The share of bunchers can then be rewritten as:

$$B_j = \int_{a_L}^0 f_{T_j}(\tilde{g}_{i,2570}) d\tilde{g}_{i,2570} - \int_{a_L}^0 f_C(\tilde{g}_{i,c_j}) d\tilde{g}_{i,c_j} \quad (5)$$

We can approximate this share of bunchers using the data by bins. Let $P_Z(a)$ be the proportion of the group Z population in a given bin a of $\tilde{g}_{i,S}$. The share of bunchers is estimated as:

$$B_j = \sum_{a=a_L}^0 [P_{T_j}(a) - P_C(a)] \quad (6)$$

Figure 7 shows the application of our dynamic bunching framework for the group just below the threshold in 2012. The distribution of normalized growth rate is plotted in blue for the treated group and in red for the control group, and the difference between the two distributions in the interval $[a_L, 0]$ identifies B_j .

Bunching range. To compute the lower and upper bounds of our bunching range, we first set the lower bound a_L visually by noting the point at which the distributions $f_C(\tilde{g}_{i,c_j})$ and $f_{T_j}(\tilde{g}_{i,S})$ begin to diverge. In our benchmark case, $a_L = -0.045$. The upper bound a_U is then chosen such that the bunching mass (blue area in Figure 7) equals the missing mass (green area in Figure 7), i.e., such that:

$$\sum_{a=a_L}^0 [P_{T_j}(a) - P_C(a)] = - \sum_{a=0}^{a_U} [P_{T_j}(a) - P_C(a)] \quad (7)$$

This leads us to set $a_U = 0.1$ and our bunching interval is therefore $[-0.045, 0.1]$.

Growth rate reduction in the treated group. We compute the average growth rate reduction at the group level $\Delta E_j(g)$ using the formula:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta E_j(g) &= E(g|T_j) - E(g|C) \\ &= \sum_{a=a_L}^{a_U} [P_{T_j}(a) \times g_{T_j}(a) - P_C(a) \times g_C(a)]\end{aligned}\quad (8)$$

where $g_Z(a)$ stands for the average growth rate for the group Z population in a given bin a . $\Delta E_j(g)$ is akin to an ITT effect. We compute it over the bunching range $[a_L, a_U]$ because the distributions are assumed to be identical (by definition of the counterfactual) outside of this range and this is verified empirically.

Growth rate reduction amongst bunchers We also compute the growth rate reduction among the bunchers $\Delta E_j(g)_B$, which can be interpreted as the LATE of the simplification threshold. We scale the average effect $\Delta E_j(g)$ by the share of bunchers:

$$\Delta E_j(g)_B = \Delta E_j(g) / B_j \quad (9)$$

We obtain standard errors using a bootstrap procedure.

5.3 Results

We now present our results using this methodology in Figure 9. Each panel displays our treatment (blue lines) and control (red lines) series, for four different treated groups (“Just below” in Panel A, “Far Below” in Panel B; “Just above” in Panel C; and “Far above” in Panel D). In each panel, we report our three key statistics of interest: the average growth rate response in the treated group (ITT), the share of bunchers, and the average growth rate response amongst bunchers (LATE). There are four main findings.

First, Figure 9 shows that lowering reporting requirements substantially distorted wealth growth

rates in a broad segment of the wealth distribution, not only for groups located right below the threshold. Groups further below or just above the threshold are also significantly affected.

Second, the average responses to the simplification threshold are smaller for groups located further away from it. The average reductions in growth rates (ITT) range from 0.47 p.p for the group Just Below and 0.44 for the group Far Below to 0.18 p.p for the group Just above, which can be compared to the average growth rate of 2.3% for the control group. These ITT estimates are similar to the ones estimated with a simple difference-in-differences strategy, as we show in Section 5.4.

Third, these responses of different groups (defined by their levels of wealth) to the simplification threshold are driven by a small subset of taxpayers. We can compute the share of taxpayers who react to the simplification threshold in each group, i.e., the share of bunchers. These shares are 14.7% taxpayers in the group Just below, 8.5% for the group Far below, 3.9% for the group Just above, and 1.4% for the group Far above. The share of bunchers thus decreases as we move away from the simplification threshold.

Among bunchers in each group, the growth rate reductions are much larger than for the average taxpayer in the group. For the group Just below, the wealth growth rate is 3.2 percentage points lower, relative to a counterfactual growth rate of 4.8%. For the group Far below, the growth rate reduction is 5.3 p.p relative to a counterfactual growth rate of 7.9%. In the group above, the reduction in the growth rate is 4.8 p.p, even though the counterfactual suggests these groups should have grown at 1.6% (they essentially report negative wealth growth).

Our analysis therefore shows that the ITT effects that would be estimated through the lens of a standard difference-in-differences approach are actually driven by a small share of taxpayers who significantly reduce their wealth growth rates in order to benefit from low information requirements when filling for the wealth tax.

Fourth, our findings indicate that the proportion of bunchers in the group located just above the wealth threshold in 2012, which stands at 3.9%, is significantly lower than for those located just below the threshold in the same year (14.7%). Similarly, the average growth rate reduction in the group just above the threshold is smaller than for the one below. What explains this asymmetry? Taxpayers above the threshold in 2012 must report a decrease in their net worth to qualify for the simplified reporting regime, whereas those below the threshold only need to report a lower

(weakly positive) growth rate. Taxpayers may worry that reporting lower taxable wealth relative to the previous year could raise suspicions from the administration and make it more likely to be audited.¹⁶ We explore issues related to the costs of evasion and avoidance in Section 6.3.

Growing responses to the threshold over time. We apply our dynamic bunching approach to subsequent cohorts, namely those defined in 2013 and 2016 (Figures A.20 and A.21). The results are similar as to those for our benchmark 2012 cohort. However, the estimated average growth reduction (ITT) is increasing over time: for taxpayers just below the threshold, the ITT almost doubles from 20% of the control group’s growth rate in 2012 to 40% in 2016. The share of bunchers in each treated group is also significantly larger for later cohorts. For instance, among taxpayers just below the threshold, the share of bunchers increases from 15% for the 2012 cohort to 24% for the 2016 cohort.

Related to our result regarding the asymmetric response of taxpayers above and below the thresholds, we can see some form of “reverse bunching” among taxpayers in the Just above groups in the 2013 and 2016 cohorts (Panels C in Figures A.20 and A.21). Relative to the control group, there is some excess mass at small positive normalized growth rates for the group Just above, as these taxpayers are reluctant to report negative enough growth rates (even if those are legitimate) to push them below the threshold out of fear of raising suspicion.

Persistence within taxpayers. How does a given taxpayer adjust to the simplification threshold over time? Figure 10 tracks the same taxpayers over time. In Panel A, left figure, we follow the cohort of taxpayers who are in the Just below group in 2012 and plot their normalized growth rate distributions in the subsequent four years (2013–2016). In Panel B, we repeat this with the cohort in the Just below group in 2014; in panel C in 2016. The first two panels show that the bunching in normalized growth rates is highly persistent within taxpayers over time. Although it is strongest in the first year (e.g., 2013 for the 2012 cohort and 2015 for the 2014 cohort) it remains sharp and large even after four years. The right figure in Panel A considers taxpayers at a given level of taxable wealth in 2012 and plots their reduction in growth rates relative to the growth rate of taxpayers above 3,000K for the subsequent four years. The normalization by the growth rate of

¹⁶This fear may be accentuated by the fact that the tax authority sends taxpayers a default empty tax form to fill out, based on their wealth in the previous year.

taxpayers further above the threshold is to account for the different growth rates of the economy in different years. Panel B repeats this analysis for the cohort defined in 2014; Panel C for the cohort defined in 2016. There is a persistently lower growth rate for taxpayers below the threshold that is attenuated over time. Together these results suggest a high persistence in the reduction of growth rates for taxpayers below the simplification threshold. Taxpayers persistently report lower wealth and pay less taxes than they would have absent the simplification threshold.

Figure 10 suggests that, although bunching is highly persistent within taxpayers over time, some taxpayers do end up crossing the threshold. Panel A of Figure 11 shows the share of taxpayers in the treatment and control groups (as defined based on their pre-reform taxable wealth in 2012) who cross the simplification threshold in 2014 as a function of their normalized growth rate from 2012 to 2013. Panel B shows the same three years later in 2016. For the control group, this share is defined relative to the placebo threshold.

Consider taxpayers in the treated group with a normalized growth rate between -2% and -1% . These are taxpayers who located right below the simplification threshold in 2013. Following our earlier analysis, there is a substantial share of bunchers in this group, i.e, individuals who intentionally adjust their growth rate in order to remain below the threshold. By contrast, taxpayers in the control group with a normalized growth rate between -2% and -1% are locating at the same relative distance from their placebo threshold and there are, by construction, no bunchers in this group. These taxpayers from the control group serve as a counterfactual for the expected probability to cross an equivalent threshold after one or three years, absent a behavioral bunching response to the simplification.

In line with our findings of substantial and persistent misreporting behavior around the 2,570K threshold, the probability that taxpayers with normalized growth rates between -2% and -1% in 2013 end up above the 2,570K threshold in 2014 (one year after the reform) is 32% in the treated group against almost 60% in the control group. Panel B shows that this effect persists over time. In 2016, three years after the reform, the probability that taxpayers in 2013 end up above the 2,570K threshold is 43% in the treated group against more than 60% in the control group. More generally, we see that taxpayers in the treated group with negative normalized growth rates in 2013 (i.e, who remain below the threshold in 2013) systematically have a lower probability of crossing the threshold than taxpayers in the control group with the same normalized growth rates. This

discrepancy persists even three years later.

