

1 Intangibles, markups, and the measurement of
2 productivity growth*

3 Nicolas Crouzet and Janice Eberly

4 This version: May 1, 2021

5 **Abstract**

6 In recent years, measured TFP growth in the US has declined. We argue that
7 two forces contributed to this decline: the mismeasurement of intangible capital, and
8 rising markups. Markups affect input shares, while intangibles omitted from measures
9 of investment affect measured capital growth, each potentially generating downward
10 bias in measured TFP growth. Most importantly, when both forces are *simultaneously*
11 present, their effects reinforce each other and amplify the downward bias in measured
12 TFP growth. Using input-output data, we estimate that this mechanism could account
13 for one-third to two-thirds of the decline in measured TFP growth.

14 **JEL Classification:** E22, D24, O47

15 **Keywords:** Productivity growth, Intangible Capital, Markups, Mismeasurement.

*Crouzet: Corresponding author; Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2211 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 60208; telephone: 847-467-5446; e-mail: n-crouzet@kellogg.northwestern.edu. Eberly: Northwestern University and NBER. This paper was prepared for the 2020 JME-SNB-SCG conference, held on October 15, 2020. We thanks Susanto Basu, Antonio Ciccone, our discussant, Ricardo Reis, our editor, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly helped improve the paper.

1 Introduction

Productivity is an enduring challenge in the U.S. economy and its measurement. Post-financial crisis, slow growth was initially put down to scarring or the aftermath of the crisis itself. But later work traces the explanation to weak productivity (Fernald et al., 2017). Moreover, they and others date weak productivity earlier than the financial crisis. That is, the weak growth in the U.S. economy following the financial crisis has its roots in a much earlier productivity slowdown. In this paper, we show how the presence of intangible capital and market power, which have also grown over this time period, leads to underestimates of productivity growth. The effect of either alone is relatively small, but together — as in Crouzet and Eberly (2020) — their effect is magnified. Empirically reasonable values of markups and unmeasured capital can account for about half of the measured productivity slowdown in the 2000s.

The US productivity slowdown has been extensively debated and researched, focusing on whether it is a measurement problem or a real phenomenon, and if it is real, what has caused productivity to decline — especially when innovation seems so prevalent. While there are many reasons for productivity to be mismeasured, especially given the methodological and data challenges, most candidate explanations cannot generate the sustained magnitudes seen in the data. For example, Byrne et al. (2016) take into account mismeasured IT capital and nonmarket consumption (among other factors). These factors have an effect on measured productivity by changing the level of output, but they cannot account for more than a tiny fraction of the magnitude of slowing productivity growth over time.

Research has instead focused on how productivity growth can be so low in the face of apparently enormous innovation in digital technologies and the internet. Prominent among this work is Robert Gordon’s research and book (Gordon, 2017) on “The Rise and Fall of American Growth,” arguing that recent innovation has not had the productivity enhancing impact of historical breakthroughs. Impact on the scale of penicillin, he argues, for example, has not occurred in the era of digital innovation.

43 Concurrent with this work on low productivity, research has expanded into explaining
44 related aspects of the puzzle, such as the low level of investment in the US economy. Low
45 capital investment is consistent with low productivity, but not consistent with observed high
46 firm valuations and profitability, which would instead suggest that the returns to capital
47 investment are high. A growing literature on the growth of market power in the U.S. economy
48 (De Loecker et al., 2020) offers one explanation, since firms have less incentive to expand
49 capacity when they have market power (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017).

50 At the same time that productivity has fallen and market power appears to have risen,
51 intangible capital has also become a larger share of firms' capital stocks while physical
52 capital investment has declined (Alexander and Eberly, 2018). Crouzet and Eberly (2019)
53 show that intangibles can explain 30 to 60 percent of the decline, when looking at firm-
54 level and industry-level data, respectively. These explanations are not mutually exclusive
55 and actually reinforce each other, as in Crouzet and Eberly (2020), and the interaction of
56 intangible capital with markups from market power can explain much the decline in observed
57 investment in the U.S.

58 This paper brings market power and intangible capital together to examine the puzzle
59 of low US productivity. Both phenomena violate the standard assumptions of productivity
60 measurement.

61 We first show, in Section 2, how market power and omitted intangible capital would
62 appear in an extension of a standard and general productivity measurement framework. We
63 allow for purchases of some capital goods to be incorrectly classified as intermediates in the
64 national accounts, instead of being treated as final spending and accordingly capitalized.
65 Omitted intangible investment is one example, but our treatment is more general.

66 In this framework, markups alone generate a downward bias in TFP growth. They imply
67 that the measured labor share is an overestimate of the true elasticity of output with respect
68 to labor. When capital is growing faster than labor, this biases downward measures of TFP
69 growth. However, this bias is not quantitatively large, even in extreme cases.

70 Omitted intangibles alone could also bias measured TFP growth: if the true stock of
71 unmeasured capital is growing more slowly than the measured stock, measured TFP growth
72 will be biased downward. In addition, omitting intangible investment makes the level of
73 GDP too low, relative to true GDP; therefore, the measured labor share is *higher* than the
74 elasticity of output to labor. This upward bias in the measured labor share can be large
75 and increases with the amount of intangible investment omitted from GDP calculations.
76 However, an upward bias in the labor share seems surprising empirically, since the measured
77 labor share has been declining since at least the late 1990s.

78 Combining markups with omitted intangibles offsets this labor share effect, while preserv-
79 ing the potential for a negative bias in productivity growth. As discussed above, markups
80 tend to make the measured labor share *lower*. Sufficiently high markups can then allow the
81 framework to be consistent with both a large and growing amount of omitted intangible
82 investment *and* a low measured labor share — potentially lower than the true elasticity of
83 output to labor, thus adding to the overall TFP bias.

84 Aside from these two sources of measurement bias — the capital growth bias, and the
85 labor share bias —, a third source of bias is that GDP growth itself might be mismeasured.
86 This is the bias emphasized by many previous studies. To the extent that omitted intangible
87 investment is growing faster than measured GDP, the true growth rate of GDP might be
88 higher than its measured counterpart, leading to underestimates of true TFP growth.

89 In Section 2, we therefore develop further results using the balanced-growth version of a
90 model to quantify the effects of the two main mechanisms that we are interested in: markups
91 and omitted intangible capital.

92 This specialized framework has two key insights. First, while in the model, the *level* of
93 output is mismeasured — it is too low —, its *growth rate* is correctly measured, because
94 omitted and measured investment, in nominal terms, grow at the same rate on the balanced
95 growth path. Thus, in our framework, mismeasurement of GDP growth is not a source of
96 bias in productivity growth by construction, whereas it is the focus of much previous work.

97 Second, and most important, the model helps clarify under what conditions mismeasure-
98 ment in the growth rate of capital may lead to underestimating TFP growth. Specifically,
99 we show that this will occur when the price of unmeasured investment grows sufficiently
100 quickly relative to the price of measured capital. This mechanism, on its own, can lead to a
101 substantial downward bias in measured TFP growth, which we characterize analytically.

102 In Section 3, we then use data on omitted intangibles, in the balanced growth framework,
103 to quantify the size of the combined biases in measured TFP growth. We use the annual
104 Input-Output tables for the 1997-2018 period to measure annual expenditures on 61 com-
105 modities or services that are treated as intermediate purchases in national accounting. We
106 then examine those for which reclassifying intermediate purchases as final expenditure on
107 capital goods would have the largest impact on GDP.

108 Several service groups stand out. Professional, Scientific and Technical services, Admin-
109 istrative and Support services, and Management services, lead to large upward adjustments
110 in measured GDP. We argue that purchases of these services could plausibly represent in-
111 vestment in what the literature has called organization capital (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005;
112 Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013): expenditures on workforce human capital, distribution
113 systems and logistics, product design, and customer and brand capital. Importantly, since
114 1997, the price of these services rose faster than the deflator for personal consumption ex-
115 penditures, consistent with the necessary condition, implied by the model, under which
116 unmeasured capital would lead to a downward bias in TFP growth.

117 Using these data and our balanced growth model, we then estimate that the combination
118 of markups and omitted intangibles can explain between one-third and two-thirds of the
119 decline in U.S. productivity from the pre-1997 to the post-1997 period. Table 1 shows that
120 productivity growth measured using the standard Solow residual, declined by 49bps, from
121 1.11% to 0.62% per year.¹ Our corrected measure of TFP growth, which adjusts for both
122 intangibles and markups, instead declines from 1.11% to 0.95%, or only about one-third as

¹Appendix A.2.1 provides more details on the construction of these figures.

123 much. Importantly, we also show that measurement bias was likely much smaller in the
124 1947-1996 period, a period which pre-dates the rise in both intangibles and in markups.²

125 Our results thus suggest that the decline in TFP growth was, at least in part, the reflection
126 of growing mismeasurement driven by structural changes in the economy — the rise in
127 markups, and the increasing importance of intangibles. Because total GDP growth, in our
128 framework, is *not* mismeasured, this result has implications for understanding sources of
129 GDP growth. For example, since our adjusted measures suggest that more of total GDP
130 growth since the 2000s was driven by TFP growth, investment-specific technical change
131 might have contributed less to GDP growth than previously thought.

132 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes theoretically the biases
133 that omitted intangibles and markups case generate in the measurement of GDP growth,
134 starting with a general growth accounting framework, and then specializing the analysis to
135 a balanced growth model. Section 3 applies this framework to the data, using measures of
136 intermediate expenditures that should potentially be reclassified as intangible investment.
137 Section 4 concludes.

138 **Related research and contribution** Our work first relates to the literature on the mea-
139 surement of productivity growth (Solow, 1957; Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967; Hall, 1968;
140 Basu and Fernald, 2001). The closest papers in this literature study the rise in intangible
141 capital. In particular, Corrado et al. (2009) also study how including omitted intangibles
142 affects measures of GDP growth, labor productivity, and TFP growth. Our work comple-
143 ments theirs by first providing a general framework for describing biases in measured TFP
144 growth, allowing in particular for markups; and, empirically, we focus on organization cap-

²Because our goal is to study the impact of misclassification of intangibles on TFP growth, we use a sample split coinciding with a breakpoint for the trend in misclassified intangible investment relative to GDP. We use the year 1997 because the ratio of unadjusted GDP to GDP adjusted for omitted intangibles stabilized around that year, after a long period of decline, as highlighted in the top panel of Figure 3. In Section 3.4 and Appendix A.2.4, we discuss how our results change if we use different breakpoints. We generally find positive but smaller effects for later breakpoints; for instance, with a breakpoint in 2000, markups and intangibles explain one-half of the observed decline in TFP growth, instead of two-thirds with the 1997 breakpoint.

145 ital ([Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005](#); [Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013](#)), whereas [Corrado et al.](#)
146 [\(2009\)](#) primarily focus on R&D capital. Heterogeneous price trends between these two types
147 of intangible capital largely explain why we reach different conclusions on the sign of the
148 bias in measured TFP growth created by intangibles. Our paper also closely relates to [Basu](#)
149 [et al. \(2003\)](#), who study how unmeasured investments in capital that is complementary to
150 information technology (IT) capital could affect TFP growth. We discuss the differences
151 with that paper in more detail in Section [2.2.2](#).

152 As mentioned in the introduction, there is a recent literature focusing on the decline in
153 measured TFP growth ([Cette et al., 2016](#); [Fernald et al., 2017](#); [Byrne et al., 2016](#)). We
154 contribute to this literature by arguing that growing mismeasurement due to intangibles and
155 markups can explain a sizable fraction of this decline. In particular, [Byrne et al. \(2016\)](#) also
156 re-estimate productivity growth for the US after 2005 including mismeasured intangibles.
157 They find a relatively small effect. Our approaches differ in three main ways. First, they do
158 not allow for markups, whereas our analysis shows that including them substantially increases
159 the impact of mismeasured capital on TFP growth. Second, their measures of intangibles
160 are drawn from [Corrado et al. \(2016\)](#), who rely on data beyond the use tables (including
161 compensation of non-production workers) to estimate intangible investment. By contrast, we
162 focus on the use tables to measure intangible investment, but also leverage the corresponding
163 price indices for services and commodities. These price indices have been rising faster than
164 those of measured capital goods, which contributes to the downward bias in TFP growth.
165 Finally, their analysis is off the balanced growth path and allows for mismeasurement of GDP
166 growth, whereas we focus on a balanced growth path where output growth (in consumption
167 units) is correctly measured.

168 As noted above, our work also relates to the literature on investment-specific technical
169 change, and in particular, to papers in this literature focusing on its impact on long-run
170 growth ([Greenwood et al. 1997](#)). As noted, our results indicate that omitting some intan-
171 gibles from measures of the capital stock can lead to overestimates of the contribution of

172 investment-specific technical change to GDP growth — and, as a result, to underestimates
173 of the contribution of TFP growth. Ongoing work by [Gourio and Rognlie \(2020\)](#) also argues
174 that existing measures may overstate the trend decline in the relative price of investment
175 goods, but they highlight issues of aggregation across existing measures of heterogeneous
176 capital goods, while we explore the possibility that investment in certain types of capital is
177 not well measured.

178 Our results also connect with the recent literature on the implications of rising rents.
179 Consistent with our findings, this literature documents a significant rise in the pure profit
180 share and in markups, especially after 2000 ([Barkai, 2020](#)). We show that rising markups
181 also have quantitatively sizable implications for measuring of TFP growth.

182 Finally, recent work has highlighted how, when intermediate input use is not symmetric
183 across industries or firms and firms have markups, aggregate TFP may also include terms
184 reflecting allocative (in)efficiencies. This is highlighted, in particular, by [Basu and Fernald](#)
185 [\(2001\)](#) and [Baqaee and Farhi \(2020\)](#). In our framework, aggregate TFP, absent markups
186 and absent the measurement issues we highlight, is equal to aggregate technology, so there
187 is no scope for allocative inefficiency. These asymmetries could augment our mechanism by
188 providing a separate way in which factor use may depress measured TFP. Relatedly, [Bils et al.](#)
189 [\(2020\)](#) study how mismeasurement in revenue and inputs can affect the allocative efficiency
190 component of TFP. Our analysis differs from theirs in several dimensions. First, their focus is
191 on the misallocation component of TFP, and how it compares across countries. In our paper,
192 we do not study the contribution of misallocation to aggregate TFP, in the sense that there
193 is no wedge between the marginal revenue product of inputs and their marginal cost. Second,
194 their focus is on differences in the *level* of *sectoral* TFP; instead, our focus is on the *growth*
195 *rate* of *aggregate* TFP. Finally, while they consider mismeasurement that is random (and
196 similar to classical measurement error), in our paper, mismeasurement is due to investment
197 expenditures being misclassified as intermediate purchases. This is important because in our
198 case, mismeasurement can be addressed by reclassifying intermediate expenditures.

2 Theory

This section studies conditions under which Solow residuals can be biased downward relative to true TFP growth. We focus on markups, omitted intangibles, or the combination of the two, as a source of such bias. Throughout the paper, we use a value added production function. Appendix A.1.2 shows that our results on the value added Solow residuals hold in a model where the underlying production function uses intermediate inputs.³

2.1 General results

We start by deriving results on measurement bias that rely on minimal assumptions.

2.1.1 The standard methodology

The Solow residual (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967; Basu and Fernald, 2001) is defined as:

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_t}{\hat{Z}_t} = \frac{d\hat{Y}_t}{\hat{Y}_t} - \hat{s}_{L,t} \frac{d\hat{L}_t}{\hat{L}_t} - (1 - \hat{s}_{L,t}) \frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} \quad (1)$$

where $d\hat{Y}_t/\hat{Y}_t$ growth rate of real output, $d\hat{L}_t/\hat{L}_t$ and $d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t$ are the growth rates of real capital and labor inputs, and $\hat{s}_{L,t} = \frac{\hat{W}_t \hat{L}_t}{\hat{N}_t}$ is the labor share of value added, with $\hat{N}_t = \hat{P}_t \hat{Y}_t$ denoting nominal value added.⁴ In words, measured TFP growth is the gap between the growth rate of real output, and a weighted sum of the growth rates of capital and labor inputs.⁵ The input weights are payments to each input relative to total value added, with the

³The Appendix also explores the link between TFP growth and the gross output Solow residual.

⁴Throughout the paper, we use the hat notation in reference to measured variables. This helps distinguish them from their unbiased values, which we denote without the hat. Additionally, we use the notation dX_t/X_t for the continuous-time growth rate $\dot{X}_t/X_t = \lim_{dt \rightarrow 0} (1/dt)(X_{t+dt} - X_t)/X_t$. In discrete-time data, we approximate it using the log-growth rates $\log(X_{t+dt}/X_t)$.

⁵Throughout, we express output in units of consumption, so that P_t represents the price of consumption goods. We follow this convention in order to be consistent with the model we study later in this section. Correspondingly, in all our empirical measures of Solow residuals, output is expressed in consumption units. We provide details on measures of output growth in consumption units, and a comparison with chained GDP growth, in Appendix A.2.1; the two measures imply similar declines in Solow residuals after 1997, as shown in Appendix Table A2. Appendix A.1.1.3 discusses the biases which using chained GDP growth would add to our basic exercise. See also Oulton (2007) for a discussion of chained GDP Solow residuals in models where the price of investment relative to consumption goods is not 1.

214 labor share $s_{L,t}$ measured directly from payments to labor, and the capital share computed
 215 as a residual. Such a measure produces an unbiased estimate of TFP growth under four
 216 assumptions:

217 A1 : Production follows $Y_t = Z_t F(K_t, L_t)$, where F is homogeneous of degree 1.

218 A2 : Labor input is given by: $L_t = \arg \min_{\tilde{L}_t} W_t \tilde{L}_t$ s.t. $Z_t F(K_t, \tilde{L}_t) \geq Y_t$.

219 A3 : The price of output is equal to its marginal cost: $P_t = MC_t$, where MC_t
 220 is the Lagrange multiplier on the output constraint $Z_t F(K_t, \tilde{L}_t) \geq Y_t$.

221 A4 : There is no measurement error in growth rates for inputs and output,
 222 $d\hat{X}_t/\hat{X}_t = dX_t/X_t$ for $X \in \{Y, K, L\}$, and there is no measurement error
 223 in levels for the labor income share: $\hat{s}_{L,t} = s_{L,t}$.

224 Under A1, growth in total factor productivity is given by:

$$\frac{dZ_t}{Z_t} = \frac{dY_t}{Y_t} - (1 - \epsilon_{L,t}) \frac{dK_t}{K_t} - \epsilon_{L,t} \frac{dL_t}{L_t}, \quad (2)$$

225 where $\epsilon_{L,t}$ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor. Under A2, $\epsilon_{L,t}$ is related to the
 226 labor *cost* share by:

$$\epsilon_{L,t} = \frac{F_L(K_t, L_t) L_t}{F(K_t, L_t)} = \frac{W_t L_t}{MC_t Y_t}. \quad (3)$$

227 Under A3, the labor *cost* share is equal to its *income* share:

$$\epsilon_{L,t} = \frac{W_t L_t}{MC_t Y_t} = \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t Y_t} = \hat{s}_{L,t}. \quad (4)$$

228 Therefore, the elasticities in Equation (2) can be derived from the labor income share.⁶
 229 Finally, under A4, all the variables involved in the right-hand side of Equation (2) are
 230 correctly measured, so that the resulting TFP growth measure is unbiased.

⁶An alternative approach is to directly measure cost shares, which are correct measures of output elasticities even with markups, but this requires proxies for the (generally unobservable) user costs of capital.

