Unveiling the Dance of Commodity Prices and the Global Financial Cycle*

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of changes in commodity prices on the business cycles and capital flows of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Our findings reveal that surges in export prices, triggered by commodity price shocks, boost domestic GDP, an effect further amplified by the endogenous decline of EMBI spreads. However, the effects on capital flows appear muted. Shifts in U.S monetary policy and global risk appetite drive the global financial cycle in EMDEs. Eased global credit conditions, attributed to looser U.S. monetary policy or lower global risk appetite, lead to a raise in export prices, higher output, decreases in EMBI spreads, and stimulate greater capital flows. To thoroughly understand the impact of commodity price fluctuations on EMDEs' business cycle and capital flows, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant role of global financial conditions and global economic activity in driving commodity price dynamics.

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1 Introduction

Emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) are highly vulnerable to the dynamics of global economic conditions, with commodity price fluctuations acting as drivers of business cycles and capital flows (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009; Reinhart, Reinhart, and Trebesch, 2016). This interplay arises primarily due to EMDEs' extensive reliance on raw commodity exports. As a result, shifts in commodity prices primarily manifest as export price fluctuations, the impacts of which propagate through terms-of-trade channels (Di Pace, Juvenal, and Petrella, 2020; Fernández, González, and Rodríguez, 2018) and potentially affecting debt financing costs (Drechsel and Tenreyro, 2018). Rey (2013) emphasizes the importance of acknowledging common determinants driving the coordinated ebbs and flows of capital, asset price fluctuations, and crises worldwide—phenomena collectively known as the Global Financial Cycle (GFC). The GFC has traditionally been linked to shifts in U.S monetary policy and to changes in risk aversion and uncertainty (Bruno and Shin, 2014; Kalemli-Özcan, 2019; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020). However, more recently, Davis et al. (2021) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021) underscore commodity prices as a potential engine of the GFC.

In order to shed light on main stylized facts underscoring the significance of commodity price movements for business cycle fluctuations, capital flows, and their interplay with the GFC, we present a collection of main indicators in Figure 1. These metrics are derived as average measures, encompassing the countries in our sample. Figure 1, Panels a and b, illustrate the key role of export price booms (and busts) in driving business cycles, and their strong association with surges (and flights) of capital flows in EMDEs. Commodity prices, in tandem with global financial conditions, are primary determinants of sovereign spreads. As illustrated in Panel c, the EMBI spread exhibits a negative correlation with export prices.

Capital flow movements in EMDEs are also closely tied to global financial conditions: heightened worldwide financial stress typically triggers capital flights from EMDEs (Panel d). However, export prices do not show a pronounced correlation with global financial conditions (Panel e). This reflects two elements of the global financial cycle: one associated with global risk and financial stress, and the other typifying the fluctuations in commodity prices (Davis et al., 2021; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2021). Nonetheless, changes in global financial conditions predict export price movements (Panel f), underpinning a powerful interplay between these two drivers of the GFC. An initial examination of the raw data underscores the pivotal role that commodity price fluctuations play within this dynamic for EMDEs. However, to truly grasp the impact of commodity price fluctuations on the business cycle and capital flows in EMDEs, it is essential to recognize the pervasive influence of global financial conditions and global economic activity, as drivers of commodity price fluctuations.

In this paper, we dissect the transmission mechanisms of different types of shocks to interpret the observed patterns in the raw data. Our focus is directed towards understanding the channels through which commodity price fluctuations affect EMDEs, and the degree to which they contribute to the propagation of world shocks. Specifically, we seek to understand how instrumental idiosyncratic shocks in commodity markets are in driving business and capital flows cycles in EMDEs, particularly in comparison to other world shocks that

Figure 1: Stylized Facts



(a) Price of Exports and GDP

(b) Export Prices and Capital Flows

(c) Export Prices and EMBI Spread

(d) BAA Spread and Capital Flows

(e) Export Prices and BAA Spread

(f) (Change in) Export Prices and BAA Spread (t-1)

Notes: Export prices and GDP are presented in percent of log deviation from quadratic trend. Capital inflows and outflows are presented as a ratio with respect to the trend of GDP in U.S. dollars. BAA and EMBI spreads are in basis points. All the variables (except the BAA spread) are plotted as an average for the countries in our sample using GDP weights in U.S. dollars.

generate an endogenous response in commodity prices. We also emphasize the role of the financial channel, mediated by changes in borrowing costs, in transmitting these shocks. In addition, we spotlight the importance of commodity price fluctuations—those embodying endogenous responses to shifts in global economic activity—as potent propagators of global shocks. Specifically, we investigate the role that commodity prices play in transmitting the GFC.

We rely on the panel local projection (LP) method with instrumental variables (IV) augmented to incorporate the Kitagawa-Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, KBO hereafter (Cloyne et al., 2023; Jordà et al., 2020). The KBO decomposition allows us to examine the responses heterogeneity over time and over states of the economy. To instrument export prices we use major events in commodity markets such as weather shocks or geopolitical incidents, exogenous to individual countries. To translate the event into an instrument we construct a metric of surprise for each event which allows us to isolate commodity price shocks from movements in commodity prices that are linked to global conditions. We use the BAA spread as an indicator of the global financial cycle, instrumented with a proxy for U.S. monetary policy and also with uncertainty shocks.

We find that increases in commodity prices stemming from significant idiosyncratic events in commodity markets yield a robust positive impact on output and an increase in foreign exchange reserves. Interestingly, these commodity price shocks trigger a relatively muted response of capital flows. Therefore, this pattern does not replicate the comovement between capital inflows and outflows evident in the raw data. These results suggest that, while commodity price shocks are potent forces driving business cycles, their impact on the capital flows cycle in EMDEs is not as pronounced. We find that, on average, the increase in export prices driven by commodity price shocks leads to a small contraction in the EMBI spread. However, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant role of the EMBI spread's endogenous response in amplifying the transmission of commodity price shocks. In fact, countries experiencing a more substantial contraction in the EMBI spread during commodity booms tend to display higher increases in GDP.

We then drill deeper into the role of commodity prices as a conduit in transmitting global shocks. Using the BAA spread as a proxy for the global financial cycle, we argue that it is imperative to distinguish between its primary drivers. We focus on two of them: U.S. monetary policy shocks and shifts in global risk appetite (see, e.g., Habib and Venditti, 2019).

We find that movements in the BAA spreads associated with looser U.S. monetary policy lead to a sustained, hump-shaped increase in export prices and GDP. In fact, we observe that countries which experience a more sustained increase in their export prices as a result of an increase in global economic activity (often because their export sector is more concentrated on highly cyclical commodities) experience higher increases in GDP. These shocks also reflect into a decline in the EMBI spread and lead to higher capital flows. Notably, we observe significant capital outflows, which appear to be predominantly associated with the banking sector's activities, falling under the "other investment" category.

Our results indicate that reductions in the BAA spread triggered by lower global risk appetite and financial uncertainty, generate a surge in export prices. This surge is associated with a marked and sustained expansion in domestic GDP and a large albeit temporary decrease in EMBI spreads (consistent with Gilchrist et al., 2022). We also find that GDP increases by more the larger the decline in the EMBI spread. This shock leads to pronounced increases in both capital inflows and outflows - particularly in portfolio flows. The response pattern maps the comovement we observe in the raw data and shown in Figure 1.

While the transmission of the two shocks linked to the BAA spread share qualitative similarities, the strength of their channels of transmission are different. The extent of U.S. monetary policy transmission to EMDEs can vary considerably, largely depending on the intensity of the response in export prices. Conversely, the transmission strength of global risk shocks seems to be propagated more through financial channels and hinges on the endogenous, varying response of EMBI spreads. For both types of shocks, we document a pronounced negative comovement between export prices and the EMBI spread. This relationship is important when considering the formulation of appropriate policy responses to global shocks (see, e.g., Frankel, 2010; Kaminsky, 2010; Drechsel et al., 2019).

In summary, our findings highlight the critical role of commodity prices, serving as a significant channel for the transmission of world shocks to EMDEs. Our paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the impact of commodity price fluctuations on business cycles (Di Pace et al., 2020; Fernández et al., 2017; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2018) and capital flows in EMDEs (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009; Reinhart et al., 2016). It also connects with the literature that underscores the relationship between export price surges and borrowing cost reductions - the financial channel, as highlighted by Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) and Hamann et al. (2023). Our analysis aligns with studies emphasizing the significant role played by commodity prices in the propagation of the global financial cycle (Davis et al., 2021; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2021). More broadly, we contribute to the literature that investigates the drivers of the GFC. This is typically split into studies focusing on the role U.S. monetary policy (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020; Kalemli-Özcan, 2019), and those emphasizing fluctuations to shifts in global risk perceptions (Bruno and Shin, 2014; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Obstfeld and Zhou, 2023). Our work stands out by carefully distinguishing between these two channels and, most importantly, demonstrating how their transmission mechanism to EMDEs hinges on the endogenous responses of commodity prices.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and Section 3 details the research design and the identification strategy. Our empirical methodology and baseline results are shown in Section 4 while Section 5 discusses the presence of regime asymmetries. Section 6 discusses the interaction effects and Section 7 concludes.

2 Data

The estimation period runs from 1990 to 2019. The yearly dataset covers 54 emerging and developing countries and includes information on output, capital flows, EMBI spreads, BAA spreads, and export prices. The sources of data and details on coverage are presented in

Appendix A.

Country-specific real GDP is sourced World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Gross capital inflows and outflows data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). In line with the literature, we use the standard balance of payments definitions and terminology on capital flows (e.g. Avdjiev et al., 2022; Forbes and Warnock, 2012) such that *inflows* are defined as net inflows from foreign residents into the domestic economy and *outflows* are defined as net outflows from domestic residents to the rest of the world. We refer to the difference between capital inflows and outflows, as net inflows.[1] International capital flows (acquisition of claims) are broken down into several categories: direct investment; portfolio investment (equity and debt); other investment, which is mainly bank-related; and foreign exchange reserves, which is a category that only exists for outflows. Emerging market sovereign spreads are measured as spreads over Treasuries of J.P. Morgan EMBI global diversified index obtained from Datastream, Bloomberg, and J.P Morgan. BAA spreads are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED.

We compute country-specific export price indices denominated in U.S. dollars using sectoral export shares, commodity prices, and disaggregated U.S. PPI data as a proxy for manufacturing prices. Export shares are calculated based on disaggregated product export values sourced from the MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity.[2] Commodity prices are obtained from the World Bank's Commodity Price Data. U.S. PPI prices for manufacturing categories and the U.S. CPI are sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED. In our empirical analysis we deflate the export and import price indices by the U.S. CPI, and therefore consider real dollar export prices (hereafter denoted as Px). The methodology for calculating this index follows the recommendations of the IMF Export and Import Prices Manual and is explained in Di Pace et al. (2020).[3]

3 Identification

The main purpose of the empirical analysis is to investigate the role of world shocks in shaping the business cycle of emerging market economies. Specifically, we are interested in the impact of commodity price fluctuations and global financial conditions.

We use the price of exports as the primary channel through which fluctuations in commodity prices are transmitted to EMDEs. In fact, the share of raw commodities in total exports is substantial in each country in our sample. Additionally, the volatility of commodity prices is significantly higher than goods prices, meaning that fluctuations in commodity prices dominate the overall variation in export prices (Di Pace et al., 2020). By using Px instead of focusing on a specific commodity price, we can account for variations in export

[1] Our analysis excludes financial derivatives due to data limitations. When these derivatives are incorporated, the difference between capital inflows and outflows constitutes the financial account balance, which corresponds to the current account balance (up to a statistical discrepancy).