Robustness check around another simplification threshold. As a robustness check, we apply our dynamic bunching analysis to the introduction of a simplified return for taxpayers above the 3,000K threshold in 2011 and 2012. We define treatment and control groups following the same methodology as before except that we focus on 3,000K instead of 2,570K as our information discontinuity. Results presented in Figure A.22 and Figure A.23 show that a significant response to the 3,000K simplification return appears in 2012. The reduction in bunchers' wealth growth rates is 4.8 percentage points for taxpayers located just below the 3,000K threshold in 2011 and 2.4 percentage points for taxpayers located far below the same year. These estimated responses are remarkably close to our baseline estimates while focusing on a different simplification threshold, in a different period. This shows that our estimates do capture behavioral responses to information discontinuities rather than responses to other potentially unobserved discontinuities that would be associated with the 2,570K threshold after 2013. In Figure A.24, we can further show that the response around the 3,000K threshold disappears in 2013, when the simplification threshold is reduced to 2,570K. Once the information discontinuity is removed in 2013, the distribution of normalized growth rates for taxpayers located just below the 3,000K threshold in 2011 aligns with the control group.

5.4 Difference-in-Differences Strategy

We now present results from a simple difference-in-differences strategy in which we track taxpayers' wealth growth rates in control versus treated groups before and after the change in reporting requirements. This allows us to compare the results from a difference-in-differences approach to our dynamic bunching method. Furthermore, by tracking taxpayers over several years, we can study persistent responses to the lower reporting requirements. We estimate the following model:

$$g_{i,t} = \frac{W_{i,t} - W_{i,t-1}}{W_{i,t-1}} = \sum_j \sum_{\substack{k=2008 \\ k \neq 2012}}^{2017} \beta_{jk} \cdot \mathbb{1}\{i \in T_j\} \times \mathbb{1}\{t = k\} + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (10)$$

where α_i is an individual fixed effect, λ_t is a year fixed effect, $\mathbb{1}\{i \in T_j\}$ is a dummy equal to

one if the individual belongs to the treated group T_j and $\mathbb{1}\{t = k\}$ is a dummy equal to one if year is year k . We set $\beta_{j,2012} = 0$ and $\lambda_{2012} = 0$ such that all estimates can be interpreted as the difference in wealth growth rates between treated and control taxpayers in year k relative to 2012. The sequence of estimates β_{jk} captures the differential evolution of wealth growth rates for households in the treated group j compared to the control group over time. They represent an intent-to-treat effect of lowering information requirements because they capture the responses of all taxpayers in the treatment group, regardless of whether they effectively react to the reform.

Results and comparison to the dynamic bunching method. We report our estimates for all treated groups in Table 2 and plot the estimated effects for the groups closest to the threshold in Figure 12, distinguishing between treated taxpayers located just below the threshold in 2012 (panel A), and those located just above (panel B). The growth rates follow the same evolution in each of the treated groups and the control group for the four years preceding the policy change. This lends support to our identifying assumption that households located far above the 2,570K threshold provide a credible counterfactual for the evolution of wealth growth rate of households located closer to the threshold. The figure shows significant and persistent reductions in growth rates or treated taxpayers located just below the 2,570K threshold in 2012 (equal to 0.6–0.8 percentage points in each of the four years following the 2013 reform). This magnitude is equivalent to 25–30% of the control group growth rate. For households located just above the 2,570K threshold in 2012, we find a much lower and non statistically significant effect. Consistent with our dynamic bunching approach, the bulk of the response to the change in reporting requirements comes from households located below the simplification threshold.

Table 3 compares the estimates of the ITT effects in the dynamic bunching approach and the standard difference-in-differences for the year 2013. The estimated ITT effects are consistent and not statistically significantly different. However, the standard errors are four times smaller when using the dynamic bunching approach. We find significant effects for all treated groups with the dynamic bunching approach but only for the group Just below using the difference-in-difference approach.¹⁷

¹⁷The higher precision of the dynamic bunching approach can be explained as follows. Outside the excluded range, average growth rates by bins are similar between control and treated groups. However, these growth rates have wide variation. By focusing only on observations in the excluded range for the estimation, the dynamic bunching estimates

6 Mechanisms and Discussion

In this section, we study the mechanisms through which taxpayers substantially and persistently reduce their wealth growth rates following the lowering of reporting requirements.

6.1 Pre-Reform Differences Between Treated and Control Groups

We first seek to understand whether bunchers (i.e., compliers) differ from other taxpayers in terms of assets, occupation, and income composition. However, we do not know whether any given individual taxpayer is a buncher. As Figure 7 showed, taxpayers in the treated group and in the control group have different distributions of normalized growth rates. The treated group is made of “always takers,” i.e., taxpayers who would have a given normalized growth rate even absent the simplification threshold and compliers (taxpayers who only exhibit a given wealth growth because of the threshold). “Always takers” correspond to taxpayers who would have been above the threshold irrespective of the reform, and “compliers” to taxpayers who would have been above the threshold absent the reform but, due to the reform, locate themselves below the threshold. Among taxpayers in the treated group in the bunching area below the threshold, there is a larger share of bunchers. For instance, at normalized growth rates of -1%, the share of bunchers in the treated group is 40%. Therefore, we compare the characteristics of treated taxpayers with normalized growth rates in 2013 of, say, -1% to the characteristics of control group taxpayers with that same normalized growth rate in 2013. Under the assumption that taxpayers who are always-takers in the treated group have the same characteristics as taxpayers in the control group with the same normalized growth rate, any differences between the treated and control group at a given normalized growth rate can be attributed to the compliers.

We start with comparing the pre-reform characteristics (in 2010) of the treated and control groups. In Figure A.25, we plot the 2010 share of housing wealth (Panel A), financial assets (Panel B), liabilities (Panel C), and primary residence (Panel D) in taxpayers’ total taxable wealth, for the treated and control group, by bins of 2013 normalized growth rates. If bunchers were different in terms of asset composition and had, say, a higher share of a given asset in 2010, we would expect to see higher shares of that asset in the treated group around normalized growth rates equal to -1%.

the same ITT as the difference-in-differences approach but with less noise.

We may also expect to see a corresponding lower share of those assets for treated taxpayers with normalized growth rates of 1%. We do not detect any such differences between the treated and control groups.

We repeat the same analysis as in Figure A.25, focusing on differences in occupations (Figure A.26) and income composition (Figure A.27). We find that before the reform, treated taxpayers with normalized growth rates around -1% had similar occupations, received the same type of income, and claimed similar levels of tax credits, compared to taxpayers in the control group at these normalized growth rates. Bunchers do not significantly differ along these characteristics.

6.2 Post-reform Differences Between Treated and Control Groups

6.2.1 Are responses to low reporting requirements associated with lower income after the reform?

A key benefit of the link between the wealth tax data and income tax returns is that we can investigate whether the effective change in reported taxable wealth following the 2013 reform goes hand in hand with a change in labor and capital income. If the lower reported taxable wealth is driven by real effects, we would expect to see a corresponding fall in capital income and/or labor income (through savings). However, Figure 13, shows that this is not the case. The figure shows the evolution between 2010 and 2017 of different types of incomes and tax rates for the subsample of the control group and the treated group “Just Below” (as defined in 2012) who have a normalized growth rate just below zero (-0.01), i.e., who are in the bunching area below the threshold. Recall that, in the treated group, there is a large share of bunchers at these normalized growth rates. The figure shows that taxable income and the shares of financial income, real estate income, and self-employed income all evolved similarly for these two groups, before and after the change in reporting requirements. Thus, while taxpayers who respond to the reporting requirements significantly reduce their reported taxable wealth, we do not see any corresponding change in their capital and labor incomes. Furthermore, Panels E and F show that there is no difference in the effective tax rates paid by these groups, either before or after tax credits. This suggests that behavioral responses to low reporting requirements capture avoidance or misreporting rather than real responses.

6.2.2 Are responses to low reporting requirements driven by misreporting of specific assets?

We then try to identify the categories of taxable wealth which are adjusted by taxpayers *after* the change in reporting requirements by studying the portfolio compositions of different groups after the implementation of the simplified tax returns.

The main challenge is that taxpayers below the simplification threshold after 2013 do not report detailed asset compositions. Our strategy is therefore to focus on taxpayers who cross the simplification threshold at some point during the 2014 to 2017 period (as highlighted in Figure 11). To understand what is driving taxpayers out of the simplified regime, we then decompose wealth growth rate by assets type for the treated group taxpayers that cross the threshold one year after the reform and for the control group taxpayers who cross the placebo threshold. Like before, we compare the treated and control group of taxpayers "Just Below" (as defined in 2012) by level of normalized growth rate from 2012 to 2013. Treated taxpayers with a normalized growth rate just below zero (-0.01) are in the bunching area below the simplification threshold.

In Figure 14, we show that conditional on crossing the threshold, there are large differences between treated and control taxpayers in terms of financial assets growth after the reform. Treated taxpayers in the bunching area experienced a 3.5 percentage point higher growth rate in their financial assets between 2010 and 2014, compared to their counterpart in the control group. In contrast, those in the treated group who did not react to the simplification reform experienced the exact same growth in terms of financial assets compared to taxpayers in the control group with similar normalized growth rates in 2013. The results are similar when looking at bunchers who cross the threshold in 2016 (Figure A.28). Treated taxpayers experienced a 2.5 percentage point higher growth rate in their financial assets between 2010 and 2016, compared to their counterpart in the control group.

This analysis highlights that bunchers end up crossing the threshold after they experience large positive shocks to their financial assets. One way to interpret this finding is that shocks in financial assets are hard to hide and therefore force bunchers into filing the detailed wealth tax return again.

6.3 Discussion

Summary of key behavioral responses. What can we learn about the underlying reasons and mechanisms for taxpayers' behaviors from the previous analyses? The findings to inform a potential model of taxpayer behavior are as follows:

1. There is sharp bunching of taxpayers at the simplification threshold.
2. Several groups of taxpayers below the threshold respond to it, not only those directly below, even though responses are strongest for groups closer to the threshold.
3. Taxpayers above the threshold (who would have to report negative growth rates in order to locate below the threshold) exhibit much lower bunching.
4. Growth rates are systematically lower for taxpayers below the simplification threshold than for taxpayers above.
5. Responses to the simplification threshold are persistent, with taxpayers attempting to remain below the threshold for multiple years, as long as possible and being “pushed out” of the simplified regime once significant financial asset shocks occur.
6. We cannot detect any change in labor or capital income that could justify the changes in reported wealth.
7. There is no discernible response at pure tax kinks in the detailed reporting regime.¹⁸
8. There is significant bunching at the exemption threshold.

