Accelerating vaccine innovation for emerging infectious diseases via parallel discovery

Joseph Barberio¹, Jacob Becraft¹, Zied Ben Chaouch²,³, Dimitris Bertsimas²,⁴,⁵, Tasuku Kitada¹, Michael L. Li⁴, Andrew W. Lo²–⁶*, Kevin Shi¹, Qingyang Xu²,⁴

¹Strand Therapeutics Inc., Cambridge, MA 02142
²MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering, Cambridge, MA 02142
³Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
⁴Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
⁵MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA 02142
⁶Sante Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501

*Corresponding author

This version: April 30, 2022

Email: alo-admin@mit.edu

Tel: (617) 253-4240

Address: 100 Main Street, E62-618, Cambridge, MA 02142

© 2022 by Barberio et al.
All Rights Reserved
Executive Summary

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised awareness about the global imperative to develop and stockpile vaccines against future outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. Prior to the pandemic, vaccine development for emerging infectious diseases was stagnant, largely due to the lack of financial incentive for pharmaceutical firms to undertake the necessary vaccine research and development (R&D). This R&D requires significant capital investment, most notably in the clinical trial process, but problematically, vaccines generate much less profit for pharmaceutical firms compared to therapeutics in disease areas such as oncology.

The portfolio approach of financing drug development has been proposed as a financial innovation to improve the risk/return tradeoff of investment in drug development projects through the use of diversification and securitization. By investing in a sizable and well-diversified portfolio of novel drug candidates, and issuing equity and securitized debt based on this portfolio, the financial performance of such a biomedical “megafund” can be made attractive to a wide group of investors in the private sector.

To analyze the viability of the portfolio approach in expediting vaccine development against emerging infectious diseases, we simulate the financial performance of a hypothetical vaccine megafund consisting of 120 mRNA vaccine candidates in the preclinical stage, which target 11 emerging infectious diseases, including a hypothetical “disease X,” which may cause the next global pandemic. We calibrate the simulation parameters with input from domain experts in mRNA technology and an extensive literature review. We find that this vaccine portfolio will generate an average annualized return on investment of −6.0% per annum and a negative net present value of −$9.5 billion, despite the scientific advantages of mRNA technology and the financial benefits of diversification. We also show that clinical trial costs account for 94% of the total investment, while vaccine manufacturing costs account for only 6%. The most important factor of the megafund’s financial performance is the price per vaccine dose, while other factors, such as the increased probability of success due to mRNA technology, the size of the megafund portfolio, and the possibility of conducting human challenge trials do not significantly improve its financial performance.

Our results illustrate the critical importance of government funding to ensure that vaccine development will be financially sustainable for the private sector and that effective vaccines will be available to prevent the next global pandemic.
I. Introduction

The incalculable human, social, and economic losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has heightened the global imperative to prepare for the next pandemic by proactively engaging in the R&D of novel vaccines against emergent infectious diseases (EIDs). EIDs are a broad class of infectious agents which have either recently appeared for the first time, or whose incidence has rapidly increased in terms of size of the affected population or geographic area (WHO 2014; NIAID 2018). A related threat is the reemergence of a different variant of previously identified EID, which may have become more transmissive or pathogenic through genetic mutation (Morens and Fauci 2020).

Given the dynamic and stochastic nature of EID outbreaks, the most effective strategy to prevent a future pandemic is to develop and stockpile vaccines proactively, before an outbreak occurs (Jarrett et al. 2021). A notable example of proactive vaccine development is the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which has a portfolio of 32 vaccine candidates, targeting COVID-19 and six other priority EIDs as of April 14, 2022 (CEPI 2022). Currently, the CEPI portfolio is diversified across 13 different therapeutic mechanisms (e.g., nucleic acid, recombinant protein, etc.) and five different stages of clinical development, from preclinical research to Emergency Use Listing by the World Health Organization (WHO). Similarly, a notable example of proactive stockpiling is the International Coordinating Group (ICG) on Vaccine Provision, which responded to the 2000 global shortage in yellow fever vaccines by stockpiling 2 million vaccine doses (Nathan et al. 2001). In 2019, members of ICG renewed its pledge to maintain a stockpile of 6 million yellow fever vaccine doses (WHO 2020). Stockpiling vaccines well before an epidemic outbreak enables local governments and public health agencies to quickly address the sharp increase in vaccine demand following the outbreak, and facilitates more efficient vaccine allocation (Jarrett, Yang, and Pagliusi 2020).

These considerations naturally lead to the question of what the financial feasibility of a portfolio of mRNA vaccine candidates diversified across target EIDs—including both local EIDs and pathogens which may cause the next global pandemic—might be? To address this question, we simulate the financial performance of a hypothetical portfolio of 120 mRNA vaccine candidates targeting 11 EIDs, and investigate whether the risk/return profile of the megafund is attractive to private sector investors. We do this by performing Monte Carlo simulations of event paths that conform to a pre-specified set of parameters, and examine the distribution of outcomes. We calibrate the simulation parameters with input from domain experts in mRNA technology and an extensive literature review.

We find that this vaccine portfolio yields an average annualized return on investment of $-6.0\%$ per annum and a negative net present value of $-\$9.5$ billion, despite the scientific advantages of mRNA technology and the financial benefits of diversification. We also show that the
clinical trial costs account for 94% of the total investment, while vaccine manufacturing costs account for only 6%. The most important factor of the megafund’s financial performance is the price per vaccine dose, while other factors, such as the increased probability of success due to mRNA technology, the size of the megafund portfolio, and the possibility of conducting human challenge trials do not significantly improve its financial performance.

Our results illustrate the critical importance of government funding to ensure that vaccine development will be financially sustainable for the private sector and that effective vaccines will be available to prevent the next global pandemic.

