Immigration Enforcement and Labor Supply: Hispanic Youth in Mixed-Status Families

By JOAQUIN ALFREDO-ANGEL RUBALCABA, JOSE R. BUCHELI, CAMILA N. MORALES*

In this study, we evaluate how immigration arrests impact the labor supply of US-born Hispanic adolescent youth living in mixed-status families. We base our empirical analysis on the theoretical framework of the added-worker effect, whereby the sudden unemployment shock of a household member spurs an interdependent labor supply response among other members. Specifically, we leverage the sudden increase in ICE arrests—above the local expected trend–to identify exogenous shocks to labor supply. Using local data on immigration-related arrests between 2014–2018 and data from the Current Population Survey, we find that a surge in ICE arrests by one standard deviation increased labor force participation of US-born Hispanics in mixed status-families by approximately 4-percentage points and hours worked by 20 percent.

Between 2014 and 2018, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducted approximately half a million arrests in the interior of the country—an effort that overwhelmingly affected Hispanic immigrants and, in many cases, their US-born children. It is estimated that 97 percent of immigrants deported

* Rubalcaba: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, jrubalca@unc.edu. Bucheli: New Mexico State University, jbucheli@nmsu.edu. Morales: The University of Texas at Dallas, camila.morales@utdallas.edu

during this period were of Latino descent,[1] and that over 140,000 of those deported had US-born children.[2] Still, this is a relatively small share of the approximately 4.1 million US-born children living in a family where at least one parent is unauthorized (Capps, Fix and Zong, 2016). While the enforcement of immigration policy mainly targets unauthorized immigrants, it also strains the socioeconomic wellbeing of US citizens, many of whom are children of immigrants. Previous research finds that intensified immigration enforcement impacts US citizens' labor outcomes, political engagement, poverty rates, and participation in social programs.[3] These negative effects could have been further amplified by the surge in ICE encounters with US citizens during the Trump Administration—27,540 during the first year alone, against 5,940 encounters during the final year of the Obama administration (Cantor, Ryo and Humphrey, 2019).[4] Yet, the relationship between immigration policy and US-citizen youth labor outcomes is largely understudied.

Our work addresses this gap in the literature by examining how intensified immigration enforcement impacts the labor supply of US-born Hispanic youth living in mixed-status families.[5] We base our empirical analysis on the theoretical framework of the added-worker effect, whereby the sudden unemployment shock of a household member spurs an interdependent labor supply response among

[1]See: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (2020)

[2]ICE bi-annual reports to Congress, e.g., `https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=817380`. Accessed October 2020.

[3]See, for example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014); Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2017); Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo and Sevilla (2018); Amuedo-Dorantes and Bucheli (2020); Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2015); East et al. (2018); Orrenius and Zavodny (2015); Watson (2014).

[4]ICE defines an "encounter" as "the interview, screening, and determination of [a person's] citizenship, nationality, and lawful presence [...], and legal right to remain in the United States of America." (AIC v. DHS (2013) as cited in Cantor, Ryo and Humphrey, 2019)

[5]Mixed-status families, as described in the literature, have been characterized as families where at least one member's immigration status differs from all other members.

other members (Lundberg, 1985). Specifically, we contend that a sudden increase in ICE arrests—above the local expected trend—stifles labor supply among non-citizen adults in mixed-status families, as unauthorized immigrants react to the increased risk of apprehension and deportation. We hypothesize that the negative employment shock induces US-born youth in these homes to enter the labor force to mitigate short term reductions in household income.

We test this hypothesis using data from the 2014–2018 basic monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and exogenous variation in the geographic and temporal distribution of immigration-related arrests observed for each MSA and month during this period. To capture the exogenous variation in ICE arrests, we construct a shock indicator that identifies periods of unusual enforcement activity above local trends.

Our analysis provides evidence that the intensification in immigration enforcement activities, as captured by a sudden increase in local ICE arrests, has led to an increase in the labor supply of US-born Hispanic adolescents (age 15 to 18) living in mixed-status families. We also observe a notable differential response by gender. Specifically, the shift in labor supply among adolescent women is concentrated along the extensive margin (labor force participation), while the shift in labor supply among adolescent men is concentrated along the intensive margin (hours worked).