[2] The data can be accessed at `https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/`.

[3] `https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Manuals-Guides/Issues/2016/12/31/Export-and-Import-Price-Index-Manual-Theory-and-Practice-19587`.

specialization over time, since the share of a particular commodity within the export basket is time-varying.

The examination of commodity price shocks, with particular focus on the export price bundle, provides insight into a country's time-varying vulnerability to specific commodity markets. For instance, consider Mozambique, which initiated natural gas production in 2004. By the end of the study period, natural gas comprised nearly 10% of its total exports. Price variations in natural gas were initially irrelevant to Mozambique's terms of trade. However, in the past decade, the natural gas price emerged as a pivotal determinant of Mozambique's export price. Consequently, Mozambique developed a pronounced vulnerability to significant energy price shocks. Overlooking these salient structural shifts in the economy could introduce considerable bias into our estimates.

When studying the impact of commodity price fluctuations in a panel setting, it is important to account for the varying exposure of the countries in our sample to different commodity markets. Estimating the average effect of a commodity price shock can be challenging without categorizing countries appropriately. Nonetheless, implementing such categorization can be challenging due to the large heterogeneity among the sample countries, which may not exclusively rely on a single commodity or commodity group. To overcome this challenge, we can directly analyze the price of exports and focus on the average effect of a shift in that price. This approach allows us to study the impact of major shifts in commodity prices, circumventing the necessity for categorization.[4]

We rely on the BAA spread as an indicator of global financial conditions. Akinci (2013) emphasizes its importance as a propagator of global financial shocks in small open economies. Additionally, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021) show that fluctuations in the BAA spread are closely related to a broad factor summarizing common fluctuations in asset prices and capital flows, which is associated with the GFC.

We can reasonably claim that, for the sample of countries under investigation, the usual small open economy assumption applies. Therefore, domestic conditions are unlikely to affect global variables. However, this does not imply that we can use these variables as proxies for the exogenous shocks of interest. For example, consider the variation in export prices or similarly, the underlying fluctuations in commodity prices. While some of these movements are certainly related to commodity-specific idiosyncratic shocks, a significant portion reflects the endogenous response of international prices to changes in aggregate demand at the global level. The way the domestic economy reacts to each of these disturbances can be drastically different. Failing to distinguish between the two can give a misleading picture of the overall importance of commodity prices for EMDEs and the transmission channels of world shocks. Likewise, while examining the causal impacts of fluctuations in BAA spreads on EMDEs, the effects can significantly vary depending on the underlying causes of the BAA spread shifts. Hence, taking these factors into account, our identification of the causal impact of export price changes - that reflect either idiosyncratic shocks to commodity prices or BAA

[4]However, it is important to note that this approach precludes the identification of whether certain commodity prices are more impactful than others when studying EMDEs. Further, it curtails our capacity to examine the heterogeneity in response to specific commodity price shocks.

spread shifts - is based on the use of external instrumental variables.

3.1 Commodity Prices Instrument

We use a series of events specific to commodity markets that are associated with large swings in prices as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the transmission of commodity price shocks. As a first step, we examined historical documents and newspaper articles to identify episodes of significant commodity price changes that were unrelated to important macroeconomic developments such as natural disasters, weather-related shocks, or significant geopolitical events. This analysis led us to identify a total of 24 events, summarized in Table 1. For instance, a positive shock in the price of cotton in 2003, resulting from global shortages associated with severe weather damage to cotton crops in China, provided us with an event for an exogenous shift the price of cotton. We use this event for cotton exporters in our sample such as Burkina Faso. To avoid selecting events that might represent both an export price shock and a capital or productivity shock, we exclude events that arise from weather conditions or political events within a specific country. For example, an attempted coup in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, a leading cocoa producing country, generated an increase of 66 percent in cocoa prices. This shock served us for an event for cocoa exporting countries except Côte d'Ivoire.[5]

A detailed narrative and evidence in support of our choice of events are provided in Appendix B. By pinpointing these events, we can construct an instrument to analyze the impact of commodity price shocks on various economic variables. This instrument is a key contribution and an essential ingredient for our analysis since it allows us to isolate commodity price shocks from movements in commodity prices that are linked to global conditions.

To create the commodity price instrument, we begin by generating a metric of surprise for each event. This metric is calculated as the difference between the observed (log) price of the commodity, which is deflated using the U.S. CPI and the price that would have been expected based on the commodity's own price history (including lags) as well as the overall (log) level of real commodity price indices for the group of commodities to which the commodity does not belong. The latter set of variables is included to control for global economic conditions that affect all commodity price indices.

Specifically, the surprise is defined as: $e_{c,t} = p_{c,t} - E_{t-1}[p_{c,t}]$, where $p_{c,t}$ is the (log real) price of commodity c at time t, and E is the expectation operator. The expectation of the price prior to the event is retrieved from the following regression model $p_{c,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{2} a_j p_{c,t-j} - \sum_{\forall g \neq g_c} \sum_{j=1}^{2} b_{g,j} p_{t-j}^{g} + e_{c,t}$, where g_c represents the commodity group g to which commodity c belongs.[6] For each event, j, we define $q_{j,t} = e_{c,t}$ for t corresponding to the year of the event,

[5] The events we consider are associated with changes in commodity prices that are exogenous to the country, stemming from *global* fluctuations in commodity-specific demand or supply. For each country in our sample, any shock can be perceived as a shift in demand for the producer country, which, considering an upward sloping domestic supply curve, is linked with increased prices. An illustration of this can be found in the instance of an extreme drought. Countries unaffected by the drought would confront an escalation in foreign demand, which would subsequently lead to higher prices.

[6] We consider the three many commodity indexes, namely agricultural, energy, and metals. When we evaluate, for instance, the surprise in one of the agricultural commodity prices, we include as a proxy of the global component the lagged value of the energy and metal commodity price indexes.

Table 1: List of Events

Year	Commodity	Sign	Source of Shock
1993	Timber	+	Clinton's environmentally friendly policies
1993	Tobacco	-	Worldwide increase in competition for exports
1994	Coffee	+	Frost in Brazil
1994	Cotton	+	Decline in production due to bad weather in key producing countries
1994	Aluminum	+	Reduction in stocks of major producing countries
1997	Cereals/Food	-	Favorable pruduction forecast
1998	Crude oil	-	Expectations of higher supply
1999	Cocoa	-	Supply surplus in major producing countries
2000	Natural gas	+	California gas crisis
2000	Nickel	+	Technical problems in key producing countries
2002	Cocoa	+	Attempted coup in Cote d'Ivoire
2003	Cotton	+	Severe weather damage in China
2005	Natural gas	+	Effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita
2006	Sugar	+	Severe draughts in Thailand
2007	Lead	-	Rising stocks and suspended production from the Magellan mine in Australia
2008	Rice	+	Trade restrictions of major suppliers
2008	Soybean	+	Expectations of a reduction in supply
2010	Cereals/Food	+	Adverse weather conditions in key producing countries
2010	Cotton	+	Negative weather shocks in the U.S. and Pakistan
2010	Rubber	+	Severe draughts in Thailand and India
2015	Energy	-	Booming in U.S. shale oil pruduction
2017	Cocoa	-	Favorable weather conditions in major producing countries
2019	Energy (excluding crude oil)	-	The U.S. became a net energy exporter
2019	Iron ore	+	Collapse of a mining dam in Brazil

Notes: This Table lists each of the episodes identified as generating large exogenous variations in commodity prices and indicates provides a brief description of the source of the shock.

and $q_{j,t} = 0$ for all other periods. By doing so, we are essentially assuming that a predominant part of the unexpected variation in the commodity price at the time of the event can be attributed to the exogenous event. This procedure is in line with the approach proposed by Hamilton (2003), who identifies oil supply shocks as reductions in oil prices from their previous peaks and shows these to be closely related to the fall in supply of oil for the country specifically affected by the event over the same period. The use of the surprise avoids the inclusion of price fluctuations into $q_{j,t}$, which would have been anticipated "ex-ante" based on the information available.[7]

The instrument puts together the unexpected variation in prices for each of the events we consider. Since the changes in the price of exports can be approximately viewed as a weighted average of the changes of the underlying commodity prices, we construct the instrument $z_{i,t} = \sum_j \mathbf{1}(w_{i,c,t-1} > \underline{w})w_{i,c,t-1}q_{j,t}$, where $w_{i,c,t}$ denotes the export weight of commodity c (associated with event j) for country i at time t and $\mathbf{1}(x)$ denotes an indicator function that takes value 1 when condition x is satisfied. The surprise component, $q_{j,t}$, reveals that the exogenous fluctuations in the export price for two countries with equivalent exposure to rel-

[7]To clarify the importance of the use of the surprise as opposed to the change in prices at the time of the event, it is useful to consider a specific case associated with a price increase. Suppose the event occurs during a phase of robust economic expansion; in that case, it is plausible to expect that the price at time t would surpass the observed price at time $t-1$, thereby leading to a smaller surprise than the price change from the previous year. In contrast, if the same event were to occur during a period of sluggish economic growth, it is reasonable to expect prices to be lower than current prices "ex-ante," resulting in a surprise that could exceed the price change from the preceding year. As a matter of fact, the surprise component is not always required to be of the same sign as the price change. Nonetheless, for each of the events we examine, the significant price change is predominantly influenced by the surprise component, resulting in the signs of both components being identical.

evant commodities for two distinct events are approximately proportional to the surprise in the commodity price changes that occurred during the respective events. The instrument, however, is also a function of the commodity weight in the export basket. Therefore, we are able to exploit the (predetermined) cross-sectional and time-series variation in export patterns. Specifically, two events that exhibit comparable levels of price surprise are anticipated to have varying effects on the same country, depending on their distinct degrees of exposure to different commodities. Most importantly, within a panel setting, we can take advantage of the cross-sectional variation in the sensitivity of different countries to the same commodity for each of the events, i.e., $w_{i,c,t-1} \neq w_{j,c,t-1}$ for each $i \neq j$. Lastly, we choose a lower bound $\underline{w} = 2\%$, so that the term $\mathbf{1}(w_{i,c,t-1} > \underline{w})$ limits the amount of noise in the instruments for countries with limited exposure to the commodity price at the time of specific events.[8]

Thus, for a country like Mozambique, we can take advantage of the the exogenous variations across an array of commodity groups to identify the average effect of commodity price shifts. More specifically, we exploit the historical economic dynamics where cotton was a dominant sector in production and exports during the 1990s, whereas in the last decade, natural gas exports have constituted a significant fraction of Mozambique's output. Correspondingly, for a country like Brazil, we use the exogenous shifts in various commodities such as aluminum, coffee, and tobacco during the early 1990s. The relevance of oil market events, however, only rose in the last decade with the discoveries of substantial offshore oil reserves in the 2000s.

In summary, unanticipated variations in the commodity prices during major, commodity-specific events, modulated based on the significance of each commodity in the total export basket, give rise to exogenous fluctuations in the price of exports for all the countries under investigation. This leads us to conclude that the correlation between the instrument and the price of exports can be used to calculate a local impulse response in the sense of the local average treatment effect in Imbens and Angrist (1994). The instrument puts together the information of multiple events, while the use of an instrument for each of the events separately could give rise to the presence of weak instruments (see, e.g., Giacomini et al., 2022). Table 2 reports first-stage regression results of the endogenous variable, the (change in) detrended log of export prices for country i (Δp^x_{it}), on the instrument z_{it} without controls and then more formally with controls (including country fixed effects). The F-statistic clearly shows that z_{it} is not a weak instrument.

