

# Why is Entrepreneurial Overconfidence (So) Persistent? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment\*

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November, 2022  
Preliminary

## Abstract

Why do overconfident entrepreneurs fail to learn from frequent market feedback? We conducted two field experiments and followed nearly 1,000 firms for over a year to explore the role of hindsight bias and causal misattribution. Both biases can potentially help sustain overconfidence psychologically, as hindsight bias creates a false memory of past mistakes while misattribution allows entrepreneurs to shift blame to external factors. We use two treatments to address biased memory and misattribution. First, under our “error reminder” treatment, entrepreneurs are shown past forecast errors to remove hindsight bias. Second, under our “scientific learning” treatment, we encourage entrepreneurs to develop causal hypotheses about their firm and test these hypotheses empirically, to mitigate misattribution. We find that the error reminder treatment does not reduce overconfidence, because misattribution replaces hindsight bias to sustain overconfidence. In contrast, we find that stronger engagement with hypothesis testing within scientific learning successfully reduces overestimation.

**JEL: L26, D91, M21**

**Keywords: Entrepreneurial overconfidence, mechanism field experiment, RCT, scientific learning**

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\*We would like to thank Kevin Bryan, Arnaldo Camuffo, Alfonso Gambardella, Josh Hausman, Holger Herz, Sara Holland, Lubo Litov, John Mondragon, Jan Rivkin, Johannes Wieland, Matthew Wood, Todd Zenger and Florian Zimmermann and the seminar participants at the University of Oklahoma, the University of Utah, for helpful comments. The authors would like to acknowledge the support from the Utah Governor’s Office of Management and Budget (GOMB), the Utah Governor’s Office of Economic Development and the Utah Chamber of Commerce. Financial support from the Utah State Legislature is gratefully acknowledged. None of the supporting entities reviewed the results of this study before circulation and the views expressed here are solely the authors’ and do not reflect the views of the supporting institutions. The IRB number from the University of Utah is 00139342 and the AEA-RCT registry number is 0006860.

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# 1 Introduction

The existence of persistent entrepreneurial overconfidence is an enduring puzzle: Economists since [Friedman \(1953\)](#) and [Becker \(1962\)](#) as well as psychologists, such as [Kahneman and Klein \(2009\)](#) have argued that incentives and frequent feedback would induce entrepreneurs to learn and de-bias their beliefs. In contrast, recent work in behavioral economics on “motivated beliefs” maintains that “wishful thinking” can impede learning, through biased memory or shifting blame for errors (see [Benabou and Tirole \(2016\)](#) for a survey of this literature).

We focus on two aspects of entrepreneurial overconfidence: overestimation of own sales growth and overprecision, defined as overconfidence about accuracy of own forecasts ([Moore and Healy, 2008](#)). To our knowledge, this study is the first mechanism field experiment (or randomized controlled trial – RCT) providing direct evidence on the mechanisms psychologically sustaining entrepreneurial overconfidence ([Ludwig et al., 2011](#); [Congdon et al., 2017](#)). Our RCT is designed to (1) test the mechanisms, that psychologically sustain entrepreneurial overconfidence, (2) provide insights into which treatments that can overcome these mechanisms, and (3) develop a new methodology to calculate the welfare effects of biased entrepreneurial expectations, allowing for a motivating effect of overconfidence ([Benabou and Tirole, 2002](#)).

We collect unique and rich panel data from a set of approximately 1,000 entrepreneurs from Utah over the course of 13 months. These firms have a median workforce of 2 employees (excluding the founder) and a median age of 7 years. A majority of founders, specifically, 61%, explicitly aspire to “profit maximization and growth,” which is higher than the 40% in the US Census Bureau’s 2016 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (ASE), 24% in the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) ([Hurst and Pusley, 2011](#)), and 12% of nascent entrepreneurs considering to start a business because of a business opportunity as reported in the working paper version of [Bennett and Chatterjee \(2019\)](#).

We document high and persistent degrees of entrepreneurial overestimation and over-

precision in our sample. Specifically, we find that entrepreneurs in the control group overestimate their next-month revenue growth by 5%, corresponding to a compounded annual revenue overestimation of 80%. We show that this overestimation cannot be explained by Bayesian “apparent overconfidence” as in [Benoit and Dubra \(2011\)](#) or the presence of persistent private information.<sup>1</sup> Experience does not eliminate this bias: among entrepreneurs with firms that are at least 7 years old, the median monthly overestimation is still 4%. This persistent entrepreneurial overestimation is in contrast to no average overestimation among large firms in the Survey of Business Expectations ([Barrero, 2022](#)). Both sets of findings are consistent with [Busenitz and Barney \(1997\)](#), who show that entrepreneurs tend to be more overconfident than managers of large firms. In addition, entrepreneurs are also overconfident about the accuracy of their estimates (overprecision). We asked entrepreneurs to report 80% confidence intervals for their revenue growth. These entrepreneurs reported 80% confidence intervals that are 21 percentage points narrower than statistical 80% confidence intervals, based on their realized revenue growth. This overprecision by entrepreneurs is smaller and comparable to the 27.7 percentage point overprecision reported by [Ben-David et al. \(2012\)](#) for CFOs of major corporations. This overprecision also persists with experience as firms that are at least 7 years old exhibit overprecision by 23 percentage points.

Importantly, we show that entrepreneurs in the control group exhibit a high degree of hindsight bias, as they report a median past forecast error of zero. We also show that biased memory and overestimation are systematically related. Specifically, individuals who recall making smaller forecast errors in the past also have higher degrees of overconfidence. These patterns are complementary to studies such as [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#) and [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#) that have shown that biased memory sustains overplacement, defined as overconfidence about one’s own rank relative to peers.

Our RCT design entails randomizing firms into three groups; a control group, an error reminder treatment, and a scientific learning treatment. Firms remain in their group

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<sup>1</sup>See [Appendix A.1](#) for our discussion of apparent overconfidence as in [Benoit and Dubra \(2011\)](#) and [Appendix A.2](#) for our discussion of persistent private information.

throughout the study and were unaware of the other groups. Our first treatment targets biased memory by showing entrepreneurs information about their past revenue forecast errors. We repeat this light touch information treatment every month.

Our second treatment targets misattribution by prompting entrepreneurs to once a month develop and test hypotheses in a structured way to learn scientifically. Misattribution could sustain overconfidence by attributing underperformance (relative to forecasts) to external factors rather than internal mistakes. Misattribution is driven by an imperfect understanding of whether and how internal or external factors drive firm performance. Related recent theoretical work in behavioral economics argues that misattribution could either be driven by misspecified mental models (Heidhues et al., 2018; Gagnon-Bartsch et al., 2021) or an inability to separately identify the external and internal reasons for under-performance even under correctly specified models (Hestermann and Yaouanq, 2021). Our scientific learning treatment builds on the literature on structured management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) and scientific learning in managerial (Yang et al., 2020) and entrepreneurial (Camuffo et al., 2019) decision-making. Our treatment induces entrepreneurs to formulate hypotheses to learn about potential misspecification of their mental model and encourages hypothesis testing to address the identification challenge of separating internal and external reasons for under-performance.

Our RCT provides three results. First, our error reminder treatment is ineffective in reducing entrepreneurial overconfidence. This empirical result is consistent with the ineffectiveness of reminders of long sales histories by Bloom et al. (2022) on a large sample of internet entrepreneurs. We go further than Bloom et al. (2022) and provide evidence on why this is the case: entrepreneurs replace hindsight bias with misattribution to psychologically sustain overconfidence. Specifically, while misattribution is not significantly correlated with overestimation in the control group, it becomes highly significantly correlated with overestimation in the error reminder treatment group. This suggests that wishful thinking by entrepreneurs is indeed subject to “reality constraints” (Caplin and Leahy, 2019),

so that they cannot just hold beliefs that clearly contradict evidence. At the same time, entrepreneurs seem willing to exert psychological effort to sustain overestimation via more use of misattribution in the face of objective information about past forecast errors. This behavior supports theories of motivated reasoning as in [Kunda \(1990\)](#), [Benabou and Tirole \(2016\)](#) and [Caplin and Leahy \(2019\)](#).

Second, scientific learning can de-bias entrepreneurs if they engage. Our scientific learning treatment has two stages and entrepreneurs choose voluntarily how much to engage with each part. To provide consistent causal estimates, we use our treatments as instruments for the endogenous variable of engagement, which is measured by the string length of free-form text responses to structured questions, see [Angrist et al. \(1996\)](#), [Angrist and Pischke \(2009\)](#), [Gerber and Green \(2012\)](#). In the first (“theory”) stage, entrepreneurs follow a structured script to explain the uniqueness of their business and to develop testable hypotheses. In the second (“testing”) stage, entrepreneurs are asked to test their hypotheses empirically. Theoretically, these two stages will affect overestimation and overprecision differently. The theory stage is designed to emphasize uncertainty of their theory and assumptions, which motivates entrepreneurs to pay attention to empirical tests of their hypotheses, consistent with [Gagnon-Bartsch et al. \(2021\)](#). Consequently we expect it to reduce overprecision. At the same time, to motivate entrepreneurs in this way, our treatment emphasizes “contrarian views,” which places more emphasis on potentially overconfident priors. This can increase overestimation ([Bernardo and Welch, 2004](#)). In contrast, the hypothesis testing stage facilitates entrepreneurial learning about misspecified mental models ([Gagnon-Bartsch et al., 2021](#)) as well as identification of internal as opposed to external causes of under-performance ([Hestermann and Yaouanq, 2021](#)). Hypothesis testing thereby directly addresses causal misattribution and is likely to reduce overestimation. Consistent with these two stages, we find that entrepreneurs more strongly engaged with the theory stage exhibit more overestimation and less overprecision. In addition, entrepreneurs more strongly engaged with hypothesis testing reduce their overestimation bias. Overall, these results suggest that entrepreneurial

overconfidence is not a fixed character trait and can be successfully influenced by structured practices. We provide a battery of robustness checks for these main results. We confirm external validity of our causal estimates for the population of US entrepreneurs, using methods suggested by [Andrews and Oster \(2019\)](#). Our results are also robust with respect to incentive pay for accurate forecasts, sample attrition, different types of forecasts, hybrid entrepreneurship or differential industry trends.

Third, we document large profit gains from the scientific learning treatment for firms with “profit maximization and growth” as their main aspiration. Our estimates suggest that such opportunity-driven entrepreneurs boost their between \$300 monthly at the 15th percentile to over \$45,000 monthly at the 85th percentile. These profit results mirror large effects on revenue found by training programs based on scientific learning, such as [Camuffo et al. \(2019\)](#). At the same time, we find no significant effects for entrepreneurs who do not pursue profit maximization and growth, including those with non-pecuniary main objectives, such as “personal or social goals” ([Hurst and Pusley, 2011](#)). These results are consistent with the zero or insignificant effects typically found in small business training programs ([Lerner, 2009](#); [Fairlie et al., 2015](#); [McKenzie, 2021](#)). Overall, our profit results suggest that identifying opportunity-driven entrepreneurs is key to successful entrepreneurial training programs or subsidies ([Hurst and Pusley, 2011](#); [Fairlie and Fossen, 2019](#)) and reinforce the finding that interventions can be very effective in boosting high-growth entrepreneurship as shown by [McKenzie \(2017\)](#).

Fourth, we use our experimental findings to develop a new methodology to assess the welfare effects of entrepreneurial overconfidence through hourly labor supply decisions. We calculate entrepreneur-specific measures of the marginal profit of entrepreneurial labor. We define this profit as the present value of the expected rational marginal benefit from more hours worked, minus the opportunity cost of time. Using our data on forecast errors as well as actual profits, we correct for biased expectations and allow for a motivating effect of overconfidence, as in [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#) and [Compte and Postlewaite \(2004\)](#). Our

welfare analysis suggests that most entrepreneurs are overworked. The median entrepreneur reports a (expected present value of) marginal profit of \$3 per hour. In contrast, our bias-corrected rational marginal profit measure implies a median loss for this entrepreneur of \$70 per hour. This is consistent with laboratory experimental evidence by [Gish et al. \(2019\)](#), who find that sleep deprivation causes inefficient decision-making by entrepreneurs. We show that in our context, entrepreneurial welfare could increase by roughly 20% of median monthly profits (\$1,000 per month) if we removed the median amount of overestimation. These welfare effects are a sizeable lower bound for the overall entrepreneurial welfare implications from overconfidence because labor supply is only one of many adversely affected margins (such as hiring and investment).

This welfare analysis has broader implications about understanding market selection and survival of entrepreneurial firms. Instead of being competed out of the market, overconfident entrepreneurs tend to have excessively high labor supply, which increases accounting profits and therefore makes market survival of overconfident entrepreneurs *more* likely. However, in terms of welfare, each additional hour of work is very unproductive as in [Gish et al. \(2019\)](#) or could be very costly in terms of the opportunity cost of work, e.g., from direct disutility of work or the foregone utility of spending time with family. In other words, economic marginal profits from more work are negative, although accounting profits are positive. And because market survival depends on accounting profits, overconfident entrepreneurs are not forced to exit by market competition. Although this logic is consistent with the persistence in entrepreneurship despite low returns, as documented by [Hamilton \(2000\)](#), [Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen \(2002\)](#) and [Hall and Woodward \(2010\)](#), ours is the first empirical paper to quantify the importance of overconfidence for entrepreneurial welfare. Most existing work either does not separate overconfidence from non-pecuniary rewards such as work flexibility or control (as in the studies by [Hamilton, 2000](#); [Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002](#); [Hall and Woodward, 2010](#)) or does not offer an empirical evaluation of the importance of overconfidence ([Astebro et al., 2014](#)).

## Related Literature

Our study is related to at least three strands of literature in economics and entrepreneurship. The first literature is the theoretical and empirical work on understanding overconfidence and motivated beliefs, such as [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#), [Compte and Postlewaite \(2004\)](#), [Malmendier and Tate \(2005\)](#), [Ben-David et al. \(2012\)](#), [Malmendier and Tate \(2015\)](#), [Heidhues et al. \(2018\)](#), [Boutros et al. \(2020\)](#), [Benabou and Tirole \(2016\)](#), [Caplin and Leahy \(2019\)](#), [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#), [Gagnon-Bartsch et al. \(2021\)](#), [Hestermann and Yaouanq \(2021\)](#), [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#). Our work is consistent with recent theoretical work on the role of causal misattribution in sustaining overconfidence, due to misspecified mental models ([Heidhues et al., 2018](#); [Gagnon-Bartsch et al., 2021](#)) or inability to separately identify internal and external causes of under-performance [Hestermann and Yaouanq \(2021\)](#). The empirical studies most closely related to ours are [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#), which is a laboratory experiment and [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#), which is an observational field study. Both of these studies focus on overplacement as opposed to overestimation and overprecision and neither of these studies conducts a field experiment or analyzes entrepreneurs.

Our work is also related to the literature on Management Practices ([Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007](#)), Strategy Practices ([Yang et al., 2020](#)) and Data-Driven Decision-Making ([McElheran et al., 2022](#)) and their role in expectation formation in firms, such as [Altig et al. \(2020\)](#), [Coibion et al. \(2020\)](#), [Bloom et al. \(2021\)](#), [Barrero \(2022\)](#) and [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#). The study closest to ours is [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#), which focuses on “noise”, defined as squared forecast error, instead of overestimation and overprecision. Furthermore, the treatments in [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#) are focused on providing incentives for accurate forecasts and providing training on forecast heuristics, rather than understanding the psychological mechanisms, that sustain overconfidence.

Our scientific learning treatment is close in spirit to recent work in entrepreneurship on scientific learning and experimentation, see [Felin and Zenger \(2009\)](#), [Ries \(2011\)](#), [Kerr et al. \(2014\)](#), [Camuffo et al. \(2019\)](#), [Konings et al. \(2022\)](#), [Coali et al. \(2022\)](#). The study closest



to ours is the paper by [Coali et al. \(2022\)](#), who randomize a multiple week entrepreneurship training program on scientific learning for early stage startups. This focus on early-stage startups naturally prevents studies such as [Camuffo et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Coali et al. \(2022\)](#) to analyze the persistence of entrepreneurial overconfidence. Beyond differences in the sample of firms (early startups vs relatively mature entrepreneurial firms) and treatment types (training sessions vs repeated structured nudges), [Coali et al. \(2022\)](#) mainly provide indirect evidence on a de-biasing effect from scientific learning. They identify a de-biasing effect by imposing a Heckman sample selection model and assume that any de-biasing effect is time-varying while learning effects of scientific learning are constant. In contrast, we directly measure overestimation and overprecision as well as the potential sustaining mechanisms of hindsight bias and misattribution.

## 2 Firm Setting and Recruiting

Our study was conducted from December 2020 to March 2022, with the core data collection and treatments being active from March 2021 to March 2022. Due to previous work we conducted for the Utah State governor and the Utah State Legislature, we had the cooperation of both government bodies as well as the State Chamber of Commerce. The cooperation and endorsement by these organizations was key to attract a deep and large pool of potential survey participants.

