Uncertainty Shocks, Capital Flows, and International Risk Spillovers*

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Abstract
Risk aversion and foreign investors’ changing appetite for risk-taking have been shown to be key determinants of the global financial cycle. To match these facts, we propose a two-country macroeconomic framework featuring time-varying uncertainty and cross-border holdings of risky assets by financial intermediaries to understand the sources and effects of global risk-on and risk-off events. We first consider an economy in financial autarky, and find that the presence of balance-sheet constrained intermediaries implies that higher uncertainty leads to sharp declines in asset prices and increases in risk premia. We next show how the economy transitions from autarky to financial openness: U.S. financial intermediaries acquire foreign assets to benefit from portfolio diversification, effectively becoming global intermediaries. With financial openness, an increase in U.S. uncertainty leads to deleveraging pressure on intermediaries in both countries as well as to increases in global risk premia and decreases in global asset values, consistent with the empirical evidence. Finally, we show that financial constraints of these intermediaries are important to generate effects of uncertainty shocks on exchange rates, UIP premia, and capital flows that are consistent with the empirical evidence.

Keywords: Financial Frictions; Risk premia; Time-varying uncertainty, U.S. Monetary Policy Spillovers, Global Financial Cycle.

JEL classification: E32; E44; F41.

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1 Introduction

There is a large empirical literature that shows the importance of global risk aversion, uncertainty, and related measures of global investors’ “risk sentiment” in driving international risky asset prices and capital flows (e.g. Rey (2013), Miranda-Agrrippino and Rey (2020), Miranda-Agrrippino and Rey (2021)). Dubbed the “global financial cycle” (GFC), this process can imply large fluctuations in domestic credit, volatile capital flows, and boom-bust cycles, especially in emerging markets (EMs) (e.g., di Giovanni et al. (2021) for Turkey, and Morais et al. (2019) for Mexico). To date, we still lack a theoretical framework to understand these empirically‐shown sources and effects of uncertainty or “risk-on/risk-off” shocks in an open economy context. Our paper provides such a model and tests the predictions of the model in the data.\footnote{Recent work with a related objective is a paper by Davis and van Wincoop (2021) that provides a theoretical framework for the GFC. Unlike our framework, which focuses on the role of uncertainty shocks (i.e. volatility shocks) that generate higher risk aversion endogenously, the main driver of the GFC in their paper is a shock to the risk aversion parameter. Moreover, their model is completely silent about the sources and effects of global risk aversion on exchange rates and UIP premia, important features of the GFC as documented in Kalemli-Ozcan (2019).}

Our objective is to understand the linkage between fluctuations in uncertainty in the “financial center” (the U.S.) and movements in risk premia, asset prices, exchange rates, and UIP premia globally. U.S. monetary policy has been shown to be a key driver of the GFC through its effect on risk aversion (e.g., Bekaert et al. (2013), Rey (2013), Bruno and Shin (2015)).\footnote{As EM capital flows are more risk-sensitive, U.S. monetary policy-driven GFC affects EMs more than advanced economies (AEs), as documented by Kalemli-Ozcan (2019). See Degasperi et al. (2021) for a similar risk spillover mechanism of U.S. monetary policy transmission through long-term interest rates and the yield curve.} To this end, we propose a two-country dynamic macro model, consisting of the U.S. and a foreign economy, an EM. A key feature of our model is the presence of balance-sheet constrained global (U.S.) financial intermediaries. These intermediaries play a key role in determining global asset prices, exchange rates, and capital flows. The key exogenous driving force in our model is a shock to the standard deviation of the future productivity (or dividend) of U.S. physical capital. This shock generates time variation in uncertainty about intermediaries’ prospective returns. Our modeling of these “uncertainty shocks” is similar to that in Basu and Bundick (2017). We believe this approach captures the reality that part of the uncertainty involving intermediaries’ returns is outside the control of intermediaries due to unexpected exogenous disturbances. Crucially, while uncertainty fluctuations are exogenous in our model, risk premia are fully endogenous, as we emphasize throughout.

We begin by studying a single-good endowment economy, in which the exchange rate is fixed at unity by assumption. In each country there is a fixed supply of capital (“trees”) which produce a random dividend (“fruit”) each period. Dividends are completely uncorrelated across countries. We assume the two countries are asymmetric in the following sense: First, the financial center (the U.S.) can hold claims to productive capital both at home and abroad, but agents in the foreign country (the EM) can only purchase claims to their own capital. Second, only in the U.S. the process for dividends features time-varying uncertainty. Thus, our work follows the literature on intermediary asset pricing (e.g. He and Krishnamurthy (2013)) in that through intermediaries’ pricing of claims on assets, asset prices and risk premia are both linked to frictions in financial.
intermediation. The household sector does not have direct access to financial instruments in either country, and instead owns financial intermediaries who make investments decisions in these risky assets on its behalf.

We first consider a case in which countries are in (financial and trade) autarky: U.S. banks cannot hold foreign assets, and there is no trade in goods and services. This case provides a useful benchmark to illustrate how uncertainty shocks transmit in our economy with constrained intermediaries. We find that an increase in uncertainty leads to considerable declines in asset values and in intermediaries’ net worth, and to sharp increases in risk premia.

To show the importance of the friction in financial intermediation, we turn off the friction and apply the same uncertainty shock. Given a standard value of just 3 for households’ risk aversion (which is equal to intermediaries’ risk aversion in the frictionless case), the magnitudes of the effects of uncertainty shocks are very small, as expected; but, importantly, asset values following an increase in uncertainty go up, while they have been shown to go down in the data. In this respect, the intermediary friction is important in generating responses both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the evidence. In fact, the financing friction works to make intermediaries effectively highly risk averse, despite a very modest value of risk aversion in the utility function. The reason is the following. Intermediary wealth is highly procyclical, due to the financial accelerator. Thus, wealth is scarce in bad times, making financial constraints particularly tight in bad times. This makes the marginal value of a unit of wealth (which helps relax financial constraints) highly countercyclical.

This observation plays an important role in shaping the effects of uncertainty shocks on asset prices and risk premia in the model with financial constraints. The intuition for how these effects play out is as follows: a rise in uncertainty triggers a sharp reduction in the prospective value of intermediaries’ activity (which consists in holding the risky asset). In effect, intermediaries face heightened deleveraging pressure. In equilibrium, as all intermediaries face this deleveraging pressure simultaneously, the asset price has to fall considerably. Turning to the effects on risk premia, intermediaries price assets using a stochastic discount factor (SDF) which augments the consumption-based SDF (capturing variations in the marginal utility of consumption) with a term that captures the tightness in intermediaries’ financial constraints. This term is highly countercyclical, as explained in the preceding paragraph, and is also highly elastic to the dividend shock (due to financial accelerator effects). As a consequence, the risk premium moves up sharply when uncertainty rises—orders of magnitude more than it would absent financial constraints. Thus, our model can generate large movements in risk premia—as observed in the data—without relying on a high risk aversion parameter.

We then examine what happens when we open up the economies to trade in financial assets. Financial openness introduces powerful motives for U.S. banks to hold foreign risky assets in addition to standard government bonds: given uncorrelated returns, this offers important hedging benefits. For this reason, our economy features capital flowing from the U.S. to the EM as the economy transits from autarky to financial openness. In effect, U.S. banks become global intermediaries, and
play a powerful role in driving capital flows and global asset prices, consistent with the empirical GFC literature.\textsuperscript{3}

In fact, the presence of these global intermediaries imparts a strong comovement in risky asset prices in the two countries, even if the dividends on the underlying assets evolve independently. This occurs through the optimal portfolio condition of these intermediaries, which states that they must be indifferent between holding assets of either country, and therefore implies that differences in expected returns between domestic and foreign capital are quickly arbitrated away. As an example, assume that the economy is hit by a disturbance that drives U.S. excess returns up and the U.S. asset price down. Without any chance in foreign asset prices, global intermediaries would want to shift away from foreign assets and into U.S. assets. To restore equilibrium, the foreign asset price must fall.\textsuperscript{4}

Next, we consider the effects of a rise in U.S. uncertainty. This means that the riskiness of U.S. capital’s productivity rises, with no change in the riskiness in the productivity of EM capital. Through the effects described earlier when discussing the autarky case, this shock causes deleveraging pressure on the U.S. (now global) intermediaries. Because of the arbitrage channel described in the previous paragraph (tying together the movements in asset prices in both countries), the shock also implies that the effective riskiness of foreign assets endogenously rises.