II. Brief Overview of Vaccine Development

A. The Past: A Decline in Vaccine R&D Prior to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, pharmaceutical firms had pivoted away from vaccine R&D for EIDs, especially for small-scale but highly lethal epidemics such as Ebola and Marburg virus (Kelland 2019). This exodus was due to several important factors, including high R&D costs (Gouglas et al. 2018), a low probability of success (PoS) in developing a vaccine candidate from preclinical studies to regulatory approval (estimated to be between 6% and 25% by Davis et al. 2011; Pronker et al. 2015; Project ALPHA 2021; Vu et al. 2022), the low list prices of vaccines (CDC 2022), the uncertainty in vaccine demand and revenue (Glennerster and Kremer 2000; Plotkin et al. 2015), and the lack of sustainable funding from public and private sectors in the absence of an imminent epidemic outbreak. Pharmaceutical firms have a greater financial incentive to develop and manufacture vaccines for common seasonal epidemics such as influenza compared to EIDs, since there is much less uncertainty in the estimated demand of these vaccines (Douglas and Samant 2018).

To illustrate the financial disincentives of vaccine R&D for EIDs more concretely, we consider a simplified back-of-the-envelope model. We assume that the cost of developing a single vaccine candidate, from preclinical studies to regulatory approval or emergency use authorization (EUA), is $200 million, and the probability of receiving regulatory approval is 25%. Furthermore, we assume that the target EID occurs every year with probability 10%; if an outbreak does occur, we assume 10 million doses are manufactured, with a list price $20 per dose. Under these assumptions, the total expected revenue over the next 20 years (the duration of a vaccine patent) – $25% \times \$20 \times 10 \text{ million} \times 10\% \times 20 = \$100 \text{ million} – is merely half of the R&D costs, despite optimistic assumptions about the R&D costs and the PoS compared to estimates found in the literature (Pronker et al. 2013; Project ALPHA 2021; Vu et al. 2022). This back-of-the-envelope calculation also shows that the financial returns of vaccine R&D can be increased if the PoS can be improved due to scientific innovation (e.g., mRNA technology) or financial innovation (e.g., a portfolio approach to parallel vaccine development), or a combination of both.
B. **The Present: A Revolution in mRNA Vaccines**

Vaccine R&D has gone through a revolution during the pandemic, exemplified by messenger RNA (mRNA) technology, which has demonstrated robust levels of safety, high efficacy, and unprecedented speed in clinical vaccine development (Chaudhary, Weissman, and Whitehead 2021). Once the genetic sequence of a pathogen is known, mRNA vaccine candidates can be designed more quickly than traditional vaccines. In addition, since mRNA vaccines do not require the production of inactivated or attenuated pathogens, they can be manufactured at large scale at higher efficiency, lower cost, and more robust safety guarantees (Pardi et al. 2018). Messenger RNA technology has the potential to significantly reduce both the cost and the duration of vaccine R&D, enabling a much more rapid response to future EIDs. It is also particularly suited for the development of multiple mRNA vaccines in parallel, as in the portfolio approach taken by CEPI, since different mRNA vaccines may be able to share the same resources and facilities for preclinical studies, clinical testing, and post-approval manufacturing and delivery (Szabó, Mahiny and Vlatkovic 2021).

As an illustration of the success of mRNA vaccine development, consider the mRNA-1273 vaccine developed by Moderna for COVID-19, which was designed in 2 days, tested on the first human volunteer in 63 days, and received an EUA from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in a little over 11 months after the genetic sequence of the original viral strain was released (Nielson, Dunn and Bendix 2020; Harbert 2020). The R&D period of mRNA vaccines is significantly shorter than the usual 5 to 10 years for traditional vaccine development that were required before the pandemic.

We should note that the stunning successes of mRNA vaccine R&D against the COVID-19 virus was a result not only of the scientific advantages of mRNA technology, but also of the close partnership between the public and private sectors in developing a mature mRNA technology for well over a decade before the pandemic (Dolgin 2021), as well as a product of the unprecedented collaboration between the government, regulatory agencies, and the pharmaceutical industry to expedite vaccine development during the COVID-19 pandemic. As we illustrate in subsequent sections, the continued collaboration and funding support from the public sector is critical to ensuring that vaccine R&D for EIDs can be financially sustainable for the private sector.

C. **The Future: Parallel R&D for mRNA Vaccines**

Messenger RNA technology introduces a novel perspective to vaccine R&D via the portfolio approach to development used by CEPI, which improves the PoS of vaccine development by the “multiple-shots-on-goal” parallel strategy of discovery, and lowers the R&D and manufacturing costs by sharing resources on a common R&D platform. However, a serious challenge to vaccine R&D remains in the lack of sufficient and sustainable funding to support the vaccine R&D pipeline over an extended period, the multiple years typically required from...
preclinical research to the regulatory approval of a vaccine, an issue known as the “valley of death” in translational biomedical research (Butler 2008). Governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations have made significant contributions to create a sizeable portfolio of vaccine candidates, but their efforts have nevertheless fallen short (see Section 2 of Vu et al. 2022 for a detailed discussion). However, the private sector may yet provide the capital needed to finance this vaccine R&D pipeline, provided that the vaccine portfolio can generate attractive financial returns for its investors.

To illustrate the benefits and challenges of applying the portfolio approach to vaccine R&D, we return to our earlier back-of-the-envelope calculation. Suppose we invest in a portfolio of 10 mRNA vaccines candidates targeting local epidemics. The total cost then increases to $2 billion, while the probability that at least one vaccine candidate receives regulatory approval (assuming statistically independent outcomes) increases dramatically to $25\%$ × $20$ × $10$ million × $10\%$ × $20 = $378 million, a financial loss of $1.6 billion. However, if the vaccine targets an EID which causes a global pandemic with an annual probability 1%, and 1 billion vaccine doses are produced if a pandemic occurs, the expected revenue of the vaccine portfolio increases to $94.4\%$ × $20$ × $1$ billion × $1\%$ × $20 = $3.8 billion (a profit of $1.8 billion), while the expected revenue of investing in one vaccine is only $25\%$ × $20$ × $1$ billion × $1\%$ × $20 = $1.0 billion (a deficit of $1 billion).

