

Convergence Across Castes

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Introduction

- ▶ How do historical inequalities behave during periods of rapid and large macroeconomic changes?
- ▶ Who gains and who loses?
- ▶ Does growth lift all boats?
- ▶ What are the key channels through which distributional changes occur?

Introduction

Indian experience provides a perfect environment:

- ▶ dramatic changes over the past 30 years
- ▶ GDP growth averaged 6-7 percent since the 1990s
- ▶ 1947 to 1980s growth averaged 3 percent

Introduction

India:

- ▶ long history of social division due to castes
- ▶ Caste identity by birth and immutable
- ▶ system often acted as a barrier to entry

This paper

- ▶ Focus on fortunes of SCSTs relative to others since 1983
- ▶ Describe the empirical evidence
- ▶ Develop a heterogeneous agent model
 - ▶ examine quantitative effects of aggregate growth shocks on caste gaps
- ▶ Identify the mechanisms at play behind the caste convergence


Data

- ▶ National Sample Survey (NSS) of India
- ▶ 6 rounds: R38 (1983-84), R43 (1987-88), R50 (1993-94), R55 (1998-99), R61 (2004-05), R68 (2011-12)
- ▶ Average sample size: 40,000 households; 170,000 individuals

Worker Wage gaps: Non-SCST/SCST


(a) Median gap

Mean Relative Wage Gaps



(b) Mean


Median Relative Wage Gaps



Worker Education gaps (years)


(a) Age cohorts

by age groups




(b) Birth cohorts

by birth cohort




Structural Transformation

Sectoral Employment Share



Sectoral Output Share



Questions

- ▶ Can aggregate growth shocks explain the caste wage convergence?
- ▶ Can this be consistent with the sectoral dynamics?
- ▶ How important were affirmative action programs?
- ▶ Were selection effects important for the convergence?
- ▶ How large are the welfare costs of caste barriers?

Model

- ▶ One-period lived heterogenous agents of measure L
- ▶ Measure S of these agents belong to caste s for SC/ST
- ▶ Measure $N = L - S$ belong to caste n for non-SC/ST

Talent Misallocation

- ▶ Castes differ along two margins
 - ▶ cost of education
 - ▶ costs of accessing labor market
- ▶ All individuals draw from same innate ability distribution
- ▶ Caste-specific schooling and sectoral ability distribution
- ▶ Costly misallocation of talent

Agent Objective

- ▶ Each agent i maximizes utility from $u(c_i)$
- ▶ The final good is produced by agent's by combining three intermediates:

$$y_i = \left(y_i^A - \bar{y}\right)^\theta \left(y_i^M\right)^\eta \left(y_i^H\right)^{1-\theta-\eta}$$

- ▶ Final good used for consumption, schooling costs and sectoral entry costs

Endowments

- ▶ Agent i : one unit of labor time and ability endowment a_i
- ▶ Ability productive in both market work and skill acquisition
- ▶ Ability a_i drawn from i.i.d. process with cdf

$$G(a), \quad a \in [\underline{a}, \bar{a}]$$

- ▶ Assume that $G(a)$ uniform distribution
- ▶ Ability distribution identical for both castes

Sectoral production technologies

- ▶ Output produced by agent i of caste $j = n, s$:
 - ▶ Sector **a** : $w_{ij}^a = Ae_{ij}$
 - ▶ Sector **m** : $w_{ij}^m = Me_{ij}$
 - ▶ Sector **h** : $w_{ij}^h = He_{ij}$
- ▶ A, M, H : exogenous sectoral labor productivities

Human Capital and Sectoral Entry Costs

- ▶ Sectoral entry costs for agent i of caste $j = n, s$:
 - ▶ Sector a : $f_j^a = 0$
 - ▶ Sector m : $f_j^m(e_i) = \phi(\gamma_j^m - \alpha e_i)$
 - ▶ Sector h : $f_j^h(e_i) = \phi(\gamma_j^h - \alpha e_i)$
- ▶ $e_i = a_i q_i^\chi$
 - ▶ schooling q raises human capital e
 - ▶ human capital reduces entry costs in sectors m, h
- ▶ Marginal cost of schooling: $\lambda_j, j = n, s$

Optimal Sector-Contingent Schooling

- ▶ Sectoral entry costs are caste and sector-specific
- ▶ Schooling costs are caste-specific
- ▶ Schooling choice reflects caste and expected sector of work

Sector Choice

- ▶ Agents maximize $\hat{c}_{ij} = \max\{\hat{c}_{ij}^a, \hat{c}_{ij}^m, \hat{c}_{ij}^h\}$
- ▶ Problem gives three ability thresholds

Lemma

All individuals $i \in \text{caste } j = n, s$ with ability a_{ij} prefer employment in sector-m to sector-a if $a_{ij} \geq \hat{a}_j^m$; employment in sector-h to sector-a if $a_{ij} \geq \hat{a}_j^h$; and employment in sector-h to sector-m if $a_{ij} \geq \tilde{a}_j^h$.