231 **2.1.2 Bias due to markups**

232 Assume that A3 is relaxed, and let: $\mu_t = \frac{P_t}{MC_t}$. We will consider the situation where the
 233 price-cost markup is larger than 1, so there may be pure profits: $\mu_t \geq 1$.⁷ In this case, the
 234 measured labor share is an underestimate of the output elasticity of labor: $\hat{s}_{L,t} \leq \mu_t \hat{s}_{L,t} = \epsilon_{L,t}$.
 235 Additionally, A1 implies that $\epsilon_{L,t} \leq 1$; $\mu_t \leq \hat{s}_{L,t}^{-1}$. We then have the following result.

236 **Result 1.** *When $\mu_t \geq 1$, the bias in measured TFP growth is given by:*

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_t}{\hat{Z}_t} - \frac{dZ_t}{Z_t} \equiv \Delta_t = -\hat{s}_{L,t}(\mu_t - 1) \left(\frac{dK_t}{K_t} - \frac{dL_t}{L_t} \right). \quad (5)$$

237 Moreover, when $dK_t/K_t > dL_t/L_t$, $\Delta_t \leq 0$, and the bias is bounded (in absolute value) by
 238 $|\Delta_t| \leq (1 - \hat{s}_{L,t}) \left(\frac{dK_t}{K_t} - \frac{dL_t}{L_t} \right)$, with the upper bound reached when $\epsilon_{L,t} = 1$, i.e. only labor
 239 is used in production.

240 With markups, the true elasticity of output to labor, $\epsilon_{L,t}$, is higher than the measured
 241 labor income share $\hat{s}_{L,t}$. As a result, the true elasticity of output to capital, $1 - \epsilon_{L,t}$, is lower
 242 than $1 - \hat{s}_{L,t}$, the (residual) capital income share. When capital grows faster than labor (the
 243 empirically relevant case, as indicated by Table 1), the latter effect dominates, and the Solow
 244 residual is biased downward.

245 Figure 1 reports time series for measured and adjusted TFP growth, and Appendix Table
 246 A1 reports estimates of the size of this bias. First, we assume that the true elasticity of output
 247 to labor is 1, so that the bias is at its upper bound. In this case, measured TFP growth is
 248 approximately $\bar{\Delta}_t = 0.80\%$ lower than true TFP growth. However, this gap is roughly the
 249 same in the pre- and post-1997 periods and cannot explain a substantial decline in estimated
 250 TFP growth. Using a more plausible Cobb-Douglas labor share, so when $\epsilon_{L,t} = \bar{\hat{s}}_{L,t} = 0.68$,
 251 the pre-1997 average of the labor income share, the bias is only $\bar{\Delta}_t = 0.09\%$ on average in
 252 that case. Moreover, the increase in $\bar{\Delta}_t$ from pre- to post-1997 is positive but small — less
 253 than 1/5th of the observed decline in measured TFP growth.

⁷Note that μ_t a value-added markup, as MC_t is the marginal cost of value added.

254 **2.1.3 Bias due to omitted intangibles**

255 Assume now that A3 holds, but A4 is relaxed: there is measurement error in input and
 256 output quantities because of omitted intangible capital. Let B_t denote nominal investment
 257 expenditures contributing to the growth of the stock of unmeasured intangible capital. In
 258 national accounts, these investment expenditures will be recorded, but treated as intermedi-
 259 ate goods purchases, as opposed to purchases of final investment goods. Therefore, measured
 260 output \hat{Y}_t and actual output Y_t will be related through:

$$\hat{N}_t = P_t \hat{Y}_t = P_t Y_t - B_t, \quad (6)$$

261 where recall that P_t is the price of consumption goods, and Y_t is assumed to be expressed in
 262 units of the consumption good, so that $P_t \hat{Y}_t$ is measured total nominal output.

263 The omission of intangibles, both as a stock and a flow, impacts measured TFP growth
 264 in three ways. First, the growth rate of output might be mis-measured; namely:

$$\frac{d\hat{Y}_t}{\hat{Y}_t} = \frac{dY_t}{Y_t} + \left(\frac{1}{b_t} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{dY_t}{Y_t} - \frac{d\tilde{B}_t}{\tilde{B}_t} \right), \quad (7)$$

265 where: $b_t \equiv \frac{P_t \hat{Y}_t}{P_t Y_t} \leq 1$ is the ratio of measured (or unadjusted) to actual (or adjusted) output,
 266 and $\tilde{B}_t = B_t/P_t$. Second, because the level of output is mismeasured, the labor share might
 267 be mismeasured. Specifically, the measured labor share of income is always an *overestimate*
 268 of the elasticity of output with respect to labor: $\hat{s}_{L,t} = \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t \hat{Y}_t} = \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t Y_t} \frac{1}{b_t} = \frac{\epsilon_{L,t}}{b_t} > \epsilon_{L,t}$.
 269 A3 holds, so the true labor income share $W_t L_t / P_t Y_t$ is equal to the elasticity of output to
 270 labor. However, because of omitted intangible investment, which biases measured output
 271 downward, the measured labor income share $W_t L_t / (P_t \hat{Y}_t)$ is higher than the true labor income
 272 share. Note that this is the opposite effect from markups. Third, the measured growth rate
 273 of capital might be incorrect: $\frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} \geq \frac{dK_t}{K_t}$. The following result summarizes these different
 274 sources of bias.

275 **Result 2.** *When intangibles are omitted ($b_t < 1$), the bias in measured TFP growth is:*

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_t &= \Delta_t^{(1)} + \Delta_t^{(2)} + \Delta_t^{(3)} \\
\Delta_t^{(1)} &\equiv \left(\frac{1}{b_t} - 1\right) \left(\frac{dY_t}{Y_t} - \frac{d\tilde{B}_t}{\tilde{B}_t}\right) && \text{(output growth bias)} \\
\Delta_t^{(2)} &\equiv \hat{s}_{L,t}(1 - b_t) \left(\frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} - \frac{dL_t}{L_t}\right) && \text{(labor share bias)} \\
\Delta_t^{(3)} &\equiv (1 - \epsilon_{L,t}) \left(\frac{dK_t}{K_t} - \frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t}\right) && \text{(capital growth bias)}.
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

276 Three points stand out. First, the sign of the bias introduced by capital growth is
277 ambiguous in general: it depends on the growth rate of the measured capital stock relative
278 to the growth rate of the true capital stock. Nevertheless, when measured (real) capital
279 input \hat{K}_t is growing faster than actual (real) capital input, the simple Solow residual will
280 tend to underestimate true output growth.

281 Second, and most important, as noted above, there is mismeasurement in the elasticity of
282 output with respect to labor, as in the case of markups; but it has the *opposite* sign as with
283 markups. Intuitively, this is because measured output is too low, so that the measured labor
284 share is too *high* relative to the elasticity of output with respect to labor, or equivalently, the
285 measured capital share is too *low* relative to the elasticity of output with respect to capital.
286 When capital is growing faster than labor, this biases measured TFP upward.

287 A third and equally important point is that, since the measured labor income share is
288 $\hat{s}_{L,t} = \epsilon_{L,t}/b_t$, if the elasticity of output with respect to labor is constant, $\epsilon_{L,t} = \epsilon_L$, but
289 there is a growing amount of omitted intangible investment, so that b_t is falling, then the
290 measured labor income share should rise. By contrast, the measured labor share of income
291 has declined since at least the late 1990s. Thus, on its own, a rising amount of omitted
292 intangible capital, even if produces downward bias in the Solow residual, would likely have
293 counterfactual implications for the measured labor share.

294 **2.1.4 Bias with both markups and intangibles**

295 The previous discussion shows that markups alone imply that the simple Solow residual
 296 underestimates true TFP growth, by making the measured labor income share *lower* than
 297 the elasticity of output with respect to labor. The magnitude of the bias in measured TFP
 298 growth, however, appears to be relatively small. On the other hand, omitted intangibles
 299 could also generate a downward bias in measured TFP growth, if their omission makes the
 300 growth rate of capital inputs too high. But omitting intangibles makes the labor income
 301 share *higher* than the elasticity of output with respect to labor, potentially offsetting some
 302 of the downward bias. Thus, alone, neither mechanism appears to be sufficient to generate
 303 a negative and large bias in measured TFP growth. Because they work through different
 304 channels, however, combining the two is potentially more powerful than either alone.

305 **Result 3.** *With omitted intangibles ($b_t < 1$) and markups ($\mu_t > 1$), the bias in measured*
 306 *TFP growth can again be decomposed as:*

$$\Delta_t = \Delta_t^{(1)} + \Delta_t^{(2)} + \Delta_t^{(3)}. \quad (9)$$

307 *The output growth bias $\Delta_t^{(1)}$ and the capital growth bias $\Delta_t^{(3)}$ have the same expression as in*
 308 *Result 2, and the labor share bias $\Delta_t^{(2)}$ is given by:*

$$\Delta_t^{(2)} = -\hat{s}_{L,t} (\mu_t b_t - 1) \left(\frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} - \frac{dL_t}{L_t} \right). \quad (10)$$

309 This result has two implications. First, the measured labor share is given by $\hat{s}_{L,t} =$
 310 $\frac{\epsilon_{L,t}}{\mu_t b_t} \geq \epsilon_{L,t}$. With both markups and intangibles, the measured labor share need not be an
 311 upper bound for the elasticity of output with respect to labor, so that rising intangibles
 312 need not lead to a rising labor share. Second, all three sources of bias described in Result 3
 313 could now potentially be negative and contribute to measured TFP growth being lower than
 314 actual TFP growth. To determine their signs, we next turn to a more specialized model.

315 2.2 Results in a balanced growth model

316 We next derive expressions for the measurement biases in the context of a balanced growth
 317 model where we allow for both markups and mismeasured capital.

318 2.2.1 Model elements

319 **Description** Here, we briefly summarize key model elements; Appendix [A.1.1](#) provides
 320 details. A representative firm chooses inputs in order to minimize total production costs.
 321 There are three inputs: labor L_t , and two types of capital: $K_{1,t}$ (which represents measured
 322 capital), and $K_{2,t}$ (which represents omitted intangibles). The production function is:

$$Y_t = Z_t (K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta)^{1-\alpha} L_t^\alpha; \quad (11)$$

323 where $1 - \alpha$ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, and η is the Cobb-Douglas share
 324 of omitted intangibles in total capital, with $\eta = 0$ corresponding to no omitted intangibles.

325 Capital and labor are rented by the firm on perfectly competitive markets from a repre-
 326 sentative household that owns them. The household's budget constraint is:

$$R_{1,t}K_{1,t} + R_{2,t}K_{2,t} + W_tL_t + \Pi_t = P_tC_t + Q_{1,t}I_{1,t} + Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}, \quad (12)$$

327 where $R_{n,t}$ is the user cost of capital of type n , W_t is the wage rate, Π_t are profits rebated
 328 by the firm to the household, C_t is consumption, P_t is the price of consumption goods,
 329 $I_{n,t}$ is investment in capital of type n , and $Q_{n,t}$ is price of capital of type n . The model
 330 is set in continuous time; labor and the prices of capital goods evolve exogenously and
 331 deterministically, according to $dL_t = g_L L_t dt$ and $dQ_{n,t} = g_{Q_n} Q_{n,t} dt$, $n = 1, 2$, and the law
 332 of motion for each capital type is given by $dK_{n,t} = (I_{n,t} - \delta_n K_{n,t}) dt$, $n = 1, 2$, where δ_n are
 333 capital-specific depreciation rates. The household's objective is $U = \int_{t \geq 0} e^{-\rho dt} \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} dt$, with
 334 $\rho > 0$ and $\sigma \geq 1$. Finally, we allow for a constant wedge between the price of consumption

335 goods, P_t , and their marginal cost of production, MC_t : $P_t = \mu MC_t$, $\mu \geq 1$. Pure profits
 336 are then $\Pi_t = (\mu - 1)MC_t Y_t$. In equilibrium, we will normalize $P_t = 1$, so that prices and
 337 quantities will be expressed relative to consumption.⁸ Thus, this setup satisfies assumptions
 338 A1 (constant returns) and A2 (cost minimization), and violates assumption A3 when $\mu > 1$,
 339 and assumption A4 when $\eta > 0$.

340 **Balanced growth path** Along the unique balanced growth path of the model, output
 341 growth dY_t/Y_t is constant, and given by:

$$g = g_L + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}gz - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}g_Q, \quad (13)$$

342 where g_Q is a weighted average of the growth rate of the prices of the two types of capital
 343 goods, $g_Q = (1 - \eta)g_{Q_1} + \eta g_{Q_2}$. Each capital stock $K_{n,t}$ grows at rate $g_{K_n} = g - g_{Q_n}$, while the
 344 growth rate of the total capital stock $K_t = K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta$ is $g_K = g - g_Q$. Additionally, the risk-
 345 free rate along the balanced growth path is given by $r = \rho + \sigma g$. A complete characterization
 346 of the balanced growth path is reported in Appendix [A.1.1](#).

347 2.2.2 An analytical characterization of the bias

348 We assume that labor L_t and payments to labor $W_t L_t$ are correctly measured, but that
 349 intangible investment — that is, investment in $K_{2,t}$ — is treated as intermediate expenditure
 350 in the expenditure-side measure of output, so that: $\hat{Y}_t = Y_t - Q_{2,t} I_{2,t}$ and $\hat{K}_t = K_{1,t}$.⁹
 351 Mirroring the discussion in Section [2.1](#), the balanced growth path has three key features
 352 that affect the measurement of TFP growth.

353 First, output *growth* is measured accurately. Recall that measured and actual output
 354 differ because investment in capital of type 2 is treated as an intermediate expenditure, and

⁸In particular, output Y_t is expressed in consumption units. Appendix [A.1.1.3](#) discusses how dY_t/Y_t relates, in the model, to chained GDP growth as defined in national accounts.

⁹Output in the income approach would also be underestimated, as measured gross operating surplus of firms would be $Y_t - Q_{2,t} I_{2,t} - W_t L_t$ instead of $Y_t - W_t L_t$.

355 not a purchase of final product: $\hat{Y}_t = Y_t - Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}$. However, along the balanced growth path,
 356 expenditures on all final products — including expenditure on intangibles, $Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}$ — grow at
 357 rate g . Therefore, there is no bias in the measured *growth rate* of output by construction.¹⁰

358 Second, there is bias in the *level* of measured output. This, in turn, affects the mea-
 359 sured labor share. Specifically, the ratio of measured to actual output is constant along the
 360 balanced growth path, and given by:

$$b_t = b = \frac{\hat{Y}_t}{Y_t} = 1 - \frac{\alpha\eta g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{\mu r + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}. \quad (14)$$

361 As a result, the measured labor share is:

$$s_L = \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t \hat{Y}_t} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{b\mu} \geq 1 - \alpha = \epsilon_L. \quad (15)$$

362 Third, the *growth rate* of capital is mis-measured, because only the stock of capital of
 363 type 1, $K_{1,t}$ is measured, and it may not grow at the same rate as omitted capital $K_{2,t}$:

$$\frac{dK_t}{K_t} - \frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} = \eta(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}); \quad (16)$$

364 that is, measured capital growth is higher than actual capital growth, if and only if, prices of
 365 omitted intangibles are growing faster than prices of measured capital.

366 **Result 4.** *The bias in measured TFP growth along the balanced growth path is constant:*

$$\Delta_t = \Delta = \Delta^{(1)} + \Delta^{(2)} + \Delta^{(3)} \quad (17)$$

¹⁰Outside of the balanced growth path, the growth rate of measured output could differ from the true growth rate of output. This assumption could be relaxed, for instance by studying transitional dynamics between steady-state. It is likely that accumulation of intangibles along the transition of the model from low- to high- η steady states (steady-states with low and high levels of the omitted capital) would further exacerbate the negative bias in measured TFP growth, as investment in omitted intangibles would be high along that transition path.

where:

$$\Delta^{(1)} = \alpha\eta \frac{g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{\mu(r - g) + (\mu - \alpha\eta)(g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})} (g - g) = 0 \quad (\text{output growth bias})$$

$$\Delta^{(2)} = \frac{-(\mu - 1)(r + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}) + \alpha\eta(g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})}{\mu(r - g) + (\mu - \alpha\eta)(g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})} (g_Z - g_{Q_1} - \alpha\eta(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1})) \quad (\text{labor share bias})$$

$$\Delta^{(3)} = -\alpha\eta(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}) \quad (\text{capital growth bias})$$

367 In balanced growth, there is no bias due to mismeasurement of output growth: $\Delta^{(1)} = 0$;
 368 so the bias is the sum of the labor share and the capital biases $\Delta = \Delta^{(2)} + \Delta^{(3)}$.

369 Two limiting cases are useful to consider. First, assume that there are no omitted in-
 370 tangibles: $\eta = 0$, but markups are positive, $\mu > 1$. Then, the capital growth bias is zero;
 371 all mismeasurement comes from the downward bias that markups create in the labor share.
 372 The value of the bias is given by $\Delta^{(2)} = -\frac{\mu-1}{\mu} (g_Z - g_Q)$, reflecting the fact that it depends
 373 on the growth rate of the capital-to-labor ratio, which is given by $(g_Z - g_Q)/(1 - \alpha)$. The
 374 bias is positive whenever capital grows faster than labor, or $g_Z > g_Q$ in the model.

375 The other limiting case is $\eta > 0$ (omitted intangibles) but $\mu = 1$ (no markups). In
 376 Appendix A.1.1.4, Result 5, we show analytically that the measurement bias will be negative,
 377 if and only if, the relative price of omitted capital is growing sufficiently fast, i.e. g_{Q_2} is
 378 sufficiently large. The reason for this is simple: a higher growth rate of intangible capital
 379 prices implies a lower growth rate of the stock of omitted intangibles, $K_{2,t}$, and therefore, a
 380 lower growth rate of the true stock of capital K_t , relative to the measured stock, $\hat{K}_t = K_{1,t}$.¹¹

381 These results relate to Basu et al. (2003), who study a model with unmeasured investment
 382 in capital that is complementary with IT capital. They show that in balanced growth, the
 383 bias in measured TFP growth must be positive. By contrast with our model, they do not
 384 allow for markups, and assume that the price of unmeasured capital and output are constant
 385 and equal to one another. This corresponds to $g_{Q_1} = g_{Q_2} = 0$ and $\mu = 1$ in our model. In

¹¹Note, however, that along the balanced growth path, expenditures on intangible capital goods $Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}$, or the value of the intangible capital stock in consumption units, $Q_{2,t}K_{2,t}$, are growing at the same rate as measured capital; so, this mechanism does not require a shrinking ratio of intangible capital (at cost) to measured capital (at cost).

386 this case, using Result 4, the measurement bias in TFP growth boils down to the labor share
 387 bias: $\Delta^{(2)} = \alpha\eta(g + \delta_2)/(r - g + (1 - \alpha\eta)(g + \delta_2))g_Z$, which is strictly positive in the balanced
 388 growth path, consistent with their result.

389 2.2.3 How large can the bias be?

390 Beyond the cases $\eta = 0$ and $\mu = 1$, it is not possible to characterize the sign of the bias
 391 analytically, so we provide a numerical illustration. First, we set $\rho = 0.04, \sigma = 1, \delta_2 = 0.20$.¹²
 392 Second, for different values of η and α , we compute productivity growth g_Z required to match
 393 the post-1997 values of output growth, labor growth, capital growth, and the measured labor
 394 share. Finally, we construct the implied markup and ratio of measured to actual GDP.¹³

395 The results are reported in Figure 2; the top panel focuses on results when the Cobb-
 396 Douglas capital share is $\alpha = 0.32$, consistent with the pre-1997 value of the measured labor
 397 share.¹⁴ The left graph on the top panel indicates that, with $\eta = 0.5$ and $g_{Q_2} = 2\%$, the
 398 balanced growth model can fit the post-1997 data on output growth, input growth, and the
 399 labor share — and thus on measured TFP growth —, without requiring a decline in true
 400 TFP growth relative to the pre-1997 period.

