Auctions with Frictions*

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Abstract

Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. Existing models have to be enriched to capture certain frictions that are salient in such informal situations. In particular, bidder participation may be the outcome of costly recruitment efforts, participation may be costly for the bidders, and the seller’s commitment abilities may be limited. This paper develops a model of auctions with such frictions and derives some novel predictions. In particular, outcomes are often inefficient, and the market sometimes unravels.

Much of the work on auction theory focuses on design aspects in situations where the seller has substantial commitment power and the potential bidders are known and ready to participate (bidding or first acquiring information). These assumptions are motivated by formally organized auctions, such as those held by government agencies. However, auction models are also convenient abstractions of less formal price formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. In such situations, the commitment ability of the seller may be limited, the recruitment

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1This view of auction models as abstractions of free-form price formation motivated some of the earlier literature (Milgrom, 1979, and Wilson, 1977).
of bidders may be a central issue, and the interaction may be affected by information that the auctioneer has or is trying to learn.

These “design” and “markets” agendas differ not only in some of their assumptions but also in the bigger questions that they are addressing. The “markets” agenda is interested in traditional economic questions concerning the efficiency of markets and how competition handles information asymmetries. It is not very interested in design questions (such as identifying a mechanism that performs well by some criteria); in fact, it might prefer to consider situations in which the fine details of the design are unimportant.

This paper contributes to the “markets” agenda. It explores the role and interaction of three aspects of less formal auction scenarios: costly recruitment, costly bidder entry/information acquisition, and the seller’s inability to commit to the level of recruitment effort.

Why is this interesting? Obviously, these features are present in almost any market (sales of assets like houses or companies and procurement of goods and services). Recruiting bidders is often an essential factor in the success of an auction, bidding usually requires costly preparation and attention, and in many scenarios in which prices are determined by some sort of bidding process, perhaps the majority of them, the seller is unable to credibly commit to important aspects of the interaction. However, this undisputed reality alone would not mean much if those features did not have qualitative effects on outcomes. This paper offers a few sharp new insights that show that these features in combination might have significant consequences.

The fundamental tension is that sellers always prefer to have more bidders, which makes it harder to motivate bidders who have to bear participation costs. When combined with the seller’s inability to commit to the level of participation or the recruitment effort, this tension may have significant consequences, even when the marginal cost of recruitment and the bidders’ cost of participation are not too high. In some cases, it results in an excessively large recruitment effort. In other cases, it results in a complete market breakdown—no trade takes place, even when the recruitment and participation costs are low enough to have facilitated trade if seller commitment were possible. Under these circumstances, whether bidders can observe

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2The importance of recruitment is supported by Bulow and Klemperer (1996)’s observation on the significant effect of adding bidders on revenue—they show that adding a single additional buyer to a standard auction with no reserve price increases revenue more than imposing an optimal reserve price.
the extent of participation also matters greatly. It may encourage or suppress trade depending on the configuration of the costs of recruitment and participation.

That tension is at the heart of the model, which we will now describe. The model features an independent private-values first-price auction with a random number of prospective bidders, which is the realization of a Poisson distribution whose parameter is determined by the seller’s costly recruitment effort. A recruited prospective bidder decides whether to participate. Participation may involve a cost, which can be due to information acquisition or other preparations. The bidders do not observe the seller’s recruitment effort. We examine two scenarios:

In the PO scenario (“participation-observable”), bidders observe the number of participants before bidding. The unique equilibrium for this scenario yields two related insights. First, it may involve a substantial inefficiency in the form of an excessively large total recruitment effort that remains costly even when the cost per unit effort is small. Second, it may result in no trade, even when the recruitment and participation costs are low enough to have facilitated trade if seller commitment or greater transparency were possible.

In the alternative PU scenario (“participation - unobservable”), the bidders do not observe the extent of participation in the auction. The unobservability generates a new consideration—the seller’s incentive to secretly reduce recruitment. This may give rise to multiple equilibria sustained by different levels of fulfilled expectations. One of them is an equilibrium with no trade. This equilibrium always exists, and sometimes it is unique, even when the circumstances seem favorable for trade (bidders bear no cost of entry, and the seller’s recruitment cost is not prohibitive). Thus, the auction collapses under circumstances that could sustain beneficial trade in the presence of commitment or observable participation.

Some interesting insights arise from comparing the two scenarios. First, if the bidders’ entry/information acquisition cost is small enough not to constrain the equilibria, then equilibrium participation and profit are higher in the PO scenario. In particular, as explained above, the PO equilibrium may involve active trade, even when no trade is the unique PU equilibrium outcome. In contrast, if the bidders’ costs are high enough to constrain the equilibrium, the total recruitment cost is larger; consequently, profit and total surplus are lower in the PO than in the PU scenario. In particular, when bidders’ cost is high enough, the unique PO equilibrium involves no trade, whereas, for small enough recruitment costs, the PU
scenario has an active-trade equilibrium.

In terms of payoffs and costs, the PO equilibrium is equivalent to the dominant strategy equilibrium of the second-price auction format in either scenario (as observability does not matter). Therefore, the above insights also apply verbatim to a comparison between the first-price and second-price auction formats with unobservable participation. In the absence of the frictions (lack of commitment, costly recruitment, and costly participation), these two auction formats would be equivalent in terms of profit and surplus. They are not equivalent in the presence of costs and absence of commitment power, and their ranking depends on the recruitment and entry-cost conditions. Given our “informal auctions” perspective, we think of the choice of the auction format not from the design angle but rather as a proxy for some mix of bidding and bargaining that arises naturally in these situations. In some informal bidding scenarios, the initial bidding is followed by a few rounds of back-and-forth negotiations with the top bidders. It is reasonable to expect that the outcome of such an informal “English auction” resembles that of a second-price auction. In other scenarios, the bids are taken more seriously, and this is more like a first-price auction.

Our results comparing the PO and PU scenarios, or equivalently the first and second-price formats when participation is unobservable, may help explain the nature of the auctions that emerge when sellers can control these aspects. They identify the recruitment and participation cost combinations that would make one of these scenarios more likely to emerge if the seller can credibly select the observability or the format. In particular, when the market "collapses" only in one scenario, the other scenario is more likely to emerge. A market collapse in both scenarios might mean that trade may take place in other forms, like sequential bargaining, that avoid the retarding effects captured by our model.

We then examine the PO scenario with the added feature of bidders’ uncertainty over the seller’s recruitment cost. This specific example represents the broader issue of how the seller’s private information may be incorporated into behavior and affect incentives and equilibrium outcomes. Such information may be more relevant for the informal environments that we have in mind than, say, for a government-sponsored auction. One insight that arises here is that the market may unravel almost completely: Almost all seller types may stay out of the market even though, if their type were commonly known, each of them would be active in equilibrium.
Driving this result is a “sampling curse:” conditional on being recruited, a bidder believes that the seller is likely to have recruited many other bidders, rendering participation unprofitable.

The core of the model is the interaction between costly recruitment and costly participation in the absence of the seller’s ability to commit. Other features like the Poisson arrival or whether bidders learn their value before or after entry are not essential for the main insights. Indeed, we present several extensions that illustrate the robustness of our qualitative findings. In particular, we consider the case in which, before entering, bidders know their valuation as well as the case in which the seller can set entry fee/subsidy and reserve price. In an earlier version of the paper, we established the same main insights with deterministic recruitment (rather than Poissonian).

We are not aware of references that contain the specific mix of ingredients that we have and derive the insights described above. There are models that feature bidders’ costly entry (e.g., Levin and Smith (1994) and Bulow and Klemperer (2009)) and models that feature recruitment costs (e.g., Szech (2011) and Lauermann and Wolinsky (2017, 2021)). However, none of those models bears a close relationship to the present paper: they do not feature the mix of recruitment and entry costs and observability; they focus on traditional questions of auction design with commitment and consequently derive different insights.\(^3,4\)

1 The PO auction: Observable participation

1.1 The model

One seller owns an indivisible object that has value 0 to her. The seller makes recruitment effort \(\gamma \geq 0\), resulting in a random number of prospective bidders that is Poisson distributed with mean \(\gamma\); i.e., the probability of her contacting \(t\) bidders is \(\frac{e^{\gamma \tau}}{t!} e^{-\gamma}\). The cost of effort \(\gamma\) is \(\gamma s\), for some \(s > 0\).

\(^3\)Levin and Smith (1994)’s insight regarding the seller’s interest in committing to reduced entry may seem to resemble one of our insights. But, in their setting, this is aimed at reducing miscoordination through mixed participation decisions, which is not present in our model.

\(^4\)Lauermann and Wolinsky (2017, 2021) explore the extent of information aggregation by price in a common-values environment with a privately informed seller. Bidders’ entry is costless, so the trade-offs at the heart of the current paper are absent.
The prospective bidders are ex-ante symmetric. A prospective bidder $i$ who decides to participate incurs a cost $c \geq 0$. Afterward, the bidder observes his own value $v_i$ for the good and the total number $n$ of bidders who chose to enter the auction (including $i$ himself). The $v_i$ are private values, independently and identically distributed with a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) $G$, with support $[0, 1]$, a continuous density $g$, and increasing “virtual values,” $v = \frac{1-G(v)}{g(v)}$. The bidders do not observe $v$.

Finally, the participating bidders submit bids. The highest bidder wins and pays $v_i - p - c$ for the winning bidder $i$, $-c$ for a participating bidder who lost, and 0 for a contacted bidder who declined entry.

1.2 Interaction: strategies and equilibrium

The seller’s strategy is the recruitment effort $\gamma \geq 0$. Bidder $i$’s strategy is $(q_i, \beta_i)$, where $q_i \in [0, 1]$ is the entry probability and $\beta_i : [0, 1] \times \{1, 2, \ldots\} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ describes $i$’s bid as a function of his information $(v_i, n)$—that is, $i$’s private value and the number of participating bidders. Bidder $i$’s belief concerning the seller’s effort, conditional on being contacted (but before observing $(v_i, n)$), is a probability distribution $\mu_i$ with finite support$^5$ in $[0, \infty)$. Thus, $\mu_i(\gamma)$ is the probability that bidder $i$ assigns to the possibility that the seller chose effort $\gamma$.

We study symmetric behavior in which all bidders employ the same strategy $(q, \beta)$ and hold the same belief $\mu$. An equilibrium consists of $\gamma^*$, $q^*$, and $\beta^*$, such that the following hold:

1. $\gamma^*$ maximizes the seller’s expected payoff given $q^*$ and $\beta^*$.

2. There exists a belief $\mu$ such that

- $q^*$ and $\beta^*$ maximize each bidder’s payoff, given $\mu$ and the other bidders’ strategy $(q^*, \beta^*)$;
- if $\gamma^* > 0$, then $\mu(\gamma^*) = 1$, i.e., the belief is confirmed on the path;

$^5$Finiteness will turn out to involve no loss of generality in this model.
• if $\gamma^* = 0$, then every $\hat{\gamma}$ in the support of $\mu$ maximizes the seller’s payoff given $q^*$ and $\beta^*$.

Thus, by definition, the equilibrium is symmetric and allows only pure recruitment and bidding strategies; mixing is allowed only in the bidders’ entry decisions, $q \in [0, 1]$.

Off-path beliefs arise only when $\gamma^* = 0$, but their role is not negligible, since this is an important case of extreme market failure. The last bullet point in the equilibrium definition imposes a refinement on the off-path beliefs, which allows us to rule out no-trade equilibria that rely on unfounded beliefs. This will be discussed in Subsection 6.5, where we present alternative ways to obtain the needed refinement.\(^6\)

Notice that the refinement does not rule out $\mu(0) > 0$. This is the case in which a bidder is contacted off-path despite the fact that the seller’s profit-maximizing effort is 0. Essentially, the bidder believes that the seller only “trembled” slightly and that this bidder is most likely the only one to have been contacted.\(^7\)

The random number of actual participants in the auction is Poisson distributed with mean

$$\lambda := q\gamma.$$ 

Given the Poisson distribution, $\lambda$ is not just the expected number of participants from an outsider’s perspective, but it is also the expected number of competitors of a participating bidder (Myerson, 1998).

For convenience we will mostly use $\lambda$ (instead of $\gamma$). Thus, bidders’ belief $\mu$ will be over $\lambda$ and the equilibrium will be expressed in terms of $\lambda^* := q^*\gamma^*$.

### 2 Equilibrium analysis for the PO scenario

#### 2.1 Solving backward

The interaction in the PO scenario unfolds in three stages—recruitment, bidders’ entry, bidding—and the equilibrium can be solved for backward.

**Stage 3: Bidding.** Once the number of participants $n$ is realized, the ensuing auction is a standard symmetric first-price auction (FPA) with independent private

\(^6\)We chose this approach for the main text since it is easy to state and does not require any special notation or modification of the model.

\(^7\)This point is also discussed in Subsection 6.5.
values drawn from the c.d.f. $G$. Such an auction has a unique symmetric equilibrium (see, e.g., Krishna 2010),

$$\beta_{FPA} (v, n) = v - \int_0^v \left[ \frac{G(y)}{G(v)} \right]^{n-1} dy,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)and so $\beta^* = \beta_{FPA}$ is the bidding strategy in every equilibrium.

**Stage 2: Bidders’ entry.** Let $U_o(\lambda)$ be the bidders’ ex-ante expected payoff (gross of the cost of entry), given a Poisson distributed number of participating bidders with mean $\lambda$ who use $\beta_{FPA}$. The subscript $o$ here and later indicates that participation is “observable.”

The following claim presents the properties of $U_o$ that are used in the equilibrium analysis. Its proof is in the appendix. (Throughout, all the proofs that do not appear in the text immediately following the statement of a formal result are in the appendix.)

**Claim 1** $U_o$ is strictly decreasing and continuous, $U_o(0) = E[v]$, and $\lim_{\lambda \to \infty} U_o(\lambda) = 0$.

Given bidders’ belief $\mu$ concerning $\lambda$—a probability distribution with finite support in $[0, \infty)^8$—their optimal entry decision $q$ satisfies

$$E_\mu[U_o(\hat{\lambda})] > c \quad \Rightarrow \quad q = 1,$$

$$E_\mu[U_o(\hat{\lambda})] < c \quad \Rightarrow \quad q = 0.$$ \hspace{1cm} (2)

The case of $c \geq U_o(0)$ is uninteresting, since it means that the bidder stays out. We therefore assume from now on that

$$0 \leq c < U_o(0).$$

Since $U_o$ is continuous and strictly decreasing to 0, the equation $U_o(\lambda) = c$ has a unique solution if $c > 0$. We denote this solution by $\lambda^c$; that is, for $c > 0$,

$$U_o(\lambda^c) = c.$$ \hspace{1cm} (3)

This is the bidders’ break-even participation level: given $\lambda$, a bidder’s expected payoff from entering is nonnegative if and only if $\lambda \leq \lambda^c$. For $c = 0$, we set $\lambda^c = \infty$.

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*Previously, we used $\mu$ to denote belief over $\gamma$. From here on, it denotes beliefs over $\lambda$. 
The upper bar in $\overline{X}$ will serve as a reminder that this is the maximal scale acceptable to bidders.

![Graph of the function $U_o(\lambda)$](image)

Figure 1: The function $U_o(\lambda)$.

It follows that, in any equilibrium,

$$\lambda^* \leq \overline{X},$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

and, if $\lambda^* \in (0, \overline{X})$, then $q^* = 1$.