This back-of-the-envelope calculation highlights both the advantages and the bottlenecks to applying a portfolio approach to fund vaccine R&D. First, the parallel discovery strategy improves the PoS of vaccine R&D. Even vaccine development outcomes are correlated to each other, the probability of having an approved vaccine in a portfolio of vaccines is still higher than the PoS of investing in one vaccine (assuming the correlation is not equal to 1). An increased PoS makes vaccine R&D profitable for EIDs which may cause global pandemics. However, it is insufficient to generate financial value for vaccines against local EIDs, since the revenue of local vaccine sales is limited. In addition, since the mRNA vaccines share the same therapeutic mechanism, it is reasonable to assume that there will be no significant difference in efficacy between different approved mRNA vaccines for the same EID (as in the case of COVID-19). As a result, there will be considerable cannibalization of demand for vaccines targeting the same EID, since the demand for vaccines will not increase with the number of approved vaccines. Finally, the stochastic nature of EID outbreaks induces large variance in the revenues of vaccine sales. For vaccine R&D aimed at preventing a global pandemic, even though the expected financial return is positive, there is still a significant probability in our back-of-the-envelope model of $(1 - 1\%)^{20} = 81.8\%$ that a global pandemic will not occur in the next 20 years, leading to a financial loss of $2 billion.
III. Portfolio Approach to Financing Drug Development

A. Challenges of the Drug Development Process

To develop a novel therapeutic candidate from laboratory discovery to regulatory approval, a drug developer needs to conduct multiple clinical trials to test the safety and efficacy of the therapeutic candidate on the target patient population. These clinical trials are conducted in sequence through four stages (preclinical, phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3). Trials in a more advanced phase typically require a larger patient enrollment and a longer time to complete, and are correspondingly more expensive. If the phase 3 clinical trial shows clear safety and efficacy, the drug developer files a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA for regulatory approval. If the FDA approves the NDA, the drug developer may manufacture the drug and collect revenue from drug sales. Sometimes the FDA may require an additional phase 4 clinical trial after regulatory approval to test the long-term benefits and side effects of the drug on a large patient population.

Despite the tremendous breakthroughs in biomedicine over the past decades, new drug development has become slower, more expensive, and less likely to succeed, causing a significant funding gap for early-stage drug development programs. The lack of sufficient funding for translational biomedical R&D is due to several institutional features of drug development, including a low PoS, a long investment horizon, high clinical trial costs, and a high cost of capital (especially for small biotechnology companies which do not have marketed drugs that generate revenue and must rely on external financing to sustain its R&D pipeline). We refer the interested readers to Lo and Thakor (2021) for a systematic review. The declining efficiency of translating scientific discovery in research laboratories into novel products has also been observed in other industries in the US (Arora et al. 2020).

B. Advantages of Financing Vaccine R&D via the “Vaccine Megafund”

To address the challenge of funding translational medicine, Fernandez et al. (2012) proposed a novel financing vehicle, the biomedical “megafund”, which invests in a sizable portfolio of drug candidates diversified across different clinical stages and therapeutic areas. Using financial engineering techniques such as securitization, the authors show that the risk/return profile of the megafund is attractive to a wide group of investors. Originally proposed to finance oncology drug development, the megafund model was subsequently applied to other disease areas, including orphan diseases (Fagnan et al. 2014), Alzheimer’s disease (Lo et al. 2014), pediatric cancer (Das et al. 2018), ovarian cancer (Chaudhuri et al. 2019), glioblastoma (Siah et al. 2021) and vaccines against EIDs (Vu et al. 2022). It is currently being applied by the National Brain Tumor Society (NBTS) to finance novel drug candidates to treat glioblastoma (NBTS 2021).

The key idea behind the megafund is to reduce the financial risks of its assets and improve its expected returns by raising capital to acquire a portfolio of vaccine candidates, issuing
equity and securitized debt with different risk/return profiles that appeal to a wide range of private sector investors. The vaccine candidates are used as collateral, and the revenues generated by future vaccine sales are used to service its debt and interest payments. The residual equity is then distributed among its equity holders. If the future cash flows are insufficient to service the debt, the megafund declares bankruptcy and the collateral is transferred to its bondholders.

The main advantage of portfolio diversification is that by increasing the PoS of having at least one approved drug candidate, the megafund is able to lower the financial risks and attract large amounts of capital from the bond market, whose size is much larger than the venture capital, public equity, or private equity market (SIFMA 2021). In 2020, a total of $12.2 trillion worth of fixed income securities were issued in the US, compared to $390 billion of equity. In the same year, the total private placement was $330.1 billion in the US, of which $314.4 billion was in the form of debt and $15.8 billion in the form of equity (SIFMA 2021).

C. Evaluating the Financial Performance of the Vaccine Megafund

In the simulation analysis of Vu et al. (2022), the financial performance of a specifically vaccine-focused megafund is extremely unfavorable to for-profit investors, with an expected annualized return of $61% and a standard deviation (SD) of 4%. Multiple factors lead to this negative financial return, including a low PoS of vaccine trials, high clinical trial costs, and limited revenue from vaccine sales. Based on these findings, the authors propose several strategies to finance the vaccine megafund, including a vaccine price increase, public sector funding, and a novel subscription model in which subscribers would pay annual fees for priority access to the vaccines during future outbreaks.

In this paper, we extend the work of Vu et al. (2022) in several important ways. First, previous work simulated vaccine trial outcomes stochastically, but used an expected value of annual profit for approved vaccines. We implement a more realistic simulation framework in which the entire pipeline of vaccine development and manufacturing is simulated under the stochastic occurrence of EID outbreaks. The uncertainty in future EID outbreaks increases the variance of megafund cash flows, and is critical to its risk/return profile. In addition, we use improved PoS estimates of mRNA vaccines to adjust the cash flows of the megafund, and calibrate the cost structure of mRNA vaccine manufacturing with input from domain experts and an extensive literature review. Finally, while Vu et al. (2022) mainly focused on the annualized return, we systematically investigate a wide spectrum of metrics to gauge the financial and social impacts of the vaccine megafund, such as the net present value and the number of EID outbreaks prevented. We also provide a detailed breakdown of the cost structure for the vaccine megafund to identify the main bottlenecks of its financial performance.
The financial performance of the megafund hinges on the scientific and business expertise of fund managers to select promising drug candidates and diversify the portfolio (Siah et al. 2021). For a real-world vaccine portfolio such as CEPI's, active portfolio management is critical, given budget constraints, to select a limited number of vaccine candidates. Gouglas and Marsh (2019) apply multi-criteria decision analysis to select promising vaccine candidates for the CEPI portfolio in the context of multiple trade-offs and heterogenous stakeholder preferences. In a subsequent study (Gouglas and Marsh 2021), the authors apply portfolio decision analysis to optimize the investment of CEPI in 16 vaccine technology platforms. Ahuja et al. (2021) analyzed the optimal investment strategy of vaccine manufacturing capacity for countries with different socioeconomic characteristics.