Sectoral Employment Gaps

$$\Delta s^a = \frac{\hat{a}_n^m - \underline{a}}{\hat{a}_s^m - \underline{a}}$$

$$\Delta s^m = \frac{\tilde{a}_n^h - \hat{a}_n^m}{\tilde{a}_s^h - \hat{a}_s^m}$$

$$\Delta s^h = \frac{\bar{a} - \tilde{a}_n^h}{\bar{a} - \tilde{a}_s^h}$$

- *Ability thresholds key for sectoral employment gaps*

Sectoral Wage Gaps

$$\Delta w^a = \left(\frac{\lambda_s}{\lambda_n} \right)^{\frac{\chi}{1-\chi}} \left(\frac{(\hat{a}_n^m)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1} - (\underline{a})^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1}}{(\hat{a}_s^m)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1} - (\underline{a})^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1}} \right) \left(\frac{\hat{a}_s^m - \underline{a}}{\hat{a}_n^m - \underline{a}} \right)$$

$$\Delta w^m = \left(\frac{\lambda_s}{\lambda_n} \right)^{\frac{\chi}{1-\chi}} \left(\frac{(\tilde{a}_n^h)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1} - (\hat{a}_n^m)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1}}{(\tilde{a}_s^h)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1} - (\hat{a}_s^m)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1}} \right) \left(\frac{\tilde{a}_s^h - \hat{a}_s^m}{\tilde{a}_n^h - \hat{a}_n^m} \right)$$

$$\Delta w^h = \left(\frac{\lambda_s}{\lambda_n} \right)^{\frac{\chi}{1-\chi}} \left(\frac{\bar{a}^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1} - (\tilde{a}_n^h)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1}}{\bar{a}^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1} - (\tilde{a}_s^h)^{\frac{1}{1-\chi}+1}} \right) \left(\frac{\bar{a} - \tilde{a}_s^h}{\bar{a} - \tilde{a}_n^h} \right)$$

► *Ability thresholds and relative schooling costs are key*

Relative Ability Thresholds

- ▶ Two key thresholds: \hat{a}_j^m and \tilde{a}_j^h

$$\frac{\hat{a}_n^m}{\hat{a}_s^m} = \left(\frac{\lambda_n}{\lambda_s} \right)^\chi \left(\frac{\gamma_n^m}{\gamma_s^m} \right)^{1-\chi}$$
$$\frac{\tilde{a}_n^h}{\tilde{a}_s^h} = \left(\frac{\lambda_n}{\lambda_s} \right)^\chi \left(\frac{\gamma_n^h - \gamma_n^m}{\gamma_s^h - \gamma_s^m} \right)^{1-\chi}$$

- ▶ *Relative schooling and entry costs are key for caste gaps*

Can model generate the observed changes?

- ▶ Approach: calibrate model to match 1983 facts
- ▶ Hit it with observed sectoral productivity shocks
- ▶ What is the implied time path of the caste wage gap?

Calibration

- ▶ Targets: eight key data moments
 - ▶ three sectoral caste employment distribution gaps
 - ▶ three sectoral caste wage gaps
 - ▶ two mean schooling levels
- ▶ We choose eight parameters
 - ▶ schooling cost parameters $\left(\lambda_s, \frac{\lambda_s}{\lambda_n}\right)$
 - ▶ entry cost parameters $(\gamma_s^m, \gamma_s^h, \gamma_n^m, \gamma_n^h)$
 - ▶ human capital elasticity of schooling: χ
 - ▶ scaling parameter for sectoral entry cost ϕ

Parameterization for 1983

VARIABLE	VALUE	VARIABLE	VALUE
\underline{c}	0.5	θ	0.46
η	0.15	α	1
\underline{a}	1	\bar{a}	50
M/A	1.2	H/A	1.1
L	1	S	0.25
CALIBRATED VARIABLES FOR 1983			
γ_s^m	20.14	γ_s^h	299.14
$\frac{\gamma_n^m}{\gamma_s^m}$	1.04	$\frac{\gamma_n^h - \gamma_n^m}{\gamma_s^h \gamma_s^m}$	1.33
$\frac{\lambda_s}{\lambda_n}$	1.55	ϕ	0.53
λ_s	2.53	χ	0.61
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 1983-2012			
Agriculture	Manufacturing	Services	
1.14	2.14	2.41	