**Stage 1: Recruitment.** Given $q$ and $\beta$, the seller’s problem is to choose recruitment effort $\gamma$ to maximize profit. The choice of effort $\gamma$ at cost $s$ is equivalent to the choice of $\lambda = q\gamma$ at cost $s/q$. Letting $R_o(\lambda)$ be the seller’s expected revenue given the participation level $\lambda$ and $\beta_{FPA}$, the profit as a function of $\lambda$ and $q > 0$ is

$$\Pi_o(\lambda, q) = R_o(\lambda) - \frac{\lambda s}{q},$$

with $\Pi_o(0, 0) = 0$ and $\Pi_o(\lambda, 0) = -\infty$ for $\lambda > 0$.

In any equilibrium, $\lambda^* \in \arg \max \Pi_o(\lambda, q^*)$. The following discussion describes the solution to this maximization problem.

In Figure 2, $\Pi_o(\lambda, q)$ is captured by the vertical difference between the curves. (Although we provide analytical arguments, the reader might find it easier to just follow the graphical arguments, which capture essentially everything.)

The revenue $R_o(\lambda)$ is an increasing function, since a larger $\lambda$ induces more aggressive bidding and higher maximal values. Owing to the former effect, $R_o$ is not concave.
Figure 2: Revenue, cost, and profit.

Figure 3 depicts properties of $R_o$ that are relevant for solving the seller’s problem. These properties are also established analytically by Claim 3 below.

The figure includes some notation that is used repeatedly:

$$\bar{s}_o := \max_{\lambda} \frac{R_o(\lambda)}{\lambda},$$

(5)

$$\lambda_o(z) := \text{largest } \lambda \text{ st. } R'_o(\lambda) = z \text{ for } z \leq \bar{s}_o,$$

$$\Delta_o := \lambda_o(\bar{s}_o).$$

Observe that

$$R'_o(\Delta_o) = \frac{R_o(\Delta_o)}{\lambda_o} = \bar{s}_o.$$

These properties of $R_o(\lambda)$ imply the form of the solution to the maximization
of $\Pi_o(\lambda, q)$ summarized by the following claim. In particular, the claim shows that $\lambda_o$ is the minimal positive profit-maximizing scale. (The lower bar in $\lambda_o$ serves as a reminder of that.)

**Claim 2** $\Pi_o(\lambda, q)$ is maximized either at $\lambda = 0$ or at some $\lambda \geq \lambda_o$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{s}{q} > \bar{s}_o & \Rightarrow \max \Pi_o(\cdot, q) = 0, \\
\frac{s}{q} < \bar{s}_o & \Rightarrow \max \Pi_o(\cdot, q) = \lambda_o(\frac{s}{q}) > \lambda_o, \\
\frac{s}{q} = \bar{s}_o & \Rightarrow \max \Pi_o(\cdot, q) = \{0, \lambda_o\}.
\end{align*}
\]

This claim follows immediately from the claim below, which summarizes the observations depicted in Figure 3. Roughly speaking, the first bidders are complementary to each other because they stimulate competitive bidding, leading to an initially increasing marginal revenue. This complementarity implies that the seller either samples no bidders or some minimal number.

**Claim 3** Revenue and optimality.

1. $R_o(\lambda)$ is strictly increasing, $R_o(0) = 0$, and $\lim_{\lambda \to \infty} R_o(\lambda) = 1$.

2. $R_o(\lambda)$ is continuously differentiable, $R'_o(0) = 0$, $R'_o(\lambda) \to 0$ as $\lambda \to \infty$, and $R'_o$ is single-peaked.

3. $\frac{R_o(\lambda)}{\lambda}$ is single-peaked; at its peak, $\frac{R_o(\lambda)}{\lambda} = R'_o(\lambda)$.

Thus, in any equilibrium, $\lambda^* = 0$ or $\lambda^* = \lambda_o(\frac{s}{q^*})$ depending on whether $\frac{s}{q^*} \leq \bar{s}_o$.

### 2.2 Equilibrium

Solving backwards through the three stages above results in the following “reduced form” equilibrium definition. An equilibrium consists of $\lambda^*$ and $q^*$ that satisfy one of the following:

1. $\lambda^* = \lambda_o(s) \in [\lambda_o, \bar{\lambda}]$ and $q^* = 1$.

2. $\lambda^* = \bar{\lambda}$ and $q^* \in (0, 1]$, with $\lambda_o(\frac{s}{q^*}) = \bar{\lambda}$. 

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3. \( \lambda^* = 0 \) and \( q^* \) is a best response\(^9\) to \( \mu \), where \( \text{supp} (\mu) \subset \arg \max_\lambda \Pi_0 (\cdot, q^*) \).

Thus, if an equilibrium \( \lambda^* \) is positive, it must satisfy \( \underline{\lambda} \leq \lambda^* \leq \overline{\lambda}^c \). That is, \( \lambda^* \) is between the minimal profit-maximizing scale and the maximal acceptable scale for the bidders.

The essential information about the equilibrium is depicted in Figures 4 and 5 below and also stated in the following propositions.

**Proposition 1** An equilibrium exists and it is unique for almost all \((s, c)\).

Proposition 1 follows from the characterization results of Propositions 2 and 3 below.

**Proposition 2** If \( s < \underline{s}_o \) and \( \overline{\lambda}^c > \underline{\lambda}_o \), then the unique equilibrium outcome has \( \lambda^* = \min \{ \overline{\lambda}^c, \lambda_o (s) \} \).

![Figure 4: PO scenario with Trade.](image)

Figure 4 illustrates \( R'_o \) and the two cutoffs, \( \underline{\lambda}_o \) and \( \overline{\lambda}^c \). It shows the two types of equilibria with trade, each obtaining for a different level of \( s \):

- At \( s_M \), the unique equilibrium outcome is with trade, \( \lambda^*_M = \lambda_o (s_M) \in [\underline{\lambda}_o, \overline{\lambda}^c] \).
- At \( s_L \), the unique equilibrium outcome is with trade, \( \lambda^*_L = \overline{\lambda}^c \), and \( q^*_L \) satisfies \( \lambda_o (\frac{s_L}{q^*_L}) = \overline{\lambda}^c \). In this case, \( \lambda_o (s_L) > \overline{\lambda}^c \).

\(^9\)Thus, it satisfies (2).
**Proposition 3** If $s > \bar{s}_o$ or $\bar{c} < \underline{\lambda}_o$, then $\lambda^* = 0$ (no trade) is the unique equilibrium outcome.

The case $s > \bar{s}_o$ has already been illustrated in Figure 4. At $s_H$, the unique equilibrium outcome is $\lambda^*_H = 0$ since $R'_o(\lambda) < s_H$ for all $\lambda \geq \underline{\lambda}_o$.

The case $\bar{c} < \underline{\lambda}_o$ is illustrated in Figure 5. In this case, no trade takes place even if $s$ is low, as is $s_L$ in the figure.

![Figure 5: PO scenario—no trade when $\bar{c} < \underline{\lambda}_o$.](image)

Entry is beneficial for bidders at $\lambda < \bar{c}$, and, when $s$ is low, such $\lambda$ would be profitable for the seller as well. The problem is that the seller cannot commit to such low $\lambda$. She also cannot be incentivized through reduced bidders’ entry ($q < 1$), which would raise the marginal recruitment cost $s/q$. If $s/q > \bar{s}_o$, the profit is maximized at $\lambda = 0$; if $s/q \leq \bar{s}_o$, the profit is maximized at $\lambda \geq \underline{\lambda}_o > \bar{c}$ (and at both $\underline{\lambda}_o$ and 0 if $s/q = \bar{s}_o$). In this case, the market will be closed even in the face of substantial potential gains from trade.

Finally, if either one of the strict inequalities in Proposition 2 is replaced with an equality, i.e., if $s = \bar{s}_o$ or $\bar{c} = \underline{\lambda}_o$, then both $\lambda^* = 0$ and $\lambda^*_c = \underline{\lambda}_o$ are equilibrium outcomes. This also holds if both of the inequalities in Proposition 3 are replaced by equalities, i.e., if $s = \bar{s}_o$ and $\bar{c} = \underline{\lambda}_o$.

### 2.3 A qualitative insight

For the following corollary, we include $s$ as an argument in the seller’s payoff and write $\Pi_o(\lambda, q, s)$.
Corollary 1 Consider a sequence \((s_k)_{k=1}^{\infty}\) with \(s_k \to 0\), and let \((\lambda_k^*, q_k^*)\) be the corresponding equilibrium outcomes.

1. If \(c = 0\), then \(q_k^* = 1\) for all \(s_k\), \(\lambda_k^* \to \infty\), and \(s_k \lambda_k^* \to 0\).

2. If \(c > 0\) and \(\overline{X} \geq \Delta_o\), then, for all \(s_k < R'_o(\overline{X})\),

\[
\lambda_k^* = \overline{X}, \quad \frac{s_k}{q_k^*} \lambda_k^* \text{ is a constant}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_o(\lambda_k^*, q_k^*, s_k) \text{ is a constant}. \quad 10
\]

Corollary 1 implies that, for \(c > 0\) (but not prohibitively large) and all small enough \(s\), total recruitment costs are constant and bounded away from zero.

To be willing to bear the cost of entry, bidders must believe that the seller is not recruiting too aggressively. This is achieved in equilibrium when bidders are sufficiently reluctant to enter \((q^*\text{ is sufficiently small})\) so that the marginal recruitment cost is high enough to induce the seller to stop at \(\overline{X}^c\).

In contrast, total recruitment cost becomes negligible when \(s\) is small, either when \(c = 0\) or when \(c > 0\) and the seller can commit to some recruitment effort \(\gamma\). No matter how large such commitment \(\gamma\) is, \(q\) will adjust to achieve \(\overline{X}^c\), but \(s\gamma \to 0\) as \(s \to 0\). Thus, inefficient costly recruitment effort is the consequence of a lack of commitment and costly bidder participation.

2.4 Other auction formats and bargaining

In the same environment, consider the second-price auction (SPA) format when its dominant strategy equilibrium is played.

Claim 4 The expected payoffs and the equilibrium magnitudes of \(\lambda^*\) and \(q^*\) are the same as they would be in the dominant strategy equilibrium of the SPA format.

This result follows immediately from revenue equivalence. Therefore, the same insights and conclusions hold. \(11\)

More generally, the characterization of equilibrium relies only on the properties of the reduced form payoffs \(U_o(\cdot)\) and \(R_o(\cdot)\) derived in the Claims 1 and 3. Thus,

10These constants are \(\overline{X} R'_o(\overline{X})\) and \(R_o(\overline{X}) - \overline{X} R'_o(\overline{X})\), respectively.

11For every realization of \(n\), this is the classic revenue equivalence result. It extends to the expected payoffs associated with any value of \(\lambda\), and hence to the equilibrium values. Of course, the distribution of the winning bid itself differs between the formats but this does not affect the results we look at.
the characterization extends from the FPA and SPA to any auction or “bargaining” scenario that implies these properties for the expected payoffs and revenue.

3 The PU auction: Unobservable participation

The PU scenario is the independent, private-values model considered so far, except that here bidders cannot observe the number of other participants at any stage (before or after entry). Besides being interesting in its own right, this scenario will help us distinguish the role of commitment from the role of observability. We index the magnitudes for this scenario with the subscript \( u \) (for “unobservable”).

The equilibrium definition presented in Subsection 1.2 above remains the same, and we continue to work in terms of \( \lambda = \gamma q \).

3.1 Solving backward (PU scenario)

As before, the interaction unfolds in three stages—recruitment, bidders’ entry, bidding—and the equilibrium can be solved for backward.

Stage 3: Bidding. Since bidders do not observe the actual participation, this is a first-price auction (FPA) with a Poisson (\( \lambda \)) distributed random number of bidders, where \( \lambda \) is the bidders’ point belief\(^{12}\) concerning the expected participation. This auction has a unique symmetric bidding equilibrium, denoted by \( \beta^*_\lambda : [0, 1] \to [0, 1] \).\(^{13}\)

Claim 5 Given belief \( \lambda \), the unique symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is

\[
\beta^*_\lambda (v) = v - \int_0^v e^{-\lambda(G(v) - G(x))} dx. \tag{7}
\]

For \( \lambda > 0 \), the bidding strategy \( \beta^*_\lambda \) is strictly increasing in \( v \) and differentiable; for \( \lambda = 0 \), we have \( \beta^*_\lambda (v) = 0 \).

In an equilibrium with participation \( \lambda^* \), the bidders’ equilibrium strategy is \( \beta^* = \beta^*_{\lambda^*} \).

\(^{12}\)As in the PO scenario, we could describe beliefs as a distribution \( \mu \). But in the PU scenario we only need point beliefs, in the sense that we would not get any more equilibrium outcomes by allowing for non-degenerate beliefs off the equilibrium path. Therefore, we focus on point beliefs from the start.

\(^{13}\)This result is proven as a straightforward implication of payoff equivalence, just as in the analysis of other auction scenarios with an uncertain numbers of bidders; see, e.g., Krishna (2009, Section 3.2.2 “Uncertain Number of Bidders”).
Stage 2: Bidders’ entry. Let $U_u(\lambda)$ be a contacted bidder’s ex-ante expected payoff, given $\lambda$ and $\beta_\lambda$. Given bidders’ point belief $\hat{\lambda}$, bidders’ entry decision $q$ is optimal if
\begin{align}
U_u(\hat{\lambda}) > c & \Rightarrow q = 1, \\
U_u(\hat{\lambda}) < c & \Rightarrow q = 0. 
\end{align}
(8)

Claim 6 $U_u(\lambda)$ is the same as $U_o(\lambda)$ of the previous PO scenario.

Since $\beta_\lambda$ is monotonic, this claim is again an immediate consequence of payoff-equivalence; see the proof of Claim 5. Therefore, $U_u$ is decreasing to 0 and continuous, and the break-even participation level $\lambda^*$ (with $U_u(\lambda^*) = c$) is also the same as in the PO scenario. Thus, as above, in equilibrium, $\lambda^* \leq \lambda^*$, and, if the inequality is strict, then $q^* = 1$.

Stage 1: Recruitment. Let $R_u(\lambda, \beta)$ be the seller’s expected revenue given participation level $\lambda$ and bidding strategy $\beta$. The seller’s expected payoff $\Pi_u(\lambda, \beta, q)$ is
\[ \Pi_u(\lambda, \beta, q) = R_u(\lambda, \beta) - \lambda \frac{s}{q}, \]
for $\lambda, q > 0$. It is 0 for $\lambda = q = 0$, and it is $-\infty$ for $q = 0$ and $\lambda > 0$.

In any equilibrium, $\lambda^* \in \arg\max_\lambda \Pi_u(\lambda, \beta^*, q^*)$. It is shown below (Claim 7) that $\Pi_u(\lambda, \beta^*, q)$ is concave and differentiable in $\lambda$ (for fixed $\hat{\lambda}$). Therefore, any $\lambda$ that satisfies the first-order condition (with respect to $\lambda$) is a maximizer of $\Pi_u(\lambda, \beta^*, q)$.

3.2 Equilibrium (PU scenario)

Let
\[ \xi(\lambda) := \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta^*)_{\hat{\lambda} = \lambda}. \]
This is the marginal revenue with respect to $\lambda$ at a point where $\lambda$ coincides with the given expectation $\hat{\lambda}$.

Proposition 4 The strategies $\lambda, \beta^*$, and $q$ constitute an equilibrium if and only if $q$ satisfies (8) and
\[ \frac{s}{q} \geq \xi(\lambda), \]
with equality holding for $\lambda > 0$.

