

Fiscal Policy in the Age of Supply Shocks

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
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
COVID-19 was an unprecedented shock characterized by:

- Extreme sectoral heterogeneity.
- Inequality in fiscal space across countries.
 - Fiscal transfers were largest in Advanced Economies (AEs).
 - Early narrative was that US stimulus would spill over to Emerging Economies (EMs).

Fiscal Spending (% of GDP)



(a) Advanced Economies



(b) Emerging Markets

Source: IMF Fiscal Policy Tracker

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This paper tackles two questions:

- Did fiscal stimulus help support aggregate activity?
- How big are cross-border spillovers?

Recent literature looks at the role of I-O networks in:

- Complementarities in demand/production may lead to amplification.
 - Closed economy: Baqaee & Farhi 2022a, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub & Werning 2022
 - Open economy: Baqaee & Farhi 2022b, Benadio, Huo, Levchenko & Pandalai-Nayar 2021, Çakmaklı, Demiralp, Kalemli-Özcan, Yeşiltaş & Yıldırım, 2021, Huo, Levchenko & Pandalai-Nayar 2022
 - All assume Current Accounts are 0

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We develop and calibrate a global GE production network model where:

- Each country & sector is subject to a rich set of COVID shocks.
- **Intertemporal model** – current accounts **endogenously** react to COVID and fiscal policy.
- Based heavily on Baqaee & Farhi (2022a)

A Global Intertemporal Production and Trade Model

Intratemporal Bloc (1)

- **Supply:** firms in country n and sector j produce output y_{nj} with fixed factors k_{nj} , effective labor $A_{nj}L_{nj}$ and intermediate inputs $m_{nj,mk}$.

$$y_{nj} = \left(\alpha_{nj} k_{nj}^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} + \beta_{nj} (A_{nj} L_{nj})^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} + \gamma_{nj} m_{nj}^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} \right)^{\frac{\phi}{\phi-1}} ; \quad m_{nj} = \left(\sum_k \sum_m \vartheta_{nj,mk} m_{nj,mk}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$

- **Labor Market:** rigid wages and labor supply shock $x_{nj} < 1$.

$$L_{nj} \leq x_{nj} \bar{L}_{nj} ; \quad w_{nj} = \bar{w}_{nj}$$

- *Supply-constrained sector:*
- *Demand-constrained sector:*

$$L_{nj} = x_{nj} \bar{L}_{nj}$$

$$L_{nj} < x_{nj} \bar{L}_{nj}$$

Intratemporal Bloc (2)

- **Demand:** firms within sectors sell differentiated varieties (nested CES demand)

$$D_n = \left[\sum_j \xi_{nj} D_{nj}^{(\eta-1)/\eta} \right]^{\eta/(\eta-1)}, \quad D_{nj} = \left(\sum_m \zeta_{n,mj} d_{n,mj}^{(\rho-1)/\rho} \right)^{\rho/(\rho-1)},$$

ξ_{nj} : sectoral demand shocks – redistributes demand between sectors

- **Sectoral Demand Curve**

$$p_{nj} y_{nj} = \sum_m \omega_{m,nj} P_m D_m + \sum_m \sum_k \Omega_{mk,nj}^m p_{mk} y_{mk}$$

- **Value Added:**

$$V_n = \sum_j (1 - \gamma_{nj}) p y_{nj}$$

Implies (In matrix form):

$$\mathbf{PD} = \mathcal{M}(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \mathbf{p}) \mathbf{V},$$

$$\mathbf{TB} = \mathbf{V} - \mathbf{PD} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathcal{M}(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \mathbf{p})) \mathbf{V}$$

- Other work:

Find $\mathbf{p}$ s.t. $\mathbf{TB} = \mathbf{0}$

- This paper:

Inter-temporal block gives $\mathbf{TB} = f(\mathbf{V}, \dots)$

- **Simplified set-up:**
 - Two periods: present (COVID, fixed wages) and future (*, flexible wages).
 - Each country is small and takes the global nominal interest rate i as given.
 - Global equilibrium ensures that $\sum_n TB_n = \sum_n TB_{n*} = 0$.
- **Heterogenous Households:** share $0 < \mu_n < 1$ are *hand-to-mouth*; remaining share $(1 - \mu_n)$ are *Ricardian* with log-preferences and discount factor δ_n .
 - Precautionary shock ($\uparrow \delta_n$) needed to match increased private savings.
- **Fiscal Transfers:** Transfer T_n
 - Financed by debt with per-capita future tax $t_{n*} = T_n(1 + i)/\bar{L}_n$.