3.2 Financial Conditions Instrument

We are also interested in measuring the impact of shifts in global financial conditions, specifically the BAA spread, and examine its transmission to the EMDEs. This aligns with the expanding body of research focused on identifying key drivers of the global financial cycle, as summarized by Kaminsky (2019) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021). Our analysis is designed to distinguish between two distinct scenarios. The first posits that changes in the BAA spread are a result of the international spillover of U.S. monetary policy, whereas

[8]The results that we report are robust to an alternative choice of $\underline{w}$ at 1% or 0.5%.

Table 2: First-stage F-statistic for alternative instrument sets

	No Controls	With Controls
Commodity Events	60.15	710.68
U.S. Monetary Policy	35.42	256.38
Global Risk Appetite	38.75	673.75

Notes: In the first row, we present the results of the first state regression for the country-specific (change in detrended log of) export prices. The left panel displays results with only country fixed effects as controls, while the right panel includes all of the controls specified in the baseline model discussed in Section 4. The second and third rows present the first stage regression outcomes for the change in BAA spread. The left column shows results without any controls, while the right column displays the outcomes with the controls used in the baseline model. All statistics are significant at the 1% level, with $F > 10$, indicating that the instruments are not weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997).

the second attributes BAA spread fluctuations to shifts in global risk perceptions. Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) highlight the importance of the former channel. More broadly, the idea that monetary policy in the financial center affects capital flows and the business cycle in EMDEs is in line with the earlier papers of Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 1996) and has been recently reinforced by by Kalemli-Özcan (2019). By contrast, the role of changes in global risk is emphasized in, e.g., Bruno and Shin (2014), Forbes and Warnock (2012), Ghosh et al. (2014), Obstfeld and Zhou (2023), and Shin (2012).

We argue that it is crucial to differentiate between the two channels when estimating the causal impact of a change in the BAA spread. To do that, our methodology relies on the use of instrumental variables, setting our research apart from prior literature, notably Akinci (2013), who identifies the transmission of ”BAA spread shocks” controlling for the contemporaneous effect of movements in the U.S. real rate. This exclusion restriction would identify the impact of a particular combination of the two effects we highlight above, where both components are combined in such a manner that their impact is offset on the U.S. real rate.[9]

To measure the causal effect of BAA movements associated with shifts in U.S. monetary policy, we use a ”proxy” for a U.S. monetary policy shock as our instrument. The challenge here is that there are alternative proxies available (e.g. constructing the proxy from high-frequency movements in prices such as Gertler and Karadi (2015); Paul (2020); Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021); Aruoba and Drechsel (2022), or lower-frequency movements in the nominal interest rate such as Romer and Romer (2004); Wieland and Yang (2020), but none of the available measures cover the entire sample we focus on. To tackle both of those challenges, we take as an instrument the first principal component from an unbalanced panel of (standardized) monetary policy shock proxies. We cumulate the shocks over the calendar

[9]Specifically, a shift in global risk appetite does not necessarily, and indeed, is unlikely to induce a null movement in the U.S. real rate. Consider a plausible scenario where an increase in global risk appetite, i.e., a rise in the BAA spread, contracts economic activity (without raising inflation) in the U.S. economy. This would very likely be accompanied by a more accommodative monetary policy stance and, therefore, a fall in U.S. real rates (as in, e.g., Caldara et al., 2016). In this context, the exclusion restrictions employed by Akinci (2013) effectively merge shifts in global risk appetite and monetary policy shocks. The latter is introduced to counterbalance the endogenous response of the U.S. real rate movements to the former shock.

year to get a yearly measure and then extract a principal component following Stock and Watson (2002). A common concern when using ”proxies” to capture monetary policy shocks is the possibility of contamination by the ”central bank informational effect” (see, e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). If the residual component of this effect is not systematically associated with the various proxies being examined, the common factor derived from the proxies has the additional benefit of minimizing the variation in the proxy that is related with this channel.

To quantify the causal impact of BAA spread fluctuations tied to shifts in global risk appetite, we use two instruments. The first one is a proxy for uncertainty shocks computed from variations in the price of gold around uncertainty-related events constructed by Piffer and Podstawski (2017). Venditti and Veronese (2020) make the case that those events are related to ”risk-off” behavior in financial markets. This proxy captures shifts in global risk perceptions and is used in line with the literature emphasizing the role of global risk in driving financial conditions. In addition, we use a measure of U.S. financial uncertainty constructed by Ludvigson et al. (2021). This index captures financial uncertainty specific to the U.S. economy and complements the gold-based proxy in capturing shifts in global risk perceptions. The use of both instruments allows us to disentangle the causal effect of BAA spread movements that originate from shifts in global risk perceptions from those that originate from other sources, such as U.S. monetary policy shocks or other drivers of the global financial cycle. Table 2 reports the F-statistic without and with controls for the two set of instruments.

4 Empirical Model

We use the framework proposed by Cloyne et al. (2023), which expands upon the conventional LP method (Jordà, 2005) to incorporate the Kitagawa-Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Kitagawa, 1955; Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). The KBO decomposition enables the evaluation of three distinct effects for an LP response. Firstly, the *direct* effect of an intervention on outcomes, which corresponds to the average effect typically identified in a standard LP framework. Secondly, the *indirect* effect of the intervention, which is mediated by the way in which other variables impact outcomes. Finally, the *composition* effect, which reflects the significance of including an appropriate set of controls. Below, we summarize the estimation method, which follows Cloyne et al. (2023).

The LP panel regression augmented by the KBO extension can be written as:

$$y_{i,t+h} - y_{i,t-1} = \mu_i^h \; + \; (x_{i,t} - \bar{x_i})\gamma_0^h + f_{i,t}\beta^h \; + \; f_{i,t}(x_{i,t} - \bar{x_i})\theta_x^h \; + \; \omega_{i,t+h}, \tag{1}$$

for $h = 0, 1, ..., H$, where the dependent variable is the cumulative change in country i's outcome variable y from year $t-1$ to $t+h$; f is the intervention, for example, a one standard deviation increase in export prices; μ_i^h is a country fixed effect; and $x_{i,t}$ is a vector of additional covariates, with mean $\bar{x_i}$. In the conventional LP approach, β^h is the object of interest, underpinning, for example, the effects of a one standard deviation increase in export prices on GDP.

The outcome variables used in our analysis are the log of GDP (detrended), log of export prices (detrended), the log of the EMBI spread, capital inflows and outflows in terms of trend GDP, and foreign exchange reserves in terms of trend GDP. In our baseline specification, $x_{i,t}$ includes two lags of real GDP growth, Px growth, the BAA spread, net capital inflows, and the lag of the dependent variable, both as a control and interacted, offering an interpretation of non-linearity.[10]

As a starting point, we present the impulse response functions (IRFs) estimated from Equation 1. This serves as a baseline treatment effect and is in line with specifications used in existing literature. Unlike the traditional LP approach, we consider indirect interaction effects, following the approach of Cloyne et al. (2023). This enables us to examine how the variables of interest are affected by changes in other macro controls while holding the other variables constant. Specifically, we show three main set of results: (i) the response of a one standard deviation increase in Px driven by shocks in commodity prices, (ii) the response of a one standard deviation fall in the BAA spread driven by U.S. monetary policy shocks, and (iii) the response of a one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread driven by a shift in global risk appetite. The reported IRFs can be interpreted as the local average treatment effect (LATE) (see, e.g., Jordà et al., 2020). The treatment is instrumented as discussed in Section 3.

Moving forward, we will extend the exercise to evaluate the effects from the KBO decomposition. This will help us assess whether the endogenous response of EMBI spreads influences the transmission of export price increases. Additionally, we will investigate if the individual endogenous responses of export prices and EMBI spreads to a decline in the BAA spread amplify the effects of U.S. monetary policy and global risk appetite shocks.

4.1 Impact of Commodity Shocks

In Figure 2 we show the baseline average effect of a one standard deviation increase in export prices driven by commodity specific shocks.[11] As described in Section 3, these are shocks driven by idiosyncratic commodity events. The figure shows that an increase in Px leads to a steady increase in domestic GDP, in line with Di Pace et al. (2020). This is what would be expected from a positive terms-of-trade shock in a standard SOE model (Mendoza, 1995; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2018). In such a model, a surge in export prices triggers a shift from exportable goods towards importable and nontradable goods, an income effect whereby households increase their demand for all goods, including nontradables, and an exchange rate appreciation. This generates an expansion in consumption, investment, and output. The increase in export prices has a small effect on borrowing costs, as shown by the decline of the EMBI spread. Capital outflows increase, mainly driven by other investment flows which are mostly bank-related (Figure 3) and countries accumulate foreign exchange reserves. Direct investment (inflows and outflows) show a small positive response (as illustrated in Figure

[10]The interaction terms include only one lag.

[11]If we extend the horizon, all impulse response functions exhibit mean reversion. However, the bands become considerably larger after four periods. This can be attributed to the fact that many countries have relatively short samples.

Figure 2: Effects of an Increase in Export Prices



Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation increase in Px driven by commodity price shocks. Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

C2 in Appendix C. Conversely, capital inflows, show a more muted response.

The response of commodity prices to an idiosyncratic commodity shock can have similar effects as the endogenous response of commodity prices to the GFC, but the impact on macroeconomic variables can differ significantly both in terms of persistence and outcomes. Notably, the literature has documented a strong association between a country's spreads and its export prices (or terms of trade). For example, Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) and Drechsel et al. (2019) propose a framework that shows how increased commodity prices in emerging countries can lead to a contraction in interest rate spreads, resulting in favorable borrowing conditions and output expansion. Similarly, Hamann et al. (2023) document a negative association between oil prices and country spreads.

Our findings, however, reveal that the correlation between commodity prices and country spreads weakens significantly when we consider the commodity price shock. Therefore, the association between export prices and countries' spreads is not driven by idiosyncratic commodity shocks. This suggests that the relationship may not be direct, but potentially influenced by other elements like the GFC or shifts in global demand.[12]

Easier global financial conditions can lead to a significant surge in commodity prices, thereby intensifying the transmission of U.S. monetary policy or global risk appetite shocks through their impact on export prices. This, in turn, has expansionary implications for EMDEs by reducing borrowing costs and attracting capital inflows. However, in response to commodity shocks, we observe a restrained response of capital inflows to fluctuations in commodity prices, as depicted in Figures 2 and 3. This suggests that an increase in commodity prices does not consistently result in a corresponding rise in capital inflows. Contrary to the stylized facts presented in Figure 1, IRFs to commodity shocks do not demonstrate a general pattern of comovement between capital inflows and outflows, which would be more indicative of the GFC. In the spirit of Kaminsky et al. (2004), the effects of negative commodity shocks suggest that "it does not always pour when it rains."

4.2 Decline in the BAA Spread

In this section, we analyze the transmission mechanism operating through the global financial cycle and use the BAA spread as an indicator of global financial conditions (Akinci, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2021). We argue that in examining the consequences of a shift in the BAA spread, it is crucial to identify its underlying causes. We explore two factors driving the BAA spread: a U.S. monetary policy shock and a change in global risk appetite.[13]

4.2.1 Decline in the BAA Spread Driven by U.S. Monetary Policy

The baseline average effect of a one standard deviation drop in the BAA spread, driven by a U.S. monetary policy shock, is depicted in Figure 4. As discussed in Section 3, we use a proxy

[12]Xiong (2019) emphasized this observation during his discussion of Drechsel et al. (2019) at the Jackson Hole Symposium.

