

The Long and Short (Run) of Trade Elasticities*

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Abstract

We propose a novel approach to estimate the trade elasticity at various horizons. When countries change Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, partners that trade on MFN terms experience plausibly exogenous tariff changes. The differential growth rates of imports from these countries relative to a control group – countries not subject to the MFN tariff scheme – can be used to identify the trade elasticity. We build a panel dataset combining information on product-level tariffs and trade flows covering 1995-2018, and estimate the trade elasticity at short and long horizons using local projections ([Jordà, 2005](#)). Our main findings are that the elasticity of tariff-exclusive trade flows in the year following the exogenous tariff change is about -0.76 , and the long-run elasticity ranges from -1.75 to -2.25 . Our long-run estimates are smaller than typical in the literature, and it takes 7-10 years to converge to the long run, implying that (i) the welfare gains from trade are high and (ii) there are substantial convexities in the costs of adjusting export participation.

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1 Introduction

The elasticity of trade flows to trade barriers – the “trade elasticity” – is the central parameter in international economics. Quantifications of the impact of shocks or trade policies on trade flows, GDP, and welfare hinge on its magnitude. However, there is currently no consensus on the value of this parameter, with a variety of empirical strategies delivering a broad range of estimates.¹

This paper develops and implements a novel approach to estimating trade elasticities. Our principal contributions are to simultaneously address (i) endogeneity due to possible reverse causality and omitted variables, and (ii) variation across time horizons. The main results are as follows. First, our estimate of the long-run elasticity of trade values exclusive of tariff payments is -1.75 to -2.25 , which is at the lower end of the range of existing estimates. This implies that the welfare-relevant (i.e., tariff-inclusive) long-run elasticity is around 1 in absolute value, and thus the gains from trade implied by most static trade models are large. Second, the trade elasticity in the year following the initial tariff change is -0.76 , and it takes several years for it to converge to the long-run value. The trade elasticity point estimate stabilizes between years 7 and 10.

To obtain these estimates, our first contribution is to highlight the role of omitted variables. The theoretical foundations of the gravity equation emphasize the need to control for exporter and importer multilateral resistance terms, structurally (Anderson, 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) or with appropriate fixed effects (e.g. Redding and Venables, 2004; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). We show that the traditional log-levels gravity specification with multilateral resistance fixed effects yields the conventional wisdom elasticities of -3 to -7 . However, multilateral resistance terms do not absorb aggregate or product-specific bilateral taste shocks or other unobserved bilateral gravity variables. Omitting these unobservables can lead to large elasticity estimates – for instance if tariffs are low when the taste shocks are high. Once we augment the traditional specification with a richer set of fixed effects to soak up bilateral unobserved gravity variables and taste shocks, conventional OLS log-levels estimates fall sharply to around 1 in absolute value.

Our second contribution is to address residual reverse causality between trade flows and tariffs, conditional on the rich fixed effects. The identification strategy relies on the key institutional feature of the WTO system: the MFN principle. Under this principle, a country must apply the same tariffs to all its WTO member trade partners. We estimate the trade elasticity based on the response of minor exporters to an importer’s MFN tariff change. The identifying assumption is that developments in the minor exporters do not affect a country’s decision to change its MFN import tariffs. Our estimation procedure then compares the minor exporters’ trade flows to a control group of exporters to the same country to whom MFN tariffs do not apply. These are countries in preferential trade agreements with the importer. Addressing the reverse causality produces larger elasticities in absolute

¹Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Head and Mayer (2015) review available estimates.

value than OLS.

Our third contribution is to provide estimates over different time horizons, ranging from impact to 10 years. Because tariff changes can be autocorrelated, to estimate elasticities at longer horizons we use time series methods, namely local projections (Jordà, 2005). This approach takes into account the fact that tariffs themselves may have a nontrivial dynamic impulse response structure, implying the elasticities of trade flows at different horizons might depend on the pattern of autocorrelation of tariffs. One useful outcome of this exercise is that we can compare short- and long-run elasticities obtained within the same estimation framework. It is well-known that trade elasticities estimated from cross-sectional variation in tariffs tend to be much higher than the short-run elasticities needed to fit international business cycle moments. Normally, this divergence is rationalized by assuming that the elasticities estimated from the cross-section essentially reflect the long run. However, existing estimates either use purely cross-sectional variation (e.g. Caliendo and Parro, 2015), or a time difference over only one horizon (e.g. Head and Ries, 2001; Romalis, 2007). In both cases it is unclear whether what is being estimated is a long-run elasticity, an elasticity over a fixed time horizon, or a mix of short- and long-run elasticities. Our exercise provides mutually consistent estimates of the short- and the long-run elasticities, as well as their full path over time. In addition, we explore sectoral heterogeneity in trade elasticities. Across 11 broad HS sections, the long-run values range from -0.75 to -5 .

Our analysis uses data on global international trade flows from BACI, and tariffs from UN TRAINS. The sample covers 183 economies, over 5,000 HS 6-digit categories, and the time period 1995-2018.

Our empirical strategy is deliberately not tied to a particular theory, because we expect that our estimates can serve as targets for multiple theories. The mapping between our estimates and structural parameters in theoretical models will then depend on model structure. To illustrate this, the final section of the paper presents a simple dynamic model, focusing on the minimal common structure required to produce sluggish adjustment to trade cost shocks.² Our framework nests dynamic versions of the Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003), and Arkolakis (2010) models, as well as extensions with pricing to market (e.g. Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo, 2003; Atkeson and Burstein, 2008). The model delivers analytical expressions for trade elasticities at all horizons that clarify the determinants of the adjustment dynamics. In this setting, we (i) state the short- and long-run model-implied elasticities and the properties of their time path; (ii) show that this framework delivers our empirical estimating equations to first order; and (iii) show that the calibrated dynamic model easily delivers a long-building response of trade to tariff shocks, consistent with the empirical estimates.

Finally, we apply our elasticity estimates to the Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012)

²The recent literature on trade dynamics is rich in both substantive mechanisms and quantification (see, among many others, Costantini and Melitz, 2007; Ruhl, 2008; Burstein and Melitz, 2013; Drozd and Nosal, 2012; Alessandria and Choi, 2014; Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014; Ruhl and Willis, 2017; Fitzgerald, Haller, and Yedid-Levi, 2019).

gains from trade formula. To do that, we must account for the fact that our left-hand side variable is trade values exclusive of tariff payments, whereas the elasticity that enters gains from trade formulas is that of tariff-inclusive spending. Our estimates imply an elasticity relevant for computing the welfare gains from trade of about -1 . Under this value, the gains from trade are 5-6 times larger than under the commonly used elasticity of -5 .

Related Literature [Anderson and van Wincoop \(2004\)](#) and [Head and Mayer \(2015\)](#) review existing trade elasticity estimates. One common approach is to use tariff variation to estimate this elasticity (e.g. [Head and Ries, 2001](#); [Romalis, 2007](#); [Caliendo and Parro, 2015](#); [Imbs and Mejean, 2015, 2017](#)). Other methods exploit differences in prices across locations ([Eaton and Kortum, 2002](#); [Simonovska and Waugh, 2014](#); [Giri, Yi, and Yilmazkuday, 2020](#)). Existing estimates do not attempt to address the reverse causality of tariffs with respect to trade flows, and do not distinguish different time horizons. An alternative is to estimate an elasticity of substitution structurally (e.g. [Feenstra, 1994](#); [Broda and Weinstein, 2006](#); [Feenstra et al., 2018](#); [Soderbery, 2015, 2018](#)). In some environments the substitution elasticity governs the trade elasticity, but in others it does not. Our empirical strategy is not confined to environments in which the trade elasticity coincides with the elasticity of substitution.

An important recent strand of the literature uses customs data to estimate firm-level elasticities of exports to tariffs, and aggregates firm-level responses to recover macro elasticities (see, among others, [Bas, Mayer, and Thoenig, 2017](#); [Fitzgerald and Haller, 2018](#); [Fontagné, Martin, and Orefice, 2018](#)). Often, similar to our strategy, the identifying variation comes from comparisons of MFN and non-MFN destinations. Our approach complements these firm-level analyses. The customs data have the clear advantage of the forensic precision with which different dimensions of firm-level responses to tariffs can be pinned down. On the other hand, this approach normally uses data for a limited set of countries (most often 1) and years, making it challenging to control for multilateral resistance terms and/or exploit time series variation in tariffs for identification.^{3,4}

[Bown and Crowley \(2016\)](#) describe the empirical features of tariff policy in general, and the MFN system in particular. A feature of MFN tariffs important for our purposes is that countries negotiate upper bounds on MFN tariffs, and are then free to set actual MFN tariffs anywhere below those bounds. In the data, a significant fraction of MFN tariffs is actually below the bounds, and thus countries can vary them without violating their WTO commitments. There is a voluminous theo-

³While our work focuses on estimating constant elasticities in the tradition of much of the literature, several contributions also explore environments with non-constant elasticities (e.g. [Novy, 2013](#); [Adão, Arkolakis, and Ganapati, 2020](#); [Lind and Ramondo, 2020](#)).

⁴An exception to the common finding of high long-run trade elasticities is [Sequeira \(2016\)](#), who estimates a virtually zero elasticity of trade flows to tariffs for the Mozambique-South Africa preferential trade agreement. The proposed explanation for this result is that high levels of corruption in Mozambique imply that firms rarely pay the tariffs in the first place. This mechanism is unlikely to account for the comparatively low elasticities we find in worldwide data.

retical and empirical literature on trade policy, both unilateral and within the framework of trade agreements, synthesized most recently in [Bagwell and Staiger \(2016\)](#). This literature emphasizes endogeneity of tariffs to a variety of factors, and thus calls for an effort to overcome that endogeneity in estimation.

A more recent literature has focused on the impact of the 2017-2019 US-China trade war. Closely related to our paper is [Fajgelbaum et al. \(2020\)](#), who use the trade war as a shock to simultaneously estimate demand and supply elasticities. Our approach in contrast isolates variation coming from the responses of third countries to incidents like the trade war. Our estimates are complementary in that we provide both short- and long-run estimates, which at the current moment is naturally impossible in the context of the trade war.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the econometric framework and the identification strategy. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 the main results. Section 5 connects the estimates to theory. Section 6 concludes.

2 Estimation Framework

2.1 The horizon- h trade elasticity

As the objective of this paper is to estimate elasticities of trade volumes to trade cost shocks at different time horizons, we start with a definition of a horizon-specific trade elasticity. Let i and j index countries, p products, and t time. Let $X_{i,j,p,t}$ be the exports of p from j to i , and $\phi_{i,j,p,t}$ the “iceberg” trade cost. Denote by Δ_h a time difference in a variable between periods $t - 1$ and $t + h$: $\Delta_h x_t \equiv x_{t+h} - x_{t-1}$.

Definition. For $\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t} \neq 0$ the *horizon- h trade elasticity* ε^h is defined as

$$\varepsilon^h = \frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}}. \quad (2.1)$$

Both conceptually and for the purposes of estimation, it is important to take into account the fact that trade costs follow a stochastic process, and the h -horizon change $\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}$ is a cumulation of a sequence of period-to-period changes that occurred between t and $t + h$. A useful way to think about this horizon- h -specific trade elasticity is as follows. Suppose an unanticipated shock to trade costs occurs at time t . The denominator $\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}$ captures the effect of this shock on trade costs h periods into the future relative to time $t - 1$. It can thus be thought of as a horizon- h impulse response. Similarly, the numerator $\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}$ captures the effect of the time- t shock to $\ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}$ and of the subsequent changes in $\ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}$ on trade flows h periods into the future.

This discussion makes clear that both the numerator $\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}$ and the denominator $\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}$ can be thought of as sequences following the initial shock. They jointly inform the behavior of dynamic models, which study how trade adjusts to changes in trade costs.

Traditionally, models of international trade are static, representing a metaphor for the long run. Thus, parameterizing these models requires the long-run elasticity ε , defined as the limit:

$$\varepsilon = \lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}},$$

if it exists. This limit measures the permanent change in trade flows that accompanies a permanent change in trade costs.

2.2 Estimating equations

In practice, we will use tariff variation to estimate ε^h . Let the total trade costs be multiplicative in gross ad valorem tariffs $\tau_{i,j,p,t}$ and non-tariff costs $\kappa_{i,j,p,t}$:

$$\phi_{i,j,p,t} = \kappa_{i,j,p,t} \cdot \tau_{i,j,p,t}.$$

Then $\varepsilon^h = \Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} / \Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$.

Consider a change in tariffs $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ between $t - 1$ and t . We estimate the following equation using local projections ([Jordà, 2005](#)):

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \beta_X^h \Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t}^{X,h} + \delta_{j,p,t}^{X,h} + \delta_{i,j,p}^{X,h} + u_{i,j,p,t}^{X,h}, \quad (2.2)$$

where the δ 's are fixed effects.

The estimating equation (2.2) is deliberately reduced-form and not tied to a particular theory. We posit a fairly general estimating equation that can be viewed as time-differenced gravity, and our objective is to develop a set of estimates that can potentially serve as targets for multiple theories. Indeed, it is common in both macroeconomics and trade that multiple microfoundations lead to the same estimating equation. For instance, many business cycle models have a vector autoregression (VAR) representation ([Sims, 1980](#); [Canova and Sala, 2009](#)). In trade, the gravity relationship can be derived from Armington, Ricardian, and monopolistic competition models ([Head and Mayer, 2015](#)). We relate the econometric estimates to a tractable dynamic model in Section 5. This model delivers estimating equation (2.2) and illustrates that the fixed effects capture dynamic analogues of multilateral resistance terms.

The coefficient β_X^h in (2.2) captures the change in trade flows h periods ahead that follows an initial

one-period change in tariffs: $\frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}}$. One might be tempted to use β_X^h as an estimate of the horizon- h trade elasticity. If $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ was a one-time change in tariffs (that is, $\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} = \Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$), β_X^h is indeed an estimate of ε^h for all h . We can, and do, estimate β_X^h , but it is often misleading as a measure of the trade elasticity if—following the initial change $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ —tariffs themselves keep changing during the next h periods. For instance, if a tariff reduction in the initial year tends to be followed by further tariff reductions, we would attribute a large change in trade flows to a small initial tariff change not taking into account the impact of subsequent, dependent, tariff decreases. The opposite would happen if tariffs were mean-reverting, such that initial reductions tend to be followed by increases. The h -period change in trade volumes thus conflates the impact of the initial- and subsequent-period tariff changes. Below we show that in the data, tariffs do continue to change following an initial impulse.

To account for this, we estimate a local projection of the h -period tariff change on the initial shock in tariffs:

$$\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} = \beta_\tau^h \Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t}^{\tau,h} + \delta_{j,p,t}^{\tau,h} + \delta_{i,j,p}^{\tau,h} + u_{i,j,p,t}^{\tau,h}, \quad (2.3)$$

where the impact effect of tariffs on tariffs is $\beta_\tau^0 = 1$ by definition.

The horizon- h trade elasticity can then be recovered as $\varepsilon^h = \frac{\beta_X^h}{\beta_\tau^h}$. This estimation is carried out at different horizons $h = 0, \dots, H$, to trace the full profile of ε^h over h . In practice, the period length is a year and we use a maximum horizon of $H = 10$, as discussed in Section 3. If the estimates of β_X^h and β_τ^h stabilize within 10 years of the shock, we interpret it as convergence of both the numerator and the denominator in (2.1), rendering our estimates informative about the long-run trade elasticity. While Section 5 provides a detailed discussion of the convergence to the long-run elasticity in the context of a class of models, this interpretation is not confined to a particular theoretical framework.

Conventional estimation A common approach to estimating the long-run elasticity ε starts from a static gravity equation: $\ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \beta \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t} + u_{i,j,p,t}$, and relies on either cross-sectional variation or a single-horizon difference of this equation. The coefficient β is interpreted as an estimate of the long-run elasticity ε . Typically, specifications include multilateral resistance fixed effects but no bilateral fixed effects.

Conventional approaches cannot speak to the horizon- h trade elasticity. This is immediate for log-levels estimates, which mostly use cross-sectional variation for identification. However, it is also true for estimates in differences. A research design that estimates an elasticity based on, say, 5-year differences in both tariffs and trade ignores the timing of tariff changes. A 5-year tariff change of a given magnitude could be due to shocks at the beginning or the end of the five year period. As a result, a 5-year difference specification will estimate a conflation of horizon-0 to horizon-5 trade elasticities. This observation suggests the use of macroeconometric methods to estimate the trade

elasticity.

We formalize this argument based on our model in Section 5. Appendix Proposition C.1 shows that estimation in h -period differences does not generally identify the horizon- h trade elasticity. If tariffs follow a random walk, estimation in h -period differences instead identifies the simple average of horizon-0 to horizon- h trade elasticities.

A corollary is that estimation in long differences will not necessarily identify the long-run trade elasticity since many tariff shocks could have occurred close to the end-point of the difference. We will also show below that estimation approaches based predominantly on cross-sectional variation likely suffer from omitted variable problems. Thus, we argue that our long-run estimates are likely preferable to the conventional alternatives even for researchers only interested in the long-run elasticity for calibrating a static trade model.

2.3 Identification

Estimating equation (2.2) by OLS would be similar to the common approach in the literature that treats all tariff variation as exogenous, except that we explicitly highlight magnitude differences across time horizons. In practice tariffs are set by governments which, in turn, are influenced by lobbyists, and subject to the WTO policy framework. There are three concerns with viewing applied tariff changes as exogenous. First, it is possible that a third factor in the importing country drives both tariff changes and changes in trade flows. A newly elected government, for instance, could change not only tariffs but also other policies that affect import demand. In a similar spirit, business cycle fluctuations could induce governments to change tariffs (Bown and Crowley, 2013; Lake and Linask, 2016). Again, imports would change in part because of the tariff change, and in part due to the changes in economic conditions. Further, a taste shock for a product from a specific source country could trigger both larger imports of the product and lower tariffs on that product due to lobbying. Second, there could be reverse causality, whereby the importer's government changes tariffs because of observed or anticipated changes in trade patterns (e.g. Trefler, 1993). Third, foreign governments could influence the importer's government to change tariffs, either through the WTO body, or through other channels (Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins, 2006; Antràs and Padró i Miquel, 2011).

An instrument for tariff changes is difficult to find, as changes in trade policy are unlikely to ever be orthogonal to economic activity in general and trade flows in particular. We turn to the WTO's MFN tariff system to construct a plausibly exogenous instrument. All WTO member countries are bound by treaty to apply tariffs uniformly to all other WTO countries. Thus, when a WTO country changes its MFN tariffs, those tariffs change for all of its partners that trade on MFN terms. Of course, when a country changes its MFN rate on a product, it might do so due to concerns about

imports from an important partner country, or lobbying by an important partner country. The baseline instrument uses the insight that third countries are also affected by this tariff change if they are MFN partners. From the point of view of these third countries, the tariff change is plausibly exogenous. The response of imports from these third countries can then identify the trade elasticity. To address concerns that trade flows at the country-product level might be trending over time, we use as a control group countries unaffected by the MFN tariff change because they do not trade on MFN terms. These are countries in preferential trade agreements (PTAs).

