Personal Bankruptcy and the Accumulation of Shadow Debt

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Bankruptcy Window into Household Balance Sheets

- Average of \$800/adult/year is discharged through personal bankruptcy
- Filings provide unique window into distressed household balance sheets
- New fact: 7% of total liabilities are not on credit reports \equiv "shadow debt"
- \rightarrow What are the drivers and dynamics of shadow debt?
- ightarrow What role does shadow debt play in debt accumulation prior to bankruptcy?
- Opportunity to delay filing $\Rightarrow +$ \$6k in shadow debt, especially in last 6 months

Digitized bankruptcy filings + credit records

- Scrape bankruptcy filing schedules for 4 BK districts from 2004-2018 (UT, MN, FL)
 - Detailed information about assets, individual liabilities, employment status, historic and current income, projected expenses, family situation...
- Final sample \sim 545,000 bankruptcy filings with 15+ million individual debt claims
- Merged to credit-bureau data on mortgagors $\sim \! 55,000$
 - (IV results robust to running the reduced-form on the full sample)

Data

Example Schedule

SCHEDULE D - CREDITORS HOLDING SECURED CLAIMS

(Continuation Sheet)

CREDITOR'S NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS INCLUDING ZIP CODE, AND ACCOUNT NUMBER (See instructions.)	C O D E B T O R	Hu H J C	sband, Wife, Joint, or Community DATE CLAIM WAS INCURRED, NATURE OF LIEN, AND DESCRIPTION AND VALUE OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIEN	CONTINGENT	UNLOULDAT	DISPUTED	AMOUNT OF CLAIM WITHOUT DEDUCTING VALUE OF COLLATERAL	UNSECURED PORTION, IF ANY
Account No. xxxxx33 #80 Mountain America Credit Union PO Box 9001 West Jordan, UT 84084-9001		J	09/2007 2003 Chevy Silverado 2500HD (93,000.00 miles)		ED			
			Value \$ 12,094.00				12,400.00	306.00

Measuring Shadow Debt


- \equiv Total unsecured debt on bankruptcy filing Total unsecured debt on credit report.
- Many creditors and collection agencies do not report to credit bureau (e.g., dentists).
- Key component: **non-payment of goods and services** \rightarrow "accidental creditors"
- Shadow debt is large: **\$41,680** (\$27,750) for mean (median) filer \approx 7% of total debt
- Not a measurement issue: equally large for high confidence matches + single filers

Shadow debt correlation with unsecured category shares

- Use LDA to categorize debt descriptions into categories.
- Can't classify shadow debt at the *liability* level.
- *Can* ask which categories are most correlated with shadow debt @ borrower level

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- Can ask which categories are most correlated with shadow debt @ borrower level
- → Weighting by average debt levels, borrowers with high shadow debt share have esp. high medical debt and unknown debt. "Collections" frequent.



Drivers and dynamics of shadow debt?

- · Goal: understand who relies on shadow debt, when, and why
- · Focus on what happens leading up to bankruptcy filing
- Supply of formal debt low: observable credit risk high
- Demand for debt high: fight off bankruptcy, subsist, or strategically "run up the tab"

Identification strategy to isolate filing delays


- Want variation in filing timing to isolate whether shadow debt more valuable right before filing
- wage garnishing affect how fast people file for bankruptcy

 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Garnishment} \downarrow \Rightarrow \mbox{Take-home pay} \uparrow \\ \Rightarrow \mbox{File for bankruptcy later} \end{array}$

• Exogenous var. in garnishment: changes to **federal** min. wage (not prevailing in FL)

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Empirical Strategy

- Treated group: filers in middle income range when wage garnishment \downarrow from min wage \uparrow
- Control groups:
 - $\circ\,$ Filers with the same income before Δmin wage or in other years
 - $\,\circ\,$ Filers with income below lowest threshold when Δmin wage
 - $\circ\,$ Filers with income above highest threshold when Δmin wage
- $\rightarrow\,$ Identifying variation is at the income \times time level
- Second stage: effect of bankruptcy delay on shadow debt accumulation
- First stage: effect of minimum wage changes on delay in entering bankruptcy

First-Stage Specification

- Months to File_{ist} = $\pi_1 \cdot \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Garnishable Wages}_{ist} + \pi_2 \cdot \text{Treatment}_i + \pi_3 \cdot \text{Garnishable Wages}_i + \pi_4 \cdot \text{Treat}_i \times \text{Income}_i + X'_i \pi_5 + \varphi_{st} + v_{ist}$
- Months to file ≡ bankruptcy filing month first 90-day delinquency date
 Average time to file: 22 months, median 15 months. Robust to alt. definitions
- Filer controls X_i and fixed effects to improve precision in subsamples. Not necessary.
- Double cluster by month and 3-digit zipcode