Proof. The proof uses the following claim, which is proved in the appendix.
Claim 7 (i) \( R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) \) is twice differentiable (in \( \lambda \) and \( \lambda \)), and for \( \lambda > 0 \) it is strictly concave in \( \lambda \).

(ii) The function \( \xi(\lambda) \) is continuous, \( \xi(0) = 0 \), and \( \lim_{\lambda \to \infty} \xi(\lambda) = 0 \).

Since, for \( \lambda > 0 \), \( R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) \) is strictly concave and differentiable in \( \lambda \), so is \( \Pi_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda, q) \). Therefore, the first-order condition \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) \leq \frac{z}{q} \) (with equality at \( \lambda > 0 \)) is both, necessary and sufficient. If \( \lambda = 0 \), then \( R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = 0 \) for all \( \lambda \), and so \( \lambda = 0 \) is the unique best response, with \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = 0 < \frac{z}{q} \).

The essential information about the equilibrium is depicted in the following two figures and stated formally in Corollary 2. Let

\[
\bar{s}_u := \max_{\lambda} \xi(\lambda),
\]

and, for \( 0 < z \leq \bar{s}_u \), let \( \overline{\lambda}_u(z) \) and \( \underline{\lambda}_u(z) \) be the maximal and minimal values of \( \lambda \) satisfying \( \xi(\lambda) = z \).

Figure 6: PU scenario with small \( c \).

Figure 6 depicts the equilibria (marked with dots) for two \( s \) values, \( s_H > s_L \), and small \( c \) (which translates to a relatively large \( \overline{\lambda}_u \)). For each of the \( s \) values there are three equilibria:

- For \( s_H \), the equilibria are at \( \lambda^* = 0 \), \( \lambda^* = \overline{\lambda}_u(s_H) \), and \( \lambda^* = \overline{\lambda}_u(s_H) \).
- For \( s_L \), the equilibria are at \( \lambda^* = 0 \), \( \lambda^* = \overline{\lambda}_u(s_L) \), and \( \lambda^* = \overline{\lambda}_u(s_L) \).
Thus, $c$ does not constrain the equilibria for $s_H$. It constrains only the largest equilibrium for $s_L$, in which $q^*$ adjusts to achieve $\bar{\lambda}_u(s_L/q^*) = \bar{\lambda}_c$. In the other equilibria, $q^* = 1$.

The case of a larger $c$—implying a smaller $\bar{\lambda}_c$—is depicted in Figure 7. In this case, for $s_H$ there is a unique equilibrium with $\lambda^* = 0$, while for $s_L$ there are still three equilibria as in the case of small $c$. The key difference is that $\bar{\lambda}_c < \bar{\lambda}_u(s_H)$, precluding trade in equilibrium with $s_H$.

More generally, if $c$ and $s$ are such that the market is not closed, then either $c$ is relatively small so as not to constrain the equilibria, implying that in all equilibria, $\lambda^* \leq \bar{\lambda}_c$ and $q^* = 1$; or $c$ is sufficiently large so the largest equilibrium $\lambda^*$ is $\bar{\lambda}_c$ and the corresponding $q^* < 1$. In particular, given $c$, for small enough $s$ there is always an equilibrium with $\lambda^* = \bar{\lambda}_c$ and $q^* < 1$.

Corollary 2 (to Proposition 4)$^{14}$ summarizes the above observations.

**Corollary 2** (i) For all $s$ and $c$, there is a no-trade equilibrium with $\lambda^* = 0$. If $s > \pi_u$ or $\bar{\lambda}_c < \bar{\lambda}_u(s)$, this is the unique equilibrium outcome.

(ii) If $s < \pi_u$ and $\bar{\lambda}_c > \bar{\lambda}_u(s)$, there are also (possibly multiple) equilibria with trade: $\lambda^* > 0$ is an equilibrium outcome if and only if either

$$\xi(\lambda^*) = s \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda^* < \bar{\lambda}_c,$$

$^{14}$Strictly speaking, this is just a restatement of Proposition 4, with the condition (8) on the optimality of $q^*$ expressed in terms of $\bar{\lambda}$. 

Figure 7: PU scenario with large $c$. 

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or there is some \( q^* \in (0, 1] \) such that

\[
\lambda^* = \lambda^c \quad \text{and} \quad \xi(\lambda^c) = \frac{s}{q^*}.
\]

Note that we have not established that \( \xi \) is single-peaked.\(^{15}\) Therefore, the possibility of more equilibria than the three shown in the figure is not ruled out.

The bidders’ inability to observe participation gives rise to two apparently conflicting phenomena. First, the no-trade equilibrium always exists, even when \( s \) and \( c \) are low.\(^{16}\) This equilibrium is sustained because bidders expect no competition and therefore intend to bid 0, making recruitment unprofitable. In the absence of the ability to commit to the level of recruitment, the seller cannot break out of this equilibrium. This logic also explains the low-trade equilibria (e.g., at \( \lambda_u(s_L) \)). When \( s > \pi_u \), this effect is strong enough to leave no trade as the unique equilibrium outcome, even if there are potential gains from trade.

Second, for any \( c < U(0) \) (which is assumed throughout), if \( s \) is sufficiently small, there still exists an equilibrium with trade. If bidders could observe participation, the low \( \lambda \) needed to induce bidders with high \( c \) to enter could not be sustained in equilibrium, since the seller would have an incentive to recruit more aggressively. However, here the bidders’ expectations of low participation induce low bids and discourage aggressive recruiting.

Let \( \lambda^*_u \) and \( q^*_u \) denote the equilibrium values with the largest \( \lambda \) (for a given \( s \) and \( c \)). We are interested in this equilibrium mainly as a useful reference for comparing the two scenarios. However, when \( c \) is small, so that \( \lambda^c \) is not binding, this equilibrium is also distinguished by being the seller’s maximal-profit equilibrium and by being pseudo-stable in the sense that the best response to a locally displaced \( \lambda \) points in the direction of the equilibrium.\(^{17}\)

**Proposition 5** Suppose \( s \leq \pi_u \).

1. If \( \lambda^c < \lambda_u(s) \), then \( \lambda^*_u = 0 \).
2. If \( \lambda^c \in [\lambda_u(s), \lambda_u(s)] \), then \( \lambda^*_u = \lambda^c \) and \( \frac{s}{q_u^*} = \xi(\lambda^c) \).

\(^{15}\) We have established analytically that \( \xi \) is continuous and that \( \xi(0) = 0 \), \( \xi(\lambda) > 0 \) for \( \lambda > 0 \), and \( \lim_{\lambda \to \infty} \xi(\lambda) = 0 \).

\(^{16}\) As opposed to only when \( s \) or \( c \) is too high, as is the case in the PO scenario.

\(^{17}\) We do not place much weight on this observation, since when \( \lambda^c \) is binding the naive pseudo-stability argument is less clear.
3. If \( \bar{X}^c > \bar{X}_u(s) \), then \( \lambda_u^* = \bar{X}_u(s) \) and \( q_u^* = 1 \), and this is the seller’s most profitable equilibrium.

4. If \( c = 0 \) (i.e., \( \bar{X}^c = \infty \)), then \( s \to 0 \) implies \( \lambda_u^* \to \infty \) and \( s\lambda_u^* \to 0 \).

Parts 1–3 follow immediately from Corollary 2 and hence do not require a proof. Part 4 is also immediate. First, \( \lambda_u^* \to \infty \) as \( s \to 0 \) since \( \lambda_u^* = \bar{X}_u(s) \) and, by Claim 7, \( \bar{X}_u(s) \to \infty \). Second, an argument analogous to that of Corollary 1 implies that, when \( s \) is small enough, the seller can extract the whole surplus with a possibly suboptimal \( \lambda = 1/\sqrt{s} \), and hence the equilibrium \( s\lambda_u^* \) may not be bounded away from 0.

A qualitative insight. Corollary 1 of the PO scenario is valid for the present scenario as well, and so is the insight that, for \( c > 0 \) (but not prohibitively large) and all small enough \( s \), the total recruitment cost is constant; that is,

\[
\frac{s}{q_u^*} \lambda_u^* = \xi(\bar{X}) \bar{X} = \text{constant},
\]

which follows from the fact that \( \frac{s}{q_u^*} = \xi(\bar{X}) \) for all small enough \( s \).

4 Comparison of the PO and PU scenarios

4.1 Ranking reversals

With observable participation (the PO scenario), the incentive to recruit is driven by two considerations: increasing the likelihood that high-value bidders will appear and inducing more aggressive bidding. With unobservable participation (the PU scenario), only the former consideration is present. This difference is reflected by the stronger marginal incentive to recruit when participation is observable. It is translated to ranking reversals: With “small” \( c \) and “not too small” \( s \), the PO scenario generates higher participation and profit than the PU scenario; these relations are reversed with “large” \( c \) or “small” \( s \).

Figure 8 combines Figures 4 and 6. Recall that \( \bar{s}_o \) and \( \bar{s}_u \) are the maximal values of \( s \) for which an equilibrium with positive \( \lambda \) exists for the PO and the PU scenario, respectively. The following claim states the essential features depicted in the figure.

Claim 8 (i) \( R_o^*(\lambda) > \xi(\lambda) \), for all \( \lambda > 0 \); (ii) \( \bar{s}_o > \bar{s}_u \).
Figure 8: Comparison with small \( c \) and medium/large \( s \).

Figure 8 depicts the case of small \( c \) and medium/large \( s \). It shows \( \lambda_o^* \) and \( \lambda_u^* \) (the unique maximal equilibrium values of \( \lambda \) for the PO\(^{18} \) and the PU scenario, respectively) for two recruitment cost levels, \( s_H > s_M \). At \( s_H \), there is trade only in the PO scenario: \( \lambda_{o,H}^* > \lambda_{u,H}^* = 0 \). At \( s_M \), there is trade in both scenarios, \( \lambda_{o,M}^* > \lambda_{u,M}^* > 0 \), and the participation is unconstrained by \( c \). In both cases, the profit in the PO scenario is higher. Graphically, the profit in each scenario is the area between the \( R'_o(\lambda) \) curve and the corresponding horizontal \( s \) line. Thus, the conclusion about the profit is evident from inspection of the figure.

Figure 9 depicts the case of small \( c \) and small \( s \). At \( s_L \), the participation level is constrained by \( c \) in both scenarios, yielding the same equilibrium participation \( \bar{\lambda} \) but with higher effective recruitment costs in the PO scenario, \( \frac{s_L}{q_{o,L}} > \frac{s_L}{q_{u,L}} \). Obviously, the profit in the PO scenario is lower in this case.

Figure 10 depicts the remaining case of large \( c \). In this case, trade takes place only in the PU scenario, \( \lambda_u^* = \bar{\lambda} > 0 = \lambda_o^* \), and the PU profit is of course higher. Observe that the same levels of participation and profits will prevail for any lower \( s \) as well.

The observations we have made with the aid of these three diagrams are stated formally in claims 9 and 10 below.

The main takeaway is that there is **ranking reversal of profit and participation**.

- If \( s \) is non-prohibitive for the PO scenario \( (s < \tau_o) \), then for \( c \) small enough, \(^{18} \)Note that, for this comparison, we add a subscript \( o \) to the unique \( \lambda^* \) of the PO scenario.
both participation and profit are higher in the PO scenario.

• If $s$ is non-prohibitive for the PU scenario ($s < \bar{s}_u$), then for $c$ large enough, both participation and profit are higher in the PU scenario.

This reversal does not conflict with the logic of revenue equivalence. If $\lambda$ is the same in both scenarios and $\hat{\lambda} = \lambda$ (in the PU scenario), then by revenue equivalence, the revenue is the same in both scenarios and, if $q$ is also the same, so is the profit. This is seen in the diagram, where the profit associated with $\lambda$ and $q$ in both scenarios (given that $\hat{\lambda} = \lambda$ in the PU case) corresponds to the area between the $R'_0(\lambda)$ curve and the $s/q$ line over the interval $[0, \lambda]$.

The reversal is due to the significant role of the observability of participation.
Observability is often assumed automatically in auction models, although it is not so obvious in less formal situations. When combined with costly recruitment and participation, the observability has important consequences.

In the presence of recruiting costs, the unobservability of participation retards the profitability of recruiting and, in the extreme, may result in no trade. Consider the case of \( c = 0 \), so that bidders’ entry considerations are absent (i.e., \( q^* = 1 \) in all equilibria). In this case, the profit in both scenarios is maximized at \( \lambda_0^* \) (where \( R'_o(\lambda_0^*) = s \)). As just mentioned above, if the seller in the PU scenario could commit to \( \lambda_0^* \), she would get the same profit. However, in the absence of commitment, this is not sustainable in the PU scenario. The seller would prefer to secretly reduce \( \lambda \). Bidders anticipating this would plan to bid less aggressively than they would if they expected \( \lambda_0^* \), thus augmenting the seller’s incentive to secretly reduce \( \lambda \) even further. When \( \pi_o > s > \pi_u \), these self-reinforcing considerations drive the maximal PU equilibrium participation \( \lambda_u^* \) to 0—complete “unraveling” of the market, even though \( s < \pi_u \) implies a positive \( \lambda_u^* \). When \( s < \pi_u \), then \( \lambda_u^* \) settles at a positive level, albeit lower than \( \lambda_o^* \). In either case, this implies lower profit in the PU scenario.19

When \( c > 0 \), the retarding effect of unobservable participation may help sustain trade by insuring bidders against excessive recruitment that will make their entry unprofitable.

The mix of these two effects, which depend on the relative sizes of \( s \) and \( c \), explains the “reversal.”

The following two claims are just formal summaries of the above observations (and hence do not require proof). Recall the seller’s profit functions \( \Pi_o(\lambda, q) = R_o(\lambda) - \frac{\lambda^2}{q} \) and \( \Pi_u(\lambda, \beta, q) = R_u(\lambda, \beta, \lambda) - \frac{\lambda^2}{q} \).

Claim 9 (Higher participation and profit in the PO equilibrium.) Suppose \( \lambda > \lambda_0 \).

1. If \( \pi_o > s > \pi_u \), then \( \lambda_o^* > \lambda_u^* = 0 \) and \( \Pi_o(\lambda_o^*, q_o^*) > \Pi_u(\lambda_u^*, \beta, \lambda_u^*; q_u^*) = 0 \).

2. If \( \pi_u > s > R'_o(\lambda^*) \), then \( \lambda_o^* > \lambda_u^* > 0 \) and \( \Pi_o(\lambda_o^*, q_o^*) > \Pi_u(\lambda_u^*, \beta, \lambda_u^*; q_u^*) \).

19A slightly different explanation appeals to the seller’s revealed preference. By choosing \( \lambda_u^* \) in the PO scenario, the seller could secure the PU equilibrium profit. Since \( \Pi_o(\lambda, q) \) is increasing in \( \lambda \) at \( \lambda = \lambda_o^* \) (as evident in the diagram from \( R'_o(\lambda_o^*) > s \)), the conclusion follows.
Claim 10 *(Higher participation and profit in the PU equilibrium.)*

1. If $\lambda^c < \underline{\lambda}_o$, then $\lambda^*_u \geq \lambda^*_o = 0$ and $\Pi(u(\lambda^*_u, \beta_{\lambda^*_u}, q^*_u)) \geq \Pi(\lambda^*_o, q^*_o) = 0$, with strict inequalities for $s < \bar{s}_u$.

2. If $\lambda^c \geq \underline{\lambda}_o$ and $s < \xi(\lambda^c)$, then $\lambda^*_o = \lambda^*_u = \lambda^c$ and $\Pi(u(\lambda^*_u, \beta_{\lambda^*_u}, q^*_u)) > \Pi(\lambda^*_o, q^*_o)$.