Our baseline instrument is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr} = & \mathbf{1} \left(\tau_{i,j,p,t} = \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right) \times \mathbf{1} \left(\tau_{i,j,p,t-1} = \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right) \\ & \times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t-1 \text{ in aggregate} \right) \\ & \times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t-1 \text{ at product level} \right) \\ & \times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t \text{ in aggregate} \right) \\ & \times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t \text{ at product level} \right) \\ & \times \left[\ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} - \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The first two indicators simply say that the applied MFN tariff is binding for the countries and product in question both in the initial $t-1$ and final period t . The next four indicators relate to whether the exporter is a major trading partner in $t-1$ or t , either in terms of aggregate trade, or in terms of trade in product p . At both the aggregate and the product levels, a trading partner is coded as major if its rank is in the top 10.⁵ Finally $\ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} - \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}}$ is simply the log change in the tariff from $t-1$ to t .

Note that the instrument conditions on minor trading partners. We presume that endogeneity concerns that survive the fixed effects will mostly apply to the importer's major MFN trading partners. Thus, major MFN partners are dropped from the sample. We stress that the classification into major and minor trading partners is from the perspective of each individual importer. As we show below, this filter does not produce a treated group composed of only small countries. This is because large countries are often minor trading partners from the perspective of individual importing countries.

Then, we estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) using $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr}$ as the instrument for the one year endogenous tariff change $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$. Further, we can directly estimate the horizon- h trade elasticity based on the specification

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \beta^h \Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t}^h + \delta_{j,p,t}^h + \delta_{i,j,p}^h + u_{i,j,p,t}^h, \quad (2.4)$$

⁵We also carried out the analysis considering the top 5 partners as major. The results were very similar.

where we instrument for $\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ with $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr}$. Note that this specification simply combines the two instrumented local projections (2.2)-(2.3) and directly identifies the trade elasticity at horizon h : $\hat{\beta}^h$ is an estimator of ε^h . Estimating (2.4) has the advantage that standard errors for the elasticity estimates are easier to compute.

While our baseline estimates treat the trade elasticity as invariant across product categories, below we also estimate these specifications for broad product groups to obtain a distribution of β_p^h 's.

Discussion To succinctly state the source of the identifying variation: we compare the changes in imports from countries hit by a plausibly exogenous tariff change to the changes in imports from countries to whom those tariff changes did not apply. The “treatment” countries experienced tariff changes because they are part of the MFN system. The “control” countries did not experience the MFN tariff changes because they trade on different terms.

This “instrumented diff-in-diffs” setup sets a high bar for identification in the following sense. First, the instrument and our estimating equation are differenced, eliminating all time-invariant factors. Second, the estimating equations include importer-product-time and exporter-product-time fixed effects, as well as a time-invariant source-destination-product fixed effects. The former are the changes in multilateral resistance terms, that absorb time-varying importer- or exporter-product-specific demand or supply shocks, as well as broad tariff changes by a country across a number of products simultaneously. The source-destination-product fixed effects absorb trends in product-specific impacts of bilateral resistance forces like distance, addressing concerns about any gravity variables that survive time differencing. These fixed effects also soak up bilateral taste shocks for a product (in levels or trends), that could be correlated with tariffs applied on the product.

The identification problem then arises entirely from time-varying, bilateral, non-tariff barriers $\Delta_h \ln \kappa_{i,j,p,t}$, or other time-varying, bilateral product-specific supply or demand shocks. The residual tariff changes may still be the result of deliberate actions aimed at a specific partner and a specific product. After eliminating the trade partners that are the likely targets of these tariffs, the instrument isolates plausibly exogenous variation in tariff changes. Finally, by only identifying the elasticity from the differential growth rate of the “treatment” group exports relative to a “control” group of countries in PTAs, we leverage the time-series dimension of the data. Relying on the time series variation also makes it straightforward to estimate how the trade response varies over different horizons.

Section 4.3 contains further discussion of threats to identification, alternative instruments, as well as extensive robustness checks.

2.4 Institutional background and examples of MFN tariff changes

To understand why countries change MFN tariffs, we provide some institutional background and discuss some examples.⁶ When countries join the WTO, their accession treaty sets maximum MFN tariff rates (“bounds”) that they can impose on imports from WTO member countries. These MFN bounds are country- and product- specific, and vary from very low rates for developed countries and large economies to much higher rates for developing countries. For instance, the average bound rate is 3.5% in the US, 10.0% in China, and 48.6% in India. The number of products covered by the bounds is also negotiated and varies by country. In many countries, including the US and China, 100% of products are covered by the bounds. By contrast, 74% of products are subject to MFN bounds in India, and 50% in Turkey. The bounds themselves vary substantially across products. In the US in 2015, about 40% of products had a bound of 0, while about one-tenth of products had bounds above 10%. Once these MFN bounds are set, they rarely change, except in subsequent rounds of WTO negotiations. As such, changes in MFN bounds do not provide sufficient variation for an instrument.

In practice, actual applied MFN tariffs are frequently far below the bounds. Thus, countries can and do legally vary their applied tariffs below the bounds. Some motives are business-cycle related. For instance Turkey raised a number of MFN tariffs temporarily around its financial crisis. The tariffs were lowered again post-crisis. Similar patterns were observed in Argentina. Sometimes the rationale for changing the MFN rates is less clear – India raises and lowers tariffs on varied products year-to-year. Finally, MFN rates might also be changed while countries are engaged in a trade war. China lowered MFN rates on 1449 consumer goods and 1585 industrial products while raising tariffs on the US as part of the US-China trade war in 2018. As a result, China’s average tariffs on the US were 20.7% in late 2018, while those faced by other exporters to China were only 6.7%, on average. Since the US was the motivation for these MFN tariff changes, they are plausibly exogenous from the perspective of small exporters to China.⁷

This discussion makes clear the endogeneity of many tariff changes, and the rationale for the inclusion of a rich set of fixed effects (to remove business cycles and broad partner-specific variation). Further, the US-China trade war example illustrates the need to eliminate major partners from the instrument, in order to isolate the exogenous component of MFN tariff changes for third countries.

⁶Further details can be found in [Bown and Crowley \(2016\)](#). We are grateful to Chad Bown for useful suggestions and examples.

⁷See the [blogpost](#) by Bown, Jung and Zhang in June 2019 for a discussion.

3 Data and Basic Patterns

Our trade dataset is the BACI version of UN-COMTRADE, covering years 1995-2018. The data contain information on the trade partners, years, and product codes at the HS 6-digit level of disaggregation, as well as the value and quantity traded. We link these data to information on tariffs from the TRAINS dataset, also covering 1995-2018. This dataset includes information on the applied and the MFN tariffs. The applied tariffs can differ from MFN tariffs for country pairs that are part of a PTA. Unfortunately, for many countries comprehensive information on tariff rates is often not available before they join the WTO. The sample covers 183 economies and over 5,000 HS6 categories.

We drop observations for which trade is subject to non-ad valorem (specific or compound) tariffs. For these tariffs TRAINS reports ad-valorem equivalents. However, computation of these equivalents requires data on quantities, which are often noisy and could also endogenously respond to changes in tariffs. Since the large majority of MFN tariffs are ad valorem, the impact of dropping these observations for our sample size is small.⁸

The most detailed product classification available in the trade data is at the HS6 level. However, we face the constraint that the data are provided in several different revisions of HS codes. Further, even within the same year, countries sometimes report trade flows in different vintages of HS codes.⁹ While some concordances of HS6 codes over time are available, we do not implement these fully as they necessitate splitting values of trade across product codes in different revisions or aggregating product codes. As we do not observe transaction-level trade, any such split will introduce composition effects into our tariff measures. In particular, we could have spurious tariff changes coming from averaging tariffs when product codes are combined over time. Instead, our definition of a product is an HS6 code of a specific revision, tracked over time. We link product codes across revisions only when there is a one-to-one mapping between the codes across revisions. This approach is conservative, but it does reduce the effective sample size – and hence widens the standard errors – for any very long run elasticity estimates, as over a longer horizon there will be fewer product codes that map uniquely across revisions. Hence, the maximum horizon over which we estimate the trade elasticity in the baseline analysis is 10 years, which typically corresponds to only one transition in HS revisions. Appendix Table A1 provides the fraction of codes that map uniquely across revisions. In a single revision transition, on average 89% of product codes have a unique mapping.¹⁰ In a small number of instances, the meaning of HS4 codes changes across revisions, which would imply that importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effect categories combine substantively different products across time periods.

⁸Among the 148 WTO members in 2013, the median fraction of HS6 products covered by non-ad valorem tariffs is 0.01%, and the mean fraction is 1.76% ([World Trade Organization, 2014](#)).

⁹As far as we are aware, there is no double counting of trade flows reported under different HS revisions.

¹⁰Naturally, alternative specifications that include several lags of tariff changes require longer horizons than ten years, reducing the sample size and increasing the standard errors of the estimates.

We manually identified those instances and eliminated them.¹¹

While HS6 product lines are often the most detailed level at which applied tariffs vary, a few countries have tariffs that vary within HS6 product groups (for instance at the HS8 or HS9 level). We do not have trade flows at a more detailed level, so we assess the robustness of our results to excluding series where countries apply different MFN tariffs within an HS6 product group.

The values of trade flows reported in these data are not inclusive of tariffs. Thus, the elasticities estimated by our procedure are tariff-exclusive, and must be appropriately adjusted to obtain the elasticity relevant from the consumer’s perspective.¹²

Patterns in tariff changes Figure 1 plots histograms of tariff changes. The left panels plot all data, while the right panels plot the data conditioning on observing a tariff change. While more than half the mass is below zero, tariff increases comprise a substantial share of tariff changes. The bottom two panels separate treatment (red) and control (green) groups. Both experience a range of tariff changes. Note that our identification strategy does not require the control group to experience no tariff changes. Since our specifications include importer-product-time fixed effects, we exploit differential changes in MFN and non-MFN tariffs for identification. Below we also check the robustness of our estimates by removing from the control group observations in which non-MFN tariffs change. Figure 2 plots the autocorrelation function of tariff changes in our data. It highlights a negative first-order autocorrelation. This pattern motivates the use of time-series methods that explicitly account for the fact that impact tariff changes are not fully permanent, but partially reversed in subsequent periods.


Appendix A presents additional summary statistics about our sample: (i) the average share of imports by destination (Figure A1) and by product (Figure A2); and (ii) the incidence of MFN and non-MFN trade (Figure A3) in the sample.

Examples of the treatment/control assignments Appendix Table A2 provides an illustration of how the instrument is implemented. As our instrument is defined at the product level, we illustrate it for a 4-digit HS code 6403, “Footwear; with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather.” For three large importers (the USA, Japan, and Germany) in 2006, we list partner countries that fall into each of the following three categories: treatment group, control group, and excluded group.

¹¹We have similarly implemented manual fixes for the very few HS6 codes that also change meaning over revisions.


¹²Section 5 contains the complete discussion. As an example, if the underlying model Armington, our long-run estimates would correspond to the elasticity in the CES aggregator $-\sigma$, while the trade elasticity inclusive of tariffs would be $1 - \sigma$.

FIGURE 1: Patterns in Tariffs: Frequency of Changes



Notes: These figures display the frequency of tariff changes in our data. The top two panels display the unconditional frequency of all tariff changes (top left) and frequency excluding zeros (top right). The bottom panel displays the overlap in the frequency of changes in the treatment and control groups, including zero changes (left panel) and removing zero changes (right panel).

FIGURE 2: Patterns in Tariffs: Autocorrelation



Notes: This figure displays the unconditional autocorrelation of tariff changes in the sample.

Columns 1-2 list the 10 largest MFN trading partners at $t - 1$ and t . Trading on MFN terms is the first criterion for being assigned to the treatment group. (Of course, there are many more than 10 countries in this category). Columns 3-4 list the 10 major trade partners in terms of aggregate trade. These countries are disqualified from the treatment group. Columns 5-6 list the 10 major trading partners for the product code HS 6403. These are also disqualified from the treatment group. As expected, there is imperfect overlap between the set of major partners overall and in a specific HS code.

After these countries are dropped, columns 7-9 list the treatment, control, and excluded groups. As the table highlights, for the US NAFTA countries such as Canada and Mexico are important in the control group. The excluded group comprises large trading partners like Germany, China, and France, but also smaller economies such as Vietnam that are important exporters of footwear to the US. The treatment group includes smaller trading partners in footwear who trade at MFN rates, such as Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. While we do not incorporate explicit data on regional trade agreements, the instrument design appropriately assigns countries in customs unions or PTAs to control or excluded groups.¹³ For Germany, for instance, EU member countries do not appear in the treatment groups, and are only part of the control groups.

¹³The instrument might be improved if we could additionally incorporate information on PTAs. This would help in particular in assigning observations to the control group instead of the excluded group in some instances where the PTA rate is the same as the MFN rate and the country is a large trading partner. Currently, these observations have to be excluded. Unfortunately, while aggregate datasets on PTAs are available, these are typically not product-specific. Many free trade agreements exclude certain products, and applying them to all products is problematic for our estimation. Assigning observations to the excluded group increases our standard errors but is the conservative option.

Identifying variation One might be concerned that the coefficient estimates are identified from special and/or non-representative segments of world trade. One possibility might be, for instance, that dropping major trading partners leaves a treated group composed of only small developing countries. Another possibility is that tariff changes might occur predominantly in products that account for relatively little of world trade. These potential concerns would be exacerbated by the large number of fixed effects, that further sweep out “singleton”-like observations, for instance cases in which the entirety of an importer-product trade is carried out on MFN basis.

To better understand the identifying variation in the data, we regress the one year (Δ_0) change in log trade flows and tariffs on the full set of fixed effects, and discard observations that are perfectly absorbed by the fixed effects. In this step we also impose the sample restriction that drops major trading partners. The resulting sample reflects the variation in trade flows and tariffs that is potentially available to identify the coefficients of interest. The patterns are reassuring on several fronts. The left panel of Figure 3 plots the (log) counts of instances countries appear as treatment or controls in the residualized data.¹⁴ The relative size of the circle reflects country GDP. It is apparent that the same countries appear in both treatment and control groups, and indeed economies large in absolute size are frequently in the treatment group. The figure rules out the possibility that identifying variation comes from very small or esoteric countries. It also allays the concern that the control group countries are dramatically different from the treatment group.¹⁵ Appendix Figure A4 projects the frequency of country appearance in treatment or control group on per-capita income. It is evident that a broad range of income levels is represented in both treatment and control groups.

The right panel of Figure 3 plots the distribution across HS sections. The green bars plot the shares of observations of all trade data. The orange bars display the shares of observations remaining in the residualized data after the fixed effects are taken out and sample restrictions imposed. The available variation is spread across all broad product groups, and is representative of the unconditional sectoral distribution of trade. The figure thus suggests that we are not identifying our elasticity coefficients from sectorally un-representative trade flows. Appendix Figure A5 plots the frequency of different product groups in our residualized data at a finer level of sectoral disaggregation (HS-2).


4 Results

We begin by estimating the impact effects of a one-time tariff change on h -periods ahead trade flows and tariffs, as in equations (2.2)-(2.3), using our instrumental variables approach. For the baseline estimation, the product disaggregation for the fixed effects is at the HS4-level. We also exclude major

¹⁴The figure reports shares of observations rather than shares of value, because our regressions are unweighted.

¹⁵For instance, it does not appear to be the case that small countries that are recipients of GSP tariffs are disproportionately in the control group.

FIGURE 3: Country and Product Variation




Notes: The left panel displays the scatterplot of base 10 log counts an exporter appears in the control group on the y-axis against the log count the same country appears in the treatment group on the x-axis. The size of the circle is proportional to relative country size as measured by GDP. The plot is based on a residualized sample from which importer-product-time, exporter-product-time, and importer-exporter-product fixed effects have been taken out, and the sample restrictions have been imposed. The right panel displays the sectoral distribution of all trade data in our sample (green bars), and the residualized sample after fixed effects have been taken out and the sample restrictions have been imposed (orange bars).

trading partners at the HS4-level in the baseline instrument. The left panel of Figure 4 reports the time path of tariff changes h periods after the initial 1-unit change. Thus, by construction the $h = 0$ coefficient is 1. The partial mean reversion in tariff changes is evident: following the initial impulse, about 80% of the change remains after 5 years, and approximately 75% after 10 years. These results illustrate the need for an estimation method that takes explicit account of the non-trivial time series behavior of tariffs.

The figure suggests a presence of a pre-trend. A tariff increase of one percent is preceded by a reduction of approximately 0.3 in the pre-period, reflecting again the negative first order autocorrelation highlighted above. We control for this pre-trend by including a lagged pre-trend control in our baseline estimates throughout. The blue lines in Figure 4 depict the estimates after including the pre-trend controls. They make little difference to the results. We include additional lags in robustness checks.

The right panel of Figure 4 displays the impact of an initial one percent tariff change on trade flows. Trade flows respond by -0.26 percent on impact, converging to approximately -1.5 in the long run. Unlike for tariffs, there is no evident pre-trend in trade flows, regardless of whether we use pre-trend controls, ruling out an important role for anticipation effects. Including the pretrend control

FIGURE 4: Local Projections: Tariffs and Trade



Notes: This figure displays the results from estimating equations (2.2) and (2.3) – the local projection of h -period tariff growth (left panel) and h -period imports (right panel) on one period tariff growth, instrumented with our baseline instrument. We depict estimates with and without pre-trend controls. The bars display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair-product level.

modestly amplifies the point estimates of the effect of the tariff shock on trade values at longer horizons, though the difference is not significant. Columns 1 and 4 of Appendix Table A4 report the estimated impulse response coefficients and standard errors for tariffs and trade, respectively.

Figure 5 reports the baseline estimates of the trade elasticity ε^h across horizons. The impact ($h = 0$) elasticity is -0.26 . Our data are annual, and it is unlikely that all tariff changes go into effect on January 1. Thus, we do not focus attention on the impact elasticity as it can be low due to partial-year effects. The point estimate in the year following the tariff change is probably a better indicator of the short-run elasticity. At $h = 1$, the elasticity is around -0.76 . The 10-year elasticity is -2.12 . Over the first 7 years, the elasticity converges smoothly to the long-run value, and then is stable for years 7-10.

The red line reports the OLS estimates. To be precise, the estimates we label “OLS” correspond to Ordinary Least Squares estimates of equations (2.2)-(2.3), but are obtained by two-stage least squares where the horizon- h tariff change is instrumented with the tariff change from $t - 1$ to t , using all the available data rather than the exogenous subset. The rationale for using only the initial 1-year tariff change as identifying variation is that relying on higher frequency variation typically reduces confounding. In addition, using only the initial tariff change allows us to estimate the horizon- h trade elasticity. In contrast, as discussed in Section 2, estimation in long differences conflates trade

elasticities of different horizons (see Appendix Proposition C.1).