A model of wealth tax misreporting. The second and fifth findings point to reporting and avoidance responses rather than real saving responses, because the true value of taxable wealth is not easily controllable by taxpayers since it depends on asset prices. This hypothesis is bolstered by the finding that there is no corresponding change in labor or capital income that could justify changes

¹⁸This means that there is no bunching at any tax kink before the simplification reform, when everyone files a detailed tax form and there is no bunching at tax kinks above the simplification threshold after it was introduced. There are no pure tax kinks inside the simplified region to be able to assess what happens there.

in taxable wealth. In Appendix E, we suggest a simple model to rationalize these findings. Taxpayers value being in the simplified regime so that the simplification threshold generates a substantial notch in the payoff. They therefore misreport their wealth in order to stay below the simplification threshold. Misreporting is costly and the cost is increasing in the amount of misreporting and decreasing in the reported growth rate from year to year. The latter assumption explains why forward-looking taxpayers further below the threshold will report lower wealth and growth rates as well, to facilitate anticipated misreporting in future years.

There are no discernible bunching at pure tax kinks in the detailed regime for two potential reasons (which can both be applicable): because the underlying misreporting elasticities are small (but would still generate significant bunching at a large notch in payoffs such as the simplification threshold or the exemption threshold) and/or because the simplified regime makes misreporting easier. The bunching at the exemption threshold can be rationalized with a fixed cost from filing any wealth tax return.

Why do taxpayers want to remain in the simplified regime? There are three potential, non-exclusive reasons why taxpayers may want to remain in the simplified regime. First, taxpayers may value the lower hassle cost of reporting taxes with a simplified return. Second, they may have privacy concerns and be averse to reporting information to the government. Finally, it may be easier to misreport wealth in the simplified reporting regime. When taxpayers only need to report total wealth, instead of detailed a breakdown, they may feel that it is easier to hide specific assets or report incorrect amounts.

Although each of these channels may play some role, it is unlikely that there is a big hassle cost difference between the detailed and the simplified tax form. The tax administration requires that taxpayers keep records in case of audits, so the information needs to be recorded and stored regardless of the type of form filled out. The affected taxpayers are wealthy (in the top 1% of the wealth distribution) and often use professional help for accounting and tax purposes. The extent of privacy concerns is also unclear because the government already has access to a lot of information related to wealth, such as the value of real estate (through property tax filing), financial wealth (through bank and brokerage accounts), and other sources of capital income (through income tax returns). Although this information does not currently appear to be used explicitly for the wealth

tax administration, taxpayers should be aware that most of it is already in the hands of the tax administration.

All in all, the ease of misreporting may be the most important reason why taxpayers value the simplified regime. In fact, if the simplified reporting reduced the burden of filing wealth taxes or the privacy concern associated with it, we might expect that some taxpayers who would otherwise have remained below the eligibility threshold are now enticed to cross it. However, the data does not support this view, as we show next.

Are more people willing to cross the wealth tax eligibility threshold? In Appendix D, we quantify the number of missing taxpayers around the exemption threshold. Our baseline methodology exploits Pareto parameters computed in the unaffected segment of the wealth distribution, that we then use to extrapolate the distribution of taxpayers around the exemption threshold.¹⁹ Table B.4 shows substantial missing mass just above the exemption threshold, both pre-2011 when the exemption threshold was around €790,000, and after 2011 when the exemption threshold was moved to 1,300K. The share of missing taxpayers around the exemption threshold after 2011 is increasing, as behaviors slowly adjust to the newly implemented simplification threshold. In 2017, around 30% of taxpayers are missing around the exemption threshold. This share is close to and, if anything, slightly lower than the 37% of missing taxpayers in 2010, before any simplified return was implemented. This suggests that allowing taxpayers to fill a simple tax return did not induce more taxpayers to enter the wealth tax reporting and reduce bunching below the exemption threshold.

Summing up. The reason why people value the simplified regime relates to the normative question of whether it should be extended or eliminated. Clearly, the threshold itself is generating a behavioral effect and distortion, so we may ask whether it should be expanded to everyone (or more taxpayers) or rather eliminated altogether. Based on the preceding arguments, it is likely that taxpayers value the ease of misreporting and that the loss of information leads to persistently higher under-reporting of wealth. It also does not appear that the simplified regime enticed more

¹⁹Our identifying assumption when conducting this analysis is that Pareto parameters should be constant over the [1,300K-4,000K] interval. Fortunately, data on pre-reform distributions allows us to gauge the plausibility of this assumption. Figure A.30 shows that this assumption is validated in the data.

taxpayers to file a wealth tax return in the first place.

7 Conclusion

In the debate on the desirability of wealth taxes, several papers have studied the experience of various countries with wealth taxes. Estimated elasticities, however, vary tremendously. We find zero behavioral responses to changes in the wealth tax rates alone (kinks) in France, but substantial responses to information notches introduced by the exemption and simplification thresholds. Most papers in the literature focus on exemption thresholds. In Sweden, [Seim \(2017\)](#) finds substantial behavioral responses to the exemption threshold in the context of wealth tax in Sweden, with implied elasticities between 0.1 and 0.3. In Denmark, [Jakobsen et al. \(2020\)](#) find substantial responses to the exemption threshold, with long-run elasticities of taxable wealth around 1. In Colombia, where enforcement is lower than in Sweden, [Londoño-Vélez and Avila-Mahecha \(2022\)](#) find large behavioral responses to the wealth tax, in particular at the salient exemption notch. Like in France, taxpayers in Colombia face additional reporting requirements when they become subject to the wealth tax.²⁰ [Londoño-Vélez and Avila-Mahecha \(2022\)](#) estimate an elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate between 0.3 and 4.4 at the exemption notch. Our results show that behavioral responses to the exemption notch are likely to capture responses to changes in reporting requirements rather than to changes in tax rates. In our context, behavioral responses to the wealth tax only arise when discontinuities in marginal tax rates are associated with changes in reporting requirements, corroborating that information avoidance is the main channel explaining responses to the wealth tax.

Our results imply that poor tax design choices can have immediate implications for tax enforcement, and that these effects may be large and persistent. Taxpayers in lower reporting environments (such as those below the simplification threshold in our setting) persistently under-report their wealth, which in turn can lead to deterioration in the information and, hence, enforcement capacities of the tax authorities. A one-off collection of information may not be enough and it may take a long time to recoup the lost enforcement capacities.

²⁰More specifically, households below the exemption cut-off must declare their assets in a very aggregate way. If they are above the exemption cut-off, they file an additional wealth tax statement that requires to disclose detailed information on their taxable wealth to the government.

If specific design choices can contribute to increasing tax elasticities, other choices can contribute to reducing them, such as mandating pre-populated returns, collecting and using information automatically transmitted by domestic and foreign third parties, or taxing non-residents (e.g., [Saez and Zucman, 2022](#)). In future research it would be valuable to study these other design choices. All of them have the potential to reduce tax base elasticities but they also have costs. In the case of the information reform we study, the cost of merely reverting back to the higher-information regime in force before the reform would be very small. A full cost-benefit analysis of different elasticity-reducing design features of income and wealth taxes constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research.

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
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
8 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: **Wealth Tax Schedule and Reporting Requirements in France, 2007-2017**




Notes: Panel A summarizes the reporting requirements for wealth taxpayers by level of reported net taxable wealth over the period 2007-2017. Panel B shows the wealth tax schedule between 2007 and 2017. The dashed line indicates the expected tax schedule in 2012, which was changed at the last minute and, therefore, never implemented (see Section 3.2).

Figure 2: Absence of Bunching at Kinks in the Tax Schedule (Marginal Tax Rate Changes)



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of taxpayers by net taxable wealth around the second (Panel A), third (Panel B), fourth (Panel C) and fifth (Panel D) wealth tax bracket threshold in year 2010. For the full tax schedule, see Figure 1 (Panel B). In each figure, we group households into bins of 10,000 net taxable wealth for Panel A and B, 20,000 in Panel C and 50,000 in Panel D, and plot the bins counts around each kinks, depicted by the vertical red line. We plot the distributions of taxable wealth in all other years and at all other marginal tax rates threshold in Figure A.5, A.6 and A.7.


Figure 3: **Bunching at the Exemption Thresholds**




Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of taxpayers around the exemption threshold in 2006-2010, years for which the exemption threshold varied only a little: it was 760K in 2006, 770K in 2008, and 790K in 2009 and 2010. Panel B shows the distribution of taxpayers around 1,300K, which in 2009 and 2010 represented a pure tax kink (discontinuity in marginal tax rates) as explored in Figure 2. Panel C layers on top of the distribution for 2010 from Panel B the distribution of taxpayers for the year 2011 when the 1,300K threshold becomes the exemption threshold. Therefore, this threshold becomes associated both with a change in wealth tax rates and a change in reporting requirements. Panel D shows the distribution of taxpayers around the new exemption threshold after 2011.

Figure 4: **Bunching at Simplification Thresholds**


A. Simplification Threshold is 3,000K in 2011




B. Simplification Threshold is 3,000K in 2012



C. Simplification Threshold is 2,570K in 2013



D. Simplification Threshold is 2,570K for 2013-2017





Notes: This figure shows the distribution of taxpayers by net taxable wealth around the simplification threshold (dashed vertical line) implemented for taxpayers with net taxable wealth below 3,000K in 2011 and that was moved at 2,570K in 2013. We also plot the threshold for the third tax bracket, which was 2,520K in 2009, 2,530K in 2010, and 2,570K in 2013 (solid vertical line). The discontinuity in MTR associated with passing the third bracket threshold was stable: 0.25 percentage points before 2013, and 0.30 percentage points after 2013. From 2007 to 2012, the third bracket MTR threshold was associated with a change in marginal tax rate (a tax kink) but not with a change in reporting requirements. In 2013, the third bracket and the simplification threshold coincide at 2,570K. In each figure, we group households into bins of 10,000 euros and plot the bin counts around the simplification threshold. Panel A shows the distribution of taxpayers in 2011, when the simplification threshold is newly created at 3,000K, as compared to the distribution in 2010; Panel B plots the distribution of taxpayers in 2011 and 2012, after the simplification threshold at 3,000K has been in place for one year already. Panel C plots the distribution in 2013 when the simplification threshold is moved to 2,570K and starts to coincide with the third bracket and compares it to the distribution in 2012. Panel D plots the distribution of taxpayers for 2013, 2015, and 2017, years for which the simplification threshold remained stable at 2,570K and compares it to the distribution in 2011.