**Remark.** Claims 9 and 10 do not address the intermediate range of $c$ where $\lambda^c > \underline{\lambda}_o$ and $s \in (\xi(\lambda^c), R^s_0(\lambda^c))$. We omitted this range to avoid dealing with details that might complicate the presentation, though they do not affect the general message. Over this range, $\lambda^c$ constrains participation only in the PO scenario. For $s$ near the bottom of the range, the outcomes are close to those of Part 2 of Claim 10 ($\lambda^*_o = \lambda^c$ and $\lambda^*_u$ just below it), and the PU equilibrium is more profitable. For $s$ near the top, the outcomes are close to those of Part 2 of Claim 9 and the PO equilibrium is more profitable. The ranking switches somewhere in the interior of this range.

### 4.2 Comparison of first- and second-price auctions

Recall from Claim 4 that, in terms of payoffs and costs, the PO equilibrium is equivalent to the dominant strategy equilibrium of a second-price auction (SPA) format, where the observability does not matter.

**Claim 11** All the insights of Subsection 4.1 comparing the PO and PU scenarios extend to a comparison of the SPA and FPA, respectively, with unobservable participation.

Thus, while the FPA and SPA formats are equivalent in terms of equilibrium profit and welfare when participation is observable, they are not equivalent with unobservable participation in this environment, and their ranking is affected by the magnitudes of these costs.

Given our “informal auctions” perspective, we think of the choice of the auction format not from a design angle, but rather as a proxy for some mix of bidding and bargaining that arises naturally in these situations. In line with this, the results comparing these two formats bring out elements that will be present to various degrees in hybrid formats, and they may also shed light on circumstances in which one format or the other is more likely to emerge.
Remark. Above, we explained that the seller has a stronger incentive to recruit in the PO scenario because this induces “more aggressive bidding.” We also noted that the PO equilibrium is equivalent (in terms of profit) to the dominant strategy equilibrium of the SPA scenario in which the bidding (one’s own value) is independent of observability, and hence greater participation in the SPA scenario does not induce “more aggressive bidding.” These two observations are not inconsistent with each other. It is not aggressive bidding per se, but rather the expected price, that affects the incentive to recruit. In the SPA, the presence of more bidders does not induce more aggressive bidding, but it does translate to a higher expected price.

4.3 Disclosure

Suppose that the seller could credibly commit in advance to always disclose or always not disclose the number of participants prior to the bidding. This is equivalent to the seller choosing between the PO and PU scenarios. Thus, the comparison in Subsections 4.1–4.2 applies also to the disclosure question (if such commitment is possible). In particular, it follows from the above discussion that the seller may prefer to commit in advance to disclosure or no disclosure depending on $s$ and $c$.

5 Uncertainty about seller’s recruitment costs

It is natural to suppose that bidders are uncertain about the seller’s recruitment effort (even in equilibrium). This is modeled here by assuming bidders’ uncertainty about $s$.

We first consider a binary setting in which the seller’s recruitment cost is either high or low, $s_H > s_L > 0$. Naturally, optimal recruitment is larger for $s_L$ than for $s_H$. This implies a “sampling curse:” even if both costs are equally likely ex-ante, conditional on being sampled, a bidder believes the low type is more likely because being sampled is more likely in this case. A small $s_L$ implies very cautious bidder entry (small $q$). This makes entry by $s_H$ unprofitable, pushing it out of the market.

In the second part, we ask how general this inefficiency is and study a setting with recruitment costs uniformly distributed on $[0, \bar{s}]$.

Formally, we consider a uniform distribution on $[\underline{s}, \bar{s}_0]$ for some $\underline{s} > 0$ and then consider $\bar{s} \to 0$. This avoids the problem that $s = 0$ would choose $\gamma = \infty$. In equilibrium, sellers are
actively recruiting bidders whenever their recruitment cost is below some cutoff. We show that this cutoff is never interior: either the seller is active for all cost levels or the market unravels completely, with no trade happening. Roughly speaking, because of the “sampling curse,” for every interior cutoff, bidders would believe that the seller has an even lower recruitment cost.

5.1 Binary setup

We minimally modify the PO model of Subsection 1.1 to capture this uncertainty about costs, and, hence, recruitment. Privately known seller’s type \( \omega \) has marginal recruitment cost \( s_\omega \) and occurs with prior probability \( \rho_\omega \), \( \omega = L, H \). Type \( L \) is more efficient, \( s_H > s_L > 0 \). Seller type \( \omega \) selects recruitment effort \( \gamma_\omega \).

Contacted bidders decide on entry, then observe their own value and the number of participants, and finally submit bids in an FPA. Bidders’ symmetric entry and bidding strategy \((q, \beta)\) and the state-dependent participation rates \( \lambda := (\lambda_L, \lambda_H) \), where \( \lambda_\omega = q \gamma_\omega \), are just as in the PO scenario.

In any symmetric equilibrium, \( \beta \) must be the unique FPA symmetric equilibrium strategy \( \beta_{FPA}(v, n) \) (see (1)). Therefore, for any given participation rate \( \lambda \), the seller’s revenue and the bidders’ ex-ante expected payoff are the same as in the PO scenario. Hence, the profit of seller type \( \omega \) is

\[
\Pi_\omega(\lambda_\omega, q) = R_0(\lambda_\omega) - \lambda_\omega \frac{s_\omega}{q},
\]

and, given bidders’ belief \( \mu \) (the distribution over \( \lambda \) conditional on being contacted), their expected payoff is \( E_\mu(U_\omega(\lambda)) \) and their optimal entry decision \( q \) satisfies (2).

For \( \lambda \neq 0 \), let

\[
\phi_\omega(\lambda) = \frac{\rho_\omega \lambda_\omega}{\sum \rho_\omega \lambda_\omega}.
\]

Since \( \lambda \neq 0 \) implies \( \gamma := (\gamma_L, \gamma_H) \neq 0 \), it follows that \( \phi_\omega(\lambda) \) is the probability of \( \omega \), conditional on a bidder being contacted by the seller. An equilibrium consists of \( \lambda^* = (\lambda_L^*, \lambda_H^*) \), and \( q^* \) such that the following hold:

(E1) \( \lambda = \lambda_\omega^* \) maximizes \( \Pi_\omega(\lambda_\omega, q^*) \).

(E2) There exists belief \( \mu \) such that

(i) \( q^* \) is optimal given \( \mu \), i.e., it satisfies (2);

(ii) if \( \lambda^* \neq (0, 0) \), then \( \mu(\lambda_\omega^*) = \phi_\omega(\lambda^*) \) (confirmation on path);
(iii) if $\lambda^* = (0, 0)$, then every $\lambda$ in the support of $\mu$ maximizes $\Pi_\omega(\lambda, q^*)$ for some $\omega$.

**Claim 12** There exists an equilibrium.

The equilibrium analysis just imports what we know from the PO scenario to the current setting. The following discussion and the diagram prove Claim 12 above and the subsequent Claim 13. Recall from the PO scenario that $s_o$ is the maximal $s$ that sustains equilibrium with trade; that $\lambda_o(z)$ is the profit-maximizing $\lambda$ for a given $z \leq s_o$ (i.e., the maximal solution of $R_o'(\lambda) = z$); that $\lambda_o$ is the minimum profitable scale for the seller ($\lambda_o^c = \lambda_o(s_o)$); and that $\lambda^c$ is the maximal $\lambda$ with which bidder entry is beneficial ($U_o(\lambda^c) = c$).

Let

$$\hat{\lambda}_\omega(q) = \begin{cases} \lambda_o(\frac{s_o}{q}) & \text{if } \frac{s_o}{q} < s_o, \\ 0 & \text{if } \frac{s_o}{q} > s_o, \end{cases}$$

and $\hat{\lambda}(q) = (\hat{\lambda}_L(q), \hat{\lambda}_H(q))$. It follows immediately from the PO analysis that $\lambda^*_\omega = \hat{\lambda}_\omega(q^*)$. Therefore, an equilibrium with $\lambda^* = (0, 0)$ exists if and only if $\frac{s_o}{q^*} \geq s_o$, which can occur if and only if $s_L \geq s_o$ or $\lambda^c \leq \lambda_o$, and it is unique if one of these inequalities is strict.

To consider equilibrium with trade, $\lambda^* \neq (0, 0)$, let $V(\lambda)$ denote bidders’ expected payoff at $\lambda = (\lambda_L, \lambda_H)$,

$$V(\lambda) = \sum_{\omega} \phi_\omega(\lambda)U_\omega(\lambda_\omega).$$

(10)

In an equilibrium with trade, $q^*$ has to satisfy

$$q^* \in (0, 1) \Rightarrow V(\hat{\lambda}(q^*)) = c,$$

$$q^* = 1 \Rightarrow V(\lambda^*) \geq c.$$  

(11)

Obviously, $s_H > s_o$ implies $\lambda^*_H = 0$ in any equilibrium, and we are back in the PO scenario with commonly known $s = s_L$, for which existence and characterization are already established. Therefore, the only interesting case to consider is $s_o > s_H > s_L > 0$.

The following diagram depicts $V(\hat{\lambda}(q))$ as a function of $q$. The intersection points between $V(\hat{\lambda}(\cdot))$ and $c$ correspond to (11), and therefore capture all the
possible equilibria with trade. The maximal $c$ that is compatible with equilibrium with trade is $\bar{c}$ such that $\lambda = \lambda_o$, just as in the PO scenario. The minimal $q$ that still facilitates a profitable positive scale for seller type $\omega$ is $\bar{q}_\omega$, st. $\bar{c} = \bar{q}_\omega o$. At $\bar{q}_L$, type $L$ becomes active with the minimal positive scale $\Delta_o$; at $\bar{q}_H$, type $H$ also joins with the minimal scale $\Delta_o$, and this explains the discontinuity of $V(\hat{\lambda}(q))$ at $\bar{q}_H$. In other words, $\hat{\lambda}(q) = (0,0)$ for $q < \bar{q}_L$; it jumps to $(\Delta_o,0)$ at $\bar{q}_L$ and increases continuously with $q \in [\bar{q}_L,\bar{q}_H]$ according to $(\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{q}),0)$; it jumps again at $\bar{q}_H$ to $(\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{\bar{q}_H}),\Delta_o)$, and thereafter continues according to $(\lambda_o(\frac{s_H}{q}),\lambda_o(\frac{s_H}{\bar{q}_H}))$. For $V$, note that it is decreasing until $\bar{q}_H$ given that $(\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{q}),0)$ is increasing, and for this range, $V(\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{q}),0) = U_0(\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{q}))$. As noted, at $\bar{q}_H$, $V$ jumps up. Moreover, at this point, $\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{\bar{q}_H}) > \Delta_o$ implies that $V(\Delta_o,0) > V(\lambda_o(\frac{s_L}{\bar{q}_H}),\Delta_o)$, which is seen in the diagram as $V(\hat{\lambda}(\cdot))$ being higher at $\bar{q}_L$ than at $\bar{q}_H$.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{subfigure}{0.45\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11a.png}
\caption{Equilibrium with two seller types.}
\end{subfigure}
\hfill
\begin{subfigure}{0.45\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11b.png}
\caption{Equilibrium with two seller types.}
\end{subfigure}
\end{figure}

Each panel shows all the equilibria for a given level of $c$. The left panel depicts a case in which there is only one equilibrium, and in it only type $L$ is active. The right panel depicts a case in which there are two equilibria. In one, only type $L$ is active; in the other, both types are active.

The location of the $V(\hat{\lambda}(q))$ curve depends on $s_L$ and $s_H$. A lower $s_L$ induces a downward shift of both parts of the curve.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the case depicted in the left panel might correspond to a lower $s_L$ than the case depicted in the right panel.

The following claim summarizes what the above discussion and the diagram have established.

\textbf{Claim 13} For $\bar{s}_o > s_H > s_L > 0$, the equilibrium set is characterized by three cutoffs $\bar{c} > c_1 > c_2$:

\textsuperscript{21}A lower $s_H$ shifts only the right branch of the curve downward.
(i) For \( c > \overline{c} \), the unique equilibrium has \( \lambda_L^* = \lambda_H^* = 0 \).

(ii) For \( c \in (c_1, \overline{c}) \), the unique equilibrium with trade has \( \lambda_L^* > 0 = \lambda_H^* \).

(iii) For \( c < c_2 \), the unique equilibrium with trade has \( \lambda_L^* > \lambda_H^* > 0 \).

(iv) For \( c \in (c_2, c_1) \), there are two equilibria with trade, one with \( \lambda_L^* > 0 = \lambda_H^* \) and one with \( \lambda_L^* > \lambda_H^* > 0 \).

**Remark.** We restrict attention to pure strategies for the seller. However, if we admit randomized strategies for the seller, then for \( c \in (c_2, c_1) \) there is also a third equilibrium in which \( \lambda_L^* > 0 \) and \( \lambda_H^* \) is randomized between a positive level and 0.

### 5.2 Unraveling

As noted above, when \( s_L \) is sufficiently small relative to \( s_H \), only type \( L \) is active in equilibrium (i.e., \( \lambda_H^* = 0 \)). This is so even when \( s_H \) itself is small enough so that, if it were commonly known, the equilibrium would involve active recruiting.

**Claim 14** Suppose \( c > 0 \). For any \( s_H > 0 \) and \( \rho_H > 0 \), there exists a threshold \( S(s_H, \rho_H) \) such that \( s_L < S(s_H, \rho_H) \) implies \( \lambda_L^* > 0 \) and \( \lambda_H^* = 0 \).

When \( s_L \) is small, \( q^* \) must be small as well, for otherwise \( \lambda_L^* \) would be very large and bidders entry would be unprofitable. However, a given \( s_H \) combined with small \( q^* \) means high marginal recruiting cost \( s_H / q^* \) for type \( H \), making participation unprofitable for this type. More formally, given \( s_H \) and \( \rho_H \), for sufficiently small values of \( s_L \), \( V(\lambda_o(s_L/\overline{q}_H), \Delta_o) < c \). Hence, for any \( q \geq \overline{q}_H \) (that accommodates the participation of \( H \)), \( V(\lambda_o(s_L/q), \lambda_o(s_H/q)) \leq V(\lambda_o(s_L/\overline{q}_H), \Delta_o) < c \). Thus, it must be that \( q^* < \overline{q}_H \), and the unique equilibrium is with \( \lambda_L^* = \overline{\lambda}_L \) and \( \lambda_H^* = 0 \).

In other words, if we start with the case depicted in the right panel of Figure 11 and lower \( s_L \) sufficiently, we will reach the case depicted in the left panel.

This outcome is inefficient: type \( s_H \) might fail to trade even when \( s_H \) is quite low and would result in active trade if it were known.

This insight does not hinge on the two-types assumption. Nothing of importance in the analysis would change if there were \( m > 2 \) types: if the lowest \( s \) is low enough, all types with higher \( s \) will still be shut out of the market. However, the insight does depend, of course, on the discreteness, since the argument relies on making the ratio of the lowest to the next lowest cost small enough while keeping their probabilities constant. The question is whether and in what circumstances a similar
unraveling occurs in an environment where exceedingly low costs are associated with exceedingly low probabilities.

5.3 Continuum of seller types

We address the last question using a version of the model with a continuum of possible seller types. The marginal recruiting cost $s$ is distributed uniformly on $[\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o]$, where $\underline{s} > 0$ and $\bar{s}_o$ is as defined above (the maximal $s$ compatible with active recruitment in the commonly-known-type case).

