Revealing 21% of GDP in Hidden Assets: Evidence from Argentina's Tax Amnesties

Juliana Londoño-Vélez UCLA & NBER Dario Tortarolo Nottingham & IFS

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Motivation

Offshore evasion poses severe challenges for tax policy (Slemrod, 2019; Zucman, 2015)

 Gov'ts worldwide have conducted enforcement initiatives to improve wealthy households' tax compliance (e.g., CRS, TIEAs, FATCA)

Voluntary disclosure programs or tax amnesties seek to entice wealthy evaders to disclose foreign income/assets in exchange for reduced penalties and no prosecution

Motivation

Despite their widespread use, tax amnesties remain controversial and differ drastically in how effectively they improve tax compliance


Understanding how and why tax amnesties succeed/fail is crucial to conduct tax policy

However, it has been hard to draw lessons; e.g., countries vary in baseline evasion rates and amnesties vary in design and contextual features

This paper

- Studies tax amnesties' effectiveness and impact on capital taxation and public spending
- Argentina is well-suited to examine these issues
 - 1. There is a lot at stake: 1/3 of GDP had been stored offshore [Alstadsæter et al., 2018]
 - 2. Argentines report assets annually because there is a gross wealth tax
 - Rich policy variation: left and right-wing gov't programs in 2009, 2013–2015, 2016, with varied effectiveness: disclosed assets ranged from 0.5% to 21% of GDP
 —world's most successful amnesty?
- Uses detailed data from wealth and income tax tabulations and pension benefits spanning two decades

Argentina owned the equivalent of 36.5% of GDP in offshore wealth



Source: Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2018)

Summary of main results

- 1. Despite substantial offshore tax evasion, declared foreign assets quadrupled in 2016
- 2. Tax progressivity improved because disclosures were extensive among top 0.1%

- 3. Improving tax compliance has sizable externalities on capital taxes and social transfers
 - Wealth and capital income tax bases more than doubled even four years later
 - Earmarked revenue boosted pension benefits by 15%

4. Limited repatriation response to amnesties and "confiscatory" taxes on foreign assets

Contributions

• Offshore evasion and fiscal implications Alstadsæter et al. (2019), Zucman (2015)

 \rightarrow Wealthy Argentines kept undeclared assets abroad, but enforcement policy provoked large disclosures, affecting capital taxation and public spending

Nascent empirical literature on tax amnesties and voluntary disclosure programs Alstadsæter et al. (2019, 2022), Johannesen et al. (2020), Langenmayr (2017), Leenders et al. (2021), Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2021)

 \rightarrow Policy revealed substantial offshore assets even in a country with a lot at stake and a history of failed amnesty programs

Outline

Context and Data

The Effectiveness of Argentina's Amnesties

Revealing Foreign and Domestic Assets Disclosures by Top Wealth Groups and Tax Progressivity Expanding the Wealth and Capital Income Tax Bases Increasing Transfers by Earmarking Revenue for Pension Spending Do Taxpayers Repatriate Assets in Response to Tax Incentives?

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
Argentina's wealth tax

- Argentina levies a gross wealth tax on inds and firms on worldwide assets held on Dec 31
- Broad tax base (e.g., real estate, vehicles, foreign currency, cash, checking account balance, shares) with two exemptions:
 - 1. Savings accounts and term deposits at Argentine banks
 - 2. Securities, bonds, other negotiable instruments issued by the public sector
- Taxpayers must file an annual tax return and pay any balance in June of year t + 1 F.762/A
- Large variation in wealth tax rate and number of taxpayers due to reforms and bracket creep

More info on AFIP website here

Argentina's wealth tax rates have ranged from 0.25% to 2.25% Table ► N payers Revenue Features ▶ ATR Bunching Tax Rates (%) 2.25% -1.75% **Special rates** 1.5% for foreign assets 1.25% Cutoff: 5m 1% -Cutoff: 2m 0.75% Cutoff: 750k Cutoff: 200k 0.5% Cutoff: 102.3k Cutoff: 102.3k Cutoff: 305k Cutoffs 800k 950k 1.05m 0.25% 0 2015 2017 2019 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2021