Figure 5: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Thresholds: Wealth Growth Rates

A. No Simplification Threshold in 2006-2010

B. Simplification Threshold is 3,000K in 2011-2012




C. Simplification threshold is 2,570K in 2013-2017




Notes: This figure shows the distribution of yearly wealth growth rates by wealth bins, pooled for different periods, around the simplification threshold (vertical solid line). In each figure, we group household into bins of 20,000 reported taxable wealth. We plot the average wealth growth rate by bin and fit linear models (one below and one above the cut-off), depicted by the dashed black lines. Panel A pools all observations for the period before the simplified reporting was introduced (2006-2010), Panel B pools all observations for the period during which the simplification threshold was at 3,000K (2011-2012) and Panel C pools all years for the period during which the simplification threshold was 2,750K (2013-2017). The shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Thresholds, Normalized Growth Rates




Notes: This Figure plots the distribution of normalized wealth growth rates for households with different levels of taxable wealth in 2012. The definition of normalized growth rate is detailed in the text (see Equation (1)).

Figure 7: Dynamic Bunching Estimator




Notes: This Figure describes our dynamic bunching methodology and estimator, as explained in Section 5.2.

Figure 8: **Distribution of normalized growth rates across groups before the simplified regime (2011): Validation of the identification assumption**



Notes: This figure investigates whether the distribution of normalized growth rates in the control group (taxpayers located in the interval [2710K,2850K[in 2012) is comparable to the distribution of normalized growth rates for other taxpayers (“Far below”, “Just below”, “Just above”, and “Far above”). We define our control and treated group by level of wealth in 2011, and plot their 2012 normalized growth rates as explained in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.


Figure 9: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Thresholds, Dynamic Bunching




Notes: This figure plots the distributions of normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; ‘Far below” in Panel B; “Just above” in Panel C; and “Far Above” in Panel D), where groups are defined in 2012. Each panel summarizes our estimates of the impact of the simplification reform on wealth growth rates, using our dynamic bunching analysis described in Section 5.2.3. Each panel reports the average growth rate reduction between the treated and control group (ITT); the average growth rate in the control group; the proportion of the treated group that bunches (“bunchers”); the reduction in growth rates among bunchers (LATE); and the counterfactual growth rate of bunchers in the absence of the simplification threshold.

Figure 10: Wealth Growth Rates Over Time, By Cohorts


A. Cohort defined in 2012



B. Cohort defined in 2014





C. Cohort defined in 2016



Notes: This figure plots normalized growth rates and wealth growth rate reductions in different years for groups (“cohorts”) defined in 2012 (Panel A); 2014 (Panel B); and 2016 (Panel C). In each panel, the left figure show the distribution of normalized growth rates for individuals in the Just Below group (right below the 2,570K threshold). The right figure show the distribution of growth rates by bin of taxable wealth.

Figure 11: **Probability to cross the simplification threshold for bunchers defined from 2012 to 2013**




Notes: This figure shows the share of taxpayers who cross the simplification threshold in 2014 (Panel A) and 2016 (Panel B) for our treatment and control group, by normalized growth rates defined between 2012 and 2013. For the control group, the normalized growth rate is defined relative to the placebo threshold.

Figure 12: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Thresholds, Difference-in-Differences




Notes: This figure plots the path of estimated β_{kj} and their 95 percent confidence interval band from the difference-in-differences model summarized by Equation 10. The dependent variable is the yearly wealth growth rate for each taxpayer (in percentage points). Standard errors are clustered at the taxpayer level. The pre-reform coefficient β_{2012j} is normalized to zero such that estimates can be interpreted relative to pre-reform year. The control group includes taxpayers with wealth in the [2710,2850] bracket in 2012. Panel A shows the effects of the simplification reform for individuals with wealth in the [2500K,2570K] bracket in 2012 (the “Just below” group). Panel B shows the effects of the simplification reform for individuals with wealth in the [2570K,2640K] bracket in 2012 (the “Just above” group).

Figure 13: Evolution of Reported Income, Income Composition, and Income Taxes



Notes: This figure shows differences in taxable income (Panel A), income composition (Panels B, C, and D) and income tax rates (Panels E and F) over time for the treated group just below (€2500-€2570) and the control group (€2710-€2780) with a normalized growth rate of -0.01 in 2013.

Figure 14: Average Annual Growth Rate After Crossing the Simplification Threshold



Notes: This figure shows the average growth rates in components of taxable wealth from 2010 to 2014, for treated and control individuals defined in 2012, who pass their upper group threshold in 2014. Normalized growth rates are defined between 2012 and 2013.

Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics, sample selection**

	All		Tax payers with wealth between 2,360 and 2,850K€ in 2012			
	2010	2012	without restrictions		with restrictions	
	2010	2012	2010	2012	2010	2012
<i>Demographics</i>						
Age	66	67	65	66	65	67
% Married	69	68	72	70	74	73
% Non residents	4	5	4	5	0	0
% Retirees	67	67	63	67	64	69
% Wage Earners	38	39	42	39	41	37
% Self-Employed	23	24	26	25	26	24
% Landlords	67	72	75	75	75	76
<i>Incomes & income tax</i>						
Taxable income	89,668	119,937	123,800	128,344	124,302	127,201
Gross income	114,447	184,104	161,437	180,884	160,928	168,699
<i>Pension benefits (%)</i>	23	17	18	18	18	20
<i>Wages (%)</i>	28	23	28	25	27	25
<i>Self-employment income (%)</i>	13	11	14	13	15	14
<i>Rental income (%)</i>	17	15	19	17	19	19
<i>Financial income (%)</i>	18	22	20	20	19	20
<i>Other (incl. Capital gains) (%)</i>	1	11	1	6	1	2
Income Tax	17,099	29,086	26,941	30,416	26,973	28,976
Income tax rate (% gross income)	15	16	17	17	17	17
<i>Wealth & wealth tax</i>						
Taxable wealth ('000)	1,747	2,656	2,371	2,585	2,380	2,584
<i>Housing assets (%)</i>	46		46		45	
<i>incl. Primary Residence (%)</i>	17		15		15	
<i>Financial assets (%)</i>	62		62		63	
<i>Liabilities (%)</i>	8		8		8	
Wealth tax	6,094	16,919	7,944	12,537	7,925	12,533
Wealth tax rate (%)	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5
Wealth tax (total, billion)	3,6	4.9	0.21	0.36	0.17	0.28
Tax units	590,031	289,119	26,677	28,872	21,243	22,331

Table 2: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Threshold, Difference-in-Differences

	Dependent Variable: Wealth Growth Rate in percent				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Wealth groups defined in 2012				
	Just Below [2500K,2570K[Far Below [2430K,2500K[Very Far Below [2360K,2430K[Just Above [2570K,2640K[Far Above [2640K,2710K[
Pre-Period (2008-2009)	-0.23 (0.35)	-0.01 (0.33)	0.23 (0.33)	-0.13 (0.35)	0.45 (0.37)
Pre-Period (2010-2011)	-0.30 (0.34)	-0.32 (0.33)	-0.03 (0.32)	-0.48 (0.35)	0.50 (0.37)
Post-Period (2013)	-0.77** (0.34)	-0.38 (0.32)	-0.30 (0.31)	-0.16 (0.34)	0.14 (0.36)
Post-Period (2014-2015)	-0.74** (0.30)	-0.43 (0.29)	-0.16 (0.28)	-0.30 (0.31)	-0.16 (0.32)
Post-Period (2016-2017)	-0.63** (0.29)	-0.19 (0.27)	-0.25 (0.27)	-0.23 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.31)
Constant			3.56*** (0.07)		
Observations			241,259		
Individuals			27,021		

Notes: This table summarizes estimates from Equation 10. The dependent variable is the yearly wealth growth rate. Standard errors are clustered at the taxpayer level. The pre-reform coefficient β_{2012j} is normalized to zero such that estimates can be interpreted relative to the pre-reform year 2012. The control group includes taxpayers with wealth in the [2710-2850] bracket in 2012.

Table 3: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Threshold, Dynamic Bunching vs. Diff-in-diff

	Dependent Variable: Wealth Growth Rate in percent				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Wealth groups defined in 2012				
	Just Below [2500K,2570K[Far Below [2430K,2500K[Very Far Below [2360K,2430K[Just Above [2570K,2640K[Far Above [2640K,2710K[
	Diff-in-diff				
Average effect (ITT)	-0.77** (0.34)	-0.38 (0.32)	-0.30 (0.31)	-0.16 (0.34)	0.14 (0.36)
	Dynamic bunching				
Average effect (ITT)	-0.47*** (0.07)	-0.44*** (0.08)	-0.37*** (0.08)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Share of bunchers	14.7*** (1.1)	8.5*** (1.0)	6.6*** (1.1)	3.9** (0.7)	1.4*** (0.5)
Effect among bunchers (LATE)	-3.2*** (0.4)	-5.3*** (1.0)	-5.8*** (1.6)	-4.8*** (0.9)	-1.7 (3.5)

Notes: This table summarizes our estimates using dynamic bunching or standard difference-in-differences designs for the year 2013. More details are provided in the text.