While we fully recognize the importance of active portfolio management in improving the financial performance of a vaccine megafund, we do not impose exogenous budget constraints or perform portfolio optimization in our simulation analysis, since our goal is to understand the relationships between the investment and revenue of the vaccine megafund and its endogenous factors, such as the improvement in the PoS of mRNA vaccine development, the cost structure of mRNA vaccine manufacturing, the size of the megafund portfolio, and the possibility of conducting human challenge trials to expedite vaccine clinical trials.

IV. Simulation Methods

A. Vaccine Megafund Portfolio

We simulate the financial performance of a large portfolio of mRNA vaccine candidates. The portfolio structure and probability of outbreak $P_a$ of each EID are adapted from Vu et al. (2022), as shown in Table 1. We include 10 vaccine candidates which target “disease X”, the unknown pathogen which may cause the next pandemic, in accordance with the updated CEPI portfolio (CEPI 2022). We assume that disease X has a low annual probability of outbreak $P_a = 1\%$, and the number of infected cases will be 400 million, close to that of COVID-19.
Table 1. Portfolio for simulated mRNA vaccine megafund (CEPI, 2022; Vu et al., 2022). \( N_{\text{vac}} \) denotes the number of vaccine candidates targeting each emerging infectious disease (EID); \( P_a \) denotes the annual probability of outbreak; \( n_I \) denotes the average number of infected cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EID</th>
<th>( N_{\text{vac}} )</th>
<th>( P_a ) (%)</th>
<th>( n_I )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disease X</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>400,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chikungunya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>523,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zika Virus</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>500,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lassa Fever</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley Fever</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>79,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARS-CoV-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nile Virus</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERS-CoV</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nipah Virus</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marburg Virus</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Vaccine Clinical Trials

We use the simulation framework in Siah et al. (2021) to model correlated phase transitions of vaccine clinical trials. The assumed values of the simulation parameters of a vaccine clinical trial are summarized in Table 2. The simulated trial outcomes depend on two critical sets of parameters. First, the PoS for each phase transition in the clinical development process is estimated using historical industry average values (Project ALPHA 2021; Vu et al. 2022). In addition, since the mRNA vaccine for COVID-19 induces humoral immune protection by producing neutralizing antibodies (Jain et al. 2021), we assume that mRNA vaccines will have a higher PoS for the six EIDs in the portfolio whose correlates of protection are neutralizing antibodies (Chikungunya virus, SARS-CoV-1, Marburg virus, Rift Valley Fever, Nipah virus, and Zika virus). To reflect the increased PoS due to mRNA technology for these diseases, we multiply the historical PoS by a technology factor \( \alpha_{\text{tech}} \). We set \( \alpha_{\text{tech}} \) to 1.2 in the baseline model, which reflects a 20% increase in the PoS over the industry average. We do not increase the PoS for the other five diseases with cellular or unknown immune responses, including disease X. We vary \( \alpha_{\text{tech}} \) in the sensitivity analysis to gauge the effect of increased PoS on financial performance.
Table 2. Simulation parameters for vaccine clinical trials. PoS denotes probability of success; PRE denotes preclinical phase, P1, P2 and P3 denote phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3; EUA denotes Emergency Use Authorization. We assume that the vaccine receives EUA once it successfully completes phase 3 clinical trial and human challenge trial is only applicable to phase 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>PRE to P1</th>
<th>P1 to P2</th>
<th>P2 to P3</th>
<th>P3 to EUA</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PoS (%)</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>Vu et al. 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard clinical trial</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>Project ALPHA 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development cost ($M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard clinical trial</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>Wong et al. 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human challenge trial</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>Vu et al. 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development cost ($M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human challenge trial</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>Berry et al. 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the correlations between vaccine trial outcomes play a major role in the simulation outcomes. If two vaccine trial outcomes are highly correlated, e.g., due to the same target pathogen or therapeutic mechanism, they are more likely to simultaneously succeed or fail, which leads to greater variance in the cash flows of the megafund, and thus greater financial risk. Using the input of domain experts in mRNA technology, we construct a biologically motivated metric to estimate these correlations. Specifically, we use a novel distance metric $d_{ij}$ between pathogens $i$ and $j$, defined as the average of similarity scores based on four biological factors: taxonomy, qualitative features (e.g., type of disease vector, strand direction, nucleic acid topology), quantitative features (e.g., number of strands, total genome size), and the edit distance of protein sequences. The value of $d_{ij}$ is normalized between 0 and 1, with $d_{ij}$ closer to 0 if pathogens $i$ and $j$ are more biologically similar, and $d_{ij} = 0$ if they are identical. Given the values of $d_{ij}$, a natural way to define the correlation $\rho_{ij}$ between the outcomes of vaccine trials targeting pathogens $i$ and $j$ is $\rho_{ij} = 1 - d_{ij}$, i.e., the vaccine trial outcomes have higher correlation if their target EIDs are more biologically similar, and vice versa.

Figure 1 shows the heatmap of $\rho_{ij}$ between each pair of pathogens excluding disease X (which we assume to be independent of the other pathogens to reflect its a priori unknown biological properties). The correlation matrix $\rho_{ij}$ defined this way is positive definite (PD) in our calibration, although it is not guaranteed to be PD in general and needs to be transformed into a PD matrix by an appropriate method (Qi and Sun 2006). Also, this metric does not specify the correlation between two vaccine trials targeting the same pathogen. We assume...
this correlation to be 0.8, which is higher than the maximum correlation of 0.64 across different pathogens (Figure 1). To gauge the impact of correlation on the financial performance, we vary the assumed values of correlation in the sensitivity analysis.

**Fig. 1. Heatmap of correlations between vaccine candidates estimated using distance metric $\rho_{ij} = 1 - d_{ij}$.** We assume that the vaccines of disease X are uncorrelated with the other diseases and the correlation between vaccines targeting the same disease is 0.8.