We contribute and build upon two strands of literature. First, we broaden the literature of the added-worker effect by applying to the context of immigration enforcement and the labor market decisions of a mixed-status household. Much of this literature focuses on the labor supply response of wives whose husbands lose employment, with few studies exploring the changes in labor supply among other unaffected household members, such as children and youth. Extant evi-

dence presents mixed findings.[6] The lack of conclusive evidence is partly explained by the fact that changes in the labor supply of household members is one of many mitigating responses in the presence of an unexpected employment shock. Alternative strategies include the use of savings and borrowing; however, these likely play a limited role in the case of mixed-status households given that lack of legal immigration status of the head of household restrains access to banking and credit markets significantly. Thus, we argue that our context is more conducive to identifying an added-worker effect.

Second, our work contributes to a growing literature on the unintended consequences of immigration enforcement on US-citizens. Prior work documents that intensified immigration enforcement, as measured by the enactment of various interior immigration enforcement policies, leads to increased propensity for living in poverty (Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo and Sevilla, 2018), lower academic achievement (e.g., Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez, 2017; Bellows, 2019), and lower social programs take-up (Watson, 2014). Literature on the labor market effects of immigration enforcement has almost exclusively focused on migrants and likely unauthorized workers, and has found that the implementation of restrictive measures reduces their employment likelihood.[7]. Our work expands this literature in two ways. First, we consider the unintended consequences of immigration enforcement on the labor market outcomes of US-born youth—a largely

[6]Early studies find no evidence of an added-worker effect, attributing their results to the transitory nature of unemployment shocks (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Maloney, 1987). More recent papers find positive labor supply responses among married women (Kohara, 2010; Starr, 2014; Bredtmann, Otten and Rulff, 2018), some estimating large effects with the increase in wives' labor supply corresponding to over 25 percent of lost income (Stephens, Jr., 2002). Yet others argue for a diminishing role of marriage as a risk-sharing contract due to an increased positive correlation in employment probabilities within couples as a result of assortative matching on education levels (Juhn and Potter, 2007).

[7]See, for example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014); Kostandini, Mykerezi and Escalante (2014); Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2015); Orrenius and Zavodny (2015); Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo and Sevilla (2020).

understudied population in this context. Second, we construct a direct measure of immigration enforcement efforts using data on immigration arrests carried out in the US interior. This construct allows us to identify large unexpected increases in enforcement, even when the underlying policies remain unchanged. Evaluating the impact that enforcement measures have on the labor outcomes of US-citizen youth is crucial given the increasing diversification of this group and the long-term implications of disruptions in their education.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines the conceptual framework. Section II describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section III outlines the empirical framework and identification strategy. Section IV presents our findings. Section V summarizes and concludes.

I. Conceptual Framework

Our empirical analysis is motivated by the theoretical framework of the added-worker effect, which posits that the temporary unemployment spell of a household member can trigger a labor supply response among unaffected household members as a mechanism for consumption smoothing (Lundberg, 1985). We build upon this general framework and apply it to the context of labor supply decisions within a household of mixed immigration status under the threat of apprehension and potential deportation.

In our model, we consider the labor supply decisions of a mixed-status family where the parents are undocumented and at least one working-age child is a citizen. We assume the household makes labor supply decisions following a unitary model, such that their preferences can be represented by a utility function $U(X, L_U, L_C)$ where X denotes total consumption by the household, L_U indicates leisure time of the undocumented relative U, and L_C denotes leisure time of the

citizen individual C.[8] Hence, $H_i = (1 - L_i)$ denotes time devoted to market production by individual i, $i = \{U, C\}$, where time is normalized to 1. Following Lundberg (1985), we assume consumption and leisure to be complements, while the leisure time across the two household agents U and C are assumed to be substitutes.

The household faces a budget constraint whereby total consumption must not exceed the sum of total labor and total non-labor income R. Given a risk of apprehension, $r \in (0,1)$, that only affects the undocumented agent, total labor income for U is defined by $w_U(1-r)(1-L_U)$, where w_U is the exogenous hourly wage. Thus, the risk of apprehension acts as a tax proportional to U's labor wages. The household optimal labor supply choices are determined by maximizing utility subject to a single budget constraint:

$$\text{Max } U(X, L_U, L_C) \quad \text{subject to} \quad w_U(1-r)(1-L_U) + w_C(1-L_C) + R \geq X$$

The optimality conditions associated with the optimization problem equate agent's i marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption with their corresponding labor wages.[9] Thus, for each i the reservation wage, W_i^0, is defined as the corner solution given by the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at $L_i = 1$. Let $H_i^* = H(\tilde{w_U}, w_C, R) \geq 0$ denote the optimal labor supply that solves the above optimization problem, where $\tilde{w_U} = w_U(1-r)$ is the hourly wage rate net of the risk of apprehension. Thus, we can assess the impact of a change in immigration enforcement through a change in net wages associated with the undocumented household agent.