OLS actually produces a significantly smaller trade elasticity than our baseline IV at all horizons, a fact we revisit in Section 4.2. The time pattern is roughly similar for OLS and IV. A substantive explanation for IV estimates being larger in absolute value than OLS is that – conditional on all the fixed effects – tariffs are endogenously higher when imports are also high. One possible rationalization of this pattern is that greater import competition leads to more intense lobbying for protection. Trefler (1993) formalizes this argument, and shows that accounting for this type of endogeneity in US non-tariff barriers increases coefficient estimates of their impact of trade substantially.

Measurement error on the right-hand side – potentially exacerbated by differencing – is another reason for OLS coefficients to be biased towards zero. Our right-hand side variable is tariffs, which are statutory policy instruments unlikely to be measured with error. We have done extensive checks on the tariff data, and eliminated known issues such as specific tariffs. Thus, both OLS and IV estimates are unlikely to suffer from this attenuation bias.


Our estimates of β_X^h , β_τ^h , and ε^h should be interpreted as averages in the following sense. For a given size shock to tariffs, the subsequent evolution of tariff changes likely differs across shocks in our sample. Further, the responses of tariffs and trade could depend on the initial state of the world, they could vary by country pair, and/or depend on the product p for which the tariff changes. The estimation approach above will effectively average tariff and trade responses over all shocks, all evolution of tariffs, all initial states of the world, and all country-pairs and products. We now relax this assumption somewhat and report elasticities for broad product groups.

4.1 Sectoral heterogeneity

HS codes are organized into 21 sections that are consistent across countries. These sections describe broad categories of goods, such as “Live Animals, Animal Products” (Section 1). In practice, there is insufficient tariff variation in some of these sections to obtain precise estimates of the elasticity at all horizons. Thus, we combine a few of the sections together, leaving us with 11 sections. Appendix Table A3 describes the sections and lists the sections that are aggregated.

Figure 6 plots the point estimates of the trade elasticities over h for the 11 HS product groups. To contain the role of estimation error, we also report the median estimate from horizon 7 to 10 in the figure. The long-run elasticities range from -0.75 to approximately -5 even in this coarse sectoral breakdown. In addition, the elasticities fan out over time. The range at $h = 1$ is from -0.5 to about -1.5 , much narrower than the long-run range. Appendix Table A5 presents the summary statistics for the trade elasticities at the 11-Section level, by horizon. The time path of the median elasticity

FIGURE 5: Trade Elasticity: OLS vs IV



Notes: This figure displays estimates of the trade elasticity based on specification (2.4), and including one lag of the change in tariffs and trade as pre-trend controls. 2SLS estimates with the baseline instrument are in blue, and OLS estimates are in red. The bars display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the bilateral country-pair-product level.

is similar to the aggregate elasticity.

4.2 Relationship to other estimates

Our preferred IV estimates of the trade elasticity are -0.76 in the short run, rising to about -2 in the long run. These are substantially smaller than the conventional wisdom range of -5 to -10 (see for instance the review in [Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004](#)). Interestingly, even our OLS estimates, which treat all tariff variation as exogenous as typical in the literature, are much smaller than the values commonly estimated in other studies. Table 1 investigates the source of these differences.


Panel A of the table estimates the elasticity using the log-levels OLS specification, assuming all tariff variation is exogenous. This specification, both without fixed effects and with the most commonly used fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance (importer-product-time and exporter-product-time), yields values between -3.7 and -6.7 , similar to previous estimates. We then add country-pair-product fixed effects to the same specification. Country-pair effects are not commonly used in elasticity estimation, but appear in [Baier and Bergstrand \(2007\)](#) and [Donaldson \(2018\)](#), among others. The elasticity estimates fall sharply to about -1.04 with multilateral resistance terms (column

TABLE 1: Elasticity Estimates: Alternative Approaches

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Panel A: Log-levels, OLS</u>						
$\ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.696*** (0.020)	-4.468*** (0.019)	-6.696*** (0.046)	-2.734*** (0.014)	-1.040*** (0.022)	-0.892*** (0.020)
R^2	0.013	0.341	0.383	0.530	0.571	0.837
Obs	107.09	107.07	106.24	105.73	104.91	98.45
<u>Panel B: 5-year log-differences, OLS</u>						
$\Delta_5 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.882*** (0.014)	-1.583*** (0.014)	-0.664*** (0.020)	-1.659*** (0.015)	-0.518*** (0.020)	-0.459*** (0.027)
R^2	0.002	0.066	0.180	0.150	0.263	0.504
Obs	38.54	38.52	38.15	38.21	37.82	35.57
<u>Panel C: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, tariffs instrumented by actual 1-year tariff change</u>						
$\Delta_5 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.337*** (0.018)	-0.968*** (0.019)	-0.470*** (0.028)	-1.019*** (0.020)	-0.448*** (0.030)	-0.406*** (0.037)
Obs	38.54	38.52	38.15	38.21	37.82	35.57
<u>Panel D: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, baseline instrument</u>						
$\Delta_5 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.259*** (0.052)	-2.206*** (0.061)	-1.170*** (0.113)	-2.000*** (0.067)	-1.112*** (0.124)	-1.381*** (0.194)
Obs	21.75	21.73	21.40	21.49	21.13	19.36
<u>Panel E: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, all partners instrument</u>						
$\Delta_5 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.967*** (0.023)	-1.426*** (0.027)	-0.471*** (0.053)	-1.579*** (0.027)	-0.653*** (0.054)	-0.901*** (0.098)
Obs	38.54	38.52	38.15	38.21	37.82	35.57
<u>Fixed effects</u>						
importer×HS4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
exporter×HS4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
importer×HS4×year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
exporter×HS4×year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
importer×exporter×HS4	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
imp×HS6×year, exp×HS6×year, imp×exp×HS6	no	no	no	no	no	yes

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the trade elasticity at a single horizon. The dependent variable is log of trade value, in levels (Panel A), or 5-year differences (Panels B-E). Panels C, D, and E differ in instruments used for the tariff change. Column 1 reports the results with no fixed effects. Column 2 adds importer-product and exporter-product fixed effects, column 3 interacts these fixed effects with years, column 4 includes country-pair-product fixed effects, column 5 includes our baseline fixed effects and column 6 uses the fixed effects in column 5 but defines the product at the HS6 level. Standard errors clustered by country-pair-product are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. Numbers of observations are reported in millions. All first-stage F -statistics are greater than 10000. The differenced specifications do not have pretrend controls for comparability with the log-levels specification in Panel A.

FIGURE 6: Trade Elasticity: Sectoral Heterogeneity



Notes: This figure displays the trade elasticities estimated by HS Section based on specification (2.4) and using the baseline instrument. Some HS Sections are grouped into a single aggregate section “Sec agg” as described in the text.

5), close to our baseline OLS estimates. Making the product dimension of the fixed effects finer in column 6 does not substantively change the estimates. The country-pair-product fixed effects soak up any confounders in the gravity equation that are country-pair-product specific (for instance, different, but constant, shipping costs between a pair of countries for steel vs. agricultural product groups). Clearly, including them is important for the estimation.

Panel B of the table then presents the results of a 5-year differenced OLS specification. The estimates fall sharply across all combinations of fixed effects, and are often below 1 in absolute terms. Differencing removes additional confounders, as discussed in Section 2.

Panel C then implements a specification in which the five-year differenced tariff change on the right-hand-side is instrumented by the actual one year tariff change at the start of the 5-year period. This is an intermediate step between running simple differenced OLS and our full instrumentation strategy. Here, the estimation is by 2SLS, but it is unlikely that the estimates are unbiased since this specification uses variation of all initial-year tariff changes, rather than the exogenous subset.

Again, across all versions of fixed effects the estimates are much smaller and close to or below 1 in absolute value. The coefficient is -0.448 in our preferred specification with the baseline fixed effects (Column 5). This specification amounts to the estimation of (2.4) for $h = 5$ by “OLS”, albeit without pretrend controls.

Panels D and E implement two versions of our IV specification. Panel D has the conservative baseline instrument, excluding major trading partners, and Panel E has the IV including all trading partners with pure diff-in-diff identification. Relative to the OLS estimates in Panel C, both instruments push estimates further away from 0. The conservative instrument increases estimates the most relative to OLS, as expected, but has larger standard errors. This instrument brings the estimates to -1.11 at the five year horizon in the specifications with the country-pair-product fixed effects and multilateral resistance fixed effects.

In summary, country-pair-product specific variation is key for the estimation of trade elasticities. Estimates are large if this variation is used, and small if this variation is taken out with importer-exporter-product fixed effects or through differencing. Relative to OLS estimation in differences our baseline instrument raises estimates of the trade elasticity.

Appendix B provides two additional tables that support these conclusions. Table A6 contrasts the traditional gravity specification in log-levels (as in Panel A of Table 1) to analogous estimates on our baseline sample. This check rules out that differences in estimates are driven by the sample composition. While the conventional approach on the constant sample delivers even higher elasticity estimates (as high as 8 – 11), the insight that the importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects decrease the estimates substantially remains the same. Table A7 presents results for specifications in differences for alternative time horizons (3 and 7 years) as well as on the baseline sample. In these specifications, variation at the importer-exporter-product level is differenced out. The estimates are uniformly low, in particular when time-varying multilateral resistance terms are taken out with fixed effects. Importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects in these differenced specifications, which take out linear time trends, do not affect the results substantially.

4.3 Robustness

Pre-trends and anticipation effects Tariff decreases often follow tariff increases (tariff changes are negatively autocorrelated), as shown above. Indeed, the left panel of Figure 4 reveals some evidence of a pre-trend in tariffs. We account for differential pre-trends in tariffs using the standard approach of controlling for lagged tariff and trade changes. Our baseline estimates use a single lag as a pretrend control. Columns 2-3 of Table 2 report results with no lags and 5 lags, respectively, to compare the results to the baseline in column 1. The substantive conclusions change little when adding or subtracting lags, although with more lags the sample size drops substantially and the

standard errors increase. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 of Table A4 reports the results of local projections of tariffs and trade flows directly on the initial tariff change, as in (2.2)-(2.3), while allowing for 1, 0 and 5 lags. Once again, the point estimates change little when adding lags.

A distinct concern is anticipation effects. Even if pre-treatment tariffs are constant, countries might begin to adjust their exports in response to an expected future MFN tariff change by the importer. We check for the presence of such anticipation effects by examining pre-trends in the trade volume equation estimates. Figure 4 shows no evidence of pre-trends in trade values even without controlling for tariff pre-trends.

Alternative samples and standard errors Column 4 of Table 2 restricts the sample so that each fixed effect is estimated from at least 50 observations. Column 5 two-way clusters the standard errors by importer-exporter-HS4 and year. In both cases the estimates and their precision change little. Column 6 reports estimates on a constant sample. While the point estimates are slightly lower in absolute value, the standard errors widen substantially. Overall, the difference from the other specifications is typically not statistically significant. This is reassuring as the constant sample conditions on positive trade flows for all time horizons. This sample likely has different characteristics than the full sample, but the stability of the estimates suggests that sample selection is not a big concern. Finally column 7 reports the results from an estimation where we drop observations from the control group that experience tariff changes. The estimates are slightly lower than the baseline, but not significantly so at most horizons.

Our estimated tariff impulse responses stabilize fast and are very persistent, with about 75% of the initial shock surviving 10 years.¹⁶ This alleviates concerns that our estimates are driven by very short-run temporary MFN tariff changes. To further explore the impact of potentially more permanent tariff changes, we estimate elasticities using only the tariff changes of the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO negotiations. It is likely that firms viewed these as persistent or permanent—at least until the next successful multilateral negotiation. In practice, we constrain the sample to only MFN tariff changes during 1995-1997, which corresponds to the staggered phasing in of the Uruguay round MFN bounds. Reassuringly, we find OLS estimates that are not significantly different from our baseline IV coefficients (Appendix Table A11). This may suggest that the Uruguay Round tariff changes were more “exogenous” than typical tariff changes, since they resulted from protracted multilateral negotiations. IV estimates on the 1995-1997 sample are imprecise and not informative, as the sample size is drastically reduced.

¹⁶Consistent with our estimates, Bown and Crowley (2014) document that most MFN tariff changes below bounds are permanent or very persistent.

TABLE 2: Trade Elasticity, Robustness: Pre-Trends, Alternative Clustering, Alternative Samples

	Baseline	Zero Lag	Five Lags	FE50	Two-way Clustering	Constant Sample	Alternative Control Group
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.147*** (0.054)	0.166 (0.138)	-0.232** (0.094)	-0.262*** (0.096)	-0.592** (0.290)	-0.187** (0.077)
obs	31.66	41.46	14.58	17.62	31.66	5.04	27.33
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.628*** (0.081)	-0.129 (0.208)	-0.599*** (0.133)	-0.756*** (0.141)	-0.098 (0.380)	-0.490*** (0.117)
obs	26.18	32.85	12.52	15.19	26.18	5.04	22.63
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.926*** (0.105)	-0.625** (0.315)	-0.865*** (0.173)	-1.024*** (0.195)	-0.895** (0.472)	-0.743*** (0.160)
obs	20.8	26.16	9.76	12.48	20.8	5.04	17.86
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-1.112*** (0.124)	-1.146*** (0.429)	-1.012*** (0.215)	-1.237*** (0.253)	-0.916** (0.437)	-0.792*** (0.201)
obs	16.69	21.13	7.3	10.22	16.69	5.04	14.27
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-1.521*** (0.145)	-2.330*** (0.595)	-1.853*** (0.270)	-2.055*** (0.357)	-0.990** (0.489)	-1.383*** (0.251)
obs	13.22	16.95	5.25	8.2	13.22	5.04	11.12
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-1.463*** (0.194)	-2.550** (1.016)	-1.760*** (0.374)	-2.122*** (0.332)	-1.818*** (0.544)	-1.600*** (0.379)
obs	8.31	11.25	3.21	5.25	8.31	5.04	6.84

Notes: This table presents robustness exercises for the results from estimating equation (2.4). All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects, and the baseline pretrend controls (one lag) unless otherwise specified. Columns 2 and 3 vary the pretrend controls (including alternatively zero lags or five lags of import growth and tariff changes). Column 4 reports the results when the sample is restricted to fixed-effects clusters with a minimum of 50 observations. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level, except in Column 5 where they are additionally clustered by year. Column 6 restricts the sample to a constant sample. Column 7 reports results where the control group only contains observations with zero tariff changes. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

Alternative instruments, outcome variables, and fixed effects The baseline instrument excludes large trading partners from both treatment and the control groups. Column 2 of Table 3 reports the results when admitting these countries into the treatment group. In this case the instrument is simply the change in the MFN tariff rate for all countries subject to the MFN tariff rate. The point estimates fall to about -0.9 for the long-run elasticity. Columns 3 and 4 report results for quantities and unit values, respectively. It turns out that the impact in the long run is mostly on quantities. The response of unit values is noisy and in general insignificant. For interpreting the unit values coefficients, it is important to keep in mind that these are unit values exclusive of tariffs. Thus, a zero estimated coefficient on unit values indicates complete pass-through of tariff changes to the buyers in the importing country. Appendix Table A11 contains results for the elasticity estimated with the multilateral resistance terms at the HS6 level. The estimates are somewhat smaller than the baseline, though the sample shrinks and the standard errors widen.¹⁷

Extensive margin Our baseline specifications are specified in log differences and our data are at the country-pair product level. Thus, our sample consists of instances where country-pair product flows are positive in both the initial and end periods. Many trade models emphasize exit and entry of firms into export markets (see, e.g. Melitz, 2003; Ruhl, 2008; Alessandria and Choi, 2014; Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014; Ruhl and Willis, 2017).¹⁸ The firm-level extensive margin of country-pair-product markets with already positive trade is reflected in our baseline elasticity estimates. However, our baseline estimation ignores the possibility that tariff changes lead to (dis)appearance of trade flows at the country-pair-product level.

To implement specifications for this margin, we use the differenced inverse hyperbolic sine transformation instead of log differences as suggested by Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988). This transformation allows us to include zero or missing trade flows, while approximating logs for larger values of the data.¹⁹

We stress that including zero trade observations in the sample need not increase the trade elasticity point estimates. How the point estimates change relative to the baseline depends on the relative importance of observations where trade switches from, say, zero to positive, compared to observations where trade goes from zero to zero. If a tariff falls and many zero trade observations turn positive, the elasticity will be pushed up. However, if following a tariff reduction many zero observations stay

¹⁷Note that in our baseline estimation, time differencing already eliminates importer-exporter-HS6 fixed effect in levels.

¹⁸As highlighted by Ruhl (2008), among others, the long-run elasticity may be even higher when the extensive margin is taken into account.

¹⁹Tariff data are typically not missing and we can always construct $\ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$, so we do not need the inverse hyperbolic transformation for tariffs. Bellemare and Wichman (2020) highlight that caution must be used in interpreting the estimated coefficient as an elasticity, but in our case the estimated β^h can be interpreted as an elasticity. The estimated coefficient converges to an elasticity as the underlying variable being transformed (trade values in our case) takes on large enough values on average. This is the case in the trade data.

at zero, the elasticity estimate will be pushed down, since, on average, trade changes become less responsive to tariff changes.

As a result, elasticity estimates that incorporate the extensive margin are sensitive to *which* zeros are added to the sample. We report two sets of estimates. In the first, we include all available zero trade observations for exporter-HS 1-digit section to any importer in instances where some exports are ever observed.²⁰ In the second, we only include observations where trade goes from zero to positive, or from positive to zero. This approach gives the extensive margin maximum chance to increase the absolute values of elasticity estimates, in the sense that it only admits observations for which extensive margin changes actually occur. This sample restriction corresponds more closely to quantitative models and firm-level analyses where the extensive margin is active. However, it should be interpreted as an upper bound on the sensitivity of trade flows to tariffs as it effectively selects the sample based on outcomes. All extensive margin estimates do not include pretrend controls. Therefore the results in this exercise must be compared to the baseline estimates without pretrend controls (Column 2 of Table 2).²¹

The resulting estimates in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 can be interpreted as the total elasticity, inclusive of both the intensive and product-level extensive margins. When including more zeros (column 5), the point estimates are similar to the baseline initially, smaller in the long run. We conjecture that this is because the estimation sample now includes many instances of trade being zero at both $t - 1$ and $t + h$. Since these appear as zero changes in the sample, they drive down the point estimate. Column 6 reports the extensive margin response when we only include zeros in instances where trade goes from zero to positive, or from positive to zero. As expected, the 10 year elasticity including the extensive margin is slightly higher (-1.64) than the corresponding intensive margin instrumented specification without pretrend controls (-1.46).