### C. Human Challenge Trials

Given the demonstrated safety and efficacy of mRNA vaccines for COVID-19, it is conceivable that human challenge trials (HCTs) may be ethically justified for mRNA vaccine candidates in our portfolio. The HCT is an efficient yet highly controversial clinical trial design in which healthy participants with no previous exposure to a disease are actively inoculated with the pathogen in a controlled clinical environment (e.g., an isolated ward in a hospital). The controlled setting of a HCT allows much more precise and rapid testing of the safety and efficacy of vaccines with a smaller number of trial participants than standard vaccine trials. As a result, an HCT may significantly reduce the cost and duration of clinical trials and lead to expedited regulatory approval of effective vaccines. In a simulation analysis, Berry et al. (2020) showed that conducting an HCT for COVID-19 vaccines may significantly reduce the number of infected and deceased patients in the US compared to other clinical trial designs, provided that the vaccine is effective and the HCT is initiated in a timely manner.

Although conducting an HCT is more time- and cost-efficient than traditional vaccine trials in principle, in practice it still faces multiple challenges. First and foremost, the ethical
justification of actively inoculating healthy participants is highly controversial, due to the absence of well-established ethical guidelines which specify the conditions under which HCT is deemed ethical. In addition, HCT requires more time and resources during the initial preparation stage (e.g., identifying and manufacturing low-risk virus strains, identifying low-risk populations, and establishing an HCT protocol with regulators). As a result, the first HCTs for COVID-19 were initiated after the mRNA vaccine candidates had already received EUA from the FDA in US and Europe (Callaway 2020; Rapeport et al. 2021).

Although we recognize the ethical and practical challenges of HCTs, we model an idealized scenario when an HCT is authorized for mRNA vaccine R&D and may be conducted in an ethical and timely manner. We use the Bernoulli random variable $HCT_i$ to denote whether an HCT is authorized by the FDA during an outbreak of disease $i$ (with probability $p_{HCT}$). If $HCT_i = 1$, we use the reduced cost and duration of HCT (rows 4 and 5 of Table 2) instead of the corresponding values of standard trials. We assume $p_{HCT} = 0$ in the baseline model (i.e., no HCT is conducted) and gauge the effect of $p_{HCT}$ in the sensitivity analysis.

### D. Vaccine Manufacturing and Supply Chain

The cost structures of mRNA vaccine manufacturing and its supply chain are key inputs to simulating the cash flows of the megafund. Since mRNA vaccine manufacturers do not disclose this information, we use publicly available estimates in the literature (Kis et al. 2021; Kis and Rizvi 2021) to calibrate the cost structures. The line-item budget of mRNA vaccine manufacturing is summarized in Table 3. The main factor driving the manufacturing costs is the amount of mRNA needed to produce the target number of vaccines. We assume that each production line consists of a bioreactor with a 30-liter working volume and mRNA titer 5g/L (Kis and Rizvi 2021). We also assume that each vaccine dose contains 65μg of mRNA, the average of the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines for COVID-19.

**Table 3. Cost structure of mRNA vaccine production (Kis et al. 2021; Kis and Rizvi 2021).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit Cost (USD)</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed cost</td>
<td>Production line</td>
<td>$58 \text{ million}^{\dagger}$</td>
<td>1 bioreactor of 30L working volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>$456.6 \text{ million}/(\text{year} \cdot \text{production line})$</td>
<td>29,162 grams of mRNA per production line per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$150 \text{ million}/(\text{year} \cdot \text{production line})$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>$20/\text{hour}$</td>
<td>113,186 labor hours per production line per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality control</td>
<td>$10/\text{hour}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable costs</td>
<td>Fill-and-finish</td>
<td>$0.27/\text{dose}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lab, utility, waste</td>
<td>&lt;1% total cost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>management, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Not modeled here.*
Using the estimates in Table 3, the variable cost of producing each mRNA vaccine dose is $1.60. We assume that each local EID outbreak requires 10 million vaccine doses. It takes 8.1 days to produce the mRNA needed with one production line, and an additional 4 to 5 weeks to perform quality control for each batch produced. The total manufacturing cost is $16 million if one uses the existing production line, and $75 million if one builds a new production line. Similarly, we assume disease X pandemic requires 1 billion vaccine doses. It takes 81.4 days to produce the mRNA needed with 10 production lines. The total cost is $1.6 billion with existing production lines, and $2.2 billion with new ones. Furthermore, we assume that the variable cost of delivering each vaccine dose in the supply chain is $1.00 (of the same order of magnitude as the manufacturing cost). We make a conservative assumption about the supply chain cost due to the lack of publicly available estimates in the literature. Our simulation results show that the supply chain costs constitute 2% of total costs (Figure 4), so the financial performance is not sensitive to the detailed structure of supply chain costs, as long as it does not exceed $1.00 per dose by an order of magnitude.

To estimate the revenue generated by vaccine sales, we use the list prices of mRNA vaccines for COVID-19. As of October 26, 2021, the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine is priced at $24.00 per dose in the US, and the Moderna vaccine at $15.00 per dose (Jimenez 2021). We assume that the price per vaccine dose is $20.00. This is likely to be an underestimate, since it is below the prices of all adult vaccines (except influenza vaccines) listed in the vaccine price list of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 2022). To gauge the impact of the list price of vaccines, we vary the price in the sensitivity analysis.

**E. Simulating Correlated Clinical Trial Outcomes**

The key to simulating the financial performance of the vaccine megafund is to simulate the correlated binary outcomes of vaccine clinical trials. As in the previous biomedical megafund simulations (e.g., Siah et al. 2021), we use the technique proposed by Emrich and Piedmonte (1991) to simulate correlated Bernoulli variables. Vaccine clinical trials have five development phases (preclinical, phase 1, phase 2, phase 3, and emergency use authorization, or EUA), and need to go through four phase transitions before receiving the EUA. Let the Bernoulli variable $B_{ij} \in \{0,1\}$ denote whether vaccine candidate $i$ has entered the development phase $j$, with $j \in \{0,1,2,3,4\}$. Initially all vaccines are in preclinical stage, i.e., we set $B_{i0} = 1$. If the vaccine trial advances from phase $j - 1$ to $j$ where $j \in \{1,2,3\}$, we set $B_{ij} = 1$. If the vaccine receives EUA from the FDA, we set $B_{i4} = 1$.