Appendix (for Online Publication)

A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Reporting requirements: Simplified versus Detailed reporting

DÉTERMINATION DE LA BASE IMPOSABLE
Le symbole (1) signifie que vous devez joindre vos justificatifs

1 | ACTIF BRUT

IMMEUBLES BÂTIS
Annexe 1: nombre de feuilles (1) AB

Région principale AC

Autres immeubles AC

IMMEUBLES NON BÂTIS, PARTS DE GROUPEMENTS FORESTIERS OU FONCIERS
Annexe 2: nombre de feuilles (1)

Bois, forêts et parts de groupements forestiers (1) BC 25% = BD

Biens ruraux loués à long terme BE

• dont montant dans la limite de 101 807 € BE 25% = BF

• dont montant pour la fraction supérieure à 101 807 € BE 50% = BG

Parts de Groupements Fonctions Agricoles et de Groupements Agricoles Fonctions BH

• dont montant dans la limite de 101 807 € BH 25% = BI

• dont montant pour la fraction supérieure à 101 807 € BH 50% = BJ

Autres biens BK

DROITS SOCIAUX – VALEURS MOBILIÈRES – LIQUIDITÉS – AUTRES MEUBLES
Annexes 3.1 et 3.2: nombre de feuilles (1)

Parts ou actions détenues par les salariés et mandataires sociaux CL 25% = CM

Parts ou actions de sociétés avec engagement de conservation de 6 ans minimum (1) CL 25% = CN

Droits sociaux de sociétés dans lesquelles vous exercez une fonction ou une activité CO

Autres valeurs mobilières CI

Liquidités CI

Autres biens meubles (voir section d'assurance-vie) CO

Montant des mandataires détenant des droits et titres et des titres:
• Droits sociaux détenus à la suite d'un rachat d'entreprise par les salariés CH

• Droits sociaux détenus par le foyer fiscal dans une société interposée CI

• Droits sociaux constituant plus de 50 % du patrimoine CI

• Titres ou parts de FCP ou FCPR reçus en contrepartie de la souscription au capital d'une PME CI

TOTAL DES IMMEUBLES ET DES BIENS MEUBLES AB + AC + BD + BE + BF + BG + BI + BJ + BK + CM + CN + CO + CG = DG

Forfait mobilier (1) ou autres réductions sur ajout de déductibles et dégrèvements à l'apport en capital DE

TOTAL DE L'ACTIF BRUT DE + DG = EG

2 | PASSIF ET AUTRES DÉDUCTIONS
Annexe 4: nombre de feuilles (1)

TOTAL DU PASSIF ET AUTRES DÉDUCTIONS GH

3 | ACTIF NET IMPOSABLE
BASE IMPOSABLE EG – GH = HI


IMPÔT DE SOLIDARITÉ SUR LA FORTUNE

Base nette imposable pour un patrimoine ou l'1.2013 supérieur à 1 300 000 € et inférieur à 2 570 000 € 980


Valeur brute du patrimoine 990

Figure A.2: Wealth Tax Base in France

A. Taxpayers Subject to the Wealth Tax




B. Taxable Wealth




Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of the share of taxpayers liable to the wealth tax in France (top panel) and the evolution of taxable wealth over total wealth (bottom panel). In 2011, the French government increased the exemption threshold from 700K to 1,300K.

Figure A.3: **Composition of Gross Taxable Wealth in 2010**




Notes: This Figure describes the composition of gross taxable wealth (i.e., gross assets) in 2010 by level of net taxable wealth.

Figure A.4: Effective wealth tax rates




Notes: This Figure shows the effective wealth tax rates in France for the period 2006-2011.

Figure A.5: Distribution of Wealth at the Second MTR Threshold



Notes: This Figure shows the distribution of taxpayers by level of net taxable wealth around the 2d wealth tax bracket threshold for the period 2006-2010.


Figure A.6: **Distribution of Wealth at the Third MTR Threshold**




Notes: This Figure shows the distribution of net taxable wealth around the 3rd wealth tax bracket threshold for the period 2006-2010.

Figure A.7: Distribution of Wealth at the 4th MTR Threshold


C. 2008




D. 2009




E. 2010




F. 2011



G. 2013




H. 2014




Notes: This Figure shows the distribution of net taxable wealth around the 4th wealth tax bracket threshold for the period 2008-2014.

Figure A.8: Large Change in Exemption Threshold




Notes: This Figure describes the wealth tax exemption reform of 2011.

Figure A.9: Excess mass estimates using static bunching



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of taxable wealth in bins of 10,000 euros around the third bracket threshold of the French wealth tax, for year 2010, and each year between 2013 and 2017. In 2010, the threshold was 2,530K and was associated with a kink in the wealth tax schedule. From 2013 to 2017, the threshold was 2,570K and was associated with a kink in the wealth tax schedule and a change in reporting requirements (notch). We plot the observed distribution in blue and an estimate of the counterfactual distribution absent the kink in pink. The counterfactual is obtained by fitting a 7th-order polynomial to the observed distribution, excluding a segment that we determine following the standard bunching methodology detailed in Appendix C. The bunching estimate b equals excess mass at the kink (B), scaled by the height of the counterfactual distribution at the kink.

Figure A.10: Behavioral Responses to Marginal Tax Rates, Wealth Growth Rates




Notes: Notes: This Figure shows the pooled distribution of yearly wealth growth rates by individuals' wealth bin over the period. We plot the average wealth growth rate by taxable wealth bin around the marginal tax rate thresholds depicted by the vertical line in each figure. We fit a linear model below and above the cut-off that is depicted by the fitted dashed black line. In each figure, we group households into bins of 10,000 net taxable wealth for Panel A and B, 20,000 in Panel C and 50,000 in Panel D. The shaded area depicts 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A.11: Wealth Growth Rates Adjusted for Years Fixed Effects

A. No Simplification Threshold in 2006-2010

B. Simplification Threshold is 3,000K in 2011-2012




C. Simplification threshold is 2,570K in 2013-2017




Notes: This Figure shows the pooled distribution of yearly wealth growth rates by individuals' wealth bin over the period, after adjusting for year fixed effects. In each figure, we group household into bins of 20,000 declared net taxable wealth. We plot the average wealth growth rate by taxable wealth bin around the simplification thresholds depicted by the vertical line in each figure. We fit a linear model below and above the cut-off that is depicted by the fitted dashed black line. Panel A pools all observations for the pre-simplification period (2006-2010), Panel B pools all observations for the first simplification threshold period (2011-2012) and Panel C pools all observations for the second simplification threshold period (2013-2017). The shaded area depicts 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.12: Cross-Section of Wealth Growth Rates

A. Before the Introduction of Simplified Return




B. Simplification threshold is 2,570K in 2013-2017




Notes: This figure shows wealth growth rate reduction by 70K bins of taxable wealth each year. For each bin, we compute the wealth growth rates reduction and normalize it to the average wealth growth rate reduction for taxpayers above 3,000K in the same year. The two vertical red lines denote the simplification thresholds in place during the period 2011-2017.

Figure A.13: Share of Taxpayers by Quartile of Wealth Growth Rates




Notes: This figure shows the share of taxpayers by quartile of wealth growth rates.

Figure A.14: Proportion of taxpayers with 0 growth rate by cohort over time




Notes: This figure shows the share of taxpayers experiencing a wealth growth rate between 0% and 0.1%, that we call "0 growth rate". Panel A plots the share of taxpayers with 0 growth rate in the for years 2013, 2014 and 2017 in cross-section. Panel B to E then plot the yearly share for taxpayers with 0 growth rate for each cohort defined from 2012 (Panel B) to 2016 (Panel F).

Figure A.15: **Robustness checks on counterfactual distributions: Multiplicative vs. additive forms**




Notes: the additive (Equation 3) instead of the multiplicative (Equation 2) formulas, as described by Equation 3

Figure A.16: Behavioral Responses to Simplification Thresholds, Wealth Growth Rates Distribution




Notes: This Figure plots the distribution of wealth growth rates for households with different levels of taxable wealth in 2012.

Figure A.17: **Distribution of normalized growth rates across groups before the simplified regime (2010): Validation of the identification assumption**




Notes: This figure investigates whether the distribution of normalized growth rates in the control group (taxpayers located in the interval [2710K,2850K] in 2010) is comparable to the distribution of normalized growth rates for other taxpayers (“Far below”, “Just below”, “Just above”, and “Far above”). We define our control and treated group by level of wealth in 2010, and plot their 2011 normalized growth rates as explained in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.

Figure A.18: Pre-reform Growth Rates for Groups Defined in 2012



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of wealth growth rates before the 2013 reform, for our treatment and control group (defined in 2012).


Figure A.19: **Robustness checks: Dynamic Bunching using additive instead of multiplicative formulas**



Notes: This figure plots the distributions of normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; “Far below” in Panel B; “Just above” in Panel C; and “Far Above” in Panel D), where groups are defined in 2012. Each panel summarizes our estimates of the impact of the simplification reform on wealth growth rates, using our dynamic bunching analysis described in Section 5.2.3. Each panel reports the average growth rate reduction between the treated and control group (ITT); the average growth rate in the control group; the proportion of the treated group that bunches (“bunchers”); the reduction in growth rates among bunchers (LATE); and the counterfactual growth rate of bunchers in the absence of the simplification threshold.

As compared to Figure 9, the distribution for the control group relies on the additive (Equation 3) instead of the multiplicative formula (Equation 2).


Figure A.20: Dynamic Bunching for the 2013 Cohort



Notes: This figure plots the distributions of normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; “Far below” in Panel B; “Just above” in Panel C; and “Far Above” in Panel D), where groups are defined in 2013. Each panel summarizes our estimates of the impact of the simplification reform on wealth growth rates, using our dynamic bunching analysis described in Section 5.2.3. Each panel reports the average growth rate reduction between the treated and control group (ITT); the average growth rate in the control group; the proportion of the treated group that bunches (“bunchers”); the reduction in growth rates among bunchers (LATE); and the counterfactual growth rate of bunchers in the absence of the simplification threshold.

As compared to Figure 9, groups (“cohorts”) are defined based on their level of taxable wealth in 2013 instead of 2012.