Additional results, diagnostics, and robustness Column 7 of Table 3 estimates a distributed-lag model as an alternative to the local projection specification. This approach has two disadvantages

²⁰That is, if country A ever exports any product in HS 1-digit section Z to importer B in any year, all the zero exports of products belonging to section Z from A to B in every year are added to the sample. This leaves out of the estimation sample export flows between pairs of countries in broad sectors that never occurred, and thus are unlikely to respond to tariff changes. A more extreme approach is to just include all the possible zeros. Predictably, this leads to even lower elasticity point estimates, as it increases the fraction of the sample in which trade flows go from zero to zero.

²¹Including pre-trend controls leads to elasticity estimates much lower in absolute value, and below the baseline (intensive margin) estimates. This appears to be due to the fact that adding zero observations adds to the sample many instances of occasional exporting, where entry is followed by exit and vice versa. As a result, the pre-trend control for lagged log change in trade has a negative sign and is a very powerful predictor of the subsequent change in trade (t -statistic of about 2000). If this part of the sample is dominated by idiosyncratic shocks that manifest themselves in occasional exporting behavior, there would be less for tariff changes to explain. Reporting extensive margin estimates without pre-trend controls thus gives the extensive margin maximum chance to produce larger elasticities relative to the baseline.

relative to the baseline: (i) it requires a panel of non-missing log growth rates for trade, tariffs, and the instrument for every lag, reducing the estimation sample greatly; and (ii) it imposes linearity on the estimates. Caveats aside, the distributed lag specification with 10 lags yields a long-run trade elasticity of 3.17 with a standard error of 1.25, while the number of observations falls to just around 6.08 million. This point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from our baseline estimates.²² Finally, the last column of Table 3 estimates the elasticity on a sample where tariffs do not vary within an importer-HS6. This drops importer-product instances where tariffs are set at finer levels of disaggregation, such as HS8 or HS10. Again, the results are very similar to the baseline at all horizons.²³

Appendix B presents the results for all the specifications at every horizon. This appendix also reports the first stage F -statistics for the baseline instrument and the all partners instrument for every horizon. In all cases, the first stage F -statistics are much higher than 10.

Other candidates for instruments There are other candidate instruments that could in principle be considered under the WTO framework. Here, we discuss these potential instruments and issues with each of them.

A natural candidate instrument is WTO accession. When a country such as China joins the WTO, the negotiations are protracted, and there are substantial anticipation effects (see for instance [Pierce and Schott, 2016](#)). However, once China joins the WTO and sets its MFN tariffs, small third countries in the WTO are also affected by these MFN tariffs. These countries are plausibly facing an exogenous change, conditional on the anticipation effects, as they were likely not key players in the negotiations. While there are a few WTO accessions in our data, a key problem with implementing this instrument is that product-level tariff data are typically not available in standard datasets for countries before they join the WTO. It is therefore not possible to construct tariff changes (the change from the pre-WTO rate to the MFN rate) for estimation.

A second instrument would be a change in the MFN bound, which is the maximum tariff a country

²²Formally, we estimate the equation $\Delta_0 \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \sum_{k=0}^{10} \gamma^k \Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t-k} + \delta_{i,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t} + \delta_{i,j,p} + u_{i,j,p,t}$ instrumenting $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t-k}$ with $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t-k}^{instr}$, for all k . The trade elasticity at horizon h reported in Table 3 is then $\sum_{k=0}^h \gamma^k$. As this estimation requires 11 instruments for 11 endogenous variables, we report the Sanderson-Windmeijer F -statistic for weak instruments in Appendix Table A10. Conceptually, there is a subtle difference between the object estimated by local projections and the distributed lag approach. Whereas the local projections take into account the time series behavior of the tariff variable, the distributed lag coefficients cumulated up to horizon h are estimates of the response of trade to a permanent once-and-for-all change in tariffs that happened at horizon 0. This distinction does not matter for the long-run limit, but is relevant for finite h .

²³We have also checked whether the trade response depends on the size of the tariff shock. To do so, we estimated separate elasticities depending on whether the absolute value of the initial (nonzero) tariff change is below or above the median nonzero absolute value tariff change. The estimated elasticities for both size categories are very similar and we do not report them here.

TABLE 3: Trade Elasticity, Robustness: Alternative Instruments, Outcomes, Fixed Effects, Samples and Models

	Baseline (1)	All Partners (2)	Quantities (3)	Unit Values (4)	Extensive (5)	Extensive Sel (6)	DL (7)	SD1 (8)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.275*** (0.030)	-0.179* (0.093)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.082 (0.063)	-0.413 (0.338)	-0.313*** (0.096)
obs	31.66	57.14	31.66	31.66	131.03	56.35	6.08	28.7
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.624*** (0.047)	-0.664*** (0.136)	-0.027 (0.080)	-0.484*** (0.063)	-0.805*** (0.089)	-0.523 (0.466)	-0.889*** (0.142)
obs	26.18	47.19	26.18	26.18	108.13	49.11	6.08	23.76
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.648*** (0.061)	-0.810*** (0.184)	-0.134 (0.104)	-0.590*** (0.084)	-0.955*** (0.107)	-1.578** (0.685)	-1.228*** (0.200)
obs	20.8	38.16	20.8	20.8	87.22	41.5	6.08	18.86
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-0.718*** (0.073)	-1.422*** (0.232)	0.291** (0.128)	-0.730*** (0.100)	-1.183*** (0.122)	-2.097** (0.861)	-1.180*** (0.253)
obs	16.69	30.89	16.69	16.69	69.73	34.61	6.08	15.12
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-0.940*** (0.091)	-2.166*** (0.292)	0.162 (0.161)	-0.902*** (0.114)	-1.496*** (0.138)	-2.710*** (1.016)	-1.990*** (0.318)
obs	13.22	24.64	13.22	13.22	55.24	28.4	6.08	11.96
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-0.866*** (0.122)	-1.765*** (0.406)	-0.078 (0.221)	-0.941*** (0.153)	-1.638*** (0.181)	-3.166** (1.252)	-2.360*** (0.444)
obs	8.31	15.92	8.31	8.31	35.09	19.24	6.08	7.52

Notes: This table presents alternative estimates for the results from estimating equation (2.4), varying the instrument or outcome variable. Column 2 uses an alternative definition of the instrument where all trade partners subject to the MFN regime are included. Column 3 reports results for quantities, and Column 4 the results for unit values. Column 5 presents results including the extensive margin using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows, and all zero trade observations for importer-exporter-section pair with ever positive trade. Column 6 presents results including the extensive margin using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows, and only zero trade observations when trade switches from zero to positive, or vice versa. Column 7 presents results from a distributed lag model. Column 8 reports the results based on a sample where tariffs do not vary within an importer-HS6. All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects and the baseline pretrend controls (one lag). Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

in the WTO can apply against other countries. While these are likely less discretionary, the MFN bounds are set in the WTO accession treaty and very hard to change ex-post. The lack of instances of changes in the bounds implies there is insufficient variation in this potential instrument to estimate the elasticity.

5 Theory and Applications

We stress that equations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) are “model free”, and under our identification assumptions will produce estimates of ε^h by definition. The mapping between these estimates and parameters in theoretical models then depends on model structure. This section provides a mapping to dynamic and static trade models. We first develop a simple dynamic model of sluggish adjustment to trade cost shocks. The recent literature on trade dynamics is rich in both substantive mechanisms and quantification (see, among many others, Costantini and Melitz, 2007; Ruhl, 2008; Burstein and Melitz, 2013; Drozd and Nosal, 2012; Alessandria and Choi, 2014; Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014; Ruhl and Willis, 2017; Fitzgerald, Haller, and Yedid-Levi, 2019; Alessandria, Arkolakis, and Ruhl, 2020). The goal of this section is not to revisit all of the proposed mechanisms for gradual adjustment of trade. Rather, we focus on the minimal common structure that characterizes these models. Appendix C lays out the model details and proves the propositions in this section.

An attractive feature of our model is that it delivers analytical expressions for trade elasticities at all horizons that clarify the determinants of the adjustment dynamics. In this setting, we state the short- and long-run model-implied elasticities and the properties of their time path. We also show that this framework delivers the estimating equations used above up to a first order approximation. We then explore a simple quantification exercise that matches the time path of the trade elasticities following a tariff shock. Finally, turning to the mapping from our estimates to the parameter relevant for static trade models, we explore the quantitative implications of our estimates for the long run gains from trade.

5.1 Dynamics of Trade Elasticities

Setup The minimalist model that can capture differing trade elasticities in the short vs. the long run has to feature a variable that determines trade flows but cannot instantaneously and fully adjust upon a change in trade costs. In addition, a long and smooth path of increasing trade elasticities requires some curvature in the costs of adjustments, such that the long run is not reached in the first period after the shock. Following a long tradition in the literature, we assume that foreign markets are served by monopolistically-competitive firms that face CES demand. We focus on the partial equilibrium decisions of firms from one market selling to another, and thus suppress importer, exporter, and product subscripts. Consistent with the gravity tradition, general equilibrium objects

such as domestic unit costs or foreign demand shifts are absorbed by country-product-time fixed effects, and thus we ignore general equilibrium forces in this section. Throughout, we assume that marginal costs are constant at the firm level and thus exporting decisions are separable across locations. The setup below nests versions of the [Krugman \(1980\)](#), [Melitz \(2003\)](#), and [Arkolakis \(2010\)](#) models, as well as extensions with pricing to market (e.g. [Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo, 2003](#); [Atkeson and Burstein, 2008](#)).

Trade between the two countries can be expressed as

$$X_t = p_t^x q_t n_t,$$

where n_t is a generic mass, p_t^x is the exporters' price exclusive of tariffs, and q_t is the quantity exported per unit mass. Crucially for the short vs. long-run distinction, we assume that p_t^x and q_t adjust instantaneously to tariff changes, whereas n_t is pre-determined by one period, and can only change from the next period onwards. Quantity and price are a function of tariffs, and quantity must be consistent with market clearing at the price: $p_t^x = p^x(\tau_t)$ and $q_t = q(p_t^x, \tau_t)$. Exporting generates flow profits $\pi(\tau_t) = q_t(p_t^x - c)$, where c is the unit cost. Define the following elasticities:

$$\eta_{q,p} := \frac{\partial \ln q}{\partial \ln p^x}, \quad \eta_{q,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln q}{\partial \ln \tau}, \quad \eta_{p,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln p^x}{\partial \ln \tau}, \quad \eta_{\pi,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln \pi}{\partial \ln \tau}, \quad (5.1)$$

where we assume that $\eta_{q,p} < 0$, $\eta_{q,\tau} < 0$, and $\eta_{\pi,\tau} < 0$.

The measure n_t comes from profit-maximizing agents serving the export market. Let r denote the real interest rate at which firms discount future profits, and G a positive and increasing function. Dynamics in this model are governed by two equations:

$$v_t = \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_t [\pi_{t+1} + (1-\delta)v_{t+1}], \quad (5.2)$$

$$n_t = n_{t-1}(1-\delta) + G(v_{t-1}), \quad (5.3)$$

subject to the transversality condition $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r}\right)^t v_t = 0$. The forward-looking equation (5.2) states that the value of exporting v_t is the expected present value of future flow profits from exporting. The backward-looking equation (5.3) describes how the mass n_t evolves. The increment to the mass n_t today $G(v_{t-1})$ is a function of the value of exporting last period, when the entry or investment decision was made. Parameter δ is a rate of depreciation or an exogenous exit rate.

The model's tractability stems from the fact that equations (5.2) and (5.3) can be solved sequentially.

For any stochastic process for tariffs $\{\tau_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, equation (5.2) can be solved forward to obtain

$$v_t = \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^k \pi(\tau_{t+k+1}) \right]. \quad (5.4)$$

Importantly the value v_t does not depend on the evolution of n_t . The resulting sequence $\{v_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, can then be used to obtain n_t after solving equation (5.3) backwards,

$$n_t = \sum_{\ell=0}^{t-1} (1-\delta)^\ell G(v_{t-1-\ell}) + (1-\delta)^t n_0. \quad (5.5)$$

For a given initial value of n_0 and a stochastic process for tariffs $\{\tau_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, equations (5.4)-(5.5) and elasticities (5.1) characterize the path of the mass of exporters n_t . The evolution of n_t together with the static price and quantity decisions then fully determines exports $X_t = p_t^x q_t n_t$. We treat the elasticities (5.1) as constant throughout, which amounts to solving the model to first order.

Examples In the [Krugman \(1980\)](#) model or the [Arkolakis \(2010\)](#) model with a representative firm, $\eta_{p,\tau} = 0$ (recall this is the tariff-exclusive price elasticity), and $\eta_{q,p} = \eta_{q,\tau} = \eta_{\pi,\tau} = -\sigma$, where σ is the demand elasticity. In the [Melitz \(2003\)](#) model, if the exporting cutoff can change instantaneously conditional on the constant mass of firms n_t , $\eta_{p,\tau} = -\partial \ln \tilde{\varphi} / \partial \ln \tau$, where $\tilde{\varphi}$ is an aggregate productivity measure of firms serving the export market, and $\eta_{q,p} = \eta_{q,\tau} = -\sigma$. In the [Krugman \(1980\)](#) and [Melitz \(2003\)](#) models, n_t is the mass of entering firms and $G(\cdot)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the sunk costs of entry into exporting. To ensure smooth adjustment of the mass of firms following a change in trade costs, we assume that this distribution is nontrivial. In the [Arkolakis \(2010\)](#) model with a representative firm, n_t is the fraction of the foreign market penetrated by the firm, and the function G is a transformation of the convex cost of acquiring new customers. Appendix C.2 provides a detailed discussion of specific microfoundations of this model.

The short-run trade elasticity Let t_0 denote the date of the tariff change. The short run trade elasticity is:

$$\varepsilon^0 := \frac{d \ln X_{t_0}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = (1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,\tau} + \eta_{q,\tau}. \quad (5.6)$$

Recall that the mass n_t is predetermined within the period, and hence the derivative of n_{t_0} with respect to τ_{t_0} is zero. The short-run trade elasticity is determined by the exporters' price response ($\eta_{p,\tau}$), the quantity response to tariff changes ($\eta_{q,\tau}$), and the quantity response to price changes ($\eta_{q,p}$). Because p_t^x and q_t are static decisions, they are fully determined by period- t tariffs. Thus, the short-run elasticity is not a function of future tariffs. As an example, in the [Krugman \(1980\)](#) model the short-run trade elasticity is $\varepsilon^0 = -\sigma$.

The long-run trade elasticity The long-run trade elasticity is the steady state change in trade following a steady state change in tariffs. The long-run trade elasticity differs from the short-run elasticity because n_t adjusts. If tariffs are constant ($\tau_t = \tau \forall t$) equation (5.4) becomes $v = \frac{\pi(\tau)}{\delta+r}$. Equation (5.5) then implies that n_t monotonically converges to $n = \frac{G(v)}{\delta}$.²⁴ It follows that $\frac{d \ln n}{d \ln \tau} = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau}$, where $\chi := \frac{g(v)v}{G(v)}$. These two expressions characterize the non-stochastic steady state of the model. Hence, the long-run trade elasticity is

$$\varepsilon := \frac{d \ln X}{d \ln \tau} = \varepsilon^0 + \frac{d \ln n}{d \ln \tau} = \varepsilon^0 + \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau}. \quad (5.7)$$

In the long run, the response of trade to tariff changes depends on $\chi > 0$ and $\eta_{\pi, \tau} < 0$, the elasticity of flow profits with respect to tariffs. Consistent with intuition, the more sensitive are profits to tariffs, the greater the absolute value of the long-run trade elasticity.

The long-run trade elasticity increases in the elasticity χ of mass n with respect to value v . The precise meaning of χ depends on the underlying microfoundation. In the dynamic Krugman (1980) model, χ captures the mass of firms at the margin of entry. The greater the mass of firms at the margin, the more n changes in response to a change in per-firm profits and hence value v . In the dynamic Arkolakis (2010) model, firms face a convex cost function $f(a)$ of adding a mass of a new customers. In that case, $\chi = \left(\frac{f''(a)a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1}$. Greater curvature of this cost function leads to a lower value of χ , implying a smaller trade response to tariff shocks.

Transitional dynamics and horizon- h elasticities To derive a horizon-specific elasticity, we must specify further details of the time path of tariffs. This is because unlike in the short run or the steady state calculations, the entire path of (expected) tariffs matters for the entry decision in each period. To make progress, we consider an unexpected change to tariffs at time t_0 . This shock is followed by a subsequent evolution of tariffs (an impulse response), denoted by $\left\{ \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right\}_{h=0}^{\infty}$. This sequence is the model counterpart of our estimated impulse response function of tariff changes as depicted in the left panel of Figure 4. Since the tariff shock at time t_0 may be followed by further shocks thereafter, agents cannot perfectly predict future tariffs or profits and therefore form expectations as in equation (5.4).

The horizon- h impulse response function of trade to the tariff shock at t_0 is:

$$\frac{d \ln X_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = \varepsilon^0 \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} + \frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}. \quad (5.8)$$

²⁴The convergence of n_t to its steady state value is geometric and monotone. The rate of convergence is δ . We provide details in Appendix C.3.

The horizon- h trade elasticity is then computed as the ratio of the two impulse response functions:

$$\varepsilon^h := \frac{\frac{d \ln X_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}}{\frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}} = \varepsilon^0 + \frac{\frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}}{\frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}}, \quad (5.9)$$

as long as this object is finite (i.e. $\frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \neq 0$). Note that this definition of the horizon- h trade elasticity coincides with equation (2.1) for a tariff change of one marginal unit, when we replace the infinitesimal difference with the difference operator Δ .

To fully characterize the horizon- h trade elasticity, we must characterize the last term in (5.9), the adjustment of n_t to the tariff shock.

Proposition 1. *Consider an arbitrary evolution of tariffs $\left\{ \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+\ell}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right\}_{\ell=1}^{\infty}$ after the shock at t_0 . The impulse response function of $\ln n_t$ at horizon $h = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ is*

$$\frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t_0+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^{\ell} \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+k+\ell+1}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right]. \quad (5.10)$$

Proof. See Appendix C.4. □

Plugging (5.10) into (5.9) delivers the horizon- h trade elasticity. As is clear from equations (5.8) and (5.9), the sluggish adjustment of trade to tariff shocks is entirely driven by the sluggish adjustment of n_t . While this adjustment is somewhat complicated (equation 5.10), it delivers a useful insight: in general, all tariff changes from time t_0 into the infinite future affect the trade response to tariff shocks. Proposition 1 captures these tariff changes as the elasticities of time $t_0 + \ell$ tariffs with respect to the tariff shock at time t_0 , for $\ell = 1, 2, \dots$. For a given time horizon h , elasticities for $0 \leq \ell < h$ reflect changes to past tariffs, the elasticity for $\ell = h$ reflects a change to current tariffs, and elasticities for $\ell > h$ reflect expected changes to future tariffs.

As the following proposition shows, ε^h converges to the long-run trade elasticity, unless the tariff change induced by the shock in period t_0 returns to zero in the limit.