[13]In Appendix C, we present the impulse responses of the BAA spread to both shocks. The impact of the risk appetite shock on the BAA spread is larger and more persistent.

Figure 3: Effects of an Increase in Export Prices on Capital Flows



Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation increase in Px driven by commodity price shocks. Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Effects of a Decline in the BAA Spread Driven by U.S. Monetary Policy



Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread driven by a U.S. monetary policy shock Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

for U.S. monetary policy to instrument the BAA spread. In this analysis, the decline in the BAA spread, which is typically associated with reduced global risk, is a direct consequence of the specific stance of U.S. monetary policy. Our primary focus is on understanding the fundamental factors driving the spread, thus we use U.S. monetary policy as an instrumental variable for the BAA spread. Previous research by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021) emphasizes the significant influence of U.S. monetary policy shocks on global financial variables associated with the GFC. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of Kalemli-Özcan (2019), U.S. monetary policy plays a pivotal role in shaping global investor risk perceptions, consequently impacting capital flows to and from EMDEs and leading to direct fluctuations in credit spreads.

As global financial conditions ease, there is a subsequent rise in global GDP and a surge in demand for commodities. This, in turn, positively influences export prices and domestic output, which display a humped-shaped response. Notably, the impulse responses of export prices and output exhibit a similar pattern, suggesting that the transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks to EMDEs primarily occurs through its effect on global commodity prices.

On impact, the EMBI spread decreases, leading to a negative comovement between the EMBI spread and Px, in line with the mechanism described in Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) and Reinhart et al. (2016). Additionally, we observe substantial increases in capital outflows, with other investment serving as the primary driver. The accumulation of foreign currency reserves experiences only a slight increase on impact. By contrast, the movements in capital inflows are comparatively subdued and lagged in relation to capital outflows.[14] Although both capital inflows and outflows exhibit an upswing, net inflows (the difference between inflows and outflows) show a negative response.[15] This differing effects between inflows, outflows, and net flows lends support to the focus of the literature on the importance of considering gross capital movements instead of net flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2014). The broad pattern of the impulse responses is consistent with the GFC, and also with the reduced form evidence of Reinhart et al. (2016).

The analysis highlights the significance of U.S. monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic fluctuations in EMDEs through their impact on the BAA spread. This contrasts with Akinci (2013), who concludes that the effects of monetary policy shocks on EMDEs' macroeconomic developments are minimal. Our findings indicate that the impact can be considerable when the BAA spread is affected. This reinforces the importance of identifying the origin of BAA spread fluctuations instead of merely focusing on a ''BAA spread shock.''

4.2.2 Decline in the BAA Spread Driven by a Shift in Global Risk Appetite

Figure 6 illustrates the average impact of a one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread, driven by shifts in global risk appetite, a phenomenon often termed as "risk-on/risk-off" event (Chari et al., 2020). This type of event provides a distinctly different source of BAA

[14]The exception is direct investment, where the response of inflows is higher than the response of outflows. See figure C2 in Appendix C.

[15]And the effect is statistically significant.

Figure 5: Effects of a Decline in the BAA Spread Driven by U.S. Monetary Policy on Capital Flows



Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread driven by a U.S. monetary policy shock. Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

spread fluctuations. To identify such movements, we use two measures as instrumental variables for the BAA spread, as outlined in Section 3: the uncertainty measure proposed by Piffer and Podstawski (2017) and the U.S. financial uncertainty measure introduced by Ludvigson et al. (2021).

Impulse responses resulting from this shock exhibit a markedly different pattern compared to those driven by U.S. monetary policy. There is an immediate increase in Px, followed by a significant surge after one year. The positive effect on GDP exhibits greater persistence. The reduction in the EMBI spread is also quite pronounced, surpassing the response observed in the prior scenario. The impact of global risk appetite on spreads, is consistent with Gilchrist et al. (2022).[16] In addition, we observe a strong comovement between export prices and the EMBI spread, a relationship underscored in Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018).

[16]Notably, even the "profile" of the IRFs parallels the pattern presented in Gilchrist et al. (2022), with the shock's effect reverting within a year.

Figure 6: Effects of a Decline in the BAA Spread Driven by Shifts in Global Risk Appetite



Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread driven by shifts in global risk appetite. Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

The effect on capital flows is remarkably large, impacting both inflows and outflows across all components, as depicted in Figure 7.[17] Notably, portfolio flows account for the largest portion of the impact on capital inflows, thereby implying that eased financial conditions enable countries to accumulate more external debt. While the effects on portfolio inflows and outflows appear to be relatively short-lived, the impact on other investment, both inflows and outflows, shows a more persistent response. Net flows, computed as the difference between inflows and outflows, are positive. The reaction of net flows to this shock stands in stark contrast to their response to a U.S. monetary policy shock, which led to a negative impact on net flows.

The effects of this shock resemble the prototype effect of capital flows in the context of the GFC, especially when we think about periods of heightened risk aversion, such as during the global financial crisis (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2014) or in recent risk-off periods like the taper tantrum (Chari et al., 2020). The former describes the collapse in both capital inflows and outflows, following the risk shock triggered by Lehman Brothers' failure. In this context, banking flows were the hardest hit due to their sensitivity of risk perception. The latter documents the negative impact of high frequency portfolio flows following Chairman's Bernanke announcement that the Fed would reduce the volume of its bonds purchases. Overall, the behavior of capital flows is aligned with the ''when it rains it pours dynamics" (Kaminsky et al., 2004)

The links between shifts in global risk appetite and the direction of capital flows in EMDEs is in principle unclear from a theoretical and empirical point of view. As explained in Kalemli-Özcan (2019), the VIX has a complicated relationship with capital flows to EMEs. On the one hand, risk aversion drives a flight to safety, while on the other hand, EMDEs' sovereign borrowing increases during bad times, which is why total capital flows to EMDEs and the VIX can be positively correlated at times. Our results provide evidence that both capital inflows and outflows increase following a reduction in global risk appetite. These findings are in line with Forbes and Warnock (2012), who find that lower levels of global risk appetite are negatively correlated with *stops* (sharp decrease in capital inflows) and *retrenchment* (sharp decrease in capital outflows) and positively correlated with *surges* (sharp increase in capital inflows) and *flight* (sharp increase in capital outflows).

5 Regime Asymmetries

Within the LP framework, in equation (1), the covariates $(x_{i,t} - \bar{x_i})$ serve a dual role. They act as control variables and also embody the characteristics of the treated subpopulation. These characteristics may influence the way in which the treatment affects the outcome. The KBO decomposition is particularly instrumental in this context, as it allows us to consider how the causal effect associated with the relevant shocks varies along four key dimensions. The first dimension comprises the growth rate of export prices, differentiating periods of commodity price booms, represented by above-average growth, from those characterized by a

[17] The responses of direct investment are shown in Figure C2 in Appendix C.

Figure 7: Effects of a Decline in the BAA Spread Driven by Shifts in Global Risk Appetite on Capital Flows



Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread driven by shifts in global risk appetite. Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

bust or weak growth in commodity prices, denoted by below-average growth. The second dimension revolves around the growth rate of domestic GDP, providing a lens to compare the impact of shock transmission during periods of high versus low economic growth. The third dimension, the level of the BAA spread, becomes an effective demarcation of periods of elevated and diminished global financial stress, identified by a BAA spread higher or lower than the sample mean, respectively. Finally, the fourth dimension centers on the net capital inflow level, offering a distinction between periods of surges in capital flows and those defined by capital flow retrenchments.[18] Table 3 shows the "peak" response for each of the variables under the alternative stratifications considered.

The transmission of commodity prices shocks, captured by the causal effect of a shift in the price of exports, tends to exert a more pronounced impact on GDP during periods of

[18]Results where we condition with respect to the level of gross inflows, as opposed to net capital inflows, are qualitatively similar to the baseline reported in this section.

Table 3: Regime Multipliers

	Baseline	Px change			GDP growth			BAA Spread			Net Inflows		
		UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF
GDP	**2.41**	1.78	**3.05**	-1.27	**1.55**	**3.28**	**-1.73**	**3.56**	**1.49**	**2.07**	**2.53**	**2.30**	0.24
Px	**10.75**	**13.63**	**10.11**	**3.52**				**15.90**	**9.09**	**6.80**			
EMBI Spread	-8.81	-17.84	**-7.63**	-10.21	-5.72	**-14.34**	**8.63**	-5.60	**-20.00**	**14.40**	-5.42	**-12.19**	6.77
Capital Outflows	**1.25**	1.49	**1.29**	0.21	**1.52**	**1.57**	-0.05	**2.77**	**0.83**	**1.94**	**1.82**	**0.71**	**1.11**
Capital Inflows	-0.62	**-2.21**	**1.13**	**-3.34**	0.91	-0.82	**1.73**	1.10	**-1.37**	**2.47**	-0.49	-0.74	0.25
Reserves	**0.87**	**1.98**	**0.80**	**1.17**	**0.93**	**0.95**	-0.03	**0.90**	**0.98**	-0.08	**0.90**	**0.85**	0.06

(a) Commodity Price Shock

	Baseline	Px change			GDP growth			BAA Spread			Net Inflows		
		UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF
GDP	**3.22**	**2.62**	**4.78**	**-2.16**	**2.74**	**3.70**	-0.97	**1.45**	**5.68**	**-4.23**	**2.03**	**4.78**	**-2.75**
Px	**13.50**	**17.08**	**9.93**	**7.15**				**9.97**	**22.72**	**-12.74**			
EMBI Spread	**-20.95**	**-30.35**	**-35.67**	5.32	**-23.28**	**-18.62**	-4.66	**-31.17**	**-67.31**	**36.14**	**-28.52**	**-13.38**	**-15.14**
Capital Outflows	**1.79**	**1.96**	**1.63**	0.32	**1.26**	**2.33**	-1.06	0.94	**2.65**	**-1.71**	**2.07**	**1.52**	0.55
Capital Inflows	**2.16**	1.11	**3.22**	**-2.11**	**2.03**	**2.30**	-0.27	1.57	**2.76**	-1.19	**1.37**	**2.98**	**-1.61**
Reserves	0.43	**1.16**	-0.61	**1.77**	**0.70**	0.16	0.54	0.57	0.51	0.06	-0.59	0.62	**-1.21**

(b) U.S. Monetary Policy Shock

	Baseline	Px change			GDP growth			BAA Spread			Net Inflows		
		UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF	UP	DOWN	DIFF
GDP	**2.40**	**2.94**	**3.10**	-0.15	**2.37**	**2.44**	-0.07	**3.30**	**1.55**	**1.75**	**2.31**	**2.49**	-0.18
Px	**8.62**	**9.07**	**9.31**	-0.24				**14.05**	**3.74**	**10.30**			
EMBI Spread	**-29.30**	**-31.53**	**-27.08**	-4.45	**-27.43**	**-31.17**	3.74	**-28.47**	**-30.14**	1.66	**-30.85**	**-27.76**	-3.09
Capital Outflows	**1.47**	**1.52**	**1.90**	-0.38	**1.65**	**1.64**	0.02	**1.98**	**1.25**	0.73	**1.79**	**1.57**	0.22
Capital Inflows	**2.00**	**1.78**	**2.53**	-0.75	**2.21**	**1.88**	0.33	**2.50**	**1.57**	0.94	**2.66**	**1.73**	0.93
Reserves	**0.47**	**0.50**	**0.46**	0.03	**0.50**	**0.45**	0.05	**0.73**	**0.55**	0.18	**0.59**	**0.52**	0.08

