

The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States*

Paola Giuliano[†] Marco Tabellini[‡]

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Abstract

We study the long run effects of immigration on American political ideology. Exploiting cross-county variation in the presence of European immigrants between 1900 and 1930, we document that historical European immigration is associated with stronger preferences for redistribution and a more liberal ideology among Americans today. We show that this result is driven by immigrants with a longer exposure to social-welfare reforms in their countries of origin prior to emigration. Our evidence suggests that the vertical transmission of preferences within immigrant enclaves was complemented by horizontal socialization that promoted the spillover of ideology from immigrants to natives. This process was reinforced by immigrants' political incorporation in the Democratic voting bloc and by the election of legislators who were more likely to support pro-redistribution bills.

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[†]UCLA Anderson School of Management, NBER, CEPR and IZA. Email: paola.giuliano@anderson.ucla.edu

[‡]Harvard Business School, NBER, CEPR, and IZA. Email: mtabellini@hbs.edu

1 Introduction

Between 1850 and 1930, during the Age of Mass Migration, the United States received more than 30 million European immigrants. Abundant evidence indicates that European immigrants played a key role in fostering American economic development, both in the short and in the long run (Jones, 1992; Sequeira et al., 2020). Their effects on American political ideology are instead less well understood. In influential work, Lipset and Marks (2000) argue that the immigrant background of the American working class hindered the development of socialism in the United States. Similarly, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) link the smaller welfare state in the US, compared to Europe, to the ethnically diverse composition of the country. Moreover, immigration often triggers political backlash in the short run, which is accompanied by cuts in public spending and lower preferences for redistribution among natives (Dustmann et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020).

This discussion suggests that immigration to the United States likely moved political preferences to the right and reduced preferences for redistribution in the short run. However, in the long run, historical immigration might have caused a left-ward shift in American ideology. First, as documented by Bursztyn et al. (2021), long run exposure to immigration may favor inter-group contact and reduce (negative) stereotypes, leading to more positive views about immigrants among natives. This process may be reinforced by immigrants' gradual assimilation, which might reduce differences between groups and offset the short run reduction in natives' preferences for redistribution. Second, and specific to our context, European immigrants arrived after 1900 had been exposed to the expansion of the welfare state and the growth of the labor movement in their countries of origin since the late nineteenth century (Kuhnle and Sander, 2010). The left-leaning ideology imported by immigrants may have spilled over to natives through horizontal socialization, such as intermarriage and residential integration. The presence of first or second generation European immigrants among the leaders of the nascent Socialist Party and of the growing labor movement in the US also played an important role (Connell, 2022; Karlsson, 2022). Finally, as the size of the foreign born population grew, American politicians may have catered to the vote of an increasingly pivotal segment of the electorate by moving their platform to the left.

In this paper, we study the long run effects of historical immigration on American political ideology and preferences for redistribution. We combine cross-county variation in exposure to historical European immigration during the last three decades of the Age of Mass Migration (1900-1930) with political preferences of American born respondents obtained from the Cooperative Election Study (CES) between 2006 and 2020. We focus on post-1900 European immigrants for two reasons. First, as we describe in Section 2, these immigrants were

more likely (relative to those moving in previous decades) to have witnessed the growth of the labor movement and the implementation of social welfare reforms in their countries of origin since the late nineteenth century (Flora and Alber, 2017). Second, between 1900 and 1930 major shocks – World War I (WWI) and country-specific quotas passed in the 1920s – influenced immigration from different European countries differentially, thereby inducing changes in both the number and the “type” of immigrants entering the United States over time (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).

We estimate individual level regressions that include state and survey year fixed effects, individual characteristics, and several 1900 (or, time invariant) county controls. We find that US born respondents living in counties with higher historical immigration are more likely to identify with and vote for the Democratic Party and to support welfare spending and a higher minimum wage. According to our estimates, a 5 percentage points increase in the historical immigrant share raises the probability of identifying with the Democratic Party by 5.7% and support for welfare spending by 2%. These effects are quantitatively large, and comparable to the effects of income or race – two of the most important predictors of political ideology and preferences for redistribution in the United States (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

To identify the causal effect of immigration, we construct different versions of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001). As in Tabellini (2020), our baseline instrument interacts the share of immigrants born in each European country and living in a given US county in 1900 with the number of new migrants from that country moving to the US in subsequent decades, net of those who eventually settled in the county. Building on Sequeira et al. (2020), we develop an alternative instrument that combines the 1860-1900 expansion of the railroads with decadal nation-wide immigration from each European country to predict the 1900 distribution of immigrants across US counties. We interact such (predicted) initial shares with post-1900 immigration predicted using weather shocks across European countries. For both instruments, we recover the average predicted number of immigrants in a county between 1910 and 1930 by aggregating across all immigrant groups, and averaging over the three decades (1910, 1920, and 1930). To further probe the validity of our empirical design, similar to Bazzi et al. (2021), we also combine the shift-share methodology with a matching strategy that selects within-state county pairs with the closest 1900 Democratic vote shares.

The inclusion of baseline or time-invariant county characteristics – such as the Black and the urban share of the population, occupational income scores, the employment share in manufacturing, labor force participation, geographic coordinates, and the vote share of the Democratic, the Progressive, and the Socialist Party – reduces concerns that the instrument may be correlated with variables that might have independent effects on the long run

evolution of ideology. Results are also robust to controlling for several other factors that may have influenced preferences for redistribution and political ideology – from (predicted) industrialization to frontier exposure (Bazzi et al., 2020) to the 1940-1970 Great Migration of African Americans to the post-1960 Mexican immigration. Our findings are also not sensitive to excluding the US South, aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ), and controlling for historical migration from non-European countries. We describe these and many other robustness checks in detail after presenting the results.

What explains the positive association between historical immigration and preferences for redistribution and a liberal political ideology among American born individuals in the long run? We hypothesize that immigrants arriving after 1900 brought with them their political preferences, shaped by the expansion of the welfare state in Europe since the late nineteenth century. In turn, such left-leaning ideology influenced the preferences of the American electorate. To test our hypothesis, we derive a measure of exposure to the welfare state that counts the years since the introduction of different social welfare reforms – from compulsory education to pensions and healthcare to unemployment insurance – across European countries up until 1930. We combine the country-specific experience with the welfare state in a county-level index that assigns weights in proportion to the share of each immigrant group (relative to all European immigrants) in the county. Then, we split the sample between counties with values of the welfare exposure index above and below the median. We find that the effects of immigration are stronger in counties that received more immigrants from countries with a longer history of exposure to social welfare reforms.

We perform two additional exercises to support the idea that exposure to welfare reforms in Europe is an important driver of our results. First, we show that only immigrants arrived after 1900, and not those arrived before, influenced long run American political ideology. This is consistent with our proposed mechanism, since most European countries began to introduce social welfare reforms in the second part of the nineteenth century (Flora and Alber, 2017). Second, we compare the effects of German immigrants arrived before and after the major reform implemented by Bismarck in 1884.¹ In line with our hypothesis, despite being observationally similar to those migrating before, only Germans arrived in the US after 1884 had an impact on American ideology and preferences for the welfare state.

In the second part of the paper, we examine how the experience with the welfare state imported by European immigrants influenced American political ideology in the long run. Our hypothesis is that immigrants' political preferences spilled over to natives, moving the ideology of the latter to the left. In the presence of this mechanism, one would expect results

¹The reform was the first compulsory health insurance ever implemented in the world, and represented a key step towards universal access to healthcare (Bauernschuster et al., 2019; Scheubel, 2013).

to be stronger when historical inter-group contact was more frequent. We provide different pieces of evidence consistent with this idea.

First, we document that immigration had stronger effects in counties where, historically, immigrants were more likely to marry with and live close to natives (of native parentage). Second, we find that, between 1910 and 1930, natives (of native parentage) living in counties with a higher immigrant share were more likely to give to their children less American sounding names and to name their offspring after prominent European socialist figures (such as Karl Marx, Frederic Engels, and Clement Attlee). Third, the persistence of ideology within counties, might result from vertical transmission across generations (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Giuliano, 2007) coupled with persistence in ethnic settlements (Burchardi et al., 2019; Card, 2001). Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), we show that results hold when we restrict the sample to individuals with US born grandparents, after controlling for respondents' ancestry. Together, these patterns suggest that, while vertical transmission is likely to be an important channel, it is not sufficient to explain our findings.

We also discuss and provide evidence against alternative mechanisms – such as immigrants' economic characteristics, direct income effects, and changes in income inequality. Although these channels may have been independently at play, they are unlikely to be picked up by our measure of exposure to social welfare reforms.

In the last part of the paper, we trace out the dynamics of the effects of historical immigration. We consider two outcomes that are available for the entire twentieth century: the Democratic vote share in presidential elections and legislators' voting behavior on redistribution-related bills. While there is no correlation between immigration and support for the Democratic Party prior to 1928 – something that increases confidence in the validity of our empirical design – we observe a stark jump in the presidential elections of that year. Since then, European immigration remains positively and strongly associated with support for the Democratic Party.² Mirroring these results, we find that historical immigration increases the probability that legislators voted in favor of pro-redistribution bills, but only after the mid-1930s.

These patterns resonate with Andersen (1979)'s mobilization theory, according to which support for the Democratic Party among (first and second-generation) immigrants had its roots in the 1928 elections, when Alfred Smith – the first Roman Catholic to run for presidency in American history, who also had an immigrant background – attracted a large segment of the immigrant electorate to the Democratic Party. Indeed, our analysis reveals that the political incorporation of immigrants happening towards the end of the Age of Mass

²Results are robust to excluding the US South, which might confound our estimates due to the realignment that occurred around the time of the Civil Rights Act (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018).

Migration was key to promote the process of transmission. First, we document that counties that received more European immigrants displayed stronger support for Robert La Follette, who ran for presidency for the Progressive Party in 1924 and was openly endorsed by both the Socialist Party and the labor movement (Shideler, 1950). Second, we provide evidence that immigrants favored the foundation of ethnic socialist newspapers, which were instrumental for the expansion of the socialist movement (Karlsson, 2022). Third, we show that the presence of immigrants had a sizeable effect on the allocation of relief spending during the New Deal, even after accounting for the severity of the Great Depression.

Our findings complement the literature that has documented a short run negative correlation between immigration and ethnic diversity on the one hand and preferences for redistribution and political ideology on the other (Alesina et al., 1999, 2023; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Luttmer, 2001). Consistent with Bursztyn et al. (2021), we show that immigration can have the opposite effects in the long run, leading to more liberal ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution. Both our results and those in Bursztyn et al. (2021) point towards the importance of inter-group contact. Bursztyn et al. (2021) show that contact can reduce prejudice against minorities among majority group members. Our findings suggest that this process might be reinforced by the transmission of preferences from immigrants to natives.

More broadly, our results are consistent with the “contact hypothesis” (Allport, 1954), according to which repeated interactions between groups can, under certain circumstances, favor inter-group relations and promote the transmission of values from one group to the other (Bazzi et al., 2019; Lowe, 2020; Schindler and Westcott, 2021). We speculate that, even if ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants initially triggered natives’ backlash (Tabellini, 2020), it might have eventually led to stronger cohesion partly because it was “not too high”, and it was possible for European immigrants and natives to feel part of the same racial group. Viewed through the lens of inter-group contact and cultural transmission, our findings complement recent work by Bazzi et al. (2021), who link the 1900-1940 migration of southern born white Americans to the expansion of racially and religious conservative values outside the US South.

Our paper also speaks to the literature on immigrants’ assimilation. Many papers have studied the pace at which immigrants assimilate economically and culturally (Abramitzky et al., 2014, 2020, 2021; Borjas, 1985); others have documented that immigrants’ culture persists across generations (Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Giuliano, 2007; Grosjean, 2014), and analyzed the effectiveness of different assimilation policies (Bandiera et al., 2018; Fouka, 2020; Lleras-Muney and Shertzer, 2015). We show that the opposite process can also happen, and immigrants’ preferences can be transmitted to natives. Immigrants’

contribution to American economic development, trade, entrepreneurship, and innovation has been largely documented (Burchardi et al., 2019; Kerr and Mandorff, 2020; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Moser et al., 2014; Fulford et al., 2020). Anecdotal and historical accounts also suggest that immigrants influenced American culture in the domains of music, cinema, and cuisine (Hirschman, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, our paper presents the first systematic analysis on the long run effects of immigration on the ideology and the political preferences of Americans.

Finally, our paper speaks to the vast literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, for a review). We highlight a novel channel – namely, the transmission of values from immigrants to natives – that can shape individuals’ views of the welfare state. Our findings complement those in Bazzi et al. (2020), who document that frontier exposure in the nineteenth century fostered a culture of “rugged individualism”, which persisted over the long run. We identify another historical factor – European immigrants and their exposure to the welfare state in their home countries – that influenced American ideology in the opposite, more liberal, direction.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Age of Mass Migration

Between 1850 and 1920, around 30 millions Europeans moved to the United States (Hatton and Williamson, 1998).³ Until 1890, most immigrants came from Northern and Western European countries, but gradually, as both transportation costs fell and income rose, more and more migrants left poorer countries in Southern and Eastern Europe (Figure A.1). After a temporary slowdown between 1890 and 1900, immigration skyrocketed to unprecedented levels (Figure A.2). This, together with the compositional shift towards new, culturally more distant sending countries, increased concerns about both immigrants’ assimilation and the negative consequences on wages and employment of native workers (Higham, 1955).

The political climate grew increasingly hostile towards European immigrants. After several attempts, in 1917, US Congress introduced a literacy test that required all immigrants arriving to the US to be able to read and write (Goldin, 1994). The literacy test was introduced when European immigration had already been drastically reduced by WWI. After the end of the war, between 1919 and 1921, immigration flows went back to their 1910 levels, fueling natives’ fears of a new “invasion”. Eventually, in 1921, the Quota Emergency Act

³Immigration to the US was restricted for Chinese and Japanese immigrants, following the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1908 Gentleman’s Agreement respectively (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), but there were no legal restrictions to European immigration.

introduced a temporary cap to immigration, which was made permanent and more stringent in 1924, with the passage of the National Origins Act (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). The quotas were explicitly designed to reduce the inflows from Southern and Eastern Europe, whose immigrants were considered culturally far and unwilling and unable to assimilate (Higham, 1955).⁴

The combined effects of WWI and the quotas were dramatic: immigration to the US dropped and remained negligible until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Figure A.3). A key feature of both shocks is that different nationalities were affected differentially. On the one hand, WWI had a larger impact on countries that were not part of the US allies (with the German case being an emblematic one). On the other, the quotas reached their goal and disproportionately restricted the inflow of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, which had sent more migrants between 1900 and 1914. As a result, the shocks created a trend-break in the country-mix of immigrants moving to the US. Since immigrants cluster geographically in receiving countries, such changes led to substantial variation in both the number and the “mix” of immigrants received by different US counties between 1910 and 1930.

2.2 The Expansion of Social Welfare in Europe

The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the “take-off of the modern welfare state” in many European countries (Flora and Alber, 2017). The expansion of social welfare was caused by a variety of factors. Among the most important ones were the social problems triggered by industrial and urban growth, which led to increasing demand for “social rights” (Briggs, 1961). Historically, Europe had dealt with poverty with *ad-hoc* solutions, through local authorities and philanthropic institutions. However, as unemployment became a key threat to citizens’ well-being (and thus, to the stability of regimes), a new notion of social welfare state emerged, and nation states started to play a more active role in fighting poverty (Stefan, 2015).

The idea that states were responsible for the social protection of their citizens was circulating in the Prussian Empire already in the 1840s. These ideas were formalized a few decades later when, with the Imperial Decree of 1881, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck launched the programs for sickness (1883), accident (1884), old age and invalidity insurance (1889). The 1883-1884 reforms, in particular, represented the first example of compulsory

⁴The 1921 Emergency Quota Act mandated that the number of European immigrants from each country entering the US in a given year could not exceed 3% of the stock from that country living in the US in 1910. With the 1924 National Origins Act, the limit was lowered to 2%, and the base year was moved to 1890, so as to further restrict immigration from “new sending countries”. Furthermore, the total number of immigrants that could be admitted in a given year was capped at 150,000 (Goldin, 1994).

health insurance ever implemented in the world, and are considered a key step in the direction of universal access to healthcare (Bauernschuster et al., 2019; Scheubel, 2013).⁵

While social protection was at the core of the new activities performed by European states, the expansion of social welfare took place also in the domains of public education, public health, and safety in the workplace (Flora and Alber, 2017). Moreover, sociologists and social scientists became increasingly concerned about the “social question”, i.e., the issue of how to reorganize the social order following the disruptive changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution (Traugott, 2022). These ideas spread through civil society associations, such as *Verein für Socialpolitik* in Germany, the Fabian Society in Great Britain, and similar associations of economists in Nordic countries (Kuhnle and Sander, 2010).

Germany was an early mover in the process of expansion of the welfare state, but was soon followed by many other European countries. For example, between 1884 and 1888, Denmark, Norway, and, Sweden started to actively discuss the “social question” in their parliaments. Cash benefits and medical assistance were introduced in Sweden in 1891, while Norway implemented a social welfare reform guaranteeing insurance against on the job accidents.⁶ The UK followed suit a few decades later, introducing workers’ compensation, health insurance, and compulsory unemployment insurance between 1898 and 1911.⁷ The top-down expansion of the welfare state on the one hand and the growth of civil society associations on the other cemented the view of “the welfare state as a state particularly for the working class, and closely linked to a demand for social rights” (Briggs, 1961). Even though the share of public spending over GDP remained limited until after WWII (Lindert, 2004), the introduction of the first social welfare programs changed the scope of the “social contract” as well as citizens’ expectations about the prerogatives of the nation state. As a consequence, members of the middle and working class in Europe began to demand a more active role by the state in fighting unemployment and poverty (Stefan, 2015).

In contrast with the trends prevailing in Europe, “the United States – widely labelled as a laggard in welfare state...did not adopt policies along European lines” (Skocpol, 1995). Rather, the US focused on separating welfare and social security, introducing provision for children, widows, and War Veterans early on, but lagged behind in the implementation of a national social insurance scheme (Kuhnle and Sander, 2010). The US did not introduce a comprehensive set of social welfare policies until the New Deal.⁸

⁵See also Leichter (1979). We discuss the Bismarck reforms in more detail in Appendix F.1.

⁶Both countries introduced other social welfare reforms, such as unemployment insurance and family allowance schemes, soon after 1900 (Kuhnle and Sander, 2010)

⁷A large historical literature has examined the reasons why constitutional-dualistic monarchies (e.g., Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden) were more likely to introduce social insurance earlier than parliamentary democracies, such as the UK. Flora and Alber (2017) argue that non-parliamentary regimes faced stronger pressure from the labor movement, and were thus more likely to make concessions early on.

⁸Several US states introduced compulsory schooling laws starting in the late nineteenth century. However, the goal of these

2.3 European Immigrants and American Socialism

Abundant historical accounts link the rise of the labor and socialist movements in the early twentieth century US to the presence of European immigrants (Connell, 2022; Karlsson, 2022). The latter actively contributed to the expansion of the Socialist Party of America (founded in 1901) through the creation of Foreign Language Federations, which operated along the lines of the main party and often sponsored their own newspapers. Already by 1914, the Socialist Party of America had as many as 46 non-English newspapers, accounting for 21% of all socialist newspapers in the US (Karlsson, 2022). Among the most active groups were those from Scandinavia and from Germany.

For instance, the Scandinavian Socialist Federation, formed in 1910 by Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian immigrants, counted 66 branches and 1,100 members in 1914, and 88 locals with 2,200 paying members in 1917 (Karlsson, 2022). The Swedes developed networks that resembled the *folkrorelsесамverkan* (or, popular movement cooperation) prevailing in their home country, relying on them to promote social mobilization. These and similar organizations, which sponsored cultural and education programs, facilitated the integration of Swedish immigrants in the American society by promoting a new definition of “group”, based on working class rather than on ethnicity (Nordhal, 1994).

The growth of ethnic socialist movements was often favored by figures such as Henry Bengston, who moved from Sweden to the US in 1907. Historical accounts indicate that Bengston was drawn to socialism already during his childhood in Sweden, due to the influence of his liberal father and the schooling he received.⁹ After emigration, Bengston became involved with the Swedish-American Socialist movement while working in a lumber camp outside of Ontario in 1908. There, he met with Swedish socialists and read copies of the Socialist newspaper *Arbetaren*. Soon after, Bengston moved to Chicago to join the Scandinavian Socialist Federation, becoming a leader of the movement. Bengston also managed the Scandinavian Socialist League’s printing and publishing establishment, the Scandinavian Worker’s Publishing Society, and became the editor of the newspaper *Svenska Socialisten* in 1912 (Karlsson, 2022).

The Germans had a similar impact on the political and social life of several US cities. One of the most emblematic example is that of Milwaukee, defined as the “most German of major American cities”, where the Germans constituted the largest immigrant group at the turn of the twentieth century (Efford, 2022). Here, the German community gave impetus to the blossoming of the socialist and labor movements, inspired by the doctrines of Karl

policies was not to provide a public good to the population. Rather, compulsory schooling laws were used as nation-building strategy to “Americanize” the immigrant population (Bandiera et al., 2018).

⁹See also the historical collection available at <https://explore.chicagocollections.org/ead/northpark/189/mw29w4s/>.

Marx and Frederick Engels circulating in Europe in previous decades. Initially, socialist ideas remained confined within the German enclaves. However, over time, they spread to the rest of the society, crossing the ethnic lines (Connell, 2022). In 1910, with the election of second generation German immigrant Emil Seidel as mayor, Milwaukee became the largest socialist-run city in the US. Although Seidel lost his bid for re-election in 1912, the influence of the socialist movement remained strong.

In many US cities, the rise of socialism went hand in hand with the growth of the labor movement. In Milwaukee, this process was promoted by Jacob Friedrick, who left Germany for Wisconsin in 1904 at the age of twelve. Friedrick became the president of the local machinists' union and, eventually, the general secretary of the Milwaukee Federated Trades Council (Walzer, 2022). Friedrick's political involvement led to the creation of the Milwaukee Labor College, a school program for workers sponsored by the Federated Trades Council, and the introduction of the first state unemployment compensation law in 1932 (Jacobson, 1932).

The left-leaning ideology brought by European immigrants was not confined to the Socialist Party. In 1924, Robert La Follette ran for presidency as the candidate of the Progressive Party, challenging the two-party system with a platform that was endorsed by most labor organizations and was heavily supported by the immigrant electorate. La Follette was also openly endorsed by the Socialist Party: in a letter to the *New York Times* on July 17, 1924, Eugene V. Debs, one of the founders of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), invited all the Party leaders to support La Follette's candidacy.¹⁰

Four years later, in the 1928 presidential elections, the Democratic Party attracted large segments of the immigrant population, when Alfred Smith ran as candidate for the party. As noted by Clubb and Allen (1969), "Al Smith, the rags-to-riches scion of the Fulton Fish-market, was responsible for bringing the children of 'new immigration' into an increasingly welfare-oriented Democratic party". In related work, Andersen (1979) proposes a "mobilization" theory, arguing that immigrants were fundamental in explaining the New Deal electoral realignment. According to this view, support for Franklin D. Roosevelt (in the 1932 elections) and the subsequent process of realignment was directly linked to immigrants' influence on American politics, and had its origins in 1928 (Clubb and Allen, 1969; Degler, 1964; Lubell, 1952).

The gradual (but persistent) left-ward shift of the Democratic Party's platform likely altered the preferences of existing native voters (Zaller, 1992). The political incorporation of Europeans might have further promoted the transmission of preferences from immigrants to

¹⁰See <https://www.nytimes.com/1924/07/17/archives/la-follette-gets-debs-endorsement-letter-to-socialist-leaders-here.html>.

natives, through the development of a common political identity, which eroded pre-existing ingroup-outgroup boundaries based on ethnicity.

3 Data

In this section, we describe the main variables used in the analysis, with the corresponding sources. Additional variables and datasets are introduced below (Sections 6 and 7), as they become relevant.

3.1 Historical Data

Historical county characteristics. The number of European immigrants and their characteristics (which we aggregate to the county-decade level) come from the full count US Censuses (Ruggles et al., 2020). From the same source we obtain several 1900 county variables, such as the Black and urban share of the population, labor force participation, employment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores.¹¹ Our main analysis considers the 25 European countries with at least one immigrant in the US in 1900, and for which we could recover information on social welfare reforms (discussed in the next paragraph).¹²

Exposure to social welfare reforms. Since we cannot directly observe preferences for redistribution of European migrants at the time of arrival, we proxy for that using an individual's exposure to the welfare state in the country of origin. We consider the three main sets of social welfare programs introduced in this period – education, pensions, and unemployment insurance. Data on education reforms is taken from Bandiera et al. (2018), except for Austria and Germany for which we instead rely on the original data reported in Flora (1983).¹³ Data on the implementation of pension reforms is taken from Galasso and Profeta (2018).¹⁴ Finally, for unemployment insurance reforms, we collect data from Flora (1983); however, since information from this source is missing for several countries, we complement it with the dates reported in SSPTW.¹⁵ Table A.2 reports the year of implementation of

¹¹Since prior to 1940 no data on wages or income was reported in the US Census, we follow the literature (Abramitzky et al., 2014), and use occupational income scores, which are constructed by assigning to an individual the median income of his job category in 1950. We fix county boundaries to 1930, applying the harmonization procedure from Perlman (2016).