To simulate the correlated phase transitions of clinical trials from phase $j$ to $j + 1$, we first draw a vector of multivariate standard normal variables $\varepsilon_j = [\varepsilon_{1j}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{nj}]$ with independent components $\varepsilon_{ij}$, where the length $n$ is the number of vaccines in the portfolio. Next, we compute $z_j = \Sigma^{1/2} \varepsilon_j$ where $\Sigma^{1/2}$ is the Cholesky decomposition of the correlation matrix $\Sigma$ (Figure 1). The resulting vector $z_j$ follows a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean.
and covariance matrix equal to $\Sigma$. Given the probability of success $p_j$ for phase transition from $j$ to $j + 1$ (Table 2), we simulate the binary clinical trial outcome as:

$$B_{i,j+1} = \begin{cases} 1, & z_{ij} > \alpha_j \\ 0, & z_{ij} \leq \alpha_j \end{cases}$$

(1)

where $z_{ij}$ is the $i$-th component of $z_j$, $\alpha_j = \Phi^{-1}(1 - p_j)$, and $\Phi^{-1}$ is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable. The clinical trial outcomes $B_{ij}$ generated this way are positively correlated in each phase transition and used in the financial calculations. In each Monte Carlo simulation, if we observe $B_{ij} = 0$, the clinical trial for vaccine $i$ terminates in phase $j$ and all subsequent $B_{ik}$ (with $k > j$) are set to 0. If we observe $B_{ij} = 1$, the megafund incurs the clinical trial cost for phase $j$. If an epidemic outbreak occurs and there is at least one vaccine $i$ with $B_{i4} = 1$ (i.e., it has received EUA), we manufacture the vaccine and collect the revenue from vaccine sales.

**F. Overview of the Simulation Framework**

At the initial time $t = 0$, all vaccine candidates enter the preclinical stage. For simplicity, we assume that the development costs of each phase are incurred at the start of the phase. In each subsequent year from $t = 1$ to $t = T$, we simulate whether any EID outbreaks (including the disease X pandemic) occur in year $t$. In the absence of any outbreaks, we develop each vaccine candidate (except the ones for “disease X”) from the preclinical stage to the completion of phase 2, assuming the cost and timeline of a standard clinical trial (rows 2 and 3 of Table 2). We do not initiate a large-scale phase 3 clinical trial unless an outbreak has occurred, since there are no or not enough infected subjects to test the vaccine efficacy on the large population. From a financial perspective, this also reduces the significant late-stage clinical trial costs compared to the simulation analysis of Vu et al. (2022).
If an EID outbreak occurs in year $t$, we assume that one of the four scenarios below will occur (Figure 2):

1. At least one vaccine candidate targeting the disease has successfully completed a phase 3 trial during a previous outbreak of the same disease and received approval or an EUA from the FDA. We manufacture the vaccine, supply it to the point of distribution, and collect the revenue from the vaccine sales.

2. At least one vaccine candidate targeting the disease has successfully completed a phase 2 trial. We initiate the phase 3 clinical trial. If the phase 3 trial is successful, the vaccine receives an EUA from the FDA. We manufacture and supply the vaccines, and collect the revenue from the vaccine sales.

3. At least one vaccine candidate for the epidemic is in the preclinical or phase 1 stage. We initiate an accelerated phase 1/2 trial, which costs $28 million (the same as a standard phase 2 trial) and completes in 3 months, followed by a standard phase 3 trial, which completes in 14 months. If the phase 3 trial is successful, the vaccine receives an EUA. We manufacture and supply the vaccines, and collect the revenue.

4. No vaccine candidates for the disease have previously completed a phase 3 trial or remain in the R&D pipeline. In this case, no cash flows are generated, since all vaccine candidates have failed in the clinical trial process.

We simulate an investment horizon of $T = 20$ years, which includes 5 years for standard clinical trial development from the preclinical phase to the completion of phase 2, and 15
years for the remaining duration of the vaccine patent. We compute the financial performance and social impact of the vaccine megafund at the end of the 20-year horizon.

V. Results

The performance of the baseline portfolio is summarized in Table 4. We find that this portfolio has a negative expected annualized return $E[R_a] = -6.0\%$ (standard deviation $SD[R_a] = 6.7\%$) and a negative expected net present value (NPV) of $-9.5$ billion (standard error $SE = 13$ million). The vaccine megafund does not generate positive financial value for its investors, since the revenue generated by the vaccine sales ($7.5$ billion on average) is insufficient to recover the investments in clinical trial development and vaccine manufacturing ($17.7$ billion on average). However, the financial value to private-sector investors does not capture the benefits generated by the megafund to greater society. On average, 45 infectious disease outbreaks will occur in the simulation period, 31 of which will be prevented or contained by vaccines developed from the portfolio. In addition, there is a 66% probability that vaccines in the portfolio will prevent the next “disease X pandemic” if it occurs. The lives saved and socioeconomic losses avoided by the vaccines far exceed the negative financial value of the megafund.

Table 4. Performance of baseline portfolio computed with 100K Monte Carlo simulations. $R_a$ denotes annualized rate of return; NPV denotes net present value; $N_{ep}$ denotes the number of epidemic outbreaks prevented by vaccines in the portfolio; $N_{p3}$ ($N_{p2}$) denotes the number of vaccines which successfully complete phase 3 (phase 2) by the end of the investment horizon of 20 years; SD and SE denote standard deviation and standard error, respectively. NPV is computed with an annual discount rate $r = 10\%$. NPV, investment, revenue and cost breakdown are shown in billion USD. The standard deviation of preclinical trial cost is zero since the megafund invests in the preclinical trials of all 120 vaccine candidates at the initial time $0$.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>25% Qt.</th>
<th>75% Qt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R_a$</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>0.021%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
<td>-7.4%</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPV</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>-14.9</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_{ep}$</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We visualize the distribution of key performance metrics of the megafund in the histograms of Figure 3. We find that, although $R_a$ and NPV are negative in most simulations, there is a 9.8% probability that $R_a > 0$, and a 3.1% probability that NPV > 0. In addition, the distribution of megafund investments is smooth and unimodal, while the distribution of revenue is bimodal: most of the probability mass is concentrated below $10$ billion, with a small mass above $20$ billion. The latter corresponds to the rare scenarios when a disease X pandemic occurs, generating a revenue of $20$ billion from vaccine sales. The bimodality of revenue leads to significant variance in the annualized return and NPV of the megafund.