(c) Global Risk Appetite Shock

Notes: For each variable we report the ”peak” response, which corresponds to the value of the IRF from the initial impact to 4 years after the shock, where the maximum response in absolute value is observed. All values are expressed in percentage. The ”up” and ”down” stratifications refer to years in which the variables in the top column are one standard deviation above or below their average over the sample, respectively. We use the term ”DIFF.” to denote the difference between these two stratifications. Bold characters denote whether the reported number is significantly different from zero (0)To indicate statistical significance at the 10% level at 10% level. Bold characters denote whether the reported number is statistically different from 0 at the 10% level.

commodity price downturns (although this difference is not statistically significant). Furthermore, the expansionary effects of an increase Px are more prevalent during periods of weak economic growth (or contraction), as well as during periods of heightened global risk as indicated by a high BAA spread. Relatedly, the decline in the EMBI spread is significant during periods of sluggish economic growth and when net capital inflows are lower than the average. This impact is even larger than it would be if the shock were to occur during an economic expansion or during periods of above-average net capital inflows. The observed effects substantiate the theoretical relevance of nonlinearities associated with the onset of ”sudden stops” (see, e.g., Mendoza, 2006). The anticipation of such a regime can can alter the behavior of economic agents, thereby magnifying the impact of economic shocks. As the domestic economy nears a point of ”sudden stop”, contractionary shocks bear an amplified potential to heighten the transition probability into this regime. Conversely, expansionary shocks are amplified as agents predict that the shock-induced transition to a ”sudden stop” regime becomes less likely. Consequently, these shocks tend to exert larger aggregate effects.

Interestingly, the decline in EMBI spreads is on average larger during periods of low global financial stress, which are also periods characterized by large and negative capital inflows. This observation underscores the relevance of domestic characteristics and pull factors when global risk is low. Conversely, during periods of heightened global financial stress, global push factors dominate and can potentially curtail the advantageous expansionary effects of an increase in commodity prices, especially for a country that exports those commodities. Additionally, reserve levels tend to increase more during periods when a positive Px shock coincides with commodity booms.

A decrease in the BAA spread associated with a more accommodative monetary policy stance in the U.S., tends to exert a stronger expansionary influence on domestic GDP during periods marked by low growth, commodity price downturns, and below-average capital inflows. The interpretation of these effects can potentially be anchored to the critical role of potential nonlinearities that arise in association with the presence or threat of ''sudden stop" regimes. The shift in risk associated with entering such a regime significantly impacts economic activity and the country's attractiveness for foreign capital.

During periods of of low global risk, a more accommodative U.S. policy stance tends to have substantially larger effect on export prices and a more pronounced expansionary impact on the domestic GDP of emerging markets. This relationship, in turn, corresponds with higher capital flows (encompassing both inflows and outflows), and a significantly larger contraction in the EMBI spread. This type of nonlinearity is consistent, for instance, with the possibility that the expansionary impact of a more accommodative U.S monetary policy in the global economy is partially hindered in periods of high global financial stress, when impairments in the monetary transmission mechanism may occur (see, e.g., Bech et al., 2012).

Lastly, the effect of a fall in the BAA associated with eased global risk appetite remains consistent across various regimes, with one notable exception. The response of domestic GDP exhibits significantly more sensitivity when the shock arises during periods of heightened global risk, a phase typically coupled with more pronounced fluctuations in capital flows. Taken together, these observed nonlinearities align with the notion that EMDEs are increasingly susceptible to abrupt changes in global risk appetite during times of intensified global financial stress.

6 KBO Decomposition: Interaction Matters

In this section, we use the KBO decomposition to examine the responses heterogeneity over time and over states of the economy. This approach enables us to evaluate how, in response to a shock, the indirect effect of certain variables modifies the response of key variables. Specifically, we investigate (i) whether endogenous fluctuations in EMBI spread magnify the impact of export price increases on output; (ii) whether endogenous response of export prices to BAA spread reductions amplify the effects of shocks on domestic output; and (iii) whether the endogenous response of the EMBI spread to a BAA spread decrease augments the effects of the shocks on domestic output.

To decompose the average effect into the part mediated by export prices or the EMBI spread, we build on the general KBO specification of Equation (1). In order to capture the effect of the intervention on either export prices or the EMBI spread over a certain horizon (h), we incorporate an extra term, denoted as Θ_i^h, which measures their responsiveness. It follows that

$$y_{i,t+h} - y_{i,t-1} = \mu_i^h \; + \; (x_{i,t} - \bar{x_i})\gamma_0^h + f_{i,t}\beta^h \; + \; f_{i,t}(x_{i,t} - \bar{x_i})\theta_x^h \; + \; f_{i,t}\Theta_i^h\theta_f^h \; + \; \omega_{i,t+h}. \quad (2)$$

The term $f_{i,t}\Theta_i^h\theta_x^h$ sheds light into how the effects of the intervention are mediated by movements in Px or the EMBI spread. From the KBO decomposition, this indirect effect is coming from the interaction term $\Theta_i^h\theta_f^h$.

We use the varying sensitivity of export prices or the EMBI spread across countries to the alternative identified treatment, which we proxy through Θ_i^h. This identification strategy is grounded on the assumption that there exists heterogeneity in the response of the relevant mediating variable to the shock under consideration across countries, owing to differences in their respective characteristics such as history, institutional quality, and economic structure. The panel structure of our analysis enables us to leverage this cross-sectional variation for the purpose of identifying the specific channel of interest.

Specifically, we follow Cloyne et al. (2023) and construct Θ_i^h estimating a local projection of the variable of interest, ζ_t, on the intervention variable (instrumented as discussed in Section 3) but allowing the coefficient associated with this variable to vary across countries:

$$\zeta_{i,t+h} - \zeta_{i,t-1} = \mu_i^h \; + \; (x_{i,t} - \bar{x_i})\gamma_0^h + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \mathbf{1}(i = j) f_{i,t}\widetilde{\Theta}_i^h \; + \; \omega_{i,t+h}, \quad (3)$$

for $h = 0, 1, ..., H$. We can therefore use estimates of $\widetilde{\Theta}_i^h$ from this regression (expressed relative to its mean over all countries) as our proxy of the effect of the offset of the variable $\zeta_{i,t}$ in the LP in equation (2).[19]

In order to improve the precision of the estimates, we choose a parsimonious specification and include only two lags of $\zeta_{i,t}$ among the controls in order to capture the persistence in the variable. The identification assumption underlying this approach is that there is variation in the average response of variable $\zeta_{i,t}$ to shocks of interest across countries but that this variation is not, on average, correlated with other factors that make the economy more sensitive to the same shock.

6.1 Results

Figure 8 presents the GDP response to a surge in export prices, obtained by estimating the KBO specification outlined in Equation 2. The impulse response in red depicts the average effect of a one standard deviation increase in Px on GDP, which is equivalent to those shown

[19] When we look at the impact of a shift in the price of exports, we have set $\Theta_i^h = 0$ for those countries for which we have less than 3 non-zeros entries for the instrument (i.e. are directly affected by a small number of major commodity events).

Figure 8: Response of GDP to Increase in Px mediated by the EMBI Spread



Notes: This figure shows how response of GDP varies with the endogenous response of the EMBI spread (ranging from -1 to 1 standard deviation from the average effect in steps of $1/4^{th}$ of a standard deviation unit). The red line reports the direct effect, which should be compared to the average effect in Figure 2. The blue lines consider experiments in which vary the degree of EMBI spread endogenous response. A larger circular marker denotes EMBI spread movements above the average effect (in which case the EMBI spread response is close to null), the smaller circular marker denotes EMBI spread responses below the average effect (cases in which the decline in the EMBI spread is more pronounced). Green dots imply the indirect effect is statistically significant at a 10% level.

in Figure 2. To examine how the effects vary with the EMBI spread, we present various scenarios (illustrated by the blue lines) by modifying the sensitivity of the EMBI spread to changes in Px through $\Theta_{i,t}$. The results show how the effect of Px on output varies as the EMBI spread deviates from its sample mean (represented by the direct effect). The circular markers' sizes correspond to higher EMBI spreads, and the green shaded markers indicate a statistically significant difference from the baseline. We adjust $\Theta_{i,t}$ by one standard deviation.

In response to an increase in export prices driven by commodity specific shocks, the response of GDP is higher in countries in which the EMBI spread falls by more. Therefore, countries in which the relationship between commodity prices and spreads is stronger exhibit a larger output response. By contrast, in countries where the EMBI spread's decrease is less pronounced, we observe a more subdued GDP response both in terms of magnitude and duration. This latter scenario seems to imply a situation where the output effects of traditional terms-of-trade channels are mitigated by the EMBI response. Given that the average effect, as depict by the LATE, is small, our results emphasize the necessity of acknowledging the heterogeneity in EMBI sensitivity to commodity price shocks. This also highlights the significance of the financial channel (Drechsel and Tenreyro, 2018) operating through borrowing costs which has the potential to magnify the effects of an increase in export prices on domestic output.[20] Accordingly, in the presence of a positive commodity price shock, elevated EMBI spreads may potentially constrain the effect on GDP. Hence, it is crucial for policymakers to incorporate the financial channel when formulating a policy response to accommodate these dynamics (Frankel, 2010; Drechsel et al., 2019).

[20]Specifically, commodity prices bolster the fiscal position and enhance the debt sustainability of exporting countries (see also Kaminsky, 2010; Hamann et al., 2023), thereby easing borrowing costs.

The red impulse responses in Figure 9 and 10 show the average effect of a one standard deviation fall in the BAA on GDP driven by U.S. monetary policy (Panel a) and global risk appetite (Panel b). The red impulse responses are equivalent to those in Figures 4 and 6. Figure 9 illustrates how the endogenous response of Px amplifies the effects on the domestic business cycle while Figure 10 shows how the response of the domestic business cycle vary with the EMBI spread. As before, we present various scenarios (illustrated by the blue lines) by modifying the sensitivity of Px to changes in the BAA spread and the sensitivity of the EMBI spread to changes in the BAA spread. In each exercise, We adjust the value of Θ_i^h by one standard deviation.

The results in Figure 9 indicate that the GDP response to a BAA spread reduction is greater and statistically significant in instances of higher export prices, particularly when this reduction is stimulated by U.S. monetary policy. This heterogeneity could be attributed to the specific specializations of different countries. Accommodative U.S. monetary policy typically correlates with robust global growth, thus increasing demand for commodities and subsequently their prices. Therefore, the strength of transmission of U.S. monetary policy is affected by the magnitude of the Px response. This provides suggestive evidence that countries specialized in commodities tightly bound to global demand, might display pronounced export price responses, thereby leading to larger effects on output. Although there is no statistically significant variation in the GDP response to a decrease in the BAA spread driven by global risk appetite across different Px values, the pattern of responses aligns with previous discussions: output response increases with the export price response. However, the effects are more muted. These findings are consistent with the narrative proposed in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021), where commodity prices are identified as a conduit for the propagation of the GFC.