Proposition 2. *If $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \neq 0$ and is finite, then $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \varepsilon^h = \varepsilon$.*

Proof. See Appendix C.4. □

Although not surprising, this result is important because it validates our interpretation of horizon- h trade elasticities for large h as estimates of the long-run elasticity.

For concreteness, we next consider two simple examples.

Example 1: tariff constant after 1 period Let there be a surprise change in the tariff sequence of the form $\left\{ \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right\}_{h=0}^{\infty} = \{1, \Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0}, \Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0}, \Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0}, \dots\}$. That is, the tariff change takes the value one in the impact period, and is subsequently constant at $\Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0}$. Note that this example nests a one-time permanent change in tariffs (if $\Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0} = 1$), and is a good approximation of our estimated impulse response function in Figure 4.

At horizon $h \geq 1$ the trade elasticity is

$$\varepsilon^h = \varepsilon^0 + \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \left(1 - (1 - \delta)^h \right), \quad (5.11)$$

with ε^0 given by (5.6). The trade elasticity converges geometrically to the long-run trade elasticity at the rate δ . Convergence occurs in one period if $\delta = 1$.

Example 2: AR(1) Second, let the tariffs follow a first order autoregressive process following an initial shock, so that $\Delta \ln \tau_{t+1} = \rho \cdot \Delta \ln \tau_t$ for $t > t_0$ and $0 < \rho < 1$. Since this process is mean-reverting, the tariff change approaches zero as h tends to infinity. It follows that the premise of Proposition 2 does not hold and that the long-run trade elasticity is not defined in this case. However, we can still compute the elasticity at a finite horizon.

First, consider the case $1 - \delta < \rho$. Intuitively, this condition requires that the rate of depreciation is higher than the rate of mean reversion of tariffs. In this case the horizon- h trade elasticity is

$$\varepsilon^h = \varepsilon^0 + \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{(\delta + r) \delta}{[1 + r - (1 - \delta) \rho] \left(1 - \frac{1 - \delta}{\rho} \right)} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{\rho} \right)^h \right). \quad (5.12)$$

As in Example 1, the trade elasticity increases with time horizon h in absolute value. Further, with $1 - \delta < \rho$ the horizon- h trade elasticity does converge, although not generally to the long-run trade elasticity. While convergence is still geometric, the rate of convergence now depends on the persistence of the tariff process. Convergence is faster for more persistent tariff processes, i.e. greater values of ρ . If tariffs mean-revert sufficiently quickly, $\rho \leq 1 - \delta$, the horizon- h trade elasticity does not converge.

Notice that as ρ approaches 1, the horizon- h trade elasticity in the AR(1) case (5.12) converges pointwise to the horizon- h trade elasticity under a permanent tariff change (5.11). This property is important for our empirical application. Although tariffs changes in our sample retain 75% of their initial impulse 10 years later, in short samples it is not possible to statistically distinguish between tariff processes featuring truly permanent or highly persistent tariff changes (Hamilton, 1994, p. 445). Since Proposition 2 does not apply under mean-reverting tariffs ($\rho < 1$), one may be concerned that the horizon- h trade elasticity is not informative about the long-run trade elasticity. This property alleviates this concern. For ρ sufficiently close to one, the horizon- h trade elasticity

essentially converges to the long-run trade elasticity, even though tariffs mean-revert in the very long run.

Estimating equations While we led off the paper with an atheoretical estimating equation, we now show that this estimating equation can be microfounded by means of the model above.

Proposition 3. *The model delivers estimating equation (2.2), where*

$$\beta_X^h = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \beta_\tau^{k+\ell+1} + \varepsilon^0 \beta_\tau^h.$$

β_τ^h is defined as the regression coefficient of $\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ on $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ in the population, and can be estimated from equation (2.3).

After augmenting the model with additional shocks, the fixed effects $\delta_{j,p,t}^{X,h}$ and $\delta_{i,p,t}^{X,h}$ capture a weighted sum of past, present, and expected future supply and demand shocks, respectively. The error term includes past, present, and expected future time-varying bilateral and product-specific demand shocks and non-tariff trade barriers, as well as the initial state.

Proof. See Appendix C.4. □


Quantification Next, we explore the time path of elasticities. To do this, we calibrate the dynamic model and subject it to the two tariff shocks in the examples above.

We choose a demand elasticity σ of 1.1. This parameter immediately determines the short-run elasticity, since in the CES-monopolistic competition model $\varepsilon^0 = -\sigma$. Based on equation (5.7), and using the fact that $\eta_{\pi, \tau} = -\sigma$ in the CES-monopolistic competition model, we set $\chi = 0.82$ to match our estimated long-run elasticity of $\varepsilon \approx -2$. We further set the depreciation rate to $\delta = 0.25$ to roughly match the rate of convergence to the long run. Calibration of these parameters is sufficient to compute the transition path of exports in Example 1. For Example 2, we also need the interest rate and the AR(1) coefficient. We set these to $r = 0.03$ and $\rho = 0.955$. The latter parameter is chosen to roughly match the impulse response function of tariffs.

The left panel of Figure 7 plots the paths of tariffs. The red line depicts the tariff response of Example 1, where tariffs increase by one unit in the impact period, and then stay constant at 0.75 starting in period 1 onwards. The blue line is the AR(1) path of tariffs following an impulse of unit size (Example 2). The green line plots the impulse response of tariffs estimated in the data, which is quite similar to the two model experiments.

The right panel of Figure 7 displays the trade elasticities. The green line depicts the econometric

FIGURE 7: Time Path of Elasticities in the Dynamic Model



Notes: This figure illustrates the trade elasticities as implied by the model.

estimates. Because the data are annual, and it is unlikely that all tariff changes went into effect on January 1, the year-zero trade elasticity is most likely subject to partial-year effects. Thus, for the purposes of comparing to the model, we consider the $h = 1$ empirical estimate to be the impact elasticity ε^0 . The red and blue lines depict the model trade elasticity in the two experiments. They are nearly indistinguishable from one another.

The model succeeds in delivering a smooth path of adjustment that takes approximately a decade. The key parameter for the speed of adjustment is the depreciation rate δ . The slow adjustment observed in the data implies that δ is substantially below 1. The main shortcoming of the model is that it cannot match our short-run elasticity point estimate of -0.76 , since the CES-monopolistic competition assumption requires that $\sigma > 1$.²⁵

²⁵A natural conjecture is that flexible markups may help push the short-run trade elasticity below 1. We experimented with versions of the model with local distribution costs à la [Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo \(2003\)](#). With local distribution costs, the net-of-tariff price received by the exporter p_t^x falls when a tariff increases, helping push down the trade elasticity all else equal. However, the flip side of a fall in p_t^x is a *ceteris paribus* increase in the quantity imported. It turns out there is no combination of $\sigma > 1$ and local distribution share between 0 and 1 that delivers a less than unitary trade elasticity as we measure it (of $p_t^x q_t$ with respect to τ_t). In addition, Table 3 shows a virtually nil response of p_t^x to tariffs, a finding consistent with recent estimates using the US-China trade war ([Fajgelbaum et al., 2020](#); [Cavallo et al., 2019](#)). Both of these points suggest that imperfect pass-through into net-of-tariff prices is unlikely to produce a short-run elasticity below 1. Developing a framework that can successfully reproduce a short-run elasticity below 1 remains a fruitful avenue for future research. One possibility is variable distribution margins. Indeed, [Cavallo et al. \(2019\)](#) document a fall in retail margins for US imports affected by the trade war.

5.2 The Long Run Welfare Gains from Trade

As is well known from [Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare \(2012, henceforth ACR\)](#), the gains from trade relative to autarky in many quantitative trade models can be expressed as a function of the trade elasticity and the domestic absorption share: $1 - \lambda_{jj}^{1/\theta}$, with λ_{jj} the share of spending on domestically-produced goods in total spending. The static models in which this formula applies are metaphors for the long run, and the gains from trade should be interpreted as steady state comparisons between autarky and trade. Thus, we use the longest horizon elasticity estimated above, $h = 10$, as the long-run value.

To translate our estimates to the welfare-relevant elasticity θ , it is important to note that in our data the outcome variable $X_{i,j,t}$ does not include tariff payments. On the other hand, most theoretical gravity relationships relate tariff-inclusive spending by domestic agents to trade costs, with the trade elasticity defined correspondingly. To go from our estimated coefficient to the elasticity relevant for welfare, we must add 1. Thus, our estimates imply that the welfare-relevant elasticity θ is around -1 .²⁶


Figure 8 displays the gains from trade as a function of λ_{jj} , under our value of θ and under an elasticity of -5 considered by ACR.²⁷ As expected, the gains from trade are substantially larger with our elasticity. For the US, gains from trade are 5.27% for $\theta = -1$, compared to 1.0% for $\theta = -5$. The median welfare gain is 22.9% in a sample of 64 countries, compared to 4.2% implied by $\theta = -5$. Table A12 reports the gains from trade under $\theta = -1, -5$, and -10 for selected countries in the sample.

The blue bars in Appendix Figure A6 report the gains from trade using the multi-sector ACR formula and our sector-specific elasticity values (section 4.1). We benchmark these to the sector-specific trade elasticity estimates from [Ossa \(2015\)](#), which explores the properties of multi-sector ACR formulas. To do this, we concord the sectoral elasticity estimates in that paper to the 11 HS sections for which we estimate elasticities. Once again, the gains from trade implied by our estimates are considerably larger than previously suggested in the literature. Our estimates applied to the ACR multi-sector formula imply mean gains from trade of 26.7%, compared to 12.8% using the elasticities in [Ossa](#)

²⁶Let $\tilde{X}_{i,j} = \tau_{i,j} X_{i,j}$ be the steady state spending by consumers in economy i on goods from j inclusive of tariffs. The elasticity in the ACR formula is $\theta = d \ln \tilde{X}_{i,j} / d \ln \tau_{i,j}$. The object we estimate is the elasticity of trade flows exclusive of tariff payments $X_{i,j}$ to tariffs: $d \ln X_{i,j} / d \ln \tau_{i,j} = \theta - 1$. As an example, in an Armington/Krugman setting θ corresponds to $1 - \sigma$, where σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods coming from different origins. In that case, our long-run coefficient estimate has the interpretation $\varepsilon = -\sigma$. In an Eaton-Kortum setting, θ is the Fréchet dispersion parameter. In that case, it can be recovered by adding 1 to our ε estimates. This calculation assumes that $X_{i,j}$ is recorded as c.i.f. The relationship between ε and θ is the same if $X_{i,j}$ is f.o.b., since the iceberg costs $\kappa_{i,j}$ are log-additive and make up the error term in our estimation.

²⁷We use data from the OECD IO tables for 64 countries for the year 2006, the midpoint of our trade and tariff sample. We compute import penetration by dividing imports by gross output as in ACR.

FIGURE 8: Gains from Trade



Notes: This figure displays the gains from trade as a function of the domestic absorption ratio λ_{jj} under our baseline welfare-relevant elasticity of -1 (solid blue line) and a comparison elasticity of -5 (red dashed line). “World Median” denotes the median domestic absorption ratio of the 64 countries in the OECD world input-output tables in 2006.

(2015).

We caveat these results in two respects. First, we acknowledge that ACR formulas are not known to apply in explicitly dynamic models (for some results bridging ACR with dynamics, see [Arkolakis, Eaton, and Kortum, 2011](#); [Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014](#)). This is a general critique of all applications of the ACR formulas in static environments. Nonetheless, the widespread use of ACR formulas makes them a natural setting for benchmarking the implications of our elasticity estimates relative to the conventional values. Exploring the implications of our estimates for gains from trade in explicitly dynamic settings is a fruitful avenue for future research.

Second, care must be taken when going from the micro elasticity estimated in our empirical work to the macro elasticity that enters the ACR formula. The calculations above make the implicit

assumption that the two coincide. While there are many models in which this is not true, some of this concern can be allayed by using the multi-sector variant of the formula, that aligns more closely the levels of disaggregation at which the coefficients are estimated and in the theory. Using our micro elasticity values in place of the macro elasticity is conservative in the sense that we would expect the elasticities of substitution to be higher at finer levels of product disaggregation.

6 Conclusion

We develop a novel method to estimate the trade elasticity, a key parameter in virtually all models in international economics. To tackle the endogeneity problem that tariffs and trade flows are jointly determined, we propose an instrument that relies on the WTO's MFN principle. We estimate trade elasticities at different horizons, and find short-run values of about -0.76 , and long-run values close to -2 . The estimates are robust to alternative specifications of the instrument and controls, and uniformly larger than OLS. Our empirical strategy is not specific to a particular theoretical framework, and applies to all models that have a gravity structure.

The long-run estimates imply the welfare-relevant trade elasticity is around 1 in absolute value. This is significantly smaller than conventional wisdom in the literature, suggesting the welfare gains from trade are larger than previously thought. Our finding that the trade elasticity differs by horizon and converges to the "long-run" after about 7-10 years implies substantial adjustment costs to changing trade volumes.

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
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
Appendix A Data

FIGURE A1: Fraction of World Imports (Average, %)




Notes: This figure shows the average fraction of world trade flows by importer in our sample. “ROW” is the mean share of world trade among countries outside of the top 20 importers.

FIGURE A2: Fraction of World Imports by HS Section (Average, %)



Notes: This figure shows the average fraction of trade that is in each HS Section in our sample.

FIGURE A3: Fraction of World Imports: MFN vs. non-MFN (%)




Notes: This figure shows the average fraction of world trade that is subject to MFN tariffs and non-MFN tariffs by decade in our sample.

TABLE A1: Fraction of Unique Mappings Across HS Revisions (percent)

		Mapped to:				
		HS-92	HS-96	HS-02	HS-07	HS-12
Mapped from:	HS-96	89.38				
	HS-02	81.55	90.81			
	HS-07	73.34	80.74	88.48		
	HS-12	68.17	74.91	81.81	91.93	
	HS-17	61.85	67.92	73.62	81.99	88.05


Notes: This table presents the fraction of HS codes that can be mapped uniquely from one HS revision (in the “Mapped from” row) to another HS revision (in a “Mapped to” column). All numbers are in percent.

FIGURE A4: Explaining Country Variation



Notes: This figure plots the (log) counts a country appears in the control group (left panel) and in the treatment group (right panel) against log real PPP-adjusted per capita income from the Penn World Tables, after taking out the variation absorbed by the fixed effects. The line depicts the OLS fit.

FIGURE A5: Product Variation



Notes: This figure plot the frequency of observations belonging to each HS-2 category, after taking out the variation absorbed by the fixed effects and imposing the sample restrictions.

TABLE A2: Instrument – Illustration

Importer	MFN Trade Partners		Major Trade Partners Aggregate		Major Trade Partners HS 6403		Treatment	Control	Excluded
	2005 (1)	2006 (2)	2005 (3)	2006 (4)	2005 (5)	2006 (6)			
<u>Panel A: Germany</u>									
	USA	USA	FRA	FRA	ITA	ITA	HKG	ITA	CHN
	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	KOR	VNM	IND
	JPN	JPN	NLD	NLD	VNM	VNM	SGP	PRT	USA
	KOR	KOR	ITA	ITA	PRT	PRT	NZL	AUT	JPN
	IND	IND	USA	USA	AUT	AUT	CAN	NLD	
	CAN	CAN	GBR	GBR	IND	IND	AUS	SVK	
	HKG	HKG	BEL	BEL	NLD	NLD	PRK	IDN	
	SGP	RUS	AUT	AUT	SVK	SVK		ESP	
	BRA	SGP	CHE	CHE	ESP	IDN		GBR	
	RUS	BRA	JPN	JPN	ROU	ROU		FRA	
<u>Panel B: Japan</u>									
	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	GBR	KHM	CHN
	USA	USA	USA	USA	ITA	ITA	PRT	MMR	ITA
	KOR	KOR	AUS	SAU	KHM	KHM	BRA	BGD	VNM
	AUS	AUS	IDN	ARE	VNM	VNM	MAR	MEX	IDN
	ITA	ITA	KOR	AUS	IDN	IDN	IND	LAO	ESP
	CAN	FRA	DEU	IDN	MMR	MMR	CHE	NPL	FRA
	DEU	CAN	THA	KOR	BGD	BGD	HUN	LBN	DEU
	FRA	DEU	MYS	QAT	ESP	ESP	SVK		THA
	VNM	VNM	ARE	DEU	FRA	FRA	LKA		USA
	DNK	DNK	SAU	THA	DEU	DEU	AUT		KOR
<u>Panel C: USA</u>									
	CHN	CHN	CAN	CAN	CHN	CHN	PRT	MEX	CHN
	JPN	JPN	CHN	CHN	ITA	ITA	SVK	CAN	ITA
	DEU	DEU	MEX	MEX	BRA	BRA	POL	DOM	BRA
	KOR	KOR	JPN	JPN	VNM	VNM	HKG	ISR	VNM
	ITA	ITA	DEU	DEU	IDN	IDN	HUN	MAR	IDN
	GBR	GBR	KOR	KOR	THA	THA	CHE	COL	THA
	FRA	FRA	GBR	VEN	MEX	MEX	ALB	SLV	ESP
	IND	IND	FRA	GBR	ESP	ESP	BGR	AUS	IND
	HKG	HKG	ITA	FRA	IND	IND	DNK	ZAF	FRA
	VNM	VNM	MYS	MYS	DOM	DOM	AUT	PER	DEU

Notes: This table illustrates the construction of our instrument, using as an example product code 6403 “Footwear; with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather” in 2006. Columns 1-2 list the top exporters to three importing countries – USA, Germany and Japan – exporting under the MFN regime in periods $t = 2006$ and $t - 1 = 2005$. Columns 3-4 list the importing countries’ major aggregate trading partners in these periods. Columns 5-6 list the major trading partners in product 6403. Columns 7-9 then list the main countries in the treatment, control and excluded group for imports of product 6403 to the three importing countries.