To gain additional insights into the leading costs that limit the financial performance of the megafund, we present a breakdown of megafund investments in Figure 4. We find that the costs of clinical trial development constitute 94% of the total cost, with phase 3 trials alone accounting for 59%. The net cost of vaccine manufacturing and supply chain constitute only 6% of the total cost. Therefore, the higher efficiency of mRNA vaccine manufacturing is not sufficient to generate financial profits for the investors. Our finding is consistent with the “valley of death” in financing translational biomedical research (Butler 2008), in which the main bottleneck is the enormous cost of clinical trial development rather than drug manufacturing and supply. Even with more efficient vaccine manufacturing technologies and supply chain designs, the significant cost of clinical trial development still prevents the vaccine megafund from generating positive financial value to its investors.

**Fig. 3. Histograms of key performance metrics of vaccine megafund.** (A) Annualized return $R_a$. (B) Net present value (NPV). (C) Number of epidemics prevented $N_{ep}$. (D) Total investment. (E) Total revenue. (F) Net profit.
VI. Sensitivity Analysis

The simulated financial performance of the vaccine megafund hinges on the assumed values of key simulation parameters calibrated using inputs from mRNA domain experts and estimates from the literature. We perform a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the simulation results against the assumed parameter values. The results are summarized in Table S1 of the Supplementary Materials and discussed below.

A. Vaccine Price

The price per vaccine dose $\pi$ is the key driver of the financial performance. In the baseline model, we assume $\pi = $20.00, where both the annualized return and NPV are negative. Increasing $\pi$ to $69.00 (row 2 of Table S1) achieves the breakeven point for the annualized return. Increasing $\pi$ further to $78.00 (row 3 of Table S1) achieves the breakeven point for NPV. Assuming $\pi = $100.00 (row 4 of Table S1), the megafund generates a small but positive expected annualized return of 1.9%, with a volatility of 7.2% and an expected NPV of $3.6$ billion (SE $55$ million). Such a high list price of $100.00 per vaccine dose is not unusual in the US. As of April 14, 2022, thirteen common adult vaccines have list prices above $100.00 in the US (CDC 2022). However, these may be impossible to afford in low-to-middle income countries, and may even increase vaccine hesitancy among the affected population.

B. Improved Probability of Success of mRNA Vaccines

To test whether the increased PoS of mRNA vaccines leads to improved financial performance, we multiply the PoS of vaccine trials for six diseases by the technology factor.
$\alpha_{tech}$ to reflect the higher efficacy of mRNA vaccines for diseases with humoral immune protection. In the baseline model, we set $\alpha_{tech} = 1.2$ (i.e., a 20% increase in PoS). Surprisingly, increasing $\alpha_{tech}$ from 1.0 to 1.3 (rows 5 to 7 of Table S1) achieves a mixed effect: the expected annualized return increased from $-6.7\%$ to $-5.8\%$, while the expected NPV decreased from $-8.1$ to $-9.9$ billion. As we increase $\alpha_{tech}$ from 1.0 to 1.3, the average number of approved vaccine candidates increases from 28 to 49, and the expected investment also increases from $15.2$ to $18.4$ billion. However, the reason for the mixed effect is that the expected revenue undergoes a much smaller increase, from $7.1$ to $7.6$ billion, since on average only 3 additional EID outbreaks are prevented by the approved vaccines (due to the stochastic occurrence of EID outbreaks). The smaller ratio of revenue to investment causes the annualized return to be less negative and increase, while the larger increase in investment causes the NPV to be more negative and decrease. We conclude that the higher PoS of mRNA technology alone does not generate positive financial value for the megafund unless we also reduce the clinical trial costs or raise the price of the vaccine.

C. Correlations between Clinical Trial Outcomes

The correlation between vaccine trial outcomes measures the tendency for multiple vaccine trials to simultaneously succeed or fail due to a common target disease or mechanism of action. In the baseline model, we estimate the correlation via the novel virus distance metric $d_{ij}$. However, we cannot simply rescale $d_{ij}$ in the sensitivity analysis, since the resulting correlation matrix is not guaranteed to remain positive definite. Instead, we gauge the impact of correlation by assuming an equi-correlated correlation matrix in which $\rho_{ij} = \rho$ is the same for all diseases, and vary the value of $\rho$ from 0 (independent) to 80% (highly correlated), as shown in rows 8 to 12 in Table S1. As expected, we observe that higher values of $\rho$ lead to worse financial performance, as the expected annualized return decreases from $-3.5\%$ to $-11.7\%$ and the expected NPV decreases from $-8.3$ to $-9.5$ billion. In addition, the volatility of the annualized return dramatically increases from 2.5% to 23.6%. This shows the importance of diversity in the megafund portfolio to generate positive financial value.

D. Human Challenge Trials

If deemed ethical, an HCT may be able to significantly reduce the cost and duration of the clinical development of vaccine candidates by testing a smaller group of participants than traditional vaccine trials. We investigate the effect of HCTs on the megafund performance by assigning the probability $p_{HCT}$ that HCT is allowed for each EID. The baseline portfolio does not utilize HCT, i.e., $p_{HCT} = 0$. Increasing $p_{HCT}$ from 0 to 30% (rows 13 to 14 of Table S1) reduces the expected investment and increases both the annualized return and NPV, although both remain negative. We find that utilizing HCT alone is also insufficient to generate positive financial value for the investors.
E. Megafund Portfolio Size

The parallel vaccine development strategy increases the probability that at least one vaccine candidate will be approved, but it also increases the investment in clinical trials. To investigate the effect of portfolio size, we multiply the number of vaccine candidates for each infectious disease by a factor $\gamma$. The baseline portfolio corresponds to $\gamma = 1$. Increasing the portfolio size by 50% ($\gamma = 1.5$, row 16 of Table S1) leads to worse financial performance, since the expected investment increases from $17.7$ to $25.7$ billion, while the expected revenue only increases by a much smaller amount, from $7.5$ to $7.9$ billion, as the natural occurrence of EID outbreaks remains the same. Decreasing the portfolio size by 50% ($\gamma = 0.5$, row 15 of Table S1) increases both expected return and NPV, though both remain negative. In addition, the average number of epidemics prevented decreases from 31 to 27, which reflects a higher loss to society not captured by our financial analysis.