Figure 10 shows the results mediated by different values of the EMBI spread. It demonstrates that GDP exhibits a larger increase in response to a BAA spread reduction when the EMBI spread is lower. While this effect is statistically significant when the BAA spread reduction is driven by global risk appetite, the heterogeneity is still visible in relation to a U.S. monetary policy shock. This suggests that countries that experience a larger reduction in the EMBI spread due to a fall in the BAA spread typically show a greater response in GDP. This effect is stronger in response to a global risk appetite shock.

Although the two shocks related to the GFC demonstrate qualitative parallels, their transmission mechanisms are different. The propagation of U.S. monetary policy shocks to EMDEs can vary considerably depending on the degree of response in export prices. By contrast, the transmission of global risk appetite shocks seems to be linked to financial channels and in particular on the endogenous response of EMBI spreads. Therefore, export prices amplify the effects of a decline in the BAA spread driven by U.S. monetary policy while EMBI spreads amplify the effects of a decline in the BAA spreads driven by shifts in global risk appetite. Taken together, these findings underscore the significance of commodity prices and EMBI spreads as an important channel of transmission of global shocks to EMDEs.

Figure 9: Response of GDP to a Decline in the BAA Spread Mediated by Px



(a) U.S. Monetary Policy (b) Global Risk Appetite

Notes: This figure shows how the response of GDP varies with the endogenous response of the price of exports (ranging from -1 to 1 stdandard deviations from the average effect in steps of $1/4^{th}$ of a standard deviation unit). The left panel focuses on a decline in the BAA spread driven by a looser U.S. monetary policy stance. The right panel shows the effects of a decline in the BAA spread driven by an easing of global uncertainty and risk. The red line reports the direct effect, which should be compared to the average effect in Figures 4 and 6. The blue lines consider experiments which vary the degree of the endogenous response in export prices. A larger circular marker denotes responses of the price of exports above the average effect (in which case the price of exports increases more than under the baseline case), the smaller circular marker denotes responses of export prices below the average effect (in which case the increase in the price of exports is less pronounced pronounced). Green dots imply the indirect effect is statistically significant at a 10% level.

Figure 10: Response of GDP to a Decline in the BAA Spread Mediated by the EMBI Spread



(a) U.S. Monetary Policy (b) Global Risk Appetite

Notes: This figure shows how response of GDP varies with the endogenous response of the EMBI spread (ranging from -1 to 1 std deviation from the average effect in steps of $1/4$ of a std unit). The left panel focuses on a fall in the BAA spread driven by looser stance in U.S. monetary policy. The right panel instead looks at a fall in the BAA spread driven by an easing of global uncertainty and risk. The red line reports the direct effect, which should be compared to the average effect in Figure 4 and 6. The blue lines consider experiments which vary the degree of EMBI spread endogenous response. A larger mark denotes EMBI spread movements above the average effect (in which case the EMBI spread response is more muted), the smaller point EMBI spread response below the average effect (in which case the fall in EMBI spread is quite pronounced). Green dots denote when the indirect effect is statistically significant at a 10% level.

7 Conclusion

We analyse the interplay between commodity price fluctuations, the global financial cycle, capital flows, and economic outcomes in EMDEs. Our findings substantiate the significant impact of export price shifts on business cycles, capital flows, and debt financing costs within EMDEs, underlining their susceptibility to commodity price fluctuations. We show that these fluctuations do not purely reflect idiosyncratic shocks in commodity markets, instead evidencing a robust and dynamic linkage to key determinants of the global financial cycle, notably shifts in U.S. monetary policy and changes in global risk appetite.

The strength and nature of the transmission mechanisms of these global shocks to EMDEs appear to vary considerably depending on the source of the shock. Commodity price shifts linked to significant idiosyncratic events in specific commodity markets exert a potent positive impact on domestic GDP and are associated with large changes in foreign exchange reserves, thereby validating their critical role in steering EMDEs' business cycles. This impact is amplified through the endogenous response of EMBI spreads, highlighting the crucial role of financial conditions in shaping the transmission process. However, the influence of these shocks on capital flows remains comparatively subdued, suggesting a more limited role in driving the global financial cycle in emerging markets.

Commodity prices also play a key role as a conduit for the transmission of world shocks: easing of U.S. monetary policy and a reduction in global financial risk trigger an increase in export prices, which, in turn, contributes to a positive response in output and capital flows in EMDEs and is also accompanied by large falls in EMBI spreads. The intensity and duration of the response, however, vary significantly, and this difference can be attributed to a distinct transmission mechanisms of the two shocks. The procyclical response of commodity prices and the countercyclical movements in EMBI spreads in response to global shocks, contribute to the overall transmission of these shocks to EMDEs. This relationship emphasizes the intertwined relationship between global financial conditions, domestic economic factors, and the dynamics of commodity prices. A nuanced understanding of these dynamics is fundamental for effectively managing economic performance and volatility in EMDEs.

Our findings underscore the need for policy makers in EMDEs to pay close attention to the financial implications of commodity price fluctuations and the different transmission channels of world shocks, as they formulate economic policies and strategies for navigating a world characterized by an interlinked global financial cycle.

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A Data

Our data set includes information on output, capital flows, spreads, and export prices. The sources of data are described in section A.1. Table A1 provides a comprehensive summary of the data coverage for each country and variable considered in our analysis. Section A.2 provides specific details on emerging markets spreads data.

A.1 Data Sources

- Real GDP in local currency units. Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Indicator code: NY.GDP.MKTP.KN

- Capital flows are scaled by trend GDP using the following sources:
  - Capital inflows. Source: International Financial Statistics.
  - Capital outflows. Source: International Financial Statistics.
  - Nominal GDP in dollar terms. Source: World Economic Outlook.

- Spreads are obtained combining data based on:
  - EMBI. Description: JP Morgan EMBI global diversified index and JP Morgan EMBI global index, in bps. Sources: Datastream, Bloomberg, and JP Morgan.
  - Interest rate spreads. Description: domestic rate over U.S. rate (lending rate or t-bill), in %. Source: International Financial Statistics.

- BAA Spread. Description: Moody's seasoned BAA corporate bond yield relative to yield on 10-year treasury constant maturity, bps. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED.

- Export Prices. Export price index, 2010=100. Sources: MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, World Bank, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).

A.2 Emerging Market Spreads

Emerging market sovereign spreads are mainly derived from the J.P. Morgan EMBI global diversified index, which measures the spread over Treasuries. To expand coverage for certain countries, we supplemented this with the J.P. Morgan EMBI global index. Moreover, to further extend coverage, we also used interest rate spreads, which are calculated as the difference between the domestic t-bill and the U.S. t-bill. In cases where this data was not available, we used the domestic lending rate over the U.S. lending rate instead. A comprehensive breakdown of our calculations can be found in Table A2.

Table A1: Data Coverage

Country	Real GDP	Spreads	DIO	PDO	PEO	OIO	FXR	DII	PDI	PEI	OII	Px
Algeria	1990-2019	1999-2019	1990-2019	1990-2013	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2019	1990-2019
Angola	1990-2019	2006-2019	1990-2019	2002-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Argentina	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Armenia	1990-2019	2000-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1993-2019
Azerbaijan	1990-2019	1998-2019	1995-2019	1995-2019	2003-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1993-2019
Belarus	1990-2019	2004-2019	1997-2019	1996-2019	1997-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1993-2019
Belize	1990-2019	2007-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Bolivia	1990-2019	1997-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Brazil	1990-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1992-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Cameroon	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Chile	1990-2019	1999-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Colombia	1990-2019	1997-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Costa Rica	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1991-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Côte d'Ivoire	1990-2019	1998-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Dominican Republic	1990-2019	2001-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2016	1990-2019	1990-2016	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Ecuador	1990-2019	1995-2019	1992-2019	1992-2019	1992-2019	1992-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1992-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Egypt	1990-2019	2001-2019	1990-2019	1990-2013	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
El Salvador	1990-2019	2002-2019	1996-2019	1999-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Gabon	1990-2019	2007-2019	1990-2015	1990-2014	1990-2018	1990-2015	1990-2018	1990-2015	1990-2015	1990-2015	1990-2015	1990-2019
Georgia	1990-2019	2007-2019	1997-2019	2000-2019	2000-2019	1997-2019	2005-2019	1997-2019	2000-2019	2005-2019	1997-2019	1993-2019
Ghana	1990-2019	2007-2019	1990-2019	1990-2010	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1993-2010	1990-2019	1990-2019
Guatemala	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Indonesia	1990-2019	2004-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2011-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2011-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Iraq	1990-2019	2006-2019	2005-2019	2005-2019	2005-2019	2005-2019	1990-2019	2005-2019	2005-2019	1990-2019	2005-2019	1990-2019
Jamaica	1990-2019	2007-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2011	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Kazakhstan	1990-2019	2007-2019	1995-2019	1995-2019	1997-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1993-2019
Kenya	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Kuwait	1995-2019	2004-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Lebanon	1990-2019	1998-2019	2002-2019	2002-2019	2002-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	2002-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019
Malaysia	1990-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Mexico	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2013	1990-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2005-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Mongolia	1990-2019	2012-2019	2005-2019	2007-2019	2004-2013	1992-2019	1990-2019	1992-2019	2000-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Morocco	1990-2019	1997-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Mozambique	1990-2019	2000-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Nigeria	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2015	1990-2019	1990-2015	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019

to be continued in the next page . . .

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Country	Real GDP	Spreads	DIO	PDO	PEO	OIO	FXR	DII	PDI	PEI	OII	Px
Pakistan	1990-2019	2001-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2010	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Panama	1990-2019	1996-2019	1991-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Peru	1990-2019	1997-2019	1991-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1991-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Philippines	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Qatar	2000-2019	2001-2019	2011-2019	2011-2019	2011-2019	2011-2019	1990-2019	2011-2019	2011-2019	1990-2019	2011-2019	1990-2019
Russia	1990-2019	1997-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1994-2019	1993-2019
Serbia	1995-2019	2005-2019	2007-2019	2007-2019	2007-2013	2007-2019	1990-2019	2007-2019	2007-2019	1990-2019	2007-2019	2007-2019
South Africa	1990-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Sri Lanka	1990-2019	2007-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Tanzania	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2009	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	2003-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Thailand	1990-2019	1997-2005	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1993-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1998-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Trinidad and Tobago	1990-2019	2007-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1997-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1997-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Tunisia	1990-2019	2002-2019	1990-2019	1990-2013	1990-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1990-2013	2000-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Turkey	1990-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1992-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Ukraine	1990-2019	2000-2019	1994-2019	1995-2019	1996-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1994-2019	1993-2019
Uruguay	1990-2019	2001-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1994-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019
Venezuela	1990-2014	1993-2019	1990-2016	1990-2016	1990-2019	1990-2016	2007-2019	1990-2016	1990-2016	2007-2015	1990-2016	1990-2019
Vietnam	1990-2019	2005-2019	1996-2019	2005-2006	2005-2019	1996-2019	1990-2019	1996-2019	2005-2014	2005-2014	1996-2019	1990-2019
Zambia	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019	1995-2019	1990-2019	1990-2019

Notes: This Table presents the data coverage for each country included in our sample. The acronyms DIO, PDO, PEO, and OIO refer to capital outflows for direct investment, portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and other investment, respectively, while FXR represents the flows of foreign exchange reserves. Conversely, the capital inflows for direct investment, portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and other investment are denoted by DII, PDI, PEI, and OII, respectively. Px are export prices.