401 In order to do this, the model requires two additional forces. First, omitted investment
 402 in intangibles must represent approximately 11% of measured GDP. Second, the markup
 403 must be substantially above 1. Why is this? We fixed the Cobb-Douglas share of labor
 404 to $1 - \alpha = 0.68$, but the post-1997 data, the measured labor income share is, on average,
 405 lower: $\hat{s}_L = 0.64$. Imagine that there were no markups: $\mu = 1$. The model-implied measured
 406 labor share would then be given by $(1 - \alpha)/b$. If $b < 1$ (that is, with omitted intangibles),
 407 this value would be larger than 0.68, and thus larger than the measured labor share. Thus,
 408 markups are required in order to offset the upward bias of the measured labor income share.

¹²See, for instance, Li and Hall (2020) for evidence on the high depreciation rates of intangibles.

¹³The corresponding values are given by: $g_Z = \hat{g} - (1 - \alpha)\hat{g}_L - \alpha\hat{g}_K + \alpha\eta(g_{Q_2} - (\hat{g} - \hat{g}_K))$, $\mu = \frac{1-\alpha}{\hat{s}_L} + \alpha\eta\frac{\hat{g} + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{\rho + \hat{g} + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}$ and $b = 1 - \frac{\alpha\eta}{\mu}\frac{\rho + \hat{g} + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{\hat{g} + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}$.

¹⁴The middle and bottom panel report results for higher values of α ; these imply somewhat smaller values for true TFP growth, but also somewhat lower markup values.

409 **3 Empirics**

410 This section assesses, empirically, whether the combined effect of omitted intangible invest-
411 ment and markups creates a large negative bias in measured TFP growth.

412 **3.1 Methodology**

413 We use two approaches, meant to answer different questions. The first approach provides an
414 estimate of the rate of relative price growth of omitted intangibles, g_{Q_2} , necessary to explain
415 a given gap between true and measured TFP. The second approach instead uses empirical
416 proxies for g_{Q_2} to estimate this gap directly. Since the first approach only uses data on
417 expenditures on omitted intangibles, and not on prices, it can be applied more broadly.

418 **First approach: computing required relative price growth** Given measured expen-
419 ditures M on a particular type of intermediate commodity or service, we construct:

$$\hat{b} = \frac{\text{Measured GDP}}{\text{Adjusted GDP}} = \frac{PY}{PY + M}. \quad (18)$$

420 This ratio captures mismeasurement in the level of GDP if recorded intermediate expendi-
421 tures on the commodity or service were in fact (misclassified) intangible investment. Using
422 the model, we then solve for the price growth rate g_{Q_2} , such that for any \tilde{g}_Z :

- 423 (1) true TFP growth in the model, g_Z , is given by $g_Z = \tilde{g}_Z$;
- 424 (2) the ratio of measured to adjusted GDP in the model, b is given by $b = \hat{b}$;
- 425 (3) the model matches measured values of output growth \hat{g} , labor growth \hat{g}_L , capital growth
426 \hat{g}_K , and the labor share \hat{s}_L , and therefore of the Solow residual \hat{g}_Z .

427 Intuitively, this approach produces the growth rate g_{Q_2} , such that *all* of the gap between
428 true TFP growth \tilde{g}_Z and the Solow residual \hat{g}_Z is due to mismeasurement. Appendix [A.2.2](#)
429 shows that there is a unique such value for g_{Q_2} .

430 In the application below, for true TFP growth \tilde{g}_Z , we use the pre-1997 empirical average
 431 of the Solow residual, while we use post-1997 averages of other measured variables. Thus,
 432 this approach will produce the value of g_{Q_2} necessary for measurement error to entirely
 433 account for the observed decline in TFP growth from pre- to post-1997 (assuming that the
 434 Solow residual properly measures TFP growth before 1997). Finally, this approach requires
 435 calibrating certain parameters; as in the previous section, we use $\sigma = 1, \rho = 0.04$, and
 436 $\delta_2 = 0.20$. Moreover, we set $\alpha = 0.32$, the measured capital share before 1997.

437 **Second approach: adjusting Solow residuals** First, given a measure of expenditures
 438 M on a particular intermediate commodity or service, we again define \hat{b} as in Equation (18).
 439 Next, we obtain an empirical proxy for \hat{g}_{Q_2} . Finally, we use the relationships implied by
 440 the balanced growth model in order to compute the value of η , the Cobb-Douglas intangible
 441 share, μ , the markup, and g_Z , true TFP growth, that are consistent with measured values of
 442 output growth \hat{g} , labor growth \hat{g}_L , capital growth \hat{g}_K , and the labor share \hat{s}_L .¹⁵ Intuitively,
 443 this approach computes an “adjusted” Solow residual that correctly measures TFP growth in
 444 the model, while also ensuring that the model matches the empirical value of the simple Solow
 445 residual \hat{g}_Z . We can then assess whether the “adjusted” Solow residual, g_Z , fell less than the
 446 simple Solow residual \hat{g}_Z after 1997. The difference is a measure of the bias introduced by
 447 intangibles and markups in the measurement of TFP growth.¹⁶

448 3.2 Data sources

449 Our data comes from two main sources. First, we use the benchmark Input-Output accounts
 450 (Lawson et al., 2002) to measure intermediate expenditures of different types of commodities
 451 and services.¹⁷ This data covers the 1997-2018 period. We use more specifically the Com-

¹⁵These are given by $\eta = \frac{1-\hat{b}}{\hat{b}} \frac{1-\alpha}{\hat{s}_L} \frac{1}{\alpha} \frac{\hat{r}+\delta_2-\hat{g}_{Q_2}}{\hat{g}+\delta_2-\hat{g}_{Q_2}}$, $\mu = \frac{1-\alpha}{\hat{b}\hat{s}_L}$, and $g_Z = \hat{g} - (1 - \alpha)\hat{g}_L - \alpha\hat{g}_K + \alpha\eta(\hat{g}_{Q_2} - (\hat{g} - \hat{g}_K))$.

¹⁶As for the first methodology, this approach requires calibrating the values of $(\sigma, \rho, \delta_2, \alpha)$; we use the same values as reported above.

¹⁷The data are available at apps.bea.gov/industry/iTables%20Static%20Files/AllTablesSUP.zip. These data were produced following the 2018 comprehensive update of the Industry Economic accounts

452 commodity Use tables, aggregated at the Summary level, which provides detail for 61 different
453 commodities and services, after excluding non-comparable imports, used and second-hand
454 goods, and government-provided services and commodities. In each year and for each com-
455 modity or service, we collapse the amount used as intermediate input (as opposed to final
456 product) across all industries. This provides a measure of M ; we then compute the associated
457 ratio of measured to adjusted GDP, \hat{b} , as in Equation (18).¹⁸

458 Second, we obtain information on prices from the GDP-by-industry tables.¹⁹ These data
459 provide annual measures of gross output, intermediate input use, and value added, at the
460 industry level, for the period 1997-2018, along with associated price deflators. Industries
461 in this data follow an identical classification as the 61 groups of commodities and services
462 described in the Input-Output tables, so that industry price deflators can be merged to
463 the Input-Output account data on commodities and services.²⁰ For each commodity and
464 service, we then compute $\hat{g}_{Q_2} = \hat{g}_{Q_2^{nom}} - \hat{g}_{PCE}$, where \hat{g}_{PCE} is the annual change in the
465 implicit deflator for personal consumption expenditure.²¹

466 The data sources on expenditures and prices overlap on both their time and commod-
467 ity/service coverage, but they are limited to the 1997-2018 period. In Section 3.3.3 below, we
468 extend our analysis to the pre-1997 period, using the historical Input-Output accounts for
469 the 1947-1962 and 1962-1996 periods. Other data sources are described in Appendix A.2.3.

470 3.3 Results

471 This section discusses the results from our two empirical approaches.

(Howells et al., 2018).

¹⁸We adjust our basic output measure, total final product use across all commodities, by subtracting imports from the Commodity Supply tables at the same level of disaggregation; the resulting measure matches, by construction, total value added.

¹⁹The data are available at apps.bea.gov/industry/iTables%20Static%20Files/AllTables.zip.

²⁰The tables provide price indices for more a disaggregated industry classification, but we only use the data at the same level of aggregation as the Input-Output accounts.

²¹The GDP-by-industry tables also provide price deflators for gross output, which have similar signs, on average, than value added deflators, but are somewhat smaller in magnitude. From the standpoint of the model, value added deflators should be used, and so we focus on this measure for the remainder of the results.

472 3.3.1 First approach: computing required relative price growth

473 **The magnitude of GDP adjustments** Table 2 reports the time-series averages of the
474 ratios of unadjusted to adjusted GDP, \hat{b} , defined as in Equation (18). The averages reported
475 are computed when intermediate use of a single commodity or service group (among the 61
476 reported in the Use table) is reclassified as intangible investment in isolation. Among the
477 groups with the 10 largest adjustments, 3 service groups are of particular interest.

478 The largest adjustment is associated with the Professional, Scientific and Technical Ser-
479 vices (PSTS) group. Reclassifying intermediate expenditures on these services as intangible
480 investment implies that actual GDP is approximately 6% larger than measured GDP. This
481 group comprises service activities that can be purchased externally by firms, such as account-
482 ing, consulting, design, or computer services. The two other service groups of interest are
483 Administrative and Support Services, and Management of Companies and Enterprises. The
484 former group measures the use of outsourced business support services (such as personnel
485 administration and training). The latter group measures the service output of establishments
486 that administer other establishments in a company.²²

487 Our core argument is that intermediate expenditures on these types of services could in
488 fact represent purchases of investment goods by firms, which would then be misclassified in
489 national accounts. The type of capital created by these purchases is intangible, in that it
490 does not have a physical presence. Indeed, these purchases could lead to the accumulation
491 of various forms of organization capital (through consulting, advertising, design, manage-
492 ment and personnel-related services), none of which are embodied in physical assets. These
493 expenditures lead to capital accumulation to the extent that the corresponding inputs are
494 not used up in production entirely within the year of their purchase.

495 Taken together, omitting these forms of investment could have large effects on GDP. The
496 first column of Table 3 shows that reclassifying the three service groups mentioned above

²²These establishments are likely to be headquarters or core firm locations where organization and strate-
gic planning services are produced. The output of these establishments is reported in isolation in the
benchmark IO accounts.

497 leads to a cumulative adjustment in the level of GDP in the order of 11%. Accordingly,
498 investment rates adjusted for these omissions are higher than, and diverging from, measured
499 investment rates. Figure 3 reports the time series for both the ratio of unadjusted to adjusted
500 GDP, and for the implied ratio of nominal investment to GDP after adjusting for omitted
501 intangibles. For instance, adjusting for Professional Services leads to an upward revision of
502 approximately 5% in the ratio of nominal investment to nominal GDP.²³

503 For reference, Table 2 also reports the adjustment factor \hat{b} implied by reclassifying seven
504 other commodities and service groups (those remaining among the 10 groups with the largest
505 GDP adjustments). However, it is difficult to argue that these inputs represent misclassified
506 investment; Chemical Products, for instance, tend to be used up in production within the
507 year of their purchase. Hence, not all intermediates are candidates to be capitalized, in
508 particular if they are clearly used as materials inputs.

509 Finally, *own-account* investment in organization capital, for instance through worker
510 training, or branding and marketing expenses, could also contribute to the stock of orga-
511 nization capital. The distinction between externally purchased and own-account intangible
512 investment is moot in our model because we assume away internal capital adjustment costs.
513 However, in the Use tables, only externally purchased intangibles will be captured. (This
514 is with the exception of one important component of own-account spending on organization
515 capital, managerial compensation, which is isolated in the Use table as intermediate inputs
516 purchased from the Management of Companies and Enterprises sector, and will therefore
517 be captured by our baseline approach.) In Section 3.4 and Appendix A.2.4, we use firm-
518 level data on organization capital spending that includes own-account investment, and show
519 that the magnitudes we obtain for the adjustments to GDP are in the upper range of those
520 implied by the Use tables.

²³In anticipation of the analysis of Section 3.3.3, this figure reports the times series for these ratios for the entire postwar era, 1947-2018. The ratios of unadjusted to adjusted GDP reported in the top panel of Figure 3 differ somewhat from those used in this section because the industry classification of the Input-Output accounts changed in 1963 and 1997, as explained in Section 3.3.3. Appendix Figure A2 reports the time series for the same moments from 1997-2018 only, using definitions of the omitted intangibles based on the more granular classifications of the post-1997 IO tables.

521 **Results** Using these GDP adjustments, Table 3 then reports the values of relative price
522 growth of omitted capital, g_{Q_2} , that would be required to explain the *entirety* of the decline
523 in measured TFP growth from bias generated by intangibles and markups. The implied
524 relative price growth ranges from 0.6 to 2.1% p.a., with lower estimates corresponding to
525 more intermediate expenditures being reclassified as investment.

526 Two points are worth noting. First, the required relative price growth is positive; that
527 is, the price of omitted capital must be rising, relative to the price of final goods, in order
528 for the bias to be positive, as discussed in Section 2. In Section 3.3.1, we argue that, for
529 the three service groups we focus on, this is empirically plausible. Second, these adjustment
530 lead to high markups. For instance, when adjusting for the PSTS group, the implied value-
531 added markup corresponds to a pure profit share of value added in the order of 11.5%. As
532 highlighted in the previous section, in order to simultaneously accommodate a low labor
533 share \hat{s}_L and a substantial underestimation of GDP, markups must be elevated.

534 3.3.2 Second approach: adjusting Solow residuals

535 **Relative price growth in the data** Are relative price growth rates for omitted intangi-
536 bles in the order of 0.6% to 2.1% realistic? The second column of Table 2 reports average
537 price growth rates for the 10 commodities or service groups with the 10 largest GDP ad-
538 justments. For the three key service groups discussed above and highlighted in Table 2, our
539 empirical proxies for \hat{g}_{Q_2} are all positive. However, their magnitudes are not as large as the
540 values discussed in the previous section: the highest rate of relative price increase is 1.5%
541 per year, for Management Services. Thus the bias generated will not be sufficient to fully
542 explain the decline in measured TFP growth. So we next discuss *how much* of this decline
543 our mechanism can account for, given these proxies for \hat{g}_{Q_2} .

544 **Results** Figure 4 reports the implied rate of growth of TFP (as well as a red line indicat-
545 ing the average simple Solow residual \hat{g}_Z the post-1997 sample) when adjusting for the 61

546 commodity and service groups individually. Adjustments of individual service or commodi-
547 ties groups have a positive, though relatively small overall effect on measured TFP growth.
548 Among the largest adjustments is obtained for the PSTS group; alone, it adds approximately
549 0.1% to overall TFP growth, or 1/5th of the gap between pre- and post- 1997 TFP growth.²⁴

550 Table 4 reports the implied growth rates, Cobb-Douglas intangible shares, and markups,
551 when adjusting for the three key groups of services highlighted earlier in the discussion. The
552 first two lines report the unadjusted Solow residual for the pre- and post-1997 periods; as
553 highlighted in the introduction, it declines by 49bps, from 1.11% to 0.62% per year.

554 The third line reports the average growth rate of TFP obtained when adjusting only for
555 markups, but not for omitted intangibles. The adjustment for markups alone raises measured
556 TFP growth by approximately 9bps, or one-fifth of the decline. The remaining lines report
557 TFP growth in the post-1997 sample when adjusted for both markups and omitted intan-
558 gibles. Altogether, the decline is 33bps (or 67%) smaller after adjusting for both markups
559 and intangibles produced by all three key sectors highlighted above. Thus markups and
560 intangibles together can account for 2/3 of the observed decline in TFP growth.²⁵ Adjusting
561 only for professional services, or for professional services plus management, yields somewhat
562 lower effects – from one-third to one-half of the total decline in measured TFP growth.

563 3.3.3 Comparing pre- and post-1997 data

564 The previous section shows that measurement bias from markups and intangible capital can
565 explain up to two thirds of the decline in the Solow residual. It is however possible that the
566 Solow residual before 1997 also requires upward adjustments because of markups and intan-

²⁴In Figure 4, it is also worth briefly highlighting the Petroleum and Coal Products commodity group. As a widely used intermediate input, it has a low value of \hat{b} . Additionally, as indicated by Table 2, this group experienced a high rate of relative price increase over the period. As result, reclassifying intermediate expenditures on this group as purchases of capital goods would lead to a large upward adjustment to TFP growth. However, as argued before, these are typically used up in production within the year, which rules out reclassifying them as omitted capital goods.

²⁵Appendix Figure A3 reports the annual time-series underlying the averages of Table 4. These time-series show that the adjustment for omitted intangibles produces a sizable upward revision of TFP growth in two periods: the early 2000's, and the Great Recession. In particular, during the Great Recession, the difference between measured and adjusted TFP growth is almost a full percentage point.

567 gibles. More generally, since the rise in intangible capital and markups are thought to have
568 accelerated after the 1990s, comparing the pre- to post-1997 data provides a “placebo” test
569 for our hypothesis that both trends have contributed to an increase in the mismeasurement
570 of TFP growth.

571 The first empirical challenge in doing so is that the service and commodity groups used in
572 the Input-Output tables change twice before 1997. More specifically, the 1947-1962 Input-
573 Output tables have a substantially coarser definition of service and commodity groups.²⁶
574 Given this limitation, we aggregate up service and commodity groups in the 1963-1996 and
575 1997-2018 data so that they match the 43 groups of the 1947-1962 data. Table 5 then reports
576 the magnitude of these GDP adjustments, both before and after 1997.

577 The top panel of Table 5 shows that omitted intangibles would have led to adjustments
578 to the level of GDP even before 1997.²⁷ However, the adjustment is substantially larger in
579 the post-1997 period. The last two columns of the top panel of Table 5 report the change in
580 \hat{b} for each group; it is generally negative, with t -tests confirming that the drop is statistically
581 significant. The bottom panel of Table 5 repeats these computations, using aggregates of the
582 three service groups most likely to represent misclassified intangible investment and discussed
583 in the previous section. Taken together, the ratio of unadjusted to adjusted GDP for these
584 three service groups is 0.92 pre-1997, but falls to 0.87, after 1997.

585 Nevertheless, the fact that $\hat{b} < 1$ even before 1997 means that one should, in principle,
586 adjust the Solow residual also before 1997. In order to do so, as discussed in the previous
587 section, data on the growth rate of relative prices of omitted intangibles is required. However,
588 the second empirical challenge is that there are, to our knowledge, no price deflators available,

²⁶There are 43 groups in the 1947-1962 tables, instead of 60 in the 1963-1996 tables and 61 in the 1997-2018 tables. The historical Input-Output tables we use in the analysis are available at https://apps.bea.gov/industry/xls/io-annual/IOUse_Before_Redefinitions_PRO_1947-1962_Summary.xlsx and https://apps.bea.gov/industry/xls/io-annual/IOUse_Before_Redefinitions_PRO_1963-1996_Summary.xlsx, respectively. In particular, the service groups most likely to include omitted intangible investment after 1997 are not consistently defined across periods. For instance, prior to 1997, the Administrative and Support Services group is included in a larger group, which also contains Waste Management services.

²⁷The GDP adjustments in this exercise after 1997 are mechanically large than in our previous exercise, because of the coarser definitions of commodity and service groups which we are constrained to use.

589 at the required level of aggregation, for the 1947-1996 period.²⁸ We therefore assume that
590 relative price growth is the same as in the post-1997 period.

591 The adjusted Solow residuals which we obtain are reported in Table 6. With all three
592 key service sectors accounted for, the pre-1997 Solow residual is 1.21% p.a., versus 1.11%
593 in the baseline. Crucially, this upward adjustment is smaller than the upward adjustment
594 for the post-1997 sample.²⁹ Thus after adjusting for markups and intangibles in *both* the
595 pre- and post-1997 periods, the Solow residual only fell by approximately 21bps after 1997,
596 instead of an unadjusted decline of 49bps, confirming our baseline findings.