In this way the shock transmits to foreign intermediaries, which also face deleveraging pressure—ultimately resulting in a fall in the foreign risky asset price. Overall, we find that a U.S. uncertainty shock drives asset prices and intermediary capital down, as well as risk premia up, in both countries. What is important here is that the shock originates in the United States, but spills over to the foreign country since U.S. financial intermediaries price both countries’ assets. As the required return on emerging market assets rises, there is pressure for capital to flow out of the emerging market to satisfy the equilibrium pricing condition. We believe our model is the first to show that an uncertainty shock that originates in the financial center of the world (the U.S.) can spill over strongly to emerging markets, and therefore have properties that resemble a global risk aversion shock. The two will be observationally equivalent in the data given the GFC—that is, the comovement in risky asset prices and capital flows.

We next extend the model to a two-good economy in order to open our countries to trade in goods and incorporate fluctuations in the real exchange rate. In this economy, U.S. intermediaries can hold both U.S. government bonds (in U.S. dollars) and EM government bonds (denominated in the local currency of the EM).\textsuperscript{5} We shut down trade in risky assets in this case to focus on the implications for real exchange rate and the UIP premium and show how deviations from UIP condition can arise even without trade in risky assets.

This is an interesting extension not only because it permits richer trade dynamics between

\textsuperscript{3}In addition to aforementioned empirical papers, see also Avedjiev and Hale (2019), and Brüning and Ivashina (2020) on capital flows to EM by U.S. banks due to search-for yield motives.

\textsuperscript{4}A similar form of propagation across markets has also been emphasized by Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and Perri and Quadrini (2018) in open economies, and by Gertler et al. (2016) in a closed economy with two sectors.

\textsuperscript{5}See Du and Schreger (2016) who show an increase in local currency-denominated borrowing of EM sovereigns.
the countries, but also because we can now study the interaction between uncertainty shocks, risk premia, and the real exchange rate. It has been shown that uncertainty shocks—proxied by the VIX—move together with the USD exchange rate (e.g. Sarno et al. (2012), Lilley et al. (2019) and Shin et al. (2010)), and with uncovered interest parity (UIP) premia (e.g. di Giovanni et al. (2021) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Varela (2021)). In this version of the model we explore the effects of uncertainty shocks on the exchange rate and the deviations from UIP condition. There are significant failures of UIP in the two-good economy model, due to movements in the “risk term” (i.e. the conditional covariance between intermediaries’ SDF and the exchange rate) stemming from fluctuations in uncertainty. We show that the model-implied effects of uncertainty shocks on UIP premia and on exchange rates align quite well with their empirical counterparts (calculated via an identified VAR).

Our UIP deviations do not depend on limits to arbitrage between U.S. government bonds and EM government bonds stemming from financing frictions, as in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) or Mukhin and Itskohki (2019): we assume that global intermediaries do not face limits to arbitrage in pricing foreign-currency bonds. Yet, our model generates a sizable dollar appreciation in the wake of increased U.S. uncertainty. The reason is that these intermediaries are highly exposed to U.S. dividend risk, in a way that makes the UIP premium on foreign currencies highly elastic to U.S. uncertainty. When U.S. uncertainty rises, the UIP premium of the EM shoots up, and the foreign currency depreciates sharply. By contrast, in a model without intermediary frictions, the dollar depreciates following higher uncertainty (though the magnitude is small as long as risk aversion is low). We show that the data indicates a stronger dollar following higher uncertainty, fully consistent with the implications of our model.

**Literature.** Our model builds on a substantial theoretical literature studying the effects of uncertainty shocks. Well-known examples include Bloom (2009) and Basu and Bundick (2017). Much of this literature focuses on closed economy settings. Our goal, instead, is to study the global effects of fluctuations in uncertainty. Another difference with the literature is that our work studies the role of financial constraints in shaping the effects of uncertainty. By contrast, the literature on time-varying uncertainty has mostly focused on settings without financing frictions (exceptions include Arellano et al. (2019) and Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana (2020), but the workings of the financing friction differs considerably between these models and ours).

There is a large literature emphasizing some form of intermediation friction in driving exchange rate dynamics. Well-known examples include Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), Mukhin and Itskohki (2019), and Basu et al. (2020). We also emphasize intermediation frictions, but our results on the exchange rate and UIP premium effects of uncertainty do not rely on limits to arbitrage in financing foreign bond positions. Instead, the critical feature of our model is the presence of long-lived financial intermediaries that face leverage constraints. This feature plays a key role in determining how the conditional covariance between intermediaries’ SDFs and the exchange rate reacts following a rise in uncertainty about the future. By contrast, the papers just mentioned generally do not feature long-lived intermediaries.
More generally, in our model uncertainty shocks that hit global intermediaries transmit internationally to foreign economies’ risky asset prices, capital flows and exchange rates through financial intermediaries’ net worth. In a recent work Morelli et al. (forthcoming) show global financial intermediaries play a relevant role in driving borrowing-cost in emerging-market.\footnote{Alfaro et al. (2018) and Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) present direct evidence that financial frictions amplify the impact of uncertainty shocks, mainly in closed economies.} Differently from their work, we focus in our modeling framework on the distinct role of uncertainty shocks in determining exchange rates and the UIP premia (in addition to the prices of risky asset worldwide), and we argue that an important mechanism through which higher uncertainty transmits globally is changes in the net worth position of global financial intermediaries that are balance-sheet constrained. In this respect, an important prediction of our model is that the spreads on international corporate bonds that are held by global banks facing tighter financing frictions (i.e., lower net worth) are more strongly associated with higher U.S. uncertainty. We test this prediction in the data and find strong evidence for our proposed mechanism.

We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 shows the dynamic effects of the uncertainty shocks. Section 5 extend the model to two goods to incorporate the exchange rate. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Empirical Evidence

The price of EM corporate bonds held by global investors is highly correlated with uncertainty (proxied by the VXO). Moreover, fluctuations in uncertainty appear to be related to global financial intermediaries’ equity positions. These observations are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the evolution of the VXO, along with U.S. banks’ net worth position and EM corporate bond spreads, over the 1998-2018 period.

These observations suggest that uncertainty shocks might potentially transmit to EM risky asset prices through their impact on global banks’ equity position. In this section we attempt to provide some motivational evidence using macro-level regressions for the presence of such channel. More specifically, we begin with the following regression:

\[
\Delta\text{Spread}_{c,t} = \eta_c + \alpha W_{t-1}\Delta V \times O_t + \beta \Delta V \times O_t + \delta NW_{t-1} + \epsilon_t
\]

(1)

where the quarterly changes in EM corporate bond spreads (\(\Delta\text{Spread}_{c,t}\)) are regressed on the interaction term between the change in a measure of global uncertainty and the lagged value of U.S. banks’ net worth (\(NW_{t-1}\)). In the regressions we control for the change in VXO (\(\Delta V \times O_t\)) and the (lagged) values of the net worth positions of the U.S. banks (\(NW_{t-1}\)), as well as the Global Financial Crisis (where the dummy for the latter takes a value of 1 for the 2008Q3-2009Q4 period and zero otherwise). Note that we use data from 20 EMs on the risk premia that the corporates in these countries have pay in the international markets to borrow from global banks, and run regressions using the country fixed effects (\(\eta_c\)).
Figure 1: EM Corporate Spread, VXO, and U.S. Banks’ Net Worth.

Table 1 presents the results for regression (1). The estimated coefficient for the effect of VXO on the spread is positive and significant, implying that higher uncertainty is associated with higher corporate bond spreads in EMs. More importantly, once we control for changes in VXO, we find that the interaction term that we are interested in becomes negative and significant: if the net worth positions of global banks are low in the previous period (implying that the banks are more likely to be constrained), EM corporate spreads increase by more for an increase in the VXO of a given size. Or conversely, if global banks are well-capitalized (NW is high in the previous period, and thus financial constraints are more relaxed), EM corporate bond spreads move less for a given change in VXO in the current period. So, we take this finding as a suggestive evidence that global banks’ net worth plays an important role in transmitting uncertainty shocks to the price of EM corporate bonds.