¹²See Table A.2 for the list of countries. Ruggles et al. (2020) report an individual's country of origin according to post-1919 boundaries. We are thus able to measure immigration across countries consistently, despite the changes borders occurring during this period.

¹³Bandiera et al. (2018) also build their dataset from Flora (1983), but attribute to Germany and Austria education reforms carried out in the eighteenth century. We instead prefer to consider the reforms of the late nineteenth century, since these in our view capture more centralized (and thus, for our purposes meaningful) reforms.

¹⁴The only exception is Luxembourg. In this case, data comes from the Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe (SSPTW) published by the *Social Security Administration* and the *International Social Security Association* in 2018, available at <https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2018-2019/europe/ssptw18europe.pdf>.

¹⁵Whenever reforms were reported in both Flora (1983) and SSPTW, they coincided. Results are robust to dropping unemployment reforms.

each reform in the countries in our sample.¹⁶

For each decade between 1900 and 1930 and for each reform, we count the number of years between the date in which a country introduced the reform and the year of arrival in the US of immigrants from that country. In this way, we obtain the decadal average exposure that immigrants from each country had to each of the three types of reforms. We then compute the average exposure to social welfare programs experienced by immigrants that moved to the US in each decade from each country, denoting this variable with $pr_{j\tau}$.¹⁷ To derive a county-specific index of exposure to welfare reforms (in Europe), we define the share of immigrants from country j living in county c arrived in the US in the previous decade (relative to all European immigrants arrived in the previous decade) with $\gamma_{jc\tau}$. We interact the country-decade specific experience ($pr_{j\tau}$) with the county-decade immigrant share ($\gamma_{jc\tau}$) to get:

$$PR_{c\tau} = \sum_j \gamma_{jc\tau} \times pr_{j\tau} \quad (1)$$

Finally, we average $PR_{c\tau}$ across decades to obtain the average exposure to reforms (brought about by European immigrants) in county c between 1910 and 1930. To ease the interpretation of results, we standardize the index by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation.

One question is whether the historical exposure to welfare reforms is indeed correlated with preferences for redistribution. In Appendix D.2.1, we perform a validation exercise using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). We show that the timing of the introduction of social welfare reforms is strongly correlated with preferences for redistribution of first generation European immigrants today (Table D.5).

3.2 Preferences for Redistribution and Political Ideology

We measure political ideology and preferences for redistribution relying on nationally representative data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), an online survey widely used in the literature (Acharya et al., 2016; Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki, 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019). Conveniently for our purposes, the CES reports the county of residence of respondents, and contains a wide range of questions – from political ideology and voting behavior to preferences for redistribution and views on the role of government. Appendix D.1 describes the CES in more detail. We restrict attention to American born individuals, and focus on eight

¹⁶When assigning reforms to a given country, we account for changes in borders occurring during this period. Specifically, we consider Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia to be one unique entity until 1918. Hence, these countries have been assigned the same set of reforms until this year.

¹⁷Note that $pr_{j\tau}$ is a function of both the year in which country j introduced a given reform and the number of immigrants that moved to the US from j in decade τ . If a country did not introduce any reform prior to 1930, we set this variable to zero.

questions – four for political ideology, and four for preferences for redistribution – coded so that higher values refer to more liberal (i.e., closer to the Democratic Party) ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution.¹⁸

3.3 Summary Statistics

Figure A.4 plots the 1910-1930 average immigrant share for the counties in our sample (unconditional in Panel A, and conditional on state fixed effects in Panel B), with darker colors representing higher immigrant presence. Consistent with the historical literature (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), European immigrants were concentrated in the Northeast, in the Midwest, and in selected areas in the West, such as California. Instead, Europeans did not extensively settle in the US South. Importantly, there is substantial variation in the presence of European immigrants not only across, but also within, states (Panel B).

In Table A.1, Panels A and B, we present the summary statistics for the historical variables and for the main immigrants' characteristics of our sample, respectively. The average CES respondent in our sample lives in a county where the 1910-1930 European immigrant share is about 9%. As documented in Figure A.4, this masks substantial heterogeneity across space. Panels C and D of Table A.1 report the summary statistics for each of the eight outcomes, while Table D.1 presents the characteristics of respondents in our sample. The average ideology score is 2.91 (on a 1 to 5 scale) and the average party affiliation score is 4.282 (on a 1 to 7 scale), while 38% and 51% of respondents identify with the Democratic Party and voted for a Democratic candidate in the last presidential elections, respectively. Around 59% of respondents in our sample oppose spending cuts, 40% of them are in favor of financing the deficit with taxes, and 71% support an increase in the minimum wage.

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Baseline Estimating Equation

To study the long run effects of European immigration on American ideology, we estimate a specification of the form:

$$y_{icst} = \alpha_s + \gamma_t + \beta imm_{cs} + X_{cs} + W_{icst} + u_{icst} \quad (2)$$

¹⁸We use the cumulative file containing data from 2006 until 2020. See Table D.2 for the exact wording, the range of the corresponding answer, and the years in which each question is available. Since not all questions were asked in all years, the number of respondents varies, ranging from a minimum of around 200,000 (support for welfare spending) to a maximum of more than 502,000 (party affiliation).

where y_{icst} refers to ideology or preferences for redistribution of respondent i living in county c in year t . The key regressor of interest is the average European immigrant share of the county population between 1910 and 1930, imm_{cs} . We always control for state and survey wave fixed effects, α_s and γ_t , for individual characteristics of respondents, W_{icst} (a quadratic in age, gender, race dummies, marital and employment status, educational attainment and income dummies), and for a large array of historical county variables, X_{cs} .¹⁹ Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

4.2 Instrument for Historical Immigration

The main threat to identification is that the location of immigrants between 1910 and 1930 was influenced by county-specific factors that were also correlated with the long run evolution of American ideology at the local level. To overcome this concern, in addition to controlling for historical county characteristics and for state fixed effects, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument used in the literature (Card, 2001).

Baseline instrument. The instrument predicts the number of immigrants received by each county in each decade from 1910 to 1930 by interacting 1900 settlements of different ethnic groups with subsequent migration flows from each sending (European) country. As in Tabellini (2020), we construct a “leave-out” version of the shift-share instrument, by excluding immigrants who eventually settled in a given county.²⁰ Formally, the predicted number of immigrants received by county c during decade τ is given by:

$$\tilde{Z}_{c\tau} = \sum_j sh_{jc} Imm_{j\tau} \quad (3)$$

where sh_{jc} is the share of immigrants from country j living in county c as of 1900 (relative to all immigrants from country j in the US), and $Imm_{j\tau}$ is the number of immigrants arrived from country j in the US between decade $\tau - 1$ and decade τ , net of those that eventually settled in county c . Since we are interested in predicting the total number of immigrants in the county, we add the 1900 immigrant stock to the predicted flows for 1910, and then recursively sum the flows for subsequent decades predicted by $\tilde{Z}_{c\tau}$. Finally, we compute the average number of predicted immigrants in the county for the three decades 1910, 1920, and 1930, and scale it by 1900 county population. We denote the predicted average immigrant

¹⁹There are 12 income categories in the CES – from less than 10,000 to more than 150,000 US dollars. We include dummies for each of them. See Table D.1 for more details. Historical or time invariant controls are: geographic coordinates, 1910-1930 predicted industrial growth as in Tabellini (2020), railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), as well as the 1900: urban and Black share, labor force participation, employment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores. As discussed below, results are robust to including many other variables. We do not include contemporaneous county controls, since any variable for the current period might be directly or indirectly affected by historical immigration (Sequeira et al., 2020). As such, these would be “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).

²⁰In Appendix B, we show that results are unchanged when using a state-level leave-out.

share in county c with Z_{cs} , and use it to instrument for the average immigrant share, imm_{cs} , in equation (2).

Instrument validity. The shift-share instrument exploits two distinct sources of variation. First, it relies on cross-sectional variation in 1900 immigrants' enclaves of different countries across US counties.²¹ Second, it leverages time-series variation in migration patterns across sending regions. Previous work has argued that 1900-1930 nation-wide shocks – WWI and the Immigration Acts – exogenous to county-specific conditions make this setting particularly well-suited to the use of shift-share instruments (Abramitzky et al., 2023; Ager et al., 2020; Tabellini, 2020). Specifically, the trend-break created by WWI and the Immigration Acts lowers the potential concern that the instrument might be correlated with shocks hitting US counties that both affected local conditions and influenced emigration patterns across European countries (Borusyak et al., 2020).²² The WWI and quota shocks also lower the serial correlation in migration flows from the same country of origin to the same local destination – a feature that might invalidate the shift-share design by conflating the short and the long run effects of immigration (Jaeger et al., 2018).²³

Alternative instrument. We also construct an alternative instrument that replaces the actual initial shares and the actual national immigration flows with *predicted* ones. We present the construction of the instrument in detail in Appendix B.1. Here, we only describe its intuition. Building on Sequeira et al. (2020), we combine the expansion of railroads across counties over time with national-level migration flows (from each country of origin) to derive the predicted number of immigrants from country j living in county c in 1900. We use this to construct a *predicted* version of the initial shares in the baseline instrument (sh_{jc}). Next, we replace the actual number of immigrants from country j entering the US in decade τ ($Imm_{j\tau}$) with that *predicted* number exploiting solely variation in weather shocks across European countries over time. The resulting instrument is obtained by interacting the predicted shares with the predicted flows.

Matching and shift-share instrument. To increase the confidence in our empirical strategy, in Appendix B.3, we combine the shift-share methodology with a matching exercise, similar to Bazzi et al. (2021). In particular, we select within-state county pairs with the closest Democratic vote shares at baseline. Then, we replicate the 2SLS analysis controlling for county-pair fixed effects (in addition to the battery of county-level historical controls).

We summarize all other robustness checks in Section 5.2, after presenting our main results.

²¹Figure A.5 plots the share of immigrants from different European origins living in selected US counties in 1900, and confirms the geographic clustering of different groups already documented in the literature (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Focusing on Massachusetts, Figure A.6 verifies that a similar degree of variation exists also for counties within the same state.

²²For a formal discussion of the validity of shift-share designs see also Adao et al. (2019), Borusyak et al. (2020), Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020), and Jaeger et al. (2018).

²³For instance, while the correlation in predicted immigration within the same destination over time is around .95 for the period between 1980 and 2010 (Jaeger et al., 2018), it is lower than .3 in our context.

5 Main Results

5.1 Historical Immigration and American Ideology

In Table 1, we investigate the long run effects of European immigration on political ideology and preferences for redistribution of American born individuals today by estimating equation (2). OLS estimates, reported in Panel A, are always positive and highly statistically significant. That is, individuals that today live in counties with a higher historical immigrant share are more likely to hold a liberal ideology and have stronger preferences for redistribution.

Panel B reports 2SLS coefficients for the baseline instrument, showing a very similar pattern. Interestingly, OLS and 2SLS coefficients are very close, and never statistically different from each other – a pattern similar to that documented in Tabellini (2020) for the short run effects of European immigration across US cities. One explanation is that the pull factors that might have attracted immigrants to a county were offset by congestion costs that induced immigrants to select otherwise declining places. Another possibility is that immigrants chose their location based on local economic conditions prevailing at the time, and these were not correlated with natives' ideology (either in the past or today).

Panel C presents results for the alternative instrument that relies on predicted shares and flows.²⁴ Also in this case, European immigration has a positive, precisely estimated, and large effect on American respondents' liberal ideology and preferences for redistribution. Especially in columns 1 to 5, coefficients in Panel C become somewhat larger, but are never statistically different from those in either Panel A or Panel B. One explanation for the larger coefficients estimated in Panel C is that the alternative instrument identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) of immigration for the subset of migrants induced to leave Europe by weather shocks. We return to this point in Section 6.1, when discussing the mechanisms. Given the similarity of results in Panels B and C, from now onwards we focus on the baseline version of the instrument, taking it as our preferred specification.²⁵

2SLS estimates (in Panel B) imply that a 5 percentage points increase in the average immigrant share – or, 40% of the inter-quartile range – is associated with a 1.1% higher probability of reporting a liberal ideology (column 1) and a 5.7% higher likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party (column 3), relative to the sample mean. Results are similar for preferences for redistribution: relative to respondents living in a county at the

²⁴Table A.3 reports first stage coefficients for the baseline (columns 1 to 3) and alternative (columns 4 to 6) instruments. In both cases, actual and predicted immigration are highly correlated, and the F-stat for weak instruments is well above conventional levels. Figure A.7 presents the graphical analogue of columns 2 and 5 by plotting the bin-scatterplot for the two first stages in Panels A and B, respectively.

²⁵The number of observations differs between Panels B and C because the alternative instrument cannot be constructed for all counties in our baseline sample (due to data limitation on the presence of railroads between 1860 and 1900). Results in Panel B (not reported for brevity) are unchanged when restricting attention to the sample considered in Panel C.

25th percentile of the historical immigrant share, individuals in a county at the 75th percentile are 4.5% more likely to oppose spending cuts and 4.7% more likely to support welfare spending, relative to the sample mean (columns 5 and 6).²⁶ The effects of immigration on support for an increase in the minimum wage and for funding state deficit through taxes (rather than via spending cuts) are quantitatively similar.²⁷

5.2 Summary of Robustness Checks

In Appendix B, we perform several exercises to probe the robustness of our findings. Table 1, Panel C, already showed that results are robust to using a version of the instrument derived combining the timing of railroad expansion and weather shocks to predict European migration. In Table B.1, we replicate the analysis using an instrument that interacts the predicted (resp., actual) shares with the actual (resp., predicted) flows in Panel A (resp., Panel B). Next, Figures B.1 and B.2 replicate the analysis by including – one by one – the initial shares of each immigrant group in the county, i.e., sh_{jc} in equation (3). This exercise reduces concerns that specific combinations of US counties and European countries of origin might be absorbing most of the variation in our data (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020).²⁸ Then, in Table B.2, we combine the shift-share instrument with the matching strategy described above, which selects within-state county pairs with the most similar 1900 Democratic vote shares.

Importantly, we check that results are robust to the inclusion of controls for baseline political preferences and ideology, proxied for by the Democratic, Socialist, and Progressive parties vote share in presidential elections (Table B.3). We also proxy for natives’ political ideology using: distance from the cities where the leaders of the failed 1848 German revolution settled, the percentage of children with native parents (of native parentage) named after a European socialist figure, and frontier exposure (Table B.4).²⁹ Relatedly, we verify that results are unchanged when controlling for different measures of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants, such as the 1900 intermarriage and residential integration rates and natives’ propensity to give to their children American sounding names (Table B.5).

Next, we address concerns that the instrument may be correlated with other forces influ-

²⁶These numbers are obtained by multiplying the coefficients in columns 5 and 6 of Panel B by the inter-quartile range of the average fraction of immigrants in our sample (0.125), and dividing it by the mean of the dependent variable, reported at the bottom of each column in Table 1.

²⁷Table A.4 reports coefficients on individual controls, and documents that they are in line with those estimated in the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

²⁸This exercise also deals with the possibility that the initial immigrant shares were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to settlers’ country of origin.

²⁹The Forty-Eighters were responsible for a “liberal contagion” across US cities, which increased support for civil rights in both the short and the long run (Dippel and Heblisch, 2021). See Section 6.2 for more details on the socialist name index. Bazzi et al. (2020) document that longer frontier exposure is associated with more individualistic preferences in the long run.

encing long run changes in natives' ideology. We replicate the analysis by controlling for: *i*) the instrumented 1940-1970 Black Great Migration, restricting the sample to non-southern counties (Table B.6); *ii*) predicted post-1965 Mexican immigration, non-European historical immigrants, and the 1900 share of internal migrants (Table B.7); *iii*) 1900 GDP per capita from Fulford et al. (2020) and the variance of (a Bartik-style measure of) economic growth between 1910 and 1930 (Table B.8); *iv*) the share of European immigrants arrived before 1900 (Tables B.9 and B.10); and, *v*) predicted ethnic diversity and polarization (Table B.11).³⁰

Finally, we show that the estimates are unchanged when: *i*) dropping potential outliers (Table B.12); *ii*) excluding the US South and aggregating the data to the SEA and the commuting zone (CZ) level (Tables B.13 and B.14); *iii*) estimating specifications without either county or individual level controls (Table B.15); *iv*) constructing the instrument using a state, rather than county, leave-out strategy (Table B.16) and, *v*) clustering standard errors at the SEA, at the CZ, or at the state level (Table B.17).

6 Mechanisms

Our results stand in contrast with those obtained by most papers that examine the short run effects of diversity and immigration on natives' political ideology and preferences for redistribution (see Alesina and Tabellini, 2022, for a recent review). They are instead more similar to findings in Bursztyn et al. (2021), who document that long run exposure to immigrants reduces prejudice against Arab-Muslims among white Americans. Bursztyn et al. (2021) interpret their results by noting that, consistent with the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), prolonged contact reduced natives' hostility against minorities by lowering negative stereotypes. A similar argument might apply to our findings. However, why should immigration lead to a left-ward shift in natives' ideology, even after several decades?

As described in Section 2.2, immigrants arrived after 1900 had been exposed to a more generous welfare state in Europe. The historical accounts discussed in Section 2.3 suggest that post-1900 European immigrants held a more left-leaning ideology, relative to American born individuals (and previously arrived immigrants), and that such ideology gradually influenced political preferences in the United States. In this section, we first provide evidence in support of this hypothesis. We then examine the channels of transmission. We document that the vertical persistence of preferences within ethnic enclaves was reinforced both by horizontal socialization and by immigrants' political incorporation. Finally, we discuss alternative mechanisms, such as immigrants' economic characteristics, direct economic effects,

³⁰In particular, Table B.9 verifies that results are unchanged when using the average immigrant share for the full 1850-1930 period. However, as shown in Table B.10, only the post-1900 immigrants have an effect on long run American ideology.

and changes in income inequality.

6.1 Immigrants' Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms

Main results. We hypothesize that European immigrants, who lived through the expansion of the welfare state in their countries of origin, exported their preferences and influenced American ideology in the long run. To test this idea, we rely on the measure of exposure to social welfare reforms that European immigrants had in their countries of origin prior to emigration (see Section 3.1). To reduce endogeneity concerns, we replace the actual immigrant share of each group (in a county and decade) with that predicted using the instrument presented in Section 4.2. We plot the distribution of the predicted index of reforms in Figure A.8, after partialling out state fixed effects. The index takes on higher values in the Mid-West, which hosted many immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany – sending areas with a relatively high exposure to welfare reforms and with a strong tradition of socialism (see also Section 2.3). However, the index displays substantial variation between and within states, suggesting that our analysis is unlikely to capture regional patterns, which would be anyway absorbed by state fixed effects.

In Figure 1, we test the main prediction of our hypothesis: the effects of immigration should be stronger when immigrants had been more exposed to social welfare programs in their countries of origin. We plot 2SLS coefficients on the average immigrant share from our preferred specification for counties with the index of exposure to reforms above (light-colored bars) and below (dark-colored bars) the median. For counties with exposure above the median, the coefficient on historical immigration is always statistically significant, positive, and quantitatively large. Instead, for counties with the index of reforms below the median, coefficients become smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated.³¹

Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that preferences for redistribution are highly persistent across generations by studying the behavior of immigrants in different European countries and using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Following their approach, we validate the index of reforms using the ESS. In Appendix D.2, we document that immigrants from countries that introduced welfare reforms earlier have stronger preferences for redistribution today (Table D.5).

Exposure to reforms and immigrants' selection. One may wonder if and how our results were influenced by immigrants' selection along ideological values.³² Data limitations prevent us from examining this issue directly. Yet, if selection were at play, we would expect

³¹To facilitate comparisons across samples, we plot standardized beta coefficients. Table A.5 reports the corresponding formal estimates, presenting both non-standardized and standardized beta coefficients (with the latter reported in square brackets).

³²Note that this question is important for extrapolating our results to other contexts. However, selection from the country of origin does not influence the internal validity of our design.

individuals with lower preferences for redistribution to leave after the implementation of reforms. Thus, if anything, our results should represent a lower bound for the effects of exposure to social welfare reforms. This idea is consistent with the patterns observed in Panels B and C of Table 1.

Recall that the alternative instrument leverages variation that is arguably uncorrelated with the introduction of reforms to predict out-migration across European countries. Hence, the somewhat larger coefficients obtained when using this instrument (reported in Panel C of Table 1) suggest that social welfare reforms might have induced individuals with a more conservative ideology to emigrate. At the same time, such selection effect appears to be relatively small, and does not alter our central results. We corroborate this idea in Figure C.1, where we replicate Figure 1 using the alternative instrument to construct the predicted index of reform.³³ If anything, coefficients on the immigrant share (above the median of the reform index) are now somewhat smaller than those in Figure 1. However, they remain similar to the latter.

Index of reforms and immigrants' characteristics. One caveat to the previous results is that the index of reforms might pick up other immigrants' characteristics. To address this concern, we replicate Figure 1 controlling for several (instrumented) immigrants' characteristics. As for the index of reforms, for each characteristic and ethnic group, we interact the predicted immigrant share in a county-decade (relative to all immigrants in the county-decade) with the average characteristic of immigrants from that group that arrived in the US in the previous decade. We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. In Figure C.2, we include immigrants' ability to speak English, occupational income scores, employment share in manufacturing, and literacy. In Figure C.3, we instead control for immigrants' rate of intergenerational mobility from [Abramitzky et al. \(2021\)](#). Reassuringly, in both cases, results remain close to those presented in Figure 1.

A related possibility is that exposure to social welfare reforms might capture the influence of the political institutions prevailing in the country of origin. We tackle this concern in Figures C.4 to C.7. First, in Figure C.4, we replicate Figure 1 by adding a measure of exposure to democracy based on the *Polity2* index from the Polity IV Project ([Gurr et al., 2016](#)). For each immigrant, we count the number of years in which the country of origin was democratic, up to the year of emigration; we then average across immigrant groups and decades to obtain the “average exposure to democracy” brought about by immigration. Next, in Figure C.5, we control for an index, constructed in the same way, that captures the

³³The railroad-weather based instrument cannot predict immigration separately for: *i*) Sweden and Norway; and, *ii*) Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. For this reason, in Figure C.1, we construct the predicted index of reforms omitting these countries.

quality of constraints on the executive.³⁴ In Figure C.6, we control for both the democracy and the constraints on the executive index. Finally, in Figure C.7, we replace the quality of democracy captured by *Polity2* with the measure of democratic capital from Persson and Tabellini (2009), which captures a country’s cumulated experience with democracy since 1800. Reassuringly, in all cases, results remain similar to those in Figure 1.

Yet another concern is that the index of reforms might be correlated with religion, and this may, in turn, shape immigrants’ preferences. In Figure C.8, we control for the percentage of immigrants (in each group) that were Protestant.³⁵ In Figure C.9, we instead control for the average number of years with at least a Catholic church in the county between 1890 and 1920, using data from Gagliarducci and Tabellini (2022).³⁶ Once again, the patterns remain in line with those in Figure 1.

Index of reforms and local characteristics. A second set of concerns is that immigrants that were more exposed to social welfare reforms settled in counties that had specific characteristics, which were, in turn, correlated with natives’ ideology. Note that our analysis already controls for a large host of 1900 county characteristics, such as connection to railroads, the urban share of the population, the employment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores. As an additional robustness check, we verify that the patterns in Figure 1 are unchanged when controlling for the vote share of the Democratic, the Progressive, and the Socialist Parties at baseline (Figure C.10). This reduces concerns that immigrants with a longer history of exposure to the social welfare selected counties where left-leaning preferences were already higher. One may also be worried that immigrants with longer social welfare reform exposure were less likely to settle in frontier counties, where individualism was more ingrained (Bazzi et al., 2020). However, controlling for frontier exposure leaves results in Figure 1 unchanged (Figure C.11).

Pre-1900 immigrants. Most reforms were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the twentieth century. This implies that European immigrants moving to the US after 1900 had accumulated a higher exposure to those reforms. At the same time, immigrants arrived during the nineteenth century faced a less densely settled country, where the “frontier culture” of rugged individualism may have dampened a left-leaning political ideology (Bazzi et al., 2020; Turner, 1893). For these reasons, we expect immigrants arrived before 1900 to have a smaller effect (if any) on natives’ preferences for

³⁴Consistent with the literature (Besley and Persson, 2019; Persson and Tabellini, 2009), we define a country as democratic if the *Polity2* index is strictly greater than zero. We measure constraints on the executive using the variable *xconst-2* taken from the Polity IV Project.