597 3.4 Robustness

598 Appendix A.2.4 reports results from four robustness checks. First, our results also hold
599 using BLS price data. Second, the magnitude of the adjustments for omitted intangibles
600 obtained from firm data (potentially including own-account intangible investment) is similar
601 to that obtained from the Input-Output tables. Third, later breakpoints weaken our results
602 somewhat, because the price of omitted intangibles grew more slowly (relative to the PCE
603 deflator) in the 2004-2007 period. However, even with a 2004 breakpoint, our mechanism
604 still explains one-third of the decline in the Solow residual. Finally, our results are robust to
605 using alternative values for the depreciation rate of omitted intangibles, δ_2 .

606 4 Conclusion

607 A recent literature has argued that the recent decline in the rate of economic growth in the
608 US is attributable to a decline in TFP growth (Cette et al., 2016; Gordon, 2017; Fernald

²⁸The historical GDP by industry tables, available at https://apps.bea.gov/industry/xls/GDPbyInd_VA_SIC.xls, do not include price deflators. The Gross Output by industry tables, available at https://apps.bea.gov/industry/xls/GDPbyInd_GO_SIC.xls, report price deflators, but only for the 1977-1997 period, and with a different industry classification (that does not adequately cover service groups) relative to the input-output accounts.

²⁹Adjusted TFP growth for the post-1997 sample is, itself, higher than in Table 3, because the estimates of \hat{b} obtained using the coarser industry classification are higher than in our baseline analysis.

609 [et al., 2017](#)). In this paper, we have studied whether this decline in measured TFP growth
610 could reflect measurement bias caused by a simultaneous rise in rents ([Barkai, 2020](#)) and a
611 rise in the importance of firms' use of intangible capital, which may not be properly measured
612 ([Corrado et al., 2009](#); [Crouzet and Eberly, 2020](#)).

613 If the price of omitted intangible capital is rising sufficiently fast, an upward bias in
614 measured capital growth (and therefore, a downward bias in measured TFP growth) can
615 occur. However, such mismeasurement would also imply that the level of measured GDP
616 is biased downward, by an amount equal to the flow of intangible investment. This, in
617 turn, would tend to generate a rising measured labor share, at odds with the data. Rising
618 markups, in tandem with rising intangibles, can offset this force and allow simultaneously for
619 a downward bias in measured TFP growth and a declining labor share. We articulated this
620 argument more precisely in balanced growth model featuring both intangibles and markups,
621 and showed, using the input-output tables, that this mechanism could plausibly account for
622 one to two-thirds of the decline in measured TFP growth.

623 Our results do not imply that the rate of growth of output is mismeasured. Rather, they
624 attribute some of this decline to rising relative prices of certain forms of intangible capital.
625 A difficult but worthwhile question is why these forms of intangible capital have become
626 relatively more expensive. Additionally, outside of the balanced growth path, omitted intan-
627 gibles may bias the measured growth rate of GDP, further exacerbating TFP growth biases.
628 Finally, our balanced growth analysis assumes Cobb-Douglas substitutability between labor
629 and capital, but deviations from this assumption may accentuate the wedge between the
630 measured labor share and the output elasticity of labor, and amplifying measurement bias.
631 We leave these questions to future research.

632 **References**

- 633 Alexander, L. and J. Eberly (2018). Investment hollowing out. *IMF Economic Review* 66(1), 5–30.
- 634 Atkeson, A. and P. J. Kehoe (2005). Modeling and measuring organization capital. *Journal of political*

635 *Economy* 113(5), 1026–1053.

636 Baqaee, D. R. and E. Farhi (2020). Productivity and misallocation in general equilibrium. *The Quarterly*
637 *Journal of Economics* 135(1), 105–163.

638 Barkai, S. (2020). Declining labor and capital shares. *The Journal of Finance*.

639 Basu, S. and J. Fernald (2001). Why is productivity procyclical? Why do we care? In *New developments in*
640 *productivity analysis*, pp. 225–302. University of Chicago Press.

641 Basu, S., J. G. Fernald, N. Oulton, and S. Srinivasan (2003). The case of the missing productivity growth.
642 *NBER macroeconomics annual* 18, 9–63.

643 Bills, M., P. Klenow, and C. Ruane (2020). Misallocation or mismeasurement? *NBER working paper*.

644 Byrne, D. M., J. G. Fernald, and M. B. Reinsdorf (2016). Does the United States have a productivity
645 slowdown or a measurement problem? *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2016(1), 109–182.

646 Cette, G., J. Fernald, and B. Mojon (2016). The pre-great recession slowdown in productivity. *European*
647 *Economic Review* 88, 3–20.

648 Corrado, C., J. Haskel, C. Jona-Lasinio, and M. Iommi (2016). Intangible investment in the EU and US
649 before and since the Great Recession and its contribution to productivity growth. Technical report, EIB
650 Working Papers.

651 Corrado, C., C. Hulten, and D. Sichel (2009). Intangible capital and US economic growth. *Review of income*
652 *and wealth* 55(3), 661–685.

653 Crouzet, N. and J. Eberly (2020). Rents and Intangibles: a Q+ Framework. Working paper, Northwestern
654 University.

655 Crouzet, N. and J. C. Eberly (2019). Understanding weak capital investment: The role of market concen-
656 tration and intangibles. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

657 De Loecker, J., J. Eeckhout, and G. Unger (2020). The rise of market power and the macroeconomic
658 implications. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 135(2), 561–644.

659 Eisfeldt, A. L. and D. Papanikolaou (2013). Organization capital and the cross-section of expected returns.
660 *The Journal of Finance* 68(4), 1365–1406.

661 Fernald, J. (2014). A quarterly, utilization-adjusted series on total factor productivity. Federal Reserve Bank
662 of San Francisco.

663 Fernald, J. G., R. E. Hall, J. H. Stock, and M. W. Watson (2017). The disappointing recovery of output
664 after 2009. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

665 Gordon, R. J. (2017). *The rise and fall of American growth: The US standard of living since the civil war*,
666 Volume 70. Princeton University Press.

667 Gourio, F. and M. Rognlie (2020). Capital heterogeneity and investment prices: how much are investment
668 prices declining?

669 Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and P. Krusell (1997). Long-run implications of investment-specific technolog-
670 ical change. *The American economic review*, 342–362.

671 Gutiérrez, G. and T. Philippon (2017). Declining Competition and Investment in the US. Technical report,
672 National Bureau of Economic Research.

673 Hall, R. E. (1968). Technical change and capital from the point of view of the dual. *The Review of Economic*
674 *Studies* 35(1), 35–46.

675 Howells, T., E. Morgan, and C. Ross (2018). Improved estimates of the industry economic accounts. In
676 *Survey of Current Business*, Volume 98. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

677 Jorgenson, D. W. and Z. Griliches (1967). The explanation of productivity change. *The review of economic*
678 *studies* 34(3), 249–283.

679 Lawson, A. M., K. S. Bersani, M. Fahim-Nader, and J. Guo (2002). Benchmark input-output accounts of
680 the United States. *Survey of Current Business* 82, 19–108.

681 Li, W. C. and B. H. Hall (2020). Depreciation of business R&D capital. *Review of Income and Wealth* 66(1),
682 161–180.

683 Oulton, N. (2007). Investment-specific technological change and growth accounting. *Journal of Monetary*
684 *Economics* 54(4), 1290–1299.

685 Solow, R. M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. *The review of Economics*
686 *and Statistics*, 312–320.

	1947-1996	1997-2018	Change
GDP growth (p.p.)	3.36	2.44	-0.92
Labor growth (p.p.)	1.52	0.98	-0.54
Capital growth (p.p.)	3.80	3.32	-0.48
Labor share of income	0.68	0.64	-0.04
TFP growth (p.p.)	1.11	0.62	-0.49
TFP growth (utilization-adjusted; p.p.)	1.13	0.66	-0.47

Table 1: Solow residuals before and after 1997. The Solow residual is constructed as $\hat{g}_Z = \hat{g} - \hat{s}_L \hat{g}_L - (1 - \hat{s}_L) \hat{g}_K$, where \hat{g} is the average growth rate of output in consumption units (defined as nominal business value added divided by the deflator for personal consumption expenditures), \hat{s}_L is the average measured labor income share, \hat{g}_L is the average growth rate of labor input, and \hat{g}_K is the average growth rate of capital input. Utilization-adjusted TFP growth is constructed as $\hat{g}_Z = \hat{g} - \hat{s}_L \hat{g}_L - (1 - \hat{s}_L) \hat{g}_K - \hat{g}_u$, where \hat{g}_u is the average growth rate of utilization. Input and utilization data are from the [Fernald \(2014\)](#) quarterly dataset; more detail on the measurement of the growth rate of output in consumption units is reported in [Appendix A.2.1](#).

	\hat{b}	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	GDP share (%)
<u>Services</u>			
Professional, scientific, and technical services	0.940	0.59	3.63
Other real estate	0.952	-1.75	0.77
Administrative and support services	0.964	0.20	0.31
Insurance carriers and related activities	0.972	-0.21	1.84
Credit intermediation and related activities	0.973	1.06	1.42
Management of companies and enterprises	0.974	1.54	0.02
<u>Commodities</u>			
Chemical products	0.962	1.31	2.67
Oil and gas extraction	0.972	2.09	-1.25
Petroleum and coal products	0.973	3.78	1.89
Food and beverage and tobacco products	0.976	1.12	5.55

Table 2: Intermediate commodities or services producing the largest GDP adjustments. The table reports the 10 commodity or service groups with the smallest value of unadjusted GDP to adjusted GDP, where the latter is computed using data from the Use tables of the benchmark Input-Output accounts. For each commodity or service, the first column is the average value of $\hat{b}_t = P_t Y_t / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $P_t Y_t$ is total GDP at producer prices, and M_t is the nominal value of intermediate input use of the commodity or service. The average is computed over the 1997-2018 period, for each commodity or service group. The second column reports average values for the relative price growth of omitted capital, computed using price deflators from the GDP-by-industry tables, as described in Section 3.2. The third column is the share of the commodity or service in total GDP. We compute the contribution of each commodity to GDP by using the final expenditure data by commodity provided in the Use tables, and subtracting imports of the commodity or service, the latter obtained from the Supply tables. Total GDP is the sum of GDP across all goods and services. The contribution of oil and gas extraction is negative because in many sample years, imports are larger than total domestic use for that commodity. The top panel reports services, while the bottom panel reports commodities. Intermediate services the purchases of which plausibly represents omitted intangible investment are highlighted in bold.

Service groups included	Average, 1997-2018			
	\hat{b}	g_{Q_2} (%)	η	μ
Professional serv.	0.94	2.08	0.25	1.13
Professional serv. + Management	0.92	1.21	0.36	1.15
Professional serv. + Management + Administrative serv.	0.89	0.60	0.50	1.19
Organization Capital (Compustat)	0.91	1.05	0.39	1.16

Table 3: Required rate of growth of relative prices, g_{Q_2} , in order to fully account for the post-1997 decline in measured TFP growth. These results are constructed using the first approach described in Section 3.1, which only uses data on intermediate expenditures on commodities or services. The first column reports the average ratio of unadjusted GDP to GDP adjusted for omitted intangible investment, \hat{b} , defined as in Equation (18). The second column reports the rate of relative price growth g_{Q_2} which would be necessary for measurement bias to account for the entirety of the decline in measured TFP growth after 1997, while the third and fourth columns report the Cobb-Douglas share of omitted intangible capital η and the implied level of markups μ . Each line reports the results when a different set of intermediate service expenditures are reclassified as intangible investment. See Section 3.1 for more details on the methodology used to construct g_{Q_2} , η and μ .

	\hat{b}	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	gz (%)	μ	η
1947-1996	0	0	1.11	1.00	0
1997-2018					
No adjustment, no markups	0	0	0.62	1.00	0
No adjustment, markups	0	0	0.71	1.06	0
Adjusted for Prof. services	0.94	0.59	0.83	1.13	0.25
Adjusted for Prof. services + Manag.	0.92	0.78	0.90	1.15	0.35
Adjusted for Prof. services + Manag. + Admin.	0.89	0.65	0.95	1.19	0.50
Adjusted for Organization capital (Compustat)	0.91	0.78	0.91	1.16	0.38

Table 4: TFP growth, after adjusting for omitted intangibles and for markups. The first line reports TFP growth estimated using a model without markups and without omitted capital on the 1947-1996 data; the simple Solow residual is, in that case, a correct measure of GDP. The second line reports the simple Solow residual in the post-1997 sample. The third line reports TFP growth adjusted for markups, and the third to sixth lines report measured TFP growth after adjusting for both markups and omitted intangibles. The adjustments are made following the second of the two approaches described in Section 3.1, which uses data on both expenditures and prices. GDP adjustments, \hat{b} , are reported in the first column, and relative price growth rates, g_{Q_2} , are reported in the third column.

	\hat{b} (average)		$\Delta\hat{b}$	t -stat
	1947-1996	1997-2018		
<u>Services</u>				
Prof., scient. & techn. services	0.955	0.921	-0.033***	-15.40
Finance and Insurance	0.957	0.929	-0.028***	-13.72
Real estate	0.973	0.952	-0.021***	-13.15
Admin. and waste services	0.984	0.959	-0.025***	-13.84
Information	0.979	0.967	-0.013***	-9.89
Management of companies	0.981	0.974	-0.007***	-17.60
<u>Commodities</u>				
Chemical products	0.966	0.962	-0.004***	-9.89
Oil and gas extraction	0.978	0.972	-0.007**	-2.78
Petroleum and coal products	0.980	0.973	-0.007***	-3.48
Food, beverage, tobacco	0.956	0.976	0.020***	6.07
All commodities and services	0.982	0.983	0.001	1.25

* : $p < 0.05$, ** : $p < 0.01$, *** : $p < 0.001$.

(a) Individual commodity and service groups

	\hat{b} (average)		$\Delta\hat{b}$	t -stat
	1947-1996	1997-2018		
Prof. services	0.955	0.921	-0.033***	-15.40
Prof. services + Manag.	0.937	0.899	-0.038***	-18.11
Prof. services + Manag. + Admin.	0.924	0.866	-0.057***	-16.23

* : $p < 0.05$, ** : $p < 0.01$, *** : $p < 0.001$.

(b) Aggregated service groups

Table 5: Change in GDP adjustment between 1947-1996 and 1997-2018, for the 10 commodity and service groups with the largest GDP adjustments after 1997. The top panel of the table reports the 10 commodity of service groups with the smallest value of unadjusted GDP to adjusted GDP for the 1997-2018 period. The data are from the Use tables of the benchmark Input-Output accounts. For each period and each commodity or service, the first column is the average value of $\hat{b}_t = P_t Y_t / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $P_t Y_t$ is nominal GDP, and M_t is the nominal value of intermediate input use of the commodity or service. Averages are computed over the 1947-1996 and 1997-2018 periods, respectively. The definition of the groups differs from Table 2 because the industry classification of the Input-Output accounts changed in 1963 and in 1997; see main text for details. The last column of the table reports the change in the adjustment ratio \hat{b} across periods, and the t-statistic for the one-sided t-test on the difference of means across the two samples. The bottom panel of the table reports similar moments, computed for the aggregated service sectors highlighted in the top panel of the table, and where purchases of intangible capital goods is most likely to be misclassified as expenditure on intermediate inputs.

	1997-2018				1947-1996				Δg_Z (%)
	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	g_Z (%)	μ	η	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	g_Z (%)	μ	η	
No adj., no markups	0	0.620	1.00	0	0	1.107	1.00	0.00	-0.487
No adj., markups	0	0.708	1.06	0	0	1.106	1.00	0.00	-0.398
Prof. serv.	0.59	0.866	1.15	0.33	0.59	1.164	1.05	0.17	-0.298
Prof. serv.+Manag.	0.78	0.942	1.18	0.44	0.78	1.202	1.07	0.25	-0.261
Prof. serv.+Manag.+Admin.	0.65	1.004	1.22	0.60	0.65	1.212	1.08	0.30	-0.208

Table 6: Change in implied moments, between 1947-1996 and 1997-2018, after adjusting for the bias induced by markups and omitted intangible investment. The columns marked “1947-1996” report adjusted moments for the 1947-1996 period, while the columns marked “1997-2018” report adjusted moments for the 1997-2018 period. The last column reports the implied change in the rate of growth of TFP. The line marked “No adjustment, no markup” uses a model with no markups and no intangibles; the line marked “No adjustment, markup” uses a model with no intangibles but positive markups; and the remaining lines adjust for both omitted intangibles and markups, using different service groups to measure omitted intangible investment.






Figure 1: Measured TFP growth, unadjusted and adjusted for markups. The solid black line is annual TFP growth, constructed as $d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t = d\hat{Y}_t/\hat{Y}_t - \hat{s}_{L,t}d\hat{L}_t/\hat{L}_t - (1 - \hat{s}_{L,t})d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t$, where $d\hat{Y}_t/\hat{Y}_t$ is output growth, $\hat{s}_{L,t}$ is the measured labor share of income, $d\hat{L}_t/\hat{L}_t$ is labor input growth, and $d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t$ is capital input growth, all obtained as annual average from the quarterly data of [Fernald \(2014\)](#). The solid red line is TFP growth adjusted for markups, assuming that $\epsilon_{L,t} = 1$: $(d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t)^{(adj)} = d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t + (1 - \hat{s}_{L,t}) (d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t - d\hat{L}_t/\hat{L}_t)$ i.e. the upper bound (in absolute value) for the bias in measured TFP growth. The dashed blue line TFP growth adjusted for markups, when the output elasticity of labor is assumed to be given by the sample average of the labor income share prior to 1995: $(d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t)^{(adj)} = d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t + (\bar{\hat{s}}_{L,t} - \hat{s}_{L,t}) (d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t - d\hat{L}_t/\hat{L}_t)$, with $\bar{\hat{s}}_{L,t} = 0.68$.

Implied moments for $\alpha = 0.32$



Implied moments for $\alpha = 0.34$



Implied moments for $\alpha = 0.36$




Figure 2: Numerical examples from the balanced growth model. The top panel corresponds to a calibration with $\alpha = 0.32$, while the middle and bottom panels correspond to $\alpha = 0.34$ and $\alpha = 0.36$, respectively. In each panel, the left graph reports the true value of productivity growth g_Z required for the balanced growth model to match measured average values of output growth \hat{g} , labor growth \hat{g}_L , measured capital growth $\hat{g}_{\hat{K}}$, and the labor share \hat{s}_L , in the post-97 sample, as a function of η , the Cobb-Douglas share of omitted intangibles. Implied TFP growth g_Z is reported for different values of the growth rate of omitted capital prices, g_{Q_2} (the different green lines). The dashed red line is the average simple Solow residual post-97, while the dashed orange line is the average simple Solow residual pre-97. The middle and right graphs of each panel report the implied markups μ and share of measured to actual capital b . In these latter two graphs, the three distinct lines, corresponding to the different levels of g_{Q_2} , are not visible because they overlap.




Figure 3: Time series for the ratio of unadjusted GDP to GDP adjusted for omitted intangibles (top panel), and for the ratio of investment to GDP without and with adjustments for omitted intangibles (bottom panel), for the 1947-2018 period. The 1997-2018 period is highlighted in grey. The top panel reports the time series for $\hat{b}_t = P_t Y_t / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $P_t Y_t$ is nominal GDP, and M_t is the nominal value of intermediate input use of a group of services, where the latter is obtained from the Use tables of the benchmark Input-Output accounts. Each line corresponds to the ratio obtained when treating a different group of services as misclassified intangible investment. The bottom panel reports the time series $\iota_t = (Q_t I_t + M_t) / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $Q_t I_t$ is measured aggregate spending on investment goods, also obtained from the Input-Output accounts. Appendix Figure A2 reports the time series for the same moments from 1997-2018 only, using definitions of the omitted intangibles based on the more granular classifications of the post-1997 input/output tables.