We next run a dynamic panel vector autoregressive model (VAR) to try to disentangle the role played by global banks’ net worth position in determination of the dynamics of EM corporate bond spreads in times of elevated uncertainty. More specifically, we estimate a panel VAR model with quarterly data from several emerging economies which includes the VXO, U.S. banks’ net worth, and the EM corporate bond spreads (in this exact order). Uncertainty shocks are identified by assuming that they are the only ones that move the VXO on impact, as in Basu and Bundick (2017). We assume that EM corporate spreads react to both VXO and the U.S. bank’s net worth (contemporaneously and with lags), but developments in individual EMs do not affect global financing conditions.

Figure 2 shows the estimated effects an increase in U.S. uncertainty. A one-standard-deviation
Table 1: EM Corporate Spreads, Uncertainty and U.S. Banks’ Net Worth

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<tr>
<td>NW$_{t-1}$ΔVXO$_t$</td>
<td>0.0196***</td>
<td>-0.0127*</td>
<td>-0.0126*</td>
<td>-0.0126*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.45)</td>
<td>(-2.47)</td>
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<td>(-2.45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔVXO$_t$</td>
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<td>0.0553***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.79)</td>
<td>(10.77)</td>
<td>(10.78)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NW$_{t-1}$</td>
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$t$ statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Spread represents the JP Morgan Corporate EM Bond Index for 20 EMs (denoted by c) over the Q1 1997 to Q2 2018 period (denoted by t). EMs include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey. The U.S. banks’ net worth (NW) is defined as the difference between the real value of assets and liabilities reported by U.S. chartered depository institutions obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds (computed as in Morelli et al. (forthcoming)), VXO is the Chicago Board Options Exchange's CBOE Volatility Index. The global financial crisis (GFC) is defined between Q3 2008 and Q4 2009. The results are robust to including EM local currency bonds.

uncertainty shock increases the VXO by around 15 percent, leading U.S. banks’ net worth to decrease by 0.25 percent one quarter after the shock hits before rising back up to its long run value. EM corporate bond spreads rise 0.80 percentage points on impact, increase further another 0.50 percentage points, and remain elevated for about a year. It is unclear whether EM corporate bond spreads are reacting to higher uncertainty or its effects on global banks’ net worth. A natural question is to what extent the endogeneity of net worth to VIX contributes to exacerbating fluctuations in risk premia faced by EM corporates.

We address this question by means of a counterfactual exercise, where the purpose is at gauging the degree to which global banks’ net worth position amplify the effects of a shock to VXO. To this end, we calculate the “direct” effect of an exogenous rise in VIX on EM corporate spreads in a (counterfactual) world where the country spread does not directly depend on the US banks’ net worth. Specifically, the net worth equation in the VAR is modified by setting to zero the coefficients on the VXO. We then compute the impulse response functions based on the modified VAR system. The results are shown by dashed red lines in Figure 2. Once U.S. banks’ net worth is not allowed to react to uncertainty, the effect of a VXO shock on EM corporate bond spreads is dampened considerably: the effect of the same VXO shock on EM corporate bond spread is reduced from 1.30 to 0.80 percent one quarter after the shock hits, and the red line remains below the blue line for
Figure 2: Impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to VIX.

Note: Solid blue lines with stars show point estimates of impulse responses; and 68% confidence bands are depicted with light-gray shaded areas. Red dashed lines show point estimates of impulse responses obtained under the counterfactual that changes in VXO do not affect U.S. Bank’s net worth. Spread represents the pooled panel of JP Morgan Corporate EM Bond Index for Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.

over a year.

Overall, we take these results as a suggestive evidence that the spreads on international corporate bonds that are held by global banks facing tighter financing frictions (i.e., lower net worth) are more strongly associated with higher U.S. uncertainty. Motivated by this evidence, we next describe our proposed model.

3 Model

We begin by studying a single-good exchange economy (as in Lucas (1978)) with two countries. While it is straightforward to extend the model to allow for endogenous production, focusing on an endowment economy helps make our analysis more transparent. Accordingly, we assume there is fixed aggregate supply of capital (“trees”) in each country, that produce a random amount of output (“fruit”) each period. The productivity of capital, $Z_t$, follows an exogenous random process that is uncorrelated across countries. In addition, and crucially, the volatility of $Z_t$ in the home economy
(which we take to represent the U.S.) is time-varying. Thus, uncertainty shocks are captured by the volatility of (next-period) home productivity, denoted $\sigma_{zt}$.

We assume that claims on capital held by financial intermediaries are subject to financing frictions (as in, for example, He and Krishnamurthy (2013)). In our analysis, we primarily focus on the effect of $\sigma_{zt}$ on the price of capital $Q_t$, credit spread (or risk premium) $E_t(R_{kt+1}) - R_t$, intermediary net worth $N_t$, as well as on the cross-border effects of higher uncertainty.

3.1 Home Economy

We assume home represents the United States, and foreign is an EM. We use * to denote the foreign economy.

3.1.1 Endowment

Aggregate capital in each country is exogenous and its aggregate supply is normalized to unity. Capital’s productivity is exogenous and given by random variable $Z_t$, subject to time-varying volatility:

$$Z_t = (1 - \rho_z) + \rho_z Z_{t-1} + \sigma_{zt-1} \varepsilon_{zt}$$

$$\sigma_{zt} = (1 - \rho_\sigma) \bar{\sigma}_z + \rho_\sigma \sigma_{zt-1} + \varepsilon_{\sigma t}$$

A positive shock to $\varepsilon_{\sigma t}$ means that agents feel more uncertain about the future productivity of capital. The formulation of uncertainty fluctuations is similar to the one used by Basu and Bundick (2017).

3.1.2 Households

Domestic households consume and save via deposits at financial intermediaries. Utility is

$$E_t \left( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \frac{C_{t+i}^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} \right),$$

where $C_t$ is consumption. The budget constraint is:

$$C_t + D_t \leq R_{t-1} D_{t-1} + T_t,$$

where $D_t$ is deposits, $R_{t-1}$ is the safe interest rate between $t - 1$ and $t$, and $T_t$ is net transfers from bankers. The first-order condition of the households’ optimization problem is

$$\beta E_t \left[ \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\theta} \right] R_t = 1$$

The representative household includes a set of bankers who run financial intermediaries. Because
they are members of the household, they use the household’s stochastic discount factor (SDF) to value payoffs, and therefore they are risk averse to the extent that the household is. The presence of financial constraints, however, works to magnify the bankers’ risk aversion, as we show. We next turn to describing the bankers’ problem.

3.1.3 Financial intermediaries

Financial intermediaries ("banks," for short) obtain funds from households and also through internally accumulated net worth. They use these funds to finance claims on both domestic capital, \( K_{it} \), and on foreign capital, \( K_{F, it} \) (which denotes claims on foreign capital held by home banker \( i \)). Home bankers may also hold a risk-free government bond issued by the foreign country, which pays gross interest \( R^*_t \) (the foreign risk-free rate). This bond is a perfect substitute with domestic deposits. As a result, the home and foreign risk-free rates are equalized: \( R_t = R^*_t \).

Bankers exit with probability \( 1 - \sigma \), at which point they pay out their earnings to the household. Exiting bankers are replaced by a set of entrant bankers who receive initial equity endowment equal to fraction \( \xi \) of the value of the aggregate capital stock.

For a continuing banker \( i \), the budget constraint states that the bank’s expenditures (consisting of asset purchases, both at home and abroad, and repayment on debt obtained from domestic households, \( R_{t-1}D_{t-1} \)) cannot exceed its revenues (stemming from new financing raised from households, \( D_t \), and payments of previous-period capital and bond holdings):

\[
Q_tK_{it} + Q^*_tK_{F, it} + B^*_t + R_{t-1}D_{t-1} \leq D_t + (Z_t + Q_t)K_{it-1} + (Z^*_t + Q^*_t)K_{F, it-1} + R^*_tB^*_{t-1} \tag{7}
\]

where \( Z_t, Z^*_t \) denote the productivity of domestic and foreign capital, respectively. The variable \( Q_t \) is the price of claims on domestic capital and \( Q^*_t \) is the price of claims on foreign capital.