Our study context is attractive to study entrepreneurship for several reasons. Utah is among the most economically diverse states within the US, see [Benway \(2020\)](#). This enabled us to collect a sample of entrepreneurs from a variety of industries, instead of only sampling technology or e-commerce companies as in [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#). Indeed the median firm in our sample reports no sales from e-commerce. Furthermore, the use of data on entrepreneurs from Utah is especially useful to study entrepreneurial overconfidence. Utah residents are consistently found to be very optimistic about the future in public polling<sup>2</sup>. If anything, a

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<sup>2</sup>See for example Gallup polling: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/189140/utah-residents-positive-state->

high level of optimism might be helpful for our study, because it suggests that any treatments that can successfully de-bias entrepreneurs in Utah might be even more effective in less optimistic states.

On the other hand, the time window of our experiment coincided with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which was a time of elevated economic uncertainty, see [Meyer et al. \(2022\)](#). To some degree, this could be considered an attractive feature of our study, as entrepreneurship studies since [Knight \(1921\)](#) have argued that dealing with uncertainty and risk is a key function of entrepreneurship. At the same time, business uncertainty was on the decline since summer 2020 and stayed at a relatively stable level during our study, see [Figure 1](#), which is from [Meyer et al. \(2022\)](#). Importantly, [Meyer et al. \(2022\)](#) report that 3 out of 5 measures of uncertainty had returned to their pre-pandemic levels by early 2021, which is when our study began. This is likely to be the consequence of the widespread availability of COVID-19 vaccines, which started to be rolled out in early 2021. Nevertheless, in our analysis, we take a cautious approach and include a full set of time fixed effects in any regression specification to control for the overall effects of changes in uncertainty due to the going COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, in our robustness checks we show that our main results are robust to controlling for a full set of industry-by-time fixed effects, in case there might be differential recovery trends across industries.

## 2.1 Recruiting, Pilot Survey and Sample Characteristics

Recruitment to participate in the survey proceeded in two steps. In the first step, we ran a large pilot survey during which we collected information on business characteristics and asked whether entrepreneurs would be interested in participating in a long-run study. In the second step, we re-contacted interested entrepreneurs for the actual study and provided incentives to reduce sample attrition over time.

The pilot study was conducted in December 2020 in cooperation with the Utah State [economy.aspx](#). It should also be noted that optimism is a related but distinct psychological concept, defined as the degree an individual thinks that "good things will happen".

Chamber of Commerce, which provided us with access to their internal email list of businesses in the state. Our recruiting email was sent to businesses on behalf of the Governor’s Office of Economic Development as well as the Utah State Chamber of Commerce and the University of Utah, see Panel A of Figure A.1. Importantly, our recruitment strategy was based on our field experiment in [Gaulin et al. \(2021\)](#). In this study we showed that moral engagement through recruitment letter framing can significantly boost participation in COVID-19 testing and is complementary with monetary incentives. Consequently, we urged entrepreneurs to participate, to help the state recover from the “ongoing health and economic crisis” and promised that “We will use your input to develop economic initiatives, policies and programs to support our business community and residents.” Only after this moral engagement framing did we offer randomized prizes, such as ten \$1,000 gift cards and non-pecuniary rewards as a “token of our appreciation for your help”. Importantly, this recruitment strategy did not mention anything about the RCT we planned, making selection into the RCT based on perceived benefits impossible.

Additionally, due to the unsolicited nature of our recruitment email, some of the potential respondents contacted a local NBC affiliate, which ran an news segment on the evening of December 1, 2020, confirming that our survey was indeed legitimate, see panel B of Figure A.1. The combination of our moral engagement-based recruitment strategy and the evening newscast build a lot of credibility for our data collection, which we believe reduced sample selection bias, since only few entrepreneurs selected into the study based solely on monetary incentives. This is in contrast to studies using convenience samples, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. All these factors make it likely that our RCT results will generalize beyond the specific RCT sample we collected. We confirm the external validity of our treatment effects formally in section 6.1

Among the key variables we obtained in the pilot survey were questions about entrepreneurs’ business goals and whether respondents are interested in participating in follow-up research. Since the initial email list of the Utah Chamber of Commerce includes only

business owners, we directed our survey towards entrepreneurs. Around 10,000 entrepreneurs completed our pilot survey, and we used a research assistant to ensure that almost all of these are verified businesses with a website or a physical address. After the pilot survey, about 4,000 entrepreneurs agreed to be re-contacted for follow up "year-long" surveys. In March 2021, we started recontacting 3,000 businesses, to target a final sample of about 1,000 entrepreneurs. During the study we also offered the remaining 1,000 businesses a chance to participate, to replenish our sample and offset the effects of sample attrition.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of firms across 2-digit NAICS industries in our initial sample of 1,067 companies in March 2021. As expected, our sample includes firms from a wide variety of industries, including health care, retail and even manufacturing and information technology.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, Figure 4 displays the firm size distribution of our sample in terms of revenue. Most of the firms in the sample are small to medium size, and are therefore well approximated by a log normal distribution. Table 1 displays key summary statistics for the initial March 2021 sample. The first row shows that the median firm has monthly revenues of about \$15,000, while the average firm has much larger revenues at \$144,000, which suggests the presence of a few very large firms in our sample. The median firm in our sample has 2 employees and is 7 years old, which confirms that most firms in our sample have already learned whether their business is viable, see Kerr and Nanda (2010), Haltiwanger et al. (2013).

An important question raised by studies such as Hamilton (2000) and Hurst and Pusley (2011), is whether entrepreneurs have non-pecuniary motives for running a business, in which case, they might not be motivated to forecast their revenues well. Rows 4-6 of Table 1 display long-term business goals, as stated by the entrepreneurs. In response to the question "What are your businesses' long term goals?", we offered three possible responses: (1) "Profit maximization and growth", (2) "Enough profit to sustain livelihood, (..) but no growth

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<sup>3</sup>There exists a regional technology cluster in Utah, called "Silicone Slopes". Obviously, there is much better data to study technology and internet entrepreneurship, such as Bloom et al. (2022). On the other hand, the variety of industry backgrounds is a strength of our sample.

plans” and (3) “Personal or social goals other than profit or growth”. The results in Table 1 show that only 12% of firms in our sample have explicitly non-pecuniary motives for running a business. In contrast, 61% elect “Profit maximization and growth” as their main goal. Therefore most of our sample can be characterized as “opportunity-driven entrepreneurs” (Kerr et al., 2018). We also note that although 27% of entrepreneurs describe their long-term goals as “Enough profit to sustain livelihood”, these firms still have an incentive to make somewhat accurate sales forecasts, to ensure that the sustainability of their firm is not in danger.

## 2.2 Survey Incentives to minimize Sample Attrition

To reduce the impact of sample attrition and preserve the panel dimension of our data as much as possible, we provided respondents incentives for continued participation. Specifically, the beginning of their survey screen included the following text:

**“What are the possible benefits from being in the project?”**

You will help Utah to recover from the pandemic and get Utahns get back to work. Additionally, as an expression of our gratitude for your time, you will receive a \$20 gift card if you complete the survey. This study is also a year-long survey of Utah businesses. For every 6 surveys you participate in, you will receive an additional \$50 gift card.“

Additionally, from October 2021 until March 2022 we offered a \$5 bonus if participants forecasted their 4-week revenue growth within 5% of actual revenue growth during that time period, which effectively increased participation incentives.

## 3 Measurement and Documenting Biases

### 3.1 Measurement of main outcomes

Our main outcomes are forecast errors for monthly revenue growth. This requires us to measure growth forecasts and realized revenues each month.

#### 3.1.1 Revenue Growth

We ask businesses to report their revenues over the last 4 weeks and use this data to construct realized monthly sales growth. This is necessary in our setup, as administrative data collected by the government is not accessible to us and would mostly not provide sales information on the monthly frequency. Bloom et al. (2022) overcome this issue by teaming up with an online payment processing firm, but this restricts their sample to firms with significant e-commerce presence, while the median e-commerce share of sales for our sample is zero.

Anecdotal evidence from our sample firms suggests that the businesses used their own accounting books to provide us with these revenue numbers. For example, one entrepreneur wrote: "I set aside 30 minutes or so and pull out my financial data and start to work." This suggests that looking up data from accounting records was easier for most entrepreneurs than misreporting such data and that survey participants had less incentive to misreport earnings on our survey than e.g. on tax forms, as discussed by Hurst et al. (2014). Additionally, although respondents did sometimes not exactly respond in 4 week intervals to our invitations to fill out the survey, the median time between responses to two subsequent surveys is 31 days in our sample. In Appendix A, we show that all of our core results are robust to normalizing sales growth rates to a 28 day period.

Our use of entrepreneurial revenue growth has also two additional advantages. On the one hand, using revenue growth makes measurement robust to permanent misreporting at the individual level. For example, suppose entrepreneurs under-report revenues  $X_{i,t}$  by a constant fraction  $u_i > 0$  as in Hurst et al. (2014), so reported revenues are  $\tilde{X}_{i,t} = (1 - u_i) \cdot X_{i,t}$ .

This under-reporting will be automatically "differenced out" by considering revenue growth.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, another potential issue might be that entrepreneurs over-report their revenue growth as a result of "social desirability bias" in our survey and the related wish to seem more successful than they are. However, such misreporting would distort reported revenue growth upwards and thereby bias results against us finding positive forecast errors and overestimation.

### 3.1.2 Forecasts

Figure 5 displays the survey screen we use to elicit monthly growth forecasts. We ask respondents to forecast revenues over the next "four weeks" and to provide upper and lower confidence bounds for this forecast. Importantly, we verify that respondents' best forecast about revenues correspond to their business' growth goals and ask firms to report business goals in case the two differ. Our baseline analysis will use business goals as measure of growth forecasts, since businesses naturally have an incentive to generate accurate business growth goals.<sup>5</sup>

A natural question our data collection raises is whether entrepreneurial forecasts are mostly noise or whether they reflect meaningful effort to forecast future growth. The main challenge in addressing this question is that forecasted variable (revenue growth) is well known to be very noisy itself (Sutton (1997)). One influential approach to evaluate the noisiness of forecasts follows Shiller (1981) and compares the total variation in the forecasted variable and the forecasts. To fix ideas, let  $g_{i,t+1}$  denote the monthly growth rate from  $t$  to  $t + 1$  for entrepreneur  $i$  and  $g_{i,t+1}^f = E_{i,t}[g_{i,t+1}]$  the forecasted growth rate at time  $t$ . Since  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  are (subjective) conditional expectations, they should be smoother than the variable they are forecasting, or:

$$Var[g_{i,t+1}] > Var[g_{i,t+1}^f] \tag{1}$$

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<sup>4</sup>To see that, note that  $g_{i,t+1} = \frac{\bar{X}_{i,t+1} - \bar{X}_{i,t}}{\bar{X}_{i,t}} = \frac{(1-u_i) \cdot [X_{i,t+1} - X_{i,t}]}{(1-u_i) \cdot X_{i,t}} = \frac{[X_{i,t+1} - X_{i,t}]}{X_{i,t}}$

<sup>5</sup>Section 6 analyzes robustness of our main results to this choice.

To evaluate this inequality in our data, we focus on the control group before October 2021, i.e. before the introduction of incentives for accurate forecasts. We do this to make sure that entrepreneurial expectations are unaffected by any of our interventions and provide an undiluted picture on the validity of entrepreneurial expectations. Figure 6 displays the distribution of revenue growth and forecasted revenue growth over the same time horizon. It highlights that actual revenue growth tends to be much more dispersed than entrepreneurial expectations of revenue growth. In other words, equation (1) holds for entrepreneurial expectations, which is in stark contrast to stock market expectations as shown by Shiller (1981). At the same time Figure 6 already foreshadows the importance of overconfidence in our sample, as only very few growth forecasts are negative, while many growth outcomes are.

An alternative and more formalized way to evaluate the validity of entrepreneurial expectations is to use the following OLS regression:

$$g_{i,t+1} = a + b \cdot g_{i,t+1}^f + D_i + D_t + e_{i,t+1} \quad (2)$$

where  $e_{i,t+1}$  is a mean zero, iid error term,  $a$  is a constant,  $D_t$  are time fixed effects and  $D_i$  is a firm fixed effect. Regression (2) nests at least three relevant benchmarks for expectations formation. First, under  $b = 0$  growth forecasts  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  could be complete noise or suffer from large amounts of classical measurement error. Alternatively, revenue growth could more generally be unforecastable, i.e. a random walk - possibly with a firm-specific drift  $D_i$ . Second, on the other extreme, entrepreneurial expectations could be completely rational and unbiased with  $b = 1$ . In this case, entrepreneurs would make no systematic forecasting mistakes, even if their forecasts might be very noisy. Third, somewhat between rational expectations and useless forecasts are adaptive expectations, as proposed for example by Muth (1960). In the simplest case of adaptive expectations,  $b = 1$  and  $g_{i,t+1}^f = g_{i,t}$ , i.e. entrepreneurial forecasts do not include more information than is included in past sales growth. In contrast to these three benchmarks, overconfident entrepreneurial expectations



are implied if  $b < 1$ .<sup>6</sup>

The first row in Table 2 shows that entrepreneurial forecasts are systematically correlated with actual revenue growth. This suggests that revenue growth is no random walk and that entrepreneurial growth forecasts are not on average arbitrary guesses. Furthermore, when we include a full set of firm fixed effects, the coefficient estimate for  $b$  rises substantially towards the rational expectations benchmark of  $b = 1$  and one cannot reject the hypothesis that expectations are indeed rational. This result in Table 2 is consistent with the view that overconfidence is very persistent and that the use of firm fixed effects removed such persistent overconfidence. Put differently, entrepreneurial expectations are close to rational, but-for persistent overconfidence.

The last column adds lagged revenue growth as predictor alongside entrepreneurial expectations. This shows that entrepreneurial expectations contain information that goes beyond what is contained in data on lagged sales growth. On the flip side, this column also shows that entrepreneurial expectations do not fully incorporate lagged growth, as this variable remains statistically significant if it is included alongside expectations. This could be consistent with entrepreneurs failing to take account of mean reversion, but other explanations are possible, too.

These results motivate our focus on understanding biases in forecasts instead of the variance of forecasts, as measured by "noise", which is defined as the absolute value of forecast errors. As we conduct our analysis, we will report results on the impact of our treatments on noise, but leave a detailed analysis of this aspect for other research, including Bloom et al. (2022).

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<sup>6</sup>To see this, we can solve (2) for the forecast error  $g_{i,t+1} - g_{i,t+1}^f$  and take expectations to obtain:  $E[g_{i,t+1} - g_{i,t+1}^f] \propto (\frac{1}{b} - 1) \cdot E[g_{i,t+1}]$  which is positive if  $E[g_{i,t+1}] > 0$ .

## 3.2 Documenting Biases

We follow [Moore and Healy \(2008\)](#) and [Astebro et al. \(2014\)](#) and distinguish between three types of overconfidence. Overestimation is overconfidence about the growth rate of the entrepreneur’s own business. This is the main measure of overconfidence we use and we measure it using forecast errors. In contrast, overprecision refers to overconfidence about the accuracy of own forecasts, see also [Moore et al. \(2015\)](#). A third type of overconfidence is overplacement and it refers to overconfidence about the own rank relative to peers. We do not analyze this type of overconfidence, as it has received much attention in the current literature, see [Camerer and Lovallo \(1999\)](#), [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#), [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#). Much of the empirical literature on overplacement has to address the issue that conventional measures of overplacement face an identification challenge of separating true overconfidence from Bayesian updating as pointed out by [Benoit and Dubra \(2011\)](#). We show in [Appendix A.1](#), that this issue does not apply to measures of forecast errors, which we use to measure overestimation. We also note that [Benoit and Dubra \(2011\)](#) explicitly acknowledge that their critique does not encompass measures of overprecision, as they state that ”Our analysis (...) is not directly applicable to overconfidence in the precision of estimates.”

We begin our documentation of biases in [Figure 7](#), which shows the distribution of forecast errors in solid blue. There are two benchmarks in this figure. The first benchmark is the vertical red dashed line for zero forecast error. Measured by this benchmark, entrepreneurs are systematically overconfident. The median forecast error for the entrepreneurs in the control group is 5% (before October 2021). This is a very large forecast error, which implies an annual overestimation of sales growth by almost 80%. Furthermore, this forecast error is persistent in the sense that more experienced entrepreneurs are not de-biased. Entrepreneurs with firms that are at least 7 years old still exhibit a median monthly forecast error of 4%. This is substantial, given that over 80% of newly founded firms fail within their first 7 years ([Fairlie and Miranda, 2017](#)) and these experienced firms are therefore among the top 20%

of startups. In Appendix A.2 we show that these overestimation patterns are robust, even if we account for the presence of persistent private information, based on a structural model of Bayesian updating with private information.

The second benchmark is the grey dashed line, which displays the distribution of forecast errors if entrepreneurs used simple adaptive expectations. Under adaptive expectations, entrepreneurs simply extrapolate their current revenue growth rate to the growth rate next month. As can be seen in Figure 7, the distribution of forecast errors under simple adaptive expectations is symmetric around zero. This is in contrast to the distribution of entrepreneurial forecast errors, which is skewed positively. In other words, overestimation is not just a simple mean shift, but the result of disproportionately many overconfident forecasts.