Model Results: 1983 and 2012

Variable	1983		2012	
	Data	Model	Data	Model
	Targeted			
Δw^a	1.04	1.04	1.08	1.05
Δw^m	1.20	1.20	1.14	1.20
Δw^h	1.45	1.45	1.33	1.16
Δs^a	0.80	0.85	0.79	0.85
Δs^m	1.43	1.43	1.57	2.15
Δs^h	1.61	1.60	1.21	1.32
Mean edu ST	1.81	1.75	4.73	3.78
Mean edu Non-ST	4.08	3.86	5.78	6.59
	Not Targeted			
Δw	1.45	1.34	1.30	1.24

Non-Targeted Moments: 1983 and 2012

Variable	1983		2012	
	Data	Model	Data	Model
Edu: Pareto shape param ST	0.57	0.77	1.33	1.19
Edu: Pareto shape param NST	1.12	1.16	1.52	1.58

Overview

- ▶ Model fits targeted 1983 distributional data quite well
- ▶ Productivity growth can explain over 70% of the observed caste wage convergence between 1983 and 2012
- ▶ We consider this suggestive of the power of growth in narrowing historical inequalities

Counterfactuals

- ▶ Model has number of built-in features
 - ▶ affirmative action
 - ▶ selection effects
 - ▶ caste distortions
- ▶ How important were each of these aspects?

Affirmative Action: Equalize entry costs

Variable	1983				
	Data	Baseline	γ_m	γ_h	both
Δs^a	0.80	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.84
Δs^m	1.43	1.43	1.54	0.79	0.84
Δs^h	1.61	1.60	1.58	93.37	82.78
Δw^a	1.04	1.04	1.01	1.04	1.01
Δw^m	1.20	1.20	1.18	1.01	1.00
Δw^h	1.45	1.44	1.45	1.26	1.26
Δw	1.45	1.34	1.31	1.62	1.58
	2012				
	Data	Baseline	γ_m	γ_h	both
Δs^a	0.79	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.84
Δs^m	1.57	2.15	2.54	0.77	0.84
Δs^h	1.21	1.33	1.31	3.90	3.84
Δw^a	1.08	1.05	1.01	1.05	1.01
Δw^m	1.14	1.20	1.18	1.02	1.00
Δw^h	1.33	1.16	1.16	1.02	1.02
Δw	1.30	1.24	1.22	1.33	1.31

Affirmative Action Takeaway

- ▶ Affirmative action reduced wage gap in 1983
- ▶ Dynamics of wage gap driven by growth
- ▶ Convergence would have been greater without protections

Selection Effects: Random Re-Sorting

Wage Gaps and Growth			
Variable	Baseline 1983	Baseline 2012	Random Sorting 2012
Δw^a	1.04	1.05	1.07
Δw^m	1.20	1.20	1.197
Δw^h	1.45	1.16	1.14
Δw	1.34	1.24	1.25

Sectoral average ability			
Ee_{nst}^a	17.06	17.69	17.85
Ee_{nst}^m	38.00	37.68	38.01
Ee_{nst}^h	46.49	45.54	44.67
Ee_{st}^a	19.86	20.57	20.67
Ee_{st}^m	42.19	41.72	42.18
Ee_{st}^h	47.81	46.64	45.84

Selection Effects

- ▶ Role of selection in wage convergence is quantitatively small
- ▶ Most of the convergence is due to
 - ▶ falling labor gaps in services
 - ▶ differential increase in education

Removing Caste Distortions

- ▶ No rebate
 - ▶ Consumption gains are 10.2% (1983) and 10.3% (2012)
 - ▶ Output gains are 11.4% (1983) and 8.4% (2012)
- ▶ With lump-sum rebates
 - ▶ Output side unaffected
 - ▶ Consumption gains: 3.3% (1983) and 2.5%

Other mechanisms

- ▶ Non-homotheticity: *not important*
- ▶ Differential sectoral growth: *not important*
- ▶ Structural transformation: *needed*
- ▶ Education re-sorting: *key for results*

Conclusions

- ▶ India has seen a catch-up in education and wages of SC/STs
- ▶ Productivity growth can explain 72% of the wage convergence
- ▶ Convergence mostly driven by education
- ▶ Affirmative action policies and selection effects have played minimal roles
- ▶ Growth has mitigated caste-based talent misallocation