The balance sheet identity of the bank dictates that the capital funded within a given period—domestic and foreign—must equal the sum of the banker’s own net worth \( (N_{it}) \) and debt raised from domestic households \( (D_{it}) \):

\[
Q_tK_{it} + Q^*_tK_{F, it} + B^*_t = D_t + N_{it} \tag{8}
\]

Combining equations (7) and (8) and imposing \( R_t = R^*_t \) we obtain the net worth evolution equation:

\[
N_{it} = (R_{kt} - R_{t-1})Q_{t-1}K_{it-1} + (R^*_k - R_{t-1})Q^*_tK_{F, it-1} + R_{t-1}N_{it-1} \tag{9}
\]

where \( R_{kt} \equiv \frac{Z_t + Q_t}{Q_{t-1}} \) and \( R^*_k \equiv \frac{Z^*_t + Q^*_t}{Q^*_{t-1}} \). Define the “leverage,” denoted by \( \phi_{it} \), and the ratio of the value of foreign to total assets in intermediary \( i \)’s balance sheet, denoted by \( x_{it} \), as the following,
respectively:

\[
\phi_{it} = \frac{Q_t K_{it} + Q_t^* K_{F_{it}}}{N_{it}},
\]

\[
x_{it} = \frac{Q_t^* K_{F_{it}}}{Q_t K_{it} + Q_t^* K_{F_{it}}},
\]

Equation (9) then can be written as

\[
N_{it} = [(R_{it} - R_{t-1})(1 - x_{it}) + (R_{it}^* - R_{t-1})x_{it}]\phi_{it} + R_{t-1}N_{it-1},
\]

which will help in formulating the banker’s constrained optimization problem.

We motivate a friction in the banks’ ability to raise funds by a simple limited enforcement problem, following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010): after borrowing funds, the banker can renege on the obligations to depositors and instead divert a fraction of the assets he or she owns. This puts an endogenous limit on how much creditors allow the banker to lever up in the first place. Thus, the banker’s objective is:

\[
V_{it} = \max_{K_{it},K_{F_{it}},D_{it}} E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} [(1 - \sigma)N_{it+1} + \sigma V_{it+1}]
\]

subject to the evolution of net worth, equation (9), and the incentive compatibility constraint

\[
V_{it} \geq \theta (Q_t K_{it} + Q_t^* K_{F_{it}})
\]

where \(\Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{C_{t+1} - \delta}{C_t}\) denotes the household’s stochastic discount factor, and the parameter \(\theta\) denotes the fraction that can be diverted. The incentive compatibility constraint states that the value of “misbehaving” must be no larger than the value of operating “honestly.”

We solve the banker’s problem by undetermined coefficients. As it is standard, we begin by guessing that the value function is linear:

\[
V_{it} = \Psi_t N_{it},
\]

where \(\Psi_t\) is non-bank-specific. Define expected discounted returns

\[
\mu_t \equiv E_t [\Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}(R_{kt+1} - R_t)]
\]

\[
\mu_{xt} \equiv E_t [\Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}(R_{kt+1}^* - R_t)]
\]

\[
\nu_t \equiv E_t (\Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}) R_t
\]

\[
\Omega_{t+1} = (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Psi_{t+1}
\]
Then the banker’s problem can be re-written as

$$
\Psi_t = \max_{\phi_{it}, x_{it}} \left[ \mu_t (1 - x_{it}) + \mu_{xt} x_{it} \right] \phi_{it} + \nu_t
$$

subject to

$$
\phi_{it} \leq \frac{\Psi_t}{\theta}.
$$

Then the first-order condition with respect to $x_{it}$ for the banker’s problem is

$$
\mu_{xt} = \mu_t.
$$

This optimal portfolio condition states that the expected discounted excess returns on domestic and foreign assets held by U.S. intermediaries have to equalize. As long as $\mu_t > 0$, the constraint (20) always binds. In our calibration below, the constraint always binds in a neighborhood of the steady state, so that (20) holds with equality. Observe that $\phi_{it}$ is the same for all $i$. The undetermined coefficient $\Psi_t$ can be solved from (19): $\Psi_t = \mu_t \phi_{it} + \nu_t$.

In each period, any banker $i$ exits with probability $1 - \sigma$. The exiting bankers are replaced by new entrants who receive a transfer from the household equal to fraction $\xi$ of the value of the capital stock in the previous period. Accordingly, the evolution of aggregate net worth, $N_t = \int N_{it} di$, is

$$
N_t = \sigma \left\{ \left[ (R_{kt} - R_{t-1}) (1 - x_{t-1}) + (R_{kt}^* - R_{t-1}) x_{t-1} \right] \phi_{t-1} + R_{t-1} \right\} N_{t-1} + (1 - \sigma) \xi Q_{t-1}
$$

### 3.2 Foreign Economy

The foreign economy is analogous to home, with one difference: foreign intermediaries cannot hold home capital, only capital of their own economy. We assume that the foreign productivity process, $Z_t^*$, is given by

$$
Z_t^* = (1 - \rho_z) + \rho_z Z_{t-1}^* + \sigma_z \varepsilon_{zt}^*.
$$

where $\varepsilon_{zt}^*$ follows an iid process (and is thus uncorrelated with $\varepsilon_{zt}$).

### 3.3 Market Clearing

There are five markets: for home deposits, for foreign deposits, for claims on home capital, for claims on foreign capital, and for foreign government bonds. Deposit market clearing requires that the amount supplied by households in each country equals amount demanded by intermediaries: $D_t = \int D_{it} di$, $D_t^* = \int D_{it}^* di$. Home capital can only be held by home bankers. Thus, $\int K_{it} di = 1$.

---

7This assumption is justified by the observation that net foreign liabilities and gross foreign liabilities for emerging markets moves closely. See, for example, Duttagupta et al. (2013) and Avdjiev et al. (2017).
Foreign capital can be held either by domestic or by foreign bankers, so we have

\[ K_{Ft} + K_{Ft}^* = 1 \]  \hspace{1cm} (24)

where \( K_{Ft} \) is total claims by home bankers on foreign capital, and \( K_{Ft}^* \) is total claims by foreign bankers on foreign capital. Finally, foreign government bonds are in zero net supply, so that the amount held by U.S. banks, \( B_t^* \), must be offset by holdings by foreign households.

Given the above, combining home bankers’ and households’ budget constraints gives the aggregate resource constraint for the U.S.:

\[ C_t + Q_t^* \Delta K_{Ft} + B_t^* - R_{t-1}^* B_{t-1}^* = Z_t + Z_t^* K_{Ft-1} \]  \hspace{1cm} (25)

Similarly, one can derive the resource constraint for the foreign economy:

\[ C_t^* + Q_t^* \Delta K_{Ft}^* = Z_t^* K_{Ft-1}^* + B_t^* - R_{t-1}^* B_{t-1}^* \]  \hspace{1cm} (26)

Note that combining (25) and (26) give the world resource constraint:

\[ C_t + C_t^* = Z_t + Z_t^* \]  \hspace{1cm} (27)

The complete set of equilibrium conditions are presented in Appendix A.