7 / 34



Argentina's wealth tax rates have ranged from 0.25% to 2.25%

A brief history of Argentina's recent experience with tax amnesties

Left- and right-wing gov'ts implemented three tax amnesties in 2009, 2013–15, and 2016, varying in policy design, contextual features, and revenue collection

Fernandez de Kirchner implemented two amnesties in 2009 and 2013–15: revealed assets worth 0.5% to 1.3% of GDP, but little impact on tax revenue

Macri's program in 2016 encouraged 255,000 individuals and firms to disclose assets worth US\$ 117B (21% of GDP), raised US\$ 9.5B (1.8% of GDP) from special tax News: [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]


Macri's 2016 tax amnesty

- 1. **Scope:** all (foreign and domestic) assets and currencies as of July 22, 2016 Passed on June 29, 2016, and lasted nine months (Aug '16–March '17)
- 2. Tax and non-tax benefits: forgave all liabilities for taxes and fines + no criminal prosecution

Pre-amnesty, penalty for evasion was 2-10X taxes evaded + imprisonment

- 3. **Costs:** a one-time penalty of 0% if assets less than US \$19k, up to 10% above US \$50k (5% for real estate)
 - To encourage early participation, top rate jumped to 15% after Dec 31, 2016 •
 - Participants could waive penalty by investing 1/3rd of disclosed asset in special Treasury bonds or domestic mutual funds for five years

An ad describing tax evaders' penalty trade-off



"Why you'll pay dearly for it later"

Example: a person with a non-declared property worth 3m pesos

Left: A 5% penalty (150k pesos) if evader discloses it before March 31

Right: A potential 202% penalty (6m pesos) + potential criminal prosecution starting April 1

Source: AFIP's webpage.

Macri's 2016 tax amnesty: four essential features

- 1. Rewarded compliant taxpayers to safe keep tax morale but slashed wealth tax to entice participation
 - Non-participants who filed wealth tax in 2014 and 2015: 0% wealth tax in 2016–18
 - Participants: wealth tax rate dropped from 1.25% in 2015 to 0.25% in 2018 •
 - Talks about repealing wealth tax in 2019
- 2. Earmarked revenue to fund public pension system
- 3. Massive ad campaign made program salient
- 4. Threat of detection became more credible: TIEAs with most relevant tax havens (Uruguay, Switzerland), Brazil, Chile, USA + Panama Papers two months prior

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An ad promoting amnesty to contribute to better pension benefits for older citizens




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Massive ad campaign made program salient



Google search trends show amnesty program was salient



Macri's 2016 tax amnesty: four essential features


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TIEAs made the threat of detection more credible




Source: Slide taken from AFIP's communication campaign.

Disclosures made under the 2016 amnesty 80% hidden abroad, mostly financial assets • Tax Revenue



Disclosures made under the 2016 amnesty 80% hidden abroad, mostly financial assets • Tax Revenue



Administrative data

1. Detailed IRS tax tabulations from wealth tax and income tax (FYs 2002-20)

- Wealth tax: number of filers, taxpayers; wealth value, tax base, tax liability. Broken by: gender, location (domestic vs foreign), type of asset, industry sector, ~15 brackets
- Income tax: number of filers, taxpayers; wealth value, debts, net worth. Tax base split into 4 sources: rental, capital, business, wage income

- 2. Spending: monthly retirement benefits from SSA; reparation spending
 - Number of retirees, average benefit, decomposed by deciles

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
The Effectiveness of Argentina's Amnesties

Revealing Foreign and Domestic Assets

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
Discussion and Conclusion

A 310% increase in the number of wealth taxpayers declaring foreign assets




Notes: There are 28,816 returns for foreign assets and 1,241,683 for domestic assets at baseline (2015). • See levels

There is a more than 310% increase in the value of declared foreign assets \bullet_{ER}




Argentines now report that half of their assets are located abroad .