³⁵Specifically, we use the procedure in Hofrenning and Chiswick (1999) to calculate the percentage of individuals who are Protestant in the country of origin. We then interact this with the predicted share of immigrants in each county from each country arrived in the previous decade. Finally, as for the other index, we sum over all groups, and average across decades.

³⁶Almost all Catholic churches in the US at the time were ethnic churches (e.g., Irish, German, or Italian). See Gagliarducci and Tabellini (2022) for more details.

redistribution and ideology.

In Table A.6, we replicate our baseline 2SLS specification (Table 1) by separately controlling for the average share of immigrants in the 1850-1900 period. The table shows that the effect of the 1910-1930 average immigrant share remains positive and statistically significant. In addition, while coefficients become somewhat smaller, they are not statistically different from those reported in Table 1. Furthermore, the point estimate on 1850-1900 immigration is small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. These findings suggest that immigrants who moved to the US after 1900, and who had accumulated higher exposure to welfare reforms, were more important than those arrived before to influence natives' political ideology in the long run.³⁷

The German example. We conclude this section by summarizing an emblematic example, discussed in more detail in Appendix F.1: that of German immigrants moving to the US before and after the major social welfare reform implemented by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884. In Table F.1, we estimate OLS regressions similar to our baseline specification, comparing the effects of Germans arrived between, respectively, 1850 and 1880, and 1885 and 1930. If exposure to the welfare state shaped immigrants' preferences, Germans arrived after the reform should have a stronger impact on natives' ideology in the long run. This is precisely what we find: only the 1900-1930 German share enters positively and significantly; instead, the coefficient on the 1850-1880 German share is quantitatively small, negative, and imprecisely estimated. We cannot rule out the possibility that these results are driven by the selection of different German immigrants before and after 1884. Yet, they are consistent with the evidence presented in previous paragraphs, and further corroborate our interpretation.

6.2 Channels of Transmission

Results presented in Section 6.1 suggest that exposure to welfare reforms in the country of origin shaped the ideology of European immigrants and, in turn, altered the geography of political preferences in the United States over the long run. In this section, we first test whether immigrants' preferences spilled over to natives, through horizontal socialization and inter-group contact. Next, we provide evidence that geographic persistence of ethnic enclaves and vertical transmission of preferences across generations cannot, alone, explain our findings.

³⁷As discussed in Appendix B.7, these results are also reassuring for the validity of the identification strategy.

6.2.1 Inter-Group Contact and Horizontal Transmission

Intermarriage and residential integration. If immigrants' preferences spilled over to natives through a process of horizontal transmission, the effects of immigration should be stronger when historical inter-group contact was more frequent. To test this idea, we develop two measures of historical inter-group contact: intermarriage and residential integration.³⁸ Similar to the analysis presented in Section 6.1, we estimate separate regressions for counties above and below the median of predicted intermarriage and residential integration, reporting results in Panels A and B of Figure 2. For most outcomes, 2SLS coefficients for counties with values of inter-group contact above the median (light-colored bars) are twice as large as those for counties below the median (dark-colored bars).³⁹ These patterns also indicate that vertical transmission within the same ancestry group (coupled with the persistence of ethnic settlements) is unlikely to explain all of our results. In fact, if this were the main channel, the effects should be smaller, and not larger, where immigrants and natives interacted more often.⁴⁰

American sounding names. In Table 2, we provide additional evidence in support of a mechanism of horizontal transmission, focusing on the name chosen by natives of native parentage for their children – a proxy for values and preferences increasingly used in the literature (Bazzi et al., 2020, 2021; Knudsen, 2019; Fouka, 2020). In the presence of horizontal transmission, we would expect native parents living in counties with a higher immigrant share to give to their children names that were more common among immigrants. Following previous work (Abramitzky et al., 2020; Fouka, 2020), we compute an American Name Index (ANI) for children of native white parents of native parentage. The ANI captures the frequency of names of children born from native parents (of native parentage), relative to names received by other children born in the same year. The index assigns higher values to names that were more common among children of natives of native parentage.

Then, we restrict attention to the counties in our sample for the 1910-1930 period, and estimate 2SLS county-level regressions similar to those reported in Table 1, where the key regressor of interest is the 1910-1930 average immigrant share.⁴¹ In column 1, the dependent

³⁸For each immigrant group, we construct the 1900 average share of individuals who, respectively, were married to a native of native parentage and had at least one native neighbor of native parentage. Then, we interact it with the predicted immigrant share (relative to all other immigrants) in a county-decade, sum across all immigrant groups in each county, and take the average across decades. The index of residential integration builds on the procedure used in Logan and Parman (2017). See Appendix E for more details.

³⁹As for Figure 1, we plot standardized beta coefficients to ease comparisons across samples. Coefficients (both standardized and non-standardized) and F-stats corresponding to Figure 2 are reported in Tables A.7 and A.8.

⁴⁰Reassuringly, these results are robust to including the baseline Democratic, Socialist, and Progressive Party vote share (Figures C.12 and C.13) and controlling for 1900 average intermarriage and residential integration (Figures C.14 to C.17). This reduces concerns that counties with higher levels of predicted (post-1900) intermarriage or integration were already more left-leaning or more open towards diversity. Appendix E presents additional robustness checks on results for residential integration.

⁴¹We weigh regressions by 1900 county population, and use robust standard errors.

variable is the average ANI of children born from natives of native parentage living in the county between 1910 and 1930. The negative and statistically significant coefficient indicates that children born from native parents (of native parentage) living in counties with a higher 1910-1930 average immigrant share received less American, i.e., more foreign, sounding names. The magnitude is non-trivial: a 5 percentage points increase in the immigrant share reduced the ANI of a child of native parents with native parentage by .56 points.

Socialist names. If immigrants brought with them and transmitted to natives left-leaning values, one may also expect native parents to name their children after influential European socialist figures. We test this idea in column 2 of Table 2, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the child of native parents (of native parentage) had a name that was common among prominent socialist figures in Europe.⁴² Consistent with our conjecture, the coefficient on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share is positive and statistically significant. That is, children born from natives of native parentage in counties with a larger immigrant share were more likely to have “socialist sounding” names. According to our estimates, a 5 percentage points increase in the average immigrant share increased the probability of receiving a socialist sounding name among children of natives with native parents by .32 percentage points (or, about 3% relative to the sample mean).

6.2.2 Vertical Transmission: Evidence from the GSS

A large literature has emphasized that both ethnic settlements (Burchardi et al., 2019; Card, 2001) and cultural preferences (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Giuliano, 2007) are sticky. Specifically in the context of political preferences, Feigenbaum et al. (2022) find that legislators with an immigrant background support policies that are more open towards immigration and that tend to favor the ethnic group of their ancestors. One may thus conjecture that our findings simply reflect the stability of ethnic patterns and the vertical transmission of preferences across (immigrant) generations. In this section, we test whether this channel can, alone, explain our results.

We use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), which offers two key advantages for our purposes. First, it includes the ancestry of respondents; second, it reports the nativity of both parents and grandparents.⁴³ We can thus test, although imperfectly, whether our findings are driven by the persistence of preferences within ancestry groups. Following the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), we select three questions for political behavior and

⁴²The list of socialist names, presented in Table A.9, was collected from Taylor (1908), which describes the life of several socialist leaders and prominent figures (e.g., Karl Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle, etc.). In Table A.9, we also report the frequency of socialist names among the children of natives of native parentage between 1910 and 1930.

⁴³Since both the sample size and the number of counties included in the GSS are substantially smaller than in the CES, we do not use the GSS as our baseline dataset.

four measures for preferences for redistribution, coding them so that higher values refer to more liberal ideology and stronger support for redistribution.⁴⁴ Then, we replicate our baseline analysis (Table 1). Because of the very limited sample size, we only include Census division – rather than state – dummies; as in Table 1, however, we include all historical and individual controls. Results are reported in Table 3.

To mirror the CES analysis, Panel A restricts attention to US born respondents, and verifies that our results are similar to those reported in Table 1. Next, in Panel B, we add dummies for respondents' ancestry. 2SLS coefficients remain virtually unchanged, indicating that a mere mechanism of vertical persistence within ancestry groups is unlikely to explain our findings. In Panels C and D, in addition to controlling for ancestry dummies, we restrict the sample to individuals with both parents and both grandparents born in the US respectively. Despite the reduction in sample size, coefficients remain in line with those reported in Panels A and B.⁴⁵

In Table A.10, we provide an additional piece of evidence against a pure mechanism of vertical transmission. Following Burchardi et al. (2019), we compute the share of the county population with a European ancestry as of 2010.⁴⁶ Then, we replicate our baseline specification by separately controlling for this variable. Since the 2010 European ancestry share is measured after our main treatment (i.e., the historical average immigrant share), and as such may be a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), this exercise should be viewed as suggestive. However, and reassuringly, 2SLS coefficients on the historical average immigrant share remain in line with those presented in Panel B of Table 1.

6.3 Economic Channels

The evidence provided thus far is consistent with European immigration shaping American long-run ideology through the horizontal transmission of preferences from immigrants to natives, which likely complemented a mechanism of vertical persistence within immigrant enclaves. However, other channels might have been at play as well. For one, it is possible that immigrants' economic characteristics, rather than their exposure to social welfare reforms in Europe, mediated the effects of immigration on American ideology. Section 6.1 already documented that the index of reforms is unlikely to pick up immigrants' economic characteristics (Figures C.2 and C.3).

⁴⁴See Table D.6 for the exact wording of each question. In Appendix D.3, we also present summary statistics for the GSS sample (Table D.7), and compare the characteristics of counties available in the GSS and in the CES (Table D.8).

⁴⁵In unreported analysis, to address the concern of small (and selected) sample in the county-level GSS dataset, we verified that results are similar when estimating regressions at the CZ and at the state level.

⁴⁶Specifically, as in Burchardi et al. (2019), we rely on the 2006-2010 five-year sample of the American Community Survey (ACS), and restrict attention to US born individuals.

A second possibility is that immigration changed natives' preferences because of economic effects. For instance, the increase in demand for redistribution may be the direct response to immigrants' labor market competition. The strong, positive effect of European immigration on long run income per capita shown in Sequeira et al. (2020) is somewhat inconsistent with this mechanism. If anything, economic forces should have led to weaker – rather than stronger – preferences for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Even though immigration had a positive effect on natives' employment and wages on average, it might have nonetheless generated redistributive effects, increasing inequality. In turn, natives negatively affected by the immigration shock may have increased their demand for redistribution. Yet, Tabellini (2020) documents that, between 1910 and 1930, even natives working in highly exposed sectors (e.g., manufacturing) and occupations (e.g., laborers) did not experience significant wage or employment losses, suggesting that immigration was unlikely to increase income inequality.⁴⁷

In Appendix F.2, we provide additional evidence that (immigrant driven) inequality is unlikely to explain our findings. First, we control for income inequality measured in 1940 (Table F.2), the first year in which income or wage data was systematically recorded in the US Census. Second, we replicate the analysis including different proxies for inequality in 2000 (Tables F.3 and F.4). In both cases, our results are unchanged. Third, we find no evidence that historical immigration was associated with higher income inequality in 1940, either when measuring the latter among all wage earners in a county or when focusing on natives of native parentage (Table F.5).

This discussion suggests that our results are unlikely to be driven by the economic effects of immigration. To be clear, European immigrants might have changed natives' preferences also through economic channels. However, our evidence is consistent with exposure to welfare reforms in Europe having an independent and important effect on American ideology.

7 From the Past to the Present

In this section, we trace out the effects of historical immigration throughout the entire twentieth century to shed light on the dynamics behind the results presented above. First, we analyze the relationship between European immigrants and the Democratic vote share in presidential elections (Section 7.1). Next, we study the effects of immigration on the voting behavior of Congress members on redistribution-related bills (Section 7.2). Finally, we examine the pivotal role played by immigrants' political incorporation in explaining the

⁴⁷These results are consistent with those obtained for the contemporaneous period: there is very limited, if any, evidence that immigration to the US has increased inequality (Card, 2009).

realignment of the Democratic Party occurring around the New Deal (Section 7.3).

7.1 Democratic Vote Share in the Twentieth Century

We begin by estimating the relationship between the Democratic vote share in presidential elections and the 1910-1930 average immigrant share across counties, from 1900 until today.⁴⁸ 2SLS results, displayed in Figure 3, indicate that the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrant was largely uncorrelated with the Democratic vote share until 1924 (included). The lack of “pre-trends” is reassuring and corroborates the validity of our empirical design. The coefficient abruptly spikes in 1928, when it becomes strongly positive and statistically significant. The positive and precisely estimated relationships between European immigration and support for the Democratic Party then persists until today.

The patterns in Figure 3 are consistent with Andersen (1979)’s mobilization hypothesis, which argues that European immigrants were fundamental in explaining the New Deal electoral realignment. According to this view, support for Franklin D. Roosevelt (in the 1932 elections) had its origins in 1928, when Alfred Smith, an urban Catholic of immigrant background, attracted the immigrant vote to the Democratic Party. In subsequent years, the process of realignment continued, reinforced by the fact that immigrants were hit hard during the Great Depression (Clubb and Allen, 1969; Degler, 1964; Lubell, 1952).

7.2 Voting Behavior of Congress Members

If European immigrants increased demand for redistributive policies, one would expect legislators representing areas with a higher immigrant share to be more supportive of redistribution. To test this hypothesis, we turn to the voting behavior of Congress members on bills whose main goal was to expand (or, limit) the provision of social welfare. We isolate the universe of redistribution-related bills using the 109-category classification from Poole and Rosenthal (2017).⁴⁹ We define bills on redistribution following Carreri and Teso (2021), and restrict attention to those included in the dataset assembled by Ansolabehere et al. (2018), who classified the most “significant” acts of US Congress from 1789 to 2010.⁵⁰ Using data on the voting behavior of Congress members on those bills and rollcalls from voteview.com, we define a dummy equal to 1 if the legislator voted to support redistribution, and 0 otherwise.

⁴⁸Electoral returns at the county level come from Clubb et al. (1990) for 1900-1968, and from Leip’s Atlas (Leip, 2018) for 1972-2016. As in Section 6.2, we control for state fixed effects and for the battery of historical variables included in our preferred specification. We weigh regressions by 1900 population, and use robust standard errors.

⁴⁹For more details on the classification, see www.voteview.com.

⁵⁰As in Carreri and Teso (2021), we consider as redistribution-related the following issue codes: Tax rates, Unemployment/Jobs, Food Stamps/Food Programs, Welfare and Medicaid, Minimum Wage, Education, Social Security, Housing/Housing Programs/Rent Control, and Medicare.

Then, we match counties to Congressional Districts (CDs) for each Congress from 65 (1917-1919) to 110 (2007-2009), fixing county boundaries to 1930 (as in the rest of the paper), and divide the US into county-CD cells.⁵¹ Using a strategy similar to that adopted in Autor et al. (2020), we collapse the data from the legislator to the county-CD level, and compute the average probability of voting in favor of a redistribution bill in each Congress (for each county-CD cell). Likewise, we map to each county-CD cell the corresponding county-level variables (including the historical immigrant share).

In Figure 4, we present 2SLS results for regressions analogous to those estimated in Figure 3, except that now all variables refer to the CD-county cell. The dependent variable is the probability of voting in favor of a redistribution bill described above. Reassuringly for our identification strategy, there is no relationship between immigration and legislators' support for redistribution bills before 1930. Instead, 2SLS coefficients become positive and statistically significant starting from the late 1930s. This indicates that legislators representing districts with a higher historical immigrant share were more likely to vote in favor of legislation that favored the expansion of social welfare. Moreover, even though the patterns are noisier than those depicted in Figure 3 for the Democratic vote share, the positive relationship between immigration and support for redistribution bills persists until the early 2000s.⁵²

To check whether our findings are driven by the behavior of legislators with immigrant background (Feigenbaum et al., 2022), for Congresses for which we can recover the country of birth of legislators' parents (Congresses until the 91st), we replicated the analysis restricting attention to Congress members with both parents born in the US. Results, not reported for brevity, remained virtually unchanged.⁵³

7.3 Immigrants' Political Incorporation

In this section, we provide evidence on the importance of immigrants' political incorporation for the persistence of the post-1928 political realignment documented in Figures 3 and 4. The historical accounts reviewed in Section 2.3 suggest that the political incorporation of immigrants was an important mechanism for the transmission of ideology from immigrants to natives. For one, as immigrants became eligible to vote, they represented a source of (potential) support for the Socialist and the Progressive Parties. Moreover, in response to

⁵¹We restrict attention to Congresses between 65 and 110 because: there were no "significant" redistribution-related bills prior to Congress 65; and, the data from Ansolabehere et al. (2018) is available only up to 2010.

⁵²The number of coefficients plotted in Figure 4 is lower than that in Figure 3 because not all Congresses introduced bills on redistribution.

⁵³The share of legislators who were either foreign born or who had at least one parent foreign born was never above 5% in our sample period. Data limitations prevent us from conducting this exercise for all Congresses and from obtaining information also on the nativity of legislators' grandparents. See Feigenbaum et al. (2022) for more details.

demand from immigrant voters, the platform of the Democratic Party might have shifted to the left, attracting the foreign born within their voting bloc (Andersen, 1979). The shift in the party agenda may have in turn altered natives' preferences, inducing them to become more supportive of pro-welfare policies.⁵⁴ The development of a common, party-based identity may have also reduced the ethnicity-based cleavages, facilitating the transmission of ideology from immigrants to natives.⁵⁵ Finally, as noted in Section 2.3, European immigrants were often themselves leaders of the nascent labor movement, and promoted the diffusion of a left-leaning ideology by founding ethnic socialist newspapers and other local organizations.

In this section, we provide evidence in support of these ideas. First, in column 3 of Table 2, we examine the effects of immigration on the vote share of the Progressive Party in the 1924 presidential elections, when Robert La Follette ran on a platform that was endorsed by most labor organizations and by the Socialist Party and was heavily supported by the immigrant electorate (see also Section 2.3). The positive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that support for the Progressive Party was stronger where the average immigrant share was higher. Our estimates imply that a 5 percentage points increase in the average immigrant share raised the Progressive Party vote share by about 1.5 percentage points (or, almost 20% relative to the sample mean). To reduce concerns that the instrument might be correlated with pre-existing left-leaning ideology, column 4 replicates column 3 by controlling for the 1912 Socialist Party vote share. Reassuringly, results are almost identical.⁵⁶

Next, in column 5, we turn to immigrants' grassroots activism. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if at least one socialist ethnic newspaper opened in the county after 1900. Consistent with the historical evidence discussed in Section 2.3, the presence of European immigrants is strongly associated with the probability that new socialist newspapers were founded in a county between 1900 and 1930.⁵⁷ According to our estimates, a 5 percentage points higher immigrant share increased the probability that a socialist ethnic newspaper opened in the county by 4 percentage points, or 40% of the sample mean.

Finally, we examine how the political incorporation of immigrants shaped American ideology in the context of the New Deal – one of the largest instances of social reforms and redistribution in American history. We conjecture that the presence of European immigrants,

⁵⁴A large literature in political science argues that voters' preferences are influenced by the position of party leaders (Stimson and Carmines, 1989; Zaller, 1992).

⁵⁵For a discussion of the mechanisms through which individuals identify with different social, cultural, or economic groups see the review in Shayo (2020).

⁵⁶Results, not reported for brevity, are also unchanged when controlling for the 1912 Progressive Party vote share.

⁵⁷Data on socialist ethnic newspapers comes from Flores (2015). The number of observations is lower in column 5 than in previous columns because we do not always observe the date of opening of a socialist newspaper. In this case, we omit the observation. Results, not reported for brevity, are robust to considering also socialist newspapers without a known founding date. Results are also unchanged when controlling for the presence of socialist ethnic newspapers before 1900.

with their stronger support for redistribution, influenced the local allocation of relief programs. Following Fishback et al. (2003), we divide New Deal expenditures in four categories: relief expenditures, public work programs, farm programs, and housing loans and insurance. The relief expenditure program – directed to areas with high unemployment – was by far the most redistributive one. The redistributive content of other programs was instead much lower. The farm program allocated more money to areas with larger farms, higher average incomes, and higher share of wealthier citizens. Similarly, public work programs targeted areas with higher average retail sales per person, while loan programs distributed more funds to areas with higher levels of per capita retail sales, and with a higher percentage of households rich enough to pay income taxes. We thus expect the effect of immigration, if any, to be larger for relief expenditures.

Table 4 reports 2SLS results for regressions identical to those estimated in Table 2. To assess the implied magnitude of coefficients and to ease comparisons across outcomes, we also report standardized beta coefficients in square brackets. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 1910-1930 immigrant share is strongly associated with relief expenditure per capita (column 1); instead, for other programs, coefficients have a small standardized beta coefficient, which in some cases is even negative (column 2, for public work programs) or not statistically significant (column 4, for housing loans). Notably, results remain unchanged when controlling for the severity of the Great Depression (Panel B), proxied for with the 1929-1933 sales growth rate as in Feigenbaum (2015) and Fishback et al. (2003).

Taken together, results in this section suggest that the impact of European immigration on American political ideology became evident already in the late 1920s, and persisted since then. As noted above, the vertical transmission of values across generations (within ethnic enclaves), the transmission of preferences from immigrants to natives, and the political incorporation of immigrants are plausible pathways for the persistence of the effects. In addition, as legislators responded to the higher demand for redistribution expressed by their constituencies, immigrants' left-leaning ideology might have become an integral part of local preferences.

8 Conclusions

A large literature has studied the short run political effects of immigration, finding that immigrants often trigger natives' backlash and lower preferences for redistribution. In contrast with these short run effects, recent work by Bursztyn et al. (2021) has documented that long run exposure to immigrants reduces stereotypes and prejudice among natives. However, little is known about the impact that immigration has on natives' political ideology in

the long run. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap, exploiting variation in the presence of European immigrants across US counties between 1910 and 1930 to examine how historical immigration shaped the geography of political preferences in United States today.

Using a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001), we find that US born individuals living in counties with a higher historical immigrant share are, today, more left-leaning, more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate, and more supportive of government spending and redistribution. We propose and test the hypothesis that immigrants brought with them their (more left-leaning) preferences for the welfare state, which were shaped by exposure to social welfare reforms in Europe. In turn, immigrants' preferences influenced the geography of American political ideology over the long run. Our evidence suggests that a process of vertical persistence of preferences across generations was reinforced by the horizontal transmission of values from immigrants to natives and by the political incorporation of Europeans.

Findings in this paper highlight the importance of distinguishing between the short and the long run effects of diversity and immigration. Our results also indicate that immigrants' assimilation is not a one-sided process. Rather, immigrants' values might spill over to natives, influencing preferences in receiving countries through a process of horizontal transmission, possibly reinforced by immigrants' political incorporation. In the early twentieth century, European immigrants held a more liberal ideology, relative to that prevailing in the US. For this reason, immigrants' preferences moved American ideology to the left. However, when migrants hold more conservative values, the ideological shift might occur in the opposite direction, from left to right. Findings in Bazzi et al. (2021) indicate that this indeed happened in the US during the migration of southern born whites between 1900 and 1940. Future work should study this question in other countries and different time periods.

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
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
Figure 1. Heterogeneous Effects: Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms



Notes: The figure replicates Table 1, separately for individuals living in counties with the predicted index of reforms above (light grey bars) and below (dark grey bars) the sample median. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample, and Section 6.1 for the description of the predicted index of reforms. Formal 2SLS estimates are reported in Table A.5. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.


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Figure 2. Heterogeneous Effects: Intermarriage and Residential Integration




Notes: The figure replicates Table 1, separately for individuals living in counties with predicted intermarriage (resp., residential integration) between immigrants and natives of native parentage above (light grey bars) and below (dark grey bars) the sample median in Panel A (resp., Panel B). Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. See Section 6.2 and Appendix E for the description of predicted intermarriage and residential integration. Formal 2SLS estimates are reported in Tables A.7 and A.8. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure 3. Effect of Historical Immigration on Democratic Vote Share



Notes: the figure plots 2SLS point coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals in dashed lines) on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share. The dependent variable is the Democratic vote share in presidential elections in a county-election year. Regressions are weighed by 1900 county population, and include state fixed effects, and historical controls. Standard errors are robust.

Figure 4. Effect of Historical Immigration on Legislators' Support for Redistribution



Notes: the figure plots 2SLS point coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals in dashed lines) on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share. Regressions are at the county by Congressional District (CD) cell level. The dependent variable is the probability that legislators in a CD cell voted in favor of a redistribution bill in each Congress (see Section 7 for the definition of redistribution bills and for more details on the sample). Regressions are weighed by 1900 county-CD cell population, and include state fixed effects, and historical controls. Standard errors are robust.

