### **Return to Protectionism and Global Reallocations**

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## **Road Map**

A. The Trade War: A Brief History

#### B. Effects on the US and China

- a. Trade Flows
- b. Prices (i.e., Unit Values)
- c. Employment, Welfare, Political Consequences

#### C. Effects on Third ("Bystander") Countries

a. Trade Flows  $\rightarrow$  Global Reallocations

#### D. Concluding Thoughts: Implications for the Future of Globalization

Trade Diversion? Trade Creation/Expansion? De-globalization?

## Based On:

- <u>The Return to Protectionism</u>, with Pablo Fajgelbaum, Amit Khandelwal, and Patrick Kennedy. <u>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</u>, Feb. 2020.
   <u>Update incl. 2019 Tariff Waves</u>
- <u>Global Reallocations in the 2018-19 Trade War</u>, with Pablo
  Fajgelbaum, Amit Khandelwal, Patrick Kennedy, and Daria Taglioni, Dec. 2021.

and many other:

- Amiti M, Redding SJ, Weinstein DE. 2019. The impact of the 2018 tariffs on prices and welfare. *J. Econ.Perspect.* 33(4):187–210
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- Bown CP. 2021. The US-China trade war and Phase One agreement. J. Policy Model. 43(4):805–43
- Bown CP, Kolb M. 2021. Trump's trade war timeline: an up-to-date guide. *Peterson Institute for International Economy*, Oct. 21. <u>https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-</u> <u>watch/trump-trade-warchina-date-guide</u>
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# <u>Reviewed in</u>: Fajgelbaum, P. and A. Khandelwal: "The Economic Impacts of the US-China Trade War," *Annual Review of Economics*, 2022.

## A. The Trade War: A Brief History

War unfolded in several waves:

- Feb. 2020: Section 201 investigation → tariffs on washing machines and solar panels
- Shortly thereafter: Section 232  $\rightarrow$  aluminum and steel
- Five waves of tariff increases vis a vis China starting in July 2018, with China retaliating in each stage
- China cut its MFN tariffs for all countries except the US
- Eventually 450 billion of annual aggregate trade flows affected
- Jan. 2020: Countries agree to halt tariffs  $\rightarrow$  Phase One Agreement
- But tariffs have remained in place as of today.


### The Trade War: A Brief History (contd.)

Some notable feature of this trade war:

- Unanticipated
- Initially targeted several countries. Later mainly China
  - $\rightarrow$  US-China Trade War
- Biggest protectionist move since 1930 Smoot-Hawley legislation:


	2018-19 Trade War	1930 Smoot-Hawley
US Imports Targeted (as % of GDP)	2.6%	1.4%
US Exports Targeted (as % of GDP)	1%	<b>0.6%</b> (Canada retaliation)
US Tariff Increases	3.7% → 25.8%	34.6% → 42.5%
# of Products Targeted	<b>75%</b> of 10-digit IM and EX products	<b>27%</b> of dutiable products

## US Tariff Changes $\Delta T^{US}_{CH} \& \Delta T^{US}_{i}$



## China Tariff Changes

 $\Delta T_{US}^{CH} \& \Delta T_{i}^{CH}$ 



## **B.** Effects on the US and China

#### a. Trade Flows:

EX from US to CH, and EX from CH to US decline

#### b. Prices (Unit Values):

Complete pass-through of tariff to US import prices at the variety level Not necessarily complete pass-through on consumer prices Overall: Tariff incidence was mainly on the US Similar results for China

#### c. Employment, Welfare, Politics:

Employment: No benefit to the US, potential loss in manuf. employment Welfare: Loss of ca. 0.13% of GDP (relatively small) BUT: Distributional effects (consumer loss: ca. \$114b or 0.6% of GDP)

Politics: Areas affected by retaliation mainly Republican

## **C. Effects on Bystander Countries**

- Focus on long-run differences (2017-2019). Stop before COVID onset
- Exploit variation across HS6 products

### Main Insights


- US-China trade declines (as shown in earlier work)
- Many countries increase exports to the US (substitute for China)
- But they also increase their exports to the rest of the world
- As a result, global trade INCREASES!

 $\rightarrow$  not just trade diversion, but trade creation

- Effects heterogeneous across countries
- Pre-existing specialization patterns explain only a small part of the response
- Winners: countries with deep trade agreements and FDI stock

ightarrow countries already well integrated in the trade system


### Heterogeneous Export Growth, 2016/17 vs. 2018/19




Part of this variation could be due to trade war. Possible drivers?

- Specialization in products targeted by the trade war?
- Substitution patterns with US/China?
- Supply elasticities?

### **Countries' Pre-War Export Baskets**






#### Implications of Export Responses to US Tariffs on China


	Exports:	
	Decrease to US	Increase to US
Increase to RW	China Complement (+) sloping supply	China Substitute (-) sloping supply
Decrease to RW	China Complement (-) sloping supply	China Substitute (+) sloping supply

Same logic applies to Chinese tariffs on US


### **Data Plots**



Pre-period:  $\beta$ =-0.00 (0.29). Post-period:  $\beta$ =-1.22 (0.27).



Pre-period:  $\beta$ =1.15 (0.41). Post-period:  $\beta$ =-2.14 (0.37).




Bystanders' Exports to US


Pre-period:  $\beta$ =-0.01 (0.11). Post-period:  $\beta$ =0.21 (0.09).



2015-17 • 2017-19




Pre-period:  $\beta$ =-0.06 (0.07). Post-period:  $\beta$ =0.29 (0.07).



#### Bystanders' Exports to China

• 2015-17 • 2017-19


Pre-period:  $\beta$ =-0.03 (0.16). Post-period:  $\beta$ =-0.19 (0.17).




Bystanders' Exports to RW

Pre-period:  $\beta$ =0.14 (0.06). Post-period:  $\beta$ =0.30 (0.07).


### CH Substitutability and Supply Slope



### US Substitutability and Supply Slope




### **Predicted "Winners"**



Log Change

### Correlates

Correlating "winners" to various country characteristics



N = 48, 10/90 error bars

#### Net Global Trade Aggregating Responses

from $\downarrow$ /to $\rightarrow$	US	CH	RW	World
US		-28.3%	3.1%	-0.4%
		(4.2%)	(2.2%)	(2.0%)
CH	-9.4%		4.8%	1.1%
	(3.0%)		(4.8%)	(3.6%)
RW	2.2%	-4.6%	6.5%	4.6%
	(1.3%)	(1.6%)	(0.7%)	(0.6%)
World	-0.6%	-7.5%	5.8%	3.5%
	(1.1%)	(1.5%)	(0.8%)	(0.6%)

### D. Concluding Thoughts Implications for the Future of Globalization

- Counterintuitive results on trade war effects on bystander countries
- Trade war  $\rightarrow$  Increase in global trade
- Possible explanation: Countries/Firms willing to pay the fixed costs of major supply chain reallocation to take advantage of opportunities
- No evidence of de-globalization. But shift of trade flows towards other countries → relocation
- HOWEVER: Analysis predates COVID and Ukraine.
- Global environment very different today. Future highly uncertain.
- Open question: Did the trade war create the political conditions that enable the Ukrainian evasion?

# **THANK YOU!**