Moving from overestimation to overprecision, we begin by denoting by  $P_{x,i}$  the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth across all months for entrepreneur  $i$  and by  $P_{x,i,t}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Under normal distribution of growth rates, the following approximation holds:  $\sigma_{g,i} \approx \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65}$ , where  $\sigma_{g,i}$  is the monthly volatility of growth rates. Similarly,  $\sigma_{g,i,t}^f \approx \frac{P_{90,i,t}^f - P_{10,i,t}^f}{2.65}$ . These approximations are not important for any of our results, but they facilitate the interpretation of results. The degree of overprecision (or precision error) can therefore be defined as

$$\omega_{i,t} = \sigma_{g,i} - \sigma_{g,i,t}^f \tag{3}$$

$$= \left( \frac{1}{2.65} \right) \cdot \left[ P_{90,i} - P_{10,i} - \left( P_{90,i,t}^f - P_{10,i,t}^f \right) \right] \tag{4}$$

The distribution of entrepreneurial overprecision is displayed in Figure 8, again focusing on the control group and the time period before the introduction of incentives for accurate forecasting. Figure 8 shows that the vast majority of entrepreneurs in our sample exhibits overprecision, that is, the stated confidence intervals of their monthly growth forecasts are much narrower than the dispersion of the growth outcomes over time. The extent of over-

confidence in stated forecast accuracy is also very big, as the median precision error is 21 percentage points. This is a bit smaller than the 27.7 percentage point overprecision error reported by [Ben-David et al. \(2012\)](#) for CFOs of public corporations, but is still quite comparable. This also suggests that the entrepreneurs in our sample are not unusually overprecise. Our findings on precision error are also consistent with separate literatures in psychology and economics, that document the robustness of overprecision. Indeed, [Moore et al. \(2015\)](#) describe overprecision as the most robust form of overconfidence and quite distinct from overestimation and overplacement. Furthermore, various field studies in economics and finance document the presence of overprecision for large firms ([Altig et al. \(2020\)](#), [Barrero \(2022\)](#)) and CFOs of large public companies ([Ben-David et al. \(2012\)](#), [Boutros et al. \(2020\)](#)).

We are also interested, in whether entrepreneurs who exhibit especially large forecast errors also tend to be excessively certain about their forecasts. Panel A of Table 3 analyzes the correlation of forecast error and overprecision. The dependent variables are either forecast errors for overestimating or underestimating entrepreneurs, or noise, defined as the absolute value of forecast errors. We find, that both, large positive and large negative forecast errors are correlated with overprecision. In other words, while entrepreneurs who provide the worst forecasts tend to think that their forecasts are very precise. This pattern is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect, according to which subjects with the lowest competence are the most confident about their own competence ([Kruger and Dunning, 1999](#)),

### **3.3 Mechanisms potentially sustaining overconfidence**

We focus on two mechanisms that could potentially sustain overconfidence, even in the presence of frequent market feedback. The first of these mechanism is biased memory, which has been theoretically related to overconfidence by [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#). Additionally, previous empirical work by [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#) and [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#) has documented the connection of overconfidence and biased memory, albeit in the context of overplacement and not for overestimation or overprecision. The specific form of biased

memory we have in mind is hindsight bias: a bias of recalled forecast errors towards zero. Hindsight bias is able to psychologically sustain overconfidence, since subjects can justify that they do not need from their past forecast mistakes, if they did not make any mistakes.

To document the presence of biased memory in the control group, we ask participants with provide us with an estimate of their forecast error for the past month.<sup>7</sup> We then contrast this recalled forecast error with the actual forecast error for the control group, we previously showed in Figure 7. The results are shown in Figure 9, where we keep the color of the realized forecast error in blue and add the distribution of recalled forecast error in black. As can be seen from Figure 9, control entrepreneurs’ recalled forecast errors are much more concentrated around zero. Indeed, the median recalled forecast error is zero. At the same time, the modal forecast error is slightly larger than zero, suggesting that many entrepreneurs recognize that they might be overconfident, but think that the degree of their overconfidence is very small.

A more formal approach to show the link between biased memory and overconfidence is provided in Panel B of Table 3. In this table, we measure biased memory as the absolute value of the recalled forecast error for the last month for the control group. Higher values of this absolute recalled error correspond to lower levels of hindsight bias. The main finding of Panel B in Table 3 is that lower absolute values of recalled forecast error are systematically correlated with more overestimation. In other words, more hindsight bias and more overestimation are linked at the individual level the same way that biased memory and overplacement are linked in Zimmermann (2020) and Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2022).

A second mechanism that might sustain overconfidence is causal misattribution (henceforth “misattribution”). For our purposes we define this mechanism as blaming external factors for own overconfidence or underperformance of forecasts. The basis for the measurement of misattribution is a follow-up question to information about past forecast errors. In

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<sup>7</sup>We also experimented with giving control group members their realized growth and ask them to recall their forecasted growth. This is a measurement approach, that has been used in psychology to show that subjects are often unable to correctly recall ex ante expectations, once ex post results are known, see Kahneman (2011), Chapter 9.

the control group, we ask entrepreneurs to recall their forecast errors in the past month. As we discuss in more detail below, for the treatment groups, we report the past forecast errors directly. For all participants, we ask respondents to provide a justification for these forecast errors. In particular, for the control group, the survey screen displays the following question:

“You indicated that you missed your expected revenue growth during the past four weeks by “X” percent. What is the most likely reason for this miss?”

We provided two checkboxes with a text entry: (1) “Reasons internal to the company (please specify)” and (2) “Reasons external to the company (please specify)”. Our measure of misattribution begins with focusing on firms that blame external factors for underperformance (or overestimation). Since it is possible that indeed external factors led to a surprising underperformance, we then calculate the median forecast error in the same industry (2-digit NAICS) for the same time. If the median firm outperformed their forecast while the focal firm underperformed by blamed external forces, we classify this as misattribution. It should be noted that this is a very conservative measure of misattribution and we will only be able to capture some very extreme cases of misattribution. This is made clear by the fact that only about 3% of observations in the control group exhibit this misattribution. Nevertheless, it turns out that this measure is very informative about the psychological mechanism that help sustain overconfidence.

## 4 Experimental Design

Before discussing the details of our treatments, it is worth noting the general design idea. Our treatments are different than either training treatments, by studies such as [Camuffo et al. \(2019\)](#) or [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#) or one-time nudges. Instead, the best way to describe our treatments is “light touch, but persistent.” Our treatments are nudges and therefore light touch, as we cannot force experimental subjects to engage with the treatments we provide. At the same time, they are persistent, as we only randomize the treatment assignment once,

in March 2021 and keep entrepreneurs in their respective treatment or control group. As a result, they are nudged repeatedly (once every month) for 13 months to engage with our treatments.

## 4.1 Error Reminder Treatment

To counter the effects of biased memory, our first treatment reminds subjects of their past forecast error. Specifically, instead of being asked to recall the forecast error of the last month, we display the following text:

In the last survey, you predicted that your revenue growth would  $g_P\%$  over the coming four weeks. Based on your reported revenue for these four weeks  $\$X_1$  and the revenue you reported in last month's survey (which is  $\$X_0$ ), your revenue growth for these four weeks was  $g_A = \frac{\$X_1 - \$X_0}{\$X_0}$ . This implies a forecast error of  $g_P - g_A\%$ . What is the most likely reason for your deviation from your goal?

with two checkboxes with a text entry: (1) "Reasons internal to the company (please specify)" and (2) "Reasons external to the company (please specify)". This treatment has the goal to directly replace biased memory with correct information about the last forecast error. The section containing questions about the forecast for the upcoming month immediately follows the treatments, to ensure that subjects have the past forecast error in mind when they make their further predictions.

## 4.2 Scientific Learning Treatment

The scientific learning treatment includes the simple error reminder treatment, but adds additional layers to address the potential misattribution of causality. For misattribution to matter, entrepreneurs must have an imperfect understanding of whether internal or external factors drive under-performance relative to expectations. There are at least three related

psychological issues. First, the psychology literature on motivated reasoning has long argued that people are often driven by “outcome-driven reasoning”, in which “motive is to arrive at a particular, directional conclusion” (Kunda (1990)), such as “I am not to blame for overconfidence/under-performance”. Second, even if outcome-driven reasoning is not an issue, overconfidence can persist, because entrepreneurs do not pay attention to the possibility that internal variables might explain under-performance. This corresponds to the issue of learning under misspecified mental models, as modeled by recent theoretical work in behavioral economics on “misguided learning”, see Heidhues et al. (2018), Goette and Mozakiewicz (2020), Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021). Third, even if entrepreneurs have the correct mental model of the world (i.e. know the correct set of internal and external variables influencing performance), they are confronted with an identification problem between internal and external causes of under-performance, see Hestermann and Yaouanq (2021).

As a result of these three considerations, the overall idea for our scientific learning treatment is to motivate entrepreneurs to aspire to accuracy, induce them to learn about model misspecification and encourage them to test their theories to address identification issues.

Our treatment builds on recent work applying scientific learning to different contexts, such as CEO decision-making (Lafley et al. (2012), Felin and Zenger (2017), Yang et al. (2020)), teaching students to think scientifically (Ashraf et al. (2022)) and entrepreneurial experimentation (Felin and Zenger (2009), Ries (2011), Camuffo et al. (2019), Felin et al. (2020) and Konings et al. (2022)). On a high level, this treatment consists of three parts:

1. Structured problem-framing and hypothesis development ( “theory” for short), to address motivation for reasoning and model misspecification.
2. Pre-postmortem
3. Hypothesis testing, based on theory, to address model misspecification and identification.

We detail each of these three main parts in the following. Starting with hypothesis



development (or theory), we follow [Felin et al. \(2020\)](#) and provide the following questions, which guide entrepreneurs along a structured script to formulate the theory of their firm<sup>8</sup>. (The bold headers are not displayed for survey respondents, but serve as guideposts for readers only.)

1. **Differentiation:** Do you have a unique idea or belief that differs from “conventional wisdom” in your industry? If you hold such a contrarian belief, what is it and how could it help with your growth goal?
2. **Problem-definition:** What are the most important problems that prevent your unique idea from being realized? Put differently, what are the reasons your belief is contrarian instead of being widely accepted in your industry?
3. **Problem-solving:** Please list two possible plans that might solve the problems that prevent your unique idea from being realized and which can help with your growth goals.
4. **Key conditions:** What would have to be true for each of the two plans you listed in the last question, to achieve your growth goal for the next month?
5. **Pre-definition of tests:** For each of the conditions you specified in the previous question, how would you test whether this condition is true?

This first part of our scientific learning treatment is designed to motivate entrepreneurs to pursue what [Kunda \(1990\)](#) calls “accuracy-driven reasoning”, in which the “motive is to arrive at an accurate conclusion, whatever it may be”. This is achieved by setting up problem-solving in the context of seeking “competitive advantage”, defined by us as “a strength your company has, which distinguishes you from your competitors and which is hard to copy”. Such a competitive advantage is a key element for elevator pitches of startups seeking VC investment, see [Lerner et al. \(2012\)](#). We prime entrepreneurs to think about their

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<sup>8</sup>We would like to thank Todd Zenger, who gave us very useful feedback on this script.

competitive advantage by considering contrarian beliefs, as such beliefs are often helpful for firms seeking competitive advantage (Felin and Zenger, 2009; Lafley et al., 2012). Based on such contrarian beliefs, we encourage entrepreneurs to find and address the main problem to realizing this competitive advantage, instead of simply confirming that the firm does have a competitive advantage. This encourages entrepreneurs to "track and discern more features of the data" (Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021)), which can be helpful to triangulate model misspecification. However, it should be noted that a framing encouraging entrepreneurs to seek out contrarian beliefs will encourage entrepreneurs to place more emphasis on their priors, which might reinforce overconfident priors (Bernardo and Welch (2004)).<sup>9</sup>

The treatment elements following the initial framing, are designed to help entrepreneurs to address model misspecification and are consistent with work on channeled attention and misguided learning by Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021). The "Problem-solving" question makes entrepreneurs brainstorm to facilitate discovery of targeted, novel theories, consistent with the "light bulb theories" in Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021). The explication of "Key Conditions" highlight potential uncertainty in the entrepreneur's theory, building on the insight that "to reveal a costly mistake, the agent must want to pay attention for her own purposes; that is, she must face some uncertainty within her theory that she wants to reduce." (Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021)). In this context, the theory part of scientific learning is likely to decrease overprecision, due to this increased attention to uncertainty. Additionally, the "pre-definition of tests" sets up entrepreneurs to be surprised by test outcomes, building on the theoretical insight that "a person is alerted to her mistakes not by the statistical unlikelihood of all the data in front of her, but rather by how surprising she finds the data she notices." (Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021)). Appendix A.4 provides more details on the questions we ask as well as the specific sandwich shop example we use to illustrate possible answers. For each of these questions, we ask respondents to provide written responses and use the length of these written responses to measure engagement with the treatment.

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<sup>9</sup>Indeed in their model, overconfidence is defined as a higher reliance of entrepreneurs on private signals as opposed to publicly observable actions of other entrepreneurs.

The second part of the scientific learning treatment is the practice of “Pre-Postmortem”, advocated by Klein (2007) and Kahneman and Klein (2009). This practice is used to inspire respondents to anticipate potential problems, which in turn is intended to reduce overconfidence. Specifically, we ask:

Suppose you miss your growth goal for the next month. What is the most likely reason for this miss?

Respondents can use two checkboxes with a text entry: (1) “Reasons internal to the company (please specify)” and (2) “Reasons external to the company (please specify)”. When measuring engagement with this pre-postmortem, we focus on pre-definition of internal reasons for failure, since this most likely offsets the misattribution bias we discussed in section 3.3.

The third part of the scientific learning treatment happens in the next survey round, in which we follow up with the theory part that entrepreneurs filled out previously. Specifically, at the beginning of the survey, we ask entrepreneurs in the scientific learning treatment:

Last month we asked you to come up with two alternative plans that might help you meet your growth target. We also asked you to specify “what would have to be true”, for these two plans to succeed and to come up with ways to test whether these conditions are true for your business. Did you have an opportunity to conduct a test of the “what would have to be true” conditions?

With the possible responses “No” and “Yes (please specify).” As before, we use the responses on this textbox to measure engagement with hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis testing complements theory development and addresses the issues of potential model misspecification and identification. Specifically, testing channels attention to data that is potentially contradicting the idea that external factors are to blame for underperformance. Furthermore, if testing makes clear that the current mental model of entrepreneurs is incomplete, this insight makes it harder for entrepreneurs to blame external

factors for under-performance. Additionally, hypothesis testing allows entrepreneurs to consider different contexts and mechanisms that vary the importance of external factors, thereby helping to disentangle external influences from own entrepreneurial ability, consistent with [Hestermann and Yaouanq \(2021\)](#).

A specific case example is helpful in illustrating potential engagement with the scientific learning treatment. To preserve the privacy of the company, we will call it “Bennett Woodworks” with the fictitious founder name “Olivia”. Olivia describes her business as “high-end furniture” manufacturing and the unique idea of her business as utilizing “exotic woods to create wood art. This is an area of woodworking that isn’t done by many woodworkers.” But she also recognizes that “The biggest problem is that the majority of customers in this market generally don’t spend a lot of money for collectible products so I limit myself in this regard.” Olivia then develops multiple hypotheses for the cause of this insufficient demand:

- H1: Demand might be too low, not because there are not enough potential customers with a sufficiently high willingness to pay, but because these customers do not know about Olivia’s offerings.
- H2: Demand might be too low because prices on her existing products are too high.
- H3: Demand might be too low because Olivia’s existing products target an unprofitable market segment.

Olivia develops three alternative approaches to test these different hypotheses:

- S1: “One plan is to use targeted advertising in order to reach a wider audience.”
- S2: “Another plan could be to create a cheaper alternative to the fine woodworking products I offer.”
- S3: “alternatively, still create high quality products but redesign them to be cheaper to manufacture and then offer them at a lower price point.”

Each of these three plans addresses a different problem and corresponds to a different mental model for why demand is too low. For example, the use of targeted advertising mostly helps if H1 is the main problem and not excessively high prices as in H2. On the other hand, the success of cutting costs and prices of existing products depends on the price elasticity of the demand curve for Olivia’s existing products. Similarly, the success of new products to address H3, depends on demand for smaller but still high-quality furniture but tells her less about the demand for her existing products.

Olivia’s case example therefore illustrates how our scientific learning treatment channels attention to different demand determinants and context variables (Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021)). Additionally, the use of different contexts allows Olivia to identify the impact of different external contextual variables, consistent with Hestermann and Yaouanq (2021).

The plans and associated outcomes are displayed in Figure 10. To test the hypothesis H1, Olivia decides to run ads for her merchandise on Facebook (called “targeted advertising” in Figure 10). This test did not generate much demand, which left Olivia unsure whether H1 is really correct.

To test hypothesis H2, Olivia decides to randomly cut prices on a few of her existing products via discounts. As a result, Olivia reports a 3-fold increased revenue for these products. However, as her quote in Figure 10 makes clear, she recognizes a potentially important identification problem: Olivia does not know whether her initial prices were too high or whether customers just responded to the availability of temporary discounts. However, this consideration makes clear that Olivia is focusing attention on what the testing tells her about her underlying theory, as advocated by Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021). Furthermore, this example illustrates that Olivia does not simply mindlessly repeat successful actions, but that our treatment is successful in inspiring her to understand the causal mechanisms at play. This addresses a key friction emphasized by Gagnon-Bartsch et al. (2021): “A person fails to discover a costly mistake only when he wrongly deems valuable data entirely useless and ignores it.”

To test H3, Olivia creates new, cheaper products to offer to target the market segment of smaller-but-high-quality furniture. Her new products are met with consistently high sales, as can be seen in the last branch of Figure 10. This test confirms Olivia’s hypothesis that demand for smaller-but-high-quality furniture pieces is high, which is why Olivia ends up adding the cheaper products to her product offerings permanently.