Aggregate Demand Determination

$$P_n D_n = \mu_n (V_n + T_n) + (1 - \mu_n)(1 - \delta_n) \left(V_n + \frac{V_{n*}}{1 + i} \right) \quad (1)$$

$$TB_n = (1 - \mu_n) \left(\delta_n V_n - (1 - \delta_n) \frac{V_{n*}}{1 + i} \right) - \mu_n T_n. \quad (2)$$

(1) determines aggregate nominal expenditures. (2) is the country's trade balance.

- HtM households needed for fiscal policy T_n to matter. MPC of 1.
- Unemployment lowers income V_n , reducing aggregate demand (Keynesian cross).
- Precautionary shock and higher interest rate reduce aggregate demand of Ricardian HHs.
- Trade balance: twin deficits and role of precautionary shocks

Details on Solving the Model

- Intertemporal + Demand System are *Nominal*.
 - Need two nominal anchors to solve model.
 - Equivalent to specifying monetary policy
- We pick a reference country that targets nominal GDP.
 - Specifically, a country that is advanced, 'isolated,' and less likely to be affected by COVID: *New Zealand*.
- All other countries fix their exchange rate relative to the reference country.
 - Saves us specifying country-by-country monetary policy
 - The results should be interpreted as *upper bounds of the effect of fiscal policy*.

From the Model to the Data

Elasticities: $(\eta, \rho, \phi, \sigma) = (1, 2, 0.6, 0.2)$

- As in, Baqaee & Farhi (2022b) and di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, Silva & Yıldırım (2022).


COVID shocks: vary by country and sector (36 ICIO sectors)

- **Labor utilization constraint** ($\hat{L}_{nj} \leq \hat{x}_{nj}$):
 - Feasibility of remote work (Dingel & Neimam, 2020) $\times$ lockdown intensity (OGRT).
- **Productivity shock** ($\hat{A}_{nj} \leq 1$): Assume remote workers are 20% less productive.
 - Change in the number of remote workers (ACS, O*NET) $\times$ lockdown intensity (OGRT).
- **Sectoral demand shock** ($\hat{\xi}_{nj}$):
 - Reliance on face-to-face interaction (O*NET) $\times$ mobility intensity Google Mobility Index.


Fiscal policy & other parameters

- T_n from IMF's COVID fiscal tracker (above the line spending).
- HtM estimates μ_n for European countries (Almagren, Gallegos, Kramer & Lima, forthcoming).

Sector-Specific Demand Shocks



(a) Sector-Specific Demand (O*NET)



(b) Demand Shock Intensity (Google Mobility)

Results

Fiscal Multiplier and Activity Reallocation

	Δ Real GDP %	Δ % Demand Constrained (pp)	Δ Keynesian Unemp. (pp)	Δ Prices %
COVID w/o stimulus	-8.90	39.22	2.36	-0.77
COVID w/ stimulus	-8.44	32.04	1.53	2.50
Effect of Stimulus (Δ)	0.50	-7.18	-0.83	3.27

Fiscal Multiplier and Activity Reallocation: Low Multiplier

	Δ Real GDP %	Δ Share Demand Constrained (pp)	Δ Keynesian Unemp (pp)	Δ Prices %
COVID w/o stimulus	-8.90	39.22	2.36	-0.77
COVID w/ stimulus	-8.44	32.04	1.53	2.50
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- **Fiscal Multiplier = 0.04:** Impulse of 11.3% of GDP raises output by 0.50%.