Figure 4: Implied moments when adjusting for individual commodity or sector groups. The moments in each panel are computed using second of the two approaches described in Section 3.1, applied to individual commodity or service groups among the 61 reported in the Input-Output tables. The top panel reports TFP growth adjusted for both intangibles and markups, the middle panel reports the implied markup, and the bottom panel reports the implied Cobb-Douglas share of omitted intangible capital in the production function. Key service sectors are highlighted in orange.

687 Supplementary Materials

688 A.1 Theory

689 This appendix provides details for the theoretical results reported in Section 2.

690 A.1.1 Main model

691 We start by describing and analyzing in more detail the balanced growth model described
692 in Section 2 and used in Section 3 for empirical analysis. This model uses a value added
693 production function.

694 A.1.1.1 Description

Firm The representative firm solves:

$$TC_t = \min_{\mathbf{K}_t, L_t} \sum_{n=1}^2 R_{n,t} K_{n,t} + W_t L_t \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Z_t (K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta)^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} \geq Y_t \quad [MC_t]$$

695 where TC_t denotes total costs of production, $\mathbf{K}_t = \{K_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$ is a vector of capital inputs,
696 with $K_{1,t}$ the measured capital input, and $K_{2,t}$ the omitted intangible input, L_t is labor
697 input, $\{R_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$ is a vector of user costs, W_t is the wage rate, Z_t is total factor productivity,
698 $1 - \alpha$ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, and η is the elasticity of the total
699 capital input $K_t = K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta$. Total factor productivity evolves exogenously, following:

$$dZ_t = g_Z Z_t dt.$$

The solution to this problem is:

$$TC_t = MC_t Y_t \tag{19}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
MC_t &= \frac{1}{Z_t} \left(\frac{W_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{R_t}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha \\
L_t &= MC_t \frac{(1-\alpha)Y_t}{W_t} \\
K_t &= MC_t \frac{\alpha Y_t}{R_t} \\
K_t &= K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta \\
R_t &= \left(\frac{R_{1,t}}{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\eta} \left(\frac{R_{2,t}}{\eta} \right)^\eta \\
K_{1,t} &= (1-\eta) \frac{R_t}{R_{1,t}} K_t \\
K_{2,t} &= \eta \frac{R_t}{R_{2,t}} K_t
\end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

The firm's revenue is $S_t = P_t Y_t$ and its profits are $\Pi_t = P_t Y_t - TC_t = (P_t - MC_t) Y_t$, where P_t is the price of consumption goods. The labor share is:

$$s_{L,t} \equiv \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t Y_t} = (1-\alpha) \frac{MC_t}{P_t}.$$

Household The representative household solves:

$$\begin{aligned}
U(\mathbf{K}_t; \mathbf{X}_t) &= \max_{\{C_{t+h}, \mathbf{I}_{t+h}\}_{h \geq 0}} \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-\rho h} \frac{C_{t+h}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} dh \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & dK_{n,t} = (I_{n,t} - \delta_n K_{n,t}) dt, \quad n = 1, 2 \\
& \sum_{n=1}^2 R_{n,t} K_{n,t} + W_t L_t + \Pi_t = \sum_{n=1}^2 Q_{n,t} I_{n,t} + C_t
\end{aligned}$$

Here, ρ is the household's discount factor, $\sigma \geq 1$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, $\{\delta_n\}_{n=1}^2$ is the rate of depreciation of capital, and the vector \mathbf{X}_t collects all variables that are either exogenous or taken as given by the household when

making consumption plans: $\mathbf{X}_t = \{W_t, L_t, \Pi_t, R_{1,t}, R_{2,t}, Q_{1,t}, Q_{2,t}\}$. In particular, the prices of investment goods, $\{Q_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$, and labor supply, L_t , all evolve exogenously, following:

$$dQ_{n,t} = g_{Q_n} Q_{n,t} dt, \quad n = 1, 2$$

$$dL_t = g_L L_t dt.$$

700 **Equilibrium** An equilibrium is a set of deterministic sequences for all endogenous vari-
 701 ables such that (1) given the exogenous processes for labor, productivity, and the prices of
 702 capital goods, the endogenous variables satisfy the solution to the firm's problem and solve
 703 the representative consumer's problem; and (2) the price of consumption goods and their
 704 marginal cost of production are related through:

$$P_t = \mu MC_t,$$

705 where $\mu > 1$ is the exogenous price-cost markup. Finally, in equilibrium, we normalize the
 706 price level to $P_t = 1$, so that all other prices are expressed relative to consumption goods.

707 A.1.1.2 Balanced growth path

708 We next derive the unique stationary, or balanced growth, equilibrium of the model. Define
 709 an aggregate price index for capital goods Q_t as:

$$Q_t = Q_{1,t}^{1-\eta} Q_{2,t}^\eta.$$

710 Next, define the trend growth factor X_t as:

$$T_{X,t} = L_t Z_t^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} Q_t^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}},$$

and define the detrended variables:

$$\begin{aligned}
c_t &\equiv \frac{C_t}{T_{X,t}} \\
w_t &\equiv \frac{W_t L_t}{T_{X,t}} \\
\pi_t &\equiv \frac{\Pi_t}{T_{X,t}} \\
i_{n,t} &\equiv \frac{Q_{n,t} I_{n,t}}{T_{X,t}}, \quad n = 1, 2 \\
k_{n,t} &\equiv \frac{Q_{n,t} K_{n,t}}{T_{X,t}}, \quad n = 1, 2 \\
R_{d,n,t} &\equiv \frac{R_{n,t}}{Q_{n,t}}, \quad n = 1, 2 \\
R_{d,t} &\equiv \frac{R_t}{Q_t} \\
y_t &\equiv \frac{Y_t}{T_{X,t}} \\
k_t &\equiv \frac{Q_t K_t}{T_t}
\end{aligned}$$

Moreover, define the trend growth rate (the growth rate of $T_{X,t}$), the capital price growth rate (the growth rate of Q_t), and the discount rate r as:

$$\begin{aligned}
g &\equiv g_L + \frac{1}{1-\alpha} g_Z - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} g_Q, \\
g_Q &\equiv (1-\eta) g_{Q_1} + \eta g_{Q_2}, \\
r &\equiv \rho + \sigma g.
\end{aligned}$$

Using these detrended variables, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation corresponding to the household's problem can be written as:

$$(r - g) u(\mathbf{k}_t, \mathbf{x}_t) = \max_{c_t, \dot{\mathbf{i}}_t} \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \sum_{n=1}^2 (i_{n,t} - (g + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}) k_{n,t}) u_{k_{n,t}}(\mathbf{k}_t, \mathbf{x}_t) \\ + \sum_j \dot{x}_{j,t} u_{x_{j,t}}(\mathbf{k}_t, \mathbf{x}_t) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{n=1}^2 R_{d,n,t} k_{n,t} + w_t + \pi_t = \sum_{n=1}^2 i_{n,t} + c_t$$

where $\mathbf{i}_t = \{i_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$, $\mathbf{k}_t = \{k_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$, $\mathbf{x}_t = \{w_t, \pi_t, R_{d,1,t}, R_{d,2,t}\}$, $u(\mathbf{k}_t, \mathbf{x}_t) = U(\mathbf{K}_t, \mathbf{X}_t)/T_{X,t}^{1-\sigma}$, and $\dot{x}_{j,t} \equiv \frac{dx_{j,t}}{dt}$. After simplifications, the two Euler equations associated with this problem can be written as:

$$\left(\sum_{n=1}^2 R_{d,n,t} k_{n,t} + w_t + \pi_t - c_t - \sum_{n=1}^2 (\delta_n + g - g_{Q_n}) k_{n,t} \right) \frac{c_{k_{n,t}}}{c_t} = \\ \frac{R_{d,n,t} - (r + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}) + \sum_j \dot{x}_{j,t} u_{x_{j,t}} k_{n,t}}{\sigma}, \quad n = 1, 2.$$

711 A balanced growth path is defined as an equilibrium where detrended variables are constant:
712 $\dot{x}_{j,t} = 0$ for all j , $\dot{k}_{n,t} = 0$, $n = 1, 2$, and so on. Detrended variables without a time index
713 indicate these constant values.

714 Since $\dot{k}_{n,t} = i_{n,t} - (g + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}) k_{n,t}$, $n = 1, 2$, on the balanced growth path,

$$i_{n,t} = i_n = (g + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}) k_n, \quad n = 1, 2.$$

715 Plugging this into the first-order condition, and using the budget constraint of the household
716 and the fact that $\dot{x}_{j,t} = 0$ for all j , we obtain that along the balanced growth path, detrended
717 user costs must satisfy:

$$R_{d,n,t} = R_{d,n} = r + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}, \quad n = 1, 2,$$

the standard Hall-Jorgenson formula. rest of the balanced growth path is then given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
 MC &= \frac{1}{\mu} \\
 R_d &= \left(\frac{R_{d,1}}{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\eta} \left(\frac{R_{d,2}}{\eta} \right)^\eta \\
 y &= k^\alpha \\
 k &= \left(\frac{\alpha}{\mu R_d} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \\
 w &= \frac{1-\alpha}{\mu} k^\alpha \\
 \pi &= \frac{\mu-1}{\mu} k^\alpha \\
 k_1 &= (1-\eta) \frac{R_d}{R_{d,1}} k \\
 k_2 &= \eta \frac{R_d}{R_{d,2}} k \\
 i_n &= (g + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}) k_n = (R_{d,n} - (r - g)) k_n, \quad n = 1, 2.
 \end{aligned}$$

718 A.1.1.3 Chained GDP growth vs. growth of output in consumption units

719 Finally, we discuss the relationship between growth of output in consumption units, $\frac{dY_t}{Y_t}$, and
 720 chained GDP growth, the usual empirical measures of real output. This discussion follows
 721 [Oulton \(2007\)](#).

722 First, note that we assume that measured nominal output is the sum of consumption
 723 expenditures, plus measured investment expenditures:

$$P_t \hat{Y}_t = P_t C_t + Q_{1,t} I_{1,t},$$

where $P_t \hat{Y}_t$ is measured nominal output (with P_t referring to the price of consumption goods,
 and \hat{Y}_t measured output in consumption units); C_t is consumption; and $Q_{1,t} I_{1,t}$ are measured

investment expenditures. In our model, measured chained GDP growth, $\frac{d\hat{Y}_t^{\text{ch}}}{\hat{Y}_t^{\text{ch}}}$, is *defined* as the share-weighted growth rate of real consumption and measured real investment:

$$\frac{d\hat{Y}_t^{\text{ch}}}{\hat{Y}_t^{\text{ch}}} \equiv (1 - s_{I_1,t}) \frac{dC_t}{C_t} + s_{I_1,t} \frac{dI_{1,t}}{I_{1,t}},$$

where the share of investment in measured nominal GDP is:

$$s_{I_1,t} \equiv \frac{Q_{1,t}I_{1,t}}{P_t\hat{Y}_t},$$

724 where variables are defined as above. By contrast, since we have:

$$\hat{Y}_t = C_t + (Q_{1,t}/P_t)I_{1,t},$$

growth of measured output in consumption units is given by:

$$\frac{d\hat{Y}_t}{\hat{Y}_t} = (1 - s_{I_1,t}) \frac{dC_t}{C_t} + s_{I_1,t} \left(\frac{dI_{1,t}}{I_{1,t}} + \frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}} - \frac{dP_t}{P_t} \right).$$

725 Therefore, chained GDP growth is not equal to the growth rate of measured output in
726 consumption units. Instead:

$$\frac{d\hat{Y}_t^{\text{ch}}}{\hat{Y}_t^{\text{ch}}} - \frac{d\hat{Y}_t}{\hat{Y}_t} = -s_{I_1,t} \left(\frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}} - \frac{dP_t}{P_t} \right).$$

727 It is straightforward to see that this bias remains nonzero even in the balanced growth path.
728 (Note that in the balanced growth path, since we normalize $P_t = 1$, the expression boils
729 down to $-s_{I_1,t} \frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}}$; however, $\frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}}$ should then be interpreted as the change of the price of
730 measured investment goods relative the price of consumption goods.)

Next, assume that, instead of measuring output growth using output in consumption units (as we do in our baseline approach), we were to measure it using chained GDP growth.

Then, denoting by $\frac{d\hat{Z}_t^{ch}}{\hat{Z}_t^{ch}}$ the Solow residual obtained using chained GDP growth, since our other measures of input growth and input shares are unchanged, we have:

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_t^{ch}}{\hat{Z}_t^{ch}} = \frac{d\hat{Z}_t}{\hat{Z}_t} - s_{I_1,t} \left(\frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}} - \frac{dP_t}{P_t} \right).$$

731 Note that, consistent with $\frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}} < \frac{dP_t}{P_t}$, Table A2 shows that the Solow residual obtained using
 732 chained GDP growth is higher than the one obtained using growth of output in consumption
 733 units.

The rest of the derivations regarding the bias between the true rate of growth of neutral technology, $\frac{dZ_t}{Z_t}$, and the Solow residual $\frac{d\hat{Z}_t}{\hat{Z}_t}$, is unchanged. Therefore, we can express the bias between the chained GDP Solow residual, and the true growth rate of neutral technology, as:

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_t^{ch}}{\hat{Z}_t^{ch}} - \frac{dZ_t}{Z_t} = \Delta_t^{(1)} + \Delta_t^{(2)} + \Delta_t^{(3)} + \Delta_t^{(4)},$$

734 where the terms $\Delta_t^{(1)}$, $\Delta_t^{(2)}$, and $\Delta_t^{(3)}$ are defined as in the baseline model, and:

$$\Delta_t^{(4)} \equiv -s_{I_1,t} \left(\frac{dQ_{1,t}}{Q_{1,t}} - \frac{dP_t}{P_t} \right).$$

735 In other words, with the chained GDP Solow residual, the analysis of the baseline text is
 736 unchanged, except that there is a fourth bias term. This term reflects the fact that with
 737 investment-specific technical change of the form assumed in our baseline model, the chained
 738 GDP Solow residual does not appropriately measure the growth rate of neutral technology.
 739 In our baseline approach, rather than adding the fourth bias terms $\Delta_t^{(4)}$, we instead measure
 740 the Solow residual using the growth rate of output in consumption units; as the previous
 741 discussion shows, the two approaches are equivalent, up to the additional bias term, $\Delta_t^{(4)}$.

742 **A.1.1.4 Additional results and proofs**

743 We next state the following result about the case of no markups ($\mu = 1$), and provide a proof
744 below.

745 **Result 5.** *Assume that $\mu = 1$, $\sigma = 1$, and that the stock of intangibles is growing ($dK_{2,t}/K_{2,t} >$
746 0 , or $g > g_{Q_2}$). Then, along the balanced growth path, TFP growth is biased downward
747 ($\Delta < 0$), if and only if: $g_{Q_2} \geq \bar{g}_2(\eta)$, where:*

$$\bar{g}_2(\eta) = \frac{g_L + \delta_2}{\rho + \delta_2} g_Z + \frac{\rho}{\rho + g_L + \delta_2} g_{Q_1} + O(\eta). \quad (21)$$

748 *In particular, if $\delta_2 \gg \rho$, measured TFP growth is biased downward, if and only if: $g_{Q_2} > g_Z$.³⁰*

Proof. [Result 5] Along the balanced growth path, using the fact that $\sigma = 1$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta &= \alpha\eta \frac{-(r-g)(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}) + (g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})(g_Z - g_{Q_1} - (1 + \alpha\eta)(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}))}{r - g + (1 - \alpha\eta)(g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})} \\ &= \alpha\eta \frac{-\rho(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}) + (g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})(g_Z - g_{Q_1} - (1 + \alpha\eta)(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}))}{\rho + (1 - \alpha\eta)(g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2})} \quad \text{when } \sigma = 1 \end{aligned}$$

The stock of intangibles is growing if and only:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dK_{2,t}}{K_{2,t}} > 0 &\iff g - g_{Q_2} > 0 \\ &\iff g_L + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}(g_Z - g_{Q_1}) - \frac{1 - \alpha + \alpha\eta}{1 - \alpha}(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Define $x \equiv g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}$. Then:

$$\begin{aligned} g - g_{Q_2} > 0 &\iff g_L + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}(g_Z - g_{Q_1}) - \frac{1 - \alpha + \alpha\eta}{1 - \alpha}x > 0 \\ &\iff x \leq \bar{x}(\eta) \equiv \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\eta} \left[g_L + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}(g_Z - g_{Q_1}) \right] \end{aligned}$$

³⁰The proof is reported in Appendix A.1.1.4, and illustrated in Appendix Figure A1 illustrates the result.

Thus intangible capital is growing so long as $x \leq \bar{x}(\eta)$. In that case, note that the sign of the total bias only depends on the sign of its numerator. The sign of the numerator in Δ is the same as the sign of:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(x, \eta) &= (x - B(\eta))(x - C(\eta)) - A(\eta)x \\ A(\eta) &\equiv \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha\eta)}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\eta}\rho \\ B(\eta) &\equiv \frac{g_Z - g_{Q_1}}{1 + \alpha\eta} \\ C(\eta) &\equiv \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\eta} \left(g_L + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (g_Z - g_{Q_1}) + \delta_2 \right)\end{aligned}$$

The minimum of $\Delta(\cdot, \eta)$ is attained at $\hat{x}(\eta) \equiv \frac{1}{2}(A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta))$. Moreover, a sufficient condition for $\hat{x}(\eta) > \bar{x}(\eta)$ for all η is:

$$\delta_2 + \rho > \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha\eta)} (g_Z - g_{Q_1}) + g_L. \quad (1)$$

The discriminant of the polynomial $\Delta(\cdot, \eta)$ can be rewritten as:

$$D(\eta) = (A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta))^2 - 4BC(\eta) = (C(\eta) - B(\eta))^2 + A(\eta)(A(\eta) + 2(B(\eta) + C(\eta)))$$

749 A sufficient condition for $D(\eta) > 0$ for all η is:

$$g_Z - g_{Q_1} > 0. \quad (2)$$

Assume conditions that (1) and (2) hold. Then, given that $D(\cdot, \eta)$ is a convex function with global minimum $\hat{x}(\eta)$,

$$D(x, \eta) < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad g > g_{Q_2} \quad \iff \quad x_1(\eta) \leq x \leq \bar{x}(\eta),$$

750 where x_1 is the smallest root of the polynomial $\Delta(x)$:

$$x_1(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} (A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta)) \left(1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{4B(\eta)C(\eta)}{(A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta))^2}} \right)$$

751 The threshold reported in the Result is therefore given by:

$$\bar{g}_2(\eta) \equiv g_{Q_1} + x_1(\eta).$$

For the expansion, assume that $C(\eta), A(\eta) \gg B(\eta)$. Then:

$$\begin{aligned} x_1(\eta) &= \frac{1}{2} (A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta)) \left(1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{4B(\eta)C(\eta)}{(A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta))^2}} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} (A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta)) 2 \frac{B(\eta)C(\eta)}{(A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta))^2} + O(\eta) \\ &= \frac{B(\eta)C(\eta)}{A(\eta) + B(\eta) + C(\eta)} + O(\eta) \\ &= \frac{g_L + \delta_2}{\rho + g_L + \delta_2} (g_Z - g_{Q_1}) + O(\eta). \end{aligned}$$

752

□

753 Appendix Figure [A1](#) illustrates this result. In a first parameter region (highlighted in
754 blue), the price of omitted capital is growing too slowly to generate negative measurement
755 error in TFP growth, while in the second one (highlighted in green), the price of omitted
756 capital is growing sufficiently fast so as to generate negative measurement bias. The frontier
757 between the two regions — corresponding to the threshold $\bar{g}_2(\eta)$ in Result [5](#) — depends on
758 η , the Cobb-Douglas intangible share, but, as indicated by Result [5](#), its slope is small.

