The Impact of Multinationals Along the Job Ladder

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Introduction

- Multinational affiliates are more productive than domestic firms
- How do they impact a host country through the labor market?

Our view of the labor market:

Multinationals affect labor market through two channels:

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- ▶ Due to search frictions, firms have monopsony power
- ▶ But workers are mobile: outside options along job ladder
- ▶ Can climb job ladder both inside and outside current firm

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Multinationals affect labor market through two channels:

1. Direct effect on workers employed at multinationals
2. Indirect effect on outside options of workers at local firms
   - Low productivity firms: workers more likely to leave
   - High productivity firms: better outside options bid up wages

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   - Low productivity firms: workers more likely to leave
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- Impact is heterogeneous across workers and local firms
- Workers gain overall, but wage inequality increases

What we do & what we find

1. Matched employer-employee data for Norway
   - ▸ Confirm existence of a job ladder
   - ▸ (New) Multinationals high up on this job ladder

2. GE job ladder model of labor market with multinationals
   - ▸ Helpman-Melitz-Yeaple (2004) meets
     Cahuc-Postel-Vinay-Robin (2006) + DMP

3. Calibration: match firm size dist (MN and non-MN), wage dist, labor share, unemployment, labor market transitions

4. Counterfactual: infinite entry cost for multinationals
   - ▸ Multinational presence helps workers, hurts local firms
   - ▸ Heterogeneous effects: multinationals increase wage inequality

▸ Literature

Data

Data

- Matched employer-employee data for Norway 1996-2007

1. Population Register: for each individual, annual earnings (all sources) & estab. identifier for main employer in November
2. Income tax files: match establishments to firms
3. SIFON registry of foreign ownership: ownership at firm level
   - Code as multinational if share of largest foreign owner >50%

- Baseline: estab. as unit of analysis (robustness with firms)
- Focus on private sector establishments & linked individuals

Summary statistics

|	All	Domestic	MN	MN share
Worker-years	12,001,918	9,815,230	2,186,688	0.18
Establishment-years	1,166,928	1,091,231	75,687	0.06
Avg establishment size	10.29	8.99	28.89	

▸ Industries   ▸ Occupations

Job-to-job transitions are not random: job ladder

- Use November cross-sections to code transitions: EE, NE, EN
- Rank establishments by their share of hires from employment ("poaching index"):

$$poach_i = \frac{\sum_{t=1998}^{2007} hire_{it}^{EE}}{\sum_{t=1998}^{2007} hire_{it}^{EE} + \sum_{t=1998}^{2007} hire_{it}^{NE}}$$

Multinationals are high up on the job ladder

Poaching index

Model

Model overview

- Discrete time
- Homogeneous workers, firms with hetereogeneous productivity
- On-the-job and off-the-job search, random matching
- Wages determined by bargaining
- Look for stationary equilibrium

How do multinational affiliates differ from domestic firms?

1. Different entry cost, draw from different productivity dist
2. Entry cost paid by foreigners, profit rebated to foreigners

Model assumptions 1/5: Workers

- Continuum of infinitely-lived workers on $[0, 1]$
- Linear utility, discount future at rate β
- Flow utility in unemployment is b
- Flow income for employed is endogenous wage w
- Match with employer breaks with probability δ each period
  - Pass through one period of unemployment before searching
- Unemployed search for jobs with probability 1
- Employed search with probability $s \leq 1$

Model assumptions 2/5: Firms

- Firm is a draw of productivity p from cdf $\tilde{\Gamma}^i(p)$, $i \in \{D, F\}$
- Output per worker employed at firm of type p is p
- Firms discount future at rate β, die at rate δ_f
- Surviving firms lose workers exogenously at rate δ_m

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- Each firm pays $c(v)$ to post $v \in \mathbb{R}$ vacancies with

$$c(0) = 0, c'(v) > 0, c''(v) > 0$$

- Choose: optimal $v(p)$ given wage setting protocol

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$$c(0) = 0, c'(v) > 0, c''(v) > 0$$

- Choose: optimal $v(p)$ given wage setting protocol
- Free entry condition:

$$C^i = \int_b^{\underline{p}} 0 \, d\tilde{\Gamma}^i(p) + \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} \frac{B(p)}{1 - (1 - \delta_f)\beta} \, d\tilde{\Gamma}^i(p)$$

  - $B(p)$ value to entrant of draw p, indep. of current employment
  - $\underline{p} > 0$: endogenous cutoff below which firm attracts no workers
- $\rightarrow$ Prod dist of active firms: $\Gamma(p)$, mass of firms M