First-Stage Effect of Wage Changes on Filing

	Months to File				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Treatment \times	-1.12***	-0.78**	-1.03**	-1.19***	
Garnishable Wages (100s)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.45)	(0.38)	
Filer Controls	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Year FEs	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	
District FEs	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	
District $ imes$ Year FEs		\checkmark			
Income $ imes$ Year Controls			\checkmark		
Income Quartile Controls				\checkmark	
Partial F-Stat	9.00	4.31	5.20	9.68	
R^2	0.60	0.61	0.60	0.60	
Observations	47,960	47,960	47,960	47,960	

- Economic magnitude: \$100 increase in garnishable wages
 ⇒ 1 month reduction in time to bankruptcy
- Results robust to weak-instruments-robust estimators

IV Results: Delaying Filers Incur Shadow Debt

Shadow Debt Share of Total Debt						
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS		
Months to File	0.0009***	0.018**	0.024*	0.017*		
	(0.0001)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.009)		
Filer Controls	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Year FEs	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark		
District FEs	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark		
$District\timesYearFEs$			\checkmark			
Income $ imes$ Year Controls				\checkmark		
R^2	0.51	0.40	0.35	0.41		
Observations	47,960	47,960	47,960	47,960		

- \approx increase of \$6,000
- Shadow debt accounts for all of unsecured debt increase
- No effects on secured debt
- Concentrated in informal debt categories

Addressing Exclusion Restriction Concerns

- Exclusion restriction: Δ min wage \Rightarrow filer shadow debt directly, only through filing timing
- Direct effects of minimum wage increase?
- Selection into bankruptcy? Sample selection conditions on an outcome (filing)
 - $\circ\,$ e.g., when wage garnishment falls, only high-debt people continue to file for bankruptcy?

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- Exclusion restriction: Δ min wage \Rightarrow filer shadow debt directly, only through filing timing
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- Selection into bankruptcy? Sample selection conditions on an outcome (filing)
 - $\circ\,$ e.g., when wage garnishment falls, only high-debt people continue to file for bankruptcy?
- Ruling out selection and direct effects of minimum wage:
 - ** Results hold for FL, where federal minimum wage wasn't binding
 - ✓ Effects only in informal shadow debt, not for other secured/unsecured categories Aaronson et al. (2012) and Sovich et al. (2021) secured debt effects not present
 - \checkmark No effects for similar income debtors with adverse life events
 - \checkmark No effect on income distribution of bankruptcy filers
 - $\checkmark\,$ Effects too large to be mechanical effect of garnishing $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ less debt repayment
 - \checkmark No effect on % of people who file for bankruptcy
 - $\checkmark\,$ No effect on debt levels of people who are 90 days delinquent but don't file for bankruptcy

What type of borrowers accumulate shadow debt?

- · Goal: separate borrowers with and without observable negative shocks
- Guess a proxy for strategic debt accumulators
- "non-shocked debtors" \equiv filers with relatively discretionary debt:
 - 1 Medical debt < \$500
 - 2 Employed
 - **3** Not separated or divorced from spouse
- Test whether "shocked" or "non-shocked" debtors have the most elastic shadow debt
- ightarrow Results strongest for non-shocked debtors, mostly insignificant for shocked
- Both samples affected by minimum wage change, delay filing the same, accumulate fines and fees, but only the more-likely strategic group increases shadow debt

Only "Non-Shocked" Debtors Increase Shadow Debt

Dep. Variable:	Unsecure	ed Debt Share	Shad	dow Debt	Informal Shadow Debt		
Sample:	Shocked	Non-shocked	Shocked	Non-shocked	Shocked	Non-shocked	
Treatment ×	-0.002	-0.019***	-0.005	-0.046***	-0.011	-0.033*	
Garnishable Wages	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.018)	
Filer Controls	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Year Fixed Effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
District FEs	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
R^2	0.61	0.58	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	
Observations	28,267	19,693	28,267	19,693	28,267	19,693	

 $\rightarrow\,$ Robust to DDD, changing shocked definition

Treated filers' debt more likely 11th hour

Share of Debt Originated Within 6 Months of Filing					
Sample	Pooled	Shocked	Non-Shocked		
Treatment \times	-0.0028**	-0.0006	-0.0087**		
Garnishable Wages	(0.0013)	(0.0018)	(0.0042)		
Filer Controls	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Year FEs	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
District FEs	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
R^2	0.521	0.516	0.531		
Observations	76,909	60,819	16,090		

- \rightarrow \$4,000 increase in debt in last 6 months.
- Consistent with all shadow debt increase coming 6 months before filing.

Conclusion

- Shadow debt (from non-payment of goods/services) is a large balance sheet component for bankruptcy filers
 - · Nonpayment and informal debt is important margin for distressed households finances
 - o Credit bureau indebtedness not whole picture
- Shadow debt increases a lot right before filing among debtors nudged to delay filing
- May raise prices for non-defaulters \Rightarrow DWL
- Shadow debt increases for filers without obvious shocks
 - Inconsistent with selection, direct effects of minimum wage, mechanical effects, fees, etc.
 - Consistent with moral hazard in debt accumulation