Table 1. Immigration, Redistribution, Ideology – Baseline Specification

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.652*** (0.132)	1.924*** (0.250)	0.457*** (0.046)	0.342*** (0.062)	0.221*** (0.052)	0.993*** (0.219)	0.265*** (0.050)	0.098*** (0.030)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates, Baseline Instrument</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.623*** (0.153)	1.867*** (0.297)	0.447*** (0.055)	0.359*** (0.074)	0.211*** (0.063)	1.080*** (0.321)	0.266*** (0.060)	0.100*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	627.4	633.1	629.7	616.6	623.7	583.1	603	666.2
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel C: 2SLS estimates, Alternative Instrument</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.064*** (0.360)	2.848*** (0.696)	0.652*** (0.135)	0.587*** (0.167)	0.391*** (0.132)	1.466*** (0.418)	0.255** (0.122)	0.129* (0.067)
F-stat	67.45	67.97	67.70	68.33	68.50	67.64	66.14	70.79
Observations	299,497	311,275	302,430	236,898	280,483	110,740	137,596	212,963
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). All regressions include state and survey year fixed effects. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 2. Naming Patterns, Progressive Party Vote Share, and Socialist Newspapers

Dep. Variables	American Name	Socialist Name	Progressive Party		Socialist Newspaper
	Index		Vote Share 1924		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	-11.278*** (1.844)	6.334*** (1.012)	0.286*** (0.042)	0.268*** (0.043)	1.507** (0.588)
1912 Progressive Party vote share	N	N	N	Y	N
KP F-stat	713	713	713.	723	704
Observations	2,905	2,905	2,900	2,900	2,899
Mean dep. var.	67.85	10.69	0.075	0.075	0.0986
Mean immigrant share	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103

Notes: Dependent variables are constructed at the county level: *i*) American Name Index (ANI) for children of native white parents of native parentage, in column 1; *ii*) Socialist Name dummy equal to 1 if the child of native parents (of native parentage) has a name common to prominent socialist figures in Europe, in column 2 (see Table 2 for the complete list of names); *iii*) the progressive party vote share in 1924, in column 3 and 4; finally, *iv*) a dummy equal to 1 if at least one socialist ethnic newspaper opened in the county, after 1900, in column 5. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). All regressions include state fixed effects and are weighed by 1900 county population. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3. Immigration, Redistribution, Ideology – GSS

Dep. Variables	Party Scale (R to D)	Liberal vs Conservative	Voted Democratic Candidate	Assistance to the Poor	Welfare	Government vs Individual	Government Role
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: People born in the US</i>							
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.647*** (0.464)	1.039*** (0.249)	0.329*** (0.097)	0.337* (0.198)	0.658*** (0.200)	0.231 (0.221)	0.708*** (0.268)
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.417*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)	0.415*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)	0.417*** (0.022)	0.417*** (0.022)
Observations	18,509	16,226	15,429	9,199	9,114	10,868	10,740
KP F-stat	355.8	352.5	354.1	344.4	362.7	366.7	366.9
Mean dep. var.	4.189	3.863	0.556	2.534	1.730	3.008	2.879
Mean immigrant share	0.089	0.089	0.090	0.090	0.089	0.089	0.089
<i>Panel B: People born in the US, controlling for ancestry</i>							
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.416*** (0.446)	0.966*** (0.245)	0.329*** (0.096)	0.327* (0.195)	0.636*** (0.189)	0.207 (0.214)	0.638** (0.266)
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.416*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)	0.415*** (0.022)	0.414*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)	0.417*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)
Observations	18,509	15,950	15,429	9,044	8,958	10,682	10,555
KP F-stat	357.8	358	355	350.5	370.8	373.9	374.7
Mean dep. var.	4.189	3.859	0.556	2.538	1.732	3.009	2.885
Mean immigrant share	0.089	0.089	0.090	0.089	0.088	0.089	0.089
<i>Panel C: People born in the US with parents born in the US, controlling for ancestry</i>							
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.374*** (0.452)	1.027*** (0.272)	0.342*** (0.100)	0.282 (0.216)	0.668*** (0.192)	0.291 (0.236)	0.619** (0.267)
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.418*** (0.022)	0.418*** (0.022)	0.418*** (0.022)	0.418*** (0.022)	0.419*** (0.022)	0.421*** (0.022)	0.420*** (0.022)
Observations	16,690	14,384	13,895	8,163	8,084	9,610	9,504
KP F-stat	359.8	358.9	355.7	347.2	374.8	371.2	374.9
Mean dep. var.	4.156	3.842	0.552	2.533	1.724	3.003	2.873
Mean immigrant share	0.085	0.085	0.086	0.085	0.085	0.085	0.085
<i>Panel D: People born in the US with parents and grandparents born in the US, controlling for ancestry</i>							
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.313*** (0.488)	0.916*** (0.352)	0.391*** (0.113)	0.172 (0.256)	0.963*** (0.205)	0.184 (0.275)	0.284 (0.298)
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.424*** (0.023)	0.424*** (0.023)	0.424*** (0.023)	0.424*** (0.023)	0.424*** (0.022)	0.426*** (0.023)	0.425*** (0.022)
Observations	11,695	9,998	9,733	5,749	5,652	6,698	6,650
KP F-stat	347.6	354.5	343.5	336.4	355.8	357	364.5
Mean dep. var.	4.176	3.821	0.541	2.540	1.741	3.033	2.900
Mean immigrant share	0.073	0.073	0.073	0.073	0.073	0.072	0.072

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from GSS surveys. See Table D.6 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4. Immigration and New Deal Expenditures

Dep. Variables	Relief Expenditure per capita	Public Work Program per capita	Farm Program per capita	Housing Loans and Insurance per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Baseline specification</i>				
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	133.427*** (30.448) [0.286]	-33.193* (19.730) [-0.077]	136.291*** (19.826) [0.265]	70.288 (73.350) [0.100]
KP F-stat	712.6	712.6	712.6	712.6
<i>Panel B: Controlling for sales growth</i>				
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	133.392*** (30.542) [0.286]	-28.495 (19.565) [-0.066]	132.883*** (19.682) [0.258]	67.772 (74.191) [0.096]
KP F-stat	709.5	709.5	709.5	709.5
Observations	2,903	2,903	2,903	2,903
Mean dep. var.	76.93	31.83	37.48	68.64
Mean immigrant share	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103


Notes: Dependent variables and the sales growth rate are taken from Fishback et al. (2003). Relief Expenditure (column 1) and Public Work Program (column 2) per capita refer to the total amount of Relief grants and public works grants, respectively; Farm Program per capita (column 3) aggregates loans and grants provided by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the Rural Electrification Administration; Housing Loans and Insurance per capita (column 4) refers to the total amount of grants and loans provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the Farm Housing Administration (insured loans), and the US Housing Administration. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. All regressions include state fixed effects, historical controls and are weighed by 1900 county population. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

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
A Additional Figures and Tables - Online Appendix

Figure A.1. Immigrants by Region




Notes: Share of immigrant stock living in the United States, by sending region and by decade. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.2. Total Number of Immigrants (in Thousands)



Notes: Annual inflow of immigrants to the United States (1850-1930). Source: Migration Policy Institute.


Figure A.3. Immigrants as Percent of US Population




Notes: the solid line shows the number of immigrants as a percent of US population. Source: Migration Policy Institute.

Figure A.4. Average Immigrant Share of the County Population (1910-1930)

Panel A. Non-Residualized Immigrant Share




Panel B. Immigrant Share, Partialling Out State Fixed Effects




Notes: the maps plot the quintiles of the average share of European immigrants, relative to county population, for the period 1910-1930 in our sample. Panel A plots the actual, raw data. Panel B plots the residuals, after partialling out state fixed effects. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.5. Share of Immigrants from Selected Countries in Different Counties



Notes: share of individuals of European ancestry living in US counties in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).


Figure A.6. Share of Immigrants from Selected Countries in Massachusetts, 1900




Notes: share of individuals of European ancestry living in Massachusetts counties in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.7. First Stage (Residual Bin-Scatterplot)

Panel A. Baseline Instrument




Panel B. Alternative Instrument



Notes: The y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the actual (resp. predicted) average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The scatterplot pools observations into 50 bins. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residuals of the two variables, after partialling out state fixed effects, and 1900 historical controls. The red, solid line refers to the slope of the first stage coefficient, which is also reported in the main diagram (with associated clustered standard errors at the county level).

Figure A.8. Exposure to Welfare Reforms: Partialling Out State Fixed Effects



Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the predicted measure of exposure to social welfare reforms after partialling out state fixed effect.
Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Table A.1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Historical County Variables					
Fraction of Immigrants	0.093	0.086	0	0.388	521,346
Urban share 1900	0.374	0.325	0	1	521,346
Black share 1900	0.115	0.173	0	0.935	521,346
Manufacturing share 1900	0.108	0.085	0	0.442	521,346
Labor force share 1900	0.798	0.050	0.407	1	521,346
Log occscore 1900	2.989	0.175	2.435	3.305	521,346
Industry Growth	0.136	0.059	0.010	0.259	521,346
Railroad connectivity	30.86	17.49	0	50	521,346
Panel B: County Immigrants' Characteristics (1910-1930)					
Exposure to social welfare	0	1	-4.463	6.683	521,346
Share of Enlish-speaking immigrants	0.818	0.056	0.183	0.983	521,346
Share of literate immigrants	0.898	0.042	0.262	0.994	521,346
Immigrants' occscore	2.548	0.046	0.806	2.635	521,346
Immigrants' manufacturing share	0.287	0.022	0.071	0.411	521,346
Panel C: CES Ideology					
Ideology	2.907	1.157	1	5	482,267
Party affiliation scale	4.282	2.202	1	7	502,403
Dem party identification	0.382	0.486	0	1	488,714
Voted Dem	0.507	0.500	0	1	381,264
Panel D: CES Preferences for Redistribution					
Oppose spending cuts	0.589	0.492	0	1	384,771
Support welfare spending	2.920	1.213	1	5	200,948
Support minimum wage increase	0.705	0.456	0	1	265,594
Finance deficit with taxes	0.402	0.264	0	1	292,322

Table A.2. Immigrants and Exposure to Welfare Reforms (Year of Introduction)

Countries	Education	Pension	Unemployment
Austria	1869	1906	1920
Belgium	1914	1900	1920
Bulgaria	-	1924	1925
Czechoslovakia	1869	1906	-
Denmark	1814	1891	1907
Finland	1921	-	1917
France	1882	1910	1905
Germany	1871	1889	1927
Greece	1834	-	-
Hungary	1869	1906	-
Ireland	1892	1908	1911
Italy	1877	1919	1919
Lithuania	-	1922	1919
Luxembourg	-	1911	1921
Netherlands	1900	1901	-
Norway	1827	-	1906
Poland	1918	1927	1924
Portugal	1835	-	-
Romania	-	1912	-
Russia	1918	1922	1921
Spain	1857	1919	1919
Sweden	1842	1913	-
Switzerland	1874	-	1924
United Kingdom	1880	1908	1911
Yugoslavia	1869	1906	-

Notes: the table presents the list of European countries included in our analysis, together with the year in which welfare reforms. The date reported for education reforms is based on Bandiera et al. (2018), except for Austria and Germany. In the latter case, we follow the definition in Flora (1983). Year of introduction of pension reforms comes from Galasso and Profeta (2018). We rely on Flora (1983) for the remaining reforms.

Table A.3. First Stage

Dep. Variable	1910-1930 Immigrant Share					
	Baseline Instrument			Alternative Instrument		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Predicted 1910-1930 Immigrant Share	0.364*** (0.014)	0.363*** (0.015)	0.352*** (0.013)	0.159*** (0.019)	0.160*** (0.020)	0.148*** (0.015)
KP F-stat	635	606.9	713	66.93	64.53	102.2
Observations	392,839	2,905	2,905	322,295	2,089	2,089
Mean dep. var.	0.093	0.056	0.056	0.098	0.054	0.054
Weights	CES respondents	1900 County Population		CES respondents	1900 County Population	
Individual controls	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table reports the first stage of the regressions in Panels B and C of Table 1. The dependent variable is the actual average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The main regressor of interest is the predicted 1910-1930 Immigrant share, described in Section 4.2. Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 5) use the baseline (alternative) instrument to predict the average fraction of immigrants. Columns 1 and 4 report results for unweighted regressions, at the individual level; columns 2 and 5 report results for county-level regressions weighing for the number of respondents in the CES sample, in the county; columns 3 and 6 report results for county-level regressions weighing for 1900 county population. Controls are specified at the bottom of the table. See Table 1 for the complete list of controls. All regressions include state fixed effects. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in columns 1 and 4, and are robust in the remaining columns. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.4. Baseline Specification with Individual Controls Coefficients

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.623*** (0.153) [0.047]	1.867*** (0.297) [0.073]	0.447*** (0.055) [0.078]	0.359*** (0.074) [0.061]	0.210*** (0.063) [0.037]	1.080*** (0.321) [0.078]	0.266*** (0.060) [0.051]	0.100*** (0.034) [0.032]
Age	-0.005*** (0.001) [-0.074]	0.020*** (0.002) [0.147]	0.002*** (0.000) [0.073]	-0.001 (0.001) [-0.026]	0.004*** (0.000) [0.146]	-0.006*** (0.002) [-0.088]	0.002*** (0.000) [0.084]	-0.002*** (0.000) [-0.092]
Age squared	-0.000 (0.000) [-0.010]	-0.000*** (0.000) [-0.163]	-0.000*** (0.000) [-0.067]	-0.000 (0.000) [-0.020]	-0.000*** (0.000) [-0.179]	-0.000 (0.000) [-0.015]	-0.000*** (0.000) [-0.116]	0.000*** (0.000) 0.074
Female	0.207*** (0.006) [0.090]	0.393*** (0.010) [0.089]	0.115*** (0.002) [0.118]	0.092*** (0.003) [0.092]	0.078*** (0.002) [0.079]	0.071*** (0.009) [0.029]	0.105*** (0.003) [0.117]	0.042*** (0.002) [0.080]
Black	0.240*** (0.016) [0.065]	1.687*** (0.038) [0.241]	0.368*** (0.008) [0.237]	0.410*** (0.010) [0.257]	0.126*** (0.005) [0.081]	0.419*** (0.017) [0.104]	0.189*** (0.006) [0.126]	0.055*** (0.003) [0.058]
Other Races	0.062*** (0.011) [0.019]	0.442*** (0.025) [0.070]	0.080*** (0.005) [0.057]	0.091*** (0.006) [0.060]	0.026*** (0.004) [0.019]	0.064*** (0.016) [0.018]	0.056*** (0.005) [0.044]	-0.007*** (0.003) [-0.009]
Married	0.065*** (0.014) [-0.166]	0.111*** (0.023) [-0.134]	0.031*** (0.006) [-0.099]	0.018*** (0.007) [-0.137]	0.043*** (0.005) [-0.116]	-0.102*** (0.020) [-0.062]	0.012* (0.006) [-0.072]	0.007* (0.004) [-0.114]
Widowed	0.033** (0.014) [-0.050]	0.047** (0.022) [-0.039]	0.023*** (0.006) [-0.031]	0.002 (0.007) [-0.049]	0.012** (0.006) [-0.028]	-0.318*** (0.020) [-0.015]	0.001 (0.006) [-0.016]	-0.013*** (0.004) [-0.036]
Divorced	0.013 (0.014) [-0.053]	-0.005 (0.023) [-0.047]	0.020*** (0.006) [-0.042]	-0.002 (0.007) [-0.047]	-0.003 (0.005) [-0.028]	-0.463*** (0.020) [-0.012]	-0.023*** (0.006) [-0.013]	-0.022*** (0.004) [-0.038]
Unemployed	0.003 (0.010) [0.001]	-0.026 (0.016) [-0.003]	-0.024*** (0.004) [-0.011]	-0.016*** (0.004) [-0.007]	0.010** (0.004) [0.005]	0.143*** (0.016) [0.026]	0.040*** (0.005) [0.018]	-0.002 (0.002) [-0.001]
Out of Labor Force	0.021*** (0.006) [0.009]	0.057*** (0.011) [0.013]	0.003 (0.003) [0.003]	0.014*** (0.003) [0.014]	0.044*** (0.002) [0.044]	0.129*** (0.010) [0.053]	0.020*** (0.003) [0.021]	0.025*** (0.002) [0.046]
High School	-0.020 (0.015) [-0.050]	-0.116*** (0.028) [-0.039]	-0.008 (0.006) [-0.031]	-0.023*** (0.008) [-0.049]	-0.012** (0.006) [-0.028]	-0.175*** (0.024) [-0.015]	-0.025*** (0.006) [-0.016]	-0.019*** (0.004) [-0.036]
More than High School	0.178*** (0.015) [-0.053]	0.101*** (0.028) [-0.047]	0.010 (0.007) [-0.042]	0.040*** (0.008) [-0.047]	0.034*** (0.006) [-0.028]	-0.048** (0.023) [-0.012]	-0.060*** (0.006) [-0.013]	0.017*** (0.004) [-0.038]

Table A.4, Continued

	0.065*** (0.014) [0.015]	0.111*** (0.023) [0.014]	0.031*** (0.006) [0.017]	0.018*** (0.007) [0.009]	0.043*** (0.005) [0.024]	-0.102*** (0.020) [-0.023]	0.012* (0.006) [0.007]	0.007* (0.004) [0.007]
Income 10-20K	0.033** (0.014) [0.009]	0.047** (0.022) [0.007]	0.023*** (0.006) [0.015]	0.002 (0.007) [0.001]	0.012** (0.006) [0.008]	-0.318*** (0.020) [-0.082]	0.001 (0.006) [0.001]	-0.013*** (0.004) [-0.015]
Income 20-30K	0.013 (0.014) [0.004]	-0.005 (0.023) [-0.001]	0.020*** (0.006) [0.007]	-0.002 (0.007) [-0.001]	-0.003 (0.006) [-0.002]	-0.463*** (0.020) [-0.124]	-0.023*** (0.006) [-0.016]	-0.022*** (0.004) [-0.026]
Income 30-40K	0.010 (0.014) [0.003]	-0.063*** (0.023) [-0.009]	0.011* (0.006) [0.007]	-0.008 (0.007) [-0.005]	-0.019*** (0.006) [-0.012]	-0.548*** (0.021) [-0.138]	-0.042*** (0.006) [-0.028]	-0.031*** (0.004) [-0.036]
Income 40-50K	-0.002 (0.015) [-0.001]	-0.110*** (0.023) [-0.015]	0.005 (0.006) [0.003]	-0.012* (0.007) [-0.007]	-0.033*** (0.006) [-0.020]	-0.581*** (0.021) [-0.146]	-0.061*** (0.006) [-0.041]	-0.035*** (0.004) [-0.041]
Income 50-60K	0.004 (0.015) [0.001]	-0.090*** (0.025) [-0.011]	0.007 (0.006) [0.004]	-0.004 (0.007) [-0.002]	-0.029*** (0.007) [-0.016]	-0.609*** (0.023) [-0.137]	-0.062*** (0.007) [-0.038]	-0.034*** (0.004) [-0.034]
Income 60-70K	0.022 (0.015) [0.005]	-0.095*** (0.025) [-0.012]	0.010 (0.006) [0.005]	-0.005 (0.007) [-0.003]	-0.038*** (0.007) [-0.021]	-0.578*** (0.022) [-0.132]	-0.067*** (0.007) [-0.042]	-0.033*** (0.004) [-0.035]
Income 70-80K	0.042*** (0.015) [0.011]	-0.088*** (0.026) [-0.012]	0.012* (0.006) [0.007]	0.005 (0.007) [0.003]	-0.038*** (0.006) [-0.023]	-0.629*** (0.022) [-0.155]	-0.073*** (0.007) [-0.049]	-0.031*** (0.004) [-0.036]
Income 80-100K	0.044*** (0.015) [0.010]	-0.082*** (0.027) [-0.009]	0.017*** (0.007) [0.009]	0.013* (0.008) [0.007]	-0.043*** (0.007) [-0.022]	-0.608*** (0.024) [-0.129]	-0.089*** (0.007) [-0.053]	-0.027*** (0.004) [-0.027]
Income 100-120K	0.051*** (0.016) [0.010]	-0.100*** (0.028) [-0.010]	0.010 (0.007) [0.005]	0.016* (0.008) [0.008]	-0.043*** (0.007) [-0.020]	-0.616*** (0.024) [-0.123]	-0.085*** (0.007) [-0.046]	-0.023*** (0.004) [-0.021]
Income > 150K	0.087*** (0.017) [0.019]	-0.080*** (0.031) [-0.009]	0.015** (0.007) [0.007]	0.031*** (0.009) [0.016]	-0.040*** (0.008) [-0.020]	-0.610*** (0.025) [-0.128]	-0.083*** (0.008) [-0.047]	-0.022*** (0.005) [-0.021]
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
KP F-stat	627.4	633.1	629.7	616.6	623.7	583.1	603	666.2
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. This table reports all individual controls associated with the regressions reported in Table 1, Panel B. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2 of the paper. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.5. Heterogeneous Effects: Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Welfare reforms above median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.902*** (0.339) [0.107]	4.044*** (0.647) [0.118]	0.745*** (0.125) [0.099]	0.901*** (0.156) [0.116]	0.665*** (0.132) [0.087]	1.813*** (0.324) [0.097]	0.649*** (0.098) [0.093]	0.351*** (0.070) [0.085]
KP F-stat	292	294.1	293.6	282.8	294	288.7	301.9	290.1
Observations	184,306	190,721	185,387	145,898	171,498	66,859	83,811	132,777
Mean dep.var.	2.878	4.215	0.370	0.502	0.589	2.831	0.711	0.405
Mean immigrant share	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.079	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.079
<i>Panel B: Welfare reforms below median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.037 (0.192) [0.003]	1.057*** (0.379) [0.048]	0.354*** (0.064) [0.072]	0.116 (0.088) [0.023]	0.015 (0.072) [0.003]	0.795* (0.453) [0.067]	0.114 (0.076) [0.026]	-0.030 (0.035) [-0.011]
KP F-stat	388	393.7	390.7	382.3	389.9	360.7	378.9	410.7
Observations	181,026	188,711	183,215	143,268	170,116	67,461	83,198	127,544
Mean dep. variable	2.927	4.396	0.408	0.536	0.604	2.849	0.742	0.407
Mean immigrant share	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.111	0.109	0.108

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.6. Controlling for Historical Immigration (1850-1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.497** (0.210) [0.037]	1.820*** (0.439) [0.071]	0.424*** (0.083) [0.074]	0.316*** (0.108) [0.054]	0.202** (0.089) [0.035]	1.046** (0.433) [0.075]	0.219** (0.090) [0.042]	0.100** (0.046) [0.032]
Historical Fraction immigrants (1850 - 1900)	0.121 (0.137) [0.011]	0.045 (0.289) [0.002]	0.022 (0.056) [0.005]	0.041 (0.066) [0.009]	0.008 (0.056) [0.002]	0.034 (0.179) [0.003]	0.046 (0.058) [0.011]	0.000 (0.031) [0.000]
KP F-stat	285.6	288.8	287.7	282.7	285.6	275.2	284	294.1
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share (1910-1930)	0.0933	0.0931	0.0932	0.0939	0.0936	0.0942	0.0931	0.0933
Mean immigrant share (1850-1900)	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.125	0.124	0.125	0.124	0.124

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.7. Heterogeneous Effects: Intermarriage

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Intermarriage above median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.409** (0.573) [0.064]	3.406*** (1.086) [0.080]	0.589*** (0.210) [0.063]	0.830*** (0.288) [0.086]	0.441** (0.219) [0.046]	1.006* (0.519) [0.043]	0.607*** (0.209) [0.069]	0.180* (0.101) [0.035]
KP F-stat	72.81	72.45	72.36	70.21	72.79	71.44	75.55	70.27
Observations	182,937	189,891	184,514	144,387	170,616	66,944	83,343	130,319
Mean dep. var.	2.858	4.192	0.364	0.495	0.583	2.826	0.711	0.401
Mean immigrant share	0.0517	0.0516	0.0517	0.0517	0.0517	0.0518	0.0517	0.0520
<i>Panel B: Intermarriage below median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.480*** (0.181) [0.039]	1.710*** (0.363) [0.073]	0.456*** (0.061) [0.087]	0.325*** (0.086) [0.061]	0.142* (0.076) [0.027]	1.142*** (0.431) [0.090]	0.181** (0.079) [0.039]	0.053 (0.039) [0.018]
KP F-stat	424.2	428.2	424.8	422.5	417.9	395.2	408.4	453
Observations	182,426	189,659	184,247	144,355	171,031	67,550	84,071	129,616
Mean dep. variable	2.947	4.418	0.414	0.543	0.610	2.854	0.742	0.411
Mean immigrant share	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.134	0.133	0.135	0.133	0.132

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of intermarriage is the predicted average share of intermarried over married immigrants in 1910-1930 period: we consider an immigrants to be intermarried if married with a native with both parents being native. Here the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (0.068). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to standardized beta coefficients. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.8. Heterogeneous Effects: Residential Integration

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential integration above median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.794*** (0.983) [0.088]	5.717*** (1.788) [0.092]	0.955*** (0.331) [0.071]	1.386*** (0.466) [0.099]	0.776** (0.331) [0.056]	2.309*** (0.854) [0.069]	1.283*** (0.278) [0.101]	0.220 (0.169) [0.030]
KP F-stat	250.6	253	253.1	252	252.1	247	252.5	252.3
Observations	180,460	187,619	182,119	141,693	168,179	65,737	82,340	127,068
Mean dep. variable	2.830	4.177	0.368	0.491	0.576	2.824	0.710	0.399
Mean immigrant share	0.0361	0.0359	0.0359	0.0361	0.0360	0.0357	0.0353	0.0364
<i>Panel B: Residential integration below median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.313 (0.191) [0.022]	1.441*** (0.372) [0.054]	0.432*** (0.065) [0.071]	0.286*** (0.092) [0.046]	0.092 (0.076) [0.015]	1.114** (0.468) [0.076]	0.161** (0.081) [0.030]	0.031 (0.042) [0.009]
KP F-stat	602.8	610.4	606.6	606	597.1	567	585.1	633.3
Observations	181,475	188,315	183,135	144,480	170,231	67,488	83,505	130,488
Mean dep. var.	2.978	4.438	0.411	0.548	0.618	2.857	0.743	0.413
Mean immigrant share	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.153	0.152	0.150

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described Section 4.2. Residential integration (1910-1930) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017): the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (-0.349). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.9. Frequency of Socialist Names

Name	Percent	Percent (Total)
William	19.97	1.976
James	19.22	1.902
Robert	19.17	1.897
Charles	12.38	1.225
George	10.53	1.042
Francis	4.212	0.417
Henry	4.207	0.416
Carl	3.974	0.393
Jean	2.29	0.227
Louis	2.104	0.208
Claude	1.124	0.111
Sidney	0.515	0.051
Karl	0.166	0.0164
Claudia	0.107	0.011
Ferdinand	0.032	0.003
Francois	0.005	0.001
Total	100	9.896

Notes: The table reports the frequency of socialist names among the children of natives of native parentage between 1910 and 1930. The second column reports the frequency of each name relative to all socialist names. The third column reports the frequency of each name relative to all names.