VII. Discussion

Our analysis illustrates three major challenges to the portfolio approach of financing the R&D of mRNA vaccines for EIDs. First, the portfolio approach reduces the supply side risk of vaccine R&D by increasing the probability of having at least one effective vaccine against an EID. However, it does not mitigate the demand side risk in the revenue generated by vaccine sales, since the demand of vaccines is mainly determined by the natural occurrence of EID outbreaks. The stochastic nature of EID outbreaks limits the revenue generated by the approved vaccines, unless we increase the list price to $78.00 per dose. With such a high list price, local governments and populations may not be able to afford the vaccines, which further reduces the demand and revenue. In addition, since the mRNA vaccines share the same therapeutic mechanism, it is reasonable to expect that there will be no differentiated efficacy of different vaccines against the same disease. As a result, there will be significant market cannibalization between the approved vaccines, since the total revenue of vaccine sales will not increase if there is more than one approved vaccine. Finally, the significant costs of clinical trial development constitute 94% of megafund investment and severely limit its financial performance. One potential solution is to use more cost-effective clinical trial designs such as adaptive trials (Berry 2011) and platform trials (Woodcock and LaVange 2017), which simultaneously test multiple vaccine candidates using a shared control arm. These innovative trial designs have been shown to significantly reduce clinical trial costs and expedite the R&D process for glioblastoma therapeutic candidates (Siah et al. 2021). In addition, they do not elicit the ethical controversies of human challenge trials.

We also note that the primary goal of the vaccine megafund is to prevent future infectious disease outbreaks and minimize the losses to general society. In light of this goal, our simulation assumes that we invest in clinical trials for all vaccine candidates simultaneously without optimizing its financial performance using sophisticated investment strategies.
(Gouglas and Marsh 2021) or financial engineering techniques such as dynamic leverage (Montazerhodjat et al. 2016). For example, if three vaccine candidates for the same infectious disease successfully complete their phase 2 trials, we may instead first conduct phase 3 trials for two vaccine candidates, initiating the phase 3 trial for the third vaccine only if the first two have failed. This will reduce the costs of late-stage clinical trial development and improve its financial value. However, the increased financial value must be weighed against potential delays in FDA approvals of life-saving vaccines. A robust and multi-criteria optimization framework is needed to ensure that the value to society is not compromised by optimizing financial returns for the investors.

VIII. Conclusion

Despite the increased probability of success due to mRNA technology, diversification across a large number of vaccine candidates, and the potential benefits of conducting human challenge trials, the vaccine megafund model does not generate financial value for private-sector investors. Three bottlenecks of the financial performance are the limited revenue of vaccine sales, the cannibalization of approved vaccines for the same disease, and the significant costs of late-stage clinical trial development. Nonetheless, the vaccine megafund generates tremendous societal value by preventing future epidemic outbreaks; if endowed with public sector funding of $10 billion, it may also generate positive financial value for investors.

Our analysis underscores the urgency for continued collaboration between government agencies and the private sector in creating a sustainable business model and global vaccine ecosystem to prevent future pandemics. Strategies such as stockpiling vaccines for the most dangerous EIDs, putting in place advance market commitments to purchase mass quantities of vaccines in case of outbreaks, creating government-sponsored manufacturing and distribution facilities that can supplement private-sector resources, and providing limited government guarantees to investors funding vaccine programs for a pre-specified list of priority diseases may all play a role in helping us reduce the impact of, or even prevent, future pandemics.

Acknowledgements

We thank Regina Dugan, Ken Gabriel, Ben Jones, and Josh Lerner for valuable feedback, insights and helpful discussions, and Amanda Hu for research assistance. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of any institution or agency, any of their affiliates or employees, or any of the individuals acknowledged above.
References


ends-development-of-ebola-vaccine-hands-work-to-u-s-institute-idUSKCN1UW15S (Accessed April 14, 2022)


World Health Organization. 2014. “A brief guide to emerging infectious diseases and zoonoses.” Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/204722 (Accessed April 14, 2022)


Accelerating vaccine innovation for emerging infectious diseases via parallel discovery:

Supplementary Materials

Joseph Barberio¹, Jacob Becraft¹, Zied Ben Chaouch²,³, Dimitris Bertsimas²,⁴,⁵, Tasuku Kitada¹, Michael L. Li⁴, Andrew W. Lo²,³,⁴,⁵,⁶, Kevin Shi¹, Qingyang Xu²,⁴

¹Strand Therapeutics Inc., Cambridge, MA 02142
²MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering, Cambridge, MA 02142
³Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 02139
⁴Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
⁵MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA 02142
⁶Sante Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501

*Corresponding author
Table S1. Sensitivity analysis of key simulation parameters computed with 100K Monte Carlo simulations. 
$R_a$ denotes annualized return (p.a.); NPV denotes net present value, Inv denotes net investment, Rev denotes net revenue, in billion USD; $N_{ep}$ denotes the number of EID outbreaks contained by vaccines from the portfolio; $\pi$ denotes the price per vaccine dose in USD; $\alpha_{tech}$ denotes the technology factor; $\rho_{HCT}$ denotes the probability of HCT; $\rho$ denotes the pairwise correlation between vaccine trial outcomes; $\gamma$ denotes portfolio size factor. NPV is computed with an annual discount rate $r=10\%$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi = $69/dose</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi = $78/dose</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi = $100/dose</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{tech} = 1.0$</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{tech} = 1.1$</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{tech} = 1.3$</td>
<td>-5.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 0%$</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 20%$</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 40%$</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 60%$</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 80%$</td>
<td>-11.7%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{HCT} = 10%$</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{HCT} = 30%$</td>
<td>-5.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 0.5$</td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1.5$</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>