TABLE A3: HS Sections

Code	Name
7	PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF
8	RAW HIDES AND SKINS, LEATHER, FURSKINS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; SADDLERY AND HARNESS; TRAVEL GOODS,
9	WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL; CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK; MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, OF ESPARTO OR OF OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND WICKERWORK
10	PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS CELLULOSIC MATERIAL; RECOVERED (WASTE AND SCRAP) PAPER OR PAPERBOARD; PAPER AND PAPERBOARD AND ARTICLES THEREOF
11	TEXTILES AND TEXTILE ARTICLES
13	ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS, MICA OR SIMILAR MATERIALS;
15	BASE METALS AND ARTICLES OF BASE METAL CERAMIC PRODUCTS; GLASS AND GLASSWARE
16	MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT; PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, TELEVISION IMAGE AND SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF SUCH ARTICLES
18	ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS; ARTICLES OF HUMAN HAIR OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC, MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, MEDICAL OR SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS AND APPARATUS; CLOCKS AND WATCHES; MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF
20	MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES
Aggregated	
1	LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS
2	VEGETABLE PRODUCTS
3	ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR CLEAVAGE PRODUCTS HANDBAGS AND SIMILAR CONTAINERS; ARTICLES OF ANIMAL GUT (OTHER THAN SILK-WORM GUT)
4	PREPARED EDIBLE FATS; ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE WAXES PREPARED FOODSTUFFS;
5	BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR; TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SUBSTITUTES
6	MINERAL PRODUCTS
12	PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL OR ALLIED INDUSTRIES FOOTWEAR, HEADGEAR, UMBRELLAS, SUN UMBRELLAS, WALKING-STICKS, SEAT-STICKS, WHIPS, RIDING-CROPS AND PARTS THEREOF; PREPARED FEATHERS AND ARTICLES MADE THEREWITH;
14	NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS, METALS CLAD WITH PRECIOUS METAL AND ARTICLES THEREOF; IMITATION JEWELLERY; COIN
17	VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT, VESSELS AND ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
19	ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF
21	WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND ANTIQUES

Notes: This table describes the 21 internationally compatible HS "Sections", which are groupings of HS product codes. We also list the 9 HS Sections that we aggregate in the main text into a Section 'aggregate', as there is insufficient variation in tariffs in these sections to estimate the elasticity. Appendix Table A5 summarizes the elasticity estimates by section.

Appendix B Robustness

FIGURE A6: Gains From Trade: Multiple Sectors



Notes: Gains from trade relative to autarky are computed using the formula $1 - \sum_s \lambda_{jj,s}^{-\beta_{j,s}/\theta_s}$, where $\beta_{j,s}$ is the share of sector s in country j 's total absorption and $\lambda_{jj,s}$ is 1 minus the import share in sector s . The numbers for China and Mexico include export-processing activities (China) and global manufacturing activities (Mexico). “Sectoral long-run elasticities” refer to the HS-section level elasticities estimated in Section 4.1. We use the median estimate between years 7-10 for each section as the long-run value. For a comparison, the red bars use elasticities obtained from Ossa (2015). Data are from the OECD IO tables for 64 countries in year 2006. The OECD IO tables are converted to HS classification using an OECD’s concordance between ISIC and HS. The GTAP sector estimates from Ossa (2015) are converted to the HS classification using GTAP’s concordance table between GTAP sectors and HS classifications. The number of HS-6 categories in each GTAP-HS section pair is used as a weight.

TABLE A4: Robustness: Local Projections

	Panel A: Tariffs			Panel B: Trade		
	Baseline (1)	Zero Lag (2)	Five Lags (3)	Baseline (4)	Zero Lag (5)	Five Lags (6)
$t - 6$	-0.099*** (0.006)	-0.090*** (0.005)	-0.102*** (0.007)	0.097 (0.130)	0.028 (0.110)	0.305* (0.165)
$t - 5$	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.004)	.	0.217 (0.121)	0.275*** (0.105)	.
$t - 4$	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.004)	.	0.004 (0.111)	-0.055 (0.093)	.
$t - 3$	-0.053*** (0.005)	-0.088*** (0.004)	.	0.075 (0.102)	-0.018 (0.087)	.
$t - 2$	-0.133*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	.	0.242*** (0.089)	0.128 (0.089)	.
$t - 1$.	-0.309*** (0.004)	.	.	0.149** (0.072)	.
t	.	.	.	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.147*** (0.054)	0.166 (0.138)
$t + 1$	0.890*** (0.004)	0.851*** (0.003)	0.842*** (0.006)	-0.673*** (0.096)	-0.535*** (0.069)	-0.109 (0.175)
$t + 2$	0.846*** (0.005)	0.830*** (0.003)	0.788*** (0.007)	-0.716*** (0.109)	-0.588*** (0.079)	-0.129 (0.206)
$t + 3$	0.831*** (0.005)	0.818*** (0.004)	0.769*** (0.008)	-0.851*** (0.122)	-0.758*** (0.086)	-0.481** (0.242)
$t + 4$	0.821*** (0.006)	0.813*** (0.004)	0.747*** (0.009)	-0.835*** (0.132)	-0.747*** (0.094)	-0.214 (0.271)
$t + 5$	0.807*** (0.005)	0.823*** (0.004)	0.718*** (0.010)	-0.998*** (0.149)	-0.915*** (0.102)	-0.823*** (0.308)
$t + 6$	0.776*** (0.006)	0.786*** (0.004)	0.663*** (0.011)	-1.006*** (0.152)	-0.875*** (0.101)	-0.496** (0.320)
$t + 7$	0.694*** (0.006)	0.754*** (0.004)	0.594*** (0.011)	-1.425*** (0.162)	-1.146*** (0.110)	-1.383*** (0.352)
$t + 8$	0.668*** (0.007)	0.716*** (0.005)	0.552*** (0.012)	-1.269*** (0.169)	-1.145*** (0.117)	-0.932** (0.391)
$t + 9$	0.699*** (0.007)	0.733*** (0.005)	0.634*** (0.015)	-1.351*** (0.198)	-0.990*** (0.120)	-1.366*** (0.513)
$t + 10$	0.715*** (0.008)	0.720*** (0.005)	0.641*** (0.018)	-1.517*** (0.232)	-1.054*** (0.139)	-1.635** (0.649)

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the local projections equations (2.3) (Panel A) and (2.2) (Panel B). The first column in each panel presents the baseline local projects results, while the second and third columns in each panel present results with 2 and 5 lags of tariffs and trade as pre-trend controls respectively. Standard errors clustered by country-pair-product are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels.

TABLE A5: Trade Elasticity: Sectoral Heterogeneity

	Mean (1)	Median (2)	25 percentile (3)	75 percentile (4)
t	-0.396	-0.407	-0.670	-0.117
$t + 1$	-0.851	-0.710	-1.116	-0.563
$t + 2$	-1.041	-0.798	-1.601	-0.465
$t + 3$	-1.381	-1.220	-2.044	-0.791
$t + 4$	-1.171	-1.100	-1.619	-0.710
$t + 5$	-1.683	-1.698	-2.060	-1.062
$t + 6$	-1.747	-1.651	-2.478	-0.887
$t + 7$	-3.082	-1.959	-3.731	-1.469
$t + 8$	-3.518	-2.324	-4.164	-1.218
$t + 9$	-3.352	-2.195	-3.248	-1.522
$t + 10$	-2.804	-2.794	-3.448	-1.906

Notes: This table presents results from estimating equation (2.4) at the HS Section-level for every horizon. We include estimates for 11 HS Sections here, including one aggregated super-section as described in the text. All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects and the baseline pretrend controls (one lag).

TABLE A6: “Traditional Gravity” Elasticity Estimates in Levels

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Panel A: Log-levels, OLS</u>						
$\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.696*** (0.020)	-4.468*** (0.019)	-6.696*** (0.046)	-2.734*** (0.014)	-1.040*** (0.022)	-0.892*** (0.020)
R^2	0.013	0.341	0.383	0.530	0.571	0.837
Obs	107.09	107.07	106.24	105.73	104.91	98.45
<u>Panel B: Log-levels, OLS, baseline sample</u>						
$\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-7.005*** (0.048)	-8.527*** (0.058)	-11.262*** (0.106)	-3.137*** (0.033)	-0.951*** (0.051)	-1.154*** (0.048)
R^2	0.021	0.362	0.419	0.550	0.593	0.887
Obs	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	19.35
<u>Fixed effects</u>						
importer×HS4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
exporter×HS4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
importer×HS4×year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
exporter×HS4×year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
importer×exporter×HS4	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
imp×HS6×year, exp×HS6×year, imp×exp×h6	no	no	no	no	no	yes

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the trade elasticity in log-levels. The dependent variable is the log of trade value. Panel A presents estimates for the whole sample while and Panel B uses our baseline sample (for $h = 5$). Column 1 reports the results with no fixed effects. Column 2 adds importer-product and exporter-product fixed effects, Column 3 interacts these fixed effects with years, column 4 includes country-pair-product fixed effects and column 5 includes our baseline fixed effects. Column 6 uses HS6 product level fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level, are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. Number of observations are reported in millions. For the baseline sample in Column 6, the number of reported observations is lower as HS6 fixed effects drop additional singleton clusters, but the underlying panel is the same.

TABLE A7: “Traditional Gravity” Elasticity Estimates in Differences

	(1)	<u>OLS</u>	(3)	<u>2SLS using all 1-year Tariff Changes</u>			(7)	<u>Baseline IV</u>	(9)
		(2)		(4)	(5)	(6)		(8)	
Panel A: 3-year log-differences									
$\Delta_3 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.069***	-0.482***	-0.393***	-0.774***	-0.397***	-0.343***	-2.011***	-1.001***	-0.926***
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.093)	(0.105)
R^2	0.038	0.149	0.210						
Observations	47.04	46.60	46.26	47.04	46.60	46.26	26.84	26.44	26.16
Panel B: 7-year log-differences									
$\Delta_7 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-2.343***	-0.858***	-0.621***	-0.965***	-0.553***	-0.468***	-2.489***	-1.535***	-1.521***
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.073)	(0.130)	(0.145)
R^2	0.097	0.209	0.315						
Observations	31.06	30.75	30.44	31.06	30.75	30.44	17.47	17.19	16.95
Panel C: 5-year log-differences, Balanced Panel									
$\Delta_5 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.638***	-0.772***	-0.634***	-0.788***	-0.402***	-0.438***	-2.238***	-1.177***	-1.112***
	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.115)	(0.124)
R^2	0.065	0.185	0.277						
Observations	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13
<u>Fixed Effects</u>									
Imp×HS4	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Exp×HS4	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Imp×HS4×Year	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Exp×HS4×Year	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Imp×Exp×HS4	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the trade elasticity in differences for a single horizon. The dependent variable is the log-difference in trade value, over 3 years (Panel A), 7 years (Panel B), and 5 years on the baseline sample for $h = 5$ (Panel C). Columns 1-3 report the OLS results, columns 4-6 2SLS instrumenting with the 1-year tariff changes, and columns 7-9 instrumenting with the baseline instrument. Standard errors, clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level, are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. Number of observations reported in millions. All first-stage F statistics are greater than 10000.

TABLE A8: Trade Elasticity, Every Horizon:, Robustness: Pre-Trends, Alternative Clustering, Alternative Samples

	Baseline	Zero Lag	Five Lags	FE50	Two-way Clustering	Balanced Panel	Alternative Control Group
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.147*** (0.054)	0.166 (0.138)	-0.232** (0.094)	-0.262*** (0.096)	-0.592** (0.290)	-0.187** (0.077)
obs	31.66	41.46	14.58	17.62	31.66	5.04	27.33
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.628*** (0.081)	-0.129 (0.208)	-0.599*** (0.133)	-0.756*** (0.141)	-0.098 (0.380)	-0.490*** (0.117)
obs	26.18	32.85	12.52	15.19	26.18	5.04	22.63
$t + 2$	-0.846*** (0.129)	-0.708*** (0.095)	-0.164 (0.262)	-0.724*** (0.156)	-0.846*** (0.189)	-0.755* (0.444)	-0.449*** (0.141)
obs	23.27	29.21	11.09	13.77	23.27	5.04	20.05
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.926*** (0.105)	-0.625** (0.315)	-0.865*** (0.173)	-1.024*** (0.195)	-0.895* (0.472)	-0.743*** (0.160)
obs	20.8	26.16	9.76	12.48	20.8	5.04	17.86
$t + 4$	-1.017*** (0.161)	-0.918*** (0.115)	-0.287 (0.362)	-0.784*** (0.187)	-1.017*** (0.232)	-0.769 (0.480)	-0.613*** (0.171)
obs	18.67	23.49	8.53	11.33	18.67	5.04	16
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-1.112*** (0.124)	-1.146*** (0.429)	-1.012*** (0.215)	-1.237*** (0.253)	-0.916** (0.437)	-0.792*** (0.201)
obs	16.69	21.13	7.3	10.22	16.69	5.04	14.27
$t + 6$	-1.296*** (0.196)	-1.113*** (0.129)	-0.747 (0.482)	-1.051*** (0.231)	-1.296*** (0.274)	-0.532 (0.463)	-0.570*** (0.216)
obs	14.92	18.9	6.17	9.2	14.92	5.04	12.62
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-1.521*** (0.145)	-2.330*** (0.595)	-1.853*** (0.270)	-2.055*** (0.357)	-0.990** (0.489)	-1.383*** (0.251)
obs	13.22	16.95	5.25	8.2	13.22	5.04	11.12
$t + 8$	-1.901*** (0.253)	-1.599*** (0.163)	-1.690** (0.709)	-1.888*** (0.289)	-1.901*** (0.465)	-1.094** (0.510)	-1.079*** (0.275)
obs	11.53	15.02	4.42	7.19	11.53	5.04	9.63
$t + 9$	-1.934*** (0.283)	-1.351*** (0.164)	-2.155*** (0.812)	-1.781*** (0.323)	-1.934*** (0.500)	-1.600*** (0.551)	-1.087*** (0.306)
obs	9.85	13.11	3.79	6.19	9.85	5.04	8.2
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-1.463*** (0.194)	-2.550** (1.016)	-1.760 (0.374)	-2.122*** (0.332)	-1.818*** (0.544)	-1.600*** (0.379)
obs	8.31	11.25	3.21	5.25	8.31	5.04	6.84

Notes: This table presents robustness exercises for the results from estimating equation (2.4). All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 vary the pretrend controls (including alternatively two lags or five lags of import growth and tariff changes). Column 4 reports the results when the sample is restricted to fixed-effects clusters with a minimum of 50 observations. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level, except in Column 5 where they are additionally clustered by year. Column 6 restricts the sample to have positive trade flows for all time horizons. Column 7 reports results where the control group only contains observations with zero tariff changes. All columns except 2 and 3 include the baseline pretrend controls (one lag). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

TABLE A9: Trade Elasticity, Every Horizon, Robustness: Alternative Instruments, Outcomes, Fixed Effects, and Samples

	Baseline (1)	All Partners (2)	Quantities (3)	Unit Values (4)	Extensive (5)	Extensive Sel (6)	DL (7)	SD1 (8)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.275*** (0.030)	-0.434*** (0.123)	-0.179* (0.093)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.082*** (0.063)	-0.313*** (0.096)
obs	31.66	57.14	29.3	31.66	31.66	131.03	56.35	28.7
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.624*** (0.047)	-1.228*** (0.174)	-0.664*** (0.136)	-0.027 (0.080)	-0.484*** (0.063)	-0.805*** (0.089)	-0.889*** (0.142)
obs	26.18	47.19	24.26	26.18	26.18	108.13	49.11	23.76
$t + 2$	-0.846*** (0.129)	-0.647*** (0.053)	-1.550*** (0.213)	-0.663*** (0.162)	-0.139 (0.094)	-0.432*** (0.073)	-0.731*** (0.098)	-0.861*** (0.174)
obs	23.27	42.29	21.42	23.27	23.27	96.99	45.23	21.1
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.648*** (0.061)	-1.669*** (0.241)	-0.81*** (0.184)	-0.134 (0.104)	-0.590*** (0.084)	-0.955*** (0.107)	-1.228*** (0.200)
obs	20.8	38.16	19.14	20.8	20.8	87.22	41.5	18.86
$t + 4$	-1.017*** (0.161)	-0.657*** (0.068)	-1.637*** (0.264)	-0.801*** (0.203)	-0.09 (0.115)	-0.449*** (0.095)	-0.846*** (0.117)	-1.171*** (0.219)
obs	18.67	34.39	17.14	18.67	18.67	77.82	37.92	16.92
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-0.718*** (0.073)	-1.686*** (0.285)	-1.422*** (0.232)	0.291** (0.128)	-0.730*** (0.100)	-1.183*** (0.122)	-1.180*** (0.253)
obs	16.69	30.89	15.32	16.69	16.69	69.73	34.61	15.12
$t + 6$	-1.296*** (0.196)	-0.781*** (0.078)	-2.477*** (0.296)	-1.374*** (0.244)	0.125 (0.135)	-0.864*** (0.101)	-1.212*** (0.124)	-1.267*** (0.261)
obs	14.92	27.65	13.64	14.92	14.92	62.07	31.34	13.51
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-0.940*** (0.091)	-3.756*** (0.401)	-2.166*** (0.292)	0.162 (0.161)	-0.902*** (0.114)	-1.496*** (0.138)	-1.990*** (0.318)
obs	13.22	24.64	12.06	13.22	13.22	55.24	28.4	11.96
$t + 8$	-1.901*** (0.253)	-1.000*** (0.099)	-3.635*** (0.430)	-2.076*** (0.318)	0.205 (0.173)	-0.688*** (0.130)	-1.429*** (0.157)	-1.955*** (0.352)
obs	11.53	21.67	10.48	11.53	11.53	48.51	25.4	10.44
$t + 9$	-1.934*** (0.283)	-0.970*** (0.109)	-3.149*** (0.451)	-1.656*** (0.353)	-0.180 (0.193)	-1.000*** (0.137)	-1.650*** (0.161)	-2.185*** (0.388)
obs	9.85	18.69	8.8	9.85	9.85	41.82	22.36	8.93
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-0.866*** (0.122)	-1.865*** (0.453)	-1.765*** (0.406)	-0.0780 (0.221)	-0.941*** (0.153)	-1.638*** (0.181)	-2.360*** (0.444)
obs	8.31	15.92	7.54	8.31	8.31	35.09	19.24	7.52

Notes: This table presents alternative estimates for the results from estimating equation (2.4), varying the instrument or outcome variable. Column 2 uses an alternative definition of the instrument where all trade partners subject to the MFN regime are included. Column 3 reports results for quantities, and Column 4 the results for unit values. Column 5 presents results including the extensive margin using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows, and all zero trade observations for importer-exporter-section pair with ever positive trade. Column 6 presents results including the extensive margin using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows, and only zero trade observations when trade switches from zero to positive, or vice versa. Column 7 presents results from a distributed lag model. Column 8 reports the results based on a sample where tariffs do not vary within an importer-HS6. All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects. All columns include the baseline pretrend controls (one lag). Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

TABLE A10: Trade Elasticity: Estimates and First Stage F -Statistics

	OLS	Baseline IV	F -stat	All Partners	F -stat	Distributed Lag	SW F -stat
t	-0.126*** (0.011)	-0.262*** (0.072)	91422	-0.275*** (0.030)	366290	-0.413 (0.338)	20536
$t + 1$	-0.275*** (0.019)	-0.756*** (0.108)	42231	-0.624*** (0.047)	132393	-0.523 (0.466)	18831
$t + 2$	-0.306*** (0.024)	-0.846*** (0.129)	36469	-0.647*** (0.053)	123145	-0.920 (0.586)	22499
$t + 3$	-0.343*** (0.026)	-1.024*** (0.146)	28537	-0.648*** (0.061)	102829	-1.578** (0.685)	22570
$t + 4$	-0.414*** (0.029)	-1.017*** (0.161)	23771	-0.657*** (0.068)	85767	-1.598** (0.773)	16227
$t + 5$	-0.448*** (0.030)	-1.237*** (0.185)	22697	-0.718*** (0.073)	81169	-2.097** (0.861)	12463
$t + 6$	-0.468*** (0.033)	-1.296*** (0.196)	19439	-0.781*** (0.078)	61812	-2.185** (0.931)	14722
$t + 7$	-0.468*** (0.037)	-2.055*** (0.233)	15481	-0.940*** (0.091)	48802	-2.710*** (1.016)	13473
$t + 8$	-0.445*** (0.040)	-1.901*** (0.253)	13933	-1.000*** (0.099)	44599	-2.798** (1.109)	13475
$t + 9$	-0.442*** (0.040)	-1.934*** (0.283)	10201	-0.970*** (0.109)	36930	-3.084*** (1.180)	14278
$t + 10$	-0.481*** (0.041)	-2.122*** (0.325)	8252	-0.866*** (0.122)	31174	-3.166** (1.252)	10962

Notes: This table presents the first-stage F -statistics for the main estimates. For the Distributed Lag model we report the Sanderson-Windmeijer F -statistic to test for weak instruments as we have 11 instruments and 11 endogenous variables.