### 3.4 Calibration

Table 2 shows the parameter values we use in the model experiments shown below. The household risk aversion, \( \varrho \), and discount factor, \( \beta \), are set to reasonably conventional values. The parameters specific to the intermediary friction include the banking survival rate, \( \sigma \), the transfer rate to new

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source/Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \varrho )</td>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Basu and Bundick (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>Basu and Bundick (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma )</td>
<td>Survival rate of bankers</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>Gertler and Karadi (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \xi )</td>
<td>Transfer to entering bankers</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>Leverage = 5 (assets/equity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>Fraction of capital that can be diverted</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>Spread = 1 p.p. per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varphi )</td>
<td>Home bias (two-good model)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Basu and Bundick (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{\eta} )</td>
<td>Persistence of uncertainty shock</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Basu and Bundick (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{\sigma}_z )</td>
<td>Average SD of productivity shock</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>Basu and Bundick (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_z )</td>
<td>Persistence of productivity shock</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>Basu and Bundick (2017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Conditional covariances (with constant uncertainty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Financial Integration</th>
<th>Autarky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Cov}<em>t(Z</em>{t+1}, Z^*_{t+1})$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Cov}<em>t(Q</em>{t+1}, Q^*_{t+1})$</td>
<td>14.26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Cov}<em>t(\Omega</em>{t+1}, Q_{t+1} + Z_{t+1})$</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Cov}<em>t(\Omega^*</em>{t+1}, Q^<em>_{t+1} + Z^</em>_{t+1})$</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Cov}<em>t(\Omega^*</em>{t+1}, Q^<em>_{t+1} + Z^</em>_{t+1})$</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

bankers, $\xi$, and the fraction of assets that can be diverted, $\theta$. We set the survival rate to 0.97, similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011), implying a long horizon for bankers of nearly ten years. We set $\theta$ and $\xi$ to hit two targets: a steady-state credit spread (or risk premium) of one hundred basis points, and a leverage ratio of five. The first target reflects the average values of corporate bond spreads. The second target is a conservative estimate of intermediary leverage. The parameter values resulting from these targets, $\theta = 0.33$ and $\xi = 0.08$, are well within the range of values used within the related literature.

The bottom of Table 2 shows the parameters pertaining to the stochastic processes (including for the uncertainty shock). We take these parameters from Basu and Bundick (2017).

4 Quantitative Results

In this section, we consider the effects of higher uncertainty on the dynamics of risk premia, (global) risky asset prices and banks’ net worth. We start our analysis with an economy in autarky, which we think is a useful benchmark in clarifying how uncertainty shocks interact with intermediaries’ financial constraint. We then consider the effects of higher uncertainty in the financially integrated economy.

4.1 Uncertainty shocks in autarky

Table 3 presents the conditional covariances between various endogenous variables in the model (as shown in rows 2-5), such as between the home and foreign asset values, $Q$ and $Q^*$, and between the banker’s SDF and the asset payoffs $Z + Q$ (both home and foreign). By assumption, the dividends $Z$ and $Z^*$ are uncorrelated across countries (first row). As expected, in autarky (second column with numbers), the asset values across countries are uncorrelated as well. The covariance between home bankers’ SDF, $\Omega$, and the home asset’s payoff is highly negative: when asset returns are low, banker net worth is high and therefore financial constraints are tight, making a unit of net worth highly valuable. Also as expected, the covariance between home bankers’ SDF and the returns on the foreign asset is zero.
Figure 3 shows the effects on the home economy of an increase in uncertainty when the economy is in financial autarky. Uncertainty, $\sigma_{zt}$, increases to about 0.55 percent from its steady-state value of 0.4 percent, implying that returns to intermediaries from holding home productive assets become more uncertain unexpectedly. As shown in the figure, this gives rise to a sharp increase in the credit spread (or risk premium for holding the asset), a decline in the price of capital (the asset value), and a loss in intermediary equity (or net worth).

In order to understand the mechanics, it is useful to remember a few model equations. In autarky, all “fruit” is consumed domestically, implying that $C_t = Z_t$, which in turn gives rise to the following expression for households’ SDF: $\Lambda_t = \beta(Z_t/Z_{t-1})^{-\theta}$. Define the banker’s SDF, $\Omega_t$, as

$$\Omega_t \equiv \Lambda_t \left(1 - \sigma + \sigma \Psi_t\right) = \Omega_t,$$

where $\Psi_t$ is given by (19). Moreover, from equation (20) at equality, one can write the maximum leverage allowed, denoted $\bar{\phi}_t$, after imposing the optimal portfolio condition (21), as

$$\bar{\phi}_t = \frac{\nu_t}{\theta - \mu_t}.$$  

(29)

Using the definition of multipliers in equations (15)-(18), maximum leverage $\bar{\phi}_t$ can then be written as:

$$\bar{\phi}_t = \frac{E_t(\Omega_{t+1} R_t)}{\theta - E_t[\Omega_{t+1}(Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1} - R_t)]}.$$  

(30)

As shown in (30), maximum leverage is a forward-looking variable that depends positively on both the discounted value of a unit of net worth, $E_t(\Omega_{t+1})R_t$, and on the excess return per unit of bank assets, $E_t[\Omega_{t+1}(Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1} - R_t)]$. The reason is that both variables raise the continuation value of the bank, and so reduce the incentives to misbehave.\footnote{Note that maximum leverage decreases in $\theta$, the amount the banker can obtain by misbehaving.} Observe that given expectations of future variables and $R_t$, $\bar{\phi}_t$ is a decreasing function of $Q_t$.

On the other hand, actual leverage $\phi_t = Q_t/N_t$ also depends negatively on $Q_t$. This can be seen from the evolution of aggregate net worth, which, in autarky, is given by:

$$N_t = \sigma(\frac{R_{kt}}{Z_{t-1} + Q_{t-1}}) - R_{t-1})\phi_{t-1}N_{t-1} + \sigma R_{t-1}N_{t-1} + (1 - \sigma)\xi Q_{t-1},$$  

(31)

Note that a higher $Q_t$ raises the banker’s return $R_{kt}$. Further, to the extent the banker is leveraged in the first place ($\phi_{t-1}$ is much larger than unity), $N_t$ will tend to increase more than one for one with $Q_t$. In this way, actual leverage $\phi_t$ will tend to fall as $Q_t$ rises, implying that it is a downward-sloping schedule in $Q_t$. Note also that actual leverage is a backward-looking object, so it does not
shift with changes in risk.

The role of risk on equilibrium asset prices and leverage can be illustrated graphically as in Figure 4. The blue schedule represents the link between actual leverage and the asset price, and the orange one displays the relationship between maximum leverage and the asset price. As discussed before, both schedules are downward sloping in $Q_t$. In addition, the maximum-leverage schedule is steeper. Now consider an increase in $\sigma_{zt}$. The higher uncertainty leads to a more-negative conditional covariance between $Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1}$ and the discount factor $\Omega_{t+1}$. This lower conditional covariance decreases $E_t[\Omega_{t+1}(Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1})]$, and thus impacts maximum leverage negatively (all else constant). As a result, the orange schedule in Figure 4 shifts left. The blue schedule in the figure is purely backward-looking, and so does not shift with the increased uncertainty about the future. Therefore, the new equilibrium following higher risk is given by lower $Q_t$, which in turn feeds into and lower net worth $N_t$.

The intuition for these effects is as follows. For each individual banker, uncertainty tightens the leverage constraint, because it reduces the franchise value (thus raising the banker’s incentive
to divert assets). In the aggregate, this implies that the asset price must fall for the banking sector to still be willing to hold the asset.\footnote{Observe that as a result of the sharp drop in the asset price, leverage in our model ends up rising following the uncertainty shock. This is not inconsistent with the evidence, because the model leverage ratio is calculated by using the market value of assets, which results in a highly procyclical bank equity. If we instead use book values to calculate bank equity, we find that leverage actually falls in response to the increase in uncertainty. See Cértler (2012).}

Turning to the effects of higher risk on the credit spread (or risk premium), we can derive an expression for the risk premium from (30), after imposing the condition that leverage constraint always binds (such that $\phi_t = \bar{\phi}_t$):\footnote{Note that we flip the sign of the covariance so that it’s positive and increasing in risk.}

$$E_t(R_{kt+1} - R_t) = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(\Omega_{t+1}, -R_{kt+1}) + \theta}{E_t(\Omega_{t+1})} - \phi_t^{-1} R_t$$

(32)

Moreover, one can write the standard expression for the risk premium in a setting without intermediary frictions as:

$$E_t(R_{kt+1} - R_t) = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(\Lambda_{t+1}, -R_{kt+1})}{E_t(\Lambda_{t+1})}$$

(33)

Comparing equations (32) and (33), two features of our model with intermediary frictions are worth
highlighting for the determination of the risk premium. First, the covariance term in (32) fluctuates much more, as the banker’s SDF $\Omega_{t+1}$ is much more countercyclical than the household’s SDF $\Lambda_{t+1}$.