To summarize, scientific learning helps address potential causal misattribution for Olivia in two ways. On the one hand, the theory development directs Olivia’s attention towards different solutions for different causes of low demand, thereby encouraging her to think about various internal and external variables, which she might have otherwise ignored (Gagnon-Bartsch et al., 2021). The solutions in turn are based on Olivia’s own cognitive problem-solving capabilities, which makes it harder to blame external factors if these solutions fail. On the other hand, testing Olivia’s solution ideas provides evidence on internal and external causes of sales performance (Hestermann and Yaouanq, 2021). Olivia’s tests fail to find evidence for the hypothesis that insufficient customer exposure is to blame for low demand, while they confirm her conjecture that prices might potentially be too high and that the wrong market segment was targeted. The latter two factors represent internal causes for low sales growth as opposed to external reasons.

To conclude this section on the treatment design, we show balance tests in Table 4. It should be noted that March 2021 was the first month of treatments, but the fact that balance tests are still confirming insignificant differences across treatment and control groups validates our randomization.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Error Reminder Treatment

The baseline results of the error reminder treatment are displayed in Table 5. There we document that the error reminder treatment is basically ineffective in addressing either over-

estimation or overprecision, although the latter results are significant at a 10% level. This ineffectiveness of the error reminder treatment is consistent with findings by [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#), who provide incentives to review past sales to a sample of internet entrepreneurs and find that these treatments are ineffective in reducing sales forecast errors. These results also seem surprising, not only given theoretical attention on the link between biased memory and overconfidence e.g. in [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#), but also empirical evidence from lab experiments as in [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#) and field settings such as [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#). However, it is worth emphasizing that both [Zimmermann \(2020\)](#) and [Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets \(2022\)](#) mainly focus on overplacement, while we study overestimation and overprecision.

To further investigate why the error reminder treatment is ineffective, we analyze the association between misattribution and overestimation in [Table 6](#). As can be seen, misattribution is basically uncorrelated with overestimation in the control group, which suffers from bias memory. However, in both treatment groups in which we removed biased memory, misattribution is highly correlated with overestimation. This is consistent with the replacement of hindsight bias to sustain overconfidence with misattribution. Importantly the correlation of misattribution and overestimation is not mechanical, as the two variables are insignificantly correlated with the opposite sign in the control group. Furthermore, the results in [Table 6](#) suggest the error reminder treatment has an effect on entrepreneurs, even if this treatment did not de-bias them. Removing hindsight bias forced entrepreneurs to find another way to rationalize the validity of overconfident forecasts in the face of evidence for under-performance. Such behavior is consistent with a model of “motivated reasoning,” in which decision-makers exert mental effort to sustain overconfidence even in the face of reminders of past errors ([Caplin and Leahy, 2019](#)). Importantly, highly deliberate people might be better at such self-delusion instead of being less likely to be biased ([Kahan, 2013](#)). In contrast, the failure of the error reminder treatment to de-bias entrepreneurs is only surprising from the perspective of a simplistic interpretation of “System 1 biases,” which are

related to biased intuition and heuristics, see [Kahneman \(2011\)](#), [Benabou and Tirole \(2016\)](#). Only in a very mechanistic view of such System 1 biases, would nudges to remove biased memory successfully lead to reducing overestimation and overprecision biases.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time, another possible explanation of the failure of the error reminder treatment to reduce overestimation and overprecision, is that these are permanent character traits of entrepreneurs, which cannot at all be impacted by nudge treatments of the kind we use in this study. The next section will provide evidence that is inconsistent with this view.

## 5.2 Scientific Learning: Access

In contrast to the error reminder treatment, the scientific learning treatment requires much more attention and effort to be effective. In this context, participants in the scientific learning treatment group have the choice to not engage at all with the material, which in turn means that there is the possibility of “one sided non-compliance” ([Angrist and Pischke, 2009](#); [Gerber and Green, 2012](#))<sup>11</sup>. We therefore begin our investigation of Scientific Learning treatment effects with an Intent-to-Treat (ITT) analysis. The effects from the ITT can best be understood as reflecting the effect of access to (or the option to engage with) scientific learning. The next section will use Instrumental Variables (IV) to analyze the causal impact of engagement with scientific learning on overconfidence.

Table 7 collects our baseline results of access to scientific learning on overconfidence. Surprisingly, access to scientific learning increases overestimation, as documented in the first column of Table 7. However, as we discussed in section 4.2 this result is only surprising when primarily equating scientific learning with hypothesis testing. Instead, the starting point of our scientific learning treatment encourages entrepreneurs to place more emphasis on “contrarian ideas”, which might reinforced overconfident priors ([Bernardo and Welch,](#)

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<sup>10</sup>This type of model is simplistic in that the deliberative System 2 is rational, as for example in rational inattention models such as [Gabaix \(2014\)](#). In contrast, [Kahneman \(2011\)](#) provides a more sophisticated system 2 model, which is also biased and may distort information processing in a self-serving way.

<sup>11</sup>Non-compliance is one-sided because entrepreneurs in the control group are unable to access the Scientific Learning treatment.



2004).

At the same time, access to scientific learning reduces overprecision, as seen in column 3 of Table 7. While the reduction in overprecision is far from completely debiasing entrepreneurs, it does reduce overprecision by about 15% on average ( $0.1524 = 3.4/22.3$ ). This effect can also be understood from the logic of our scientific learning treatment, which asks entrepreneurs “What would have to be true for each of the two plans you listed in the last question, to achieve your growth goal for the next month?” In other words, entrepreneurs are asked to consider all the key conditions that have to be met for their plans to support revenue growth targets, which increases perceived uncertainty by channeling attention to the many potentially unknown factors about the entrepreneurs’ theory, as discussed in section 4.2.

Although the scientific learning treatment was designed to reduce misattribution, column 4 of Table 7 shows that it was ineffective in systematically reducing measured misattribution. This might be related to the fact that our measure of misattribution is very conservative and therefore captures only a few very strongly misattributing entrepreneurs.

### **5.3 Scientific Learning: Engagement and Impact of Different Practices**

In this section we document evidence on the causal effects of engagement with our scientific learning treatment. Engagement is measured as string length of the free form text responses we collected with each question of the scientific learning treatment. Engagement with scientific learning is endogenous because entrepreneurs who benefit more from engagement will also tend to engage more. To address this endogeneity, we follow common practice and use the randomly assigned scientific learning treatments as an IV. On the one hand, only entrepreneurs in the treatment group will have access to scientific learning, which directly makes the scientific learning treatment a relevant instrument to predict engagement. On the other hand, the scientific learning treatment is randomly assigned, which implies that it will

impact overconfidence and other firm outcomes only through scientific learning engagement and not through other channels. In other words, the IV exclusion restriction will be met. For more details, we refer the interested reader to Angrist et al. (1996), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Gerber and Green (2012). All measures of engagement are normalized to have a standard deviation of one, for ease of exposition.

Panel A of Table 8 shows the causal impact of overall engagement with scientific learning on overconfidence. Overall engagement in turn is measured by the sum of string lengths with all three parts of the Scientific Learning treatment (hypothesis development, pre-postmortem and hypothesis testing). Column 1 shows that a one standard deviation increase of overall engagement with Scientific Learning increases overestimation by 1.3 percentage points per month. In other words, more overall engagement leads to higher levels of overestimation. At the same time, a one standard deviation higher overall engagement with Scientific Learning also reduces overprecision by 1.9 percentage points as seen in column 2 of Table 8. These effects are consistent with the ITT analysis of the last section. To investigate the effect of different part of the scientific learning treatment, we begin by measuring engagement with the theory section first. As can be seen in columns 3 and 4 of panel A in Table 8, the effects of theory engagement are almost identical to the overall scientific learning engagement effects. This is unsurprising, since theory development is by far the largest segment of the treatment with five of seven parts, see 4.2.

To contrast other parts of the scientific learning treatment, we construct relative engagement measures. For example, for hypothesis testing we take the string length of responses to the hypothesis testing question and subtract the string length of theory engagement. The resulting measure then tells us how much more entrepreneurs were engaged with hypothesis testing relative to theory. Similarly, we compute the string length of responses to the internal factors<sup>12</sup> cited for the pre-postmortem and subtract the string length of the hypothesis development section. All relative engagement measures are normalized to have a unit standard

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<sup>12</sup>As previously mentioned, we focus on internal factors in the pre-postmortem, since they should counter the misattribution bias of blaming external forces for overestimation or underperformance.

deviation.

The first two columns of Panel B in Table 8 show that relatively more engagement with hypothesis testing significantly reduces overestimation. A one standard deviation higher relative engagement with hypothesis development implies a reduction in overestimation of 2.25 percentage points per month. Over the entire sample, the control group has a median forecast error of 3.8% per month, so the a one standard deviation increase in relative engagement with hypothesis testing reduces this bias by almost 60% ( $0.59 = 2.25/3.8$ ). However, this de-biasing of overestimation goes hand in hand with an increase in overprecision. As the second column of of Panel B in Table 8 documents, precision error increases by 3.34 percentage points for every standard deviation increase in relative engagement with hypothesis testing compared to theory. This result is consistent with the view that the conduct of empirical tests suggests to respondents that they understand the sources of uncertainty in their business very well. Although this might be true for the specific part of their business for which they conducted a hypothesis test, this better understanding of risk is unlikely to be true for all possible sources of risk in their business, so that in the end, they become more overly confident in their own forecasts.

The last two columns of Panel B in Table 8 show that the IV effects for relative hypothesis testing are not mechanical. There, we estimate IV effects of relative engagement with the pre-postmortem and do not find significant effects. This analysis suggests that the use of pre-postmortem in our Scientific Learning nudges does not differentially impact overconfidence, over and above the effects of hypothesis development.

## 5.4 Learning Dynamics

One of the strengths of our field experiment is the collection of relatively long panel data for the 13 months of our study. This allows us to go beyond average treatment effects to document how forecast and precision errors change over time. As we discussed in the context of Figure 1, one potential concern with such an analysis is that the dynamics of the COVID-

19 pandemic might impact our estimates. As in the test of the analysis, we therefore include a full set of time fixed effects. However, to still estimate effects of how treatments impacted changes in forecast errors, we estimate interactions of treatment indicators with linear time trends.

Figure 11 highlights our main result from this analysis. The figure shows the evolution of forecast errors over time for the scientific learning treatment. Access to scientific learning initially strongly increases forecast error and therefore overestimation, but this effect slowly fades over time. In other words, although our scientific learning treatment increases overestimation over the entire sample, entrepreneurs eventually learn to adjust their forecasts and learn that they have been overconfident.

Table 9 presents the formal regressions results underlying Figure 11 as well as additional results for other outcomes. Column 3 of Panel A in Table 9 is of special interest, as it shows the impact of the scientific learning treatment on overprecision. These results stand in contrast to the dynamics just discussed for overestimation. While Scientific Learning increases the overestimation bias, and this bias slowly fades over time, the same treatment reduces overprecision and this effect is persistent over time.

The dynamic effects associated with scientific learning also contrast with the effects of the error reminder treatment, which are reported in Panel B of Table 9. Consistent with our estimates in Table 5, the error reminder treatment has no effect on overestimation. However, there is some evidence that entrepreneurs exposed to the error reminder treatment are systematically reducing noise - or the size of their forecast errors. Column 3 of Panel B in Table 9 also suggests that the error reminder treatment reduces overprecision, but not as strongly as the scientific learning treatment. This suggests that part of the reduction in overprecision in the scientific learning treatment is due to the fact that entrepreneurs in this treatment are shown their past forecast error as well and that they knowledge of these forecast errors makes them reduce the confidence in their own forecasting ability.

## 5.5 Profit Effects of Treatments

With this section we begin to investigate the broader welfare consequences of our treatments. Specifically, for 6 of the 13 months we collected data on monthly total operating costs and variable operating costs. We defined total operating costs as “expenses for the day-to-day running of your business, like rent or material costs.” Subtracting operating costs from revenues allows us to calculate monthly profits for all firms. We will estimate the effects of treatments on monthly profit levels, as we want to allow for the possibility that some of the firms in our sample make losses during the study time window.

Following [Syverson \(2011\)](#) we are especially interested in within-industry differences in firm performance, so we include industry fixed effects in the profit regressions. Furthermore, it is unlikely that our treatments will improve performance for firms that do not have profit maximization as main aspiration, as they might not seize opportunities to grow the business, see [Hurst and Pusley \(2011\)](#), [Fairlie and Fossen \(2019\)](#). We therefore use the data on the main goal of the business, which we collected during the December 2020 pilot survey as variable to be interacted with our treatments.

Table 10 reports the results from our profit regressions. It suggests that the Scientific Learning treatment systematically increased profits, especially at firms with profit maximization and growth as their main goal. The value of the estimated profit effects is large and heterogeneous. Compared to the control group, scientific learning treatment group firms with profit maximization goals see their monthly operating profits increase by an average of \$101,000 ( $101.32 = 132.00 - 30.86$ ). This is a large effect, compared to the average monthly profit of \$130,000 for the profit-maximizing entrepreneurs in our sample. Since we suspect that this large effect is driven by uneven gains from scientific learning across the distribution of firms, we analyze quantile regressions in columns 2-4 of Table 10. At the 15<sup>th</sup> percentile profit-maximizing firms gain around \$380 ( $0.38 = 0.51 - 0.13$ ) per month, which is economically significant, even if it is not statistically significant. At the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile profit-maximizing firms gain around \$46,000 ( $46.29 = 53.44 - 7.14$ ) per month. Effects be-

come much larger and statistically significant at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile. This analysis confirms that the profit effects entirely stem from large effects of scientific learning for entrepreneurs at the 90<sup>th</sup> of the profit distribution. In other words, scientific learning potentially has a huge impact on profits for already very successful entrepreneurs. Decomposing this effect further, the last two columns of Table 10 highlight that this effect is driven by increased revenue and not by cost savings.

We caution that these profits effects are not representative for the average firm in our sample but instead suggest large gains for already profitable opportunity-driven entrepreneurs. Note that Table 10 fails to find evidence for profit effects of our treatments on entrepreneurial profits on average, which is consistent with small or statistically insignificant effects of small business training programs found in the literature, see Lerner (2009), Fairlie and Fossen (2019), McKenzie (2021).

## 6 Robustness

### 6.1 External Validity

A natural question for any RCT is whether its results are likely to extrapolate to other samples. RCTs always rely on voluntary participation in the experiment, which might result in sample selection of the trial sample (sum of treatment and control groups) relative to the underlying population. Applied to our RCT, this would mean that entrepreneurs who expected to benefit more more participation actively selected into the sample. However, it is worth pointing out that trial participants were unaware of the ongoing RCT, which makes such sample selection unlikely. But rather than just relying on this argument, this section quantifies the degree of potential bias from such an RCT participation bias. One approach to address this concern is to document to what degree the RCT trial population differs from any other population that researchers or readers would like to extrapolate to. For example, panel A of Table 11 displays differences in eight observable characteristics of

founders and their firms in our sample, compared to nationally representative data from the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, [Azoulay et al. \(2020\)](#) and the Kauffman Firm Survey. Our sample clearly differs from nationally representative data in several respects. But how much do these differences matter for generalizing our RCT results to all US entrepreneurs?

To address this question, we follow [Andrews and Oster \(2019\)](#) and quantify the potential RCT participation bias. To fix ideas, let  $TE_i$  denote the treatment effect for entrepreneur  $i$ ,  $P_S$  the trial population and  $P$  the population of US entrepreneurs. Under the assumption of "small selection bias", [Andrews and Oster \(2019\)](#) show that the RCT participation bias can be written as

$$E_{P_S} [TE_i] - E_P [TE_i] \approx \Psi (E_{P_S} [C_i] - E_P [C_i])' \gamma \quad (5)$$

where  $C_i$  is a vector of observable characteristics,  $\gamma$  is a parameter vector to be estimated. Importantly,  $\Psi$  is a constant multiple, which quantifies the direction and magnitude of selection into the RCT, based on unobservables. For example if  $\Psi = 1$ , then there is only selection into the RCT based on observables, while if  $\Psi = 2$ , then selection on unobservables into the RCT is of the same direction and magnitude as selection on observables.

[Andrews and Oster \(2019\)](#) show that the parameter vector  $\gamma$  can be estimated, using the RCT data using the following regression

$$Y_i = (1 - T_i) \cdot \alpha_0 + (1 - T_i) \cdot C_i' \gamma_0 + T_i \cdot \alpha_1 + T_i \cdot C_i' \gamma_1 \quad (6)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the dependent variable of interest (such as forecast error),  $T_i$  is an indicator for being in the treatment group and  $C_i$  denotes observable characteristics. Based on regression (6), one can then estimate  $\hat{\gamma} = \hat{\gamma}_1 - \hat{\gamma}_0$ . For the dependent variable  $Y_i$  of forecast error, we report estimates for  $\gamma_0, \gamma_1$  in panel B of [Table 11](#) alongside the implied bias-terms as measured by equation (5) with  $\Psi = 1$ . In other words, the row "bias term(s)" quantifies the bias of selection into the RCT, using equation (5). The sum across all columns of the row

”bias terms(s)”, then gives the overall bias from selection on observables.