The model extends immediately to this environment. Identifying $\omega$ with $s$ itself, we write $s$ and $\lambda = (\lambda_s)_{s \in [\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o]}$.

The definition of an equilibrium also extends almost directly. For each $s$, $\lambda_s^*$ and $q^*$ satisfy the equilibrium conditions (E1) and (E2) of Subsection 5.1, with $s$ and $\lambda_s$ replacing $s_\omega$ and $\lambda_\omega$, respectively. The equilibrium belief density $\mu$ also satisfies the analogous conditions. In particular, let

$$\phi_s(\lambda) := \frac{\lambda_s}{\int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_s ds}.$$ 

If $\lambda_s^* \neq 0$ for some $s \in (\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o]$, then $\mu(\lambda_s^*) = \phi_s(\lambda^*)$ for all $s$. Let

$$V(\lambda) := \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}_o} \phi_s(\lambda) U_o(\lambda_s) ds = \frac{\int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_s U_o(\lambda_s) ds}{\int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_s ds}.$$ 

In an equilibrium with trade, $q^*$ satisfies (11).

We already know from the discrete-types case that partial unraveling is possible, in the sense that trade might be shut down for some type, even though trade would be sustainable if that type were commonly known. The question is whether it is possible to have complete or nearly complete unraveling in equilibrium, even when $c$ is low enough to allow trade when $s$ is commonly known.

Obviously, if some seller type in $[\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o]$ is active in equilibrium, so is every lower type. Hence, the equilibrium has a cutoff structure, and, moreover, the cutoff must be $q^* \bar{s}_o$. It follows from the previous discussion that, for $s < q^* \bar{s}_o$, $\lambda_s^* = \lambda_o(s/q^*) > 0$, and, for $s > q^* \bar{s}_o$, $\lambda_s^* = 0$, where $\lambda_o(z)$ is the profit-maximizing $\lambda$ in the PO scenario when the marginal recruitment cost is $z$. Let $\lambda_o = (\lambda_o(s))_{s \in [\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o]}$, and recall that $\bar{c}$ is the maximal cost level compatible with trade in the PO scenario (i.e., $\bar{c} = \lambda_o(\bar{s}_o) =$
Claim 15  The unique equilibrium outcomes are as follows:

(i) \( c \geq \bar{c} \): no trade, \( \Lambda^* = 0 \); \( q^* = \bar{s}/\bar{s}_o \);
(ii) \( c \leq V(\lambda_o) \): all types are active, \( \Lambda^* = \lambda_o \); \( q^* = 1 \);
(iii) \( V(\lambda_o) < c < \bar{c} \): only \( s \in [\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o q^*] \) are active, with

\[
\lambda^*_s = \begin{cases} 
\lambda_o(s/q^*) > 0 & \text{for } s \in [\underline{s}, \bar{s}_o q^*], \\
0 & \text{for } s > \bar{s}_o q^*,
\end{cases}
\]

and \( q^* \in (0, 1) \) is such that \( V(\lambda^*) = c \).

Proof:  The equilibrium has a cutoff structure with cutoff \( q^* \bar{s}_o \) and \( \lambda^*_s \), as in (12). It is also immediate that the configurations described in Parts (i)—(iii) are equilibria.

Part (i): For \( c > \bar{c} \), the equilibrium is just the same as the \( \lambda = 0 \) equilibrium of the PO scenario with \( s = \underline{s} \). That is, the support of the off-path beliefs is \( \{0, \lambda_o(\bar{s}_o)\} \), and these values are optimal for type \( \underline{s} \) given \( q^* = \bar{s}/\bar{s}_o \). The probabilities \( \mu \) satisfy \( \mu(0)U_o(0) + \mu(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o))U_o(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o)) = c \). The uniqueness is also the same as in the corresponding PO scenario. For \( c = \bar{c} \), apart from the above equilibrium, there is also an equilibrium in which only type \( \underline{s} \) can be active. Since type \( \underline{s} \) is of zero measure, we think of this as a no-trade outcome as well.

Parts (ii) and (iii): The \( \lambda^*_s \) and \( q^* \) are optimal, and there are no off-path moves. To see that the equilibria in Parts (ii) and (iii) are unique among those with \( \lambda_s > 0 \) for some \( s \), suppose that, in either scenario, there are two equilibria with \( q_{1}^* < 1 \) and \( q_{2}^* > q_{1}^* \). The corresponding equilibrium values of \( \lambda \), namely \( \lambda^*_s(q_{1}^*) \) and \( \lambda^*_s(q_{2}^*) \), are given by (12). Hence, \( V(\lambda^*(q_{2}^*)) < V(\lambda^*(q_{1}^*)) = c \), in contradiction to \( q_{2}^* > 0 \). Therefore, to establish uniqueness, we only have to rule out the no-trade equilibrium. Such an equilibrium may be supported only by the beliefs \( \mu \) described in the proof of Part (i). But \( c < \bar{c} = U_o(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o)) \) implies that \( \mu(0)U_o(0) + \mu(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o))U_o(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o)) = c \) cannot hold.

Since by definition \( \bar{c} = U_o(\lambda_o) \), for any \( c < \bar{c} \) and commonly known \( s < \bar{s}_o \), the equilibrium in the PO scenario involves trade. In contrast, Part (iii) of Claim 15 identifies a range of \( c < \bar{c} \) and \( s < \bar{s}_o \) for which there is no trade.

The extent of such unraveling depends on \( c \) and \( \underline{s} \). The following claim identifies a threshold \( \underline{c} < \bar{c} \) such that, if bidder entry cost \( c \) exceeds \( \underline{c} \), then the unraveling is
nearly complete when \( s \) is small; if \( c < c^* \), trade always takes place regardless of how small \( s \) is.

The probability of equilibrium with no trade (given \( c \) and \( s \)) is

\[
\Pr(\text{no-trade}|c, s) = \Pr(\{s : \lambda_s^* = 0\}|c, s).
\]

**Proposition 6** There exists \( c < c^* \) such that

(i) for any \( c \in (c^*, c) \), \( \lim_{s \to 0} \Pr(\text{no-trade}|c, s) = 1 \);

(ii) for any \( c < c^* \) and any \( s < \bar{s}_o \), \( \Pr(\text{trade}|c, s) = 1 \).

**Proof:** For the proof, we include \( s \) as an argument in \( V(\lambda_o, s) \). Let

\[
\bar{c} := \lim_{s \to 0} V(\lambda_o, s) = V(\lambda_o, 0).
\]

Since \( V(\lambda_o) \) is monotone in \( s \) (if \( s \) is decreasing, bidders are facing higher \( \lambda \); see the proof of Claim 15), it holds that \( U_o(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o)) > V(\lambda_o, s) > \lim_{s \to 0} V(\lambda_o, s) \). So, \( \bar{c} = U_o(\lambda_o(\bar{s}_o)) \) implies that

\[
c < \bar{c}.
\]

If \( c > c^* \), then for small enough \( s \), \( V(\lambda_o, s) < c \), and the equilibrium is given by Part (iii) of Claim 15. Therefore,

\[
\Pr(\text{no-trade}|c, s) = \frac{\bar{s}_o - q^*\bar{s}_o}{\bar{s}_o - s}.
\]

A change of variables shows that, for all \( q > 0 \),

\[
V(\lambda_o, 0) = \frac{\int_{\bar{s}_o}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_o(s) U_o(\lambda_o(s)) ds}{\int_{\bar{s}_o}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_o(s) ds} = \frac{\int_{\bar{s}_o}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_o \left( \frac{z}{q} \right) U_o(\lambda_o \left( \frac{z}{q} \right)) \frac{1}{q} ds}{\int_{\bar{s}_o}^{\bar{s}_o} \lambda_o \left( \frac{z}{q} \right) \frac{1}{q} ds},
\]

(13)

where the right-hand side equals \( V(\lambda(\cdot, q), 0) \) for \( \lambda(\cdot, q) = \lambda_o \left( \frac{z}{q} \right) \). Thus, \( V(\lambda(\cdot, q'), 0) = V(\lambda(\cdot, q''), 0) \) for all \( q', q'' > 0 \). (The bidders’ payoffs are independent of the cutoff \( \pi_o q \). This stationarity property utilizes the uniform distribution.)

Now, denote by \( \lambda_k^* \) and \( q_k^* \) the equilibrium magnitudes for \( \bar{s}_k \). From (13), if \( q_k^* \to q > 0 \), then \( \lim_{k \to \infty} V(\lambda_k^*, \bar{s}_k) = V(\lambda_o, 0) \). Since \( c > c^* = V(\lambda_o, 0) \), this implies a contradiction to buyer optimality. Hence, it must be that \( q_k^* \to 0 \), which implies the claim.
If \( c < c \), then for any \( s \), \( V(\lambda_0, s) > c \), and the equilibrium is given by Part (ii) of Claim 15. Therefore, \( \text{Pr}(\text{trade}|c, s) = 1 \). 

Note again that nearly complete unraveling occurs for a range of \( c < \bar{c} \) for which trade would take place at any commonly known \( s \in (0, \bar{s}_0) \).

6 Discussion and extensions

6.1 Welfare

Welfare \( W(\lambda, q) \) is identified with the total surplus,

\[
W(\lambda, q) := T(\lambda) - \lambda \frac{s}{q} - \lambda c,
\]

where \( T(\lambda) = \int_0^1 v \lambda e^{-\lambda(1-G(v))} g(v) dv = \int_0^1 [1 - e^{-\lambda(1-G(v))}] dv \) is the expected value of the first order statistic given Poisson(\( \lambda \))-distributed participation. Let \( \lambda^w \) and \( q^w \) denote the welfare-maximizing magnitudes.

**Proposition 7** (i) \( q^w = 1 \). (ii) If \( U_o(0) > s + c \), then \( \lambda^w \) is the unique level satisfying

\[
U_o(\lambda) = c + s. \tag{14}
\]

If \( U_o(0) \leq s + c \), then \( \lambda^w = 0 \).

**Proof:** (i) Obvious. (ii) Note that

\[
T'(\lambda) = \int_0^1 (1 - G(v)) [1 - e^{-\lambda(1-G(v))}] dv = U_o(\lambda),
\]

using (20) for the second equality. Since \( U_o \) is strictly decreasing, \( T \) is strictly concave. It follows that, (14) is the first-order condition for welfare maximization and the condition is sufficient, proving the claim. 

The critical equality is

\[
T'(\lambda) = U_o(\lambda). \tag{15}
\]

For intuition, recall the equivalence of the expected payoffs to those of the SPA, where each bidder’s payoff is equal to his marginal contribution to the total surplus.
There are two types of inefficiency in equilibrium. First, as we already know, we can have $q^* < 1$ in equilibrium, which immediately means wasted recruiting effort. Second, as shown below, for almost all $(s, c)$ combinations in the PO scenario, $\lambda^* \neq \lambda^w$, and both excessive participation, $\lambda^* > \lambda^w$, and deficient participation, $\lambda^* < \lambda^w$, may arise in equilibrium.

For the equilibrium of the PO scenario to coincide with the welfare maximum, we must have $R_o'(\lambda^*) = s$ and $U_o(\lambda^*) = s + c$. Since both $U_o$ and $R_o'$ are independent of $s$ and $c$, these equalities in general cannot be expected to hold simultaneously. Thus, in general, the equilibrium does not maximize welfare.

Figure 12 depicts a possible relation between $U_o(\lambda)$ and $R_o'(\lambda)$. Its relevant features are consistent with a uniform value distribution, that is, $G(v) = v$.

In this case, since for any $\lambda \geq \Delta_o$, $U_o(\lambda) < R_o'(\lambda)$, it follows that $\lambda^* > \lambda^w$ in any equilibrium with trade. If $\lambda^* < \lambda^c$, then $s + c > s = R_o'(\lambda^*) > U_o(\lambda^*)$; if $\lambda^* = \lambda^c$, then $s + c > c = U_o(\lambda^*)$. In the case of $\lambda^* = \lambda^c$, there is also the inefficiency of $q^* < 1$ (except when $s$ is exactly equal to $R_o'(\lambda^c)$). On the other hand, there is a range of $(s, c)$ combinations such that $s + c < U_o(0)$ requires trade, $\lambda^w > 0$, but either $s > \bar{\sigma}_o$ or $\lambda^c < \Delta_o$ precludes trade in equilibrium, meaning, $\lambda^w > \lambda^* = 0$.

We did not examine in detail the relationship between equilibrium and the welfare maximum in the PU scenario. However, the observation that the equilibrium is generally inefficient should hold for that scenario as well. Since the maximal equilibrium in the PU scenario involves lower participation than that of the PO scenario, there will be less inefficiency due to excessive recruiting.

For a general $G$ (satisfying our assumptions), we have already established that $U_o$ is decreasing and $R_o'$ is single-peaked, as shown in Figure 12. The fact that $U_o$
intersects \( R'_0 \) for the first time at some point \( \tilde{\lambda} \) to the right of the maximum of \( R'_0 \) also holds for general \( G \) (see Claim 20 in the online appendix). Some other details in the figure have not been established analytically for a general \( G \),\(^{22}\) but these details do not affect the general understanding of the suboptimality of the equilibrium.

### 6.2 Fees/subsidies to influence participation

The question of optimal entry subsidies or fees is of secondary importance for this paper. First, it belongs more to the “design” paradigm that assumes significant seller commitment power, which we de-emphasize in this paper. Second, entry fees and subsidies may be abused by non-serious bidders and sellers, and their credible implementation may require commitment and enforcement capabilities.

Here, we put aside those issues and consider briefly the possibility of a flat subsidy/fee that is offered to, or collected from, each bidder who enters the auction in the PO scenario. Let \( D \) denote this fee (\( D < 0 \) means it is a subsidy). The subsequent interaction is formally equivalent to the PO scenario with bidders’ cost given by \( c + D \) and seller’s marginal cost given by \( \frac{s}{q} - D \). Let \( \lambda^*(D) \) and \( q^*(D) \) be the unique equilibrium magnitudes given \( D \), and let \( \Lambda^{c+D} \) be the solution to \( U_o(\Lambda^{c+D}) = c + D \).

**Claim 16** (i) If the seller can commit to \( \lambda \), then profit is maximized at \( \lambda^w \) with \( D = s > 0 \).

(ii) Suppose that the seller cannot commit to \( \lambda \). If there exists a \( D \) that facilitates trade (i.e., \( s - D \leq \tilde{s}_o \) and \( \Lambda^{c+D} \geq \Lambda_o \)), then profit is maximized with \( D^* \) that satisfies \( s - D^* = R'_o(\Lambda^{c+D^*}) \), with

\[
\lambda^*(D^*) = \Lambda^{c+D^*} \text{ and } q^*(D^*) = 1.
\]

Part (ii) implies that the profit-maximizing fee is related to the equilibrium configuration that prevails when fees cannot be imposed (i.e., the case of \( D = 0 \)). If \( \lambda^*(0) < \Lambda^c \) (i.e., recruiting is unconstrained when fees are not allowed), then \( D^* > 0 \)—a fee. If \( \lambda^*(0) = \Lambda^c \), then \( D^* < 0 \)—a subsidy.

\(^{22}\)If \( G \) is uniform, we have shown that \( U_o(\lambda) \) and \( R'_o(\lambda) \) intersect only once and that \( \tilde{\lambda} \) is below \( \Lambda_o \). For general \( G \), we have not established these properties. However, loosely speaking, we expect \( U_o(\lambda) \) to be mostly below \( R'_o(\lambda) \) since \( R_o(\lambda) \) is below \( T(\lambda) \) and converging to it.
**Proof of Claim 16:** (i) By committing to $\lambda^w$ and imposing an entry fee $D$ that satisfies $U_o(\lambda^w) = c + D$, the seller creates the maximal possible surplus and fully appropriates it since bidders’ payoff is 0. Since $U_o(\lambda)$ is decreasing and $\lambda^w > \lambda$, it follows that $D = s > 0$.