Table A.10. Historical Immigration and European Ancestry

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.611*** (0.155)	1.784*** (0.301)	0.418*** (0.055)	0.339*** (0.074)	0.197*** (0.064)	0.992*** (0.309)	0.242*** (0.059)	0.095*** (0.035)
KP F-stat	596.2	601.8	598.7	585.8	592.7	555.2	574.4	635.5
Observations	365,311	379,495	368,708	288,699	341,601	134,477	167,393	259,901
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.0933	0.0931	0.0932	0.0939	0.0936	0.0942	0.0931	0.0933

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The measure of European ancestry share is from Manson et al. (2020): it is computed as the sum over European countries in our sample of the share of people with ancestors from country j minus immigrants from the same country in 2000. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B Appendix – Robustness Checks

B.1 Alternative Shift-Share Instruments

As explained in Section 4.2 of the main paper, we replicate the analysis using an alternative instrument that combines two separate sources of variation.

Railroad expansion to predict initial shares. First, following Sequeira et al. (2020), we exploit the gradual expansion of the railroads across counties, interacted with decadal national inflows of immigrants. This strategy allows us to predict the initial (1900) shares of immigrants from each sending European region. Using data from 1860 to 1900, we estimate a “zeroth stage” regression akin to that in Sequeira et al. (2020):

$$\begin{aligned} imm_{jc,\tau} = & \alpha_c + \alpha_\tau + \gamma imm_{jc,\tau-1} + \delta R_{c,\tau-1} \\ & + \beta Imm_{j,\tau} \times R_{c,\tau-1} + X_{c,\tau-1} + X_{\tau-1} + \epsilon_{jc,\tau} \end{aligned} \quad (B.1)$$

where $imm_{jc,\tau}$ is the share of immigrants from country j living in county c in decade τ ; $imm_{jc,\tau-1}$ is the corresponding one-decade lag; $Imm_{j,\tau}$ is the number of immigrants arrived from country j in the US between decade $\tau - 1$ and τ ; $R_{c,\tau-1}$ is a dummy equal to one if county c is connected to the railway network in decade $\tau - 1$; and, α_c and α_τ are county and decade fixed effects. $X_{c,\tau-1}$ is the vector of county-level controls used in Sequeira et al. (2020): log population density, a one-decade lag of urban share, and its interaction with the lagged US-aggregate immigrant flow. As in Sequeira et al. (2020), we also control for a vector of national-level variables ($X_{\tau-1}$) that includes: the annual average of the level of industrialization during the decade $\tau - 1$ and τ and the decadal growth in national GDP (both interacted with $R_{c,\tau-1}$).

From equation (B.1), we derive the predicted number of immigrants from country j living in county c in each decade τ . Then, we average these predicted stocks over the entire period (1860-1900), and use these (rather than their actual counterpart) to construct the share of immigrants from country j living in county c in 1900 (relative to all predicted immigrants from j).

Weather shocks in Europe to predict flows. The alternative instrument leverages a second source of variation: national flows from each country of origin predicted from weather shocks in Europe from 1900 and 1930. That is, we replace the actual number of immigrants from country j entering the US in decade τ , $Imm_{j,\tau}$ in equation (3) in the main text, with that predicted exploiting solely variation in weather shocks across European countries over time, $Imm_{j,\tau}^W$.

Following Sequeira et al. (2020) and Tabellini (2020), for each calendar year between 1900 and 1930, we estimate the relationship between weather shocks and migration from each European country using the following equation:

$$\ln \text{Immig}_{jt} = \sum_{s=1}^4 \sum_{m \in M} \beta_{j,s,m} I_{j,t-1}^{\text{Temp},s,m} + \sum_{s=1}^4 \sum_{m \in M} \gamma_{j,s,m} I_{j,t-1}^{\text{Precip},s,m} + \epsilon_{j,t-1} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

The dependent variable is the log of immigrants from European country j arrived in the US in year t .⁵⁸ $I_{j,t-1}^{\text{Temp},s,m}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average temperature in season s of year $t-1$ falls in the range m . $I_{j,t}^{\text{Precip},s,m}$ is the equivalent dummy variable for precipitation. As in Sequeira et al. (2020), we consider the following six ranges m : more than 3 standard deviations below the mean; between 2 and 3 standard deviations below the mean; between 1 and 2 standard deviations below the mean; between 1 and 2 standard deviations above the mean; between 2 and 3 standard deviations above the mean; and more than 3 standard deviations above the mean.

After estimating separately equation (B.2) for each country j , we predict $\widehat{\ln \text{Immig}_{j,t}}$ using the coefficients $\beta_{j,s,m}$ and $\gamma_{j,s,m}$ as defined above.⁵⁹ Then, we aggregate predicted flows at the decade level for each European country

$$\text{Imm}_{j\tau}^W = \sum_t \exp(\widehat{\ln \text{Immig}_{j,t}}) \quad (\text{B.3})$$

Results. Finally, we interact the predicted shares derived from equation (B.1) with the predicted flows in equation (B.3), to replace the baseline shift-share instrument in Section 4.2 in the main text. In Panel C of Table 1, we already showed that results are robust to using this alternative shift-share instrument.⁶⁰ In Table B.1 we present “hybrid” versions of the alternative instrument that interact: *i*) the predicted shares with the actual flows (Panel A); and, *ii*) the actual shares with the predicted flows (Panel B). Also in this case, results are in line with those obtained when using the baseline shift-share instrument.

B.2 Controlling for Initial Immigrant Shares

In this section, we examine the possibility that the 1900 settlements of specific European groups across US counties might be correlated with both the long-run political ideology

⁵⁸Data come from Willcox (1929). European countries are slightly different from the ones in the main sample: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (including Austria and Czechoslovakia), Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia (including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland), Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

⁵⁹See Tabellini (2020), Appendix B2 for more details.

⁶⁰Columns 4 to 6 of Table A.3 verify that, similar to the baseline instrument, also the alternative instrument has a strong first stage.

of Americans (or, with factors that determined them) and the migration patterns of that specific immigrant group in each decade between 1900 and 1930. As shown formally in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020), if this were to be the case, the validity of the instrument would be threatened. Following an approach similar to that used in Tabellini (2020), we replicate the analysis for each of our eight outcomes by adding – one by one – the share of each European group in the county in 1900 (relative to all immigrants from that group in the United States).

We plot 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% intervals) for each of these separate regressions in Figures B.1 and B.2, reporting the point estimate associated with the baseline specification as the first dot from the left to ease comparisons. In all cases, coefficients remain close to, and never statistically different from, our baseline estimates.

B.3 Matching Exercise

We already showed that results are robust to using an alternative shift-share instrument that replaces actual initial shares and actual immigrant flows with predicted ones (see Appendix B.1). In this section, we perform an additional exercise. Similar to Bazzi et al. (2021), we match within-state county pairs that have the closest 1900 Democratic vote shares. Then, we replicate our preferred specification by adding county-pair fixed effects in Table B.2. Panel A reproduces our preferred specification (Table 1, Panel B) for the counties that can be included in the county-pair strategy.⁶¹ Panel B presents 2SLS results by further controlling for county-pair fixed effects.

Reassuringly, coefficients remain positive, quantitatively large, and statistically significant also when controlling for county-pair fixed effects. If anything, the point estimate in Panel B becomes somewhat larger, especially in columns 1 and 2, but it is never statistically different from that presented in Panel A. These results reduce concerns that our baseline instrument predicts larger immigration in counties where support for the Democratic Party (within a state) was already higher. Indeed, even when comparing counties with the closest baseline Democratic vote shares in the same state, we continue to find a positive and large effect of historical European immigration on long run American political ideology and preferences for redistribution.

⁶¹Not all counties can be matched to the closest pair (e.g., when there is an odd number of counties in a state). For this reason, the number of observations is slightly lower when performing the matching, county-pair exercise.

B.4 Controlling for Natives' Initial Ideology

In this section, we address the possibility that the instrument predicts a higher immigrant share in counties that already had a more liberal and left-leaning ideology, or where natives' attitudes towards immigrants were warmer.

Political preferences. In Table B.3, we focus on political ideology, augmenting our preferred specification by controlling for returns in presidential elections at baseline. Since electoral data is missing for some counties, in Panel A, we replicate the main analysis restricting the sample to counties for which electoral data is available. In Panel B, we include the Democratic vote share in the 1900 and 1904 elections.⁶² In Panel C, we replace the Democratic Party vote share with that of the Socialist Party in the 1912 presidential elections – the first time in which the party obtained more than 5% of the national votes.⁶³ In Panel D, we instead control for the 1912 vote share of the newly formed Progressive Party, which in that year won more than 27% of the votes.⁶⁴ Finally, in Panel E, we include all controls simultaneously. Reassuringly, all coefficients remain precisely estimated and quantitatively close to those from the preferred specification.

Next, in Table B.4, we use alternative proxies for historical political ideology. In Panel A, we control for the distance between the county centroid and the closest city where the Forty-Eighters (former leaders of the failed 1848-1849 German revolution) settled.⁶⁵ In Panel B, we include the share of children born from native parents (of native parentage) in the previous 10 years that were given a socialist name and were living in the county in 1900.⁶⁶ In Panel C, we control for total frontier exposure, which was conducive to the development of rugged individualism (Bazzi et al., 2020; Turner, 1893).⁶⁷ Finally, in Panel D, we include all controls simultaneously. In all cases, the point estimate on the average immigrant share remains positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively similar to that reported in Table 1.

Natives' attitudes. In Table B.5, we consider different proxies for natives' attitudes towards immigration, measuring all variables in 1900. In Panel A, we include the average intermarriage rate between immigrants and natives of native parentage. In Panel B, we

⁶²In unreported results, we varied the definition of “baseline” years (1900 or 1904 alone; including elections of 1908 and 1912; combining all elections until 1912), and our estimates remained virtually unchanged.

⁶³Results are unchanged if we replace 1912 with other years, e.g., 1908 or 1904.

⁶⁴Theodore Roosevelt ran as candidate for the Progressive Party on a platform that called for social insurance programs, the establishment of an eight-hour workday, and stronger government intervention in the economy.

⁶⁵Dippel and Heblisch (2021) show that the presence of the Forty-Eighters had long-lasting effects on support for racial equality in the US.

⁶⁶The list of socialist names, taken from Taylor (1908), is reported in Table A.9. See Section 6.2 for more details.

⁶⁷As in Bazzi et al. (2020), total frontier exposure is constructed as follows. In each Census year, between 1790 and 1890, a binary indicator is defined that takes the value of one if a county was on the frontier. The total frontier experience is then obtained as the sum of indicators of frontier status from 1790 to 1890. We rescale the variable dividing it by 100, so that it ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 0.63.

control for the probability that an immigrant had at least one native neighbor of native parentage. In Panel C, we control for the average American Name Index (ANI) among children of natives of native parentage (born in the previous decade). In Panel D, we include all variables simultaneously. Also in this case, results remain unchanged, reducing concerns that the instrument predicts a higher immigrant share in counties where natives had warmer attitudes towards immigration.

B.5 Controlling for Non-European Migration

The Black Great Migration. Between 1940 and 1970, during the second Great Migration, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South, migrating to northern and western cities (Boustan, 2016; Collins, 2020). An important determinant, though not the only one, of the Great Migration was the increase in demand for manufacturing employment. Since many European immigrants between 1910 and 1930 were employed in this sector (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Tabellini, 2020), one may be worried that the destinations chosen by Black migrants between 1940 and 1970 also had large immigrant enclaves at the turn of the twentieth century. If this were to be the case, and, more precisely, if our instrument were correlated with Black inflows between 1940 and 1970, our estimates may be biased. On the one hand, race is, together with income, the single most important variable that shapes individuals' preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). On the other hand, recent work by Calderon et al. (2022) shows that the second Great Migration had a strong, positive effect on the Democratic vote share and on support for the civil rights movement outside the US South.

To address these concerns, focusing on non-southern counties, we construct an instrument for the average Black share in each decade between 1940 and 1970, and augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for it.⁶⁸ The instrument for the average Black share is constructed following the same logic as the baseline instrument for European immigration described in Section 4.2.⁶⁹ In particular, after excluding southern states, we compute the share of Black individuals who were born in a southern state and who, as of 1930, were living in a non-southern county, relative to all Black individuals born in that (southern) state and living in another state in that year. Then, we predict the number of Black migrants in each county and decade by interacting these shares with the number of Black migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970, and summing over all southern

⁶⁸Following the literature (Boustan, 2016), we consider part of the US South the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.

⁶⁹Our approach replicates that implemented by Calderon et al. (2022). The only difference with the instrument for European immigrants of Section 4.2 is that, because of data limitation, we cannot construct a “leave-out” version of the instrument for Black in-migration.

states.⁷⁰ To obtain the predicted stock of Black individuals, we add recursively the predicted flows. Finally, we divide by 1940 population and take the average across decades.

We report 2SLS results in Table B.6. In Panel A, we replicate the specification of Table 1 in the main text, restricting the sample to the counties for which the instrument for the Black migration can be constructed. As one can see, results remain largely unchanged. Next, in Panel B, we add the (instrumented) 1940 to 1970 average fraction of Black Americans in the county. Reassuringly, results are in line with those from our baseline specification: in all cases, historical European immigration is strongly and positively associated with both liberal ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution. Interestingly, the point estimate on the average Black share is positive, although not statistically significant, and quantitatively small.⁷¹

The positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effects of the Great Migration on preferences for redistribution might be surprising, especially in light of the large literature that has documented a negative relationship between racial heterogeneity and demand for government spending (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). However, two factors can help explain this apparent puzzle. First, as already mentioned above, Calderon et al. (2022) find that Black in-migration between 1940 and 1970 increased support for the Democratic Party and for the civil rights movement, not only among African Americans, but also among white residents. Since Democratic ideology is bundled with preferences for a larger welfare state, it is possible that Black in-migration also increased demand for redistribution. Second, Alesina et al. (2004) find that higher racial heterogeneity is associated with a higher number of local jurisdictions across US counties. This implies that white residents might have created their own school and special districts so as not to share public goods with African Americans. As a result, their demand for redistribution may have remained unchanged. These forces may have counterbalanced the “standard” negative effect of diversity on preferences for redistribution, leading to a “close to zero” effect of the Great Migration.

Post-1965 Mexican immigration. Following the enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the number of Mexican immigrants living in the United States skyrocketed, increasing from about 750,000 in 1970 to more than 11.5 million individuals in 2010.⁷² This unprecedented demographic shift changed natives’ attitudes and political preferences (Fouka and Tabellini, 2022; Mayda et al., 2020). One may thus be worried that the historical

⁷⁰Data on Black migration rates come from Bowles and Lee (2016) and from Gardner and Cohen (1992). County level data on Black population between 1940 and 1970 come from the County Databooks (Haines et al., 2010), while we use the full count US Census (Ruggles et al., 2020) to construct the 1930 shares of African Americans residing in each northern county and born in a southern state.

⁷¹To ease the interpretation of results, we report standardized beta coefficients in square brackets.

⁷²See also the Migration Policy Institute at <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us-immigration-trends#source>.

European settlements (and thus, our instrument) were correlated with the patterns of post-1965 Mexican immigration to the US.

To tackle this potential issue, we construct the predicted average Mexican immigrant share in a county between 1970 and 2010. As in Fouka and Tabellini (2022), we interact the number of Mexican immigrants who migrated to the US in each decade between 1970 and 2010 with the 1930 share of Mexican immigrants in the county (relative to all Mexican immigrants in the US in that year). We recover the predicted stock of Mexican immigrants in a county in 1970 by adding the predicted flows to the 1960 Mexican immigrant population (in the county). We then iterate this procedure for each subsequent decade, until 2010. Next, we scale the predicted number of Mexican immigrants in each decade by predicted county population (in the same decade), and take the average across decades.⁷³

In Panel A of Table B.7, we replicate the baseline specification by controlling for this variable. Reassuringly, both the magnitude and the precision of coefficients are unchanged.

Historical non-European immigrants. While more than 85% of the immigrants moving to the United States during the Age of Mass Migration were Europeans (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), one may nonetheless be concerned that our estimates picked up also the effects of non-European immigration. To assuage this concern, we augment our preferred specification by controlling for the 1910-1930 average predicted non-European immigrant share. We proceed in a similar way as for the instrument constructed in Section 4.2 of the paper for European immigration.

Specifically, for each non-European country, we define the 1900 immigrant share in the county, relative to all individuals from that country living in the US in that year.⁷⁴ Then, we interact it with the number of immigrants from each sending origin living in the US in each decade (leaving out those that eventually settled in the county), and sum across all countries (other than European ones). Finally, we take the average over time (between 1910 and 1930), and scale it by 1900 county population.

In Panel B of Table B.7, we augment our preferred specification by controlling for the average (predicted) non-European immigrant share just described. Once again, results are unchanged.

Historical internal migrants. One may be concerned that the instrument – in particular, the 1900 ethnic enclaves – were correlated with the presence of internal migrants. This may be problematic for two different reasons. First, a higher share of internal migrants may be a

⁷³As in Fouka and Tabellini (2022), predicted county population in 1940 is computed by interacting the 1930 county population with (one plus) the national population growth rate, calculated excluding the Census division of the county. We then iterate this procedure up until 2010.

⁷⁴We consider the following country-groups: Mexico, Canada, Cuba, West Indies, South America, China, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Middle East, Africa, and Australia. Combining countries in different groups leaves all results unaffected.

proxy for stronger economic attractiveness, which may in turn be correlated with long-run shifts in political ideology. Second, internal migrants may have a direct effect on original residents' attitudes towards diversity, contributing to the development of a more liberal ideology and offering more fertile grounds for the emergence of a “melting pot” society.⁷⁵

To address these and similar concerns, we augment our baseline specification including the 1900 share of individuals born in another state. Since the US Census did not report internal migration status prior to 1940, and because only state – and not county – of birth is available, it is not possible to control for the share of internal migrants, within and between states. We are thus forced to rely on between-states migrants as a proxy for the prevalence of internal migration, as done in previous work (Bandiera et al., 2018; Tabellini, 2020).⁷⁶ In particular, we construct the share of household heads born in another state relative to all of those living in the county in 1900. We report results in Panel C of Table B.7. Reassuringly, they remain close to those obtained in the main specification.

B.6 Controlling for Historical GDP, Growth, and Volatility

In our preferred specification, we already control for several historical measures of economic activity (labor force participation, employment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores in the county in 1900, and predicted economic growth from 1910 to 1930). In Table B.8, we verify that results are unchanged when further including additional historical variables. In Panel A, we add the log of GDP per capita in 1900 from Fulford et al. (2020). In Panel B, we address the possibility that the instrument might be correlated with the volatility of economic growth, by controlling for the variance of predicted economic growth between 1910 and 1930.⁷⁷ In Panel C, we include both variables simultaneously. Reassuringly, coefficients remain always positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively similar to those from our baseline specification.⁷⁸

B.7 Immigrants Before 1900

In Table B.9 we verify that our results are robust to extending the sample period used to define the average European immigrant share to 1850-1930. Since our instrument is

⁷⁵It is also possible that a higher share of internal migrants reflects a county's initial openness to diversity, which persisted over time, influencing American-born preferences today.

⁷⁶While imperfect, this measure should address the concerns described above, since pull factors are stronger between rather than within states, and because diversity is likely to increase more in response to between, rather than within, state migration.

⁷⁷In our baseline specification, we already control for average predicted economic growth, constructed as in Tabellini (2020) using a Bartik approach. Specifically, for each decade between 1900 and 1930, we interact the 1900 employment share in each industry in the county with the national growth in that industry, aggregate this over all industries within the same county (in each decade).

⁷⁸The number of observations in Panels A and C is lower than in the baseline specification, since 1900 GDP per capita is not available for all counties in our sample.

constructed using the 1900 settlements of European immigrants, we cannot conduct this exercise with 2SLS. However, the similarity of OLS and 2SLS estimates in our main results bolsters our confidence in the OLS analysis for the 1850 to 1930 period.

Panel A of Table B.9 reports the baseline OLS results obtained for the 1910 to 1930 period (also shown in Panel A of Table 1), while Panel B replicates them for the 1850-1930 decades. As noted in Sequeira et al. (2020), when going back to pre-1900 decades, some counties are not available. For this reason, in Panel C, we repeat this exercise including only counties for which we have observations in all decades. Reassuringly, results are always quantitatively and qualitatively close to those reported in Panel A: in all cases, historical immigration is strongly and positively associated with liberal ideology and higher preferences for redistribution among American voters today.⁷⁹

In addition, as also discussed in the main text (see Section 6.1, Table A.6), we explicitly check whether our results are robust to controlling for the share of European immigrants arrived before 1900. Replicating the analysis conducted above, Table B.10 estimates the 2SLS regression reported in Table 1, separately controlling for the immigrant share between 1850 and 1900. As noted in Section 6.1, not only our main results for the effects on the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrants are left unchanged; but also, the share of pre-1900 immigrants is not statistically significant and quantitatively smaller.

B.8 Controlling for Ethnic Diversity and Polarization

In this section, we explore the relationship between political ideology, European immigration, and ethnic diversity. As noted in Section 6 in the main text, a large literature has documented a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Tabellini (2020) finds that such relationship was evident also during the Age of Mass Migration: in US cities where (immigrant induced) ethnic diversity was higher, public spending and tax rates were lower. In light of these results, one may wonder if our positive estimates for the effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution are, at least partly, due to the fact that we are not accounting for ethnic diversity explicitly.

To examine this possibility, we augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for the (instrumented) ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants. Following the literature (Alesina et al., 1999), we define ethnic diversity in county c and decade τ as $ED_{c\tau} = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_{cj\tau}^2$, where $\gamma_{cj\tau}$ is the share of immigrants from country c (relative to all other European immigrants) in county c in decade τ . As done also in the

⁷⁹Results (unreported) remain unchanged also when defining the period of interest from 1850 to 1920, or from 1860 to 1920 as done for instance in Sequeira et al. (2020).

paper, we then take the average across decades, in order to obtain the 1910-1930 average ethnic diversity in a given county. When instrumenting the index of ethnic diversity, we replace the actual share of each immigrant group (relative to other groups in each county in each Census year) with that predicted using the shift-share instrument constructed in the main text (see Section 4.2).