<i>Channels:</i>	<i>Multiplier:</i>
Transfers work through MPC (avg. = 0.29)	0.40
+ Bottlenecks in 2/3 of sectors (w/o I-O)	0.11
+ I-O structure matters	0.06
+ Global Policy Rate Rises	0.04

Fiscal Multiplier and Activity Reallocation: Employment


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COVID w/ stimulus	-8.44	32.04	1.53	2.50
Difference (Δ)	0.50	-7.18	-0.83	3.27

- Fiscal Policy dissipated through higher prices—**but, stimulus supported employment:**
 - Policy increased activity in demand-constrained sectors.
 - 7% of GDP no longer demand constrained.
 - ‘Keynesian Unemployment’ decreases from 2.36% to 1.53% of labor force.

Cross-border Spillovers: US-only Fiscal policy Scenario



(a) RGDP – Advanced Economies




(b) RGDP – Emerging Economies

• Spillovers are small!


- 20 % of US NGDP stimulus → 1% rise in US RGDP → 0.1% of GDP rise in Canada!
- Supply shocks matter. If the whole world were demand constrained:
 20 % of US NGDP stimulus → 2.7% rise in US RGDP → 0.4% of GDP rise in Canada!
- Home bias also important in explaining low fiscal spillovers.

No Supply Shocks

Cross-border Spillovers: Role of International I-O



(a) RGDP – Advanced Economies



(b) RGDP – Emerging Economies


Only Domestic I-O Connections (*Lighter bars*)
 Full International I-O (*darker bars*)

- **International I-O shapes the distribution of spillovers:**

- On top of previous graph: Δ RGDP if I-O connections are *domestic only*
- International I-O connections matter for the distribution of spillovers

No Supply Shocks

Cross-border Spillovers: Explaining GNI Decline in ROW




- **Standard: Final Demand ToT (1/2)**
 - US goods prices rise
 - ROW pays more for US goods
- **New: Intermediates ToT (1/2)**
 - US GDP and final goods $\uparrow$
 - US intermediate demand $\uparrow$
 - $P_m \uparrow$, ROW intermediates $\downarrow$
 - ROW Final Goods Production $\downarrow$
- **RGDP vs. RGNI $\leftrightarrow P_{GDP}$ vs. P_{CPI}**

Final Output RGNI


- The multiplier from fiscal transfers is very small.
 - *This is to be expected: transfers + bottlenecks + I-O linkages.*
- Nonetheless, fiscal policy increase demand to sectors with slack
 - *Fiscal policy in COVID reduced 'Keynesian' unemployment by 1/3*
- Cross border spillovers are small & RGNI falls for two reasons:
 - *Standard terms of trade mechanisms (1/2) & competition for constrained intermediates (1/2)*

Thank You

Intensity of Sectoral Supply & Demand Shocks




(a) Sectoral Labor Restrictions




(b) Supply Shock Intensity: Advanced

Intensity of Sectoral Supply & Demand Shocks




(a) Supply Shock Intensity: Emerging




(b) Demand Shock Intensity: Emerging

Cross-border Spillovers – No Supply Shocks

Counterfactual: US fiscal policy only (relative to no fiscal policy)




(a) Advanced




(b) Emerging

Cross-border Spillovers

Counterfactual: US fiscal policy only (relative to no fiscal policy)



(a) Advanced




(b) Emerging


▨ Only Domestic I-O Connections

□ Full International I-O

Cross-border Spillovers – Final Output Decomposition



(a) Final Output – Advanced Economies



(b) Final Output – Emerging Economies


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
- Need supply shocks *and* international I-O for non-US final output to fall
- (Competition for global intermediates needs both)

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Cross-border Spillovers – Final Output w.o. supply shocks Decomposition



(a) Final Output – Advanced Economies



(b) Final Output – Emerging Economies


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
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Cross-border Spillovers – RGNI Decomposition



(a) Final Output – Advanced Economies



(b) Final Output – Emerging Economies

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■ Full International I-O

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