From row 4 of panel B in Table 11 onward we quantify the impact of non-random selection into the RCT on the estimated average treatment effect. These rows show that accounting for selection on observables tends to increase the treatment effect from 2.32 (baseline effect from Table 7) to 2.36. In other words, selection on observables biases our treatment effect estimates by a small amount and the selection-corrected effect if anything becomes stronger. This means that selection into the RCT based on observables biases results against finding results.

Additionally, we can gauge the impact of selection into the RCT based on unobservables. For this, we assume that selection on unobservables into the RCT is in the same direction and of the same magnitude as selection on observables, i.e.  $\Psi = 2$ . Under this assumption, the selection-corrected treatment effect further increases to 2.40. An alternative way to consider the role of selection into the RCT based on unobservables is to analyze what direction and magnitude selection on unobservables into the RCT has to take to overturn our results. As the last row of panel B shows, this will be the case for  $\Psi(0) = -59.99$ . This value suggests that selection on unobservables into the RCT would have to move into the opposite direction from selection on observables and would have to be 60 times larger in magnitude compared to selection on observables, to overturn our main result.

Panel C of Table 11 repeats the RCT participation bias quantification, using testing engagement as dependent variable. This variable is of interest, since it is the basis of our discussion of the impact of engagement with scientific learning on de-biasing entrepreneurial overconfidence in section 5. Furthermore, it is well-known that IV estimators can be understood as the ratio of the direct impact of the treatment on the outcome on the one hand and the first stage estimate capturing the impact of the treatment on the endogenous variable (here: engagement) on the other hand, see (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Gerber and Green, 2012). Panel B of Table 11 already highlights the external validity of our ITT estimate, which corresponds to the reduced form of an IV regression of testing engagement on forecast



error, using the scientific learning treatment as instrument. Panel C adds external validity for the first stage of this IV of Panel B in Table 8. This first stage estimates the the impact of the scientific learning treatment on testing engagement. It should be noted that for testing engagement, it is true that  $\gamma_0 = 0$  for all values, because entrepreneurs in the control group cannot engage with scientific testing. Panel C of Table 11 shows that the first stage of the IV regressions for the impact of scientific testing on forecast error are externally valid as well.

## 6.2 Incentives for Accurate Forecasts

One potential issue with our analysis is that entrepreneurs might have insufficient incentives to report accurate forecasts. We believe that this is unlikely for several reasons. On the one hand, we showed in section 3.1 that forecasts are systematically correlated with growth outcomes, which they should not be if they are just noise. On the other hand, our main analysis focuses on growth forecasts from explicit business targets. Any inaccurate business targets would result in misallocation of resources, for example by hiring too many or to few employees and purchasing too many or to few materials etc.

However, instead of just relying on the plausibility of these conceptual points, we incorporated explicit performance pay for accurate forecasts into our analysis. Specifically, from October 2021 until March 2022 we provided a bonus of an additional \$5 if revenue growth forecasts were within 5% of reported revenue growth over the next 4 weeks. We chose 5% since this was the median overestimation of the control group in the first few months of the study. This bonus payment was both, salient and credible. As shown in Figure 5, we use bright red color on the survey screen to highlight the bonus payment. Additionally, survey respondents had been part of the survey for 6 months at this point and knew that we would follow through with any promised payments. The incentive payment for accurate forecasts applied to all firms in our sample, because rather than being interested in the impact of incentives for accurate forecasts per se, we are interested whether higher incentives

for forecast accuracy differentially affect treatment as opposed to control firms. If there is no interaction effect between the additional forecast accuracy incentives and our treatments, then our estimated treatment effects are by definition similar, with or without incentives for forecast accuracy. In contrast, if there are significant interaction effects, then treatment effects systematically differ if firms have more incentives for accurate forecasts, which would imply that our main analysis might not generalize to firms with more incentives to forecast more accurately.

Table 12 reports our findings from the introduction of incentive pay for accurate forecasts. The variable “Incentive Treatment” is a dummy that is one after the introduction of our bonus payment for accurate forecasts. This allows us to estimate the effect of interest similar to a difference-in-difference specification. As can be seen in Table 12, none of the interaction effects are significant at conventional levels. We therefore fail to find evidence that our results might not be valid for samples of firms with larger incentives for forecast accuracy.

Additionally, we re-estimate our key findings regarding engagement with scientific learning in Table 13. As before, we measure engagement with the string length of free form text responses and instrument engagement with the random scientific learning treatment. We evaluate the importance of incentives by interacting scientific learning engagement with the incentive treatment variable. The corresponding instrument for this interaction variable is the interaction of the incentive treatment and the scientific learning treatment. As Table 13, our main results on from Table 8 continue to hold. Importantly, none of the interaction effects of the incentive treatment and engagement with scientific learning or testing are significant for overestimation. There is some evidence that the incentive treatments attenuated the effect of scientific learning engagement on precision error, but the overall results are very similar to Table 8.

A possible objection to this conclusion might be that our incentives were not high stakes enough to matter. This point is reinforced by the incentive treatment used Bloom et al. (2022), which varied amounts of up to \$400 to reward entrepreneurs for forecasts within

10% of their actual revenue growth. [Bloom et al. \(2022\)](#) find that higher incentives induce entrepreneurs to reduce their biases. However, we believe that the use of business targets mitigates this issue, because entrepreneurs already have a strong incentive to avoid systematic forecast errors in business targets. There is also a variety of evidence, which suggests that the impact of incentives on behavioral biases is limited. [Camerer and Hogarth \(1999\)](#) provided an early survey for laboratory experiments and recent work by [Enke et al. \(2022\)](#) has shown that even incentives that correspond to a month’s pay are mostly unsuccessful in de-biasing participants in lab experiments. Furthermore, there are many empirical studies of high-stakes field settings that consistently document biases at highly educated and trained subjects, such as stock traders ([Daniel and Hirshleifer \(2015\)](#)), CEOs of major corporations ([Malmendier and Tate \(2005\)](#), [Malmendier and Tate \(2015\)](#)) and CFOs of public firms ([Ben-David et al. \(2012\)](#), [Boutros et al. \(2020\)](#)).

### **6.3 Use of Business Targets as Forecasts**

Another potential issue with our analysis is the use of business targets as main proxy for forecasts. Entrepreneurs might use formal business targets to motivate employees and might therefore tend to be more optimistic than their best guess of revenue growth. On the other hand, business targets that are unrealistically high might induce employees to exert less effort rather than more.

To address potential issues with the use of business targets, we explicitly asked respondents to differentiate between their best forecast for revenue growth and business targets as we highlighted in the discussion of [Figure 5](#). To test the robustness of our main analysis to the use of business targets, we focus on the sample of firms for which business targets and the best forecast are the same.

The results in [Table 14](#) show that our main results about the effect of engagement with scientific learning and testing relative to theory are robust to the use of business targets.

## 6.4 Sample Attrition

Most of the incentives in our study were provided to reduce sample attrition. Nevertheless, sample attrition cannot be avoided. From April 2021 to August 2021, we averaged 920 responses per month, which fell to 850 responses from September 2021 to March 2022. In other words, the degree of sample attrition was quite moderate.

To evaluate to what degree sample attrition might drive our results, we focus on the sample time frame from March 2021 to August 2021 and re-estimate our main results of the impact of Scientific Learning on overconfidence. The results are presented in Table 15 and show that stronger results. This suggests that sample attrition is likely to bias results against us finding any effect.

## 6.5 Hybrid Entrepreneurship

Another potential concern might be that many of the entrepreneurs in our sample are only devoting limited attention to the business we are surveying. This could be the case, if they pursue their business primarily to supplement their income through flexible "gig work" or "hybrid entrepreneurship" [Folta et al. \(2010\)](#) or for the option value of the business ([Manso, 2016](#)). A related possibility would be that the entrepreneurs have several businesses and only devote limited time to every single one of them. To address this concern, we collected data on how many hours per week the entrepreneurs devote to the business we survey. About 70% state that they devote more than 35 hours per week to the surveyed business. We therefore re-run our main results on the sample of entrepreneurs devoting at least 35 hours per week to the surveyed business.

Table 16 shows that our main results about how engagement with overall scientific learning or testing relative to theory, remains robust in the full-time work sample.

## 6.6 Differential Industry Trends

Our main study data was collected from March 2021 to March 2022, shortly after vaccines for COVID-19 became widely available in all 50 US states. However it is well-known that the COVID-19 pandemic and associated (voluntary) social distancing affected industries differently. For example, in-person services and restaurants were negatively affected by the pandemic, while technology and e-commerce was positively affected. It might therefore be plausible that recovery dynamics after the pandemic differ across industries as well. To control for potential differential industry trends, we add a full set of industry-by-time fixed effects for our main IV analysis in Table 17. The results in Table 17 that our main results are unchanged even if we control for differential industry time trends.

## 7 Extension: Welfare Analysis

In this section we develop a methodology to evaluate some of the welfare consequences from overconfident entrepreneurs. For this purpose, we focus on the intensive margin of labor supply from entrepreneurs, since this margin has been a key theoretical mechanism of how overconfidence impacts welfare since [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#). The question we seek to answer is whether de-biasing an entrepreneur, for example using a scientific testing, would increase the welfare of that entrepreneur. The answer to this question is theoretically ambiguous, due to the confluence of two opposing forces. On the one hand, an overconfident entrepreneur might work more hours compared to a rational entrepreneur, despite a negative marginal profit. In this case, de-biasing the entrepreneur and reducing her work hours would increase her welfare. On the other hand, theoretical work since [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#) and [Compte and Postlewaite \(2004\)](#) has shown that overconfidence can have positive welfare effects. For example, [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#) have argued that the motivating effects of overconfidence might offset other behavioral biases, such as hyperbolic discounting. In this case, hyperbolic discounting leads to procrastination and low work hours despite

positive marginal profits. A motivating effect of overconfidence can compensate the tendency to procrastinate and lead to more work and higher profit. In this context, de-biasing an entrepreneur would actually harm her welfare, as she returns to procrastinate work after reducing overconfidence.

The key empirical challenge in this context is to correct subjective estimates of marginal profit for the presence of overconfidence. Providing a comprehensive and assumption-free approach to achieve this is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we develop a workable approach that can be used by researchers running their own field experiments using a few key additional survey questions, in combination with a small number of very strong assumptions.

## 7.1 Theory

To fix ideas, let  $\pi_{S,i}^e(h_i)$  denote the expected present value of future profits for an entrepreneur  $i$  who works  $h_i$  hours per week. These benefits of entrepreneurial labor supply compared to opportunity costs of  $w_{O,i} \cdot h_i$ , where  $w_{O,i}$  is an hourly opportunity cost of work for  $i$ . The net expected profit from labor supply  $h_i$  can therefore be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{S,i}^e(h_i) &= \pi_{S,i}^e(h_i) - w_{O,i} \cdot h_i \\ &= [\pi_{R,i}^e(h_i) - w_{O,i} \cdot h_i] + \epsilon_i \cdot \pi_{R,i}^e \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where the last line uses the notation of  $\pi_{R,i}^e(h_i)$  for the rational expected present value of future profits from entrepreneurial work and  $\epsilon_i = \frac{\pi_{S,i}^e - \pi_{R,i}^e}{\pi_{R,i}^e}$  denotes the profit forecast error. We use  $\Pi_{S,i}^e$  to denote the expected subjective (biased) profit net of opportunity costs of time and  $\Pi_{R,i}^e(h_i) = \pi_{R,i}^e(h_i) - w_{O,i} \cdot h_i$  the expected rational (unbiased) profit net of opportunity costs. We show in the appendix, that expected profit changes from more labor supply can be approximated by

$$\Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{1,i}) - \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i}) \approx \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} \right] \cdot \left( \frac{dh_i}{d\epsilon_i} \right) \cdot (\epsilon_{1,i} - \epsilon_{0,i}) \quad (8)$$

where,  $\frac{dh_i}{d\epsilon_i}$  is the labor supply response to increased profit expectation errors and  $(\epsilon_{1,i} - \epsilon_{0,i})$  is a change in this forecast error. Equation (8) summarizes changes in net entrepreneurial welfare, defined as expected profit net of opportunity costs of time, as a result from changes in forecast errors, such as debiasing through intensive use of scientific hypothesis testing. The key term in (8) is the rational expected marginal profit  $\left[\frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i}\right]$ : if it is positive, then increased labor supply induced by overconfidence will increase welfare, as would be the case in the theoretical models of [Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#) and [Compte and Postlewaite \(2004\)](#). On the other hand, if this marginal profit is negative, then any additional work due to overconfidence will reduce welfare.

In the appendix, we show that this rational marginal profit term  $\left[\frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i}\right]$  can be calculated as

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} = \underbrace{\left[\frac{\partial \pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} - w_{O,i}\right]}_{\text{(i) Subjective Marginal Profit}} - \left\{ \underbrace{\frac{\pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i / \partial \epsilon_i}}_{\text{(ii) Motivational Effect}} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} \cdot \epsilon_i}_{\text{(iii) Biased Expectations}} \right\} \quad (9)$$

Equation (9) is our main measurement tool driving our welfare calculations. Before relating it to the needed measurement assumptions, it is worth discussing the economic intuition for (9). Rational marginal profit from more entrepreneurial work consists of three components. The first term on the right-hand side of (9) is the subjective marginal profit of work  $\left[\frac{\partial \pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} - w_{O,i}\right]$ . For a profit-maximizing rational entrepreneur, this term should be zero. However, this term could be non-zero, reflecting potentially behavioral frictions such as weak willpower ([Benabou and Tirole \(2002\)](#)) or market frictions, such as credit constraints.

Our main concern is that overconfident entrepreneurs might perceive themselves as profit maximizing with a subjective marginal profit of zero, but in reality their expectations might be biased by overconfidence. Therefore the “wedge” term on the curly brackets in (9) corrects the subjective marginal profit for two effects. On the one hand, the term  $\frac{\pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i / \partial \epsilon_i}$  corrects for the motivational effect of overconfidence. If entrepreneurs are very responsive to overcon-

fidence ( $\partial h_i / \partial \epsilon_i$  is large), then this term will be smaller, as any perceived positive marginal profit will lead to a large increase in labor supply which will thereby reduce marginal profits under diminishing returns. Therefore, under very elastic labor supply, subjective marginal profit measures do not need to be corrected much. On the other hand, the term  $\frac{\partial \pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} \cdot \epsilon_i$  corrects for biased expectations of the marginal benefits from work, using information on the forecast error  $\epsilon_i$ . The more overconfident entrepreneurs are ( $\epsilon_i > 0$  is larger) the more subjective marginal profits need to be corrected for this overconfidence.

To summarize the welfare effects in (9), note that even if subjective marginal profits are zero, the term in the curly brackets in (9) is likely positive for overconfident entrepreneurs. As a result, rational marginal profits  $\frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i}$  will be negative, implying welfare losses from overconfidence. At the same time, if subjective marginal profits in (9) are sufficiently positive, rational marginal profits will be positive as well, thereby implying welfare increases from more hours worked.

## 7.2 Measurement

We begin by measuring the first term in (9), the subjective marginal profit of more hours,  $\left[ \frac{\partial \pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} - w_{O,i} \right]$ . We use the methodology of Altig et al. (2020) applied to expected profits from more work. Figure 12 shows the survey screen that was shown to participants to measure the present value of the benefits of additional work. After the questions in Figure 12, we asked entrepreneurs to convert these expected values into certainty-equivalent units to remove the influence of risk aversion by asking the question

Consider a choice between working for 10 hours that would result in the uncertain profits you reported above and being offered a contract for a fixed profit that would require 10 hours of your labor. What is the smallest amount of fixed profits in the contract that would encourage you to accept the fixed profit option over the uncertain profit option. (Note: We are trying to understand the cost of uncertainty, please do not consider the fact that you may not be able/willing to



work an additional 10 hours).

To measure the opportunity cost of time  $w_{O,i}$ , we ask respondents:

Suppose you need to spend 10 more hours at work this week and have to forgo this time you would otherwise spend on a non-work activity you enjoy the most. This would be spending time with your family, relaxing, gardening etc. How much would you be willing to pay to avoid working these 10 hours?

For the remaining components of (9), we need to make a number of strong assumptions.

**Assumption 1.** *The labor supply response  $\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial \epsilon_i}$  can be measured as the effect of higher growth targets on hours worked, using a direct survey question.*

Assumption 1 allows us to measure  $\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial \epsilon_i}$  using the following survey question:

Suppose, one month you decide to increase your revenue growth goal, just to motivate yourself and for no other reason. You increase your revenue goal for your business over the next four weeks by an additional 5%. How many additional hours do you think you would end up working per week to meet this new goal?

Although this survey question is less ideal than estimating labor supply elasticities with respect to overestimation, it has two advantages. On the one hand, the responses are entrepreneur-specific, thereby making pooling of data across entrepreneurs unnecessary. On the other hand, the question focuses on increased revenue growth goals, irrespective of potential demand shocks or other business opportunities.

The next assumption allows us to use the estimated forecast errors  $\xi_i$  from our experiment to proxy for the profit forecast error  $\epsilon_i$ .

**Assumption 2.** *The forecast error in expected marginal profits  $\epsilon_i$  can be measured by the forecast error in revenue growth  $\xi_i$ .*

This assumption would for example be valid in a model of monopolistic competition with a constant returns to scale production technology as in [Dixit and Stiglitz \(1977\)](#), in which profits are proportional to revenues. Since almost all of our entrepreneurs are small to medium sized businesses, strategic interactions among oligopolistic firms are unlikely to be relevant, which makes a monopolistic competition assumption more attractive.