Figure A.21: Dynamic Bunching for the 2016 Cohort




Notes: This figure plots the distributions of normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; “Far below” in Panel B; “Just above” in Panel C; and “Far Above” in Panel D), where groups are defined in 2016. Each panel summarizes our estimates of the impact of the simplification reform on wealth growth rates, using our dynamic bunching analysis described in Section 5.2.3. Each panel reports the average growth rate reduction between the treated and control group (ITT); the average growth rate in the control group; the proportion of the treated group that bunches (“bunchers”); the reduction in growth rates among bunchers (LATE); and the counterfactual growth rate of bunchers in the absence of the simplification threshold.


As compared to Figure 9, groups (“cohorts”) are defined based on their level of taxable wealth in 2016 instead of 2012.

Figure A.22: **Distributions of 2011 normalized growth rates of treated and control group around the 3,000K simplification threshold**

A. Taxpayers just below the 3,000K threshold in 2010




A. Taxpayers far below the 3,000K threshold in 2010




Notes: This figure applies the dynamic bunching analysis to the introduction of the simplification threshold at 3,000K threshold in 2011. This figure plots the distributions of 2011 normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; ‘Far below” in Panel B), where groups are defined based on their level of taxable wealth in 2010. The groups “Far Below” and “Just Below” correspond to individuals with wealth in the range [2850K-2925K] and [2925K-3000K], respectively.

Figure A.23: **Distribution of 2012 normalized growth rates of treated and control group around the 3,000K simplification threshold**

A. Taxpayers just below the 3,000K threshold in 2011




B. Taxpayers far below the 3,000K threshold in 2011




Notes: This figure applies the dynamic bunching analysis to the simplification threshold at 3,000K threshold in 2012. This figure plots the distributions of 2012 normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; ‘Far below” in Panel B), where groups are defined based on their level of taxable wealth in 2011. The groups “Far Below” and “Just Below” correspond to individuals with wealth in the range [2850K-2925K[and [2925K-3000K[, respectively.

Figure A.24: **Distribution of 2013 normalized growth rates of treated and control group around the 3,000K simplification threshold**

A. Taxpayers just below the 3,000K threshold in 2012




B. Taxpayers far below the 3,000K threshold in 2012




Notes: This figure plots the distributions of 2013 normalized growth rates as defined in Section 5.2 for the control group and for one treated group (“Just below” in Panel A; ‘Far below” in Panel B), where groups are defined based on their level of taxable wealth in 2012. The groups “Far Below” and “Just Below” correspond to individuals with wealth in the range [2850K-2925K[and [2925K-3000K[, respectively.

Figure A.25: Differences in wealth composition in 2010




Notes: This figure shows differences in wealth composition in 2010 for our treated and control group, by normalized growth rate defined between 2012 and 2013.

Figure A.26: Differences in occupation in 2010




Notes: This figure shows differences in occupation in 2010 for our treated and control group, by normalized growth rate defined between 2012 and 2013.

Figure A.27: Differences in income composition in 2010



Notes: This figure shows differences in income composition in 2010 for our treated and control group, by normalized growth rate defined between 2012 and 2013.

Figure A.28: Average Annual Growth Rate After Crossing the Simplification Threshold, 2016



Notes: This figure shows the average growth rates in components of taxable wealth from 2010 to 2014, for treated and control individuals defined in 2012, who pass their upper group threshold in 2016. Normalized growth rates are defined between 2012 and 2013.

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics, all taxpayers in France

	2007	2010	2011	2017
<i>Demographics</i>				
Age	65	66	67	68
% Married	69%	69%	68%	67%
% Non residents	5%	4%	5%	4%
% Retirees	64%	67%	68%	70%
% Wage Earners	40%	38%	38%	38%
% Self-Employed	17%	23%	25%	24%
% Landlords	69%	67%	72%	72%
<i>Incomes & income tax</i>				
Taxable income	91 819	89 668	115 511	129 707
Gross income	129 410	114 487	165 969	163 686
<i>Pension benefits (%)</i>	18%	23%	18%	22%
<i>Wages (%)</i>	25%	28%	24%	26%
<i>Self-employment income (%)</i>	5%	13%	12%	9%
<i>Rental income (%)</i>	14%	17%	17%	16%
<i>Financial income (%)</i>	15%	18%	21%	13%
<i>Other (incl. Capital gains) (%)</i>	22%	1%	8%	13%
Income Tax	21754	17099	26720	28161
Income tax rate (% gross income)	17%	15%	16%	17%
<i>Wealth & wealth tax</i>				
Taxable wealth ('000)	1 716	1 747	2 630	2 813
Wealth tax	45%	46%	.	.
<i>Primary residence (%)</i>	18%	17%	.	.
<i>Financial assets (%)</i>	63%	62%	.	.
<i>Liabilities (%)</i>	8%	8%	.	.
Wealth tax	7 638	6 094	13 268	11 689
Wealth tax rate (%)	0.45%	0.35%	0.50%	0.42%
Wealth tax (total, billion)	4.0	3.6	3.8	4.2
Tax units	526105	590031	287157	356062

B Institutional Appendix

B.1 Assessing the wealth tax base and the wealth tax liability

To assess the wealth tax base and the amount of wealth tax to be paid, households must first assess which of their assets are fully exempted from the wealth, and which of their assets can lead to partial deductions that reduce their effective wealth tax base. Their wealth tax base is then computed using the market value of all assets that do not satisfy the conditions for full exemption and after applying the partial deductions granted for some assets. Next, tax credits and tax ceiling need to be taken into account in order to obtain the final wealth tax payment that is due to the French administration.

Fully exempted Assets Taxpayers must start by assessing which of their assets are fully exempted from the wealth tax, by satisfying the following conditions:

- **Business Assets related to individuals' main occupation:** The first category of fully exempted assets are business assets related to individuals' main occupation. This exemption rule has different conditions and requirements depending on the type of companies.
 - *Sole proprietorship:* all business assets related to individuals' main professional activity are exempted from the wealth tax. For this condition to be satisfied, this activity must be carried on in an "effective and regular" way. If the taxpayer has more than one occupation, his main activity is the one where most of his time is spent. If the activities are similar or complementaries, they are considered as one only activity for the purpose of the wealth tax.
 - *Limited Liability Companies (LLCs):* For LLCs that are not liable to the corporate tax, the exemption is granted if the company represents the main professional activity of the taxpayer, following the same criteria than described before. In addition, the individual must have a managing position in the company. No additional conditions on capital held is required.
 - *Companies liable to the Corporate Tax:* Assets held in companies subject to the corporate tax are exempted if the taxpayer has a managing position that represents more than 50% of her income and if she holds more than 25% of the overall firm's capital. This second condition is no longer necessary if these shares represent more than 50% of the gross value the taxpayers' total wealth.
- **SME's shares acquired through capital subscription** The Dutreuil Law of 2003 introduced a total wealth tax exemption for shares held in a small or medium sized enterprise (SME), if those shares have been acquired through a subscription to the company's capital rather than on the secondary market. This exemption does not require that the taxpayer has any professional activity in the company.
- **Foreign investments** Any financial investments carried-out by non-residents in France are fully exempted from the wealth tax base.

- **Arts** All artworks, antiques and collection items (for instance old cars) are fully exempted from the wealth tax base.
- **Intellectual property** All property rights are fully exempted from the wealth tax base for inventors and artists.
- **New residents foreign assets** Since 2008, a preferential regime allows “impatriates” to be fully exempted from the wealth tax on their wealth located abroad for a 5-years duration (8 years since 2017). The preferential regime applies to new residents who have not been tax residents in France for the past 5 years preceding their change of residence. This can apply to French citizens if they satisfy those conditions.

Tax deductions Next, taxpayers must take into account the deductions that reduce their effective wealth tax base for the assets that satisfy the following conditions:

- **Main residency** 30% of the value of a household’s main residence is exempted from the wealth tax and can be deducted from the tax base.
- **Shareholders agreements** Shareholders who commit to hold their shares for a certain duration can deduct 50% (75% since 2006) of those shares from their wealth tax base. To benefit from this tax deduction, the shareholders must have agreed to retain their shares for 6 years, collectively hold at least 20% of the voting rights or 34% of all shares and one of them must be the manager of the company for at least 5 years after the agreement.
- **Employees ownership** Since 2006, employees who own shares in the company where they are employed can deduct 75% of those shares from their wealth tax base. To benefit from this tax deduction, they must hold those shares for at least 6 years. Retirees who previously worked in the company and held the shares for at least 3 years before retiring can also benefit from this tax deduction.
- **Wood, forests and rural properties** Taxpayers who commit to hold and manage wood, forests and long-term leased rural property for at least thirty years can deduct 75% of the market value of those assets from their wealth tax base.
- **Debts** All private debts evaluated in a given year can be deducted from the wealth tax base, but those debts can only be related to assets that are not exempted from the wealth tax. For instance, debts related to business assets and business activity cannot be deducted from the wealth tax base. Eligible debts are deductible in proportion to the fraction of the taxable value of the assets to which they relate (?).

Tax credits All assets that do not satisfy the conditions for fully exempted assets and partial deductions listed before are included in the wealth tax base. Once taxpayers have self-assessed their wealth tax base, they must assess their tax credits:

- **Charitable giving:** Taxpayers can obtain a tax credit of 50% of their charitable giving to entities recognized as being of public utility by the government. This tax credit cannot exceed 50,000 euros per year.
- **SME's investment:** Since 2008, taxpayers can obtain a tax credit of 50% of their investment in SMEs. The reduction for SME investment adds to the full exemption of SMEs shares acquired through capital subscription.²¹ The tax credit for SME investment cannot exceed 45,000 per year.

Note that the yearly cap for tax credits is evaluated for both charitable giving and investment in SMEs. If taxpayers want to combine tax credits for SME investment and charitable giving simultaneously, the joint yearly cap is 45,000 euros.

Tax ceiling After assessing their total liability to the wealth tax, accounting for exemptions, deductions and tax credits, taxpayers can benefit from the ceiling of their wealth tax. The wealth tax ceiling (*plafonnement*) was introduced in 1989 and establishes that the total amount of taxes paid by an individual for the wealth tax and the income tax in a given year cannot exceed 85% of the total net taxable income received the year before (75% since 2013).²² From 1996 to 2013, the amount of wealth tax reduction granted by the ceiling mechanism could not exceed 50% of the initial wealth tax amount for individuals with taxable wealth above a certain threshold.²³ In 2013, the government reintroduced a version of the wealth tax ceiling without the cap.