Recent work by Bazzi et al. (2019) has shown that the effects of ethnic diversity (or, fractionalization) might partly capture those of polarization. When ethnic fractionalization is high, i.e. when there are many small minority groups that are roughly equal in size, but group polarization is low, inter-group relations are more likely to lead to social cohesion. This can be for a variety of reasons: first, no specific group will dominate over the others, and there may be incentives to cooperate, since the number of groups is relatively high; second, chances that a few groups become “more visible” to natives fall, thereby lowering the probability of scapegoating. On the other hand, when polarization is high, i.e. when there are few large but distinct groups, social cohesion may be impaired by diversity. For this reason, we also construct an index of polarization, and augment our analysis by controlling for it.⁸⁰

2SLS results for this exercise are reported in Table B.11, which shows not only that the coefficient on the historical fraction of immigrants is unchanged, but also that ethnic diversity has a *positive* effect on both liberal ideology and preferences for redistribution, although its precision varies across outcomes. Consistent with findings in Bazzi et al. (2019), the coefficient on polarization is negative, albeit never statistically significant.

We speculate that the, somewhat surprising, positive coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is due to the fact that the diversity brought about European immigrants was relatively contained in size. On the one hand, when levels of diversity are not “too high”, at least in the medium to long run, social cohesion can be enhanced, consistent with recent work by Bazzi et al. (2019). On the other, although slowly and at varying rates, European immigrants eventually became fully integrated into the American society (Abramitzky et al., 2020), in part helped by the arrival of new outsiders like African Americans from the US South, who looked even more different from white natives than European immigrants (Fouka et al., 2022).

⁸⁰Following Bazzi et al. (2019), for each county c and decade τ , we define the index of polarization as $P_{c\tau} = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_{cj\tau}^2 (1 - \gamma_{cj\tau})$, where $\gamma_{cj\tau}$ is the share of immigrants (relative to other European immigrants) from country j in county c in decade τ . We then average over the three decades. As for ethnic diversity, we use the predicted, rather than actual county-immigrant group-decade shares when constructing the instrumented versions of the index.

B.9 Additional Robustness Checks

Dropping potential outliers. As an additional robustness check, we verify that our results are robust to omitting counties with very large and very low immigration, and that could be potential outliers. In Table B.12, we replicate our baseline results trimming observations in counties with average 1910-1930 European immigration below (resp. above) the 1st and the 5th (resp. the 99th and 95th) percentiles respectively. Reassuringly, in all cases coefficients are in line with those reported in Table 1 (Panel B).

Alternative geographies. In Table B.13, we verify that our results are robust to excluding the US South, where identification with the Democratic Party and, more broadly, political preferences may have been greatly influenced by the history of race relations (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Schickler, 2016).⁸¹ Panel A replicates the baseline specification excluding the South, while Panel C further controls for the vote share of the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and the Progressive Party in presidential elections at baseline.⁸² Reassuringly, results are unchanged.

Next, in Table B.14, we show that our estimates are robust to defining the European immigrant share at the SEA (Panel A) and at the CZ (Panel B) level. This exercise deals with the possibility that European immigration triggered selective white flight, inducing more conservative natives to emigrate in response to the arrival of European immigrants. If this were to be the case, our findings may be unduly affected by sample selection. However, Table B.14 documents that, even when aggregating the unit of analysis to the SEA or the CZ, our results remain unchanged.

Estimating less stringent specifications. Table 1 reports results from a specification that already includes a large set of controls. In addition to state and survey wave fixed effects, we include individual respondents' characteristics, and the following county-specific historical controls: geographical coordinates, 1910-1930 predicted industrial growth as in Tabellini (2020), railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and the 1900 urban and Black share, male labor force participation, employment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores.⁸³ We now show that the coefficient on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share remains similar – both in size and in precision – when estimating more parsimonious specifications. Specifically, in Panel A of Table B.15, we only include state and survey wave fixed effects and respondents' characteristics. While the 2SLS point estimate becomes

⁸¹We consider part of the US South the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.

⁸²See also Appendix B.4 for more details. Panel B of Table B.13 replicates Panel A restricting attention to the sample of counties with non-missing electoral data.


⁸³Individual respondents' characteristics include: a quadratic in age, gender, race dummies, marital and employment status, educational attainment, and income dummies.

somewhat larger, it remains highly statistically significant and quantitatively close to that reported in Table 1. Next, in Panel B, we replicate the baseline specification of Table 1 by omitting individual controls. Since the characteristics of respondents are measured after the treatment of interest (i.e. average historical immigration), one may be worried that these are “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), and as such should not be included in the analysis. Reassuringly, Table B.15 verifies that 2SLS estimates are quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged.

State-level leave-out. Our baseline shift-share instrument is constructed by leaving out immigrants from each country that eventually settled in a given county (in each decade). In Table B.16, we further address endogeneity concerns that local pull factors (outside, but “close to,” the county) attracted immigrants from a specific country of origin and shaped the long run ideology of a given US area. To do so, we replicate the analysis by constructing a state-level leave-out instrument that excludes immigrants (from each origin) that settled in the entire state. Once again, results remain very close to those from the baseline specification.

Clustered standard errors. Our results are obtained clustering standard errors at the county level. To address potential concerns of spatial correlation, in Table B.17, we verify that the precision of our estimates is unchanged when clustering standard errors at the SEA (Panel A), at the CZ (Panel B), and at the state (Panel C) level.

Figure B.1. 2SLS Coefficients, Controlling for Initial Shares: Political Ideology



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share, augmenting the specification reported in Table 1 with the 1900 immigrant share from each sending country (relative to all immigrants from that country in the US in that year), separately. The first coefficient from the left corresponds to that from the baseline specification. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure B.2. 2SLS Coefficients, Controlling for Initial Shares: Preferences for Redistribution



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share, augmenting the specification reported in Table 1 with the 1900 immigrant share from each sending country (relative to all immigrants from that country in the US in that year), separately. The first coefficient from the left corresponds to that from the baseline specification. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Table B.1. Main Results: Alternative Instruments

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Railroad expansion to predict initial shares</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.756*** (0.182)	2.184*** (0.348)	0.515*** (0.067)	0.427*** (0.084)	0.263*** (0.069)	1.084*** (0.277)	0.272*** (0.067)	0.105*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	365.5	367.9	365.3	359.8	369.8	364.3	356.6	369.2
Observations	299,497	311,275	302,430	236,898	280,483	110,740	137,596	212,963
Mean dep. var.	2.920	4.352	0.397	0.530	0.602	2.845	0.730	0.407
Mean immigrant share	0.100	0.0998	0.0999	0.101	0.100	0.101	0.0995	0.0998
<i>Panel B: Weather shocks to predict immigrant flows</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.760*** (0.199)	2.236*** (0.381)	0.505*** (0.073)	0.414*** (0.097)	0.281*** (0.078)	1.133*** (0.242)	0.304*** (0.072)	0.156*** (0.043)
KP F-stat	129.1	129.6	129.6	126.2	129.7	126.6	132.3	131.7
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Table 1 using the alternative instrument interacting: i) the predicted shares with the actual flows (Panel A); and, ii) the actual shares with the predicted flows (Panel B). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.2. Main Results: Controlling for County Pair Fixed Effects

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.623*** (0.153)	1.870*** (0.297)	0.448*** (0.055)	0.359*** (0.075)	0.211*** (0.063)	1.077*** (0.321)	0.267*** (0.060)	0.099*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	625	630.8	627.3	612.6	621	577.1	597.9	664.9
Observations	365,360	379,547	368,758	288,735	341,642	134,468	167,403	259,931
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel B: Controlling for county-pair fixed effects</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.862*** (0.196)	2.571*** (0.339)	0.549*** (0.069)	0.430*** (0.109)	0.241*** (0.083)	1.158*** (0.378)	0.292*** (0.064)	0.110* (0.061)
KP F-stat	615.8	616.5	618.1	624.0	597.9	534.2	571.2	681.1
Observations	365,360	379,547	368,758	288,735	341,642	134,467	167,403	259,931
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Table 1 augmenting the specification by adding county-pair fixed effects. Counties, within the same state, are paired through matching the 1900 Democratic vote share. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.3. Main Results: Controlling for Baseline Political Preferences

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS baseline, restricted to counties with electoral data</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.631*** (0.155)	1.897*** (0.298)	0.453*** (0.0554)	0.366*** (0.0746)	0.217*** (0.0635)	1.100*** (0.323)	0.271*** (0.0602)	0.0999*** (0.0343)
KP F-stat	618.6	624.4	621	608.6	615	575.1	594.3	656.7
<i>Panel B: Controlling for Democratic Party vote share (1900-1904)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.632*** (0.155)	1.897*** (0.298)	0.452*** (0.0551)	0.366*** (0.0747)	0.217*** (0.0636)	1.100*** (0.322)	0.271*** (0.0608)	0.0999*** (0.0345)
KP F-stat	638.1	644.2	640.9	627.8	634.4	594.1	614.5	675.3
<i>Panel C: Controlling for Socialist Party vote share (1912)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.668*** (0.158)	1.916*** (0.304)	0.458*** (0.0566)	0.384*** (0.0763)	0.227*** (0.0647)	1.111*** (0.327)	0.284*** (0.0607)	0.104*** (0.0351)
KP F-stat	601.8	607.8	604.3	591.8	598.9	560.3	578.1	639.6
<i>Panel D: Controlling for Progressive Party vote share (1912)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.665*** (0.158)	1.974*** (0.305)	0.470*** (0.0564)	0.377*** (0.0762)	0.219*** (0.0654)	1.162*** (0.327)	0.278*** (0.0614)	0.109*** (0.0347)
KP F-stat	612.1	618.1	614.9	602.2	609.4	569.5	587.8	647.1
<i>Panel E: All controls</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.749*** (0.163)	2.050*** (0.314)	0.481*** (0.0583)	0.407*** (0.0790)	0.236*** (0.0670)	1.217*** (0.333)	0.307*** (0.0631)	0.124*** (0.0361)
KP F-stat	594	599.7	596.6	584.5	591.4	554	570.9	629.2
Observations	349,338	363,033	352,673	275,925	326,844	128,753	160,335	248,409
Mean dep. var.	2.903	4.311	0.390	0.520	0.597	2.837	0.728	0.405
Mean immigrant share	0.0957	0.096	0.096	0.096	0.096	0.097	0.095	0.096

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Panel A replicates Panel B of Table 1 restricting the attention to the sample of counties with non-missing electoral data. Panel B controls for the average 1900-1904 Democratic Party vote share; Panel C controls for the 1912 Socialist Party vote share; Panel D controls for the 1912 Progressive Party vote share; and, finally, Panel E includes all the political controls inserted in the previous panels. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.4. Main Results: Controlling for Baseline Natives' Ideology

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Controlling for distance to “Forty-Eighters”</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.578*** (0.147)	1.771*** (0.287)	0.433*** (0.054)	0.341*** (0.073)	0.196*** (0.060)	1.072*** (0.326)	0.250*** (0.059)	0.090*** (0.032)
KP F-stat	622	628	624.5	609.7	619.2	579.3	599	658.1
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel B: Controlling for socialist names (1900)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.636*** (0.156)	1.910*** (0.305)	0.456*** (0.057)	0.361*** (0.076)	0.208*** (0.064)	1.037*** (0.317)	0.259*** (0.060)	0.097*** (0.035)
KP F-stat	572.2	577.2	573.9	561.6	568.4	532.4	549.8	608.9
Observations	365,361	379,548	368,759	288,740	341,646	134,494	167,414	259,934
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel C: Controlling for frontier exposure</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.612*** (0.147)	1.850*** (0.288)	0.443*** (0.053)	0.352*** (0.071)	0.207*** (0.062)	1.074*** (0.319)	0.260*** (0.057)	0.099*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	638.4	643.8	640.5	628.5	633.6	591.3	611.4	679.6
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel D: All controls</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.576*** (0.143)	1.790*** (0.286)	0.437*** (0.054)	0.335*** (0.071)	0.189*** (0.060)	1.019*** (0.322)	0.235*** (0.057)	0.085*** (0.033)
KP F-stat	572.7	577.4	574.2	561	568.6	532	549.4	608.5
Observations	365,361	379,548	368,759	288,740	341,646	134,494	167,414	259,934
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Panel B of Table 1 controlling, in Panel A, for the distance between the county centroid and the closest city where the Forty-Eighters settled; in Panel B, for the share of children born from native parents (of native parentage) that were given a socialist name and were living in the county in 1900 (see The Table A.9 for the list of socialist names); in Panel C, for total frontier exposure; finally, in Panel D, for all controls simultaneously. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.5. Main Results: Controlling for Baseline Natives' Attitudes

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Controlling for intermarriage (1900)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.642*** (0.210)	1.939*** (0.406)	0.446*** (0.077)	0.384*** (0.101)	0.204** (0.088)	1.257*** (0.487)	0.302*** (0.077)	0.094** (0.043)
KP F-stat	667.3	668.3	668	654.9	671.6	691.6	688.5	631.7
Observations	365,361	379,548	368,759	288,740	341,646	134,494	167,414	259,934
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel B: Controlling for residential integration (1900)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.569** (0.240)	1.906*** (0.452)	0.455*** (0.083)	0.366*** (0.113)	0.182* (0.099)	1.270** (0.554)	0.268*** (0.090)	0.075 (0.048)
KP F-stat	434.1	434.1	434.3	428.4	439	459.4	434.4	422
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel C: Controlling for American Name Index (1900)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.588*** (0.148)	1.801*** (0.288)	0.431*** (0.053)	0.338*** (0.070)	0.203*** (0.062)	1.049*** (0.307)	0.252*** (0.057)	0.094*** (0.033)
KP F-stat	635.1	640.2	636.9	625	630.9	591.5	611.1	674.4
Observations	365,361	379,548	368,759	288,740	341,646	134,494	167,414	259,934
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel D: All controls</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.502** (0.230)	1.886*** (0.441)	0.450*** (0.081)	0.342*** (0.107)	0.175* (0.095)	1.169** (0.515)	0.228*** (0.084)	0.058 (0.046)
KP F-stat	434.4	433.7	433.9	430.3	438.1	455.2	435.1	425.6
Observations	365,361	379,548	368,759	288,740	341,646	134,494	167,414	259,934
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Panel B of Table 1 controlling: in Panel A, for the average intermarriage rate between immigrants and natives of native parentage; in Panel B, for the probability that an immigrant had at least one native neighbor of native parentage; in Panel C, for the average American Name Index (ANI) among children of natives of native parentage (born in the previous decade); in Panel D, for all variables simultaneously. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.6. Main Results: Controlling for the Black Great Migration (1940-1970)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS baseline estimates (non-South)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.503*** (0.157)	1.784*** (0.302)	0.454*** (0.0575)	0.341*** (0.0761)	0.161** (0.0641)	1.007*** (0.336)	0.232*** (0.0589)	0.0793** (0.0376)
KP F-stat	521.3	526.4	523.7	516.1	514.8	479.1	487.6	572.9
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates, controlling for Black migration</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.496*** (0.163) [0.036]	1.793*** (0.318) [0.068]	0.448*** (0.0608) [0.075]	0.348*** (0.0788) [0.058]	0.175** (0.0707) [0.030]	0.882*** (0.245) [0.062]	0.224*** (0.0597) [0.042]	0.0895** (0.0413) [0.027]
Fraction of Black Americans	0.0372 (0.288) [0.002]	-0.0438 (0.556) [-0.001]	0.0322 (0.103) [0.003]	-0.0365 (0.133) [-0.003]	-0.0681 (0.111) [-0.007]	0.623 (0.531) [0.025]	0.0368 (0.0924) [0.004]	-0.0537 (0.0665) [-0.009]
KP F-stat	366.6	364.7	364.9	365.2	362	358.3	384.9	389.3
Observations	236,616	245,356	238,558	188,351	221,804	87,215	108,103	170,628
Mean dep. var.	2.970	4.398	0.404	0.542	0.615	2.850	0.736	0.410
Mean immigrant share	0.130	0.130	0.130	0.130	0.131	0.132	0.130	0.129

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. We restrict our sample to counties for which data on Black Great Migration are available. The table replicates Panel B of Table 1 for the restricted sample, in Panel A, and controlling for Black migration, in Panel B. Data on Black migration rates come from Bowles and Lee (2016) and from Gardner and Cohen (1992). County level data on Black population between 1940 and 1970 come from the County Databooks (Haines et al., 2010), while we use the full count US Census (Ruggles et al., 2020) to construct the 1930 shares of African Americans residing in each northern county and born in a southern state. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.7. Main Results: Controlling for Other Migrants

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Controlling for Mexican migration (1970-2010)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.608*** (0.153)	1.861*** (0.296)	0.452*** (0.056)	0.361*** (0.075)	0.204*** (0.063)	1.040*** (0.327)	0.263*** (0.060)	0.093*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	613.8	618.6	615.4	603.4	609.4	570.1	590.3	651.9
<i>Panel B: Controlling for historical non-European immigrants (1910-1930)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.647*** (0.154)	1.952*** (0.298)	0.468*** (0.056)	0.380*** (0.075)	0.219*** (0.064)	1.077*** (0.322)	0.273*** (0.060)	0.102*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	159.6	166.4	159.4	120.6	156.9	151.3	184.1	132.1
<i>Panel C: Controlling for natives' internal migration (1900)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.641*** (0.160)	1.910*** (0.312)	0.449*** (0.058)	0.358*** (0.077)	0.208*** (0.066)	1.054*** (0.314)	0.260*** (0.062)	0.101*** (0.036)
KP F-stat	605.1	611.8	608.4	595.7	602.6	562.5	579.7	643.5
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Panel B of Table 1 controlling: in Panel A, for the 1970-2010 average predicted stock of Mexican immigrants in the county; in Panel B, for the 1910-1930 share of non-European immigrants in the county; in Panel C, for the share of household heads born in another state relative to all of those living in the county in 1900. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.8. Main results: Controlling for GDP per Capita and Economic Volatility

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Controlling for GDP per capita (1900)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.648*** (0.149)	1.914*** (0.291)	0.448*** (0.058)	0.350*** (0.076)	0.229*** (0.058)	1.139*** (0.336)	0.275*** (0.058)	0.103*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	501.8	503.2	501.7	501.8	492.4	461.2	480.2	557.5
Observations	344,851	358,196	348,091	272,389	322,328	126,989	158,350	245,517
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.303	0.388	0.518	0.597	2.839	0.725	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.096	0.095	0.095
<i>Panel B: Controlling for economic volatility</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.725*** (0.151)	2.033*** (0.294)	0.485*** (0.054)	0.422*** (0.072)	0.244*** (0.062)	1.234*** (0.319)	0.306*** (0.057)	0.118*** (0.033)
KP F-stat	596.7	601.5	598.2	586.3	592.7	551.3	569.7	629.6
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel C: Controlling for GDP per capita (1900) and economic volatility</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.745*** (0.145)	2.070*** (0.286)	0.484*** (0.057)	0.410*** (0.074)	0.263*** (0.055)	1.307*** (0.331)	0.315*** (0.055)	0.121*** (0.033)
KP F-stat	477.8	478.7	477.3	478	468.4	436.1	453.6	528
Observations	344,851	358,196	348,091	272,389	322,328	126,989	158,350	245,517
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.303	0.388	0.518	0.597	2.839	0.725	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.085	0.085	0.085	0.085	0.085	0.086	0.086	0.084

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Panel B of Table 1 controlling: in Panel A, for the 1900 county log of GDP per capita, from Fulford et al. (2020); in Panel B, for the variance of predicted economic growth between 1910 and 1930; in Panel C, for both variables. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.9. Ideology, Preferences for Redistribution, and Immigration (1950-1930): OLS Estimates

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline OLS specification</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.652*** (0.132)	1.924*** (0.250)	0.457*** (0.046)	0.342*** (0.062)	0.221*** (0.052)	0.993*** (0.219)	0.265*** (0.050)	0.098*** (0.030)
<i>Panel B: OLS, immigration (1850-1930)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.511*** (0.122)	1.373*** (0.240)	0.332*** (0.047)	0.271*** (0.056)	0.158*** (0.049)	0.766*** (0.190)	0.212*** (0.046)	0.0695** (0.028)
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.113	0.112	0.113	0.112	0.112

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. Data are based on Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020). The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1850 and 1930. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.10. Main Results: Controlling for Historical Immigration (1850-1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Average Fraction of Immigrants (1910-1930)	0.497** (0.210) [0.037]	1.820*** (0.439) [0.071]	0.424*** (0.083) [0.074]	0.316*** (0.108) [0.054]	0.202** (0.089) [0.035]	1.046** (0.433) [0.075]	0.219** (0.090) [0.042]	0.100** (0.046) [0.032]
Average Fraction of Immigrants (1850-1900)	0.121 (0.137) [0.011]	0.0450 (0.289) [0.002]	0.0221 (0.056) [0.005]	0.0411 (0.066) [0.009]	0.00810 (0.0560) [0.002]	0.0337 (0.179) [0.003]	0.0458 (0.058) [0.011]	-0.000714 (0.031) [0]
KP F-stat	285.6	288.8	287.7	282.7	285.6	275.2	284	294.1
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share (1910-1930)	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
Mean immigrant share (1850-1900)	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.125	0.124	0.125	0.124	0.124

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.11. Main results: Controlling for Ethnic Diversity and Polarization

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.629*** (0.151)	1.893*** (0.291)	0.450*** (0.055)	0.363*** (0.073)	0.216*** (0.062)	1.097*** (0.316)	0.266*** (0.059)	0.098*** (0.033)
Ethnic Diversity Index	0.202* (0.109)	0.412** (0.184)	0.070* (0.038)	0.123** (0.051)	0.088** (0.040)	0.270** (0.123)	0.052 (0.042)	0.043** (0.020)
Polarization Index	-1.180* (0.646)	-1.889 (1.164)	-0.386* (0.224)	-0.772** (0.306)	-0.418* (0.234)	-1.243* (0.729)	-0.357 (0.233)	-0.344*** (0.116)
KP F-stat	11.79	11.75	11.79	12.06	11.61	12.89	12.19	11.64
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 1 augmenting the specification by controlling for the index on Ethnic Diversity and Polarization. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The index on Ethnic Diversity and Polarization are reconstructed using national group shares and come from Bazzi et al. (2019). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.12. Main results: Trimming Outliers

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates, 1th-99th percentiles of immigration</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.615*** (0.158)	1.833*** (0.303)	0.426*** (0.060)	0.318*** (0.076)	0.222*** (0.061)	0.767*** (0.172)	0.251*** (0.060)	0.100*** (0.038)
KP F-stat	633.6	632.8	632.7	630.4	628.5	630.9	617.4	652.8
Observations	358,478	372,319	361,746	283,404	335,103	131,831	164,053	255,386
Mean dep. var.	2.901	4.299	0.388	0.518		2.836	0.725	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.092	0.091	0.091	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.091	0.092
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates, 5th-95th percentiles of immigration</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.734*** (0.200)	2.054*** (0.390)	0.447*** (0.076)	0.383*** (0.097)	0.247*** (0.081)	0.673*** (0.217)	0.308*** (0.072)	0.132*** (0.047)
KP F-stat	640.2	638	638.5	626.7	640.1	626.1	652.8	635.4
Observations	330,392	342,984	333,291	261,348	308,672	121,350	151,199	236,259
Mean dep. var.	2.898	4.280	0.383	0.514	0.594	2.825	0.723	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.087	0.087	0.087	0.088	0.087	0.088	0.087	0.088

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The Table replicates Table 1 but restricting the sample to counties with average fraction of immigrants above the 99th percentile (0.3379) and below the 1st percentile (0.0004) in Panel A and above the 95th percentile (0.2604) and below the 5th percentile (0.0012) in Panel B. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.13. Main results: Excluding US South

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS baseline estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.560*** (0.152)	1.869*** (0.291)	0.466*** (0.055)	0.358*** (0.074)	0.177*** (0.062)	1.036*** (0.327)	0.241*** (0.057)	0.091** (0.036)
KP F-stat	591.3	598.2	594.2	588.7	585.2	537.1	552.3	649.4
Observations	244,099	253,157	246,144	194,368	228,771	89,898	111,567	176,206
Mean dep. var.	2.963	4.383	0.401	0.539	0.614	2.847	0.733	0.410
Mean immigrant share	0.129	0.129	0.129	0.129	0.130	0.131	0.129	0.128
<i>Panel B: 2SLS baseline restricted to counties with electoral data</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.559*** (0.154)	1.904*** (0.291)	0.472*** (0.055)	0.364*** (0.074)	0.180*** (0.062)	1.055*** (0.330)	0.245*** (0.058)	0.091** (0.037)
KP F-stat	576.4	583.2	579.3	574.6	570.5	523.6	538.7	633.1
Observations	229,983	238,619	231,972	182,986	215,713	84,783	105,397	166,046
Mean dep. var.	2.967	4.393	0.403	0.541	0.615	2.843	0.736	0.410
Mean immigrant share	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.136	0.135	0.133
<i>Panel C: Controlling for Socialist (1912), Progressive (1912), Democratic (1900-1904) Share</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.676*** (0.166)	2.008*** (0.315)	0.488*** (0.060)	0.385*** (0.080)	0.194*** (0.067)	1.143*** (0.342)	0.280*** (0.062)	0.117*** (0.039)
KP F-stat	572.1	577.7	574.4	570.2	565.4	520.2	531.3	629.1
Observations	229,983	238,619	231,972	182,986	215,713	84,783	105,397	166,046
Mean dep. var.	2.967	4.393	0.403	0.541	0.615	2.843	0.736	0.410
Mean immigrant share	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.136	0.135	0.133

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 1 excluding US South States (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia). The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.14. Main results: Aggregating at the SEA and Commuting Zone Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates, aggregating at the SEA Level</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.434*** (0.164)	1.512*** (0.319)	0.378*** (0.062)	0.239*** (0.076)	0.199*** (0.065)	0.955*** (0.188)	0.272*** (0.065)	0.069* (0.038)
KP F-stat	493.5	490.9	486.3	469.9	490.8	479.6	461.1	495.3
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean deo.var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates, aggregating at the commuting zone level</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.700*** (0.190)	1.777*** (0.360)	0.394*** (0.066)	0.312*** (0.087)	0.281*** (0.075)	0.942*** (0.257)	0.297*** (0.085)	0.136*** (0.042)
KP F-stat	511.4	509.6	508.6	506.8	511.7	492.6	492.4	525.7
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.101	0.101	0.101	0.102	0.101	0.102	0.101	0.101

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 1 aggregating the geography used to define the fraction of immigrants from the county to the Commuting Zone level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.15. Main Results: Alternative Controls

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates, individual controls only</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.163*** (0.131)	2.851*** (0.252)	0.628*** (0.048)	0.620*** (0.059)	0.363*** (0.053)	1.520*** (0.277)	0.426*** (0.048)	0.189*** (0.026)
KP F-stat	577.1	583.3	581	569.3	580.5	552	572.7	598.6
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
Individual controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates, historical controls only</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.818*** (0.171)	2.313*** (0.329)	0.529*** (0.069)	0.489*** (0.087)	0.253*** (0.058)	1.027*** (0.279)	0.268*** (0.051)	0.134*** (0.035)
KP F-stat	609.4	616.7	614.2	602	619.2	580.7	585.4	657.7
Observations	482,267	502,403	488,714	381,264	384,771	200,948	265,594	292,322
Mean dep. var.	2.907	4.282	0.382	0.507	0.589	2.920	0.705	0.402
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.094
Individual controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Panel B of Table 1 including only individual controls, in Panel A, or only historical controls, in Panel B. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.16. Main Results: State Level Leave-Out Instrument

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.630*** (0.153)	1.869*** (0.294)	0.444*** (0.055)	0.359*** (0.074)	0.212*** (0.062)	1.037*** (0.296)	0.269*** (0.058)	0.100*** (0.034)
KP F-stat	928.2	927.3	924.4	898.1	923	884.8	927.7	951.3
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is constructed using the shift-share instrument and leaving out immigrants that settled in the entire state, not just in the county as in the baseline version. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.