Second, in the model with frictions, the premium is also positively related to leverage $\phi_t$. This occurs because the incentives to misbehave increase with higher leverage, leading banks to require a larger excess return for holding assets. This feature adds an extra kick to the effects of volatility through the impact of higher risk on leverage.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, the presence of frictions in intermediation has a significant bearing for the determination of risk premia in the model. In this sense the model fits into the “intermediary asset pricing” category (He and Krishnamurthy (2013); see He et al. (2017) for evidence).

Going back to Figure 3, one can see the implications of this feature of our model in terms of asset pricing. The blue lines illustrate the effects of higher uncertainty just described. The gray lines show the effects of uncertainty in a frictionless model. The frictionless setting is characterized by the following two equations:

$$\beta E_t\left[\frac{Z_{t+1}^{-\varrho}}{Z_t^{-\varrho}}\right]R_t = 1,$$

$$\beta E_t\left[\frac{Z_{t+1}^{-\varrho}}{Z_t^{-\varrho}}(Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1})\right] = Q_t.$$  \(34\)

These equations constitute a simple Lucas (1978) asset pricing model, and can be used to compute the impact of higher uncertainty $\sigma_{zt}$ on the asset price $Q_t$, the risk-free rate $R_t$, and the risk premium. As is well known, such a frictionless setting predicts very small effects of risk (see Mehra and Prescott (1985)) for low values of $\varrho$. Thus, as Figure 3 makes clear, the dynamic effects of an increase in uncertainty are an order of magnitude smaller compared with our model with intermediary frictions (recall that in our baseline calibration we have a risk aversion, $\varrho$, of just 2.5). In addition, in the frictionless model the asset value $Q_t$ moves very little and in the “opposite” direction of what is typically found in the empirical literature: it goes up with higher uncertainty, while the empirical literature finds that asset prices fall when measures of uncertainty rise (see, for example, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021)).

### 4.2 Uncertainty shocks with financial integration

We next analyze the case in which the two countries are financially integrated. Table 3 shows the conditional covariances with financial integration (the first row with numbers), and compares the results with the economy in financial autarky (the second row with numbers). As shown in the table, the asset values across countries, $Q$ and $Q^*$, become highly positively correlated across the two countries with integration, although the dividends ($Z$ and $Z^*$) are assumed to be uncorrelated. Moreover, home bankers’ SDF comoves negatively with the foreign country’s payoff, and the conditional covariances within each country become significantly smaller. This reflects a (well-known) risk-sharing arrangement between countries that emerges due to financial integration.

\textsuperscript{11}There is also a constant additive term given by the agency frictions parameter $\theta$. 

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Figure 5: Dynamic effects of U.S. uncertainty shock with financial integration

We now turn to the dynamic effects of higher home uncertainty in a world in which countries are financially integrated, shown in Figure 5. The key observation is that a rise in home uncertainty affects the foreign economy variables by almost as much as it does the home economy variables: the increases in the risk premium abroad, and the declines in the foreign asset values and intermediary net worth, are nearly of the same magnitude as their counterparts at home. Thus, the model features powerful spillovers on foreign economies of increases in home uncertainty.

What drives these large cross-border effects? Recall from the analysis of the autarky case that the key channel through which higher uncertainty feeds into the economy is by making the conditional covariance between intermediaries payoffs and their SDF more negative. In effect, intermediation becomes riskier, which endogenously tightens intermediaries’ leverage constraints. Now consider
higher uncertainty under financial integration. In the second column, second row of Figure 5, we plot the covariances between home bankers’ SDF and the excess return on home securities (blue solid line) and between foreign bankers’ SDF and foreign securities (orange dash-dotted line). As shown, higher uncertainty leads both of these covariances to move down in tandem: in each case, the covariance increases (in absolute magnitude) relative to its pre-shock value—where the magnitudes are similar to the time path of the shock $\sigma_{zt}$ itself. Thus, with higher home uncertainty, both home and foreign assets effectively become riskier, and thus both sets of intermediaries face deleveraging pressure.\footnote{Figure 11 in the Appendix shows the effects with financial integration but without intermediary frictions. As in the case with autarky, the (cross-border) effects of higher uncertainty are very small. But more importantly, the asset values in the model, $Q$ and $Q^*$, move in opposite directions, contrary to what is implied by the empirical estimates.}

To understand why the covariances move synchronously, it is helpful to recall the optimal portfolio for U.S. (or global) banks, equation (21):

$$E_t(\Omega_{t+1}R_{kt+1}^*) = E_t(\Omega_{t+1}R_{kt+1})$$

(36)

Suppose that a standard adverse productivity shock (a negative disturbance to $Z_t$) hurts home banks’ net worth. This limits home banks’ ability to arbitrage, and triggers a rise in the domestic expected return on capital (the right-hand side of (36)) and a decline in $Q_t$. Note that a first-order approximation is sufficient for the present argument: observe that $E_t(\Omega_{t+1})$ vanishes from (36) to a first order. Without any change in foreign variables, equation (36) would be violated: the left-hand side would exceed the right-hand side, indicating that global intermediaries have incentives to pull investments out of the foreign economy and into the domestic one. To restore portfolio optimality, the foreign expected excess return must rise as well, which occurs through a fall in $Q_t^*$. In turn, the tight link between $Q_t$ and $Q_t^*$ induced by the presence of global banks helps explain why all conditional covariances increase with higher uncertainty. Suppose that the riskiness of home productivity goes up. This makes home securities more risky not just because their dividend process has turned more volatile, but also (and mainly) because their price has turned more volatile as well. But through arbitrage by global banks, the foreign price $Q_t^*$ turns more volatile at the same time, and thus the risk facing foreign bankers also rises—as reflected in the more-negative covariance shown in Figure 5.

Observe also that the effects of the shock are considerably muted under financial integration relative to the autarky economy: comparing Figure 3 with Figure 5, the risk premium increases much more in autarky, and $Q_t$ and $N_t$ fall more, given the same increase in uncertainty. Key to this finding is that movements in domestic productivity $Z_t$ have considerably smaller effects under financial integration. In autarky, lower home productivity, and the consequent drop in net worth, must be accommodated by lower $Q_t$. The usual financial accelerator dynamics operate powerfully: lower $N_t$ leads to lower $Q_t$, which feeds back into net worth. Financial integration introduces a second margin of adjustment: now $Q_t^*$ also falls (through global banks’ portfolio condition). In turn, this mitigates the required adjustment of $Q_t$ and $N_t$. The covariances between discount factors and
asset payoffs are thus much smaller (in absolute value) under financial integration, as made clear by Table 3. This also means that they increase by less (in absolute value) with integration. In this way, the size of the impulse that triggers deleveraging pressure (which ultimately rests on the magnitude of the rise in the conditional covariances between SDF and asset payoffs) is smaller under financial integration.

Overall, our findings offer a very natural explanation for the high degree of comovement between measures of U.S. uncertainty, such as the VIX, and corporate bond spreads for different countries. More formally, Figure 6 shows the empirical counterpart of the effects of an increase in U.S. uncertainty. These empirical estimates are obtained from a standard Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model including measures of credit spreads (proxying for the risk premium) in the United States, advanced foreign economics (AFEs) and emerging market economies (EMEs) as well as the VXO. Uncertainty shocks are identified by assuming that they are the only ones that move the VXO on impact, as in Basu and Bundick (2017). The figure also reproduces the results predicted by the

\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{Basu2017}}\]
model. In the data, a one-standard-deviation uncertainty shock increases the VXXO by around 15 percent, and leads to an increase in corporate bond spreads in the U.S. and in AFEs of just under 0.2 percentage points, and around 0.25 percentage points in EME corporate bond spreads. The model-implied effects are generally very close to the empirical ones. Overall, we argue that the model does pretty well in matching the observed responses in credit spreads globally to an increase in uncertainty.

5 Uncertainty Shocks and Exchange Rates

We have so far studied a single-good economy real in which the real exchange rate is accordingly fixed at unity by assumption, and trade results entirely from consumption-smoothing motivations. We next study an extension with two goods in which the exchange rate can fluctuate. Our goal is to study the effect of uncertainty on the exchange rate. We make a number of simplifications to the previous setting to make the analysis transparent. In particular, we abstract from cross-border holdings of risky securities, and from financial frictions in the foreign economy. We next describe the economy and derive the key equilibrium relationships.