TABLE A11: Trade Elasticity: Further Robustness

	Uruguay Round		HS6 Multilateral Effects	
	OLS (1)	Baseline IV (2)	OLS (3)	Baseline IV (4)
t	-0.285 (0.179)	-0.181 (0.851)	-0.186*** (0.014)	0.077 (0.106)
obs	0.9	0.55	54.3	30.2
$t + 1$	-1.157** (0.581)	-2.011 (2.392)	-0.261*** (0.022)	-0.682*** (0.134)
obs	0.84	0.51	54.3	24.9
$t + 2$	-0.771 (0.663)	-1.493 (2.662)	-0.278*** (0.027)	-0.599*** (0.028)
obs	0.78	0.5	48.5	22.2
$t + 3$	-1.489*** (0.563)	-5.094 (2.469)	-0.288*** (0.030)	-0.589*** (0.173)
obs	0.78	0.47	43.7	19.8
$t + 4$	-1.608*** (0.592)	-1.434*** (1.960)	-0.373*** (0.032)	-0.767*** (0.190)
obs	0.77	0.46	39.5	17.8
$t + 5$	-1.287* (0.683)	-2.077 (2.462)	-0.406*** (0.034)	-1.041*** (0.219)
obs	0.71	0.43	35.6	15.9
$t + 6$	-1.428** (0.644)	-1.152 (2.306)	-0.446*** (0.036)	-1.090*** (0.219)
obs	0.71	0.43	31.9	14.2
$t + 7$	-1.533* (0.831)	0.260 (2.905)	-0.429*** (0.041)	-1.371*** (0.266)
obs	0.7	0.42	28.6	12.6
$t + 8$	-1.848** (0.814)	-4.740 (2.928)	-0.353*** (0.045)	-0.993*** (0.287)
obs	0.74	0.46	24.4	11.0
$t + 9$	-1.041 (0.801)	-3.610 (2.515)	-0.405*** (0.044)	-0.981*** (0.330)
obs	0.74	0.46	22.2	9.45
$t + 10$	-0.296 (0.991)	-2.967 (3.278)	-0.495*** (0.043)	-0.468 (0.355)
obs	0.65	0.4	19.0	7.95

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the trade elasticity using both OLS (column 1) and the baseline instrument (column 2) for tariff changes only in years 1995-1997 (“Uruguay round”). Columns (4) and (5) present the OLS and baseline IV specifications when the multilateral resistance terms are country-HS6-year level. In these columns we drop the bilateral fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level. All columns include the baseline pretrend controls (one lag). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

TABLE A12: Gains from Trade

Country	$\theta = -1$	$\theta = -5$	$\theta = -10$
<u>G7</u>			
Canada	21.0%	3.9%	1.9%
France	15.6%	3.0%	1.5%
Germany	21.7%	3.8%	1.9%
Italy	13.9%	2.7%	1.3%
Japan	7.7%	1.5%	0.7%
UK	13.9%	2.6%	1.3%
US	5.3%	1.0%	0.5%
<u>Major Emerging Markets</u>			
Brazil	7.4%	1.4%	0.7%
China	11.9%	2.1%	1.1%
India	10.5%	2.0%	1.0%
Mexico	6.1%	1.2%	0.6%
Russia	19.5%	3.6%	1.8%
South Africa	14.1%	2.7%	1.3%
Median, 64 Countries	22.9%	4.2%	2.1%

Notes: Data are from the OECD IO tables for 64 countries in year 2006. Gains from trade relative to autarky are computed using the formula $\lambda_{jj}^{1/\theta}$, where λ_{jj} is 1 minus the import share. The import share is calculated as imports divided by gross output. The numbers for China and Mexico include export-processing activities (China) and global manufacturing activities (Mexico).

Appendix C Model

Notation Throughout this appendix, we let tildes denote percent deviations from steady state, e.g. $\tilde{v}_t = \ln v_t - \ln v = d \ln v_t = \frac{v_t - v}{v}$. Variables without subscripts denote steady state values.

For most of this appendix we suppress source and destination country as well as product subscripts for convenience. For clarity we provide an overview on the notation here:

- D_t is a destination and product-specific demand shock, i.e. $D_t = D_{i,p,t}$
- ω_t is a source, destination, and product-specific demand shock, i.e. $\omega_t = \omega_{i,j,p,t}$
- c_t denotes marginal cost and is specific to the source country and product, i.e. $c_t = c_{j,p,t}$
- κ_t denotes non-tariff trade barriers and varies with the source country, the destination country, and by product, i.e. $\kappa_t = \kappa_{i,j,p,t}$
- τ_t is the country-pair and product-specific iceberg tariff, i.e. $\tau_t = \tau_{i,j,p,t}$

C.1 Model summary

The following system of equations characterizes the trade response to tariff shocks. The first set of equations is

$$p_t^x = p^x(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t), \quad (\text{C.1})$$

$$q_t = q(p_t^x, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t), \quad (\text{C.2})$$

$$\pi_t = \pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t), \quad (\text{C.3})$$

$$X_t = q_t p_t^x n_t, \quad (\text{C.4})$$

where p_t^x is the price of exported goods, q_t a quantity measure, π_t a measure of flow profits, X_t is exports exclusive of tariffs, and n_t a generic mass. Let further v_t denote a generic value. The following dynamic system determines the evolution of v_t and n_t ,

$$v_t = \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_t [\pi(c_{t+1}, \kappa_{t+1} \tau_{t+1}, \omega_{t+1} D_{t+1}) + (1-\delta)v_{t+1}], \quad (\text{C.5})$$

$$n_t = n_{t-1}(1-\delta) + G(v_{t-1}), \quad (\text{C.6})$$

together with $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r}\right)^t v_t = 0$, a given initial value for n_0 , and stochastic processes for c_t , κ_t , τ_t , ω_t and D_t , which are exogeneous in our partial equilibrium model.

We define the following constants

$$\eta_{q,p} := \frac{\partial \ln q}{\partial \ln p^x}, \eta_{q,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln q}{\partial \ln \tau}, \eta_{p,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln p^x}{\partial \ln \tau}, \eta_{\pi,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln \pi}{\partial \ln \tau}, \quad (\text{C.7})$$

and assume that $\eta_{q,p} < 0$, $\eta_{q,\tau} < 0$, and $\eta_{\pi,\tau} < 0$. We also define $\chi := \frac{g(v)v}{G(v)}$ where G introduced below, and $g = G'$.

C.2 Microfoundations

We next show that three different frameworks generate the above system of equations.

C.2.1 A dynamic Arkolakis (2010) model

This model is a dynamic extension of the Arkolakis (2010) market penetration framework, where the number of customers adjusts gradually. The model also shares features with Fitzgerald, Haller, and Yedid-Levi (2019), and others.

A single representative firm sells its good in the foreign location, earning profits $\Pi_t = n_t \pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t)$. Here, n_t denotes the mass of foreign consumers that the firm reaches in the foreign location. Further, $\pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t)$ denotes flow profits per unit mass of foreign consumers reached, and is a function of the exporter's costs c_t , tariffs τ_t , nontariff trade costs κ_t , and the demand shifters $\omega_t D_t$.

The mass of foreign consumers available for the firm to sell to evolves according to the accumulation equation

$$n_{t+1} = n_t (1 - \delta) + a_t, \quad (\text{C.8})$$

where a_t is the mass of newly added customers in the foreign country. Note that mass n_t is predetermined in the current period, so that adding new consumers this period only affects next period's mass of consumers n_{t+1} . We assume that adding a_t new customers requires a payment of $f(a_t)$, where $f' > 0$, $f'' > 0$, $\lim_{a \rightarrow 0} f'(a) = 0$, $\lim_{a \rightarrow \infty} f'(a) = \infty$, and that the existing mass of consumers already reached by the firm depreciates at rate δ .

The firm discounts at interest rate r and maximizes the present discounted value of future profits,

$$\max_{\{a_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t [n_t \pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t) - f(a_t)].$$

Denoting by v_t the multiplier on constraint (accumulation equation), the current value Lagrangian is

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t [n_t \pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t) - f(a_t) + v_t (n_t (1 - \delta) + a_t - n_{t+1})].$$

The first order necessary conditions are

$$\begin{aligned} f'(a_t) &= v_t, \\ v_t &= \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_t [\pi(c_{t+1}, \kappa_{t+1} \tau_{t+1}, \omega_{t+1} D_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta) v_{t+1}], \end{aligned}$$

and the transversality condition $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t v_t n_t = 0$, which implies that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^t v_t = 0$. The firm chooses its investment into accumulating new consumers such that the marginal benefit v_t equals the marginal cost $f'(a_t)$. The shadow value v_t , in turn, is the expected present value of profits generated by each consumer reached in the foreign market.

Note that the above problem is reminiscent of a standard investment problem with convex adjustment

costs, except that flow profits are a linear function of n_t , the analogue of the capital stock. This linearity greatly improves the tractability of the problem and permits analytical solutions.

Letting $q_t = q(p_t^x, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t)$ denote foreign demand per unit mass of consumers, and letting $p_t^x = p^x(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t)$ denote the price set by the representative firm, exports are $X_t = q_t p_t^x n_t$. After substituting out a_t , the accumulation equation (C.8) becomes

$$n_t = n_{t-1} (1 - \delta) + (f')^{-1} (v_{t-1}).$$

For $G \equiv (f')^{-1}$, the model is described by the set of equations in Section C.1.

C.2.2 A dynamic Krugman (1980) model

We next present a dynamic partial equilibrium version of the Krugman (1980) model. The model also shares features with Costantini and Melitz (2007), Ruhl (2008), and many others.

There is a continuum of firms, and each exporting firm receives flow profits $\pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t)$ from exporting. Further, exporters exit the bilateral trade relationship with probability δ per period. The value of an exporting firm at the end of period t is

$$v_t = \frac{1}{1+r} E_t [\pi(c_{t+1}, \kappa_{t+1} \tau_{t+1}, \omega_{t+1} D_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta) v_{t+1}],$$

where we assume that the value of a non-exporting firm is zero. We also require that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r}\right)^t v_t = 0$, which follows from the transversality condition of the firms' owner(s).

In every period, a unit mass of firms receives the opportunity to begin exporting to the foreign location. Each of these firms receive i.i.d sunk cost draw ξ_t^s , drawn from distribution G , and then decide whether to start exporting. Each firm solves

$$\max \{v_t - \xi_t^s, 0\},$$

so a firm enters if and only if $\xi_t^s \leq v_t$. Note that a firm entering this period begins to receive profits from exporting only in the next period. The mass of firms entering into exporting in period t is thus $G(v_t)$. The mass of exporting firms at the end of period t is denoted by n_t , and it evolves according to

$$n_{t+1} = n_t (1 - \delta) + G(v_t).$$

Letting $q_t = q(p_t^x, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t)$ denote foreign demand per unit mass of firms, and letting $p_t^x = p^x(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t)$ denote the price set by each firm, exports are $X_t = q_t p_t^x n_t$. It is clear that this model is nested by the set of equations in Section C.1.

C.2.3 A dynamic Melitz (2003) model

Consider a version of the Melitz (2003) model, with a two-stage entry problem. In the first stage of the entry problem, firms do not know their productivity of producing the exported good. Further, they pay a sunk cost to obtain the *right to export on a per-period basis*. Having paid this sunk cost,

they learn their productivity and face the following static decision problem going forward: As long as the firm maintains its right to export on a per-period basis, it can pay a fixed cost to obtain the profit of exporing for one period.

First stage Let $\pi(c_t, \kappa_t \tau_t, \omega_t D_t)$ denote *expected* flow profits from exporting in stage one of the entry problem. The remainder of this stage is isomorphic to the dynamic [Krugman \(1980\)](#) model described above. Firms lose their right to export on a per-period basis with probability δ per period. The expected value of exporting at the end of period t is

$$v_t = \frac{1}{1+r} E_t [\pi(c_{t+1}, \kappa_{t+1} \tau_{t+1}, \omega_{t+1} D_{t+1}) + (1-\delta) v_{t+1}],$$

where we assume that the value of a non-exporting firm is zero. We also require that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r}\right)^t v_t = 0$, which follows from the transversality condition of the firms' owner(s).

In every period, a unit mass of firms faces the first stage of the entry problem. Each of these firms receives an i.i.d sunk cost draw ξ_t^s , drawn from distribution G , and then decides whether to enter into the second stage. Each firm solves

$$\max \{v_t - \xi_t^s, 0\},$$

so a firm enters if and only if $\xi_t^s \leq v_t$. Note that a firm entering this period faces the second stage of the entry problem only in the next period. The mass of firms entering into the second stage in period t is $G(v_t)$. The mass of firms with the right to export on a per-period basis is denoted by n_t , and evolves according to

$$n_{t+1} = n_t (1 - \delta) + G(v_t).$$

Foreign consumer We assume that foreign demand takes the form $Q_t = (P_t^c)^{-\sigma} \omega_t D_t$, where $P_t^c = \kappa_t \tau_t P_t^x$ is the ideal price index of consumer prices paid for the country's exports, so that $Q_t = (P_t^x)^{-\sigma} (\kappa_t \tau_t)^{-\sigma} \omega_t D_t$ is the quantity aggregate of the firm-level exports. Q_t takes the CES form

$$Q_t = \left(\int_{j \in J_t} q_t(j)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dj \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (\text{C.9})$$

where j indexes exporting firms and J_t is the set of exporting firms. Profit maximization implies that

$$q_t(j) = Q_t \left(\frac{p_t^x(j)}{P_t^x} \right)^{-\sigma}, \quad (\text{C.10})$$

where

$$P_t^x = \left(\int_{j \in J_t} (p_t^x(j))^{1-\sigma} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}. \quad (\text{C.11})$$

Measured exports are $X_t = Q_t P_t^x$.

Second stage Once a firm has paid the sunk entry cost, it draws its productivity φ from distribution F , which we assume to be independent of the sunk cost draw ζ_t^s . A firm's marginal costs are

$\frac{c_t}{\varphi}$. Each firm faces demand function (C.10). Profit maximization implies that

$$p_t^x(j) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\varphi(j)},$$

and yields flow profits from exporting

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t(j) &= q_t(j) \left(p_t^x(j) - \frac{c_t}{\varphi(j)} \right) - \xi \\ &= \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\varphi(j)} \right)^{1-\sigma} Q_t (P_t^x)^\sigma - \xi, \end{aligned}$$

where ξ denotes the per-period fixed cost of exporting, which is common across firms.

A firm exports in period t if $\pi_t(j) \geq 0$, and the marginal firm has productivity

$$\varphi_t^m = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c_t \left(\frac{\sigma \xi}{Q_t (P_t^x)^\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

Note that Q_t and P_t^c depend on τ_t and hence changes in tariffs will affect the composition of firms that exports in a given period.

Following Melitz (2003), we write the price index (C.11) as

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^x &= \left(\int_{\varphi_t^m}^{\infty} (p_t^x(\varphi))^{1-\sigma} n_t dF(\varphi) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\ &= n_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c_t \left(\int_{\varphi_t^m}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} dF(\varphi) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\ &= n_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\tilde{\varphi}_t = \left(\int_{\varphi_t^m}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} dF(\varphi) \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (\text{C.12})$$

Note that $\tilde{\varphi}_t$ denotes an *aggregate* productivity measure of exporting firms, and not an *average*.

Now letting

$$p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\tilde{\varphi}_t}, \quad (\text{C.13})$$

we have

$$P_t^x = n_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t).$$

Again following Melitz (2003), and noting that $q_t(\varphi) = Q_t \left(\frac{p_t^x(\varphi)}{P_t^x} \right)^{-\sigma}$ and

$$q_t(\tilde{\varphi}_t) = Q_t \left(\frac{p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t)}{P_t^x} \right)^{-\sigma}, \quad (\text{C.14})$$

we have that $q_t(\varphi) = \left(\frac{\varphi_t}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} \right)^\sigma q(\tilde{\varphi}_t)$. We can then write the quantity index (C.9) as

$$\begin{aligned} Q_t &= \left(\int_{\varphi_t^m}^{\infty} q_t(\varphi)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} n_t dF(\varphi) \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \\ &= n_t^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} q_t(\tilde{\varphi}_t). \end{aligned}$$

Now the total value of exports is

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= Q_t P_t^x \\ &= n_t^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} q(\tilde{\varphi}_t) n_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} p^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t) \\ &= n_t q_t(\tilde{\varphi}_t) p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t), \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\varphi}_t$, $p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t)$, and $q_t(\tilde{\varphi}_t)$ are defined in equations (C.12), (C.13), and (C.14).

Lastly, expected profits can be written as

$$\pi_t = \frac{1}{\sigma} Q_t (P_t^x)^\sigma \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} \right)^{1-\sigma} - \xi (1 - F(\varphi_t^m)).$$

Since our assumptions on foreign demand imply that $Q_t (P_t^x)^\sigma = (\kappa_t \tau_t)^{-\sigma} \omega_t D_t$, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t) &= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} \\ q_t(\tilde{\varphi}_t) &= (p_t^x(\tilde{\varphi}_t))^{-\sigma} (\kappa_t \tau_t)^{-\sigma} \omega_t D_t \\ \pi_t &= \frac{1}{\sigma} (\kappa_t \tau_t)^{-\sigma} \omega_t D_t \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{c_t}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} \right)^{1-\sigma} - \xi (1 - F(\varphi_t^m)) \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\varphi}_t$ is given by equation (C.12) and

$$\varphi_t^m = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c_t \left(\frac{\sigma \xi}{(\kappa_t \tau_t)^{-\sigma} \omega_t D_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

It is now easy to see that the above functions take the forms assumed in equations (C.1)-(C.4).