Table B.17. Main Results: Alternative Standard Errors Clustering

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates, clusters at the SEA level</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.608*** (0.177)	1.826*** (0.336)	0.441*** (0.063)	0.349*** (0.089)	0.207*** (0.074)	1.086*** (0.284)	0.267*** (0.065)	0.097** (0.046)
KP F-stat	409.2	412.6	411.7	406	405.8	392.1	389.1	455.1
Observations	359,709	373,736	363,116	284,444	336,417	132,514	164,832	256,309
Mean dep. var.	2.901	4.300	0.388	0.518	0.596	2.836	0.725	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.094	0.094
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates, clusters at the commuting zone level</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.623*** (0.187)	1.867*** (0.336)	0.447*** (0.062)	0.359*** (0.091)	0.210*** (0.076)	1.080*** (0.294)	0.266*** (0.070)	0.100** (0.047)
KP F-stat	481.3	483	482.5	471.4	470.1	444.2	474.1	535.2
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093
<i>Panel C: 2SLS estimates, clusters at the state level</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.623** (0.248)	1.867*** (0.458)	0.447*** (0.075)	0.359*** (0.119)	0.210* (0.109)	1.080*** (0.366)	0.266** (0.103)	0.100 (0.069)
KP F-stat	327.8	329.8	328.7	317.1	329.6	332.7	321	345.7
Observations	365,363	379,550	368,761	288,742	341,647	134,494	167,414	259,935
Mean dep. var.	2.902	4.305	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.840	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.093	0.093	0.093	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.093	0.093

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described Section 4.2. The table replicates the specification in Table 1, clustering: in Panel A, at the State Economic Area (SEA) level; in Panel B, at the commuting zone level; in Panel C, at the state level. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.


C Robustness Checks on Heterogeneity and Sample Splits

Figure C.1. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Alternative Instrument




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 using the alternative instrument. The railroad-weather based instrument cannot predict immigration separately for: *i*) Sweden and Norway; and, *ii*) Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. For this reason, the predicted index of reforms considered in this figure is constructed omitting these countries. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.2. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Immigrants' Characteristics




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for instrumented immigrants' economic characteristics. Economic characteristics include: the log of occupational income scores, literacy, ability to speak English, and manufacturing employment share. For each characteristic and ethnic group, we interact the predicted immigrant share in a county-decade (relative to all immigrants in the county-decade) with the average characteristic of immigrants from that group that arrived in the US in the previous decade. We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.3. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Intergenerational Mobility




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for instrumented immigrants' rates of intergenerational mobility from Abramitzky et al. (2021). For each ethnic group, we interact the predicted immigrant share in a county-decade (relative to all immigrants in the county-decade) with the rates of intergenerational mobility estimated in Abramitzky et al. (2021). We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.4. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Exposure to Democracy




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for immigrants' exposure to democracy in the country of origin. For each immigrant, we count the number of years in which the country of origin was democratic (defined as having the *Polity2* score from the Polity 5 Project strictly greater than zero), up to the year of emigration to derive the average years of exposure to democracy for each arrival cohort and sending country. We then interact the country-decade specific measure of exposure to democracy with the predicted immigrant share in a county-decade (relative to all immigrants in the county-decade). We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.5. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Constraints on the Executive




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for quality of constraints on the executive in immigrants' country of origin. For each immigrant, we construct the average quality of constraints on the executive for the country of origin (defined using the variable *xconst-2* from the Polity 5 Project), up to the year of emigration to derive the average quality of constraints on the executive for each arrival cohort and sending country. We then interact this measure with the predicted immigrant share in a county-decade (relative to all immigrants in the county-decade). We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.6. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Exposure to Democracy and Constraints on the Executive




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for immigrants' average exposure to democracy and average quality of constraints on the executive. See Figures C.4 and C.5 for more details. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.7. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Democratic Capital




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for the index of democratic capital, constructed using the measure of domestic democratic capital for each sending country j , in year t from Persson and Tabellini (2009). We associate to each immigrant arrived in year t the corresponding value of the country of origin's democratic capital. Then, we construct the country-decade average and interact it with the predicted immigrant share in a county-decade (relative to all immigrants in the county-decade). Then, we sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.8. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Share of Protestant Immigrants




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for the predicted share of protestant immigrants. Following Hofrenning and Chiswick (1999), we calculate the percentage of individuals who are Protestant in the country of origin. We then interact this with the predicted share of immigrants in each county, from each country, arrived in the previous decade. We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.9. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Exposure to Catholic Church




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for the average number of years with at least one Catholic church between 1890 and 1920. See Gagliarducci and Tabellini (2022) for more details on data on Catholic churches. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.10. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Baseline Political Preferences




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for the 1900-1904 average Democratic vote share, the 1912 Socialist Party share, and the 1912 Progressive Party share. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.11. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Controlling for Frontier Exposure




Notes: The figure replicates Figure 1 by controlling for exposure to frontier culture, which comes from Bazzi et al. (2020). Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.12. Sample Split for Intermarriage, Controlling for Baseline Political Preferences




Notes: The figure replicates Panel A, Figure 2 controlling for the 1900-1904 average Democratic vote share, the 1912 Socialist Party share, and the 1912 Progressive Party share. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.13. Sample Split for Residential Integration, Controlling for Baseline Political Preferences




Notes: The figure replicates Panel B, Figure 2 controlling for the 1900-1904 average Democratic vote share, the 1912 Socialist Party share, and the 1912 Progressive Party share. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.14. Sample Split for Intermarriage, Controlling for 1900 Intermarriage Rate




Notes: The figure replicates Figure Panel A, Figure 2, controlling for 1900 intermarriage rate. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.15. Sample Split for Intermarriage, Controlling for 1900 Residential Integration




Notes: The figure replicates Panel A, Figure 2, controlling for 1900 average residential integration. We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.16. Sample Split for Residential Integration, Controlling for 1900 Intermarriage Rate



Notes: The figure replicates Panel B, Figure 2, controlling for 1900 intermarriage rate. We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure C.17. Sample Split for Residential Integration, Controlling for 1900 Residential Integration



Notes: The figure replicates Panel B, Figure 2, controlling for 1900 average residential integration. We then sum over all immigrant groups (in the county), and take the average over the three decades from 1910 to 1930. Bars plot 2SLS standardized beta coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the 1910-1930 average European immigrant share. See Table 1 for more details on dependent variables, controls, and sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

D Appendix – Survey Data

D.1 Cooperative Election Study

As mentioned in Section 3.2, the CES is a nationally representative survey conducted online in November of every year since 2005. We use it to measure ideology and preferences for redistribution of native-born American respondents. In particular, for ideology and political behavior, we use the Cumulative CES Common Content dataset (Kuriwaki, 2018), which combines all surveys between 2006 and 2020, for a total of more than 500,000 respondents. For all other questions, we instead combine surveys for the years in which each question is available. The Cumulative dataset includes a sub-set of questions that are common to all survey waves, and whose answers can be more easily interpreted.⁸⁴

The CES also asks a large number of demographic and socioeconomic questions such as nativity, age, gender, marital status, income, and education and, crucially for our purposes, the county of residence of respondents. Differently from most other surveys, such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) or the General Social Survey (GSS), the CES offers a key advantage: its sample size is very large and nationally representative even at the county level. This is key for our empirical analysis, which exploits cross-county variation in exposure to the presence of European immigrants between 1910 and 1930.

⁸⁴See <https://dataVERSE.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910/DVN/II2DB6> for more details.

Table D.1. Summary Statistics, CES - Individual Characteristics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Age	49.49	16.61	18	109	521,346
Female	0.542	0.498	0	1	521,346
Male	0.458	0.498	0	1	521,346
Black	0.110	0.313	0	1	521,346
White	0.743	0.437	0	1	521,346
Other	0.148	0.355	0	1	521,346
Single	0.282	0.450	0	1	519,798
Married	0.543	0.498	0	1	519,798
Widowed	0.048	0.213	0	1	519,798
Separated	0.127	0.333	0	1	519,798
No High School	0.032	0.175	0	1	521,346
High School	0.276	0.447	0	1	521,346
More than High School	0.693	0.461	0	1	521,346
Employed	0.516	0.500	0	1	521,045
Unemployed	0.066	0.248	0	1	521,045
Out of Labor Force	0.418	0.493	0	1	521,045
Income < 10K	0.047	0.211	0	1	394,348
10K < Income < 20K	0.082	0.274	0	1	394,348
20K < Income < 30K	0.114	0.318	0	1	394,348
30K < Income < 40K	0.116	0.320	0	1	394,348
40K < Income < 50K	0.104	0.305	0	1	394,348
50K < Income < 60K	0.101	0.302	0	1	394,348
60K < Income < 70K	0.075	0.263	0	1	394,348
70K < Income < 80K	0.081	0.272	0	1	394,348
80K < Income < 100K	0.094	0.292	0	1	394,348
100K < Income < 120K	0.068	0.252	0	1	394,348
120K < Income < 150K	0.055	0.228	0	1	394,348
Income > 150K	0.063	0.242	0	1	394,348

Table D.2. Dependent Variables: Definition and Construction

Variable	Question	Answers coded as	Years
Panel A. CES Ideology			
Ideology	In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?	From 1=very conservative to 5=very liberal	2006-2020
Party Affiliation Scale (R to D)	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as: Strong democrat, not very strong democrat, lean democrat, independent, lean republican, not very strong republican, strong republican.	From 1=strong republican to 7=strong democrat	2006-2020
Democratic Party Indicator	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a: democrat, republican, independent.	Indicator equal 1 for Democrat, 0 for Republican or Independent	2006-2020
Voted Democratic Candidate	For whom did you vote for President of the United States?	Indicator equal 1 if voted Democrat and 0 for Independent or Republican	2006-2020
Panel B. CES Preferences for Redistribution			
Oppose spending cuts	The federal budget deficit is approximately 1.38 trillion this year. If the Congress were to balance the budget it would have to consider cutting defense spending, cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social Security), or raising taxes to cover the deficit. What would you most prefer that Congress do - cut domestic spending, cut defense spending, or raise taxes?	Indicator equal 1 if preferred option is not to cut spending	2006, 2008, 2010-2018
Support welfare spending	State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Welfare spending.	From 1=most decrease to 5=most increase	2014, 2016, 2018, 2020
Support minimum wage increase	Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage to \$X an hour over the next two years, or not? OR If your state put the following questions for a vote on the ballot, would you vote FOR or AGAINST? Raise the minimum wage to \$X/hour?	Indicator equal 1 if in favor	2006-2008, 2016, 2018-2020
Finance deficit with taxes	If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 0 to 100	Normalize range to 0-1, where 1=100% taxes and 0% cuts	2006-2017

D.2 European Social Survey

In Section 6.1 of the main text and in Appendix D.2.1 below, we validate the use of exposure to historical social welfare reforms as a proxy for immigrants' preferences for redistribution. We do so by using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), focusing on first generation European immigrants.

The ESS is a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted in around 38 countries in Europe since 2002, every two years.⁸⁵ Our analysis includes survey rounds from 1 to 10, i.e. until 2020, and all the countries that are available therein. The number of respondents in each wave varies from 40,000 to 56,000 for a total of about 500,000 respondents overall. The ESS collects demographic and socioeconomic characteristic of respondents, and elicits political ideology as well as attitudes towards social exclusion and preferences for redistribution. Consistent with the literature (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), we measure preferences for redistribution using individuals' response to the following statement in the ESS: "Government should reduce differences in income levels". The possible answers range from 1 (*Strongly Agree*) to 5 (*Strongly Disagree*). We recode the variable so that higher values correspond to stronger preferences for redistribution.

Table D.3 reports the names and the definition of the variables. In Table D.4, we present the summary statistics for the sample considered in the exercise conducted in the next section. Panel A reports respondents' characteristics, while Panel B presents their proxy for preferences for redistribution.

D.2.1 Measuring Immigrants' Preferences for Redistribution in the ESS

Using the ESS data described above, we now show that preferences for redistribution reported by European immigrants in the ESS are highly correlated with the year in which social welfare reforms were first implemented in their country of origin. We focus on immigrants to more accurately capture the portability of preferences. We estimate the following specification:

$$y_{ijt} = \gamma_t + \beta \log(Reforms_j) + X_{ijt} + \log(GDP_{2000,j}) + u_{ijt} \quad (D.1)$$

where y_{ijt} is the stated preference for redistribution of respondent i from country j in survey wave t , which takes on higher values for stronger desire to redistribute. We also control for wave fixed effects γ_t , a set of individual characteristics X_{ijt} , and the logarithm of country j 's GDP in 2000. The key regressor of interest is the logarithm of the year of the reform for country j . The vector of individual characteristics, X_{ijt} , includes: gender, a quadratic in

⁸⁵The exact number of countries varies across survey waves. Data can be downloaded at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>.

age, income, logarithm of years of education, employment and marital status.⁸⁶

We report results in Table D.5. In column 1, we only include survey wave fixed effects and the log of country of origin GDP, while in column 2 we also add individual controls.⁸⁷ In both columns, the coefficient on the year of introduction of social welfare reforms is negative and statistically significant. That is, European immigrants from countries that introduced social welfare reforms earlier have stronger preferences for redistribution today.

⁸⁶We create ten different income dummies: the first nine exactly correspond to the first nine possible categories that are reported in the ESS question; the last dummy encompasses all higher levels of income. Employment status reports three different categories: employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force. Marital status includes the following four categories: single, married, divorced or separated, and widowed.

⁸⁷Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Results are unchanged when using robust standard errors.

Table D.3. Variable Description - ESS

Variable	Question	Answers coded as
Panel A. Preferences for Redistribution		
Preferences for Redistribution	Government should reduce differences in income levels. 1=Strongly Agree to 5 Disagree Strongly. 7=Refusal, 8=Don't know. 9=No answer	Scale from 1=Disagree Strongly to 5=Strongly Agree
Panel B. Main Regressor and Individual Controls		
Country of Residence		
Country of Birth		
112 Age		
Gender	Gender of the respondent	Coded as 1=male, 2=female
Years of Education	Years of education	Logarithm(1+years of education)
Marital Status	Legal marital status: single, married or in a civil union, separated, divorced, widowed.	Coded as 1=single, 2=married or in a civil union, 3=divorced or separated, 4=widowed
Employment Status	Main activity, last 7 days.	Coded as 1=out of the labor force, 2=unemployed, 3=employed
Income	Household's total net income, all sources	Coded as 1 to 9 for the first nine deciles and 10 for higher levels

Table D.4. ESS - Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Individual Characteristics					
Age	50.73	17.89	15	100	18,815
Male	0.435	0.496	0	1	18,905
Female	0.564	0.496	0	1	18,905
Single	0.215	0.411	0	1	18,374
Married	0.559	0.497	0	1	18,374
Separated/Divorced	0.122	0.327	0	1	18,374
Widowed	0.104	0.305	0	1	18,374
Log of Years of Education	2.583	0.354	0	4.043	18,688
Employed	0.500	0.500	0	1	18,785
Unemployed	0.063	0.243	0	1	18,785
Out of Labor Force	0.437	0.496	0	1	18,785
1st Decile	0.077	0.267	0	1	14,265
2nd Decile	0.103	0.304	0	1	14,265
3rd Decile	0.103	0.304	0	1	14,265
4th Decile	0.121	0.327	0	1	14,265
5th Decile	0.117	0.322	0	1	14,265
6th Decile	0.108	0.311	0	1	14,265
7th Decile	0.096	0.295	0	1	14,265
8th Decile	0.089	0.284	0	1	14,265
9th Decile	0.100	0.299	0	1	14,265
Higher Levels	0.085	0.280	0	1	14,265
Panel B: Individual Outcome					
Preferences for Redistribution	3.870	1.029	1	5	18,905

Table D.5. Immigrants' Preferences for Redistribution and Year of Introduction of Welfare Reforms in the Countries of Origin, European Social Survey

Dep. Variable	Preferences for Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)
Log Year of of Welfare Reforms	-5.021** (1.908)	-4.654*** (1.400)
Observations	13,682	13,682
Cluster	Y	Y
N. Clusters	25	25
Mean dep. var.	3.853	3.853
Individual Controls	N	Y

Notes: Each regression controls for logarithm of GDP from the immigrants' countries of origin and includes survey year fixed effects. In column 2, we also add individual controls: gender, a quadratic in age, logarithm of years of education, employment and marital status, income. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Regressions use data from the European Social Survey, including rounds from 1 to 9. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.3 General Social Survey

In Section 6.2 of the main text, we rely on data from the General Social Survey (GSS) – a repeated cross-sectional, nationally representative survey collected in the United States since 1972. The GSS interviews a nationally representative sample of English speaker individuals, who are independently drawn from the population and who are at least 18 years old. The survey has been conducted every year up to 1991, except for 1979 and 1981, and every two years since then (and until 2018). We use data from 1972-2010.⁸⁸

As the CES and the ESS, the GSS also collects socioeconomic and demographic information of respondents as well as their political ideology and preferences for redistribution. While the GSS sample is an order of magnitude smaller than the CES one, reducing the precision of the analysis (especially at the county level), it offers a unique advantage for our purposes: it also records an individual's ancestry and the country of birth of both her parents and her grandparents. This allows us to restrict the analysis to natives with native parents and grandparents and, as discussed in Section 6.2 of the main text, to control for the ancestry of respondents.

Table D.6 describes the key outcome variables considered in the analysis conducted in Section 6.2 of the main text. We proxy for respondents' political views and preferences for redistribution with three (Party affiliation – Democratic vs. Republican; Ideology – liberal vs. conservative; and whether the person voted for a Democratic candidate in the last presidential elections) and four (welfare spending; spending for assistance to the poor; government vs individual responsibility; and, government involvement in the economy) variables respectively. As in our main analysis, all variables are coded so that higher values correspond to more liberal views and higher preferences for redistribution.

In Table D.7, we present the summary statistics for the main dependent variables and controls used in the GSS analysis. Finally, in Table D.8, we compare the characteristics of counties in our main CES sample and in the GSS sample. As expected, the GSS sample has a larger actual immigrant share and is more likely to be drawn from urban areas. However, and somewhat reassuringly, the difference between counties is much smaller for the instrument; moreover, the characteristics of immigrants historically settling in counties with GSS respondents (today) are very similar to the immigrants' characteristics observed in the full sample.

⁸⁸County identifiers are available since 1993.

Table D.6. Variable Description - GSS

Variable	Question	Answers coded as	Years
Panel A. Preferences for Redistribution			
Party scale - R vs D	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?	From 1=Strong Republican to 7=Strong Democrat	1993-2010
Liberal vs Conservative	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal-point 1-to extremely conservative-point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	From 1=Extremely Conservative to 7=Extremely Liberal	1993-2010
Voted Democratic Candidate	Voted for the Democratic Party at the last presidential elections	Indicator equal to 1 for Democratic Party, 0 for Republican.	1993-2010
Welfare Spending	We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on Welfare?	From 1=too much to 3=too little	1993-2010
Assistance to the poor	We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on assistance to the poor?	From 1=too much to 3=too little	1993-2010
Government vs Individual	Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?	From 1=People's responsibility to 5=Government's responsibility	1993-2010
Government role	Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?	From 1=Government doing much to 5=Government do more	1993-2010

Table D.7. GSS - Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Individual Characteristics					
Age	46.631	17.365	18	89	21,550
Female	0.563	0.496	0	1	21,607
Male	0.437	0.496	0	1	21,607
Black	0.146	0.353	0	1	21,607
White	0.819	0.385	0	1	21,607
Other	0.035	0.184	0	1	21,607
Single	0.240	0.427	0	1	21,598
Married	0.472	0.499	0	1	21,598
Widowed	0.095	0.293	0	1	21,598
Divorced	0.193	0.395	0	1	21,598
No High School	0.158	0.365	0	1	21,563
High School	0.300	0.458	0	1	21,563
More than High School	0.542	0.498	0	1	21,563
Employed	0.661	0.473	0	1	21,070
Unemployed	0.035	0.183	0	1	21,070
Out of Labor Force	0.304	0.460	0	1	21,070
Lower than \$1000	0.014	0.118	0	1	19,085
\$1000 to 2999	0.013	0.111	0	1	19,085
\$3000 to 3999	0.010	0.101	0	1	19,085
\$4000 to 4999	0.010	0.098	0	1	19,085
\$5000 to 5999	0.013	0.112	0	1	19,085
\$6000 to 6999	0.013	0.113	0	1	19,085
\$7000 to 7999	0.014	0.118	0	1	19,085
\$8000 to 9999	0.025	0.156	0	1	19,085
\$10000 - 14999	0.079	0.270	0	1	19,085
\$15000 - 19999	0.069	0.253	0	1	19,085
\$20000 - 24999	0.082	0.274	0	1	19,085
\$25000 or more	0.659	0.474	0	1	19,085
Panel B: Individual Outcomes					
Party affiliation - D vs. R	4.205	2.009	1	7	21,125
Liberal vs conservative	3.847	1.399	1	7	18,396
Voted Dem - Presidential Elections	0.553	0.497	0	1	17,585
Welfare Spending: too little vs too much	1.744	0.774	1	3	10,368
Spending for assistance to the poor: too little vs too much	2.538	0.687	1	3	10,483
Government vs individual responsibility - help poor	3.018	1.156	1	5	12,389
Government should do more vs is doing too much	2.888	1.208	1	5	12,206

Table D.8. GSS vs. CES

Variables	Main Sample		GSS Sample	
	N	Mean/Std. Dev.	N	Mean/Std. Dev.
Fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	244,302	0.066 (0.068)	277,044	0.117 (0.093)
Urban share (1900)	244,302	0.251 (0.264)	277,044	0.482 (0.336)
Black share (1900)	244,302	0.131 (0.201)	277,044	0.101 (0.143)
Employment share in manufacturing sector (1900)	244,302	0.090 (0.080)	277,044	0.125 (0.086)
Labor Force share (1900)	244,302	0.813 (0.058)	277,044	0.786 (0.038)
Log Occupational Score (1900)	244,302	2.920 (0.160)	277,044	3.050 (0.163)
Share of English-speaking immigrants	244,302	0.824 (0.060)	277,044	0.813 (0.051)
Share of Literate Immigrants	244,302	0.903 (0.046)	277,044	0.894 (0.037)
Immigrants' Log Occupational Score	244,302	2.540 (0.063)	277,044	2.550 (0.021)

E Appendix – Index of Residential Integration

In Section 6.2, we explore the heterogeneity of the effects of European immigration by splitting counties above and below the sample median of (predicted) average 1910-1930 residential integration of immigrants. In what follows, we explain the procedure used to construct the index, and the robustness exercises we performed. Following Logan and Parman (2017), we exploit full count US Census manuscript files to identify next-door neighbors, and construct a measure assessing the likelihood of inter-group interactions given the observed neighborhood composition.