**Assumption 3.** *The rational flow profit term  $\pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})$  can be approximated by average daily profits and the marginal rational profit term  $\frac{\partial \pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i}$  can be approximated by hourly profits.*

This last assumption will be valid, for example under rational expectations and a constant returns to scale production technology, which are very strong assumptions but which allow us to go back and forth between average and marginal changes.

Figure 13 shows the key data components entering in our calculation of the wedge term in equation (9). Panel (A) of Figure 13 displays the distribution of weekly work hours, which has a median of 40. Panel (B) reports the distribution of weekly hours responses to meet an additional 5% revenue growth goal, with a median of 5 hours per week or an additional hour per week for each percentage point higher sales growth per month. Panel (C) then shows the results of calculating the two components of the wedge term in (9). Overall, both terms are of similar importance and both terms exhibit a fat tail of values that are positive, suggesting large effects of calculating the wedge. To be conservative, we apply the correction implied by the wedge term only to entrepreneurs, which exhibit overestimation on average during the 13 months of our experiment.

### 7.3 Welfare Results

The distributions of our measures of expected marginal profit are displayed in Figure 14. The distribution in grey is a kernel density estimate of the subjective marginal profit term  $\frac{\partial \pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} - w_{O,i}$ . It has a median value of \$2.90 per hour which is close to the red dashed zero line that is added as a reference point in Figure 14. This suggests that the median entrepreneur in our sample believes herself to be optimizing.

The blue distribution in Figure 14 reports the rational marginal profit, based on equation (9). It differs from the subjective distribution in that it has less mass concentrated around zero marginal profits and more mass in the left tail of the distribution - where entrepreneurs exhibit marginal losses from more work. Indeed, the median rational profit for our sample of entrepreneurs is \$70 per hour, which is sizable, but not unrealistically so. To put this number into perspective, the median opportunity cost of an hour of additional work is \$50 in our sample and therefore quite comparable in magnitude. Furthermore, the negative median marginal profit of hours worked we find, is consistent with laboratory evidence by Gish et al. (2019), who show that sleep deprivation can cause inefficient entrepreneurial decision making, such as the pursuit of worse business opportunities. Figure 14 highlights that our rational marginal profit measures most correct the estimates of entrepreneurs who believe themselves to work an optimal amount. In other words, our correction does not reduce the number of entrepreneurs to believe themselves to have very high marginal profits, because these entrepreneurs do not exhibit much overestimation in our data.

Figure 15 illustrates the heterogeneity of the welfare effects from equation (9). The x-axis displays values of rational marginal profit  $\left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} \right]$  from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the values in the data. The y-axis displays values for the labor response per percentage point monthly growth goal  $\left( \frac{dh_i}{d\epsilon_i} \right)$ , ranging from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles for this variable. The combined plot gives values for the term  $\left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_{0,i})}{\partial h_i} \right] \cdot \left( \frac{dh_i}{d\epsilon_i} \right)$  to convey the heterogeneity of the implied welfare loss per week as result of different combinations of entrepreneurial labor supply responses and rational marginal losses. Welfare losses can range from almost zero to almost \$1,200 per week.

## 8 Conclusion

This study provides the first mechanism field RCT investigating the channels through which entrepreneurial overconfidence is psychologically sustained. Our findings are broadly consis-

tent with the recent Behavioral economics literature on motivated beliefs and wishful thinking (Benabou and Tirole, 2016), applied to the important field setting of entrepreneurial sales forecasts. We find that relatively intensive engagement with structured practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Camuffo et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2020), for scientific testing can successfully de-bias entrepreneurs. This suggests that entrepreneurial overconfidence is not a fixed character trait, but instead a result of limited adoption of structured practices.

Our findings open up several possibilities for future research. For example, how does scientific learning impact other potential behavioral biases of entrepreneurs, such as loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 1994), the sunk cost fallacy, and others. Furthermore, scientific learning is by its very nature a natural approach to deal with ambiguity (Knight, 1921) and complexity. The analysis of these additional dimensions will not only offer a better understanding of the entrepreneurial decision-making but also a broader appreciation of the effects of scientific learning.

Another avenue for future research is the exploration of the effects of scientific learning on entrepreneurial financing. Indeed, entrepreneurial overconfidence might not just have a motivating effect on effort and labor supply, but also the ability of entrepreneurs to persuade investors to fund them. Theoretical arguments by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2015) suggest that rational investors will disproportionately increase the cost of capital in response to managerial overconfidence, thereby reducing investment in profitable opportunities. A key question is therefore whether scientific learning can reduce entrepreneurial overconfidence, while at the same time providing entrepreneurs with the tools to better convince investors of the future potential of their startup.

Finally, although there is a broad consensus that experimentation is crucial, especially for opportunity-driven entrepreneurship (Kerr and Nanda, 2010), there are several distinct approaches to such experimentation. In this study, we followed previous work by Lafley et al. (2012), Camuffo et al. (2019) and Yang et al. (2020) and used scientific learning, in the context of relatively mature firms. However, the most popular practitioner approach

for early stage entrepreneurship is the “Lean Startup” methodology, see [Ries \(2011\)](#). This methodology is an alternative set of structured practices, which emphasize early customer validation of product ideas through “minimum viable products”, without the emphasis on stating and testing assumptions as in the scientific learning approach ([Felin et al., 2019](#)). Like [Felin et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Cao et al. \(2020\)](#), we are cognizant of potential pitfalls of the lean startup approach to early stage entrepreneurship. However, we also believe that the effectiveness of different structured practices for early stage startups is ultimately an empirical question, which is left for future research.

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


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# Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Growth and business uncertainty during survey period




Note: Figure 3A from Meyer et al. (2022) with overlaid vertical dashed blue lines to indicate study time window.

Figure 2: Key elements of recruiting




(A) Pilot survey contact email



(B) Evening news coverage by local NBC affiliate (Dec 1, 2020)


Note: Figures show elements of initial recruiting of participants in December 2020. Full video of evening news coverage of the pilot survey available at: <https://ksltv.com/450121/is-a-new-unsolicited-email-survey-about-doing-business-in-utahs-pandemic-economy-legit/>

Figure 3: Distribution of firms across industries



Note: Initial sample of 1027 firms in Utah in March 2021.

Figure 4: Firm size distribution in initial month (March 2021)




Note: Firm size is measured by the log of revenue in March 2021.

Figure 5: Measurement of forecasts

Please enter below the worst case revenue growth you worry about (bottom of the range), the growth you *actually* expect, and the best case revenue growth you hope for (top of the range).

We want to know the range of revenue growth you reasonably expect next four weeks (in percent, compared to this month), such that 9 times out of 10 you are certain that revenue growth over the next four weeks would be between this worst case and best case.

**Attention:** If your best guess (what you enter under "Expected revenue growth" below) is **within 5% of your actual revenue growth over the next 4 weeks**, we will **add an additional \$5,-** to your Amazon giftcard you will receive for filling out this survey.




Are your goals for next four weeks' revenue growth different from the expected revenue from the previous question? (In other words, are your goals higher or lower than your expectations?)

- No
- ★ Yes (please state your revenue growth goals over the next month in %)

Note: Survey screen to elicit monthly revenue growth forecasts and uncertainty about forecasts. Incentive payments were introduced in October 2021 (7 months into the study and 6 months before the end of the study).


Figure 6: Distribution of growth rates and forecasts in control group



Note: Forecasts in blue are  $g_{i,t+1}^f$ , while the grey dashed line shows actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ . Data for the figure uses only periods before introduction of incentive payments for prediction accuracy.




Figure 7: Overestimation in the control group




Note: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Adaptive expectations uses lagged actual sales growth as forecast for the next month  $g_{i,t+1}^{ada} = g_{i,t}$ . Adaptive expectations forecast error is therefore calculated as adaptive expectation forecast minus actual monthly revenue growth  $\xi_{i,t+1}^{ada} = g_{i,t} - g_{i,t+1}$ . Data for the figure uses only periods before introduction of incentive payments for prediction accuracy.

Figure 8: Precision error in the control group




Note: Let  $P_{x,i}$  denote the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Under normal distribution of growth rates, the following approximation holds:  $\sigma_{g,i} \approx \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65}$ , where  $\sigma_{g,i}$  is the monthly volatility of growth rates. Similarly,  $\sigma_{g,i,t}^f \approx \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65}$ . The precision error is then defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \sigma_{g,i} - \sigma_{g,i,t}^f$ . Data for the figure uses only periods before introduction of incentive payments for prediction accuracy.

Figure 9: Biased memory (hindsight bias) in the control group




Note: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{i,t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . In contrast, the solid black line displays recalled forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}^{rec}$ . Data for the figure uses only periods before introduction of incentive payments for prediction accuracy.

Figure 10: Scientific Learning Treatment Case for "Bennett Woodworks"



Note: Case example from the data for anonymized participant "Bennett Woodworks".

Figure 11: Treatment effect of Scientific Learning on forecast error over time



Note: Dependent variable on the y-axis is forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  and is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Figure plots the sum of the average treatment effect and the interaction effect of treatment and a linear time trend, controlling for a full set of time fixed effects to control for the impact of changes in uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Time horizon is one year between March 2021 and March 2022.

Figure 12: Measurement of the marginal expected benefit from more work hours

How much would your total profits increase if you worked 10 additional hours over the coming week?

Please consider the impact on profits immediately and in the foreseeable future. Please state your answer in today's dollars. For statements in today's \$, please take account of the cost of waiting. For example, \$100 of profit next year might only be worth \$90 to you today, since you need to wait for this money. Please include any profits you would anticipate to receive personally from the business, subtracting costs for employees, materials etc. (Rough estimates are acceptable.)

Please come up with five possible cases and define profits for these cases, starting from the worst possible scenario and moving up to profits in the best possible case.


	Profit over the foreseeable future in today's \$, from working 10 more hours over the coming week
WORST case	<input type="text"/>
BAD case	<input type="text"/>
MIDDLE case	<input type="text"/>
GOOD case	<input type="text"/>
BEST case	<input type="text"/>

welf2

You are given 100 points to put in the following bins. Each bin describes a scenario for the value of working 10 more hours over the coming week, which you defined in the last question. The more likely you think a bin is, the longer should be the bar in the bin.


For example, the initial numbers below suggest that there is a 1 in 10 chance for the worst case, a 2 in 10 chance for the bad case and so on.

What do you think are the chances for each case for how much working 10 additional hours over the coming week changes your profits?




Note: Question measures the expected benefit of 10 more hours of work in terms of present value. After this question follows the measurement of the certainty equivalent value of the benefits.


Figure 13: Data underlying correction of subjective marginal profits



(A) Hours worked per week




(B) Impact of growth targets on work hours



(C) Components of wedge

Note: Panel (A) shows reported work hours per week. Panel (B) shows individual estimate of additional work hours per week, required for 5 percentage point higher monthly growth. Panel (C) exhibits two terms of wedge between subjective and rational expected marginal profit of entrepreneurial work. In panels (A)-(B) the median value is displayed with the vertical dashed lines.


Figure 14: Distribution of present value of expected marginal profits across firms



Note: Subjective expected marginal profit for individual entrepreneur  $i$  is defined as difference between the certainty-equivalent present value of expected profit increases due to 1 hour more work per week  $\frac{\partial}{\partial h} \pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i})$ , minus the opportunity costs of that 1 hour work increase  $w_{0,i}$ :  $\frac{\partial}{\partial h} \Pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i}) = \frac{\partial}{\partial h} \pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i}) - w_{0,i}$ , with  $h_{0,i}$  denoting current hours worked per week. The rational marginal profit then corrects the subjective marginal profit for motivating effects of overconfidence (or demotivating effects of underconfidence):  $\frac{\partial}{\partial h} \Pi_{R,i}^e(h_0) = \frac{\partial}{\partial h} \Pi_{S,i}^e(h_{0,i}) - \frac{\partial \pi_{\epsilon}}{\partial h}$ . Rational marginal losses are bounded below using the opportunity cost of time. For more details, see text.



Figure 15: Marginal entrepreneurial welfare as function of labor supply and rational marginal profit



Note: Labor supply is measured in hours per week in response to a one percentage point increase in revenue growth goals. Rational expected present value of marginal profit is measured per hour. Isoprofit levels show loss in \$ per month. Extreme values of each axis are roughly the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentile values in the data.

Table 1: Summary statistics, March 2021 (1,077 responses)

	Mean	Std	25 <sup>th</sup> Perc	Median	75 <sup>th</sup> Perc
Revenue (\$)	144,919.6	578,587	2,800	15,000	60,000
Employees	10.09	26.6	0	2	8
Firm age (years)	12.77	13.72	4	7	17.5
Profit max & Growth? <sup>1</sup>	.61	.49	0	1	1
Livelihood? <sup>2</sup>	.27	.45	0	0	1
Non-pecuniary? <sup>3</sup>	.12	.33	0	0	0
Revenue growth (%)	16.57	50.41	-20	0	42.86
Forecast error <sup>4</sup> (%)	1.18	38.71	-36	2.93	35.71

<sup>1</sup> Indicator for stated objective “Profit maximization and Growth”.

<sup>2</sup> Indicator for stated objective “Enough profit to sustain livelihood, but no growth plans”.

<sup>3</sup> Indicator for stated objective “Personal or social goals other than profit and growth”.

<sup>4</sup> Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ .

Table 2: Benchmarking Entrepreneurial Expectations

	Revenue growth $g_{i,t+1}$			
	(OLS)	(OLS)	(AB)	(AB)
Forecast $g_{i,t+1}^f$	0.6525*** (0.0920)	0.9056*** (0.1523)		0.8807*** (0.2128)
Lagged growth			-0.1682*** (0.0380)	-0.1578*** (0.0414)
Constant	4.0779*** (1.1179)	1.4278 (1.6100)	11.5546*** (1.1121)	2.8846 (2.5113)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Firm FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
Number of firms	461	389	328	305
Number of observations	1,952	1,880	1,145	998

Notes: Dependent variable  $g_{i,t+1}$  is revenue growth. Forecast is forecasted revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}^f$ . Sample of observations before the introduction of the forecast accuracy incentive. Columns (3) and (4) use Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 3: Relation of Biases in the Control Group

	<b>A: Overprecision and Size of Forecast Errors</b>		
	Noise	Underestimation Error	Overestimation Error
Overprecision	0.2223*** (0.0260)	0.1759*** (0.0302)	0.2457*** (0.0368)
Constant	24.8544*** (0.9065)	25.4345*** (1.0216)	26.3589*** (1.2682)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.0568	0.0385	0.0662
Number of firms	456	409	368
Number of observations	1,871	1,066	762
	<b>B: Overconfidence and Biased Memory</b>		
	Forecast Error	Noise	Overprecision
Abs. value of recalled Forecast Error	-0.1810*** (0.0676)	0.2787*** (0.0393)	0.0135 (0.0544)
Constant	6.1254*** (1.0610)	26.0734*** (0.9233)	21.6098*** (1.2176)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.0077	0.0381	0.0026
Number of firms	429	429	465
Number of observations	1,519	1,519	1,763

Notes: The precision error is then defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{i,t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Noise is the absolute value of forecast errors. Overestimation error are all values for which  $\xi_{i,t+1} > 0$ , while underestimation error is the absolute value of  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  conditional on  $\xi_{i,t+1} < 0$ . Absolute value of recalled forecast error is measured using reported forecast error for current month from memory. Sample only considers periods before the introduction of incentives. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 4: Balance Tests of Randomization

<b>A: Error Reminder</b>			
	Treatment (ERT)	Control (CON)	Difference (CON-ERT)
Firm age (years)	12.93	12.59	-0.340 (.7318646)
Employees	10.01	9.236	-0.770 (.6643342)
Revenue (\$)	106729.2	126303.9	19574.6 (.537192)
Revenue growth (%)	14.07	19.41	5.343 (.1898272)
Forecast Error	1.664	-1.082	-2.746 (.4567501)
<b>B: Scientific Learning</b>			
	Treatment (SLT)	Control (CON)	Difference (CON-SLT)
Firm age (years)	12.85	12.59	-0.263 (.7966671)
Employees	11.37	9.236	-2.136 (.3055529)
Revenue (\$)	217034.7	126303.9	-90730.8* (.0698629)
Revenue growth (%)	15.55	19.41	3.868 (.383219)
Forecast Error (%)	3.805	-1.082	-4.886 (.2131215)

Notes: Firm age is measured as reported years since founding. Revenue measures monthly revenue for the month of March 2021. Revenue growth is measured between April and March 2021. Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between revenue growth forecast from March 2021 to April 2021  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . P-values reported in parentheses.

Table 5: (No) Impact of Error Reminder Treatment

	Forecast Error	Noise	Precision Error
Error Reminder Treatment	0.3913 (0.8373)	-0.4564 (0.8835)	-2.4601* (1.3596)
Constant	2.2009*** (0.5736)	29.3348*** (0.5827)	22.3465*** (0.9502)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.0033	0.0065	0.0119
Number of firms	926	926	951
Number of observations	6,222	6,222	7,905

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Noise is defined as the absolute value of the forecast error  $|\xi_{t+1}|$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left(\frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65}\right) - \left(\frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65}\right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 6: Correlation of Misattribution and Overconfidence

	Forecast Error		
	Control Group	Error Reminder Treatment Group	Scientific Learning Treatment Group
Misattribution (negative)	-4.8136 (3.7477)	37.6604*** (1.6371)	35.2447*** (1.8385)
Constant	2.3568*** (0.5870)	1.1715* (0.6277)	3.0842*** (0.6778)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.0053	0.0458	0.0475
Number of firms	480	446	322
Number of observations	3,255	2,967	1,988

Notes: Negative misattribution is measured as firms that state they underperformed their forecasted revenue growth due to reasons external to the firm, while being in industries in which the median firm outperformed their forecasted revenue growth. Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ .

Table 7: Causal impact of Access to Scientific Learning Treatment  
(Intend-to-Treat/ITT effect)

	Forecast Error	Noise	Precision Error	Misattribution
Scientific Learning Treatment	2.3250*** (0.8688)	-0.0633 (0.9769)	-3.4080** (1.5463)	0.0093 (0.0062)
Constant	2.1982*** (0.5744)	29.3526*** (0.5825)	22.3113*** (0.9498)	0.0322*** (0.0037)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.0062	0.0057	0.0153	0.0266
Number of firms	802	802	827	802
Number of observations	5,243	5,243	6,647	5,243

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Noise is defined as the absolute value of the forecast error  $|\xi_{t+1}|$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left(\frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65}\right) - \left(\frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65}\right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Negative misattribution is measured as firms that state they underperformed their forecasted revenue growth due to reasons external to the firm, while being in industries in which the median firm outperformed their forecasted revenue growth. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 8: Causal impact of Engagement with Scientific Learning

	<b>A: Overall and Theory Engagement</b>			
	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Overall Engagement with Scientific Learning	1.3256*** (0.5067)	-1.9384** (0.8802)		
Theory Engagement			1.3544*** (0.5175)	-1.9663** (0.8927)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	242.11	272.60	262.61	293.48
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	155.27	174.74	164.09	183.93
Number of firms	802	827	802	827
Number of observations	5,243	6,647	5,243	6,647
	<b>B: Testing and Pre-Postmortem Engagement</b>			
	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Testing relative to Theory	-2.2529*** (0.8737)	3.3406** (1.5003)		
Pre-Postmortem relative to Theory			-15.0501 (10.4173)	20.2815 (14.6563)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	140.90	140.17	2.99	3.63
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	109.03	107.16	2.98	3.61
Number of firms	802	791	802	791
Number of observations	5,243	5,012	5,243	5,012

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Engagement is measured by length of response (string length) to free-form textboxes, in which we ask about the reasoning behind responses to scientific learning questions. Overall scientific learning engagement consists of the normalized (zero mean, unit variance) engagement score in theory, pre-postmortem and testing. Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Pre-postmortem consists of internal firm conditions that might imply underperformance next month. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Samples exclude firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 9: Learning Dynamics of ITT Effects

	<b>A: Scientific Learning</b>		
	Forecast Error	Noise	Precision Error
Scientific Learning Treatment	5.6711*** (1.7997)	1.8493 (1.4556)	-5.2319*** (1.7799)
Scientific Learning Treatment × linear time trend	-0.5207** (0.2509)	-0.2976 (0.1860)	0.2620 (0.1594)
Constant	2.1958*** (0.5744)	29.3512*** (0.5824)	22.3147*** (0.9503)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.02
Number of firms	802	802	827
Number of observations	5,243	5,243	6,647
	<b>B: Error Reminder</b>		
	Forecast Error	Noise	Precision Error
Error Reminder Treatment	1.8023 (1.7590)	1.7702 (1.2858)	-3.1740** (1.5910)
Error Reminder Treatment × linear time trend	-0.2185 (0.2346)	-0.3447** (0.1588)	0.1015 (0.1389)
Constant	2.2021*** (0.5736)	29.3368*** (0.5826)	22.3459*** (0.9505)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01
Number of firms	926	926	951
Number of observations	6,222	6,222	7,905

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Noise is defined as the absolute value of the forecast error  $|\xi_{t+1}|$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left(\frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65}\right) - \left(\frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65}\right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . All specifications include a full set of time fixed effects to control for changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.



Table 10: Intend-to-Treat Profit Effects

	Profit	Profit	Profit	Profit	Revenue	Cost
	Average	15 <sup>th</sup> Perc.	85 <sup>th</sup> Perc.	90 <sup>th</sup> Perc.	90 <sup>th</sup> Perc.	90 <sup>th</sup> Perc.
	(in \$1,000 per month)					
Error Reminder Treatment	-25.2571 (17.1421)	-0.0083 (0.2431)	-6.3400 (4.0484)	-12.3300 (7.6810)	-29.0000 (21.5677)	-5.9000 (5.3549)
Profit/Growth Max	56.3772* (30.7368)	-0.1175 (0.3453)	29.6990** (12.3565)	47.6700 (35.7309)	85.5000** (41.5708)	50.7000*** (17.9003)
Error Reminder Treatment × Profit/Growth Max	7.2831 (44.5475)	0.3675 (0.4658)	5.3350 (16.7580)	13.1180 (48.6157)	22.2840 (56.4405)	3.8000 (30.7168)
Scientific Learning Treatment	-30.8628 (19.5803)	-0.1317 (0.2568)	-7.1450* (4.0724)	-11.0420 (7.7881)	-24.0000 (21.8361)	-4.0000 (10.7765)
Scientific Learning Treatment	132.0058** (66.9236)	0.5192 (0.5366)	53.4450 (47.8103)	148.1030** (66.8933)	188.5000** (74.4116)	80.6140 (70.8327)
	45.0087*** (13.8271)	-0.2417 (0.2609)	11.3400** (4.5927)	21.7880** (9.8744)	60.0000* (33.4032)	32.2000* (16.5686)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.07	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.08
Number of firms	1067	1067	1067	1067	1067	1067
Number of observations	4,223	4,223	4,223	4,223	4,223	4,223

Notes: All numbers as in 1,000 \$ per month. Profit is measured as the difference between operating revenues and operating costs. The variable “Profit/Growth Max” is an indicator that is one if the firm stated that its main objectives are profit maximization and growth in the pilot survey in December 2020. Column 1 is an OLS regression, while columns 2-6 are quantile regressions with the quantile defined in the column header. Full set of time fixed effects are included to control for changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit NAICS level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 11: External Validity: Correcting for RCT Participation Bias

		<b>A: Founder and Firm Characteristics <math>X_i</math></b>							
		Female Founder	Founder Age	Founder Married	Founder Hours	Goal: Growth	Firm Age	Firm Employment	Firm Revenue
<b>RCT Sample</b>		0.33	46.8	0.87	31.76	0.6	12.37	8	140.68
<b>All US entrepreneurs</b>		0.25	41.80	0.79	41.81	0.38	18.50	21.62	511.72
		<b>B: External Validity of Forecast Error ITT</b>							
<b>Outcome <math>y_i</math>:</b>	$\gamma_1$	-0.9423	0.0887	3.4373	0.0090	2.4415	0.0191	-0.1419	0.0045
	$\gamma_0$	-0.3604	0.1527	1.7502	-0.0357	1.3853	-0.1827	-0.1542	0.0094
	Bias term(s)	-0.0490	-0.3198	0.1350	-0.4495	0.2333	-1.2366	-0.1670	1.8151
<b>Forecast Error</b>	Baseline ITT				<b>2.32</b>				
	Bias-corrected ITT (select. on observ. only)				<b>2.36</b>				
	Bias-corrected ITT (select. on observ. & unobserv.)				<b>2.40</b>				
	$\Psi(0)$ (for $ITT = 0$ )				<b>-59.99</b>				
		<b>C: External Validity of Testing Engagement ITT</b>							
<b>Outcome <math>y_i</math>:</b>	$\gamma_1$	-0.2980	0.0128	-0.1079	-0.0007	0.1963	-0.0155	0.0037	0.0002
	$\gamma_0$	0							
	Bias term(s)	-0.0251	0.0642	-0.0086	0.0067	0.0434	0.0952	-0.0507	-0.0621
<b>Testing Engagement</b>	Baseline ITT				<b>-0.99</b>				
	Bias-corrected ITT (select. on observ. only)				<b>-1.06</b>				
	Bias-corrected ITT (select. on observ. & unobserv.)				<b>-1.12</b>				
	$\Psi(0)$ (for $ITT = 0$ )				<b>-15.88</b>				

Notes: Panel A displays average firm characteristics in our RCT sample and the same characteristic among all US entrepreneurs. Representative sample data on marital status of entrepreneurs is from the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2004 and data on founder age is from [Azoulay et al. \(2020\)](#). All other variables are from the the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, 2016 by the US Census Bureau. For panels B and C, estimates  $\gamma_i$  are obtained from a regression of outcome  $y_i$  on the characteristic  $C_i$  in the column headers.  $\gamma_1$  is for the scientific learning treatment group and  $\gamma_0$  for the control group respectively. Following [Andrews and Oster \(2019\)](#), the bias term corresponding to each variable is calculated as  $(\gamma_1 - \gamma_0) \cdot (\bar{C}_{PS} - \bar{C}_P)$ , where  $\bar{X}_{PS}$  is the average in the RCT (or “trail”) sample and  $\bar{X}_P$  is the average in the population of all US entrepreneurs. In panel C, all values for  $\gamma_0 = 0$ , since firms in the control group cannot engage with scientific learning by definition of being in the control group. The overall bias correction is the sum of all individual bias-correction terms. The first bias-corrected ITT term assumes that there is only selection on observables. The second bias-corrected ITT term assumes that bias on unobservables is in the same direction and of the same magnitude as selection on observables.  $\Psi(0)$  quantifies the direction and magnitude that needs to be assumed for selection on unobservables to overturn our estimated treatment effects. For example:  $\Psi(0) = -2$  means that selection of unobservables needs to move in the opposite direction of the selection on observables and has to be double the magnitude to imply a zero treatment effect.

Table 12: Interaction of Learning Treatments and Incentive Pay

	Forecast Error	Noise	Precision Error
Error Reminder Treatment	0.5764 (1.0628)	0.3551 (0.9480)	-2.6568* (1.3811)
Error Reminder Treatment × Incentive Treatment	-0.4555 (1.5847)	-2.0143* (1.0567)	0.4331 (0.9080)
Scientific Learning Treatment	3.2133*** (1.0980)	0.4320 (1.0637)	-4.0786*** (1.5616)
Scientific Learning Treatment × Incentive Treatment	-2.2300 (1.7498)	-1.2645 (1.2582)	1.5124 (1.0546)
Constant	2.2006*** (0.5738)	29.3460*** (0.5825)	22.3268*** (0.9500)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01
Number of firms	1248	1248	1282
Number of observations	8,210	8,210	10,371

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Noise is defined as the absolute value of the forecast error  $|\xi_{t+1}|$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left(\frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65}\right) - \left(\frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65}\right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Incentive treatment is a dummy that is one from October 2021 onwards. All specifications include a full set of time fixed effects to control for changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 13: Robustness: Incentive Treatments

	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Theory Engagement	2.1290*** (0.7363)	-2.6776*** (1.0205)		
Theory Engagement × Incentive Treatment	-1.6520* (0.9709)	1.3838** (0.6017)		
Testing relative to Theory			-3.5126*** (1.2498)	4.2481*** (1.6253)
Testing relative to Theory × Incentive Treatment			2.7117 (1.6691)	-2.1013** (1.0161)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	158.43	193.84	51.36	65.22
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	186.19	221.66	85.45	106.14
Number of firms	802	827	802	827
Number of observations	5,243	6,647	5,243	6,647

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Sample excludes firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 14: Robustness: Sample of entrepreneurs for which business goal and best guess for revenue growth is the same

	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Theory Engagement	1.5139*** (0.5760)	-1.8950** (0.9119)		
Testing relative to Theory			-2.4378*** (0.9386)	3.0207** (1.4510)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	221.54	235.55	132.25	161.15
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	145.59	155.39	103.96	123.05
R-squared	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
Number of firms	742	786	742	786
Number of observations	4,316	5,078	4,316	5,078

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{i,t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Sample excludes firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 15: Robustness: Sample of observations in the first half of the study

	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Theory Engagement	2.1290*** (0.7363)	-2.6776*** (1.0205)		
Testing relative to Theory			-3.5126*** (1.2498)	4.2481*** (1.6253)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	316.92	387.73	102.75	130.47
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	186.19	221.66	85.45	106.14
Number of firms	770	803	770	803
Number of observations	3,143	3,651	3,143	3,651

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Sample excludes firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 16: Robustness: Sample of entrepreneurs working at least 35 hour per week in focal business

	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Theory Engagement	1.7606*** (0.6555)	-2.9181*** (1.0442)		
Testing relative to Theory			-3.5300** (1.3847)	5.4909*** (1.9447)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	116.49	132.12	46.13	70.95
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	76.36	86.51	39.67	58.44
Number of firms	518	540	518	540
Number of observations	2,981	3,750	2,981	3,750

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Sample excludes firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 17: Robustness: Differential industry trends

	Forecast Error	Precision Error	Forecast Error	Precision Error
Theory Engagement	1.2721** (0.5181)	-1.9641** (0.8909)		
Testing relative to Theory			-2.1062** (0.8652)	3.1923** (1.4416)
Industry-by-Time FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	258.55	289.64	139.81	176.22
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	164.68	183.98	109.84	134.64
Number of firms	802	827	802	827
Number of observations	5,243	6,647	5,243	6,647

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . The precision error is defined as  $\omega_{i,t} = \left( \frac{P_{90,i} - P_{10,i}}{2.65} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{90,i}^f - P_{10,i}^f}{2.65} \right)$ , where  $P_{x,i}$  denotes the percentile  $x$  of monthly growth, and  $P_{x,i}^f$  the subjective percentile  $x$  of monthly growth at month  $t$  for firm  $i$ . Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Sample excludes firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 18: Welfare effects of Debiasing and Scientific Learning Treatment

	<b>A: Debiasing</b>		<b>B: Scientific Learning Treatment</b>	
	\$ per month	% of median monthly profit	\$ per month	% of median monthly profit
40 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	\$2737.88	60.87%	-\$2263.58	-50.32%
<b>Median</b>	<b>\$990.23</b>	<b>22.01%</b>	<b>-\$818.69</b>	<b>-18.20%</b>
60 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	\$160.29	3.56%	-\$132.52	-2.94%
75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	-\$67.49	-1.50%	\$55.79	1.24%
85 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	-\$787.39	-\$17.50	\$650.99	14.47%

Notes: Debiasing is defined as removing the median of the average monthly overestimation error of 2.81% per month, in the control group. Scientific Learning Treatment counterfactual is adding an average monthly forecast error of 2.3% (from estimates in Table 6). All welfare calculations are on a monthly basis. Median monthly entrepreneurial profit in the sample is roughly \$4,500.



# A Appendix Figures and Tables

## A.1 Apparent Overplacement and Forecast Errors

Benoit and Dubra (2011) offer a critique of empirical work on overplacement by arguing that this work measures "apparent overconfidence": despite the population updating correctly using Bayes' Law and being bias-free, survey measures of self-ranking may indicate overplacement spuriously. In this section, we show that their critique requires a discrete type space and does not apply to overestimation, as measured in this paper. To make this point, we provide a counterexample to the conjecture that their Bayesian model can explain overestimation. This counterexample is building on an example of apparent overplacement, provided by Benoit and Dubra (2011) but translated to our context. Specifically, consider a population of entrepreneurs, which can be of three types: low-growth, medium-growth and high-growth, denoted  $\tau_L, \tau_M, \tau_H$ . Each of the three types is equally likely, implying priors for the types of  $p_{0,\tau} = 1/3$ . Firm growth for entrepreneurs is a function of their type and can either be high or low, with low growth firms not growing ( $g_L = 0$ ) and high growth growing by 10% ( $g_H = 0.1$ ). The corresponding random variable of firm growth is denoted  $G$ . Each of the three types differ in their probabilities of not growing, with  $P(g_L|\tau_L) = 0.5875$ ,  $P(g_L|\tau_M) = 0.5625$ ,  $P(g_L|\tau_H) = 0.05$ . As a result, the probability of no growth across the population of entrepreneurs is 40% ( $\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5875 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5625 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.05 = 0.4$ ).

Benoit and Dubra (2011) show that in this example the majority of entrepreneurs might consider themselves to be above average, and therefore exhibit overplacement in the sense of Moore and Healy (2008), despite the fact that all entrepreneurs correctly use Bayes' Law to update their beliefs and are therefore bias-free. For this purpose, consider the subgroup of entrepreneurs who did not have zero growth, but instead experienced a 10% growth rate. According to Bayes' Law, their posteriors for being of the different types are

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\tau_L|g_H) &= \frac{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5875}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5625 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5875 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.05} = 0.2291 \\
 P(\tau_M|g_H) &= \frac{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5625}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5625 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5875 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.05} = 0.243 \\
 P(\tau_H|g_H) &= \frac{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.05}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5625 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.5875 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0.05} = 0.527
 \end{aligned} \tag{A.1}$$

In other words, 60% of the entrepreneurs (who had a growth rate of 10%) think that they are more likely than not to be in the top third of the population. Specifically, they think that the probability of being in the top third is 0.527 and therefore higher than 1/2. A researcher conducting a representative survey in this population of entrepreneurs would therefore find widespread overplacement, despite everybody forming their beliefs rationally. A crucial issue is that survey respondents are asked to select one type among a discrete number of types and therefore select the type that is most likely. In the terminology of Benoit and Dubra (2011), beliefs are "median-rationalizable".