(ii) Given $D$, we noted that this is the PO scenario with seller cost $w - D$ and bidders’ cost $c + D$. Thus, in equilibrium given $D$, either $\lambda^*(D) \leq \lambda^w$ and $R_o'((\lambda^w)(D)) = s - D$, or $\lambda^*(D) = \lambda^w$ and $R_o'((\lambda^w)(D)) = \frac{s}{q^*} - D$.

If $\lambda^*(D) < \lambda^w$, then $D' > D$ such that the inequality still holds yields $\lambda^*(D') > \lambda^*(D)$ and higher profit.

If $\lambda^*(D) = \lambda^w$ and $R_o'((\lambda^w)(D)) > s - D$, then $q^*(D) < 1$. In this case, a fee $D' < D$ defined by

$$s - D' = \frac{s}{q^*(D)} - D,$$

results in $q^*(D') = 1$, $\lambda^w < D' < \lambda^w$ and $\lambda^*(D) = \lambda^*(D')$. This and the equality of the marginal recruitment costs imply that the profits for $D$ and $D'$ are equal as well. But then the argument of the previous paragraph implies that a slightly higher fee than $D'$ would be even more profitable.

Thus, by elimination, $D^*$ satisfies $\lambda^*(D^*) = \lambda^w + D^*$ and $R_o'((\lambda^w + D^*)) = s - D^*$. ■

Part (i) is established by Levin and Smith (1994) in the context of their model.\(^{23}\)

In contrast, in the absence of commitment to $\lambda$, the availability of fees and subsidies does not necessarily improve welfare. For example, if $\lambda^w < \lambda^* < \lambda^w$ with no fees or subsidies, then the profit-maximizing entry fee is strictly positive and will drive the equilibrium $\lambda$ further away from $\lambda^w$.

### 6.3 Reserve price

This subsection discusses the effects of a reserve price $r$—a minimum bid below which the good is not sold. Before we turn to the details, it should be mentioned that the imposition of a reserve price requires commitment power that might not be available in the less formal settings that we have in mind. However, it is still interesting to understand the role of such instruments even if their use is limited or imperfect.

\(^{23}\)The critical argument is that (15) holds, that is, bidder entry is surplus-maximizing, and the seller can extract the full surplus through an appropriate fee.
Assume that the auctions in both scenarios are subject to a reserve price \( r > 0 \) (not necessarily the optimal one). The equilibrium then differs in some details from that of the \( r = 0 \) case analyzed above, but not in the main qualitative features. Graphically, the marginal revenue curves in the diagrams change somewhat: for small values of \( \lambda \) they lie above the \( r = 0 \) curve (in particular, the intercept at \( \lambda = 0 \) is \( r(1 - G(r)) \) rather than 0), and for large values of \( \lambda \) they lie below the \( r = 0 \) curve. However, their general properties (such as single peakedness of \( dR_o/d\lambda \) and the relationship between the PO and PU curves) remain the same, and the general relationship between the curves and the nature of the equilibria also does not change. One immediate implication of the intercept at \( \lambda = 0 \) being \( r(1 - G(r)) \) is that, in the PU scenario, the no-trade equilibrium \( \lambda = 0 \) will continue to exist only for \( s \geq r(1 - G(r)) \). For smaller level of \( s \), the equilibrium necessarily involves trade. Bidders’ entry decision is also affected, since the reserve price lowers the benefit of entry for any level of anticipated participation.

Recall from the literature that, under the maintained assumptions on \( G \), the revenue-maximizing \( r_{\text{max}} \) for a standard auction satisfies \( r = \frac{1-G(r)}{g(r)} \). It follows immediately that this is also true for the FPA with stochastic participation in the PU scenario. Therefore, if the seller commits to \( r \) only after bidders enter, then the profit-maximizing \( r \) is \( r_{\text{max}} \). Of course, since \( r_{\text{max}} \) maximizes the revenue at any realized auction, it also maximizes the expected revenue in both scenarios, given any fixed participation rate \( \lambda \).

Let us add \( r \) as an argument and write \( U_o(\lambda; r), R_o(\lambda; r), \Pi_o(\lambda, q; r) \), etc.

**Claim 17**  
(i) For a given \( \lambda \), \( R_o(\lambda; r) \) (and hence\(^{24} \) \( R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda(r)) \)) is maximized at \( r_{\text{max}} \).
(ii) If the seller commits to \( r \) only after bidders enter, the reserve price is \( r_{\text{max}} \) in any equilibrium.

If the seller can commit to a reserve price in advance, then it affects entry, and therefore the profit-maximizing \( r \) may differ from \( r_{\text{max}} \). Suppose that the seller commits to a reserve price \( r \), and then the interaction proceeds according to the PO scenario. Essentially the same arguments presented in the \( r = 0 \) case establish that, in the subgame following the selection of \( r \), there is a unique equilibrium. Let \( \lambda^*(r) \),

\(^{24}\)By revenue equivalence, \( R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda(r)) = R_o(\lambda, r) \).
$q^*(r)$, and $\lambda^r(r)$ denote the equilibrium magnitudes in the subgame following $r$, and let $r^*$ denote the seller’s profit-maximizing $r$, i.e., $r^* = \arg \max_r \Pi_o(\lambda^r(r), q^*(r); r)$.

**Claim 18** In the PO scenario, the following hold:

(i) If $\lambda^r(r^*) > 0$ and bidders’ entry does not constrain the equilibrium, i.e., $\lambda^r(r^*) < \lambda^r(r^*)$, then $r^* = r_{\text{max}}$.

(ii) If bidders’ entry constrains the equilibrium, i.e., $\lambda^r(r^*) = \lambda^r(r^*)$, then $r^* \neq r_{\text{max}}$.

Both parts of this claim are almost immediate. In Part (i), bidders’ entry does not constrain the seller, and so there is no reason to deviate from $r_{\text{max}}$. In Part (ii), bidders’ entry considerations do constrain the equilibrium, so the first-order effect of a change of $r$ at $r = r_{\text{max}}$ is its effect on entry, which does not vanish. The proof (as well as the remaining proofs for this section) are in the online appendix.

The introduction of $r > 0$ affects the seller’s profit and the bidders’ expected benefit at each participation level. First, it makes the auction more profitable. This increases the range of $s$ for which an equilibrium with trade can be sustained; i.e., $\pi_o(r) > \pi_o(0)$. Second, it lowers bidders’ benefit from entry for any expected level of participation, resulting in a lower maximal level of participation for which entry is profitable; i.e., $\lambda^r(r) < \lambda^r(0)$.

Intuitively, it seems that $r^*$ should be lower than $r_{\text{max}}$ because decreasing $r$ slightly when it is above $r_{\text{max}}$ increases the profitability of the auction and relaxes the bidders’ entry constraint. However, this intuition is incomplete, since $q^*$ would change at the same time and the total recruitment cost would increase. For this reason, although $r^* < r_{\text{max}}$ might be true in general, we have been able to establish it only under additional conditions that guarantee that the $\lambda^r(r)$ values corresponding to the $r$ values in the relevant range are not too small. This will be the case if $c$ is not too large.\(^{25}\)

Analogous results most likely hold for the equilibria with trade in the PU scenario, but we have not proved this. However, it is immediate that, if $s \leq r[1 - G(r)]$ and $c$ is not prohibitive, the no-trade outcome is not an equilibrium in the PU scenario. Since $r[1 - G(r)]$ is maximized at $r_{\text{max}}$, it follows that if $s < r_{\text{max}}[1 - G(r_{\text{max}})]$, the seller can avoid the no-trade outcome by selecting an appropriate reserve price.

\(^{25}\)The precise condition is $\lambda^r(r)[2 - G(r)] > 1$. 

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6.4 Bidders learn their value before entering

In the models discussed so far, bidders learned their private values only after incurring the cost $c$. This is a scenario of costly information acquisition. If, however, the values are readily known and the main effort lies in bid preparation or other costs associated with bidding, then a more suitable model would have the bidders’ costly entry decision taking place with knowledge of their private values. This subsection outlines how our analysis can be expanded to cover this case. A full analysis would take too much space, but our discussion suggests that the analysis is doable and that the main qualitative insights would be the same as those for the models discussed earlier. In particular, we show below for the case of small marginal recruitment cost $s$ that the recruitment cost is higher in the PO scenario than in the PU scenario.

Consider the PO scenario in this case. If entry is profitable for a bidder with value $v$, then it is profitable for bidders with higher values. Therefore, bidders will enter if and only if their value $v$ exceeds a certain cutoff $v \in (0, 1)$, at which a prospective bidder is indifferent about entry.

As before, let $\gamma$ denote the Poisson rate of contacts made by the seller. The probability that a contacted bidder enters (the counterpart of $q$ above) is $1 - G(v)$, and the effective Poisson rate of entry into the auction is $\lambda = \gamma (1 - G(v))$. For a given $v$, the seller’s problem of choosing $\gamma$ at marginal cost $s$ is equivalent to choosing $\lambda$ at marginal cost $s/(1 - G(v))$. As before, it will be convenient to express the relevant magnitudes in terms of $\lambda$ rather than $\gamma$.

The bidding game among entrants is an FPA with observable participation and private values independently drawn from $[v, 1]$. In equilibrium, if there is only one participant, the winning bid is 0; if there are two or more participants, the bids lie in $[v, 1]$ and are monotone in values. Therefore, the seller’s revenue is 0 if fewer than two bidders enter, and it is the appropriate equilibrium winning bid which lies in $[v, 1]$ otherwise. Given $\lambda$ and $v < 1$, the seller’s payoff $\Pi_o(\lambda, v)$ is

$$\Pi_o(\lambda, v) = R_o(\lambda, v) - \lambda s/(1 - G(v)).$$

Since the equilibrium bids in the bidding subgame with two or more bidders are monotone in values, the marginal entering bidder $v$ will win the good only if he is the sole entrant, in which case he will pay 0. The probability that the bidder with value $v$ is the sole entrant is $e^{-\lambda}$. Therefore, this bidder’s payoff from entering is
$ve^{-\lambda}$, and the indifference of bidder $v$ with respect to entry implies

$$ve^{-\lambda} = c. \quad (17)$$

An equilibrium with trade is characterized by some $\lambda > 0$ and $v < 1$ such that $\lambda$ maximizes $\Pi_o(\lambda, v)$ and $v$ satisfies (17).

Consider next the PU scenario. Here, too, bidders enter if their value $v$ exceeds a threshold $v_e$. Given the Poisson rate $\gamma$ of contacts made by the seller, the effective Poisson rate of entry into the auction is $\lambda = \gamma(1 - G(v))$. As before, it will be convenient to express the relevant magnitudes in terms of $\lambda$ rather than $\gamma$. The bidding game among entrants is an FPA with unobservable participation and independent private values drawn from $[v; 1]$. Given that bidders expect an effective Poisson rate $\hat{\lambda}$ of entry, the equilibrium bidding strategy of the entering bidders, $\beta(v; v, \hat{\lambda})$, is strictly increasing in $v \in [v, 1]$.

With probability $e^{-\lambda}$ no bidders enter and the seller’s revenue is 0; otherwise it is the winning bid. Let $R_u(\lambda, v, \hat{\lambda})$ denote the expected winning bid given $\lambda$, $\hat{\lambda}$, and $v < 1$. The seller’s payoff $\Pi_u(\lambda, v, \hat{\lambda})$ is

$$\Pi_u(\lambda, v, \hat{\lambda}) = R_u(\lambda, v, \hat{\lambda}) - \lambda s/(1 - G(v)). \quad (18)$$

Since $\beta(v; v, \lambda)$ is strictly increasing in $v$, the marginal entering bidder $v$ will win the good only if he is the sole entrant. Therefore, $\beta(v; v, \hat{\lambda}) = 0$, and $v$ satisfies the same entry condition as above,

$$ve^{-\lambda} = c. \quad (19)$$

An equilibrium with trade is characterized by $\lambda > 0$ and $v < 1$ such that $\lambda$ maximizes $\Pi_u(\lambda, v, \hat{\lambda})$ with $\hat{\lambda} = \lambda$ and $v$ satisfies (19).

Existence of an equilibrium is somewhat more complicated than in the previous scenarios of Subsections 2.2 and 3.2, since here $v$ varies with $\lambda$. We do not undertake the full equilibrium analysis for this case. Instead, we conjecture that, for sufficiently small $s$ and $c$, there exists an equilibrium with trade in both scenarios. Under this assumption, we compare the equilibrium outcomes in the limit as $s \to 0$.

Let $\lambda_i(s)$ and $v_i(s)$ denote the equilibrium magnitudes in the equilibrium with
maximal $\lambda$ in the PO ($i = o$) and PU ($i = u$) scenarios, respectively.\textsuperscript{26}

**Claim 19** (i) $\lim_{s \to 0} \lambda_i(s) = -\ln c$ for $i = u$ and $i = o$.

(ii) In the limit, total recruitment cost is higher in the PO scenario:

$$\lim_{s \to 0} \lambda_o(s) \frac{s}{1 - G(v_o(s))} = (\ln c)^2 c > \lim_{s \to 0} \lambda_u(s) \frac{s}{1 - G(v_u(s))}.$$

Thus, in the limit as $s \to 0$, both scenarios give rise to the same level of effective participation, but total recruitment cost is higher in the PO scenario. This ranking of the costs is the same as in the information acquisition case in which bidders learn their values only after incurring $c$.

### 6.5 Uniqueness of equilibrium in the PO scenario

The equilibrium outcome of the PO scenario is unique for almost all values of $s$ and $c$ (except when $s = \bar{s}_o$ or $\bar{\lambda} = \Lambda_o$) given the refinement imposed by the last condition of the equilibrium definition in Section 1.2.\textsuperscript{27} Without the refinement, the no-trade outcome is always an equilibrium. More precisely, without the condition,

- if $s > \bar{s}_o$ or $\bar{\lambda} < \Lambda_o$, then no-trade is the unique equilibrium outcome;
- if $s \leq \bar{s}_o$ and $\bar{\lambda} \geq \Lambda_o$, there are two equilibrium outcomes: one with $\lambda^* > 0$ and one with $\lambda^* = 0$.

In the case with $s < \bar{s}_o$ and $\bar{\lambda} > \Lambda_o$, the additional no-trade equilibrium $\lambda^* = 0$ is supported by the off-path belief $\mu(\bar{\lambda}) = 1$ and $q^* \in (0, \frac{\rho}{\bar{s}_o})$. That is, bidders who are contacted off-path conjecture that $\lambda = \bar{\lambda}$, which makes them just indifferent among all choices of $q$, including $q^*$ that makes it unprofitable for the seller to recruit. Such an equilibrium violates the refinement since the seller’s best response to $q^* < \frac{s}{\bar{s}_o}$ is $\lambda = 0$, rather than the conjectured $\bar{\lambda}$.

Observe that such a no-trade equilibrium is unconvincing on other grounds as well. First, when $s < \bar{s}_o$ and $\bar{\lambda} > \Lambda_o$, the no-trade equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with trade. Second, it is not robust to perturbations. Consider

\textsuperscript{26}In the PO scenario this is probably the unique equilibrium. However, we do not prove this because it would be essentially a repetition of the analysis in Subsection 2.2.

