The Efficiency-Equity Tradeoff of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

> Patrick Kennedy Berkeley and JCT Job Market Paper

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Disclaimer

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Research Question

What are the efficiency and equity implications of corporate income tax cuts?

- Existing evidence primarily from state and local tax changes
- Federal tax changes may have different effects:
 - Differences in factor mobility; higher tax rates and broader base
- Why is existing evidence scarce?
 - Federal reforms are rare
 - Microdata not previously available to researchers
 - Challenging to find credible counterfactuals


This Paper

- **1**. Large Federal Tax Change + Rich Microdata + Within-Country Design
 - Exploit variation from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)
 - Rich employer-employee linked IRS microdata
 - DiD comparing C- and S-corps within the same industry-size bin


2. Empirics

- Firm-level evidence: profits, investment, shareholder payouts
- Worker-level evidence: employment, earnings
- 3. Stylized Model
 - Use reduced form elasticities to quantify efficiency gains, incidence
 - Benchmark against alternate taxes

Historically Large Reform



Large Relative to Recent Studies



IRS Microdata

Sample: Employer-employee linked federal tax records, 2013-2019

Business Tax Returns (SOI 1120, 1120s)

- Sales, profits, investment, taxes, firm characteristics
- Restrict to large firms, balance panel, drop C \leftrightarrow S switchers

Individual Tax Returns + SSA Data

• Employment and earnings (W-2); S-Corps business income (K1), demographics

Measurement


- S-Corp MTR constructed as weighted average of shareholder MTR's
- Scale outcomes by 2016 sales to account for potentially non-positive values

Empirical Design: C vs. S Corps

DiD comparing two legal entity types:

	C-Corps	S-Corps			
Legal Differences					
Taxes	Pay corp, dividend taxes on profits	Owners pay personal taxes on profits			
Shareholders	No restrictions	<=100 owners; must be individual US citizens			
TCJA Changes					
Top Rate Cut	$35\% \rightarrow 21\%$	$39.6\% \rightarrow 37\%;$ 20% QBI deduction			

Top Marginal Income Tax Rates



Empirical Strategy

Estimate:

$$y_{ft} = \sum_{t \neq 2016} \beta_t C_f * \mathbf{1}(year = t) + \gamma_f + \alpha_{is(f),t} + \epsilon_{ft}$$

- y_{ft} is an outcome for firm f in year t
 - $y \in \{MTR, taxes, profits, payouts, investment, employment, workers' earnings\}$
- C_f is an indicator = 1 if firm f is a C-Corp
- γ_f is a firm fixed effect
- $\alpha_{is(f),t}$ is an industry×size-bin×year fixed effect
- Cluster standard errors by firm

Identification and Interpretation

$$y_{ft} = \sum_{t \neq 2016} \beta_t C_f * \mathbf{1}(year = t) + \gamma_f + \alpha_{is(f),t} + \epsilon_{ft}$$

Identification

- Key assumption is parallel trends in counterfactual with no MTR shocks
- Defending parallel trends:
 - TCJA was unexpected prior to 2016 elections
 - Compare outcomes in narrow industry-size-year bins
 - Examine pre-trends to assess plausibility


Interpretation

- β_t captures differential trend of C-Corps relative to S-Corps
- Also report elasticities WRT to the net-of-tax rate, $(1- au_f)$


How might $\Delta \tau^{MTR}$ affect firm and worker outcomes?

- Changes in the cost of capital and relative prices
- Income or liquidity effects
- Other channels: expectations, salience, information...


Marginal Tax Rate Wedge τ_f




Tax Per Worker




Pre-Tax Profits




After-Tax Profits




Shareholder Payouts




Net Investment / Lagged Capital




Labor Markets: Modest Employment Effect




No Change in Median Earnings



Big Increases at the Top



Firm Wage Quantile Regressions



Elasticities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	$\ln(1-\tau_f^{MTR})$	Pre-tax π	Post-tax π	I_t/K_{t-1}	w_{p50}	w_{p95}	Executives
C × 2019	0.069***	0.030***	0.040***	0.123***	-0.001	0.013***	0.047***
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.034)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.016)
2016 Outcome Mean	-0.305	0.465	0.419	0.142	46,225	157,534	6,209,335
ε^{NTR}		0.43	0.58	1.80	-0.01	0.20	0.65
s.e.		0.12	0.14	0.51	0.08	0.07	0.22
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Size-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.74	0.71	0.70	0.22	0.95	0.95	0.92
N	83,517	83,517	83,517	83,517	83,517	83,517	83,517
N Firms	12,110	12,110	12,110	12,110	12,110	12,110	12,110

• Federal corporate elasticity of taxable income $\varepsilon^{\pi} \approx 0.43$

- $\varepsilon^{\pi} \leq \text{most}$ estimates from state/local tax lit; $\geq \text{most}$ estimates from personal tax lit
- Consistent with theory that tax distortions are proportional to factor mobility
- Leverage other elasticities to estimate incidence


Incidence

	\$ (bil)	%
Factor Incidence		
Firm Owners	44.3	69.8
Capital Owners	7.3	11.4
Executives	3.0	4.7
High-Paid Labor	9.0	14.1
Low-Paid Labor	0.0	0.0
Distributional Incidence		
Тор 1%	16.9	26.6
91-99th%	26.5	41.7
Bottom 90%	20.1	31.7

• Distributional incidence estimated using K ownership data from Fed SCF (2018)

 $\bullet~\approx$ 70% of benefits flow to top 10% of earners

Corporate Tax Vs. Alternate Tax Instruments



More in the Paper

Additional results:

- Shifting and evasion
- Mechanism and robustness tests
- Firm and worker heterogeneity
- Market-level effects
- Model-based welfare estimates

Conclusion

Clear evidence that corporate tax cuts have significant effects on real outcomes

Efficiency-equity tradeoff:

- Efficiency: Greater efficiency gains from cutting CIT relative to other federal taxes
- Equity: Tax cuts disproportionately benefit high earners