5.1 Home Households

Domestic households continue to maximize (4), but now $C_t$ is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of a home-produced good, $C_{H,t}$, and a foreign-produced one, $C_{F,t}$:

$$C_t = \left( \frac{C_{H,t}}{\omega} \right)^{\omega} \left( \frac{C_{F,t}}{1 - \omega} \right)^{(1-\omega)},$$

where the parameter $\omega \in (0.5, 1]$ governs home bias in consumption preferences. We denote the terms of trade (defined as the price of the foreign good in terms of the home good) by $T_t$, and the real exchange rate (defined as the price of the foreign consumption basket in terms of the home basket) by $S_t$. We assume that both countries practice producer currency pricing. Under this assumption, it is straightforward to show that $T_t$ and $S_t$ must satisfy the following condition:

$$S_t = T_t^{2\omega-1}. \quad (38)$$

Given consumer optimality, demands for home and foreign goods satisfy

$$C_{H,t} = \omega T_t^{1-\omega} C_t, \quad (39)$$

$$C_{F,t} = (1 - \omega) T_t^{-\omega} C_t. \quad (40)$$

The home consumer’s intertemporal optimality condition is

$$1 = E_t(A_{t+1}) R_t, \quad (41)$$

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where $R_t$ is the home real interest rate and $\Lambda_t$ is the household’s SDF between $t-1$ and $t$, given by

$$\Lambda_t = \beta \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}}$$

(42)

5.2 Home Financial Intermediaries and Government Bonds

As before, home financial intermediaries hold domestic risky securities. In addition, they can also hold a (real) foreign government bond as well, denominated in the foreign currency. We continue to think of these institutions as “global banks,” as they hold international government bonds in addition to domestic private securities.

A continuing banker $i$’s budget constraint is

$$Q_t K_{it} + R_{it} D_{it-1} + S_t B^*_t \leq D_{it} + (Z_t + Q_t) K_{it-1} + S_t R_{it-1} B^*_t,$$

(43)

where $B^*_t$ is the intermediary’s holdings of the foreign government bond, and $R^*_t$ is the foreign-currency interest rate.

The intermediary’s balance sheet identity is

$$Q_t K_{it} + S_t B^*_t = D_{it} + N_{it}.$$  

(44)

As a benchmark, we assume that the intermediary can divert holdings of private assets (capital), but cannot divert its portfolio of government bond holdings: the incentive constraint (the counterpart of equation (14)) reads

$$V_{it} \geq \theta Q_t K_{it}.$$  

(45)

This assumption implies that the intermediary does not face limits to arbitrage in its financing of foreign government bonds. Given this assumption, it is straightforward to show that the following condition must hold:

$$E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( \frac{S_{t+1} R^*_t}{S_t} - R_t \right) \right] = 0.$$  

(46)

That is, there is perfect arbitrage between bonds denominated in different currencies. Note, however, that the relevant discount factor is the global banks’, $\Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \equiv \Omega_{t+1}$. Through this term, the model generates substantial deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) in response to uncertainty shocks, as we will show.

Proceeding in similar steps as before, whenever the constraint binds we must have

$$\phi_t (1 - y_t) = \frac{\Psi_t}{\theta},$$

(47)
where again $\Psi_t$ is the marginal value of net worth,

$$\phi_t = \frac{Q_t + S_t B_t^*}{N_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (48)

is total leverage, and

$$y_t = \frac{S_t B_t^*}{Q_t + S_t B_t^*}$$  \hspace{1cm} (49)

is the share of foreign government bonds in domestic banks’ portfolio. (These expressions hold for each individual bank $i$ as well as for the aggregate, denoted here by letters without $i$ subscripts.)

The value of banker wealth satisfies

$$\mu_t (1 - y_t) \phi_t + \nu_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (50)

where

$$\mu_t = E_t[\Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} (R_{kt+1} - R_t)],$$  \hspace{1cm} (51)

$$\nu_t = E_t(\Lambda_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} R_t),$$  \hspace{1cm} (52)

$$\Omega_{t+1} = (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Psi_{t+1},$$  \hspace{1cm} (53)

$$R_{k,t} = \frac{Z_t + Q_t}{Q_{t-1}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (54)

Combining (43) with (44) and aggregating across banks yields the law of motion for aggregate net worth:

$$N_t = \sigma \left\{ \left[ (R_{kt} - R_{t-1})(1 - y_{t-1}) + \left( \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} R_{t-1}^* - R_{t-1} \right) y_{t-1} \right] \phi_{t-1} + R_{t-1} \right\} N_{t-1} + (1 - \sigma) \xi Q_{t-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (55)

### 5.3 The Foreign Economy

Foreign households face a problem analogous to home households. They may also hold the foreign government bond (which we assume is in zero aggregate net supply). The corresponding optimality conditions are the following:
\begin{align}
1 &= E_t(\Lambda^*_t + R^*_t), \\
\Lambda^*_t &= \beta^* \frac{C^*_{t-\xi}}{C^*_{t-\xi-1}}, \\
C^*_{F,t} &= \bar{\omega} \Gamma_t^{(1-\omega)} C^*_t, \\
C^*_{H,t} &= (1-\omega) \Gamma_t^\omega C^*_t.
\end{align}

### 5.4 Market Clearing

The total amount consumed of the home good must be equal to its total production:

\[ Z_t = C_{H,t} + C^*_{H,t}. \tag{60} \]

(recall that we normalize the capital stock in each country to unity). A similar condition must hold for the foreign good:

\[ Z^*_t = C^*_{F,t} + C^*_{F,t} \tag{61} \]

Finally, by combining home and foreign budget constraints it is possible to derive the following balance of payments condition:

\[ C^*_{H,t} - \Gamma_t C^*_{F,t} = \Gamma_t^{\omega} (B^*_t - R^*_t - R^*_{t-1} B^*_{t-1}) \tag{62} \]

From equation (62), whenever home’s imports exceed the value of exports, the home economy accumulates net foreign assets.

Equations (38), (39)-(42), (46)-(62) determine the endogenous variables \( \Lambda_t, \Lambda^*_t, R_t, R^*_t, C_t, C^*_t, C^*_{H,t}, C^*_{F,t}, C^*_{F,t}, T_t, S_t, N_t, R_{k,t}, y_t, \phi_t, Q_t, \mu_t, \Omega_t, \nu_t, \Psi_t, \) and \( B^*_t. \)

### 5.5 Dynamic Effects of Uncertainty Shocks on Exchange Rates

We now examine the model’s implications for the effects of uncertainty on the exchange rate. We calibrate the home bias parameter, \( \omega, \) to 0.95, to reflect the relatively small trade share of the United States with emerging market economies. All remaining parameters are calibrated as in Table 2.

Figure 7 shows the effect of higher U.S. uncertainty, \( \sigma_{zt} \) in our baseline model with intermediary frictions. As a reference, the figure also shows the effects of the same shock in the setting without intermediary frictions (dashed red lines).\(^{14}\) In the absence of intermediary frictions, there are two

\(^{14}\)See Figure 12 in the Appendix for a zoomed-in version of the figure without intermediate frictions.
competing forces in determining the response of the exchange rate: on the one hand, the home risk-free rate declines by more than the foreign rate, which exerts upward pressure on $S_t$. On the other hand, the “risk adjustment” (the conditional covariance between $\Lambda_{t+1}$ and $S_{t+1}$), which is always negative, turns more negative when $\sigma_{xt}$ rises, thus exerting downward pressure on $S_t$ (see equation (46)). (To understand why the covariance is negative, consider a decline in U.S. productivity $Z_t$: lower supply of the U.S. “fruit” makes it more expensive relative to the foreign fruit, lowering $S_t$; at the same time, lower U.S. consumption increases the U.S. household’s SDF). The interest differential channel turns out to dominate, and the dollar depreciates. The size of the effect, however, is very small.