[8]For simplicity, we denote the undocumented parents as a single agent in the household assuming symmetric responses in labor supply to shocks in immigration enforcement.

[9]Specifically, $W_U(1-r) = \frac{U'_{L_U}}{U'_C}$ and $W_C = \frac{U'_{L_C}}{U'_C}$

Consider a large exogenous increase in the risk of apprehension, r, such that $(1-r)w_U < W_i^0$. Then, as own wages fall below the reservation wage, the undocumented agent exits the labor market leading to a decline in total income for the household. The response of the citizen agent will depend on the cross-wage elasticity of substitution and income effects. Given our assumption of substitutability between leisure time across agents, we expect a decline in leisure time for the citizen agent, corresponding to an increase in labor hours. As the price of leisure increases for the undocumented agent, the citizen agent responds by decreasing their own consumption of leisure. This is compounded by the decline in leisure associated with lower household income, assuming that leisure is a normal good. We utilize this framework to conceptualize the mechanisms behind the labor supply response of citizen youth. The empirical strategy however, takes a reduced-form approach where we estimate the impact of immigration enforcement directly on the labor force participation of citizen household members.

II. Data

The data analyzed in this study comes from the 2014–2018 basic monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). Our sample consists of US-born adolescent youth between the ages of 15 and 18 observed within an metropolitan statistical area (MSA) made available in the CPS.[10] We focus on labor force participation and hours worked in the previous week as the main outcomes of interest, while accounting for ethnicity, nativity, citizenship, and family characteristics. Although the CPS does not survey immigration status, respondents are asked to report their country of birth and U.S. citizenship. We use this information to identify US-born children living in a mixed-status family if at least one of the child's parent(s), also

[10]We restrict the sample to individuals in an identified MSA given that our identification strategy relies on ICE arrests aggregated at the MSA level.

observed in the same household, is not a US citizen.

In Table 1, we present summary statistics for our CPS sample of US-born children across mixed-status family typology. Column 1 presents the characteristics of US-born children in non-mixed-status families, where each parent reported being a US citizen.[11] Column 2 contains the characteristics of US-born children in mixed-status families, where at least one parent is not a US citizen. The estimates indicate that US-born children in non-mixed-status families participate in the labor force at higher rates; however, US-born children in mixed-status families work on average two hours longer. Additionally, US-born children in mixed-status and non-mixed-status families experienced 20 percent unemployment over our observation period. In terms of demographic characteristics, we see that 16.5 percent of children in non-mixed-status families identify as Hispanic, while 76.2 percent of US-born children in mixed-status families identify as Hispanic. Both age and gender compositions are similar across the two groups.

Finally, we gather data on month-by-county immigration-related arrests conducted by ICE between October 2014 and May 2018.[12] Given that most counties are not identified in the CPS public use file, we cross-walk ICE arrests observed at the county level to the MSA. All ICE arrests that occurred between October 2014 and May 2018 are illustrated in Figure 1. To capture sudden changes in local ICE arrests, we compute a 'shock' when the number of arrests in MSA m at time t increases by one standard deviation above the 6-month moving av-

[11] Note this includes US-born and naturalized citizens.

[12] Used in our analysis to capture respondents' overall exposure to immigration enforcement in a period in which several federal, state, and local immigration policies were active across the country, mainly Secure Communities and the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), 287(g) agreements, E-Verify mandates, and omnibus immigration laws (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bucheli, 2020). The implementation of these policies led to the detention and deportation of approximately 480,000 immigrants across the country during the 44 months included in our study. The data was obtained from TRAC.

erage.[13] This approach addresses concerns of potential MSA-specific trends in immigration enforcement.

III. Methodology

The objective of our empirical strategy is to identify the effect of intensified immigration enforcement on the labor supply of US-born adolescent youth. We leverage geographic and temporal variation in the sudden increase in immigration arrests conducted by ICE agents across MSAs and months. Our strategy assumes that shocks in immigration arrests are exogenous to our variable of interest, namely Hispanic youth labor outcomes, and unobserved MSA characteristics that may drive both labor outcomes and sudden changes in ICE arrests. Notably, the validity of our results does not depend on level differences in immigration enforcement intensity across MSAs, rather the unexpected change in arrests above the local 6-month trend.