\textsuperscript{27}If $\gamma^* = 0$, then every $\hat{\gamma}$ in the support of $\mu$ maximizes the seller’s payoff given $q^*$ and $\beta^*$.

\textsuperscript{28}If $q^* = \frac{\rho}{\bar{s}_o}$, then $\lambda = \Lambda_o$ is also a best response, but still $\Lambda_o \neq \bar{\lambda}$.
a perturbation in which the seller is required to choose at least an effort \( \gamma \geq \varepsilon > 0 \), for some small \( \varepsilon > 0 \). As \( \varepsilon \to 0 \), this perturbed game has a unique limit outcome that corresponds to the equilibrium with trade. This is because, for any \( q \in (0, 1) \) that is small enough so that \( \frac{\varepsilon}{q} \geq \bar{s}_o \), the seller’s best response is either \( \lambda = \varepsilon \) or \( \lambda_o \) (or mixing between them). However, in all these cases, \( \bar{\lambda}_c > \lambda_o \) implies that the bidders would have a strict incentive to enter, implying \( q = 1 \).

Formally, since this game is not finite (it has both a continuum of actions and an unbounded number of players), we cannot directly apply the concept of stability in the sense of Kohlberg–Mertens (1986). However, if we look at a discretized version in which the seller chooses \( \lambda \) from a finite grid (that contains 0, \( \bar{\lambda}_c \), and \( \lambda_o \)), we can define a refinement in the spirit of stability, requiring that the equilibrium be immune to all vanishing fully mixed perturbations. It is fairly immediate that the no-trade equilibrium will fail such refinement, while the unique equilibrium with trade will survive it.\(^{29}\)

We can also confirm the instability of the no-trade equilibrium indirectly by observing that it fails the invariance property of stable equilibrium. To see this, consider the equivalent extensive form in which the seller first chooses between \( \lambda = 0 \), which terminates the game, and another action, “\( \lambda > 0 \)”, which stands for all positive recruitment efforts. The action “\( \lambda > 0 \)” is followed by the seller’s choice of the specific \( \lambda \) and the subsequent bidders’ decisions. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in this extensive form is the equilibrium with trade, by the same argument presented above for the variation that embodies the constraint \( \gamma \geq \varepsilon \).

7 Appendix

7.1 Proofs for the PO scenario

7.1.1 Proof of Claim 1: Bidders’ ex-ante expected payoff

We show that

\[
U_o(\lambda) = \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda}[1 - G(v)]dv. \tag{20}
\]

\(^{29}\)Note, however, that the no-trade equilibrium will survive a refinement in the spirit of perfect equilibrium that is defined in an analogous way, since we can focus on a sequence of perturbations for which the expectation conditional on \( \lambda > 0 \) is \( \bar{\lambda}_c \).
When a bidder with value $v$ is in an auction with a total of $n$ bidders, the bidder obtains the object with probability $G(v)^{n-1}$ given that $\beta_{FPA}$ is strictly increasing. Also, the lowest type obtains no payoff, $U(n,0) = 0$. Therefore, the usual envelope argument implies that the expected equilibrium payoffs must be $U(n,v) = \int_0^v G(x)^{n-1} \,dx$; see Krishna (2000).\footnote{From $U(n,v)$, one can derive the closed-form expression for $\beta_{FPA}(v,n)$ given in (1). The bid must solve $U(n,v) = G(v)^n (v - \beta_{FPA}(v))$, and substituting for $U(n,v)$ yields (1).}

Hence, when $n$ is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean $\lambda$, the expected payoff of type $v$ is

$$
\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-\lambda} \frac{\lambda^{n-1}}{(n-1)!} U(n,v) = \int_0^v \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} e^{-\lambda} \frac{\lambda^n G(x)^n}{n!} = \int_0^v e^{-\lambda(1-G(x))} \,dx.
$$

Therefore, the ex-ante expected payoff is

$$
U_o(\lambda) = \int_0^1 \left( \int_0^v e^{-\lambda(1-G(x))} \,dx \right) g(v).
$$

Changing the order of integration yields (20). Inspection of the RHS of (20) immediately implies the claimed properties of $U_0$.

**Payoff-Equivalence:** Note that the above characterization of the buyers’ payoffs applies to any standard auction format in which type $v$ in an auction with $n$ bidders wins with probability $G(v)^{n-1}$ and $U(n,0) = 0$. In particular, the buyers’ expected payoff in a second-price auction (SPA) is also $U_o(\lambda)$.

### 7.1.2 Proof of Claim 3

The total surplus (gross of the recruitment costs) is the expectation of the first order statistic of Poisson($\lambda$),

$$
\text{Total Surplus}(\lambda) = \int_0^1 \left[ 1 - e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda} \right] \,dv,
$$

and is equal to the sum of the revenue, $R_o(\lambda)$, and total bidders’ expected payoff, $\lambda U_o(\lambda)$. Hence, revenue is simply the difference of Total Surplus($\lambda$) and $\lambda U_o(\lambda)$, that is,

$$
R_o(\lambda) = \int_0^1 \left[ 1 - e^{-(1-G(b))\lambda} - e^{-(1-G(b))\lambda} ((1 - G(b)) \lambda) \right] \,db. \tag{21}
$$
Therefore,
\[
\frac{d}{d\lambda} R_0(\lambda) = \int_0^1 \frac{d}{d\lambda} \left( 1 - F^{SPA}(b) \right) \, db = \int_0^1 \lambda (1 - G(b))^2 e^{-(1-G(b))\lambda} \, db. \tag{22}
\]

Parts 1 and 2: Positivity, continuity, and values at \( \lambda = 0 \) and \( \lambda \to \infty \) are obvious from (22). To establish that \( R_0^\prime \) is single-peaked, consider the second derivative
\[
\frac{d^2}{d\lambda^2} R_0(\lambda) = \int_0^1 (1 - G(b))^2 e^{-(1-G(b))\lambda} \, db - \int_0^1 \lambda (1 - G(b))^3 e^{-(1-G(b))\lambda} \, db \tag{23}
\]
\[
= e^{-\lambda} \left( \frac{1}{g(0)} - \int_0^1 (1 - G(b))^2 e^{G(b)\lambda} \left[ b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{g(b)} \right]' \, db \right),
\]
using integration by parts.

Recall that by assumption, \( \left[ b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{g(b)} \right]'_b > 0 \). Thus, the integral on the last line of (23) is positive and increasing in \( \lambda \), while the first term is positive and independent of \( \lambda \). Therefore, \( \frac{d^2}{d\lambda^2} R_0(\lambda) < 0 \) for large \( \lambda \), and once it turns negative, it stays negative. Inspection of the first line of (23) reveals that \( \frac{d}{d\lambda} R_0(\lambda) \) is single-peaked.

Part 3: Immediate from Parts 1 & 2 and \( d(R_0(\lambda)/\lambda) d\lambda = \left[ R_0^\prime(\lambda) - \frac{R_0(\lambda)}{\lambda} \right] /\lambda \).

Revenue-Equivalence: Note that the argument above implies again to any standard auction format in which type \( v \) in an auction with \( n \) bidders wins with probability \( G(v)^{n-1} \), and so \( R_0(\lambda) \) is also the seller’s revenue in the second-price auction.

7.1.3 Proofs of Propositions 3 and 2 and Corollary 1

The following lemma summarizes the implications of backward induction from Subsection 2.1 and will be used in the proofs of the propositions.

Lemma 1 If \( (\lambda^*, q^*) \) is an equilibrium, then (i) either \( \lambda^* = 0 \) or \( \underline{\lambda}_o \leq \lambda^* \leq \overline{\lambda} \) and \( R_o^\prime(\lambda^*) = \frac{\lambda^*}{q} \); (ii) if \( q^* \in (0, 1) \), then either \( \lambda^* = \overline{\lambda} \), or \( \lambda^* = 0 \) and \( E_\mu[U_o(\lambda)] = c \); (iii) if \( \lambda^* = 0 \), the support of \( \mu \) is contained in \( \{0, \underline{\lambda}_o\} \).

Proof: Part (i): From (4), \( \lambda^* \leq \overline{\lambda} \). The rest follows immediately from Claim 2.

Part (ii) follows immediately from (2).

Part (iii): \( \lambda^* = 0 \) implies \( \max \Pi_o(\cdot, q^*) = 0 \). So, by the last equilibrium condition, \( \Pi_o(\lambda, q^*) = 0 \) for any \( \lambda \) in the support of \( \mu \). The result then follows from Claim 2 and the fact that the only \( \lambda \geq \underline{\lambda}_o \) s.t. \( R_o^\prime(\lambda) = \frac{\lambda}{q} \) and \( \Pi_o(\lambda, q^*) = 0 \) is \( \underline{\lambda}_o \).
Proof of Proposition 3: From Lemma 1, the only possible equilibrium outcome in these cases is $\lambda^* = 0$. It remains to establish the existence of equilibria with $\lambda^* = 0$

If $s > \tilde{s}_o$, then $\lambda = 0$ is the uniquely optimal choice of the seller for any $q^*$. Therefore, $\lambda^* = 0$ with $q^* = 1$ and $\mu(0) = 1$ is an equilibrium.

If $s \leq \tilde{s}_o$ and $\bar{x} < \underline{\lambda}_o$, then the following is an equilibrium: $\lambda^* = 0$, $q^* = s/\tilde{s}_o$, and $\mu$ with support on $\{0, \underline{\lambda}_o\}$ such that $\mu(0)U(0) + \mu(\underline{\lambda}_o)U(\underline{\lambda}_o) = U(\bar{x})$. The choice of $q^*$ guarantees that $\max \Pi_o(\lambda, q^*) = 0$ and that it is maximized at $\lambda = 0$ and $\lambda = \underline{\lambda}_o$. The choice of $\mu$ implies $E_{\mu}(U(\lambda)) = U(\bar{x}) = c$, so $q^*$ is bidder optimal.

Proof of Proposition 2: If $\bar{x} \geq \lambda_o(s)$, then $\lambda^* = \lambda_o(s)$ and $q^* = 1$ is an equilibrium. By definition $\lambda_o(s) = \arg \max \Pi_o(\cdot, 1)$. The optimality of $q^* = 1$ for bidders follows from $\bar{x} > \lambda^*$ and (2).

If $\bar{x} < \lambda_o(s)$, then $\lambda^* = \bar{x}$ and $q^*$ satisfying $\lambda_o(\frac{s}{\bar{x}}) = \bar{x}$ constitute an equilibrium. By the choice of $q^*$, $\bar{x} = \arg \max \Pi_o(\cdot, q^*)$. Since, by definition, $U(\bar{x}) = c$, the optimality of $q^*$ for bidders follows.

It follows from Lemma 1 that, if $\lambda^* > 0$, then $\lambda^* \geq \underline{\lambda}_o$ and $R'_o(\lambda^*) = \frac{s}{\bar{x}}$, and that $q^*$ may differ from 1 only if $\lambda^* = \bar{x}$. Therefore, the only possibilities are $\lambda^* = \bar{x}$ or $\lambda^* = \lambda_o(s)$. If $\bar{x} > \lambda_o(s)$, then for any $q$, $R'_o(\bar{x}) < \frac{s}{q}$, so $\bar{x}$ cannot be an equilibrium outcome. If $\bar{x} < \lambda_o(s)$, then $U(\lambda_o(s)) < c$, so $\lambda_o(s)$ cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Thus, if $\lambda^* > 0$, it must be that $\lambda^* = \min \{\bar{x}, \lambda_o(s)\}$.

It remains to show that there is no equilibrium with $\lambda^* = 0$. It follows from Lemma 1 that the support of the belief $\mu$ in such an equilibrium would be contained in $\{0, \underline{\lambda}_o\}$. Since $\bar{x} > \underline{\lambda}_o$, $q^*$ must be 1. But then $\Pi_o(\lambda_o(s), 1) > \Pi_o(\underline{\lambda}_o, 1) = \Pi_o(0, 1)$, contradicting the equilibrium condition on beliefs.

Proof Corollary 1: Part 1: Since $c = 0$, $q^*_k = 1$ for all $k$. Let $\lambda_k = \frac{1}{\sqrt{s_k}}$. Since $\lim_{\lambda \to \infty} R_o(\lambda) = 1$, we have $\Pi_o(\lambda_k, q^*_k, s_k) = R_o(\lambda_k) - \sqrt{s_k} \to 1$. From optimality, $\Pi_o(\lambda^*_k, q^*_k, s_k) \geq \Pi_o(\lambda_k, q^*_k, s_k)$ for all $k$. Hence $\lim \Pi_o(\lambda^*_k, q^*_k, s_k) \geq 1$. This together with $\Pi_o(\lambda^*_k, q^*_k, s_k) \leq R_o(\lambda^*_k) \leq 1$ implies that $\lim_{k \to \infty} \lambda^*_k s_k = 0$.

Part 2: For all $s_k < R'_o(\bar{x})$, $\lambda^*_k = \bar{x}$ and $\frac{\lambda^*_k}{q^*_k} = R'_o(\bar{x})$. Therefore, $\frac{s_k}{q^*_k} \lambda^*_k = \bar{x} R'_o(\bar{x}) = \text{constant}$ and $\Pi_o(\lambda^*_k, q^*_k, s_k) = R_o(\bar{x}) - \bar{x} R'_o(\bar{x}) = \text{constant}$. 

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7.2 Proofs for the PU scenario

7.2.1 Proof of Claim 5: The bidding strategy

A standard overbidding argument implies that the equilibrium bidding strategy $\beta_{\hat{\lambda}}$ must be strictly increasing whenever $\hat{\lambda} > 0$. Hence, given expected participation $\hat{\lambda}$, a bidder with value $v$ wins with probability $e^{-\hat{\lambda}(1-G(v))}$. Hence, the standard envelope argument implies that equilibrium payoffs of a buyer with value $v$ are given by

$$\int_0^ve^{-\hat{\lambda}(1-G(x))}dx,$$

and the ex-ante expected payoffs are $U_0(\hat{\lambda})$, as in the PO scenario.

Given a winning probability $e^{-\hat{\lambda}(1-G(v))}$, this implies that the bid $\beta_{\hat{\lambda}}(v)$ must solve

$$\int_0^ve^{-\hat{\lambda}(1-G(x))}dx = e^{-\hat{\lambda}(1-G(v))}(v - \beta_{\hat{\lambda}}(v)),$$

and so

$$\beta_{\hat{\lambda}}(v) = v - \int_0^ve^{-\hat{\lambda}(G(v)-G(x))}dx.$$

Revenue equivalence. Given any increasing bidding strategy, the allocation is the same in the FPA and the SPA, which implies that the total realized surplus is the same. When, $\hat{\lambda} = \lambda$, then the envelope argument implies that the bidders’ ex-ante expected payoffs are the same in the FPA and the SPA. Taken together, revenue is the same, too,

$$R_o(\lambda) = R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda}).$$

Of course, when $\hat{\lambda} \neq \lambda$, then this is not the case: While the total realized surplus remains identical, the bidders’ expected payoffs in the FPA when bidding according to $\beta_{\hat{\lambda}}$ is generally not $U_0(\lambda)$; so, $R_o(\lambda) \neq R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda})$.