759 **A.1.2 Gross output model**

760 This appendix provides more details on the results relating to gross-output production func-
761 tions. The main difference is that gross output is not mismeasured, but its components are,

762 which will contribute to mismeasured productivity growth as in the value-added approach.

763 A.1.2.1 General results

764 Assume that gross output is given by $X_t = Z_{X,t}G(M_t, L_t, K_t)$, where G is homogeneous of
765 degree 1, M_t are intermediate inputs, and $Z_{X,t}$ is "gross output" total factor productivity.³¹

766 Define the "gross output" Solow residual as:

$$\frac{d\widehat{Z}_{X,t}}{\widehat{Z}_{X,t}} = \frac{d\widehat{X}_t}{\widehat{X}_t} - \widehat{s}_{X,M,t} \frac{d\widehat{M}_t}{\widehat{M}_t} - \widehat{s}_{X,L,t} \frac{d\widehat{L}_t}{\widehat{L}_t} - (1 - \widehat{s}_{X,M,t} - \widehat{s}_{X,L,t}) \frac{d\widehat{K}_t}{\widehat{K}_t}. \quad (22)$$

767 Here, $\widehat{s}_{X,M,t}$ and $\widehat{s}_{X,L,t}$ are the shares of intermediate input and labor in *gross output*:

$$\widehat{s}_{X,M,t} \equiv \frac{\widehat{P}_{M,t}\widehat{M}_t}{P_t X_t}, \quad \widehat{s}_{X,L,t} \equiv \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t X_t}, \quad (23)$$

768 and $\widehat{P}_{M,t}\widehat{M}_t$ is nominal expenditure on intermediate inputs.

769 Analogous to the value added case, we are interested in whether the gross-output Solow
770 residual is a biased measure of gross-output TFP growth when there are markups and omit-
771 ted intangibles. Markups are defined as the wedge between the price of consumption goods,
772 P_t , and the marginal cost of gross output, $\mu_{X,t} \equiv \frac{P_t}{MC_{X,t}}$.³² With omitted intangibles, gross
773 output is always correctly measured. Omitting intangibles only affects its distribution be-
774 tween purchases of intermediates and purchases of investment goods.

775 As before, denoting by B_t misclassified purchases of intangibles, we have: $\widehat{P}_{M,t}\widehat{M}_t =$
776 $P_{M,t}M_t - B_t$, where $P_{M,t}M_t$ are actual purchases of intermediate inputs. Similar to the ratio
777 b_t in the value added case, the ratio $c_t = \frac{P_{M,t}M_t}{\widehat{P}_{M,t}\widehat{M}_t} \leq 1$ captures the amount of mismeasurement
778 due to omitted intangibles; in particular, when $c_t = 1$, there is no mismeasurement.

³¹The terminology "multi-factor productivity" is sometimes used to refer to $Z_{X,t}$, but we use "gross output" TFP in order to distinguish it from the notion of productivity in our value-added approach.

³²Note that $\mu_{X,t}$ is a gross-output, or a sales, markup. Under cost minimization and constant returns, we have $\mu_t = (\mu_{X,t} - \epsilon_{X,M,t})/(1 - \epsilon_{X,M,t}) \geq \mu_{X,t}$, where $\epsilon_{X,M,t}$ is the elasticity of gross output with respect to intermediate inputs. This can also be written as $\mu_t = \mu_{X,t}(1 - c_t \widehat{s}_{X,M,t})/(1 - c_t \mu_{X,t} \widehat{s}_{X,M,t})$. Additionally, as in the case of the value-added approach, we assume that X_t is expressed in units of consumption goods.

779 **Result 6.** Assume that labor and intermediate inputs are chosen to minimize total variable
780 cost $P_{M,t}M_t + W_tL_t$. Then, the bias in the gross-output Solow residual, relative to gross-output
781 TFP growth, can be written as:

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_{X,t}}{\hat{Z}_{X,t}} - \frac{dZ_{X,t}}{Z_{X,t}} \equiv \Delta_{X,t} = \Delta_{X,t}^{(1)} + \Delta_{X,t}^{(2,L)} + \Delta_{X,t}^{(2,M)} + \Delta_{X,t}^{(3)}. \quad (24)$$

782 The components of the bias in the gross-output Solow residual, relative to gross-output TFP
783 growth, are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{X,t}^{(1)} &= \hat{s}_{X,M,t} \left(\frac{dM_t}{M_t} - \frac{d\hat{M}_t}{\hat{M}_t} \right) && \text{(intermediate growth bias)} \\ \Delta_{X,t}^{(2,L)} &= -\hat{s}_{X,L,t} (\mu_{X,t} - 1) \left(\frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} - \frac{dL_t}{L_t} \right) && \text{(labor share bias)} \\ \Delta_{X,t}^{(2,M)} &= -\hat{s}_{X,M,t} (\mu_{X,t}c_t - 1) \left(\frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} - \frac{dM_t}{M_t} \right) && \text{(intermediate share bias)} \\ \Delta_{X,t}^{(3)} &= (1 - (\epsilon_{X,L,t} + \epsilon_{X,M,t})) \left(\frac{dK_t}{K_t} - \frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} \right) && \text{(capital growth bias)} \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

784 and $\epsilon_{X,L,t}$ and $\epsilon_{X,M,t}$ are the elasticities of gross output with respect to labor and intermediate
785 input, respectively.

786 The similarities and differences with respect to the value added case are the following.

787 First, there is no mis-measurement in gross output growth (whereas, in the value-added
788 approach, output growth is potentially mismeasured). The term $\Delta_{X,t}^{(1)}$ instead reflects mis-
789 measurement in the growth rate of intermediate inputs.

790 Second, the labor share of gross output $\hat{s}_{X,L,t}$ is not affected by the omission of intangibles,
791 because gross output and the wage bill are correctly measured (whereas, in the value-added
792 approach, the omission of intangibles can affect the measurement of the labor share). Thus,
793 the labor share bias $\Delta_{X,t}^{(2,L)}$ only reflects markups.

794 Third, the intermediate share of gross output $\hat{s}_{X,M,t}$ is affected by the omission of intan-

795 gibles. This creates an "intermediate share" bias, $\Delta_{X,t}^{(2,M)}$, the expression of which is closely
 796 analogous to the "labor share bias" in Result 3.

797 Finally, the mismeasurement of capital growth rates also creates a bias, $\Delta_{X,t}^{(3)}$, with the
 798 same intuition as in the value added case.

799 A.1.2.2 Model

800 Next, we describe a version of our model in which firms use a gross output production
 801 function. We then derive results on measurement bias in this model along the balanced
 802 growth path.

Firm The representative firm solves:

$$TC_{X,t} = \min_{\mathbf{K}_t, L_t} \sum_{n=1}^2 R_{n,t} K_{n,t} + W_t L_t + P_{M,t} M_t \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Z_{X,t} \left((K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta)^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\beta} M_t^\beta \geq X_t$$

803 where $TC_{X,t}$ denotes total costs of production, $\mathbf{K}_t = \{K_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$ is a vector of capital inputs,
 804 with $K_{1,t}$ the measured capital input, and $K_{2,t}$ the omitted intangible input, L_t is labor
 805 input, $\{R_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^2$ is a vector of user costs, W_t is the wage rate, M_t are intermediate inputs,
 806 $Z_{X,t}$ is total factor productivity (over all factors), β is the elasticity of output with respect
 807 to intermediate inputs, $(1-\alpha)(1-\beta)$ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, η is
 808 the elasticity of the total capital input $K_t = K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta$ with respect to intangibles. Total
 809 factor productivity (over all factors, including gross output) evolves exogenously, following:

$$dZ_{X,t} = g_{Z_X} Z_{X,t} dt.$$

The price of intermediate goods also evolves exogenously, following:

$$dP_{M,t} = g_M P_{M,t} dt.$$

Define $MC_{X,t}$, the marginal cost of capital, labor, and intermediates, to be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. The solution to this problem is:

$$TC_t = MC_{X,t}Y_t \quad (26)$$

$$MC_{X,t} = \frac{1}{Z_{X,t}} \left(\frac{P_{M,t}}{\beta} \right)^\beta \left(\frac{W_t}{(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)} \right)^{(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)} \left(\frac{R_t}{(1-\beta)\alpha} \right)^{(1-\beta)\alpha}$$

$$M_t = MC_{X,t} \frac{\beta X_t}{P_{M,t}}$$

$$L_t = MC_{X,t} \frac{(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)X_t}{W_t}$$

$$K_t = MC_{X,t} \frac{(1-\beta)\alpha X_t}{R_t}$$

$$K_t = K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta$$

$$R_t = \left(\frac{R_{1,t}}{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\eta} \left(\frac{R_{2,t}}{\eta} \right)^\eta$$

$$K_{1,t} = (1-\eta) \frac{R_t}{R_{1,t}} K_t$$

$$K_{2,t} = \eta \frac{R_t}{R_{2,t}} K_t \quad (27)$$

810 The firm's revenue is $S_t = P_t X_t$ and its profits are $\Pi_t = P_t X_t - TC_{X,t} = (P_t - MC_{X,t})X_t$,

811 where P_t is the price of consumption goods.

812 **Household** The representative household solves the same problem as in the model with a

813 value added production function, so we do not re-state it here.

814 **Equilibrium** An equilibrium is a set of deterministic sequences for all endogenous variables

815 such that (1) given the exogenous processes for labor, productivity, the price of intermediate

816 goods, and the prices of capital goods, the endogenous variables satisfy the solution to

817 the firm's problem and solve the representative consumer's problem; and (2) the price of
 818 consumption goods and their marginal cost of production are related through:

$$P_t = \mu_X MC_{X,t},$$

819 where $\mu_X > 1$ is the exogenous price-cost markup of price over the marginal cost of labor,
 820 capital, and intermediate inputs — the gross output markup, for short. Finally, in equilib-
 821 rium, we normalize the price level to $P_t = 1$, so that all other prices are expressed relative
 822 to consumption goods.

823 A.1.2.3 Equivalence with the value added model

824 **Aggregate accounting** Intermediate output was introduced above assuming a "round-
 825 about" production function, where the representative firm both produces consumption goods,
 826 and uses consumption goods as intermediate input (converting them to intermediate output
 827 at rate $P_t/P_{M,t}$) within the same period, while still behaving as though it were purchasing
 828 consumption goods from a perfectly competitive market.

Using the normalization $P_t = 1$, gross output is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= Z_{X,t} \left((K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta)^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\beta} M_t^\beta \\ &= W_t L_t + R_{1,t} K_{1,t} + R_{2,t} K_{2,t} + P_{M,t} M_t + \Pi_t \\ &= C_t + Q_{1,t} I_{1,t} + Q_{2,t} I_{2,t} + P_{M,t} M_t \end{aligned}$$

The first relationship uses the definition of the production function (the output approach), the second uses the definition firm profits (the income approach), and the third relationship uses the budget constraint of the household (the expenditure approach). Value added is

defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_t &\equiv X_t - P_{M,t}M_t \\
&= W_tL_t + R_{1,t}K_{1,t} + R_{2,t}K_{2,t} \\
&= C_t + Q_{1,t}I_{1,t} + Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}.
\end{aligned}$$

829 The second line is the income approach definition of GDP, and the third line is the expen-
830 diture approach to GDP.

831 **Value added representation** The following result describes the equivalence between the
832 value added and gross output models.

833 **Result 7.** *Define:*

$$\begin{aligned}
Z_t &= \frac{\mu_X - \beta}{1 - \beta} \left(\frac{Z_{X,t}}{\mu_X} \left(\frac{P_{M,t}}{\beta} \right)^{-\beta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \\
\mu &= \frac{\mu_X - \beta}{1 - \beta}
\end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

834 *Then, all quantities and prices in the gross output model are the same as in a value added*
835 *model where total factor productivity Z_t and markups μ are given by Equation (28).³³*

836 This equivalence result says that one can think of the value-added model as being derived
837 from an underlying gross output model. The expressions in (28) then highlights two points.
838 First, the link between the (value-added) markup μ in the value added model and the (gross
839 output) markup μ_X in the gross output model depends on the intermediate share β . Second,
840 value-added TFP growth g_Z in the value-added model is related to gross-output TFP growth
841 g_{Z_X} through: $g_Z = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} (g_{\hat{Z}} - \beta g_{P_M})$. Value-added TFP in the value-added model should
842 therefore be thought of as reflecting a combination of technical change and change in the
843 price of intermediate products. This equivalence result implies that all the result results
844 regarding how the simple value-added Solow residual $d\hat{Z}/\hat{Z}_t$ potentially mis-measures value-
845 added TFP, g_Z , follow through in the gross output model.

³³This is with the exception of intermediate inputs M_t , gross output marginal cost $MC_{X,t}$, and gross output X_t , which are undefined in the value-added model.

Proof. [Result 7] Since the household's problem is the same in both models, we only need to show (1) that the first-order conditions of the firm's problem are the same as in the value-added model, under the definitions of value-added TFP Z_t and markups μ given above; and (2) that Y_t and MC_t defined as:

$$Y_t = Z_t L_t^{1-\alpha} (K_{1,t}^{1-\eta} K_{2,t}^\eta)^\alpha, \quad (29)$$

$$MC_t = \frac{1}{Z_t} \left(\frac{W_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{R_t}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha. \quad (30)$$

indeed measure value added and its marginal cost in the gross output model.

Combining the first-order conditions for capital and labor from the firm's problem in the gross output model, (26), we obtain (for any Z_t):

$$Z_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} = \frac{MC_{X,t}}{MC_t} (1-\beta) X_t, \quad (31)$$

where we defined MC_t as in Equation (30). Plugging this back into the first-order conditions for capital and labor, this implies that they are the same as in the value added model:

$$W_t = \frac{(1-\alpha) MC_t Y_t}{L_t}$$

$$R_t = \frac{\alpha MC_t Y_t}{L_t}$$

where Y_t is defined as in equation (29). Note, additionally, that equation (31) implies:

$$MC_t Y_t = (1-\beta) MC_{X,t} X_t. \quad (32)$$

In the equilibrium of the gross output model, $MC_{X,t} = \mu_X^{-1}$. Therefore:

$$\left(\frac{L_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{K_t}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha = \left(\frac{Z_{X,t}}{\mu_X} \left(\frac{P_{M,t}}{\beta} \right)^{-\beta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}.$$

Therefore, using the definitions of Z_t and μ

$$\begin{aligned} MC_t &= \frac{1}{Z_t} \left(\frac{L_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{K_t}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha \\ &= \frac{1-\beta}{\mu_X - \beta} = \frac{1}{\mu}. \end{aligned}$$

This proves that $1 = P_t = \mu MC_t$, as in the value-added model. Additionally, it implies that:

$$\frac{MC_{X,t}}{MC_t} = \frac{\mu_X - \beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{1}{\mu_X}.$$

Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} X_t - P_{M,t}M_t &= \left(1 - \frac{\beta}{\mu_X} \right) X_t \\ &= \frac{\mu_X - \beta}{\mu_X} \frac{MC_t}{MC_{X,t}} (1 - \beta) Y_t \\ &= \frac{\mu_X - \beta}{\mu_X} \frac{\mu_X (1 - \beta)}{\mu_X - \beta} (1 - \beta) Y_t \\ &= Y_t, \end{aligned}$$

where to go from the first to the second line, we used equation (32). So Y_t indeed measures value added. Moreover:

$$MC_t Y_t = MC_{X,t} X_t - \beta MC_{X,t} X_t = TC_{X,t} - P_{M,t} M_t = TC_t$$

850 where TC_t is the total cost of production of output minus intermediate costs. So MC_t
 851 measures the marginal cost of value added. □

852 **A.1.2.4 Balanced growth**

853 For completeness, we next report the balanced growth expressions for the solution of the
 854 gross output model. The steps are the same as for the value added model, so we do not
 855 detail them. Define the aggregate price index for capital goods Q_t as:

$$Q_t = Q_{1,t}^{1-\eta} Q_{2,t}^\eta.$$

856 Next, define the trend growth factor $T_{X,t}$ as:

$$T_{X,t} = L_t Z_{X,t}^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)}} Q_t^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} P_{M,t}^{-\frac{\beta}{(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)}},$$

and define the detrended variables:

$$c_t \equiv \frac{C_t}{T_{X,t}} \quad (33)$$

$$w_t \equiv \frac{W_t L_t}{T_{X,t}} \quad (34)$$

$$m_t \equiv \frac{P_{M,t} M_t}{T_{X,t}} \quad (35)$$

$$\pi_t \equiv \frac{\Pi_t}{T_{X,t}} \quad (36)$$

$$i_{n,t} \equiv \frac{Q_{n,t} I_{n,t}}{T_{X,t}}, \quad n = 1, 2 \quad (37)$$

$$k_{n,t} \equiv \frac{Q_{n,t} K_{n,t}}{T_{X,t}}, \quad n = 1, 2 \quad (38)$$

$$R_{d,n,t} \equiv \frac{R_{n,t}}{Q_{n,t}}, \quad n = 1, 2 \quad (39)$$

$$R_{d,t} \equiv \frac{R_t}{Q_t} \quad (40)$$

$$x_t \equiv \frac{X_t}{T_{X,t}} \quad (41)$$

$$k_t \equiv \frac{Q_t K_t}{T_{X,t}} \quad (42)$$

Moreover, define the trend growth rate (the growth rate of $T_{X,t}$), the capital price growth rate (the growth rate of Q_t), and the discount rate r as:

$$g \equiv g_L + \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \left(g_{Z_X} - \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} g_{P_M} \right) - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} g_Q,$$

$$g_Q \equiv (1-\eta)g_{Q_1} + \eta g_{Q_2},$$

$$r \equiv \rho + \sigma g.$$

857 Note that $g_Z = g_{Z_X} - \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} g_{P_M}$, where Z_t is defined in Equation (28). Detrended user costs
858 must satisfy:

$$R_{d,n,t} = R_{d,n} = r + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}, \quad n = 1, 2,$$

the standard Hall-Jorgenson formula. The balanced growth path is then given by:

$$MC = \frac{1}{\mu_X}$$

$$R_d = \left(\frac{R_{d,1}}{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\eta} \left(\frac{R_{d,2}}{\eta} \right)^\eta$$

$$x = \left(\frac{\beta}{\mu_X} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)}} \left(\frac{(1-\beta)\alpha}{\mu_X R_d} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$k = \frac{(1-\beta)\alpha}{\mu_X R_d} x$$

$$m = \frac{\beta}{\mu_X} x$$

$$w = \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta)}{\mu_X} x$$

$$\pi = \frac{\mu_X - 1}{\mu_X} x$$

$$k_1 = (1 - \eta) \frac{R_d}{R_{d,1}} k$$

$$k_2 = \eta \frac{R_d}{R_{d,2}} k$$

$$i_n = (g + \delta_n - g_{Q_n}) k_n = (R_{d,n} - (r - g)) k_n, \quad n = 1, 2.$$

859 A.1.2.5 TFP measurement on the balanced growth path

Assumptions We make the same assumptions about (mis)measurement in aggregate accounts as we do in the analysis of Section 2. First, gross output X_t is correctly measured. Second, measured value added excludes $Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}$. We have:

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{Y}_t &= Y_t - Q_{2,t}I_{2,t} \\ &= X_t - \widehat{P_{M,t}M_t} \\ \widehat{P_{M,t}M_t} &= P_{M,t}M_t + Q_{2,t}I_{2,t} \end{aligned}$$

Here, $\widehat{P_{M,t}M_t}$ is measured nominal purchases of intermediates (which are too large, because $Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}$ is misclassified). In what follows, we use the following two ratios (the first of which is also the one we use in the analysis of the value-added model):

$$\begin{aligned} b_t &= \frac{\widehat{Y}_t}{Y_t} \\ c_t &= \frac{P_{M,t}M_t}{P_{M,t}M_t + Q_{2,t}I_{2,t}} \end{aligned}$$

The case of no omitted intangibles corresponds to $\eta = 0$. Using the expressions from Section A.1.2.4, we obtain that along the balanced growth path:

$$\begin{aligned} b_t = b &= 1 - \frac{1 - \beta}{\mu_X - \beta} \frac{g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{\rho + g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}} \alpha \eta \\ c_t = c &= 1 - \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \frac{g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{\rho + g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}} \alpha \eta \end{aligned}$$

860 The expression for b_t is the same as Equation (14), for the value-added model, when $\mu =$
861 $\frac{\mu_X - \beta}{1 - \beta}$. These expressions indicate that there are no omitted intangibles ($\eta = 0$), if and only
862 if, $b = 1$ and $c = 0$.