The likelihood of declaring foreign assets increased for all asset types

▶ See cases




The value of declared foreign real estate increased by over 1000%


▶ Absolute



By contrast, smaller change in no. of taxpayers declaring domestic assets • See cases



By contrast, smaller change value of declared domestic assets



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
Revealing Foreign and Domestic Assets

Disclosures by Top Wealth Groups and Tax Progressivity


Expanding the Wealth and Capital Income Tax Bases Increasing Transfers by Earmarking Revenue for Pension Spending Do Taxpayers Repatriate Assets in Response to Tax Incentives?

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
The increase in reported assets is greater for Argentina's top 0.1%



Amnesty tripled the share of foreign assets declared by top 0.1%



An increase in the progressivity of the wealth tax in 2019 $\scriptstyle \bullet$



Outline


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
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The amnesty raised the total value of wealth reported by tax filers




Levels
 Tax base


As a result, wealth tax revenue doubled—and tripled when tax rate \uparrow



The number of taxpayers subject to capital income tax doubled • All sources



The capital income tax base tripled—and the increase persisted • Levels • Shares



Outline


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
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
By earmarking revenue, the amnesty raised pension benefits by 15% .



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
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
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
Argentina raised top wealth tax rate to 2.25% for foreign assets in 2019




However, little change in declared foreign assets (relative to 2018)



And effective tax rate remains constant



As a result, big spike in wealth tax revenue to GDP ratio in 2019



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Quick recap

 Argentina had unprecedented success in encouraging evaders—especially the wealthiest 0.1%—to reveal assets hidden offshore

- The expansion of the wealth and capital income tax bases turned out to be key later when gov't needed to raise revenue to deal with the COVID-19 crisis
 - Wealth tax surcharge on the wealthiest 12.5k Argentines Details

▶ Will our results replicate in other countries or even a future Argentina?

What made the 2016 amnesty different? •

Combined generous tax incentives while retaining support and compliance of honest taxpayers

- A credible threat of detection thanks to TIEAs and leaks •
- A favorable political economy thanks to a pro-market and business-friendly gov't
 + earmarking revenue to garner taxpayer support

High salience and low compliance costs ••

Thanks!



Macri and a shower of dollars

Appendix

Wealth Tax Form 762/A • Back

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
Declaro que los datos consignados en este formulario son correctos y completos y que he confeccionado la presente utilizando el programa aplicative (offware) entregado y aprobado por la AFIP, sin omitir ni falsear dato alguno que deba contener, siendo fiel expresion de la verdad.

Tax Rates and Wealth Tax Thresholds: 1991-2020


Fiscal Years	Exemption Threshold	Bracket 1	Bracket 2	Bracket 3	Bracket 4			
1991-1994	100k/102.3k	1%						
1995-1998	102.3k	0.5%						
1999-2006	102.3k	0.5% 7	90X	0.75%				
2007-2015 (notches)	305k	0.5% 1	0 [℃] 0.75% 2	n 1%	1.25%			
2016	800k	0.75%						
2017	950k	0.50%						
2018	1.05m	0.25%						
2019-2020 domestic assets 2019-2020 foreign assets	2m 2m	0.5% 0.7% ³	0.75% 1.20%	5 ^m 1% 1.80%	1.25% 2.25%			

Notes: Thresholds (in current pesos) are reported in blue. For 2007-2015 the thresholds operated as notches. Back Filing thresholds (earnings): 2007-2014: \$96k; 2015: \$200k; 2016: \$500k; 2017: \$1m; 2018: \$1.5m; 2019: \$2m; 2020: \$2.5m.

Wealth Tax Filers and Wealth Tax Payers .




Revenue from the 2016 Amnesty's Special Tax • Back • Disclosures




Foreign vs Domestic Assets

Share of total wealth Back




Wealth Tax Revenue




A 256% increase in wealth tax revenue!


Wealth Tax / Tax Revenue (%)




Reported Wealth (levels) • Back




Wealth Tax Base • Back




Wealth Tax / GDP (%) • Back




Effective Tax Rate • Back



Revenue with and without "Good Compliers" • Back




Wealth reported in income tax returns




Robustness: Reassuringly, people also report more assets abroad in their income tax returns.

Wealth reported in income tax returns • zoom in




Robustness: Reassuringly, people also report more assets abroad in their income tax returns.