However, within this same example, the use of growth forecast errors shows that this population of entrepreneurs is bias-free, as one would expect under Bayesian updating. To see this, we first calculate the expected growth rates for the three types, which are given by

$$\begin{aligned}
E[G|\tau_L] &= (1 - 0.5875) \cdot 0.1 = 0.04125 \\
E[G|\tau_M] &= (1 - 0.5675) \cdot 0.1 = 0.04375 \\
E[G|\tau_H] &= (1 - 0.05) \cdot 0.1 = 0.095
\end{aligned} \tag{A.2}$$

These expected growth rates in (A.2), conditional on type can now be combined with the posterior probabilities for type in (A.1) to calculate growth forecast, given that the last growth rate was  $g_H$ :  $g_H^f = E[G|g_H]$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_H^f &= \sum_{\tau \in \{\tau_L, \tau_M, \tau_H\}} P(\tau|g_i = 0.1) \cdot E[g_i|\tau] \\
&= 0.07
\end{aligned} \tag{A.3}$$

And similarly for the firms that experienced no growth  $g_L^f = E[G|g_L]$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_L^f &= \sum_{\tau \in \{\tau_L, \tau_M, \tau_H\}} P(\tau|g_i = 0) \cdot E[g_i|\tau] \\
&= 0.0446
\end{aligned} \tag{A.4}$$

Ex post, there will be four possible forecast errors,  $\xi_{k,l} = g_k^f - g_l$  with  $k, l \in L, H$  namely

$$\begin{aligned}
\xi_{H,H} &= 0.07 - 0.1 = -0.03 \\
\xi_{H,L} &= 0.07 - 0 = 0.07 \\
\xi_{L,H} &= 0.0446 - 0.1 = -0.0553 \\
\xi_{L,L} &= 0.0446 - 0 = 0.0446
\end{aligned} \tag{A.5}$$

Averaging over the group with high-growth as previous realized outcome, we get<sup>13</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{\xi}_H &= \sum_{l,\tau} [\xi_{H,l} \cdot P(g_l|\tau)] \cdot P(\tau|g_H) \\
&= [0.07 \cdot 0.5975 - 0.03 \cdot 0.4125] \cdot 0.2291 \\
&\quad + [0.07 \cdot 0.5625 - 0.03 \cdot 0.4375] \cdot 0.243 \\
&\quad + [0.07 \cdot 0.05 - 0.03 \cdot 0.95] \cdot 0.5277 \\
&\approx 0
\end{aligned} \tag{A.6}$$

In other words, the same 60% of entrepreneurs that exhibited apparent overplacement, do not exhibit overestimation as measured by average forecast error. In this group, firms with positive forecast error cancel out firms with negative forecast error. This suggests that the critique of [Benoit and Dubra \(2011\)](#) does not apply generally to average forecast error as measure of overconfidence.

<sup>13</sup>Similarly, for firms with low-growth as previous realized outcome the average forecast error could be computed as  $\bar{\xi}_L = \sum_{l,\tau} [\xi_{L,l} \cdot P(g_l|\tau)] \cdot P(\tau|g_H) \approx 0$

## A.2 Persistent Private Information

In the main text we use simple forecast error, calculated as the difference between sales growth forecast and realized sales growth. However, this approach can be problematic, if there exists persistent private information. For example, an entrepreneur might consistently make very high growth forecast, since he knows about a business opportunity that might realize over the next several months, but every month it does not realize, his growth forecast spuriously looks like overestimation. In this section we build on a model of Bayesian learning with persistent private information in [Healy and Moore \(2007\)](#) to correct for this issue. As we show below, correcting for persistent private information leads to even higher measured entrepreneurial overestimation in the control group. At the same time, the theory developed in this section confirms that systematic overestimation cannot be generated by Bayesian updating, as argued in the previous section.

The firm growth rate  $g_{i,t}$  for entrepreneur  $i$  in time period  $t$  can be modeled as

$$g_{i,t} = \theta_{i,t} + u_{i,t} \tag{A.7}$$

where  $u_{i,t}$  is an iid error term with  $u_{i,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)$  and  $\theta_{i,t}$  is the forecastable part of firm growth with  $\theta_{i,t} \sim N(\mu, \sigma_\theta^2)$ . For simplicity, we assume that variances  $\sigma_u^2, \sigma_\theta^2$  are known.

Entrepreneurs observe a noisy private signal  $s_{i,t-1}$ , which is unobserved by the econometrician and is given by

$$s_{i,t-1} = g_{i,t} + e_{i,t-1} \tag{A.8}$$

where  $e_{i,t-1}$  is an iid error term with  $e_{i,t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2)$ . Under Bayesian updating growth forecasts will be

$$E[g_{i,t}|s_{i,t}] = \alpha \cdot \mu + (1 - \alpha) \cdot s_{i,t-1} \tag{A.9}$$

with  $\alpha = \frac{\sigma_e^2}{\sigma_e^2 + \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_\theta^2} \in (0, 1)$ . An econometrician analyzing the entrepreneur's forecasts does not observe the private information  $s_{i,t-1}$ . However, the econometrician will observe the growth outcome  $g_{i,t}$ , which is correlated with the private signal  $s_{i,t-1}$ .<sup>14</sup> This insight is key to address the presence of private information. Specifically, conditional on observing  $g_{i,t}$ , one can integrate out the private signal:

$$\begin{aligned} E_s [E[g_{i,t}|s_{i,t-1}]|g_{i,t}] &= E_s [\alpha \cdot \mu + (1 - \alpha) \cdot s_{i,t-1}|g_{i,t}] \\ &= \alpha \cdot \mu + (1 - \alpha) \cdot E_s [s_{i,t}|g_{i,t}] \\ &= \alpha \cdot \mu + (1 - \alpha) \cdot E_s [(g_{i,t} + e_{i,t-1})|g_{i,t}] \\ &= \alpha \cdot \mu + (1 - \alpha) \cdot g_{i,t} \end{aligned} \tag{A.10}$$

The last line in [\(A.10\)](#) shows that one can use the realized growth rate to condition on private information. Intuitively, conditioning on realized growth rates allows the econometrician to control of all possible private signals are correlated with this growth. The simplest approach to do this is regress forecasts on contemporaneous growth rates and use the fitted forecast values as forecast measure when calculating forecast errors. This is the approach we pursue below.

Before the empirical application, it is worthwhile showing in the context of our discussion of [Benoit and Dubra \(2011\)](#), that overestimation will only result if entrepreneurs deviate from Bayesian updating. To see this, we subtract the growth rate  $g_{i,t}$  from both sides of [\(A.10\)](#) and take

---


<sup>14</sup>If the private signal  $s_{i,t-1}$  would be uncorrelated with the growth outcome  $g_{i,t}$ , a rational entrepreneur should not put any weight on it, i.e.  $\alpha = 1$  in [\(A.9\)](#).

expectations:


$$E[E_s[E[g_{i,t}|s_{i,t}]|g_{i,t}] - g_{i,t}] = \alpha \cdot (\mu - E[g_{i,t}]) \quad (\text{A.11})$$

Taking expectations gives  $E[g_{i,t}] = E[\theta_{i,t} + u_{i,t}] = E[\theta_{i,t}] = \mu$  and there should be no average forecast error. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that Bayesian learning converges to unbiased (or "rational") expectations, see [Feldmann \(1987\)](#).

Figure A.1: Forecast Error and Private information



(A) Private-information-corrected forecast error



(B) Private-information-corrected forecast error with firm FE

Note: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{i,t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Data for the figure uses only periods before introduction of incentive payments for prediction accuracy.

To investigate whether private information might drive forecast errors, we need to estimate

forecasts, conditional on realized growth. The approach implied by theory is given by equation (A.10):

$$E_s [E[g_{i,t}|s_{i,t-1}]|g_{i,t}] = \alpha \cdot \mu + (1 - \alpha) \cdot g_{i,t} \quad (\text{A.12})$$

This can be estimated by regressing forecasts on a constant and realized growth rates  $g_{i,t}$ . A slightly more general version allows for firm fixed effects:

$$E_s [E[g_{i,t}|s_{i,t-1}]|g_{i,t}] = \alpha \cdot \mu_i + (1 - \alpha) \cdot g_{i,t} \quad (\text{A.13})$$

It is useful to recall that the Bayesian updating parameter is common across all entrepreneurs, if  $\sigma_e^2, \sigma_u^2$  are common, since  $\alpha = \frac{\sigma_e^2}{\sigma_e^2 + \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_\theta^2}$ . To calculate private-information corrected forecasts we estimate (A.13) with firm fixed effects and then use (A.13) to solve for  $\mu_i$  and then average across time periods to estimate it.

Figure A.1 contrasts our baseline measures of forecast error used in the main text in solid blue, with private-information-corrected forecast error in green dashed lines. Median overestimation becomes stronger when accounting for private information. As a result, private information about growth opportunities cannot explain the degree of entrepreneurial overconfidence we observe in the data. Importantly the distribution of private-information-corrected forecast errors is very similar to the uncorrected forecast error distribution, especially if we account for firm fixed effects as in the bottom panel of Figure A.1.

### A.3 Normalizing revenue growth outcomes

As discussed in section 3, we asked participants to make revenue forecasts for the next 4 weeks, or roughly 28 days. To calculate realized revenue growth, we used reported monthly revenues in the main text. However, the median time between subsequent survey responses was about 31 days instead of 28 days.

A simple way to address this issue is to normalize the revenue growth outcomes to a 28 day time window. For this purpose, we use data on the reported revenues in combination with data on the number of days between responses to calculate the implied average daily revenue growth at the business. With these average daily revenue growth, we can then recalculate revenue growth to a 28-day horizon and then re-calculate forecast error.

The following tables show that all of our main results are robust to this rec-calculation of forecast errors.

Table A.1: Correlation of Misattribution and Overconfidence

	<b>Forecast Error</b>		
	Control Group	Error Reminder Treatment Group	Scientific Learning Treatment Group
Misattribution (negative)	-3.1621 (3.3055)	33.3731*** (1.5597)	30.8073*** (1.6708)
Constant	3.2062*** (0.5559)	2.0486*** (0.5865)	3.9441*** (0.6386)
R-squared	0.0042	0.0470	0.0480
Number of firms	480	446	322
Number of observations	3,255	2,967	1,988

Notes: Negative misattribution is measured as firms that state they underperformed their forecasted revenue growth due to reasons external to the firm, while being in industries in which the median firm outperformed their forecasted revenue growth. Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ .

Table A.2: Treatment Effect of Scientific Learning

	Forecast Error	Forecast Error
Scientific Learning Treatment	2.0889** (0.8238)	5.6573*** (1.6300)
Scientific Learning Treatment × linear time trend		-0.5553** (0.2244)
Constant	3.1060*** (0.5430)	3.1034*** (0.5431)
Time FE?	YES	YES
R-squared	0.0058	0.0066
Number of firms	802	802
Number of observations	5,243	5,243

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . All specifications include a full set of time fixed effects to control for changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

## A.4 Details on Scientific Learning Treatment

Table A.3: Causal impact of Engagement with Scientific Learning

	Forecast Error	Forecast Error	Forecast Error
Overall Engagement with Scientific Learning	1.1910** (0.4798)		
Testing relative to Theory		-2.0241** (0.8241)	
Pre-Postmortem relative to Theory			-13.5219 (9.5036)
Constant		0.4053 (1.5581)	-2.1818 (2.4673)
Time FE?	YES	YES	YES
Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test	242.11	140.90	2.99
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification Test	155.27	109.03	2.98
R-squared	-0.00	-0.00	-0.43
Number of firms	802	802	802
Number of observations	5,243	5,243	5,243

Notes: Forecast error  $\xi_{i,t+1}$  is measured as difference between monthly revenue growth forecast  $g_{i,t+1}^f$  and actual revenue growth  $g_{i,t+1}$ :  $\xi_{t+1} = g_{i,t+1}^f - g_{i,t+1}$ . Engagement is measured by length of response (string length) to free-form textboxes, in which we ask about the reasoning behind responses to scientific learning questions. Scientific learning engagement consists of the normalized (zero mean, unit variance) engagement score in story, pre-postmortem and testing. Theory consists of basic idea of the business, definition of problems preventing the idea from being more successful, solution approaches, definition of conditions under which the core idea of the business will be more successful, and definition of tests to validate or falsify conditions for success. Pre-postmortem consists of internal firm conditions that might imply underperformance next month. Testing captures description of empirical tests that firm conducted to test conditions for success of the core business idea. All measures are normalized (zero mean, unit variance). Sample excludes firms with Error Reminder Treatment. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level.


Figure A.2: Scientific Learning Treatment Nudges

**Part 1 (Hypothesis Development): (1) Differentiation**

A "competitive advantage" is a strength your company has, which distinguishes you from your competitors and which is hard to copy.

Often such "competitive advantage" results from exploring previously untested ideas. **Do you have a unique idea or belief that differs from "conventional wisdom" in your industry? If you hold such a contrarian belief, what is it and how could it help with your growth goal?**

*For example, you might own a sandwich shop and no other sandwich shop in your neighborhood might offer breakfast, because "conventional wisdom" is that there is not enough foot-traffic in the morning. A contrarian belief might be that many office workers are open to purchasing breakfast, but do not currently do so, because they want to avoid fatigue after eating a heavy and unhealthy breakfast sandwich.*



**Part 1 (Hypothesis Development): (2) Problem Framing**

**What are the most important problems that prevent your unique idea from being realized? Put differently, what are the reasons your belief is contrarian instead of being widely accepted in your industry?**

*In the sandwich shop example, among the problems preventing you from offering breakfast could be that you do not know demand by office workers for healthy breakfast options. Another problem might be that office workers do not know that healthy breakfast options are available for purchase.*






Figure A.3: Scientific Learning Treatment Nudges

**Part 1 (Hypothesis Development): (3) Hypothesis Generation**

**Please list two possible plans that might solve the problems that prevent your unique idea from being realized and which can help with your growth goals. Ideally, these two plans would be two different ways that help you solve a problem that other competitors in your market are not solving.**

We recommend that these two plans include

- (1) What advantage you intend to use or create to achieve your goal,
- (2) What customer or market segment you will target
- (3) A list the activities that you will use to deliver the intended results

Two questions other business executives have found helpful to come up with these two possible plans are the following:

- (A) What does this company do especially well? How could that strength help to increase value for new potential customers or reduce costs to you?
- (B) What are the underserved needs or needs that customers find hard to express, and what gaps have competitors left?

*In the sandwich shop example, one plan might be to offer healthy breakfast smoothies with caffeine, which prevent customers from being tired after breakfast. The targeted customer segment are nearby office workers, which are more likely to be repeat customers. To deliver such smoothies you would need equipment and freshly purchased ingredients. One potential advantage might be your knowledge of tasty smoothie recipes.*

Figure A.4: Scientific Learning Treatment Nudges

**Part 1 (Hypothesis Development): (4) Key Assumptions**

What would have to be true for each of the two plans you listed in the last question, to achieve your growth goal for the next month?

For each of the two plans, please make up a list of conditions, which you could potentially observe, and that can either assure you that your plan worked or make you confident that the plan did not work. Such a list of conditions can enable you to pay attention to the relevant business information in a targeted way and more accurately learn from your experiences.

One way to express this is an IF-THEN statement: IF your conditions are met, THEN your profit increases because of the problem the plan solves.

*In the sandwich shop example, your condition might be "IF I can at least attract 45 office workers at \$5 per breakfast smoothie every weekday, THEN offering breakfast is profitable". One way this condition might fail is that there are not enough office workers interested to purchase breakfast smoothies every weekday.*

Figure A.5: Scientific Learning Treatment Nudges

**Part 1 (Hypothesis Development): (5) Pre-Definition of Tests**

**For each of the conditions you specified in the previous question, how would you test whether this condition is true?**

A "test" involves figuring out if the underlying REASON your plan works is correct or incorrect, just like a "business scientist" would. Understanding the reason your plan works can be important to ensure that you can repeat your success and do not rely on "luck". It will also ensure you that you solved the problem that prevents other firms from doing the same.

*Let's return to the sandwich shop example with the condition "IF I can at least attract 45 office workers at \$5 per breakfast smoothie every weekday, THEN offering breakfast is profitable". Your test might involve offering healthy breakfast smoothies with caffeine and advertise these healthy options in neighboring office buildings. Keeping track of how many of your breakfast smoothie customers are office workers and how many of your office workers are repeat customers can then tell you if you can repeat your success.*

For more detail, see [this article](#) (which will open in a new tab and not interrupt your survey responses on this tab).

Note: The link on this page leads to an online version of [Lafley et al. \(2012\)](#), which is a general audience introduction to Scientific Learning for managers.

Figure A.6: Scientific Learning Treatment Nudges

**Part 2 (Pre-Postmortem)**

Suppose you miss your growth goal for the next month. What is the most likely reason for this miss?

Reasons internal to the company (please specify)	Reasons external to the company (please specify)
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

**Part 3 (Hypothesis Testing)**

Last month we asked you to come up with two alternative plans that might help you meet your growth target. We also asked you to specify "what would have to be true", for these two plans to succeed and to come up with ways to test whether these conditions are true for your business.

Did you have an opportunity to conduct a test of the "what would have to be true" conditions?

- No
- Yes (please specify the outcome)