Mis-measurement of value-added TFP growth (g_Z) Recall that in the gross output model, value-added TFP (in levels) is defined as:

$$Z_t = \frac{\mu_X - \beta}{1 - \beta} \left(\frac{Z_{X,t}}{\mu_X} \left(\frac{P_{M,t}}{\beta} \right)^{-\beta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}},$$

so that, in growth rates.

$$g_Z = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} (g_{Z_X} - \beta g_{P_M}).$$

Given the equivalence between the gross output and value added approaches developed in Result (7), all the results of Section 2 on the mis-measurement of value-added TFP growth go through. Define the (value-added) Solow residual as:

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_t}{\hat{Z}_t} = \frac{d\hat{Y}_t}{\hat{Y}_t} - \hat{s}_{L,t} \frac{d\hat{L}_t}{\hat{L}_t} - (1 - \hat{s}_{L,t}) \frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t},$$

where $\hat{s}_{L,t}$ is the labor share of value added, which, on the balanced growth path, is given by:

$$\hat{s}_{L,t} = \hat{s}_L = \frac{W_t L_t}{\hat{Y}_t} = \frac{(1 - \beta)(1/\mu_X)}{b(1 - \beta/\mu_X)} (1 - \alpha) = \frac{1 - \alpha}{b\mu}.$$

863 Then $d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t$ is a biased measure of g_Z , and the bias can be decomposed into a capital growth
864 bias (which is zero whenever there are no omitted intangibles), and a labor share bias (which
865 is driven by markups, but can amplify the omitted capital bias), and their expressions are
866 given as in (4).

867 **Mis-measurement of gross output TFP growth** (g_{Z_X}) This model also has predictions
868 for the bias between the *gross-output* Solow residual $d\hat{Z}_{X,t}/\hat{Z}_{X,t}$, and gross-output TFP
869 growth g_{Z_X} , in the presence of markups and omitted intangibles, analogous to Result 6.
870 These predictions are summarized in the follow result.

871 **Result 8.** *Assume that the growth rate of intermediate goods prices is correctly measured.*
872 *Then, along the balanced growth path:*

$$\Delta_{X,t} = \Delta_X = \Delta_X^{(1)} + \Delta_X^{(2,M)} + \Delta_X^{(2,L)} + \Delta_X^{(3)} \quad (43)$$

where $\Delta_X^{(1)} = 0$, and:

$$\Delta_X^{(2,L)} = -(1-\beta)\frac{\mu_X-1}{\mu_X}(g_Z - g_{Q_1} - \alpha\eta(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1})) \quad (\text{labor share bias})$$

$$\Delta_X^{(2,M)} = -\beta\frac{\mu_X c - 1}{\mu_X c}(g_{P_M} - g_{Q_1}) \quad (\text{intermediate share bias})$$

$$\Delta_X^{(3)} = -(1-\beta)\alpha\eta(g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}) \quad (\text{capital growth bias}),$$

873 where along the balanced growth path, $c = 1 - \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \frac{g + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}}{r + \delta_2 - g_{Q_2}} \alpha\eta$.

874 Result (8) reports expressions for the components of the bias between the gross output
875 Solow residual and gross output TFP growth, derived from applying to balanced growth
876 solution to Result (6). In this result, we have assumed that the real growth rate of actual
877 intermediate inputs, which is equal to $g - g_{P_M}$ in the balanced growth path, is the same as the
878 real growth rate of measured intermediate inputs. The latter growth rates depends on the
879 measured growth rate for intermediate inputs, $g_{\hat{P}_M}$. If this growth rate is correctly measured,
880 the contribution of mismeasurement of intermediate input growth along the balanced growth
881 path (the term $\Delta_{X,1,t}$) is zero; otherwise, the contribution of this term is equal to $-\frac{\beta}{\mu_X}(g_{P_M} -$
882 $g_{\hat{P}_M})$.

883 An important difference with the value-added case is that, so long as $d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t > dL_t/L_t$
884 (the empirically relevant case), the labor share bias will be (weakly) negative. Thus, a

885 sufficient condition for the overall bias to be negative is $g_{Q_2} > g_{P_M} > g_{Q_1}$. As discussed in
886 Section 3, this condition is empirically plausible, as the types of intangible investments most
887 likely to be misclassified as omitted intangibles are also among the intermediate goods with
888 highest relative price growth.

889 In the empirical applications, we focus on quantifying mis-measurement of value-added
890 TFP growth g_Z by the value-added Solow residual $d\hat{Z}_t/\hat{Z}_t$, and not on mismeasurement of
891 g_{Z_X} using the gross-output Solow residual $d\hat{Z}_{X,t}/\hat{Z}_{X,t}$. We make this choice because we are
892 interested in understanding trends in value-added TFP growth which can be compared with
893 the relevant literature, but, in principle, the analysis could be extended to gross-output TFP
894 growth.

895 A.2 Empirics

896 This section of the appendix provides more details on the empirical analysis.

897 A.2.1 The decline in measured TFP growth

898 In order to document the decline in measured TFP growth, we use the time series constructed
899 by Fernald (2014). This data covers the period 1947q1-2020q1, and provides measures of
900 the growth rate of real output, labor input, capital input, and the labor share, for the
901 business sector. This comprises all corporate and non-corporate for-profit businesses, as well
902 as other business entities, such as non-profits and certain government agencies; see Bureau
903 of Economic Analysis (2017).

904 We make one main modification to the data of Fernald (2014): in Solow residual com-
905 putations, we use the growth rate of GDP in *consumption units*. In computing the Solow
906 residual, Fernald (2014) use the quarterly growth rate of real value added by businesses in
907 chained dollars (NIPA table 1.3.6; FRED series A195RX1Q020SBEA). Instead, we use the
908 quarterly growth rate in the ratio of nominal value added by businesses (NIPA Table 1.3.5;

909 FRED series A195RC1Q027SBEA) to the implicit price deflator for personal consumption
910 expenditures (NIPA Table 1.1.9; FRED series DPCERD3Q086SBEA).

911 We choose to do this because, in our balanced growth model, the notion of output we
912 consider, Y_t , is directly defined in consumption units, and is not necessarily equal to chained
913 GDP growth. We explain this point, which is explained more generally in [Oulton 2007](#), in
914 Appendix [A.1.1.3](#). We compare below the results of the simple growth accounting decom-
915 position when chained GDP growth is used instead of the growth of output in consumption
916 units.

917 Other than this difference, three points about these data are worth noting. First, the data
918 on capital input growth are constructed from estimated stocks for nine types of capital, in-
919 cluding specific estimated stocks for R&D capital and software. These stocks are themselves
920 derived from NIPA series on investment capitalized using perpetual inventory methods. The
921 nine types of capital are: land; business inventory; business residential real estate; informa-
922 tion processing equipment; other equipment; structures; software; R&D; artistic originals.
923 Investment in different capital goods is deflated using capital-specific price indices, so that
924 the resulting growth rates in stocks are real. Aggregate capital growth is obtained by weight-
925 ing these series by their estimated user cost shares. Second, the labor share is measured as
926 the ratio of total labor payments to total value added; the capital share is obtained as the
927 residual (one minus the labor share), as opposed to being directly imputed from estimates of
928 the user cost of capital. Proprietor's income, in particular, is allocated so as to ensure that
929 the aggregate labor share is equal to the labor share of non-financial corporations. Third,
930 the data also contain an adjustment for variable capacity utilization; we compare trends
931 with and without this adjustment below.

932 Figure [1](#) reports the time-series for TFP growth without adjustments for capacity uti-
933 lization, defined as the simple Solow residual:

$$\frac{d\hat{Z}_t}{\hat{Z}_t} = \frac{d\hat{Y}_t}{\hat{Y}_t} - \hat{s}_{L,t} \frac{d\hat{L}_t}{\hat{L}_t} - (1 - \hat{s}_{L,t}) \frac{d\hat{K}_t}{\hat{K}_t} \quad (44)$$

934 where $d\hat{Y}_t/\hat{Y}_t$ denotes the growth rate of output in consumption units,

$$\hat{s}_{L,t} = \frac{W_t L_t}{N_t} \quad (45)$$

935 denotes the labor share in nominal business value added, N_t , $d\hat{L}_t/\hat{L}_t$ denotes the growth rate
936 of labor, and $d\hat{K}_t/\hat{K}_t$ denotes the measured growth rate of capital. The series show that,
937 after a period of rapid increase in the early to mid-1990's, TFP growth reach a plateau,
938 and then declined. This decline lasted until late 2007, but was not followed by a persistent
939 rebound; instead, productivity growth has remained subdued since 2010.

940 Table 1 reports simple averages on the decline in TFP growth, comparing the 1947-1996
941 period, to the 1997-2018 period. Before 1997, TFP growth in the US had been, on average,
942 1.11% per year; after 1995, it fell to 0.62% per year, a 0.49% decline. By contrast, between
943 the two periods, growth of output in consumption units fell by 0.92%; 0.43% of that decline
944 is therefore attributable to a decline in input growth, and the rest to the TFP growth decline.
945 Additionally, the labor share of income fell by 4 p.p. over the period. Finally, the last line in
946 the table highlights the fact that the utilization adjustment constructed by Fernald (2014)
947 using the methodology of Basu et al. (2013) only leads to a very small difference in the
948 decline of measured TFP growth.

949 Table A2 compares output growth and the Solow residuals obtained using output in con-
950 sumption units (our baseline approach), to the values obtained using chained GDP (the data
951 provided in Fernald (2014)). The table shows that the growth rate of GDP in consumption
952 units is lower than the growth rate of chained GDP by approximately 0.25% in both the
953 1947-1996 and 1997-2018 periods. As a result the Solow residual obtained using chained
954 GDP is higher than in our baseline approach (by 0.25%) in both periods. However, the
955 *change* in both GDP growth and the Solow residual is the almost identical under the two
956 approaches. This indicates that the bias created by the fact that Y_t , in the model, does
957 not correspond to chained GDP in the data is stable across periods and does not affect our

958 measurement of the *decline* in the the Solow residual.

959 **A.2.2 Methodology using only expenditure data**

The value of the growth rate g_{Q_2} such that *all* of the gap between true TFP growth and the Solow residual \hat{g}_Z is due to mismeasurement is given by:

$$g_{Q_2} = \frac{1}{2} \left(\hat{r} + \delta_2 + \hat{g} - \hat{g}_K + \hat{\xi} - \sqrt{\left(\hat{\xi} + (\hat{r} - \hat{g} - (\hat{g}_K + \delta_2)) \right)^2 + 4(\hat{r} - \hat{g})(\hat{g}_K + \delta_2)} \right),$$

$$\hat{\xi} = \frac{\hat{s}_L \hat{b}}{(1 - \hat{b})(1 - \alpha)} [\tilde{g}_Z - (\hat{g} - (1 - \alpha)\hat{g}_L - \alpha\hat{g}_K)],$$

960 where $\hat{r} = \rho + \sigma\hat{g}$. This result is derived as follows.

Replacing g_{Q_2} with x , and omitting the hat notation for measured variables, the conditions from the balanced growth model are:

$$g_Z = g - (1 - \alpha)g_L - \alpha g_K + \alpha\eta(x - (g - g_K))$$

$$\mu = \frac{1 - \alpha}{sb}$$

$$\eta = \mu \frac{1 - b}{\alpha} \frac{r + \delta_2 - x}{g + \delta_2 - x}$$

Substituting the expression for the markup,

$$g_Z = g - (1 - \alpha)g_L - \alpha g_K + \alpha\eta(x - (g - g_K))$$

$$\eta = \frac{(1 - b)(1 - \alpha)}{\alpha sb} \frac{r + \delta_2 - x}{g + \delta_2 - x}$$

Substituting the expression for η into the expression for the production function,

$$g_Z = g - (1 - \alpha)g_L - \alpha g_K + \frac{(1 - b)(1 - \alpha)}{sb} \frac{r + \delta_2 - x}{g + \delta_2 - x} (x - (g - g_K))$$

Let:

$$\xi \equiv \frac{sb}{(1-b)(1-\alpha)} [g_Z - (g - (1-\alpha)g_L - \alpha g_K)],$$

then we can write this as:

$$((r + \delta_2) - x)(x - (g - g_K)) - \xi(g + \delta_2 - x) = 0$$

Let:

$$a \equiv r + \delta_2$$

$$b \equiv g - g_K$$

$$c \equiv g + \delta_2 < a$$

961 The solution must satisfy:

$$b < x < c < a.$$

Indeed, the condition $b < x$ ensures that the implied growth rate of prices of omitted intangible capital is higher than than the growth rate of prices of measured capital. The condition $x < c$ ensures that the detrended user cost of omitted intangible capital is strictly positive.

The equation for x can be rewritten as:

$$(a - x)(x - b) - \xi(c - x) = 0,$$

or:

$$\frac{(a - x)(x - b)}{c - x} = \xi.$$

Using the fact that $b < c < a$, it can be shown that the left-hand side in this equation is a strictly increasing mapping from $]b, c[$ to $]0, +\infty[$, so there is always a unique solution to this equation in $]b, c[$. The unique solution in this interval is given by:

$$x = \frac{1}{2} \left(a + b + \xi - \sqrt{(\xi + (a + b - 2c))^2 + 4(a - c)(c - b)} \right).$$

In terms of the original variables, the solution can be written as:

$$x = \frac{1}{2} \left(r + \delta_2 + g - g_K + \xi - \sqrt{(\xi + (r - g - (g_K + \delta_2)))^2 + 4(r - g)(g_K + \delta_2)} \right),$$

$$\xi = \frac{sb}{(1 - b)(1 - \alpha)} [g_Z - (g - (1 - \alpha)g_L - \alpha g_K)].$$

962 A.2.3 Other data sources

963 **BLS price indices** In Section 3.4, as an alternative empirical proxy for g_{Q_2} , we use the
 964 BLS' Producer Price Indices for commodities.³⁴ There are a number of challenges in map-
 965 ping these data to the Input-Output tables. The main one is that the level of aggregation
 966 differs from that of the IO tables. Information on the producer prices for commodities are
 967 substantially more granular than in the Input-Output tables; but it tends to be less granular
 968 for service prices. We focus on BLS price indices reported at the 3- and 4-NAICS levels,
 969 and match them, based on names, to the IO table classification. This matching is available
 970 from the authors on request. Not all IO commodity and service groups are matched (for
 971 instance, Data processing, in the IO tables, does not have a clear match to the BLS com-
 972 modity groups), and for the IO groups with several more granular matches in the BLS PPI
 973 tables, we take the simple average of prices across matches.

974 Table A5 reports results from a simple regression using the matched BEA-BLS sample. In
 975 all specifications, the dependent variable is $g_{Q_2}^{(BEA)}$, the empirical proxy for g_{Q_2} constructed
 976 using the BEA GDP-by-industry data and described in Section 3.2, and the independent
 977 variable is the equivalent empirical proxy constructed using the BLS price deflators. The
 978 results of the table indicate that there is a robust correlation between the two variables, even
 979 within industry and year, though there remains independent variation between the two sets
 980 of price indices, with R^2 s in the order of 65% across specifications.

³⁴The PPI commodity tables are available at <https://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/wp/>.

981 **Non-financial public firms** We obtain data on spending on organization capital from
 982 the sample of Compustat non-financial firms, for the 1997-2018 period. We use standard
 983 selection criteria in order to obtain the sample of domestically incorporated, publicly traded-
 984 firms not in the utility or financial sector.³⁵ The sample we obtain covers approximately 70%
 985 of aggregate investment and gross operating surplus in the corporate non-financial sector, as
 986 documented in [Crouzet and Eberly \(2020\)](#).

987 Our objective is to use this sample to construct an alternative measure of adjusted to
 988 unadjusted GDP, after reclassifying expenditures on organization capital, M as investment:

$$\hat{b}_{CS} = \frac{\hat{Y}_{CS}}{\hat{Y}_{CS} + \hat{M}_{CS}},$$

989 where \hat{Y}_{CS} is total value added in the Compustat sample, and \hat{M}_{CS} are expenditures on
 990 organization capital. As discussed in the main text, intermediate expenditures on the three
 991 key service groups closely relate to the notion of organization capital developed in the macro
 992 and finance literature on intangible capital ([Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005](#); [Eisfeldt and Pa-
 993 panikolaou, 2013](#)). As an empirical proxy for \hat{M}_{CS} , we use the measure developed by [Eis-
 994 feldt and Papanikolaou \(2013\)](#), who propose to measure organization capital spending as
 995 $0.3 \times (\text{xsga} - \text{xrd})$, where xsga denotes spending on sales and general and administrative
 996 expenses, and xrd denotes $R\&D$ spending.

997 Measuring value added, \hat{Y}_{CS} , is more challenging, because Compustat firms do not report
 998 separate line items for wage payments. In order to address this issue, we map the Compustat
 999 data to the 61 sectors of Make tables of the Input-Output accounts. This match uses the
 1000 NAICS-3 and NAICS-4 classification of firms in Compustat, and is available from the authors
 1001 on request. For each sector s , we then impute Compustat wages using:

$$W_s^{(CS)} = \frac{S_s^{(IO)}}{S_s^{(CS)}} W_s^{(IO)},$$

³⁵We use the same sample selection criteria as [Crouzet and Eberly \(2020\)](#); see the appendix of that paper for more details.

1002 where $S_s^{(IO)}$ is sector gross output at producer prices from the IO tables, $S_s^{(CS)}$ is total revenue
 1003 for the sector from Compustat, and $W_s^{(IO)}$ are total wage payments for the sector from the
 1004 IO tables. Given imputed wages for the sector, we then compute:

$$\hat{Y}_s^{(CS)} = \Pi_s^{(CS)} + W_s^{(CS)} + RD_s^{(CS)},$$

1005 where $\Pi_s^{(CS)}$ is total EBITDA in the sector, and $RD_s^{(CS)}$ are total *R&D* expenditures in the
 1006 sector. The former is the closest firm accounting counterpart to gross operating surplus, so
 1007 that adding back wages provides an estimate of value added. The main difference with na-
 1008 tional accounting definitions of gross operating surplus is that *R&D* expenditures as treated
 1009 as intermediate expenditures (operating costs) in firm accounting data, so that they need
 1010 to be added back to EBITDA in order to obtain a measure of value added consistent with
 1011 the national accounts definition. Finally, we define the Compustat proxy for the ratio of
 1012 unadjusted to adjusted value added as:

$$\hat{b}^{(CS)} = \frac{\sum_s \hat{Y}_s^{(CS)}}{\sum_s \hat{Y}_s^{(CS)} + \hat{M}_s^{(CS)}}.$$

1013 Figure A4 reports the resulting time series for $\hat{b}^{(CS)}$, along with the ratio of nominal invest-
 1014 ment to value added, with and without adjustment for investment in organization capital.