Model assumptions 3/5: Matching

- Total measure of vacancies is V:

$$V = M \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} v(p) \, d\Gamma(p)$$

- Total measure of searching workers is S:

$$S = u + s(1 - \delta)(1 - u)$$

  - u: unemployment rate & number of unemployed

- CRS matching function $\mu(S, V)$
  - Probability unemployed worker meets vacancy: λ
  - Prob vacancy meets worker: χ

$$\lambda = \frac{\mu(S, V)}{S}, \; \chi = \frac{\mu(S, V)}{V}$$

Model assumptions 4/5: Bargaining & wages

- ► Follow Cahuc-Postel-Vinay-Robin (2006)

- ► When worker and firm match, they split match value
  - ► i.e. appropriately discounted flow of p
- ► Worker gets value of outside option + share ϕ of match surplus (i.e. value of match - value of outside option match)
- ► Implemented by constant wage until outside option increases

- ► Outside option depends on origin / best on-the-job meeting
- ► If outside option is better than current match, worker moves

Model assumptions 5/5: Bargaining & wages

▶ Worker at firm p with outside option q gets $w(q,p)$ s.t.

$$W(q,p) = \underbrace{W(q,q)}_{\text{outside option}} + \phi\underbrace{(W(p,p) - W(q,q))}_{\text{match surplus}}$$

where

$$W(q,p) = w(q,p) + \beta \left[\underbrace{\delta U}_{\text{unemp}} + \underbrace{(1-\delta)(1-\lambda s)W(q,p)}_{\text{do not search on job or match}} + (1-\delta)\lambda s \left(\underbrace{F(q)W(q,p)}_{\text{meet } x \text{ with } x \leq q} + \underbrace{\int_q^p W(x,p)\,dF(x)}_{\text{meet } x \text{ with } q < x \leq p} + \underbrace{\int_p^{\bar{p}} W(p,x)\,dF(x)}_{\text{meet } x \text{ with } p < x} \right) \right]$$

Model results 1/4: Worker transitions

Separations to unemployment
- ▶ Workers enter unemployment w/prob $\delta = \delta_f + \delta_m$

Hires from unemployment
- ▶ Unemployed searchers meet a firm w/prob λ; accept all offers

Job-to-job transitions
- ▶ Worker employed at firm of type p meets new firm w/prob λs
  - ▶ If new firm has productivity $x > p$, worker moves to new firm
  - ▶ Otherwise stays at original firm

- ▶ Multinational presence affects λ & prob of meeting better firm

Model results 2/4: Wages

- Wage for worker at firm p with outside option $q \leq p$ is

$$w(q,p) = \phi p + (1-\phi) q - \underbrace{\int_q^p \frac{(1-\phi)^2 \beta (1-\delta) \lambda s (1-F(x))}{1-\beta(1-\delta)(1-\phi\lambda s(1-F(x)))} dx}_{\text{discount due to value of moving up ladder in firm } p}$$

- $F(x)$: cdf of job offer distribution (endogenous)

$$dF(x) = \frac{v(x) d\Gamma(x)}{\int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} v(y) d\Gamma(y)}$$

- Note: $w(q,p)$ need not be monotonic in p

- Multinational presence affects joint distribution of $\{p, q\}$
- Multinational presence also affects $F(x)$, λ, and therefore wages conditional on $\{p, q\}$

Model results 3/4: Vacancy posting

- Value to firm with productivity p of posting v vacancies:

$$B(p,v) = v\chi \left[\begin{array}{c} \frac{u}{S} J\left(\underline{p}, p\right) + \\ \frac{(1-u)(1-\delta)s}{S} \int_{\underline{p}}^{p} J(x,p)\, dL(x) \end{array} \right] - c(v)$$

  where
  - $J(x,p)$: value to firm p of match with worker w/ outside option $x \leq p$
  - $dL(x)$: pdf of dist of workers by their firm's productivity
- foc implicitly defines $v(p)$, optimal vacancy posting
- Note: current employment does not enter $B(p) = B(p, v(p))$

- Multinational presence affects incentives to post vacancies through impact on $J(x,p)$, and vacancy yield
- Multinational presence therefore affects size conditional on p

Model results 4/4: Note on ranking firms

- Average wage at the firm level need *not* be monotonic in p
  - Due to value of option to move up