Annual inflation [2000-2017]



Exchange Rate Pesos-US Dollar • Back



Total Tax Revenue




Tax Revenue collected in December 2016 almost doubles due to amnesty's special tax

Details of disclosed assets


Type of Asset	Value (in mill USD)	%	
Investments - Abroad	54,999	47	
Investments - in Argentina	860	1	
Cash deposits - Abroad	25,925	22	
Cash deposits - in Argentina	405	0	
National/foreign currency - in Argentina	7,344	6	
Real Estate - Abroad	10,124	9	
Real Estate - in Argentina	10,434	9	
Rest of Assets	6,685	6	
Total	116,775	10	
% of GDP	21%		

Notes: Investments abroad: 30% located in the US, 26% in Switzerland, 15% in the UK; Cash deposits abroad: 45% located in the US, 32% in Switzerland, 9% in Uruguay; Real estate abroad: 49% located in Uruguay, 37% in the US, 4% in Brazil. Rest of assets: cars, boats, airplanes, art, jewelry, etc.


Tax returns reporting foreign assets • Back




Real Estate • Back



Stocks Back




Vehicles Back




Bank deposits and currency • Back




Massive disclosures of foreign stocks, cash, and real estate • Back




Domestic real estate and cash also increase (but smaller in %) \bullet



Share of Male Wealth Tax Payers




Wealth reported in income tax returns • Back




Fiscal Externalities into the Income Tax

Capital Income: Tax base • Back




Fiscal Externalities into the Income Tax

Capital Income: Taxpayers • Back




Fiscal Externalities into the Income Tax

Capital Income: Share of total tax base • Back




Fiscal Externalities into Pensions

Average pensions
Back



Distribution of wealth (assets)

Bunching at the exemption cutoff • Back



Advertisement of earmarked revenue Back



Source: AFIP's webpage.

Translation:

Tax Amnesty

Declaration of assets

Report your assets, contribute to your country. **We achieve better pensions**. We all grow.

An ad to encourage the disclosure of real estates • Back

Why is it going to be more expensive afterwards? The banner shows an example of a citizen with a non-declared property worth 3m pesos. background/costo de no sincerar.jpg The left blue panel shows a 5% penalty (150k pesos) if the person comes forward and disclose it. The right red panel shows a potential 202% penalty (6m pesos) if the person doesn't disclose it and is detected by AFIP.

Source: AFIP's webpage.

What makes for a successful tax amnesty? A roadmap

The tax incentives

The threat of detection

► A favorable political economy

High salience and low compliance costs

What made the 2016 amnesty successful at disclosing hidden assets?

	2009	2013-2015	2016
President	Fernandez	Fernandez	Macri
Political inclination	Left	Left	Right
Can you disclose foreign currencies?	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Can you disclose assets?	\checkmark		\checkmark
Is there a penality for disclosing?	\checkmark		\checkmark
Is there a reduced penality for repatriation?	\checkmark		\checkmark
Is repatriation required?		\checkmark	
Is there a credible information exchange threat?		\sim	\checkmark
Is there legal certainty? (currency controls)			\checkmark
How many people disclosed?	35k	16k	255k
How much was disclosed? (% GDP)	1.3%	0.5%	21%

A credible threat of detection? Yes Back

► The threat of detection was not credible prior to 2014 because Argentina had no TIEAs ⇒ It is difficult to catch people evading taxes offshore

 In October 2014, Argentina commits to exchange information by September 2017 (for FY 2016) for OECD-AEOI

In 2016: TIEAs with Uruguay (Sep'16), Switzerland (Nov'16), Brazil (Dec'16), and the US (Dec'16)

▶ In April 2016: Panama Papers were leaked

TIEAs made the threat of detection more credible • Back


Timeline of agreements signed during the 2016 amnesty



Source: Slide taken from AFIP's communication campaign.

A credible threat of detection? Yes

Panama Papers leaked in April 2016 • Back



A credible threat of detection? Yes

Argentina's TIEAs are being used to enforce taxes • Back

LA NACION

Dólar: Oficial \$97,75 \$103,75 Blue \$180,50 \$184,50



"ELEVADOS PATRIMONIOS".