With intermediary frictions, the risk adjustment term is much more powerful: observe that
the downward move of $\text{Cov}_t(\Omega_{t+1}, S_{t+1})$ is orders of magnitude larger than without frictions. The reason this risk-adjustment term is more powerful is that when U.S. fruit ($Z_t$) is low (which lowers $S_t$), these bankers’ returns are low, and therefore their constraints are tight. Thus, in a similar way as in the one-good model the presence of intermediaries’ constraints made the covariance term in the risk premium much more elastic to movements in uncertainty, these constraints now also make the premium term in equation (46) more elastic to uncertainty. As a consequence, this risk effect dominates the interest differential channel, and the dollar now appreciates substantially vis-a-vis the foreign currency following the increase in uncertainty. Further, the magnitude of the appreciation is substantial. Accompanying the stronger dollar is a persistent outflow from foreign bonds ($\Delta R_t^* < 0$)—in contrast to the frictionless case, which featured a small inflow.

Figure 8 displays the effects of higher uncertainty on the UIP premium in our baseline model with intermediary frictions (solid blue line) and in a model without intermediary frictions (dashed red line). Note that the UIP premium is defined as the expected excess returns for holding emerging economy local bonds adjusted for the expected exchange rate depreciation of foreign currencies, $r_t^* + E_t(\Delta s_{t+1})$, over the (net) safe rate on U.S. bonds, $r_t$ (lowercase denotes the log of uppercase letters). Consistent with the findings on the risk adjustment term $-\text{Cov}_t(\Omega_{t+1}, S_{t+1})$ we just described, when uncertainty rises global investors require significantly larger excess returns for holding EM bonds in our baseline model, compared with the without intermediary frictions.

The UIP premium and the conditional covariance between SDF and future exchange rate can be shown to satisfy the following equation:

$$E_t\left(\frac{S_{t+1}R_t^*}{R_t}\right) = \frac{-\text{Cov}_t(\Omega_{t+1}, \frac{S_{t+1}R_t^*}{R_t})}{E_t(\Omega_{t+1})} + 1.$$

Thus, the UIP premium on foreign currencies (the left-hand side) is increasing in $-\text{Cov}_t(\Omega_{t+1}, S_{t+1})$. 

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consistent with the empirical evidence (see, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan and Varela (2021)).

These findings appear consistent with the often-discussed notion of the dollar as a “safe haven” currency which appreciates, especially against emerging market currencies, in times of higher uncertainty. More specifically, they may rationalize the observed positive correlation between the VIX and the dollar exchange rate against EMs.

Figure 9 shows the effects of uncertainty shock on exchange rate, both implied by an empirical
VAR model (solid black lines) and the model (blue lines). As before, the model does a reasonably good job in matching the observed responses of exchange rate to an increase in uncertainty: the dollar appreciates in both the model and the data in response to higher uncertainty. We also compare the model’s implications for the UIP premium with those found in the data, using the empirical measures of the UIP premium constructed by Kalemli-Ozcan and Varela (2021). We compute a single foreign UIP premium time series by taking the average of all countries in the sample, and then estimate a VAR with the UIP premium and the VXO. As shown in Figure 10, the UIP premium in the data rises significantly following an uncertainty shock. The model-implied response aligns quite well with the data for this case as well.

6 Conclusion

We presented an open economy macro model with financial intermediaries that are balance-sheet-constrained and subject to time-varying uncertainty in the prospective returns on their capital holdings. We show that in a financially integrated world, an increase in U.S. uncertainty leads to global deleveraging pressure, a decrease in global asset prices, and a rise in global risk premia, with magnitudes consistent with those obtained from an identified VAR. The model also implies an appreciation of the dollar and a rise in uncovered interest parity premia on foreign currencies in the wake of higher U.S. uncertainty, also consistent with the data. Possible next steps include using the model to shed light on the differential behavior between advanced and emerging economies observed in the data.
References


A Complete Set of Equilibrium Conditions

Home:

\[ 1 = E_t(\Lambda_{t+1})R_t \]  
\[ \Lambda_t = \beta \frac{C_{t-1}^e}{C_{t-1}^g} \]  
\[ N_t = \sigma \left\{ [(R_{kt} - R_{t-1})(1 - x_{t-1}) + (R^*_{kt} - R^*_{t-1})x_{t-1}]\phi_{t-1} + R_{t-1} \right\} N_{t-1} + (1 - \sigma)\xi_{Q_t} \]  
\[ R_{kt} = \frac{Z_t + Q_t}{Q_{t-1}} \]  
\[ \mu_t = E_t[\Lambda_{t+1}\Omega_{t+1}(R_{kt+1} - R_t)] \]  
\[ \mu_{xt} = E_t[\Lambda_{t+1}\Omega_{t+1}(R^*_{kt+1} - R_t)] \]  
\[ \nu_t = E_t(\Lambda_{t+1}\Omega_{t+1})R_t \]  
\[ \Omega_{t+1} = (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Psi_{t+1} \]  
\[ \mu_{xt} = \mu_t \]  
\[ \phi_t = \frac{\Psi_t}{\theta} \]  
\[ \Psi_t = [\mu_t(1 - x_t) + \mu_{xt}x_t]\phi_t + \nu_t \]  
\[ \phi_t = \frac{Q_t + Q_t^*K_{Ft}}{N_t} \]  
\[ x_t = \frac{Q_t^*K_{Ft}}{Q_t + Q_t^*K_{Ft}} \]  
\[ C_t + Q_t^*\Delta K_{Ft} + B_t^* - R_{t-1}^*B_{t-1}^* = Z_t + Z_t^*K_{Ft-1} \]

Foreign:

\[ 1 = E_t(\Lambda^*_{t+1})R^*_t \]  
\[ \Lambda^*_t = \beta^* \frac{C^*_{t-1}^e}{C^*_{t-1}^g} \]  
\[ N^*_t = \sigma[(R^*_t - R^*_{t-1})\phi^*_{t-1} + R^*_{t-1}]N^*_{t-1} + (1 - \sigma)\xi^*_{Q_t} \]  
\[ R^*_{kt} = \frac{Z^*_t + Q_t^*}{Q^*_{t-1}} \]  
\[ \mu^*_t = E_t[\Lambda^*_{t+1}\Omega^*_{t+1}(R^*_{kt+1} - R^*_t)] \]  
\[ \nu^*_t = E_t(\Lambda^*_{t+1}\Omega^*_{t+1})R^*_t \]
\[ \Omega_{t+1}^* = (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Psi_{t+1}^* \]  
(84)
\[ \phi_t^* = \frac{\Psi_{t}^*}{\theta^*} \]  
(85)
\[ \Psi_{t}^* = \mu_t^* \phi_t^* + \nu_t^* \]  
(86)
\[ \phi_t^* = \frac{Q_t^* K_t^*}{N_t^*} \]  
(87)
\[ C_t^* + Q_t^* \Delta K_{Ft}^* = Z_t^* K_{Ft-1}^* + B_t^* - R_{t-1}^* B_{t-1}^* \]  
(88)

Market clearing for claims on foreign capital and risk-free rate equalization:

\[ K_{Ft} + K_{Ft}^* = 1 \]  
(89)
\[ R_t = R_t^* \]  
(90)

The 27 equilibrium conditions above determine the evolution of the 26 endogenous variables \( R_t, R_t^*, B_t^*, \Lambda_t, \Lambda_t^*, C_t, C_t^*, N_t, N_t^*, R_{kt}, R_{kt}^*, Q_t, Q_t^*, \mu_t, \mu_t^*, \mu_{xt}, \nu_t, \nu_t^*, \Omega_t, \Omega_t^*, \phi_t, \phi_t^*, \Psi_t, \Psi_t^*, x_t, K_{Ft}, K_{Ft}^* \), given the process for exogenous variables \( Z_t, Z_t^*, \sigma_{zt}, \sigma_{zt}^* \).
B Additional model results
Figure 11: Effects of U.S. uncertainty shock with financial integration and no intermediary frictions
Figure 12: Exchange rate model, effects of U.S. uncertainty shock without intermediary frictions
C Data
Figure 13

VXO and 5-Yr. BBB Corporate Bond Spreads

- Green line: US Corporate Spread
- Blue dashed line: AFE Corporate Spread
- Red dotted line: EME Corporate Spread
- Black solid line: VXO Close

Corr(VXO, U.S. Corp. Spread) = 0.76
Corr(VXO, AFE Corp. Spread) = 0.72
Corr(VXO, EME Corp. Spread) = 0.8
Figure 14: VAR-predicted effects of uncertainty shock on credit spreads
Figure 15: VAR-predicted effects of uncertainty shock on dollar exchange rates