1015 A.2.4 Robustness

1016 **Other measures of relative price growth** We use the Producer Price Indices for com-
 1017 modities from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as an alternative empirical proxy for g_{Q_2} .
 1018 Appendix A.2.3 discusses the differences between BLS and BEA data, and shows that there
 1019 is independent variation between the two sets of price measures, though they are highly cor-
 1020 related. Appendix Table A6 reports results obtained using this alternative empirical proxy
 1021 for g_{Q_2} . For two of the three key service groups, g_{Q_2} is lower than in our baseline analysis.³⁶

³⁶Price information in the BLS data is missing for the third key service group, Management.

1022 As a result, the implied adjustments for TFP growth are lower than in the baseline; the total
1023 adjustment is approximately 21bps, instead of 32bps in the baseline. However, the adjust-
1024 ment remains positive, because even the BLS proxies for g_{Q_2} are higher than our estimate
1025 of g_{Q_1} , which is negative throughout the 1997-2018 period.

1026 **Estimating organization capital spending from firm data** We use firm accounting
1027 data in order to construct an alternative proxy for \hat{b} . Our adjustment builds on the empirical
1028 measures of investment in organization capital proposed by [Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou \(2013\)](#).
1029 Conceptually, this form of intangible investment corresponds most closely to what might be
1030 misclassified as intermediate expenditures on the three key service groups highlighted in
1031 our baseline analysis. Appendix [A.2.3](#) explains in detail how the empirical proxy for \hat{b} is
1032 constructed in Compustat data, and Appendix Figure [A4](#) reports the resulting time-series.

1033 The most important point to note about this empirical proxy for \hat{b} is that it contains both
1034 *externally purchased* investments in organization capital (which is also what our baseline
1035 approach estimates from the Use tables), and, potentially, *own-account* intangibles. Own-
1036 account intangibles could include, for instance, worker training, in-house investments in
1037 logistics, or expenditures on product management and branding, so long as they are not
1038 externally contracted or purchased. Because these expenditures would not correspond to
1039 service or commodity purchase in the Use tables, our baseline approach would not capture
1040 them.³⁷

1041 The inclusion of own-account intangibles in this alternative measure of \hat{b} suggests that its
1042 resulting values could be lower (i.e. the intangible adjustment larger) than those obtained
1043 from the Use tables. On the other hand, the estimates of \hat{b} measure organization capital
1044 investment as a constant fraction $\gamma = 30\%$ of sales, general and administrative expenses
1045 (SG&A), but there is evidence that this fraction may vary across industries, and could be
1046 as high as 50% in industries such as Healthcare and High-tech ([Ewens et al., 2019](#)). This

³⁷The exception to this is managerial time spent on organization capital, as this may be as use of inter-
mediate inputs produced by the Management of Companies and Enterprises sector in the Use tables.

1047 could lead the values of \hat{b} estimated from Compustat data to be lower than in the Use tables.
1048 Appendix Figure A4 (top panel) reports the time series for the ratio of \hat{b} obtained from
1049 Compustat data; it is generally close to our most extensive adjustments from the Use tables
1050 (using Professional Services, Management, and Administrative Services), suggesting both
1051 of the effects described (the higher estimates due to own-account spending on organization
1052 capital, and the lower estimates due to the value of γ used) potentially affect estimates of \hat{b} .

1053 The magnitude of the adjustment is similar to what we obtained in our baseline analysis
1054 when reclassifying expenditures on PSTS and Management services in the Use tables. Table
1055 4 then reports the implied TFP growth rates when using estimates for \hat{b} from Compustat
1056 data.³⁸ Our mechanisms explain 29bps of the 49bps TFP growth decline in that case.

1057 **Alternative breakpoints** Our baseline analysis uses 1997 as the breakpoint relative to
1058 which we analyze the decline of the Solow residual compared to its historical values. We
1059 use this breakpoint as our baseline for two main reasons. First, after 1997, the ratio of
1060 unadjusted GDP to GDP adjusted for misclassified investment stabilizes, after a long period
1061 of decline that starts in the 1980s, as indicated by Figure 3. In other words, the size of
1062 potentially misclassified investment, relative to GDP is closer to being constant after 1997,
1063 consistent with the assumptions of our balanced growth in Section 2.2. Since our goal is to
1064 understand the effects of misclassification of intangibles on TFP growth measurement, it is
1065 natural to date our breakpoint using this change in the trend of the ratio of unadjusted to
1066 adjusted GDP. Second, papers focusing on the slowdown in productivity growth have noted
1067 that this slowdown in productivity growth in the US started some time between the late
1068 1990s and the mid-2000s (Cette et al., 2016; Byrne et al., 2013; Fernald, 2015).³⁹

1069 However, as emphasized in other papers, the breaks in the data is not sharp, so we
1070 also consider results using alternative breakpoints. Following the literature, we look at

³⁸Appendix Figure A3 reports year-by-year results from this exercise for the 1997-2018 period.

³⁹Cette et al. (2016) dates the start of the slowdown in TFP growth relative to the US, in a sample of advanced economies, in 1997. Fernald (2015) dates the slowdown in productivity growth in most US industries to 2004.

1071 breakpoints in 2000 and 2004. Additionally, we consider an earlier breakpoint, 1993, as
1072 further robustness check. In Appendix Table A3, we report key data moments (the growth
1073 rate of inputs, output, and the resulting Solow residuals) for these three breakpoints. Using
1074 the later breakpoints, the implied decline in TFP growth is higher, with the drop in measured
1075 TFP growth rising to 0.68% for the 2004 breakpoint (compared to 0.49% in our baseline),
1076 reflecting the brief acceleration of TFP growth in the late 1990s, also noted in Byrne et al.
1077 (2013) and Fernald (2015).

1078 Table A4 then reports results analogous to those of Table 4 (the effect of adjusting
1079 for markups and misclassified intangible investment on measured TFP growth) for these
1080 alternative breakpoints. The earlier breakpoint (1994) makes no notable difference to the
1081 results. However, the results for the later breakpoints are more muted than in our baseline.
1082 For the 2000 breakpoint, markups and intangibles together account for half of the decline in
1083 TFP growth (or 0.29% out of the 0.58%), while after 2004, they account for one-third of the
1084 decline in TFP growth (or 0.22% out of 0.68%). By contrast, in our baseline, they account
1085 for two-thirds (or 0.33% out of 0.49%) of the decline in TFP growth. The key reason for this
1086 difference is that the growth rate of the relative price of potentially misclassified intangibles
1087 $-g_{Q_2}$ fell somewhat during the 2004-207 period, though it remains larger than the growth
1088 rate of the price of measured capital (and positive overall, as indicated in Appendix Table
1089 A3). Thus, to the extent that the growth in the relative price of misclassified intangibles
1090 slowed down over time, the source of mismeasurement we highlight will also decline.

1091 **Values of δ_2** Appendix Figure A5 reports comparative statics for the adjusted Solow
1092 residual obtained in Section 3.3.2, when changing the value of the rate of depreciation of
1093 omitted intangibles. Our estimates are relatively insensitive to this parameter: compared to
1094 our baseline estimate of 0.95% when adjusting for two of the three key service inputs, implied
1095 TFP growth (the adjusted Solow residual) declines from 0.96% to 0.89% as δ_2 increases from
1096 0.05 to 0.40. The intuition for the sign of the effect is that with lower depreciation, the stock

1097 of omitted intangibles, and therefore its user cost share, is larger, magnifying the effect of
1098 the capital growth mismeasurement on TFP growth.⁴⁰

⁴⁰A potential alternative to calibrating the value of δ_2 is to try to estimate it directly. This could in principle be done with data on the income share of omitted intangible capital and on the required rate of return to capital r_t . However, contrary to the measures of omitted intangible investment explored in this section, an empirical proxy for the intangible capital income share is more challenging to construct.

	1947-1996	1997-2018	Change
Growth rate of K/L ratio	2.27	2.34	0.06
Measured labor share	0.68	0.64	-0.04
Bias ($\epsilon_L = 1.00$)	-0.73	-0.84	-0.11
Bias ($\epsilon_L = 0.68$)	0.00	-0.09	-0.09

Table A1: Potential size of the bias in measured TFP growth induced by markups. The first two lines report sample averages of the measured rate of change of the capital to labor ratio and of the labor income share). The last two lines report estimates of the bias in measured TFP growth; the third line is the absolute upper bound, when all measured capital income is pure profits; and the fourth line is the estimate obtained when setting the output elasticity of labor equal to the 1947-1996 sample average of the measured labor income share, $\hat{s}_L = 0.68$.

	1947-1996		1997-2018		Change	
	GDP in cons. units	Chained GDP	GDP in cons. units	Chained GDP	GDP in cons. units	Chained GDP
GDP growth (p.p.)	3.36	3.62	2.44	2.68	-0.92	-0.93
TFP growth (p.p.)	1.11	1.36	0.62	0.86	-0.49	-0.50
TFP growth (util.-adj.; p.p.)	1.13	1.39	0.66	0.91	-0.47	-0.49

Table A2: Differences in output growth and Solow residual using GDP in consumption units and chained GDP growth. The data are the same as in Table 1, except that in the columns marked "Chained GDP", the measure of GDP growth is the growth of business value added in chained dollars; see Appendix A.2.1 for more details on data sources. TFP growth (the Solow residual) is constructed as $\hat{g}_Z = \hat{g} - \hat{s}_L \hat{g}_L - (1 - \hat{s}_L) \hat{g}_K$, where \hat{g} is either the growth rate of output in consumption units (as defined in Appendix A.2.1), or chained output growth; \hat{s}_L is the average measured labor income share; \hat{g}_L is the average growth rate of labor input; and \hat{g}_K is the average growth rate of capital. Utilization-adjusted TFP growth is constructed as $\hat{g}_Z = \hat{g} - \hat{s}_L \hat{g}_L - (1 - \hat{s}_L) \hat{g}_K - \hat{g}_u$, where \hat{g}_u is the average growth rate of utilization.

Breakpoint	Average change (after minus before breakpoint)			
	1997	2000	2004	1994
GDP growth (p.p.)	-0.92	-1.34	-1.22	-0.75
Labor growth (p.p.)	-0.54	-0.80	-0.31	-0.15
Capital growth (p.p.)	-0.48	-0.96	-1.30	-0.39
Labor share of income	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04
TFP growth (p.p.)	-0.49	-0.58	-0.68	-0.59
TFP growth (util.-adj.; p.p.)	-0.47	-0.57	-0.87	-0.58

Table A3: Data moments with alternative breakpoints. This table reports the change average output growth (with output measured in consumption units), labor growth, capital growth, the labor share of income, TFP growth, and utilization-adjusted TFP growth, for alternative breakpoints between the two samples we consider: 1997 (our baseline breakpoint); 2001; 2005; and 1993. The data are the same as in Tables 1 and A2.

	\hat{b}	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	g_Z (%)	μ	η
1947-1996	0	0	1.11	1.00	0
1997-2018					
No adj., no markups	0	0	0.62	1.00	0
No adj., markups	0	0	0.71	1.06	0
Intan. adj., markups	0.89	0.65	0.95	1.19	0.50

(a) Breakpoint: 1997

	\hat{b}	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	g_Z (%)	μ	η
1947-2000	0	0	1.11	1.00	0
2001-2018					
No adj., no markups	0	0	0.53	1.00	0
No adj., markups	0	0	0.63	1.07	0
Intan. adj., markups	0.89	0.36	0.82	1.20	0.51

(b) Breakpoint: 2000

	\hat{b}	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	g_Z (%)	μ	η
1947-2000	0	0	1.11	1.00	0
2001-2018					
No adj., no markups	0	0	0.43	1.00	0
No adj., markups	0	0	0.51	1.09	0
Intan. adj., markups	0.88	0.28	0.65	1.23	0.53

(c) Breakpoint: 2004

	\hat{b}	\hat{g}_{Q_2} (%)	g_Z (%)	μ	η
1947-1996	0	0	1.17	1.00	0
1997-2018					
No adj., no markups	0	0	0.62	1.00	0
No adj., markups	0	0	0.71	1.06	0
Intan. adj., markups	0.89	0.65	0.95	1.19	0.50

(d) Breakpoint: 1994

Table A4: Results with alternative breakpoints. Each panel reports the effects of adjusting for markups and for intangibles when the breakpoints used are 1997 (our baseline); 2001; 2005; and 1993. The intangible adjustment used is for Professional Services, Management, and Administrative services (corresponding to the penultimate line of Table 4). The adjustments are made following the second of the two approaches described in Section 3.1, which uses data on both expenditures and prices of intangibles.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$g_{Q_2}^{(BLS)}$	0.97*** (0.18)	0.97*** (0.18)	1.04*** (0.17)	1.05*** (0.18)
Commodity/service FE	no	yes	no	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Clustering of s.e.	commodity + year	commodity + year	commodity + year	commodity + year
R^2	0.603	0.633	0.643	0.673
N	829	829	829	829

Table A5: Simple correlations in proxies for g_{Q_2} , for BEA and PPI price indices. The sample is the set of year and commodity or service groups for which the BEA GDP-by-industry and the BLS PPI commodity price indices can be matched. In all specification, the dependent variable is $g_{Q_2}^{(BEA)}$, the empirical proxy for g_{Q_2} derived from the BEA's GDP-by-industry tables and described in Section 3.2.

	\hat{b}	g_{Q_2} (% , BEA)	g_{Q_2} (% , BLS)
<u>Services</u>			
Professional, scientific, and technical services	0.940	0.59	0.25
Other real estate	0.952	-1.75	n.a.
Administrative and support services	0.964	0.20	0.33
Insurance carriers and related activities	0.972	-0.21	0.28
Credit intermediation and related activities	0.973	1.06	1.59
Management of companies and enterprises	0.974	1.54 w	n.a.
<u>Commodities</u>			
Chemical products	0.962	1.31	1.26
Oil and gas extraction	0.972	2.09	1.38
Petroleum and coal products	0.973	3.78	3.36
Food and beverage and tobacco products	0.976	1.12	0.37

(a) Individual commodity and service groups

	BEA			BLS		
	g_z (%)	μ	η	g_z (%)	μ	η
1947-1996	1.11	1.00	0	1.11	1.00	0
1997-2018						
No adjustment, no markups	0.62	1.00	0	0.62	1.00	0
No adjustment, markups	0.71	1.06	0	0.71	1.06	0
Adjusted for Prof. services	0.83	1.13	0.25	0.80	1.13	0.25
Adjusted for Prof. services + Admin.	0.88	1.17	0.40	0.83	1.17	0.40
Adjusted for Org. capital (Compustat)	0.88	1.16	0.38	0.83	1.16	0.38

(b) Aggregated service groups

Table A6: Comparison of results using BEA and BLS price indices for mismeasured investment goods. The top panel reports the 10 commodity or service groups with the smallest value of unadjusted GDP to adjusted GDP, as in Table 2. The average is computed over the 1997-2018 period, for each commodity or service group. The second column reports average values for the relative price growth of omitted capital, computed using price deflators from the BEA GDP-by-industry tables, as described in Section 3.2. The third column reports price indices obtained from the BLS, as described in Section 3.4. The bottom panel reports results from adjusting TFP growth measures for intangibles and markups, as in Table 4.




Figure A1: Sign of the total bias in measured TFP growth on the balanced growth path, depending on model parameters. The total bias is $\Delta = d\hat{Z}_t/Z_t - dZ_t/Z_t = d\hat{Z}_t/Z_t - g_Z$, where $d\hat{Z}_t/Z_t$ is measured TFP on the balanced growth path, and $dZ_t/Z_t = g_Z$ is actual TFP growth. The horizontal axis corresponds to different values of η , the Cobb-Douglas share of omitted capital in production, and the vertical axis corresponds to different values of $g_{Q_2} - g_{Q_1}$, the difference between the growth rate of prices of omitted and measured capital.




Figure A2: Time series for the ratio of unadjusted GDP to GDP adjusted for omitted intangibles (top panel), and for the ratio of investment to GDP without and with adjustments for omitted intangibles (bottom panel). The top panel reports the time series for $\hat{b}_t = P_t Y_t / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $P_t Y_t$ is total GDP at producer prices, and M_t is the nominal value of intermediate input use of a group of services, where the latter is obtained from the Use tables of the benchmark Input-Output accounts. Each line corresponds to the ratio obtained when treating a different group of services as misclassified intangible investment. The bottom panel reports the time series $\iota_t = (Q_t I_t + M_t) / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $Q_t I_t$ is measured aggregate spending on investment goods, also obtained from the Input-Output accounts.






Figure A3: Time series for implied moments when adjusting for three key service groups. Adjusted TFP growth, markups, and the Cobb-Douglas share of omitted intangibles in the production function are computed following the second of the two approaches described in Section 3.1, which uses data on both expenditures and prices. The implied moments are constructed for each year separately. The series marked “unadjusted TFP growth” is the simple Solow residual.




Figure A4: Compustat vs. IO tables: time series for unadjusted GDP to GDP adjusted for omitted intangibles (top panel), and for the ratio of investment to GDP without and with adjustments for omitted intangibles (bottom panel). Relative to Figure A2, the only difference is the addition of the Compustat time series. The top panel reports the time series for $\hat{d}_t = P_t Y_t / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $P_t Y_t$ is total GDP at producer prices, and M_t is the nominal value of intermediate input use of a group of services, where the latter is obtained from the Use tables of the benchmark Input-Output accounts. The bottom panel reports the time series $\iota_t = (Q_t I_t + M_t) / (P_t Y_t + M_t)$, where $Q_t I_t$ is measured aggregate spending on investment goods. See Section 3.2 for details on time series constructed from the IO tables, and A.2.3 for the time series constructed from Compustat.




Figure A5: Implied moments for alternative values of the depreciation rate of omitted capital, δ_2 . The top graph reports implied productivity growth g_Z , and the bottom graph reports the implied value of the Cobb-Douglas share of intangible capital, η , obtained using the second of the two approaches describes in Section 3.1. For the values of \hat{b} and \hat{g}_{Q_2} , we use those corresponding to the case when only intermediate expenditures on Professional, Technical and Scientific services (PSTS) and Management services are reclassified as intangibles. This corresponds to the fifth line in Table 4.

1099 **References**

- 1100 Atkeson, A. and P. J. Kehoe (2005). Modeling and measuring organization capital. *Journal*
1101 *of political Economy* 113(5), 1026–1053.
- 1102 Basu, S., J. Fernald, J. Fisher, and M. Kimball (2013). Sector-specific technical change.
1103 *Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.*
- 1104 Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). NIPA Handbook: Concepts and Methods of the US
1105 National Income and Product Accounts.
- 1106 Byrne, D. M., S. D. Oliner, and D. E. Sichel (2013). Is the information technology revolution
1107 over?
- 1108 Cetto, G., J. Fernald, and B. Mojon (2016). The pre-great recession slowdown in productivity.
1109 *European Economic Review* 88, 3–20.
- 1110 Crouzet, N. and J. Eberly (2020). Rents and Intangibles: a Q+ Framework. Working paper,
1111 Northwestern University.
- 1112 Eisfeldt, A. L. and D. Papanikolaou (2013). Organization capital and the cross-section of
1113 expected returns. *The Journal of Finance* 68(4), 1365–1406.
- 1114 Ewens, M., R. H. Peters, and S. Wang (2019). Measuring intangible capital with market
1115 prices. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- 1116 Fernald, J. (2014). A quarterly, utilization-adjusted series on total factor productivity. Fed-
1117 eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- 1118 Fernald, J. G. (2015). Productivity and potential output before, during, and after the great
1119 recession. *NBER macroeconomics annual* 29(1), 1–51.
- 1120 Oulton, N. (2007). Investment-specific technological change and growth accounting. *Journal*
1121 *of Monetary Economics* 54(4), 1290–1299.