Table A2: Spreads Data

Country	Years	Notes
Algeria	1999-2019	1999-2002 uses EMBI GD index. Coverage extended by splicing using the African EMBI GD index for 2003-2019.
Angola	2006-2019	2012-2019 uses EMBI G and GD indices. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread based on domestic t-bill over U.S. t-bill for 2006-2011.
Argentina	1993-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Armenia	2000-2019	2013-2019 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread on domestic lending rate over U.S. lending rate for 2000-2012
Azerbaijan	1998-2019	2012-2019 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread on domestic lending rate over U.S. lending rate for 1998-2011.
Belarus	2004-2019	2010-2019 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread on domestic lending rate over U.S. lending rate for 2004-2009.
Belize	2007-2019	EMBI GD index.
Bolivia	1997-2019	2012-2019 uses EMBI G and GD indices. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread on domestic lending rate over U.S. lending rate for 1997-2011.
Brazil	1994-2019	EMBI GD index.
Cameroon	1993-2019	2015-2019 uses EMBI G and GD indices. Spliced backwards using the Sub-Saharan Africa GD index for 2003-2014.
Chile	1999-2019	EMBI GD index.
Colombia	1997-2019	EMBI GD index.
Costa Rica	2002-2019	2012-2018 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using the CACI index for Costa Rica for 2002-2011.
Côte d'Ivoire	1998-2019	EMBI GD index.
Dominican Republic	2001-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Ecuador	1995-2019	EMBI GD index.
Egypt	2001-2019	EMBI GD index.
El Salvador	2002-2019	EMBI GD index.
Gabon	2007-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Georgia	2007-2019	2008-2019 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread on domestic lending rate over U.S. lending rate for 2007.
Ghana	2007-2019	EMBI GD index.
Guatemala	2002-2019	2012-2019 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using the CACI index for Guatemala for 2002-2011.
Indonesia	2004-2019	EMBI GD index.
Iraq	2006-2019	EMBI GD index.
Jamaica	2007-2019	EMBI GD index.
Kazakhstan	2007-2019	EMBI GD index.
Kenya	1993-2019	2014-2019 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using the Sub-Saharan Africa GD index for 2003-2013.
Kuwait	2004-2019	Due to lack of EMBI data corresponds to MECI spread.
Lebanon	1998-2019	EMBI GD index.
Malaysia	1996-2019	EMBI GD index.
Mexico	1993-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices.
Mongolia	2012-2019	EMBI GD index.
Morocco	1997-2019	EMBI GD index.
Mozambique	2000-2019	2012-2014 uses EMBI G index. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread based on domestic t-bill over U.S. t-bill for 2000-2011.
Nigeria	1993-2019	EMBI GD index.

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Country	Years	Notes
Pakistan	2001-2019	EMBI GD index.
Panama	1996-2019	EMBI GD index.
Peru	1997-2019	EMBI GD index.
Philippines	1993-2019	EMBI GD index.
Qatar	2001-2019	Due to lack of EMBI data corresponds to MECI spread.
Russia	1997-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Serbia	2005-2019	EMBI GD index.
South Africa	1994-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Sri Lanka	2007-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Tanzania	1993-2019	2013-2019 uses EMBI G and GD indices. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread based on domestic t-bill over U.S. t-bill for 1993-2011.
Thailand	1997-2005	EMBI GD index.
Trinidad and Tobago	2007-2019	EMBI GD index.
Tunisia	2002-2019	EMBI GD index.
Turkey	1996-2019	EMBI GD index.
Ukraine	2000-2019	EMBI GD index.
Uruguay	2001-2019	EMBI GD index.
Venezuela	1993-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Vietnam	2005-2019	EMBI G and EMGI GD indices
Zambia	1990-2019	2012-2014 uses EMBI GD index. Spliced backwards using interest rate spread based on domestic t-bill over U.S. t-bill for 1990-2011.

Notes: This Table displays the data coverage for the country spreads data along with the specific indices used for each country.

A.3 Country Selection

We restrict the set of countries that we study to ensure the availability of data for the variables analyzed. First, we focus on emerging countries according to the definition of the IMF World Economic Outlook. Second, we narrow the sample to countries with data available from 2007. Third, we drop large economies such as China and India. Finally, we drop economies which are classified as emerging but are part of the European Union such as Poland. After applying these filters, our sample consists of 54 emerging economies.

B Commodity Events

This appendix delineates the methodology adopted to identify events tied to substantial commodity price fluctuations, which we use in building the instrument for export prices. Our approach involved examining historical documents, reports, and newspaper articles to pinpoint significant commodity price shifts, independent of global economic conditions. Following this, we classified each event into positive or negative price shocks, contingent on the price change trajectory. This categorization eventually influences the characterization of a country's export price shock as positive or negative, contingent on its role as an exporter of the particular commodity in question.

The series were constructed by using a number of sources: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports, publications from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), newspaper articles, academic papers and a number of online sources. In order to establish some rules at the time of selecting the dates, we followed the criteria listed below.

1. The event has to be important enough to affect a commodity market at a global level. Examples of these are natural disasters or weather related shocks in key areas where the commodity is produced, major geopolitical events, and unanticipated news on the volume of global production or demand of commodities.
2. The event should have an unambiguous effect on the price of the commodity.
3. The event has to be unrelated to important macroeconomic developments such as the global financial crisis or a U.S. recession. This aims at eliminating endogenous responses of commodity prices to the state of the economy.

By using this criteria we were able to identify 24 episodes of exogenous commodity price shocks that are unrelated to business cycle fluctuations. Of these events, 16 are favorable commodity price shocks and 8 are negative price shocks.

B.1 Agriculture: Food and Beverage Commodities

i. Coffee

Year of Event: 1994.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

According to a report from the International Coffee Organization (ICO), climate shocks which affected coffee prices were recorded in Brazil in 1994.[1] Our data are in line with this observation given that we observe that Arabica coffee prices increased from 1.56 dollars per kilo in 1993 to 3.31 in 1994.

Newspaper Articles. A newspaper article from the New York Times documents that the climate shock of 1994 in Brazil is related to a frost. Some important aspects of the article are quoted in what follows.

New Frost Hits Brazilian Coffee, New York Times (July 11, 1994):[2]

"Frost struck in Brazil's biggest coffee-growing state early today, and farmers said the effects were harsher than a freeze that hit two weeks ago."

"(...)Coffee prices soared after the previous cold snap late last month, which destroyed one-third of next year's crop. Brazil is the largest coffee producer, accounting for about a quarter of world production. A threat to its crop can drastically affect world coffee prices(...)."

ii. Cereal

Year of Event: 1997.
Type of Event: Negative price shock.

As documented in De Winne and Peersman (2016), in 1996 the FAO issued a favorable forecast for world 1996 cereal output.[3] The largest increase was expected in coarse grains output, mostly in developed countries. Overall, global cereal production increased by 7.8 percent that year and this translated into lower prices. Our data show that the cereal price index experienced a sharp reduction from 1996 to 1997, going from 83.61 to 64.76.

Year of Event: 2010.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

De Winne and Peersman (2016) report that cereal output was seriously affected by adverse weather conditions in key producing countries in Europe. A group of countries that includes the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine suffered from a heatwave and droughts while the Republic of Moldova had floods. According to a report from the FAO, "International prices of grain have surged since the beginning of July in response to drought-reduced crops in CIS exporting countries and a subsequent decision by the Russian Federation to ban exports."[4]

iii. Cocoa

Year of Event: 1999.

[1] Report available at: http://www.ico.org/news/icc-111-5-r1e-world-coffee-outlook.pdf.

[2] Article available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/11/business/new-frost-hits-brazil-coffee.html.

[3] The FAO document is available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/w1690e/w1690e02.htm#I2.

[4] Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak354e/ak354e00.pdf.

Type of Event: Negative price shock.
According to a report from FAO, the drop in cocoa prices during 1999 was primarily attributed to a surplus in supply resulting from a rise in production levels across major cocoa-producing nations.

Newspaper Articles. An article from the New York Times documents the cocoa price decline in 1999.
The Market: Commodities, New York Times (November 3, 1999):[5]

"COCOA FALLS. Cocoa fell as shippers in the Ivory Coast, the world's largest supplier, begin exporting newly harvested beans at a time of weak demand. In New York, cocoa for December delivery fell $38, to $840 a metric ton."

Year of Event: 2002.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

According to a report from the International Cocoa Organization, the increase in cocoa prices in 2002 was largely due to an attempted coup on 19th September in Côte d'Ivoire, which is the leading cocoa producing country. Uncertainty over potential disruptions emanating from the sociopolitical crisis and civil war pushed prices to a 16-year high at 2.44 dollars per tonne in October 2002.[6] Our data show that between 2001 and 2002 cocoa prices increased from 1.07 dollars per kilo to 1.78 dollars per kilo.

Year of Event: 2017.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

According to a report from the International Cocoa Organization, the decline in cocoa prices in 2017 was driven by favorable weather conditions in major producing countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.[7] Our data show that cocoa prices declined around 30 percent in 2017.

Newspaper Articles. A newspaper article from the New York Times documents the cocoa price increase originated in Cote d'Ivore in 2002. Some important aspects of the article are quoted below.
War Inflates Cocoa Prices But Leaves Africans Poor, New York Times (October 31, 2002):[8]

"As civil war raged in Ivory Coast, the world's biggest cocoa producer, speculative traders here and in New York sent prices this month to 17-year highs."

[5] Article available at: `https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/03/business/the-markets-commodities.html?searchResultPosition=24`.

[6] `https://www.icco.org/about-us/international-cocoa-agreements/cat_view/30-related-documents/45-statistics-other-statistics.html`.

[7] `https://www.icco.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ICCO-Monthly-Cocoa-Market-Review-February-2017.pdf`.

[8] Article available at: `https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/31/business/war-inflates-cocoa-prices-but-leaves-africans-poor.html`.

iv. Rice

Year of Event: 2008.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

In 2008 rice prices nearly doubled. A report from the United States Department of Agriculture explains that the price increase was driven by trade restrictions of major suppliers.[9]

v. Sugar

Year of Event: 2006.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

The sugar price increase in 2006 was caused by severe draughts in Thailand, the second largest sugar producer.[10]

vi. Soybean

Year of Event: 2008.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

A report from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics highlights that the high soybean prices in 2008 originated in the expectation of a reduction in supply.[11] We observe an increase of 40 percent in soybean prices in our data.

B.2 Agriculture: Raw Materials

i. Cotton

Year of Event: 1994.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

A report from the U.S. International Trade Commission describes that the 1994 cotton price increase was driven by a decline in production in key production areas such as China, and India.[12] The decline in production in China is explained by bad weather and a bollworm infestation. A study from the National Cotton Council of America explains that the price increase is also partly due to a recovery in world cotton consumption following the stagnation

[9] https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/outlooks/38489/13518_rcs09d01_1_.pdf?v=242#:~:text=Global\%20rice\%20prices\%20increased\%20nearly,through\%20the\%20spring\%20of\%202008.

[10] see https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/thailand-facing-its-worst-drought-in-20-years-/552381.

[11] https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-9/a-historical-look-at-soybean-price-increases-what-happened-since-the-year-2000.htm

[12] Article available at: https://books.google.com/books?id=OZFDf6qLEosC&pg=SA3-PA5&lpg=SA3-PA5&dq=cotton+prices+1994&source=bl&ots=vi6JuOeGer&sig=DX9iSSIDP__dPIGTNKEfB03FkSA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiJkOOWztneAhVkneAKHWFOCWs4ChDoATADegQIBRAB#v=onepage&q=cotton\%20prices\%201994&f=false.

that resulted from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.[13] Our data indicate that cotton prices declined from 1.28 dollars per kilo in 1993 to 1.76 dollars per kilo in 1994.