La AFIP tiene bajo la lupa 3000 cuentas bancarias de argentinos en el exterior

No fueron declaradas ante el fisco durante los períodos 2016 y 2017; la Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos seguirá investigando información que recibió de otras entidades tributarias del mundo

Source: La Nacion, October 9, 2021.

- AFIP crackdown on foreign accounts thanks to TIEAs
- "3,000 foreign bank accounts under investigation"
- "They were not reported to AFIP in 2016 and 2017; the AFIP will continue to investigate information received from other tax entities around the world"
- Reinforces the value of TIEAs


Generous tax incentives? Maybe •Back

Unlike for previous amnesties, 2016 amnesty participants expected the **wealth tax** to be progressively eliminated \Rightarrow encourages participation of evaders

Notwithstanding, 2016 participants also paid the highest **penalty rate**: up to 15% compared to only 8% in 2009 and 0% in 2013–15 \Rightarrow discourages participation of evaders but retains support and compliance of honest taxpayers


Moreover, conditional on participating, penalty rates do matter (but appear to have a limited effect if **repatriation** is required). Recall the 2016 penalty schedule: $\Rightarrow 10\%$ vs 15% for assets above US\$ 50k if disclosed before or after **Dec 31, 2016** $\Rightarrow 0\%$ if 1/3 disclosed value is invested in **treasury securities** or in domestic **mutual funds** for 5-vr

Most assets disclosed in Dec 16, before top penalty rate Revenue from Amnesty's Special Tax



A favorable political economy? Yes

Confidence in government (UTDT Index)
Back




Salience? Yes

A massive advertisement campaign • Back



Salience? Yes • Back



Low compliance cost? Yes Screenshot of AFIP's main webpage • Back




Translation:

Tax Amnesty (Sinceramiento Fiscal) "HOW TO DISCLOSE ASSETS"

"Access this video-tutorial for a step-by-step guide to report your undeclared assets and enjoy the benefits"

Low compliance cost? Yes

An App and a calculator to simulate the tax penalty • Back



Low compliance cost? Yes Screenshot of AFIP's main webpage



Translation:

Tax Amnesty (Sinceramiento Fiscal)

"This is an opportunity to do your part, declare all your assets, regularize your debt and, if you complied, find out about the benefits"

Low compliance cost? Yes Screenshot of AFIP's main webpage



Translation:

Tax Amnesty (Sinceramiento Fiscal)

"DO YOU HAVE UNDECLARED CASH?"

"You have until October 31st. Don't miss it out. You still have time!"

Under What Conditions is a Tax Amnesty Successful?

What does seem to work?

- $\checkmark\,$ A credible threat of detection thanks to TIEAs and leaks
- \checkmark Large tax incentives for evaders to disclose (but maintain support of compliant taxpayers)
- ✓ A favorable political economy thanks to a pro-market and business-friendly government and earmarking revenue for a perceived good cause
- $\checkmark\,$ High salience thanks to massive info campaign
- $\checkmark\,$ Low compliance cost by simplifying the procedure to disclose

What does not seem to work?

- Tax incentives to repatriate assets
- Tax benefits for investing in treasury securities

An increase in the wealth tax to raise revenue for COVID-19 • Back

- The increase in reported wealth enabled the gov't to raise revenue progressively in 2020 to deal with the COVID-19 crisis News: [1] [2]
- A one-time wealth tax surcharge was levied on the 12.5k wealthiest people: MTRs between 2% to 3.5% for domestic assets and 3% to 5.25% for foreign assets
- Revenue was earmarked for health expenses (e.g., medical supplies, vaccines), subsidies for SMEs, and welfare for low-income households
 - ⇒ 10k people filed, with \approx USD 80B in taxable assets (50% located abroad) Reference: pre-amnesty taxable assets of wealthiest 10k \approx USD 41B
 - $\Rightarrow\,$ Collected \approx USD 2.66B (~80% of the projected revenue); \equiv 1 month of VAT revenue
 - \Rightarrow Non-filers were subject to higher audit rates