In the procedure developed by Logan and Parman (2017), neighbors are first identified according to the position of household heads in census records; then, individuals are split according to whether they belong to the majority or the minority group. Differently from Logan and Parman (2017), who consider the Black-white racial classification to assign individuals across groups, we use nativity and parentage to define members of the majority and minority group. We define as part of the “majority group” native-born individuals with both native-born parents.⁸⁹ Members of the minority group, instead, include first-generation immigrants from European countries in our sample (see also Table A.2).

Logan and Parman (2017) propose two computational procedures, which turn out to deliver rather similar results. We follow the less stringent one, and include all households with at least one (and not necessarily both) observed neighbor. We briefly describe the procedure here, referring the interested reader to Logan and Parman (2017) for a more detailed discussion. Let X_m be the number of immigrants with native-born neighbors in a county. This number is first compared to the expected number that one would obtain under complete integration, $E(\bar{X}_m)$, i.e. a situation in which individuals were randomly assigned within neighborhoods independently of nativity (and parentage). Next, X_m is compared to what one would observe under complete segregation, $E(\underline{X}_m)$, i.e. a situation where there is complete segregation along group lines, and immigrants living next to a native would be only the two individuals on either end of the immigrant neighborhood.

With these definitions at hand, the index of residential segregation in county c , μ_c , is computed as:

⁸⁹In our specifications, we include all natives with native parents (irrespective of race), but results are unchanged when restricting attention to white individuals. Indeed, the correlation between the index of integration constructed using, respectively, all and white-only natives of native parentage is as high as 0.9.

$$\mu_c = \frac{E(\overline{X_m}) - \overline{X_m}}{E(\overline{X_m}) - E(\underline{X_m})} \quad (\text{E.1})$$

To ease the interpretation of results, we multiply μ_c by -1 , so that the index increases as immigrant residents become more integrated with natives in a county.⁹⁰

As we discuss in the main text (Section 6.2), we examine the heterogeneous effect of historical immigration, depending on the intensity of inter-group contact by splitting the sample above and below the median value of a predicted version of the index in equation (E.1). To construct the predicted index of residential integration, we proceed as follows. First, we compute an index of integration for each country j as of 1900 in county c , μ_{jc} . Next, we interact it with the predicted 1910-1930 county immigrant share (relative to all immigrants) from each country. Finally, as for the other immigrants' characteristics, we sum over all European countries. Effectively, this predicted measure of integration, which highly correlates with the actual one, exploits the residential patterns of each group in each county as of 1900 to apportion the inflows of immigrants between 1910 and 1930. In this way, we do not capture potentially endogenous trends in residential segregation, which may be correlated with changes in natives' political preferences and ideology.

As highlighted by Logan and Parman (2017), this measure is defined for heterogeneous communities, and becomes less precise as the size of a group becomes small, i.e. when $m_{all} \rightarrow 0$. This is purely a computational issue, and may lead to extreme values of the index. Since in some counties the size of immigrants from country j can be close to zero, in our most preferred specification we drop country-county residential integration index (μ_{jc}) below and above the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively.⁹¹ As an additional robustness check, in what follows, we replicate results presented in Figure 2, Panel B, and Table A.8 with two different strategies.

First, to limit the “small group” concern just described, we follow Fouka et al. (2022), and aggregate European immigrants into eight macro-regions: Northern Europe; Southern Europe; Central-Eastern Europe; Western Europe; Russian Empire; United Kingdom; Ireland; and, Germany.⁹² Results are reported in Table E.2. Reassuringly, also in this case, the effects of immigration are substantially larger and more precisely estimated for counties above the sample median of residential integration. Also, and importantly, in most cases, the magnitude of coefficients remains close to that of estimates presented in Table A.8.

⁹⁰Note that the index in equation (E.1) can be negative if the area is more integrated than in a random assignment scenario.

⁹¹Reassuringly, in unreported analysis, we replicated our results using less stringent trimming criteria, or without trimming at all. All our findings remained unchanged.

⁹²We keep Germany and Ireland as independent countries because they, alone, are relatively large. The largest group in the “Southern European” group is represented by the Italians. Results are robust to using different classifications to assign countries to macro-regions. See Table E.1 for the classification of individual countries in the different macro-regions.

Second, in Table E.3, we present results obtained from a more straightforward residential integration index. This is computed using the standard Logan and Parman (2017) strategy, and simply classifying immigrants and natives according to their nativity and parentage. That is, we do not compute any immigrant-county specific residential segregation index (μ_{jc}). Instead, we simply compute the index of integration as of 1900 (to reduce concerns of endogeneity) for European immigrants and natives of native parentage. Also in this case, our findings are in line – both quantitatively and qualitatively – with those reported in Table A.8.

Table E.1. European Macro-regions

European Macro-regions	Countries
Northern Europe	Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
United Kingdom	England Scotland Wales
Ireland	Ireland
Southern Europe	Albania Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Central and Eastern Europe	Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia
Germany	Germany
Western Europe	Belgium France Netherlands Switzerland
Russian Empire	Estonia Latvia Lithuania Russia

Notes: the table presents the list of European countries included in our analysis, aggregated by European macro-regions. We follow this classification to compute the index of residential integration in Table E.2.

Table E.2. Sample Split around Residential Integration (1910-1930) - European Macro-regions

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential integration above median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.244*** (0.864) [0.0730]	5.274*** (1.522) [0.0880]	0.934*** (0.290) [0.0710]	1.162*** (0.393) [0.0860]	0.565** (0.287) [0.0420]	1.667** (0.768) [0.0510]	0.834*** (0.238) [0.0680]	0.148 (0.153) [0.0210]
KP F-stat	177.4	179.1	178.1	174.4	182.7	171.4	175.6	182.4
Observations	180,774	187,887	182,364	142,086	168,360	65,846	82,701	127,672
Mean dep. var.	2.835	4.180	0.368	0.493	0.577	2.826	0.710	0.399
Mean immigrant share	0.0391	0.0389	0.0390	0.0392	0.0390	0.0387	0.0385	0.0395
<i>Panel B: Residential integration below median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.344* (0.198) [0.0260]	1.470*** (0.400) [0.0570]	0.430*** (0.070) [0.0740]	0.305*** (0.095) [0.0520]	0.097 (0.080) [0.0170]	1.168** (0.484) [0.0830]	0.200** (0.079) [0.0390]	0.030 (0.043) [0.00900]
KP F-stat	625.4	632.9	630.2	628	616.5	588.9	610.2	653.8
Observations	181,161	188,047	182,890	144,087	170,050	67,378	83,144	129,884
Mean dep. var.	2.973	4.435	0.411	0.547	0.617	2.855	0.743	0.413
Mean immigrant share	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.150	0.149	0.148

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. The table replicates Table A.8. The predicted measure is the same as in Table A.8 but European countries are aggregated in macro-regions (see Table E.1 for the classification). The sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (-0.425). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. The coefficients in square brackets refer to standardized beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.3. Sample Split around Residential Integration (1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential integration above median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.796*** (0.671) [0.0630]	3.521*** (1.282) [0.0640]	0.600** (0.275) [0.0500]	0.761** (0.348) [0.0610]	0.454* (0.254) [0.0370]	1.521** (0.718) [0.0500]	0.736*** (0.231) [0.0650]	0.117 (0.138) [0.0180]
KP F-stat	280.6	281.6	282	282.3	282.6	272.1	287.1	282.4
Observations	180,392	187,477	182,005	141,803	168,094	65,639	82,292	127,328
Mean dep. var.	2.829	4.173	0.367	0.489	0.576	2.823	0.709	0.399
Mean immigrant share	0.0385	0.0382	0.0383	0.0385	0.0384	0.0379	0.0379	0.0390
<i>Panel B: Residential integration below median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.406** (0.183) [0.0290]	1.603*** (0.363) [0.0610]	0.457*** (0.062) [0.0770]	0.308*** (0.088) [0.0510]	0.115 (0.071) [0.0190]	1.087** (0.428) [0.0760]	0.177** (0.078) [0.0340]	0.039 (0.041) [0.0120]
KP F-stat	426.6	431.7	428.8	425.2	422.9	399.7	411.9	454.1
Observations	181,543	188,457	183,249	144,370	170,316	67,586	83,553	130,228
Mean dep. var.	2.978	4.442	0.412	0.550	0.618	2.857	0.744	0.413
Mean immigrant share	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.150	0.150	0.151	0.149	0.148

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2. Residential integration (1900) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017): the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (-0.576). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. The coefficients in square brackets refer to standardized beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

F Appendix – Additional Results

F.1 The German Example

In Section 6.1 of the paper, we consider the case of Germany, which experienced a major social welfare reform under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884. We compare the effects of German immigrants who migrated to the US before and after the implementation of the reform. We conjecture that, if exposure to the welfare influenced immigrants' preferences, which in turn spilled over into those of natives, Germans arrived after the reform should have a stronger impact on natives' preferences for redistribution in the long run.

The core of Bismarck's welfare program was the approval of the Compulsory Health Insurance Bill – the first compulsory health insurance ever implemented in the world and considered as a key step in the direction of universal access to healthcare (Bauernschuster et al., 2019; Scheubel, 2013) – and the Accident Insurance Bill in 1884.⁹³ These two reforms became effective in December 1884 and covered all industrial manual laborers employed “in factories, iron-works, mines, ship-building yards and similar workplaces” (Leichter, 1979). The reform required both employees and employers to make contributions to a fund that would then be used in case workers fell sick or injured.⁹⁴

Restricting attention to German immigrants, we estimate a regression similar to our baseline specification (equation (2)), except that the two regressors of interest are now the average German share between, respectively, 1850 and 1880, and 1900 and 1930 (and arrived after 1884).⁹⁵ Table F.1, which includes survey wave and state fixed effects as well as all historical controls of Table 1, reports OLS results. It documents that only the 1900-1930 German share enters positively and significantly, while the coefficient on the 1850-1880 share is quantitatively small, negative, and imprecisely estimated. This is consistent with our hypothesis: exposure to social welfare reforms changed immigrants' preferences (and, perhaps expectations) about the size of the government; as immigrants moved to the US, their ideology likely spilled over onto that of natives.

⁹³These reforms were later augmented with the the Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill in 1889 (and subsequently adopted in 1891). The insurance program was introduced by Bismarck in response to increased social unrest among the German working class (Rosenberg, 1967).


⁹⁴Workers were eligible to paid leave amounting to at least half of their wage for 13 weeks. In addition, workers were eligible to receive free medical and dental care and prescribed medicine for a maximum of 13 weeks as well as treatment in hospitals for a maximum of 26 weeks. At discretion of the employers, workers' dependents were eligible to free healthcare too. See Bauernschuster et al. (2019), Leichter (1979), and Scheubel (2013) for more details about the reform.

⁹⁵Since Census data for 1890 is not available, we consider decades 1900 through 1930, and restrict attention to all German immigrants arrived after 1884. Importantly for our purposes, immigration from Germany was sustained both before and after 1884. According to the official immigration statistics in Willcox (1929), almost 2.5 million Germans entered the United States between 1850 and 1880, and 1.9 million of them immigrated between 1886 and 1930 (data between 1925 and 1930 were digitized by Tabellini, 2020, from the *Commissioner General of Immigration*). Between 1881 and 1885, another 960,000 individuals moved to the US. Our analysis excludes German immigrants arrived between 1881 and 1884. The boundaries of Germany changed several times. Ruggles et al. (2020) classify as “Germans” individuals born in one Germany’s administrative areas circa 1900. See https://usa.ipums.org/usa/1860_1870.release.notes.shtml for more details.


Reassuringly, Germans moving before and after 1884 were very similar to each other along observable characteristics. On average, 90% of German immigrants were literate between 1850 and 1880; this number was slightly higher (95%) among those arrived after 1884. Similarly, 90% of German men in working age (15-64) were in the labor force between 1850 and 1880, while 92% of them were in the labor force after 1884. Moreover, Germans moved to a very similar set of counties. Figure F.1 plots the share of German immigrants across counties for the two periods, and shows that, indeed, there is almost complete overlap between the places that received German immigrants between 1850 and 1880 and between 1884 and 1930, respectively.

Figure F.1. Fraction of German Immigrants over County Population

Panel A: Period 1850-1880



Panel B: Period 1900-1930



Notes: the two maps plot the average share of German Immigrants (over county population) in the periods 1850-1880 and 1900-1930, respectively. In the latter period, we restrict the sample to Germans arrived after 1884. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Table F.1. Ideology, Redistribution and Immigration – the German Example

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Fraction of German Immigrants(1900-1930)	1.005 (0.616) [0.013]	3.367** (1.362) [0.023]	0.888*** (0.303) [0.028]	0.743** (0.309) [0.023]	0.544*** (0.199) [0.017]	1.674* (0.865) [0.022]	0.708*** (0.258) [0.024]	0.141 (0.110) [0.008]
Fraction of German Immigrants(1850-1880)	-0.089 (0.153) [-0.004]	-0.307 (0.337) [-0.007]	-0.046 (0.069) [-0.005]	-0.069 (0.076) [-0.007]	-0.116* (0.060) [-0.012]	-0.103 (0.229) [-0.004]	-0.074 (0.069) [-0.008]	-0.057* (0.034) [-0.011]
Observations	363,183	377,286	366,566	287,089	339,635	133,767	166,377	258,389
Mean dep. var.	2.903	4.307	0.389	0.520	0.597	2.839	0.727	0.406
Mean fraction of German Imm.(1900-1930)	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Mean fraction of German Imm.(1850-1880)	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.040	0.039	0.039

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressors of interest are the average fraction of German immigrants over county population between 1850 and 1880 and between 1900 and 1930. German immigrants in the second period are restricted to those arrived after 1884. Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

F.2 Historical Immigration and Income Inequality

As discussed in Section 6.3 of the paper, one potential concern with our results is that historical immigration increased income inequality – either in the short or in the long run – in turn inducing natives to demand more redistribution. Studies on the more recent period tend to find that immigration had, if anything, a very limited impact on US income inequality (Card, 2009). Similarly, Tabellini (2020) provides suggestive evidence that European immigration was unlikely to increase inequality in the short run.

To test the possibility that historical immigration influenced natives’ preferences for redistribution via changes in inequality, we augment our baseline specification (Table 1 in the main text) with different measures of income inequality. Following the literature (Autor et al., 2008), we construct the ratio of log wage ratios for full-time, full-year workers computed at the following percentiles: 90 to 10; 90 to 50; and, 50 to 10.⁹⁶ In Table F.2, we use inequality measured in 1940 – the first year in which the US Census systematically collected income and wage data. Next, we consider income inequality measured in 2000 – the last Census year before the CES data becomes available. Due to data limitation, not all counties in our sample can be included.⁹⁷ For this reason, we present results constructing the historical immigrant share (and all other controls, including 2000 income inequality) at the county level in Table F.3 and at the CZ level in Table F.4. We present our baseline estimates in Panel A, to account for the fact that the sample of counties and respondents in these exercises is slightly different from that in Table 1, Panel B. In Panels B to D, we include each of the three measures of income inequality described above, respectively. Finally, in Panel E we include all of them simultaneously.

Reassuringly, in all cases, results remain quantitatively and qualitatively close to those of the baseline specification. When interpreting these patterns, one should remember that, especially in Tables F.3 and F.4, income inequality is measured several years after our treatment (historical immigration), and as such may be a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Thus, results should be interpreted with some caution. Yet, the fact that the point estimate on the historical immigrant share remains unchanged corroborates the idea that our findings are unlikely to be driven by (immigrant induced) changes in income inequality.

In Table F.5, we present one more piece of evidence consistent with this interpretation. In particular, we regress 1940 income inequality at the county level against state fixed effects, historical controls, and the historical immigrant share.⁹⁸ In columns 1 to 3, we consider the

⁹⁶As in Autor et al. (2008), we exclude self-employed workers, and construct full-time, full-year weekly wages focusing on workers who worked for at least 40 weeks and at least 35 hours per week.

⁹⁷Differently than for 1940, we cannot rely on the full count US Population Census for 2000. The 10% sample of individuals surveyed does not cover the entire United States.

⁹⁸As in the main text, we weigh regressions by 1900 population and use robust standard errors.

three measures of income inequality described above calculated among all men in the county. In columns 4 to 6, we restrict attention to natives (of native parentage). The coefficient on immigration is imprecisely estimated, quantitatively small, and unstable across columns. This suggests that historical immigration did not have detectable effects on inequality, at least as measured in 1940. We cannot rule out that the lack of association between inequality and European immigration is the result of the policies implemented between 1910 and 1940 (in response to the inflow of immigrants). At the same time, together with the estimates in Tables F.2 to F.4, results in Table F.5 are consistent with the idea that, alone, changes in income inequality are unlikely to explain our main findings.

Table F.2. Controlling for Wage Inequality, 1940

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.606*** (0.154)	1.841*** (0.299)	0.443*** (0.0556)	0.354*** (0.0748)	0.205*** (0.0637)	1.075*** (0.322)	0.262*** (0.0601)	0.0970*** (0.0343)
KP F-stat	623.8	629.5	626.2	613	620.1	580.7	599.9	662.2
<i>Panel B: Wage inequality 90/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.613*** (0.154)	1.843*** (0.300)	0.442*** (0.0560)	0.356*** (0.0747)	0.205*** (0.0639)	1.075*** (0.325)	0.262*** (0.0604)	0.0991*** (0.0343)
KP F-stat	647.4	653.8	650.3	636.5	644.3	605.5	627.6	684.3
<i>Panel C: Wage inequality 90/50</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.606*** (0.155)	1.837*** (0.306)	0.442*** (0.0573)	0.354*** (0.0756)	0.204*** (0.0646)	1.074*** (0.327)	0.262*** (0.0611)	0.0972*** (0.0341)
KP F-stat	634.8	641.3	637.7	624.2	631.7	593.9	615.2	671.9
<i>Panel D: Wage inequality 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.615*** (0.156)	1.852*** (0.302)	0.445*** (0.0559)	0.358*** (0.0753)	0.207*** (0.0643)	1.079*** (0.323)	0.263*** (0.0605)	0.0991*** (0.0347)
KP F-stat	627.8	633.9	630.5	617.5	624.6	582.9	603.2	666.9
<i>Panel E: Wage inequality 90/10; 90/50; 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.614*** (0.158)	1.846*** (0.312)	0.443*** (0.0586)	0.357*** (0.0765)	0.206*** (0.0651)	1.079*** (0.324)	0.263*** (0.0610)	0.0993*** (0.0346)
KP F-stat	675	682.6	678.4	662.3	673.5	634.7	660.1	708.5
Observations	363,292	377,390	366,687	287,109	339,714	133,769	166,460	258,549
Mean dep. variable	2.902	4.303	0.389	0.519	0.597	2.839	0.726	0.406
Mean immigrant share	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.095	0.094	0.094

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Wage inequality is proxied with the ratio of log wage for full-time, full-year workers at the following percentiles, in 1940: 90 to 10 (Panel B); 90 to 50 (Panel C); and, 50 to 10 (Panel D). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table F.3. Controlling for Wage Inequality, 2000 – County Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.758*** (0.195)	2.177*** (0.367)	0.520*** (0.071)	0.402*** (0.089)	0.225*** (0.078)	1.126*** (0.383)	0.285*** (0.082)	0.120*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	166.1	167.2	165.9	164.8	166.9	164.9	176	160.6
<i>Panel B: Wage inequality 90/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.741*** (0.195)	2.151*** (0.367)	0.514*** (0.071)	0.396*** (0.089)	0.222*** (0.078)	1.104*** (0.382)	0.281*** (0.082)	0.120*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	166	167.1	165.9	164.7	166.8	164.7	175.8	160.6
<i>Panel C: Wage inequality 90/50</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.736*** (0.195)	2.149*** (0.367)	0.514*** (0.071)	0.394*** (0.089)	0.220*** (0.077)	1.104*** (0.383)	0.280*** (0.082)	0.119*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	165.5	166.7	165.4	164.3	166.3	164.3	175.5	160.2
<i>Panel D: Wage inequality 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.752*** (0.195)	2.164*** (0.367)	0.517*** (0.071)	0.400*** (0.089)	0.224*** (0.078)	1.116*** (0.382)	0.283*** (0.082)	0.120*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	166.6	167.7	166.5	165.3	167.5	165.4	176.4	161.1
<i>Panel E: Wage inequality 90/10; 90/50; 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.716*** (0.200)	2.139*** (0.377)	0.505*** (0.073)	0.383*** (0.091)	0.212*** (0.079)	1.038*** (0.384)	0.279*** (0.083)	0.120*** (0.041)
KP F-stat	159.9	161.1	160	158.7	160.6	158.6	169	155.5
Observations	304,460	316,673	308,017	245,257	283,041	113,506	140,761	216,131
Mean dep. variable	2.89	4.27	0.38	0.51	0.59	2.82	0.72	0.41
Mean immigrant share	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Wage inequality is proxied with the ratio of log wage for full-time, full-year workers at the following percentiles, in 2000: 90 to 10 (Panel B); 90 to 50 (Panel C); and, 50 to 10 (Panel D). Regressions include state and survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table F.4. Controlling for Wage Inequality, 2000 – Commuting Zone Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.810*** (0.223)	2.030*** (0.453)	0.454*** (0.092)	0.396*** (0.107)	0.319*** (0.088)	1.221*** (0.317)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.052)
KP F-stat	65.50	65.68	65.55	64.12	65.56	64.89	67.74	66.20
<i>Panel B: Wage inequality 90/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.807*** (0.223)	2.025*** (0.449)	0.453*** (0.091)	0.395*** (0.106)	0.319*** (0.088)	1.214*** (0.313)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.052)
KP F-stat	65.53	65.71	65.58	64.15	65.59	64.93	67.77	66.23
<i>Panel C: Wage inequality 90/50</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.804*** (0.223)	2.022*** (0.452)	0.452*** (0.092)	0.394*** (0.106)	0.318*** (0.088)	1.212*** (0.315)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.051)
KP F-stat	65.63	65.82	65.68	64.26	65.70	64.99	67.85	66.30
<i>Panel D: Wage inequality 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.811*** (0.223)	2.032*** (0.448)	0.454*** (0.090)	0.396*** (0.107)	0.319*** (0.088)	1.220*** (0.314)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.052)
KP F-stat	65.84	66.02	65.89	64.46	65.91	65.29	68.07	66.53
<i>Panel E: Wage inequality 90/10; 90/50; 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.789*** (0.227)	2.011*** (0.459)	0.444*** (0.092)	0.383*** (0.107)	0.311*** (0.089)	1.139*** (0.310)	0.340*** (0.110)	0.170*** (0.051)
KP F-stat	64.29	64.53	64.44	62.92	64.42	63.75	66.46	65.05
Observations	304,460	316,673	308,017	245,257	283,041	113,506	140,761	216,131
Mean dep. variable	2.89	4.27	0.38	0.51	0.59	2.82	0.72	0.41
Mean immigrant share	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CES surveys. See Table D.2 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Wage inequality is proxied with the ratio of log wage for full-time, full-year workers at the following percentiles, in 2000: 90 to 10 (Panel B); 90 to 50 (Panel C); and, 50 to 10 (Panel D). The Table replicates Table 1 aggregating the geography used to define the fraction of immigrants from the county to the Commuting Zone level. Regressions include survey year fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table F.5. Income Inequality, 1940

Dep. Variables	All			Natives		
	Wage Inequality 90/10	Wage Inequality 90/50	Wage Inequality 50/10	Wage Inequality 90/10	Wage Inequality 90/50	Wage Inequality 50/10
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.042 (0.074)	0.071 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.036)	0.110 (0.079)	0.071 (0.056)	0.013 (0.043)
KP F-stat	725.7	725.7	725.7	725.7	725.7	725.7
Observations	2,877	2,877	2,877	2,877	2,877	2,877
Mean dep. var.	1.569	1.225	1.279	1.569	1.225	1.280
Mean immigrant share	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103

Notes: Dependent variable is income inequality proxied with the ratio of log wage for full-time, full-year workers at the following percentiles, in 1940: 90 to 10 (columns 1); 90 to 50 (columns 2); and, 50 to 10 (columns 3). Columns 4 to 6 replicate columns 1 to 3 restricting to natives' income inequality. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Regressions include state fixed effects and historical controls. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