The main threat to our identification relies on plausible reverse causality, whereby the sudden change in ICE arrests is explained by Hispanic youth labor force participation at the MSA level. We examine whether this is the case, using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), by regressing the number of annual immigration enforcement shocks on MSA-specific characteristics, including Hispanic labor outcomes, overall unemployment rate, adolescent youth labor force participation, and demographic characteristics. We find that the number of ICE arrests shocks in a given year is only predicted by the share of the MSA population that is Hispanic. As Table 2 indicates, none of the results estimated from several model specifications suggest that immigration arrests are endogenous to

[13] We standardize the MSA$\times$month number of arrests ($A_{t,m}$) using the moving average. ($\mu_{k=6,m}$) and moving standard deviation ($\sigma_{k=6,m}$) for the preceding 6-month period ($k=6$), where $Z_{t,m} = \frac{A_{t,m}-\mu_{k=6,m}}{\sigma_{k=6,m}}$

either overall or adolescent labor supply.

We further assume that immigration arrests, targeted towards unauthorized immigrants in a given locality, primarily impact families where at least one family member is not a US citizen. Thus, we expect that the effects of immigration enforcement on US-born adolescent youth's labor supply will be isolated to individuals who live in mixed-status households. Given this context, and the proportion of Hispanic children in mixed-status families presented in our summary statistics, we expect the treatment effects to be concentrated on US-born Hispanic adolescent youth in mixed-status families. As a falsification exercise, we estimate the impact of immigration arrest shocks on the labor outcomes of adolescent youth living in non-mixed-status families.

The empirical approach conducted in this study is presented over two models. The first model measures the impact of local ICE arrests shocks on labor supply along the extensive margin. The second model was designed to measure the same relationship, however, along the intensive margin. In the first model, we estimate the probability of labor force participation, $Pr(L_{imt})$, for individual i, in MSA m, at time t using the following logistic regression:

$$(1) \quad Pr(L_{imt} = 1) = \Lambda\left(\alpha S_{mt} + \eta H_i + \phi P_i + \tau(S_{mt} \cdot H_i \cdot P_i) + \theta_m + \theta_t + X'_{imt}\beta\right)$$

Labor force participation is represented by the indicator variable L_{imt}, where $L_{imt} = 1$ indicates that individual i, in MSA m at time t, participates in the labor force, and zero otherwise. S_{mt} is an indicator variable that identifies whether there was a shock to ICE arrests in MSA m at time t. H_i indicates Hispanic ethnicity for respondent i and P_i indicates whether the same respondent was observed to live in a mixed-status household. The vector X_{imt} includes individual characteristics as well as a set of two-way interaction between S_{mt}, H_i, and P_i.

Additionally, we account for both MSA fixed effects, θ_m, and time fixed effects, θ_t, measured in year-month periods between October 2014 and May 2018. he former is key to our identification as it controls for MSA-specific characteristics, such as time-invariant immigration enforcement intensity and Hispanic population share. Note that we limit our analysis to immediate labor supply responses contemporaneous to the immigration arrests shock, thus limiting possible household migration responses that would confound our results.

To evaluate the impact of ICE arrests on US-citizen Hispanic youth in mixed-status families, we restrict the sample to US-born citizens and model a three-way interaction between the shock indicator, S_{mt}, a Hispanic ethnicity indicator, and a mixed-status families indicator. We estimate the treatment effect as the cross partial marginal effect of the three-way interaction ($S_{mt} \cdot H_i \cdot P_i$). All regression estimates using equation 1 are presented as the calculated marginal effects.[14]

In the second model we evaluate the logged hours worked, $\ln h_{imt}$, using the following OLS model:

$$\ln h_{imt} = \alpha S_{mt} + \eta H_i + \phi P_i + \tau(S_{mt} \cdot H_i \cdot P_i) + \theta_m + \theta_t + X'_{imt}\beta + \mu_{imt}, \tag{2}$$

Equation 2 is modeled using the same independent variables described in equation 1. While the sample restriction follows the same scheme discussed above, we further restrict the sample to include only employed respondents. In both equations 1 and 2, we control for age, age squared, number of siblings, an eldest sibling indicator, a school enrollment indicator, a parental labor force participation indicator, a single parent indicator, as well as MSA and month-year fixed effects.