B.2 Definition of tax unit and territoriality

The wealth tax base is defined at the tax unit level by summing up all worldwide assets, net of debts, owned by French tax residents. The tax unit includes married couples, civil partners (under a civil partnership), partners in a public cohabiting relationship as well as minor children. Married couples are allowed to be taxed separately if they are in the process of separation or divorce and live separately.

Tax residency for the purpose of the wealth tax is defined at the individual, not the tax unit level. An individual qualifies as a French tax resident as at 1 January of a given year if: (i) the individual has his "home" in France or (ii) the individual has the centre of his economic interests in France.

For French tax residents, the taxable base includes all taxable assets (as defined above) located in France and outside France. For non-residents, the taxable base is limited to assets located

²¹This means that since 2008, taxpayers can benefit from a tax credit equal to the value of her contribution in the SME upon the year of subscription, on top of the full exemption of the shares invested from the wealth tax base. A direct investment in a SME satisfying the condition for capital subscription thus leads to both full exemption of the shares but also to a wealth tax credit the year of the investment.

²²Income taxes include both the progressive income taxes and other flat income taxes (CSG and CRDS), as well as a variety of small payroll taxes paid on capital income.

²³More specifically, if wealth < 2.45 taxpayers can benefit from fully capped mechanism, if wealth < 3.62 and > 2.45 the reduction is limited to 11,160 euros and if wealth > 3.62 it is limited to 50% of initial ISF.

in France, with the exception of financial assets that are fully exempted from the wealth tax.²⁴ Additionally, some bilateral tax treaties grant wealth tax exemptions to non-residents from specific countries. For instance, residents from Gulf countries are exempted from the wealth tax on their assets held in France if they own enough financial securities in France.

B.3 Valuation of assets

There is no third-party reporting for the wealth tax in France. The assets included in the wealth tax base must be valued each year at their market value by the taxpayer. When the assets include shares of a company, the taxpayer should obtain information on the valuation of those shares from the company. The tax administration also provides official guidelines to taxpayers for the market value assessment of their shares in unlisted companies and other companies. For real estate, there is an online official database providing sale prices, square metres for properties located and sold in France, that can be used to assess the value of real estate assets. For jewelry, cars, horses, planes and boats, the valuation must be based on the public sale prices for similar goods that occurred one to two years before the reporting year.

B.4 Reporting requirements and timing

The net value is evaluated on the 1st of January of year t for fiscal year t . Thus, in calendar year t , taxpayers fill out their income tax return and pay their income tax for income earned in year $t - 1$, but fill out their wealth tax return and pay a tax based on the value of their wealth on January 1st of year t . Households must send their filled wealth tax return and payment (by check or bank transfer) to the tax authorities by mid June of each year. For individuals who are below the simplification threshold, the payment of the wealth tax can be made at the end of August of the same year. Late payment automatically triggers a penalty of 10%. The simplified form can be filed as part of the appendice of the income tax return starting in 2012.

²⁴See article 885 du code général des impôts (CGI). To be exempted from the French wealth tax, financial assets held by non-residents must be linked to a company located in France.

Table B.2: **Reporting Requirements for Wealth Taxpayers in France**

	Regular Form	Simplified Form
<i>Tax exemptions</i>		
Taxpayer has exempted professional assets	Y	N
Name, activity and tax ID of the company of main activity	Y	N
Names, activities and tax IDs of held companies	Y	N
Profession in held companies	Y	N
Share of capital owned in held companies	Y	N
Capital share representing more than 50% of taxable wealth	Y	N
Capital share after takeover by employees	Y	N
Holding shares after SMEs capital buyout	Y	N
<i>Taxable assets decomposition</i>		
Real estate, main residence (address + characteristics+value)	Y	N
Real estate, other buildings (address + characteristics+value)	Y	N
Forests	Y	N
Rural lands	Y	N
Agricultural lands	Y	N
Shares owned with 6 years holding clause	Y	N
Shares owned by employees	Y	N
Other financial assets	Y	N
Liquid assets	Y	N
<i>Tax deductions</i>		
75% deduction for forests (+ proofs)	Y	N
75% deduction for 6 years holding clause (+ proofs)	Y	N
75% deduction for shares owned by employees (+ proofs)	Y	N
Liabilities (+ proofs)	Y	N
<i>Tax credits</i>		
Direct investment in SMEs*	Y	Y
Investment in SMEs through holdings (FIP/FCPI)*	Y	Y
Charitable giving*	Y	Y
<i>Tax ceiling</i>		
Income taxes paid	Y	N
Amount of capped wealth tax	Y	Y
<i>Gross and Net Taxable Wealth</i>		
Net Taxable Wealth	Y	Y
Gross Taxable Wealth	Y	Y

Notes: *components for which taxpayers filling the regular form must attach proofs, while taxpayers filling the simplified form do not have to attach proofs.

C Static Bunching Computations

This section details analysis of bunching at the kink point created by the 2,530K marginal tax rate threshold in the French wealth tax. in 2010. In 2013, the threshold was increased to 2,570K and became associated with a change in reporting requirement. Figure A.9 presents bunching evidence for the full population, for years 2010, and 2013-2017. We plot the observed distribution around the "kink" in bins of 10, 000 euros in blue and the counterfactual distribution absent the kink in pink. The counterfactual distribution is obtained by fitting a polynomial to the observed distribution, excluding data in a range around the kink and extrapolating the fitted distribution to the kink. We use a polynomial of order 7 as the baseline, but our estimates show very little sensitivity to this choice. To fit our polynomial, we choose the lower bound manually and determine the upper bound based on the methodology described in (Kleven, 2016). The upper and lower bounds are plotted with the vertical dotted black lines in Figure A.9.

For year 2010, the 2,530K threshold is associated with a change in marginal tax rate only (pure kink). For that year, we therefore use the methodology for kinks and choose the upper bound visually. We then compute the excess mass B at the kink as the difference between the observed and counterfactual distribution in the entire excluded range.

For years 2013-2017, the 2,570K threshold is associated with both a change in marginal tax rate (kink) and a change in reporting requirements (notch). We follow the methodology for notches to compute the excess mass. We define the excess mass B as the difference between observed and counterfactual distribution in the left side of the excluded range (below the threshold). We choose our upper bound such that the excess mass equals the missing mass right to the threshold.

The estimated parameters are plotted in Figure A.9 and summarized in Table B.3. We also report b that we define as the total excess mass computed as described before, scaled by the height of the counterfactual distribution at the threshold. This parameter can be interpreted as the number of bins by which bunchers are moving on average (Jakobsen et al., 2020). As showed by Saez (2010), this statistic is proportional to the compensated elasticity in the presence of a pure kink.

Table B.3: **Parameters Estimates from Static Bunching**

Year	Excess Mass (B)	b	$d\tau$
2010	46	0.08	.25%
2013	1,952	2.74	.30%
2014	2,348	3.07	.30%
2015	2,163	2.64	.30%
2016	3,124	3.68	.30%
2017	3,865	4.49	.30%

Notes: This table reports the estimated parameters from the static bunching analysis using the counterfactual distribution plotted in Figure A.9 as detailed in the text. The parameter b is the total excess mass around the kink (B) scaled by the average height of the counterfactual distribution at the kink.

D Missing Taxpayers at Exemption Thresholds


This section describes the methodology used to impute counterfactual wealth distributions around the exemption thresholds.

To build counterfactual wealth distribution, we use the parametric properties delivered by the Pareto distribution assumption. It has been well documented that the top of the wealth distribution follows a Pareto distribution. As the French wealth tax covers the top 1% of the taxable wealth distribution, this extreme tail assumption can be made to extrapolate net taxable wealth of individuals above the exemption threshold. A Pareto distribution has the following form : $f(y) = a \frac{k^a}{y^{a+1}}$. If we assume that the distribution of wealth is Pareto distributed, we can then estimate the parameters a and k of the Pareto distribution for the wealth bracket $[s_i, s_{i+1}]$. Our method is based on the survival distribution function $p(y) = (k/y)^a$ and relies on the number of households and the threshold of each tax brackets. The parameters a et k are estimated by solving the two equations $k = s_i \cdot p(s_i)^{1/a}$ and $k = s_{i+1} \cdot p(s_{i+1})^{1/a}$ where $p(s_i)$ is the fraction of households above the threshold s_i . Solving the system gives:

$$\begin{cases} a_i = \frac{\log \frac{p(s_{i+1})}{p(s_i)}}{\log \frac{s_i}{s_{i+1}}} \\ k_i = s_i \cdot p(s_i)^{1/a_i} \end{cases} . \quad (11)$$


We use those equations to infer the distribution of taxable wealth in segments affected by the exemption threshold, using the Pareto parameter a from unaffected segments.

Figure A.29: Counterfactual and Observed Distributions at Exemption Threshold




Notes: This Figure shows observed and counterfactual wealth distributions around the exemption threshold between 2006 and 2010. Taxpayers self-assess their exemption to the wealth tax, and file a wealth tax return only if their taxable wealth is above the exemption threshold. If their taxable wealth level is below the exemption threshold, they do not disclose any information regarding their taxable wealth. Counterfactual distributions are extrapolated using Pareto parameters in the segment of the wealth distribution not distorted by misreporting at exemption threshold, denoted by dashed blue lines. The wealth tax schedule over the period is summarized in details in Figure 1 (Panel B).

Figure A.30: Empirical Strategy Validation for 2010 Placebo Year



Notes: This Figure shows the prediction of the 2010 distribution using our main methodology. The Pareto prediction method uses the average Pareto parameter in part of the distribution that is unaffected by the exemption threshold to extrapolate the full wealth distribution. The growth rate method uses the average 2009-2010 growth rate in the number of taxpayers in the part of the distribution that is unaffected by the exemption threshold and applies it to the observed 2009 distribution. The blue dashed lines denote the part of the unaffected part of the distribution used to implement these two methodologies.