Year of Event: 2003.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

MacDonald and Meyer (2018) analyze the challenges faced when forecasting cotton prices in the long run. The article highlights that in 2003 there was a severe weather damage to cotton crops in China which resulted in a surge in cotton prices. In addition, an article from the National Cotton Council of America highlights that in the 2003 season, "(...) USDA's forecast put world sticks at their lowest level since 1994/95, raising the specter of a world cotton shortage for the first time in nearly a decade."[14] Our data show that cotton prices increased from 1.02 dollars per kilo in 2002 to 1.40 dollars per kilo in 2003.

Year of Event: 2010.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

Janzen et al. (2018) analyze the extent to which cotton price movements can be attributed to comovement with other commodities vis-à-vis cotton specific developments. They point at the fact that in 2010-2011 cotton was scarce as a consequence of a negative supply shock generated by lower than average planted crops and negative weather shocks in the USA and Pakistan. This led to an increase in the price of cotton. The authors explain that this boom-bust appears to be cotton-specific, unlike other cases in which a set of macroeconomic factors drive the price of a broad range of commodities. Our data confirm the findings of the paper. In fact, cotton prices increased from 1.38 dollars per kilo in 2009 to 2.28 dollars per kilo in 2010.

ii. Timber

Year of Event: 1993.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

Sohngen and Hayne (1994) explain that the 1993 price spike was driven by the environmentally friendly policies that President Clinton issued to protect forests which limited the timber harvests.[15] The application of such policies is confirmed in the list of environmental actions taken by President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore and is documented in the White House Archives.[16] Our data reveal that the timber price index increased from 72.41 in 1992 to 100.58 in 1993.

[13] Article available at: https://www.cotton.org/issues/2005/upload/WorldCottonMarket.pdf.
[14] Article available at: https://www.cotton.org/issues/2005/upload/WorldCottonMarket.pdf.
[15] Article available at: https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_rp476.pdf.
[16] Available here https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/CEQ/earthday/ch13.html.

Newspaper Articles. A newspaper article from the Washington Post documents this episode and describes how the environmental policy was viewed as a threat to the woods product industry.

Clinton to Slash Logging (July 2, 1993):[17]

"To protect the region's wildlife and old-growth forests, the administration plan will allow for average timber harvests over the next decade of 1.2 billion board feet per year. That is about half the level of the last two years, and only a third of the average rate between 1980 and 1992, when annual harvests swelled as high as 5.2 billion board feet."

iii. Tobacco

Year of Event: 1993.

Type of Event: Negative price shock.

A report from the FAO highlights that the worldwide increase in competition for exports in 1993 led to a substantial fall in tobacco prices.[18] Our data reveal that tobacco prices declined 22 percent between 1992 and 1993.

iv. Rubber

Year of Event: 2010.

Type of Event: Positive price shock.

In 2010 rubber prices almost doubled in 2010. This is due to severe draughts in Thailand and India, major rubber producers.

Newspaper Articles. A newspaper article from the Financial Times documents this.

Rubber price breaks 58-year record (March 31, 2010):[19]

"The price surge comes on the back of the worst drought in north Thailand in a decade, which meteorologists blame on the lingering impact of the El Niño weather phenomenon. Drought has also hit India, the world's fourth-largest producer."

B.3 Energy Commodities

i. Combined Energy Commodities

Year of Event: 2015.

Type of Event: Negative price shock.

The booming U.S. shale oil production played a significant role in the oil price plummet in 2015. However, this event has affected the prices of the main fossil fuels commodities. Our data shows that crude oil prices declined 47 percent, while coal and natural gas prices con-

[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/07/02/clinton-to-slash-logging/f2266e63-f45f-4f88-bd1f-5f1a1edd820f/

[18] Commodity Review and Outlook 1993-1994, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, page 156.

[19] https://www.ft.com/content/636c534c-3ce1-11df-bbcf-00144feabdc0

tracted 16 and 26 percent, respectively, between 2015 and 2015.

Year of Event: 2019.
Type of Event: Negative price shock.

This is the first time that the United States became a net energy exporter following the development of shale technology (EIA, 2020). Therefore, this event can be understood as an event affecting crude oil, natural gas, and coal prices. However, it is not visible in crude oil price because there were attacks to Saudi Arabia oil facilities which disrupted oil exports (World Bank, 2021). This effect partially offset the price reduction from shale technology in the United States. In our dataset we observe that natural gas prices declined 25 percent in 2019 while coal declined 15 percent.

Newspaper Articles. A newspaper article explains the dimension of the oil price plunge.

How the U.S. and OPEC Drive Oil Prices, New York Times (October 5, 2015)[20]

"The global price of a barrel of oil remains near its lowest point since the depths of the 2009 recession — a result of a supply glut and battle for market share between the OPEC oil cartel and the United States, which has shifted toward the role of global swing producer."

iii. Crude Oil

Year of Event: 1998.
Type of Event: Negative price shock.
Känzig (2021) highlights the role played by oil supply expectations in driving the plunge in oil prices in 1998. Our dataset indicate that oil prices declined 32 percent in 1998.

iii. Natural Gas

Year of Event: 2000.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) documents the California energy crisis of 2000-2001.[21] In terms of natural gas, a report from the Task Force on Natural Gas Market Stability finds that "the 2000-2001 California natural gas crisis resulted in major part from a perfect storm of sudden demand increase, impaired physical capacity, natural gas diversion, and inadequate storage fill. The quick summary is as follows: Low hydroelectric availability in 2000, coupled with a modest increase in overall power needs resulted in a substantial increase in gas-fired generation usage, with little preparation."[22] A study from the Federal Reserve

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/30/business/how-the-us-and-opec-drive-oil-prices.html?searchResultPosition=28.

[21] https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html.

[22] http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/Introduction\%20to\%20North\%20American\%20Natural\%20Gas\%20Markets_0.pdf.

Bank of San Franciso documents the natural gas price increase in 2000.[23] Our data show that the natural gas price index jumped from 39.78 in 1999 to 73.85 in 2000.

Year of Event: 2005.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.

An article from the "Oil and Gas Journal" highlights that the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were the main source of the price increase. Some details of the article are quoted below.[24]

"The combined effects of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons had an impact across all sectors of the US gas industry. Hurricane Ivan, which made landfall in September 2004, caused more long-term gas production interruptions than any previous hurricane, but its impacts were dwarfed by Hurricanes Katrina (landfall Aug. 29, 2005) and Rita (Sept. 24, 2005). The combined effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were by far the most damaging in the history of the US petroleum industry."

A report from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission highlights the following:[25]

"The pump was primed for significant energy price effects well before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit the Gulf Coast production areas in September. The Gulf storms exacerbated already tight supply and demand conditions, increasing prices for fuels in the United States further after steady upward pressure on prices throughout the summer of 2005. Most of this was due to increased electric generation demand for natural gas caused by years of investment in gas-fired generation and a significantly warmer-than-average summer. Supply showed some weakness despite increasing numbers of active drilling rigs. The result was broadly higher energy prices."

Our natural gas index data shows a clear spike in 2005, going up from 95.39 in 2004 to 142.40 in 2005.

Newspaper Articles. The increase in natural gas prices in the aftermath of the hurricanes received media attention. An example from NBC News is included in what follows.[26]

"Gas prices in cities across the United States soared by as much as 40 cents a gallon from Tuesday to Wednesday, a surge blamed on disruptions by Hurricane Katrina in Gulf of Mexico oil production."

[23] https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2001/february/economic-impact-of-rising-natural-gas-prices/#subhead3.

[24] https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-104/issue-36/general-interest/us-gas-market-responds-to-hurricane-disruptions.html.

[25] https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20051020121515-Gaspricereport.pdf.

[26] http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9146363/ns/business-local_business/t/pump-prices-jump-across-us-after-katrina/#.W3NQbehKiUk.

B.4 Metals and Mineral Commodities

i. Aluminum

Year of Event: 1994.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.
According to the "Commodity Markets and Developing Countries" report from the World Bank, aluminum prices increased in 1994 due to a reduction in stocks, attributed primarily to the cutbacks in production by major producers.[27] Our data reveal that aluminum prices went up 30 percent in 1994.

Newspaper Articles. A newspaper article illustrates the cuts in supply.
A Loose Plan On Output of Aluminum, New York Times (January 31, 1994):[28]

"Six leading aluminum producers have agreed on ways to reduce a serious oversupply that has depressed prices on world markets."

ii. Iron ore

Year of Event: 2019.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.
The collapse of a mining dam in Brazil, the largest iron ore producer, led the price increase. Our data reveal that iron ore prices increased around 35 percent in 2019.[29]

iii. Lead

Year of Event: 2017.
Type of Event: Negative price shock.

According to the "Commodity Markets Review" from the World Bank, prices declined due to rising stocks and expectation that suspended production from the Magellan mine in Australia will be allowed to resume in the first quarter of 2008. In our data lead prices declined 32%.[30]

iv. Nickel

Year of Event: 2001.
Type of Event: Positive price shock.
According to World Bank (2001), various supply problems contributed to the tight market, particularly technical problems bringing on new capacity in Australia and labor strikes in Canada.[31] In our data nickel prices increased by 44%.

[27] http://https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/475131464184948121-0050022016/original/CMO1994November.pdf.

[28] Article available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/31/business/a-loose-plan-on-output-of-aluminum.html?.

[29] https://www.ft.com/content/8c2f26f6-72b0-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5.

[30] https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/324111462981400952-0050022016/original/CMO2007December.pdf.

[31] https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/398441462978606788-0050022016/original/CMO2001GEP.pdf.

B.5 Country-Specific Assumptions

Our approach requires the omission of certain events when they are a result of unique weather conditions or political incidents exclusive to a specific country. The following exclusions have been implemented:

- The cocoa price surge of 2002, instigated by an attempted coup in Côte d'Ivoire amidst an ongoing civil war and escalating tensions, is omitted for this particular country.
- The sugar price shock in 2006, which was due to drought conditions in Thailand, is not considered in our analysis for this country.
- The 2019 disruption to iron ore prices, attributable to the collapse of a mining dam in Brazil, is specifically excluded for Brazil in our study.
- The 2010 spike in cereal prices, precipitated by weather conditions in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, results in these countries' exclusion from the event.
- The cotton price shock in 2010, induced by weather-related incidents in Pakistan, is disregarded for Pakistan in our analysis.
- The rubber price shock in 2010, triggered by droughts in Thailand, leads to Thailand's exclusion from this event in our analysis.

C Additional Results

Figure C1: Impulse Responses of the BAA Spread



(a) Accomodative U.S. Monetary Policy (b) Eased Global Risk Appetite

Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of the response of the BAA spread to a U.S. monetary policy shock and to shifts in global risk appetite.

Figure C2: Impulse Responses of Direct Investment (Inflows and Outflows)



(a) Increase in Export Prices



(b) Decline in the BAA Spread (driven by U.S. Monetary Policy)



(c) Decline in the BAA Spread (driven by Global Risk Appetite)

Notes: The Impulse Responses show the LATE (in blue) of one standard deviation decline in the BAA spread driven by increases in Px (Panel a), U.S. monetary policy (Panel b), and shifts in global risk appetite (Panel c). They complement figures 3, 5, and 7. Gray areas denote 68% and 90% confidence intervals.

Appendix References

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