- But share of hires from employment *is* increasing in p:

$$poach(p) = \frac{(1-u)(1-\delta)s\int_{\underline{p}}^{p} dL(x)}{u + (1-u)(1-\delta)s\int_{\underline{p}}^{p} dL(x)}$$

- Intuition: All firms hire all the unemployed workers they meet, but higher p firms more likely to attract employed workers

Extensions

1. Capital in the production function
   - With Cobb-Douglas, no frictions in capital allocation, p is productivity of *equipped* labor

2. Labor heterogeneity
   - Workers have fixed observable skill types
   - Firms post vacancies in each skill market
   - With productivity-skill complementarity can get sorting
   - Multinational presence may affect between-group inequality

Calibration

Calibration

- Functional forms:

$$\mu(S,V) = A S^{\theta} V^{1-\theta}$$

$$c(v) = \frac{v^{1+\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{1+\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$

$$\tilde{\Gamma}^D \sim Pareto\left(b, \sigma^D\right) \text{ and } \tilde{\Gamma}^F \sim Pareto\left(\tau, \sigma^F\right)$$

$\bar{p}$: bounded above at 99th pctile of more dispersed dist.

- Production function: Cobb-Douglas in capital, labor with capital share κ, all firms face same rental price of capital
- Solve for mass of active firms M, share ω of foreign firms in potential entrants
- $\rightarrow$ recover C^D, C^F

Parameters and targets

- Preset: $\beta = 0.95^{1/4}$, $\kappa = 1/3$, $b = 1$ (normalize), $\theta = 0.5$ (literature), $\delta = 0.038$ (Eurostat), $\delta_f = 0.01$ (Balsvik & Haller)

Parameters and Targets

Target description	Data	Model		Value
Outside data				
EE quarterly transition rate (Eurostat)	0.03	0.03	s	0.54
Labor share (Statistics Norway)	0.60	0.60	ϕ	0.84
Nonemp rate 25-54 (Statistics Norway)	0.155	0.155	A	0.43
Our data				
Std dev ln estab. employment	1.13	1.12	α	0.22
Average establishment size	10.29	10.29	M	0.08
Share active estabs that are domestic	0.94	0.94	ω	0.005
Std dev ln estab. wage	0.63	0.63	σ_D	1.57
Std dev ln estab. employment, MN	1.32	1.33	σ_F	0.72
Diff in ln av size betw dom & MN estabs	0.96	0.96	$\tau/\bar{p}$	0.02

Nontargeted moment: poaching index distribution

▶ Simulate quarterly model for 10 years with 1 million workers, calculate poaching index as in data

Data

Model

Nontargeted moment: joint dist of poaching index & wages

▶ Simulate quarterly model for 10 years with 1 million workers, calculate poaching index, wages as in data ▸ Size


Data

Model

Counterfactual

Counterfactual: No multinationals

- $C^F \to \infty$, C^D held fixed
- Solve for counterfactual measure of firms & active firm productivity dist s.t. domestic free entry condition holds

Labor market impact of multinational presence

	Level	
	Baseline	No MN
Employment	1	1.004
Average worker-level wage	1	0.86
Wage Gini coefficient	0.51	0.49
Average firm size	10.29	9.49
Measure of firms	1	1.09

- ▶ Multinational presence increases average wages
- ▶ But also increases unemployment and wage inequality

▸ Aggregates ▸ Wages ▸ Profits ▸ Size

Impact on worker-level wage distribution

► Multinational presence increases wage inequality

Intuition: shift in employment distribution

- Wage for worker at firm p with outside option $q \leq p$ is

$$w(q,p) = \phi p + (1-\phi) q - \underbrace{\int_q^p \frac{(1-\phi)^2 \beta (1-\delta) \lambda s (1-F(x))}{1 - \beta (1-\delta)(1 - \phi \lambda s (1-F(x)))} dx}_{\text{discount due to value of moving up ladder in firm } p}$$

Intuition: shift in outside option distribution

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
Low productivity firm

High productivity firm

Relation to reduced form evidence

Alfaro-Ureña, Manelici & Vasquez (2021)

- ▶ Positive impact of (instrumented) multinational presence in local labor market on wages of employees of domestic firms
- ▶ Insufficient college workers to distinguish effects for high and low skill groups

Setzler & Tintelnot (2021)

- ▶ Positive impact of (instrumented) multinational presence in local labor market on wages of employees of domestic firms
- ▶ Increase bigger for high-paid workers (don't see education)
- ▶ Employment at domestic firms increases

We find:

- ▶ Heterogeneous effects across workers & local firms

# Conclusion

- Labor market is characterized by a job ladder, with multinationals at the top
- Multinational presence increases productivity and labor market competition: on average helps workers, hurts local firms
- But impact is heterogeneous:
  - Low productivity local firms lose workers, shrink, may pay lower wages due to fewer outside options low down on the job ladder
  - High productivity local firms pay higher wages due to more outside options high up on the job ladder
- Wage inequality rises

Extensions

- Worker heterogeneity and sorting: between-group inequality

Worker heterogeneity and sorting

Education & estab. rank   Ability & estab. rank

Model extension: Worker heterogeneity and sorting

- Three (observable) labor types, $h \in \{1, 2, 3\}$
- Firms can post vacancies in each skill market
- Random matching within each skill market
- Marginal product of skill type h at firm p is

$$y = \eta_h p^{\nu_h}$$

  with

$$1 = \eta_1 \leq \eta_2 \leq \eta_3$$

  and

$$1 = \nu_1 \leq \nu_2 \leq \nu_3$$

- $\nu_h > 1 \rightarrow$ sorting

- Identification of $\{\eta_h, \nu_h\}$: skill premium & skill group share of employment along job ladder

Related literature

Applications of general equilibrium job ladder models with firms

- ▶ Bagger & Lentz (2019), Engbom & Moser (2021), Gouin-Bonenfant (2022)

Impact of multinationals through the labor market

- ▶ Alfaro-Ureña et al (2021), Setzler & Tintelnot (2021)

Empirical literature on job ladders

- ▶ Haltiwanger, Hyatt, Kahn & McEntarfer (2018), Moscarini & Postel-Vinay (2018)

Search and matching models of distributional impact of trade

- ▶ Helpman, Itskhoki, Redding (2010), Cosar, Guner and Tybout (2016), Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler & Redding (2017), Fajgelbaum (2020)

▸ Back

Industries: Domestic vs MN

Occupations: Domestic vs MN

Employment shares

Poaching index distribution by ownership: firms

Model results: Profits

- Per period profit of firm of type p with age a is

$$\pi(p) = \left(p - \underbrace{\int_{\underline{p}}^{p} w(x,p)\, dG(x|p)}_{\text{average wage at firm } p} \right) e(p,a) - c(v(p))$$

- $dG(x|p)$: pdf of outside options for workers at firm of type p
- $e(p,a)$: employment at firm of type p with age a

- Multinational presence affects $w(x,p)$, $G(x|p)$, $\underline{p}$ and therefore average wage conditional on p
- Multinational presence also affects $e(p,a)$, $v(p)$

Model results: Firm age and size

▶ Firms of type p which survive to age a have employment:

$$e(p, a) = \frac{h(p)}{1 - x(p)} (1 - x(p)^a)$$

▶ with

$$h(p) = v(p) \chi \left(\frac{u + (1 - u)(1 - \delta) s \int_{\underline{p}}^{p} dL(x)}{S} \right)$$

$$x(p) = \frac{(1 - \delta)}{(1 - \delta_f)} (1 - \lambda s (1 - F(p)))$$

▶ Fraction of firms of age a is $(1 - \delta_f)^{a-1} \delta_f$

Nontargeted moment: joint dist of poaching index & size

- ▶ Simulate quarterly model for 10 years with 1 million workers, calculate poaching index, size as in data ▸ Back


Data

Model

Nontargeted moment: 2-year log wage growth

- ▶ Simulate quarterly model for 10 years, with 1 million workers calculate transitions, wages as in data

Data

Model

Aggregate impact of multinational presence

- Compare steady states

	Level		Share of output	
	Baseline	No MN	Baseline	No MN
Payments to labor	1	0.87	0.60	0.60
Domestic firm profit	1	1.13	0.04	0.05
Foreign firm profit	1	0.00	0.01	0.00
Payments to capital	1	0.86	0.33^*	0.33^*
Hiring cost	1	0.84	0.01	0.01
Output	1	0.86		

* By assumption

- Multinational presence on aggregate benefits workers, hurts domestic firms
- Increase in labor income due to multinational presence more than offsets decrease in domestic firm profit

Heterogeneous impact on firm-level average wages

- Multinational presence increases firm-level average wages for some firms, reduces them for others ▸ Back

Heterogeneous impact on domestic firm profit

- Multinational presence shrinks profit at some domestic firms, increases it at others ▸ Back

Heterogeneous impact on domestic firm size

- ▶ Multinational presence shrinks employment at some firms, increases it at others ▸ Back