Figure A.31: Counterfactual and Observed Distributions at Exemption Threshold



Notes: This Figure shows observed and counterfactual wealth distributions around the exemption threshold between 2011 and 2017. Taxpayers self-assess their exemption to the wealth tax, and file a wealth tax return only if their taxable wealth is above the exemption threshold. If their taxable wealth level is below the exemption threshold, they do not disclose any information regarding their taxable wealth. Counterfactual distributions are extrapolated using Pareto or average growth rate parameters in the segment of the wealth distribution not distorted by misreporting at exemption threshold, denoted by dashed blue lines. The wealth tax schedule over the period is summarized in details in Figure 1 (Panel B).

Table B.4: **Missing Taxpayers At Exemption Thresholds**

Year	Bracket	Missing Taxpayers	% Taxpayers
<i>Panel A: Exemption Threshold</i>			
2006	760-1200	155208	41.3
2007	770-1200	179597	42.2
2008	790-1200	166754	38.9
2009	790-1200	134686	33.5
2010	790-1200	162116	37.8
2011	1300-1700	6078	5.1
2013	1300-1700	16406	12.4
2014	1300-1700	24440	17.1
2015	1300-1700	30816	20.5
2016	1300-1700	42395	26.4
2017	1300-1700	50478	30.4

Notes: This Table summarizes estimated missing number of taxpayers around the exemption thresholds in the wealth tax schedule, using our predicted counterfactual distribution, based on Pareto interpolation.

E A Model of Taxpayer Behavior

We now present a simple model of taxpayer behavior that can help rationalize our findings (summarized in Section 6.3). The lower growth rates below the simplification threshold, combined with the absence of bunching at tax kinks in the detailed regime are consistent with lower misreporting or evasion costs for taxpayers filing the simplified form. The bunching at the exemption threshold (which is a combination of a reporting notch and a tax kink), in the absence of bunching at pure tax kinks suggests a fixed cost from entering the wealth reporting area, such as hassle costs or administrative reporting costs.

Taxpayer i has wealth w_{it} in year y and reports wealth \hat{w}_{it} . We assume away real wealth responses for expositional ease; adding them would provide another channel of response. Therefore, the sequence of expected wealth is given exogenously to the taxpayer. For the sake of notation, we omit expectation operators but it can be assumed that all future payoffs are in expected value.

The cost of misreporting has two components, which we allow to differ depending on whether the taxpayer is in the simplified or the detailed reporting regime. First, there is a cost to reporting wealth different from the true one and this cost is increasing and convex in the amount misreported. Denote by $v_i^k(w_{it} - \hat{w}_{it})$ the cost of reporting wealth \hat{w}_{it} when true wealth is w_{it} for taxpayer i in regime k where $k = S$ for the simplified regime and $k = D$ for the detailed regime. One interpretation is that the cost represents the expected cost from being caught misreporting by the tax authority, which is a function of the probability of being audited, the probability of misreporting being uncovered conditional on an audit, and the penalty for misreporting, all of which are

increasing in the gap between true and reported wealth.

In addition, there is a second component to the cost of misreporting which depends on the reported growth in wealth: $h_i^k(\hat{w}_{it} - \hat{w}_{i,t+1})$ is the cost of reporting a growth in wealth $\hat{w}_{i,t+1} - \hat{w}_{i,t}$. It is increasing and convex in $\hat{w}_{it} - \hat{w}_{i,t+1}$, i.e., the lower reported growth the higher the misreporting cost. The key difference between a flow income (such as self-employed income) and a stock (such as wealth) is that changes in the stock (such as a decrease in reported wealth) can raise flags for the tax authority. For instance, it is likely that taxpayer who reports the same wealth level in subsequent years is misreporting because asset values change due to price changes. Therefore, $h_i(0) > 0$. Similarly, a decline in reported wealth may raise flags if the economy is overall growing and returns are positive (as was the case over the entire period of study), so the cost may become steeper for negative reported growth values. Furthermore, there is a fixed cost γ_i of filing any wealth tax return (i.e., reporting wealth above the exemption threshold), which can be interpreted of the administrative and hassle cost burden of filing taxes.

A given taxpayer has a value $V_{i,t}$ from being in the simplified regime. As explained in the main text, this could be the value due to lower hassle costs, privacy concerns, or the ease of misreporting. Consider a taxpayer in year t who reports taxable wealth above the exemption threshold. Assuming an infinite horizon, quasilinear utility, and a tax rate τ for simplicity and a discount factor β_i , the utility of this taxpayer is:

$$\sum_{j=t}^{\infty} \beta^{j-t} (w_{i,j} - \tau \hat{w}_{i,j} - \mathbb{I}_{i,j} (v_i^S(w_{i,j} - \hat{w}_{i,j}) + h_i^S(\hat{w}_{i,j-1} - \hat{w}_{i,j}) - V_{i,j}) - (1 - \mathbb{I}_{i,j}) (v_i^D(w_{i,j} - \hat{w}_{i,j}) + h_i^D(\hat{w}_{i,j-1} - \hat{w}_{i,j})))$$

where $\mathbb{I}_{i,j} = 1$ if the taxpayer is below the simplification threshold in year j and 0 otherwise.

For a taxpayer in period t , with reported wealth $\hat{w}_{t-1,i}$ in period $t-1$ and who is still in the simplified filing regime and plans to remain in it in period $t+1$, the interior first-order condition with respect to \hat{w}_{it} is:

$$-\tau + v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) + h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t-1} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) - \beta h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t} - \hat{w}_{i,t+1}) = 0$$

The taxpayer misreports wealth up to the point where the marginal tax savings τ equal the marginal cost of misreporting, taking into account that misreporting in year t changes the cost of misreporting in year $t+1$ as well. Specifically, reporting lower wealth in year t makes it easier to misreport in year $t+1$, inducing an intertemporal consideration to the misreporting decision that may be absent for flow incomes.

In period $t+1$, the first-order condition is:

$$-\tau + v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t+1} - \hat{w}_{i,t+1}) + h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t} - \hat{w}_{i,t+1}) - \beta h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t+1} - \hat{w}_{i,t+2}) = 0$$

Rearranging and combining these first-order conditions yields:

$$v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) + \beta v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t+1} - \hat{w}_{i,t+1}) + h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t-1} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) - \beta^2 h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t+1} - \hat{w}_{i,t+2}) = \tau(1 + \beta)$$

Result 1: taxpayers below the threshold will start adjusting to the anticipation of crossing the threshold in future years.

A myopic taxpayer ($\beta = 0$) will simply solve the static problem with first-order condition:

$$v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) + h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t-1} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) = \tau$$

A non-myopic taxpayer, however, will anticipate how their the future ease of misreporting is affected by their current misreporting and engaged in “misreporting smoothing” over time. All else equal, a taxpayer who anticipates to have to misreport in order to cross the threshold in a future year will start misreporting already in previous years, in order to minimize their misreporting costs.

To see this, suppose that taxpayer i expects their wealth to be above the threshold in year $t + 1$. In year $t + 1$, the taxpayer anticipates that they will misreport their wealth in order to remain below the threshold, and report i.e., $\hat{w}_{i,t+1} = 2,570K$. They will also do so in $t + 2$ in order to keep staying below the threshold. Knowing this, their decision in year t of how much wealth to report is governed by the FOC:

$$v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) + \beta v_i^{S'}(w_{i,t+1} - 2,570K) + h_i^{S'}(\hat{w}_{i,t-1} - \hat{w}_{i,t}) - \beta^2 h_i^{S'}(0) = \tau(1 + \beta)$$

Therefore, we expect to see taxpayers further below the threshold, with lower taxable wealth levels, also misreport. This is consistent with the systematically reported wealth growth rates below the threshold (relative to above) which we observe in the data.

Result 2: Bunching can persist for several years and taxpayers can be pushed above the threshold for a sufficiently large wealth shock.

Taxpayer i will bunch at the threshold if and only if:

$$\begin{aligned} w_{it} - \tau w_S - v_i^S(w_{it} - w_S) - h_i^S(\hat{w}_{i,t-1} - w_S) + V_{i,t} + \beta \omega_i^S(w_{it}) \\ \geq w_{it} - \tau \hat{w}_{i,t}^* - v_i^D(w_{it} - \hat{w}_{i,t}^*) - h_i^D(\hat{w}_{i,t-1} - \hat{w}_{i,t}^*) + \beta \omega_i^D(w_{it}) \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

For a myopic taxpayer, we are back to the static bunching indifference equation. However, a forward-looking taxpayer anticipates the dependency between future misreporting costs and today’s report. Note that this bunching indifference condition can hold for several years, as different realizations of wealth occur and as long as the value from remaining in the simplified regime $V_{i,t}$ is high enough.

We can also see that a high realization of w_{it} will push a taxpayer above the threshold as it will increase the cost of misreporting $v_i^S(w_{i,t} - w_S)$ such that it becomes too costly to remain at the threshold.

Result 3: Taxpayers above the threshold will bunch less, since it requires them to decrease reported wealth which is costly. If the cost h_i^S of reporting negative wealth growth is sufficiently large and steep, taxpayers above the threshold will face a higher cost, all else equal, of reporting at the threshold. To see this, consider taxpayers with wealth above and below the threshold, respectively, with the same cost functions and same value V . From the bunching condition (Equation 12), we

can see that for a taxpayer with wealth above the threshold, the left-hand side is smaller, making it less likely that the bunching will be appealing. Furthermore, they may even engage in reverse bunching, whereby they will over-report their true wealth to avoid having to report negative wealth growth.

Result 4: There is no detectable bunching at pure tax kinks in the detailed reporting regime because the costs of misreporting imply low elasticities of misreporting. In the limit, if there is a fixed (and large) cost component of misreporting above the threshold, only taxpayers with sufficient incentives to do so will misreport and the tax elasticity of misreporting observed may be low.

Result 5: We will observe bunching at the exemption threshold because of the fixed cost of reporting wealth.