7.2.2 Proof of Claim 7

Let $F_u(\cdot|\lambda, \beta_{\hat{\lambda}})$ be the distribution of the price received by the seller, given that actual participation is Poisson ($\lambda$) distributed and all bidders bid according to $\beta_{\hat{\lambda}}$, where the no-trade event is identified with price 0. Let $\tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}$ denote the “generalized inverse” of $\beta_{\lambda}$, defined as follows: $\tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1} = \beta_{\lambda}^{-1}$ over $[0,\beta_{\lambda}(1))$ and $\tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1} \equiv 1$ over $[\beta_{\lambda}(1), 1]$. Note that this implies that $\tilde{\beta}_{0}^{-1} \equiv 1$. Therefore,
$$F_u(b|\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = e^{-\lambda(1-G(\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b)))}. \quad (25)$$

Observe that $F_u$ is indeed a c.d.f. and is well defined for $\lambda = 0$ as well: since $\beta_\lambda$ is non-decreasing for any $\lambda \geq 0$, $\beta_\lambda^{-1}$ is non-decreasing and so is $F$; since $\beta_\lambda^{-1}(1) = 1$, $F_u(1|\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = 1$, and $F_u(0|\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = e^{-\lambda} < 1$. Then,

$$R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = \int_0^1 [1 - F_u(b|\lambda, \beta_\lambda)]db = \int_0^1 [1 - e^{-\lambda(1-G(\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b)))}]db, \quad (26)$$

where the last equality is obtained by substitution from (25). This and the characterization of $\beta_\lambda$ in (7) imply that $R_u$ is twice continuously differentiable in $\lambda$ and $\lambda$:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = \int_0^1 \left(1 - G(\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b))\right) e^{-\lambda(1-G(\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b)))}db \quad (27)$$

If $\lambda > 0$, then $\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b) < 1$ for all $b < 1$. Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial \lambda^2} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) < 0, \quad (28)$$

so that $R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda)$ and $\Pi_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda, q)$ are strictly concave in $\lambda$. By definition,

$$\xi(\lambda) = \int_0^1 \left(1 - G(\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b))\right) e^{-\lambda(1-G(\beta_\lambda^{-1}(b)))}db.$$

The continuity of $\xi(\lambda)$ and its other properties follow directly from this functional form and the properties of $\beta_\lambda^{-1}$. This proves the claim.

### 7.3 Proof of Claim 8: Comparison of PO and PU scenarios

Part (i): As noted in (24), the PO and PU scenarios are revenue equivalent on the equilibrium path, that is, $R_o(\lambda) = R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda)$ for every $\lambda$. Hence,

$$\frac{d}{d\lambda} R_o(\lambda) = \frac{d}{d\lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda)_{\lambda=\lambda} + \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_\lambda)_{\lambda=\lambda} = \xi(\lambda).$$
Now, using (26),
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda})|_{\lambda=\lambda} = \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \int_0^1 \left[ 1 - e^{-\lambda G(\tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}(b))} \right] db \right) |_{\lambda=\lambda} \\
= -\int_0^1 \lambda g(\tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}(b)) \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}(b) e^{-\lambda G(\tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}(b))} db,
\]
and from (7),
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}(b) = -\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \beta_{\lambda}(v) = -\frac{\int_0^v (G(v) - G(x)) e^{-\lambda(G(v) - G(x))} dx}{\lambda g(v) \int_0^v e^{-\lambda(G(v) - G(x))} dx} < 0,
\]
where \( v = \tilde{\beta}_{\lambda}^{-1}(b) \). Therefore, we have \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda})|_{\lambda=\lambda} > 0 \) for all \( \lambda \), which implies Part (i) of the claim.

Part (ii): We have
\[
R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda}) = \int_0^{\lambda} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} R_u(t, \beta_{\lambda}) dt > \lambda \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda})|_{\lambda=\lambda},
\]
(29)
since (28) implies that \( \frac{\partial}{\partial t} R_u(t, \beta_{\lambda}) \) is strictly decreasing in \( t \). Since by revenue equivalence \( R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda}) = R_o(\lambda) \), for all \( \lambda \), it follows from (29) that
\[
\frac{R_o(\lambda)}{\lambda} > \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda})|_{\lambda=\lambda}.
\]
The claim then follows from \( s_o = \max \frac{R_o(\lambda)}{\lambda} \) and \( s_u = \max \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} R_u(\lambda, \beta_{\lambda})|_{\lambda=\lambda} \).

8 References


9 Online Appendix

This appendix is not intended for publication. It contains the proofs for Section 6 (discussion and extensions).

9.1 Welfare

Claim 20 (i) For any \( \lambda > \Lambda \) such that \( U_o(\lambda) < R'_o(\lambda) \). (ii) There is \( \tilde{\lambda} > \Lambda \) such that \( U_o(\lambda) \geq R'_o(\lambda) \) for \( \lambda \leq \tilde{\lambda} \) and \( U_o(\lambda) < R'_o(\lambda) \) at least over some interval just above \( \tilde{\lambda} \).

Proof: Obviously, \( R_o(\lambda) \) is also the residual surplus not received by the bidders,

\[
R_o(\lambda) = T(\lambda) - \lambda U_o(\lambda),
\]

and \( R_o(\lambda) \to T(\lambda) \) as \( \lambda \to \infty \).

(i) If there is \( \Lambda \) such that \( U_o(\lambda) > R'_o(\lambda) \) for all \( \lambda \geq \Lambda \), then, by (15), for all such \( \lambda \), \( T(\lambda) - R_o(\lambda) > T(\Lambda) - R_o(\Lambda) > 0 \), which contradicts the fact that \( R_o(\lambda) \to T(\lambda) \) as \( \lambda \to \infty \).

(ii) By (15),

\[
R'_o(\lambda) = -\lambda U''_o(\lambda) = \lambda \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda}[1 - G(v)]^2 dv
\]  

and

\[
U_o(\lambda) - R'_o(\lambda) = U_o(\lambda) + \lambda U'_o(\lambda) = \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda}[1 - G(v)][1 - (1 - G(v))\lambda] dv.
\]  

Therefore,

\[
R''_o(\lambda) = -U'_o(\lambda) - \lambda U'''_o(\lambda) = \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda}[1 - G(v)]^2 dv
\]  

\[
-\lambda \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda}[1 - G(v)]^3 dv
\]  

\[
= \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\lambda}[1 - G(v)]^2 [1 - (1 - G(v))\lambda] dv.
\]
Recall that $R'_o(\lambda)$ is single-peaked and let $\bar{\lambda}$ denote the argument of the peak. Thus, $R''_o(\bar{\lambda}) = 0$, and it follows from (32) that there must be $x$ such that $(1 - G(x)) \bar{\lambda} = 1$, so the integrand on the RHS of (32) is positive for $v > x$ and is negative for $v < x$. Therefore,

$$0 = R''_o(\bar{\lambda}) < \int_0^x e^{-(1-G(v))\bar{\lambda}} [1 - G(x)][1 - G(v)] [1 - (1 - G(v))\bar{\lambda}] \, dv + \int_x^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\bar{\lambda}} [1 - G(x)][1 - G(v)] [1 - (1 - G(v))\bar{\lambda}] \, dv$$

$$= [1 - G(x)] \int_0^1 e^{-(1-G(v))\bar{\lambda}} [1 - G(v)] [1 - (1 - G(v))\bar{\lambda}] \, dv$$

$$= [1 - G(x)] [U_o(\bar{\lambda}) - R'_o(\bar{\lambda})].$$

The first inequality follows from $1 - G(x) < 1 - G(v)$ for the range $v < x$ where the integrand is negative, and from $1 - G(x) > 1 - G(v)$ for the range $v > x$ where the integrand is positive; the last equality follows from (31). Therefore, $U_o(\bar{\lambda}) > R'_o(\bar{\lambda})$.

Since $U_o$ is decreasing and $R'_o$ is increasing for $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}$, it follows that $U_o(\lambda) > R'_o(\lambda)$ for all $\lambda \leq \bar{\lambda}$. This and Part (i) imply that $U_o$ and $R'_o$ first intersect at some $\bar{\lambda} > \bar{\lambda}$.

\[\Box\]

### 9.2 Proof of Claim 18: Reserve price

Obviously, $r^*$ satisfies $\frac{d\Pi_o(\lambda^*_o(r); g^*(r); r)}{dr}|_{r=r^*} = 0$. Observe that

$$\frac{d\Pi_o(\lambda^*_o(r); g^*(r); r)}{dr} = \frac{d}{dr} \left[ R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r) - \frac{s}{q^*(r)} \lambda^*_o(r) \right]$$

$$= \left( \frac{\partial R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda} - \frac{s}{q^*(r)} \right) \frac{\lambda^*_o(r)}{dr} + \frac{\lambda^*_o(r) s}{(q^*(r))^2} \frac{dq^*(r)}{dr} + \frac{\partial R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial r}$$

$$= \frac{\lambda^*_o(r) s}{(q^*(r))^2} \frac{dq^*(r)}{dr} + \frac{\partial R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial r},$$

where the first term on the second line vanishes because it is the first-order condition with respect to $\lambda$. Also observe that, using integration by parts,

$$R_o(\lambda; r) = 1 - e^{-\lambda(1-G(r))} \left[ r - \frac{1 - G(r)}{g(r)} \right] - \int_r^1 e^{-(1-G(b))\lambda} \left[ b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{g(b)} \right]' \, db,$$
and therefore
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial r} R_o(\lambda; r) = -g(r) \lambda e^{-(1-G(r))\lambda} \left[ r - \frac{1 - G(r)}{g(r)} \right].
\]
Hence, \( \frac{\partial}{\partial r} R_o(\lambda; r) = 0 \) iff and only if \( r = r_{\text{max}} \).

Now if \( \lambda^*_o(r^*) < \lambda^c(r^*) \), then \( q^*(r) = 1 \) in a neighborhood of \( r^* \). Hence \( \frac{dq^*(r)}{dr} \bigg|_{r=r^*} = 0 \) and
\[
\frac{d\Pi_o(\lambda^*_o(r), q^*(r); r)}{dr} = \frac{\partial R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial r}.
\]
Therefore, \( \frac{d\Pi_o(\lambda^*_o(r), q^*(r); r)}{dr} = 0 \) if and only if \( r = r_{\text{max}} \), implying \( r^* = r_{\text{max}} \).

If \( \lambda^*_o(r) = \lambda^c(r) \), then \( \frac{dq^*(r)}{dr} \) is obtained from total differentiation of the first-order condition with respect to \( \lambda \),
\[
\frac{dq^*(r)}{dr} = \frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda^2} \frac{dq^*_o(r)}{dr} + \frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda \partial r} - \frac{s}{q^*(r)} = 0.
\]
Thus,
\[
\frac{dq^*(r)}{dr} = \frac{-\frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda^2} \frac{dq^*_o(r)}{dr}}{\frac{s}{q^*(r)}},
\]
Now, \( \frac{d\lambda^*_o(r)}{dr} = \frac{d\lambda^c(r)}{dr} = -\frac{\sqrt{U_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}}{\sqrt{U_o(\lambda^c_o(r); r)}} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda^2} < 0 \) from the second-order condition of profit-maximization with respect to \( \lambda \). Furthermore, at \( r = r_{\text{max}} \) both
\[
\frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial r^2} = 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial r} = 0.
\]
Therefore, at \( r = r_{\text{max}} \),
\[
\frac{d\Pi_o(\lambda^*_o(r), q^*(r); r)}{dr} = \lambda^*_o(r) \frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda^2} \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial \lambda} = \lambda^*_o(r) \frac{\partial^2 R_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{\partial \lambda^2} \frac{\partial U_o(\lambda^*_o(r); r)}{dr} < 0,
\]
implies that \( r^* \neq r_{\text{max}} \). This finishes the proof.

### 9.3 Proof of Claim 19: Bidders learn their value before entering

Part (i): In both scenarios, \( v_o(s) \rightarrow 1 \) as \( s \rightarrow 0 \). Therefore, the entry condition \( \overline{v} e^{-\lambda} = c \) for both scenarios implies \( \lim_{s \rightarrow 0} \lambda^c(s) = -\ln c \).

Part (ii): For a given \( s \), the respective equilibria (with trade) of the two scenarios satisfy the first-order conditions \( \partial \Pi_o(\lambda_o(s), v_o(s))/\partial \lambda = 0 \) and \( \partial \Pi_u(\lambda_u(s), v_u(s), \lambda); \lambda) / \partial \lambda \bigg|_{\lambda = \lambda_u(s)} = 0 \), where
\[
\frac{\partial R_o(\lambda_o(s), v_o(s))/\partial \lambda = \frac{s}{1 - G(v_o(s))}}.
\]
and
\[ \partial R_u(\lambda_o(s), \nu_o(s), \hat{\lambda})/\partial \lambda|_{\hat{\lambda}=\lambda_o(s)} = \frac{s}{1 - G(\nu_o(s))}, \]  
(34)

Thus, in each of the scenarios, the total recruiting cost is
\[ \lambda_i(s) \frac{s}{1 - G(\nu_i(s))} = \lambda_i(s) \partial R_i/\partial \lambda. \]  
(35)

By revenue equivalence, \( R_o(\lambda, \nu) \) and hence \( \partial R_o(\lambda, \nu, b)/\partial \lambda \) are the same as they would be with the SPA for the same participation process. Let \( F^{SPA} \) denote the price distribution in the SPA, that is,
\[ F^{SPA}(b|\lambda) = e^{-\frac{1}{1-G(b)}(1 - G(b))} \]  
and \( F^{SPA}(b|\lambda) = e^{-\lambda \ln(1 + \lambda)} \) for \( b \leq \nu \). So, by revenue equivalence, \( R_o(\lambda, \nu) = \int_0^1 (1 - F^{SPA}(b|\lambda)) \, db \). Therefore,
\[ \partial R_o(\lambda, \nu)/\partial \lambda = \lambda \nu e^{-\lambda} + \int_0^1 \left( \frac{(1 - G(b))}{1 - G(\nu)} \right)^2 \lambda e^{-\frac{1}{1-G(\nu)}(1 - G(b))} \, db. \]

Since \( \nu_o(s) \to 1 \) as \( s \to 0 \), we have \( \lim_{s \to 0} \partial R_o(\lambda_o(s), \nu_o(s))/\partial \lambda = \lim_{s \to 0} \lambda_o(s) e^{-\lambda_o(s)} = -c \ln c \). Therefore, \( \lim_{s \to 0} \lambda_o(s) \frac{s}{1 - G(\nu_o(s))} = (\ln c)^2 c \).

The inequality in Part (ii) of the claim will follow from \( \lim_{s \to 0} \lambda_i(s) = -\ln c \) and (35) after establishing
\[ \lim_{s \to 0} \partial R_u(\lambda, \nu, \hat{\lambda})/\partial \lambda|_{\hat{\lambda}=\lambda} < \lim_{s \to 0} \partial R_o(\lambda, \nu)/\partial \lambda. \]  
(36)

This follows from observing that, by revenue equivalence, \( R_o(\lambda, \nu) = R_u(\lambda, \nu, \lambda) \) and hence
\[ \partial R_o(\lambda, \nu)/\partial \lambda = dR_u(\lambda, \nu, \lambda)/d\lambda = \partial R_u(\lambda, \nu, \hat{\lambda})/\partial \lambda|_{\hat{\lambda}=\lambda} + \partial R_u(\lambda, \nu, \hat{\lambda})/\partial \hat{\lambda}|_{\hat{\lambda}=\lambda}. \]

Then, by adapting the arguments used in Subsection 3.2, it can be shown that
\[ \lim_{\nu \to 1} \int_0^1 \left[ e^{-\lambda(1 - G(\beta^{-1}(b; \nu, \lambda)))}/[1 - G(\nu)] \right] \frac{G(\beta^{-1}(b; \nu, \lambda)) - G(\nu)}{(1 - G(\nu))} \, db > 0, \]  
53
which implies (36) and hence Part (ii) of the claim.