[14]For instance, the marginal effect for a shock to ICE arrest is calculated as: $\frac{\partial Pr(L_{imt})}{\partial S_{mt}} = \Lambda(\theta_m + \theta_t + \alpha S_{mt} + X'\beta)[1 - \Lambda(\theta_m + \theta_t + \alpha S_{mt} + X'\beta)]\alpha$

IV. Findings

Table 3, Panel A contains our primary results from our analysis of labor supply among US-born adolescent youth age 15 to 18. Columns 1 through 3 contain the results for labor force participation (extensive margin) and columns 4 through 6 the results for log hours worked (intensive margin). The pooled-sample results in Panel A reveal that a sudden and exogenous shock to ICE arrests increases labor force participation by approximately 4-percentage points among US-born Hispanic youth in mixed-status families. We also find that this effect is most likely attributable to US-born adolescent Hispanic women, age 15 to 18, in mixed-status families. The results in Column 2 were estimated using a split sample restricted to women, revealing that US-born adolescent Hispanic women in mixed-status families increased their labor force participation by approximately 5-percentage points in response to a shock in ICE arrests. Results from the split sample of men are positive, but not statistically significant.

Along the intensive margin, the results in column 4, Panel A reveal that a shock to ICE arrests led to an overall increase in the hours worked among US-born Hispanic adolescent youth by approximately 20 percent. We also find that the number of hours worked among US-born adolescent Hispanic men in mixed-status families increased by approximately 18 percent. Results from the split sample of women are positive, but not statistically significant.

Our identification strategy requires that the labor effects of ICE arrests are isolated to US-citizen adolescents in mixed-status families. Thus, if the treatment effects presented in Panel A are correctly identified, we should not observe any changes among US-citizen adolescent youth with US-citizen parents or non-US-citizen adolescents. To test the validity of the first condition, we conduct a simple falsification test by repeating the analysis on the sample of US-born adolescent

youth in *non-mixed-status* families. Panel B in Table 3 presents the results of this exercise. As expected, the estimates show no evidence that ICE arrest shocks affect the labor supply of Hispanic adolescents living with US-citizen parents.

Finally, we verify the validity of the second identifying assumption by gauging whether the impact of ICE arrests on labor supply is unique to US-born adolescent youth. Given that non-citizen children face the same limitation as their non-citizen parents, it is expected that the labor supply of non-citizen adolescent youth will remain unaffected or potentially decrease during periods of intensified immigration enforcement. To investigate this, we evaluate equations (1) and (2) using a sample of non-citizen youth and find that shocks in ICE arrests did not affect the labor supply of this group (Table 3, Panel C). This suggests that our estimated effects in Panel A are not driven by MSA-specific economic conditions or other local characteristics, as they would have affected other groups as well. Overall, these results support our main findings that ICE arrests affect the labor supply of US-born Hispanic adolescent youth living in mixed-status families along the intensive and extensive margins.

V. Summary and Conclusion

Existing literature shows that intensified enforcement of US immigration policies has affected both immigrants and their US-born children across various dimensions. This study, shows that ICE arrests lead to an increase in labor force participation and hours worked among US-born Hispanic adolescent youth living in mixed-status families. Using local data on immigration-related arrests between 2014–2018 and data from the CPS, we estimate an increase in ICE arrests by one standard deviation increased labor force participation by approximately 4-percentage points and hours worked by 20 percent. When evaluated across

gender, we find that these estimates are mostly driven by US-born Hispanic adolescent women along the extensive margin and US-born Hispanic adolescent men along the intensive margin.

We consider these treatment effects to be lower-bound estimates for two reasons. First, we model labor supply responses that occur contemporaneously to the ICE arrest shock. Thus, estimates only capture the immediate change in labor supply. Second, we are unable to determine immigrants' legal immigration status using the CPS data. Our treatment group includes US-born children whose parent(s) are non-citizens, but their immigration status may be authorized or unauthorized. While the treatment (a sudden increase in ICE arrest) is identified, the treatment group (mixed-status families) includes some families that may be unaffected by the treatment. Evidence from our falsification test suggests that the labor supply of US-born children in *non-mixed status families* was not affected by ICE arrests. It is reasonable to assume that labor supply among US-born children, whose non-citizen parent(s) are authorized, is also unaffected by ICE arrests.

TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS: US-BORN ADOLESCENT YOUTH (AGE 15 TO 18)

	Non-Mixed-Status Families	Mixed-Status Families
	(1)	*(2)*
Labor force participation (%)	0.211	0.151
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Hours worked last week	18	20
	(0.075)	(0.264)
Unemployment Rate (%)	0.202	0.200
	(0.003)	(0.008)
Hispanic (%)	0.165	0.762
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Age	16	16
	(0.003)	(0.008)
Women (%)	0.489	0.489
	(0.001)	(0.004)
Observations	153,495	18,463

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for a sample of US-born adolescent youth between the ages of 15 and 18 observed in the CPS. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample between US-born adolescent youth who were observed to live in a non-mixed-status or mixed-status family. The standard errors for each mean or proportion are presented below the respective estimate in parentheses.

TABLE 2—ENDOGENEITY CHECK: DOES HISPANIC LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION PREDICT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SHOCKS?

	(1) Number of annual IE shocks	(2) Proportion of year with an IE shock
Hispanic LFP rate	-4.729	-0.394
	(3.011)	(0.251)
Hispanic share in labor force	-15.870	-1.322
	(27.366)	(2.280)
Hispanic unemployment rate	1.067	0.089
	(3.623)	(0.302)
Unemployment rate	-15.746	-1.312
	(13.316)	(1.110)
Adolescent youth LFP rate (16 to 19)	1.991	0.166
	(3.582)	(0.298)
Share of non-US-citizens (2010 ref. pop.)	19.031	1.586
	(26.261)	(2.188)
Share of Hispanics (2010 ref. pop.)	43.396*	3.616*
	(23.182)	(1.932)
Year and MSA FE	✓	✓
Observations	1146	1146
R^2	0.326	0.326

Notes: All specifications include a constant, year fixed effects, and MSA fixed effects. MSA-level immigration enforcement shocks are defined as deviations greater or equal to one standard deviation above the MSA's 6-month moving average in ICE arrests. All variables are aggregated at the MSA×year level. Annual MSA controls were obtained from the 2015–2017 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



FIGURE 1. ICE ARRESTS BY MSA (OCTOBER 2014–MAY 2018)

TABLE 3—ICE ARRESTS & LABOR SUPPLY: US-BORN HISPANIC ADOLESCENT YOUTH (AGE 15 TO 18)

Panel A: US-born citizens						
	Labor Force Participation			ln(*Hours Worked*)		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
Enforcement Increase	0.037*	0.055**	0.024	0.200***	0.161	0.187*
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.085)	(0.138)	(0.108)
Dependent variable mean	0.205	0.219	0.197	2.684	2.645	2.727
Controls	x	x	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R2				0.146	0.148	0.163
No. Obs	171,208	80,774	87,522	28,814	14,887	13,920
Panel B: US-born citizens with citizen parents as a falsification test						
	Labor Force Participation			ln(*Hours Worked*)		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
Enforcement Increase	-0.001	-0.004	0.001	-0.018	-0.007	-0.021
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Dependent variable mean	0.224	0.237	0.212	2.663	2.624	2.706
Controls	x	x	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R2				0.143	0.152	0.162
No. Obs	132,992	63,902	69,012	24,019	12,508	11,500
Panel C: Non US citizens						
	Labor Force Participation			ln(*Hours Worked*)		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
Enforcement Increase	-0.02	-0.049	0.001	0.001	0.094	-0.194
	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.089)	(0.134)	(0.154)
Dependent variable mean	0.171	0.161	0.190	2.832	2.758	2.896
Controls	x	x	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R2				0.245	0.214	0.31
No. Obs	11,720	5,398	5,795	1,575	714	846

Notes: This table presents the regression results. Results in Panel A were estimated using a sample of US-born adolescent youth between the ages of 15 and 18. Results in Panel B were estimated using a sample of US-born adolescent youth between the ages of 15 and 18 whose parent(s) are US citizens (non-mixed-status families). Results in Panel C were estimated using a sample of non-citizen adolescent youth between the ages of 15 and 18. Columns 1 through 3 in each panel contains the treatment effect estimated in the logit model, where labor force participation is the dependent variable. Columns 4 through 6 in each panel contains the treatment effect coefficient estimated in the log-linear OLS model, where logged hours worked is the dependent variable. The covariates for each model include age, age squared, number of siblings, eldest sibling indicator, school enrollment indicator, parental labor force participation indicator, single parent indicator, as well as MSA and month-year fixed effects. All results were estimated using robust standard errors which were also clustered at the MSA level. The standard errors for each mean or proportion are presented below the respective estimate in parentheses.

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