While the exact values of elasticities (C.7) depend on the distribution F , it is always true that $\frac{\partial \ln \varphi_t^m}{\partial \ln \tau_t} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \ln \tilde{\varphi}_t}{\partial \ln \tau_t} < 0$, and hence $\frac{\partial \ln p_t^x}{\partial \ln \tau_t} = -\frac{\partial \ln \tilde{\varphi}_t}{\partial \ln \tau_t} > 0$. Further, the partial derivative $\frac{\partial \ln q_t}{\partial \ln \tau_t} = -\sigma$.

C.3 Model solution

Global solution Solving equation (C.5) forward gives, after imposing the transversality condition,

$$v_t = \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell \pi_{t+\ell+1} \right].$$

Further, solving equation (C.6) backwards gives

$$n_t = \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (1-\delta)^k G(v_{t-1-k}) + (1-\delta)^t n_0.$$

The model solution is unique: for any sequence of $\pi_{t+\ell+1}$'s, the first equation yields a unique v_t , and for any sequence of v_t 's, the second equation yields a unique n_t .

Nonstochastic steady state Suppose all exogenous driving forces are constant so that $c_t = c$, $\kappa_t = \kappa$, $\tau_t = \tau$, $\omega_t = \omega$ and $D_t = D$. Then $\pi_t = \pi$, and v_t immediately collapses to

$$v = \frac{\pi}{r+\delta}.$$

Further, n_t converges to

$$n = \frac{G(v)}{\delta}.$$

These two equations characterize the non-stochastic steady state.

Long-run trade elasticity The long-run trade elasticity is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln X}{d \ln \tau} &= \frac{d \ln q}{d \ln \tau} + \frac{d \ln p^x}{d \ln \tau} + \frac{d \ln n}{d \ln \tau} \\ &= \varepsilon^0 + \frac{d \ln n}{d \ln \tau}, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\frac{d \ln n}{d \ln \tau} = \frac{d \ln n}{d \ln v} \frac{d \ln v}{d \ln \tau} = \chi \frac{d \ln \pi}{d \ln \tau} = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau},$$

and

$$\chi := \frac{d \ln n}{d \ln v} = \frac{d \ln G(v)}{d \ln v} = \frac{g(v) v}{G(v)}.$$

Monotone convergence If $c_t = c$, $\kappa_t = \kappa$, $\tau_t = \tau$, $\omega_t = \omega$ and $D_t = D$, then $v_t = v = \frac{\pi}{r+\delta}$. It then follows from equation (C.6) above that

$$\begin{aligned} n_t - n &= (1-\delta)(n_{t-1} - n) + G(v) - \delta n \\ &= (1-\delta)(n_{t-1} - n), \end{aligned}$$

so convergence is monotone.

Linearized economy We characterize all impulse response functions and trade elasticities up to a first order approximation. Letting tildes denote percent deviations from steady state, e.g. $\tilde{v}_t = \ln v_t - \ln v = d \ln v_t = \frac{v_t - v}{v}$, these are

$$\tilde{v}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} + \frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \tilde{v}_{t+1} \right], \quad (\text{C.15})$$

$$\tilde{n}_t = \tilde{n}_{t-1} (1 - \delta) + \delta \chi \tilde{v}_{t-1}, \quad (\text{C.16})$$

in recursive form and

$$\tilde{v}_t = \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \tilde{\pi}_{t+\ell+1} \right], \quad (\text{C.17})$$

$$\tilde{n}_t = \delta \chi \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (1 - \delta)^{t-1-k} \tilde{v}_k + (1 - \delta)^t \tilde{n}_0, \quad (\text{C.18})$$

when solved forwards and backwards, respectively.

Further, the static model block (C.1)-(C.4) takes the form

$$\tilde{p}_t^x = \eta_{p,c} \tilde{c}_t + \eta_{p,\tau} (\tilde{\kappa}_t + \tilde{\tau}_t) + \eta_{p,D} (\tilde{\omega}_t + \tilde{D}_t), \quad (\text{C.19})$$

$$\tilde{q}_t = \eta_{q,p} \tilde{p}_t^x + \eta_{q,\tau} (\tilde{\kappa}_t + \tilde{\tau}_t) + \eta_{q,D} (\tilde{\omega}_t + \tilde{D}_t), \quad (\text{C.20})$$

$$\tilde{\pi}_t = \eta_{\pi,c} \tilde{c}_t + \eta_{\pi,\tau} (\tilde{\kappa}_t + \tilde{\tau}_t) + \eta_{\pi,D} (\tilde{\omega}_t + \tilde{D}_t), \quad (\text{C.21})$$

$$\tilde{X}_t = \tilde{q}_t + \tilde{p}_t^x + \tilde{n}_t. \quad (\text{C.22})$$

C.4 Proofs of propositions and examples

C.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1. Consider an arbitrary evolution of tariffs $\left\{ \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0 + \ell}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right\}_{\ell=1}^{\infty}$ after the shock at t_0 . The impulse response function of $\ln n_t$ at horizon $h = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ is

$$\frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = \chi \eta_{\pi,\tau} \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t_0+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+k+\ell+1}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right].$$

Proof. Combining equation (C.17) as of time $t_0 + k$ with the fact that $\tilde{\pi}_t = \eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}_t$ in the version of the model with tariff shocks only (see C.21) gives

$$\tilde{v}_{t_0+k} = \eta_{\pi,\tau} \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \mathbb{E}_{t_0+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \tilde{\tau}_{t_0+k+\ell+1} \right]. \quad (\text{C.23})$$

Next take equation (C.16) at time $t_0 + h$ and solve it backwards until period t_0 . This gives

$$\tilde{n}_{t_0+h} = \delta\chi \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0} \quad (\text{C.24})$$

Now plugging (C.23) into (C.24) gives

$$\tilde{n}_{t_0+h} = \eta_{\pi,\tau} \chi \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t_0+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell \tilde{\tau}_{t_0+k+\ell+1} \right] + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0}.$$

Lastly, replace \tilde{n}_{t_0+h} with $d \ln n_{t_0+h}$, etc., differentiate with respect to $d \ln \tau_{t_0}$, and note that $\frac{d \ln n_{t_0}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = 0$.

□

C.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Proposition 2. *If $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \neq 0$ and is finite, then $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \varepsilon^h = \varepsilon$.*

Proof. We first show that $\{\tilde{v}_{t_0+h}\}_{h=0}^{\infty}$ converges to $\eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}$. Fix an arbitrary $\psi > 0$. Since $\{\tilde{\tau}_{t_0+h}\}_{h=0}^{\infty}$ converges to $\tilde{\tau}$, there exists a h_ψ such that for $\forall h \geq h_\psi : |\tilde{\tau}_{t_0+h} - \tilde{\tau}| < \frac{\psi}{|\eta_{\pi,\tau}|}$. Next note that

$$\tilde{v}_{t+h} - \eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau} = \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_{t+h} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell \eta_{\pi,\tau} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+h+\ell+1} - \tilde{\tau}) \right].$$

Then, for $h \geq h_\psi$, and using Jensen's and the triangle inequality,

$$\begin{aligned} |\tilde{v}_{t+h} - \eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}| &\leq \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_{t+h} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell |\eta_{\pi,\tau} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+h+\ell+1} - \tilde{\tau})| \right] \\ &< \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_{t+h} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell \psi \right] = \psi, \end{aligned}$$

and hence $\{\tilde{v}_{t_0+h}\}_{h=0}^{\infty}$ converges to $\eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}$.

We next show that $\{\tilde{n}_{t_0+h}\}$ converges to $\chi \eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}$. Fix an arbitrary $\psi > 0$. Since $\{\tilde{v}_{t_0+h}\}_{h=0}^{\infty}$ converges to $\eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}$, there exists a h_ψ such that for $\forall h \geq h_\psi : |\tilde{v}_{t_0+h} - \eta_{\pi,\tau} \tilde{\tau}| < \frac{\psi}{2\chi}$. Next note that for $h > h_\psi$,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{n}_{t_0+h} &= \delta\chi \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0} \\ &= \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + \delta\chi (1-\delta_\psi)^{h-h_\psi} \sum_{k=0}^{h_\psi-1} (1-\delta)^{h_\psi-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0}. \end{aligned}$$

Then, for $h > h_\psi$,

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{n}_{t_0+h} - \chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} &= \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{v}_{t_0+k} - \eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} + \eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}) - \chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} \\
&\quad + \delta\chi (1-\delta_\psi)^{h-h_\psi} \sum_{k=0}^{h_\psi-1} (1-\delta)^{h_\psi-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0} \\
&= \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{v}_{t_0+k} - \eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}) + \delta\chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} - \chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} \\
&\quad + \delta\chi (1-\delta_\psi)^{h-h_\psi} \sum_{k=0}^{h_\psi-1} (1-\delta)^{h_\psi-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0} \\
&= \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{v}_{t_0+k} - \eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}) \\
&\quad - \chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} (1-\delta)^{h-h_\psi} + \delta\chi (1-\delta_\psi)^{h-h_\psi} \sum_{k=0}^{h_\psi-1} (1-\delta)^{h_\psi-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} + (1-\delta)^h \tilde{n}_{t_0},
\end{aligned}$$

where we used that $\sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} = \frac{1-(1-\delta)^{h-h_\psi}}{\delta}$. Next note that

$$\begin{aligned}
\left| \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{v}_{t_0+k} - \eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}) \right| &\leq \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} |\tilde{v}_{t_0+k} - \eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}| \\
&< \delta\chi \sum_{k=h_\psi}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \frac{\psi}{2\chi} = \frac{\psi}{2} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^{h-h_\psi} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Hence,

$$\begin{aligned}
|\tilde{n}_{t_0+h} - \chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}| &< \frac{\psi}{2} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^{h-h_\psi} \right] + (1-\delta)^{h-h_\psi} |\chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}| \\
&\quad + (1-\delta_\psi)^{h-h_\psi} \left| \delta\chi \sum_{k=0}^{h_\psi-1} (1-\delta)^{h_\psi-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t_0+k} \right| + (1-\delta)^h |\tilde{n}_{t_0}|.
\end{aligned}$$

Now choosing $h_\psi^* > h_\psi$ such that for all $h > h_\psi^*$ the last three terms are smaller than $\frac{\psi}{2}$, implies that \tilde{n}_{t_0+h} converges to $\chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau}$.

Lastly note that $\tilde{X}_{t_0+h} = \varepsilon^0 \tilde{\tau}_{t_0+h} + \tilde{n}_{t_0+h}$, and hence $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \tilde{X}_{t_0+h} = \varepsilon^0 \tilde{\tau} + \chi\eta_{\pi,\tau}\tilde{\tau} = \varepsilon \tilde{\tau}$. Since $\tilde{\tau} \neq 0$, $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \varepsilon^h = \lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\tilde{X}_{t_0+h}}{\tilde{\tau}_{t_0+h}} = \varepsilon$.

□

C.4.3 Details on Example 1

Plug $\Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0}$ into equation (5.10). This gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} &= \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \\ &= \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^h \right] \Delta \ln \tau_{>t_0}. \end{aligned}$$

The claim now follows immediately.

C.4.4 Details on Example 2

Tariffs follow a first or autoregressive process with autoregressive root ρ . Then

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_0+k} \left[\frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+k+\ell+1}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right] = \rho^{\ell+k+1}.$$

Plugging this expression into (5.10) gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} &= \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell \rho^{\ell+k+1} \\ &= \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\rho)^{k+1} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \rho \right)^\ell \right] \\ &= \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta+r}{1+r-(1-\delta)\rho} \delta \rho^h \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{\rho} \right)^{h-1-k} \\ &= \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta+r}{1+r-(1-\delta)\rho} \delta \rho^h \frac{1 - \left(\frac{1-\delta}{\rho} \right)^h}{1 - \frac{1-\delta}{\rho}}. \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\frac{\frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}}{\frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}} = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{(\delta+r)\delta}{[1+r-(1-\delta)\rho] \left(1 - \frac{1-\delta}{\rho} \right)} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1-\delta}{\rho} \right)^h \right),$$

the claim follows immediately.

C.4.5 Proof of Proposition 3

Proposition 3. *The model delivers estimating equation (2.2), where*

$$\beta_X^h = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell \beta_\tau^{k+\ell+1} + \varepsilon^0 \beta_\tau^h.$$

β_τ^h is defined as the regression coefficient of $\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ on $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ in the population, and can be estimated from equation (2.3).

After augmenting the model with additional shocks, the fixed effects $\delta_{j,p,t}^{X,h}$ and $\delta_{i,p,t}^{X,h}$ capture a weighted sum of past, present, and expected future supply and demand shocks, respectively. The error term includes past, present, and expected future time-varying bilateral and product-specific demand shocks and non-tariff trade barriers, as well as the initial state.

Proof. Using equations (C.20) and (C.19), and the definition of $\varepsilon^0 = (1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,\tau} + \eta_{q,\tau}$ (equation (5.6)), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{q}_{t+h} - \tilde{q}_{t-1} + \tilde{p}_{t+h}^x - \tilde{p}_{t-1}^x &= \varepsilon^0 (\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + \varepsilon^0 (\tilde{\kappa}_{t+h} - \tilde{\kappa}_{t-1}) + [(1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,D} + \eta_{q,D}] (\tilde{\omega}_{t+h} - \tilde{\omega}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + (1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,c} (\tilde{c}_{t+h} - \tilde{c}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + [(1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,D} + \eta_{q,D}] (\tilde{D}_{t+h} - \tilde{D}_{t-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Next, note that

$$\tilde{v}_{t+k} = \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \tilde{\pi}_{t+k+\ell+1} \right]$$

and

$$\tilde{n}_{t+h} = \delta \chi \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \tilde{v}_{t+k} + \tilde{n}_t (1 - \delta)^h,$$

so that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{n}_{t+h} - \tilde{n}_{t-1} &= \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \tilde{\pi}_{t+k+\ell+1} \right] + \tilde{n}_t (1 - \delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{t-1} \\ &= \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell (\tilde{\pi}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\pi}_{t-1}) \right] \\ &\quad + \chi \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} \left[1 - (1 - \delta)^h \right] + \tilde{n}_t (1 - \delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{t-1}. \end{aligned}$$

From (C.21) we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\pi}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} &= \eta_{\pi,c} (\tilde{c}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{c}_{t-1}) + \eta_{\pi,\tau} (\tilde{\kappa}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\kappa}_{t-1}) + \eta_{\pi,\tau} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + \eta_{\pi,D} (\tilde{\omega}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\omega}_{t-1}) + \eta_{\pi,D} (\tilde{D}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{D}_{t-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Now putting the pieces together, and adding the subscripts back in, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} &= \varepsilon^0 \Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \eta_{\pi,\tau} \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \Delta_{k+\ell+1} \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} \right] \\ &\quad + \delta_{j,p,t}^h + \delta_{i,p,t}^h + u_{i,j,p,t}^{X,h} \end{aligned}$$

where we used that, for a generic variable x_t , $\Delta_h x_t = x_{t+h} - x_{t-1}$, and

$$\begin{aligned}
\delta_{i,p,t}^{X,h} &= [(1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,D} + \eta_{q,D}] \Delta_h \ln D_{i,p,t} \\
&\quad + \eta_{\pi,D} \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \Delta_{k+\ell+1} \ln D_{i,p,t} \right], \\
\delta_{j,p,t}^{X,h} &= (1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,c} \Delta_h \ln c_{j,p,t} \\
&\quad + \eta_{\pi,c} \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \Delta_{k+\ell+1} \ln c_{j,p,t} \right], \\
u_{i,j,p,t}^{X,h} &= \varepsilon^0 \Delta_h \ln \kappa_{i,j,p,t} + \eta_{\pi,\tau} \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \Delta_{k+\ell+1} \ln \kappa_{i,j,p,t} \right] \\
&\quad + [(1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,D} + \eta_{q,D}] \Delta_h \ln \omega_{i,j,p,t} \\
&\quad + \eta_{\pi,D} \chi \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \Delta_{k+\ell+1} \ln \omega_{i,j,p,t} \right] \\
&\quad + \chi \tilde{\pi}_{i,j,p,t-1} \left[1 - (1 - \delta)^h \right] + \tilde{n}_{i,j,p,t} (1 - \delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{i,j,p,t-1}.
\end{aligned}$$

Next define the regression coefficient of $\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ on $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ as β_τ^h in the population, where we assume that $\Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ is an exogenous tariff shock. Clearly, β_τ^h can be estimated from equation (2.3). Then the estimating equation becomes

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \beta_X^h \Delta_0 \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t}^{X,h} + \delta_{i,p,t}^{X,h} + u_{i,j,p,t}^{X,h}$$

where

$$\beta_X^h = \chi \eta_{\pi,\tau} \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^\ell \beta_\tau^{k+\ell+1} + \varepsilon^0 \beta_\tau^h.$$

Note that β_τ^h , $h = 0, 1, \dots$ are constants, so the expectation drops out. □

C.5 Estimation in long differences

Proposition C.1. (Part 1) *Estimation as a horizon- h difference does generally not identify the horizon- h trade elasticity.*

(Part 2) *If tariffs follow a random walk, a regression of $\Delta_h \ln X_t$ on $\Delta_h \ln \tau_t$ identifies the simple average of horizon-0 to horizon- h trade elasticities.*

Proof. Since the first part of the proposition follows from the second part, we prove the second part.

Tariffs follow a random walk,

$$\tilde{\tau}_t = \tilde{\tau}_{t-1} + \sigma_u u_t^\tau,$$

where u_t^τ is white noise with unit variance, and σ_u denotes the standard deviation of the innovation to tariffs. Then

$$\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1} = \sigma_u \sum_{j=0}^k u_{t+j}^\tau.$$

Consider the projection of $\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}$ on $\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}$ (i.e. the OLS estimator),

$$\frac{\text{Cov} [\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}]}{\mathbb{V} [\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}]} = \frac{\text{Cov} \left[\sum_{j=0}^k u_{t+j}^\tau, \sum_{j=0}^h u_{t+j}^\tau \right]}{\mathbb{V} \left[\sum_{j=0}^h u_{t+j}^\tau \right]} = \frac{k+1}{h+1}. \quad (\text{C.25})$$

Next note that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{n}_{t+h} - \tilde{n}_{t-1} &= \chi \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell (\tilde{\pi}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\pi}_{t-1}) \right] \\ &\quad + \chi \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^h \right] + \tilde{n}_t (1-\delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{t-1}, \end{aligned}$$

which implies, together with

$$\tilde{\pi}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} = \eta_{q,\tau} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1})$$

that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{n}_{t+h} - \tilde{n}_{t-1} &= \chi \eta_{q,\tau} \frac{\delta+r}{1+r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1-\delta}{1+r} \right)^\ell (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k+\ell+1} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}) \right] \\ &\quad + \chi \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^h \right] + \tilde{n}_t (1-\delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{t-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Since $\mathbb{E}_{t+k} [\tilde{\tau}_{t+k+\ell+1}] = \tilde{\tau}_{t+k}$, this expression becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{n}_{t+h} - \tilde{n}_{t-1} &= \chi \eta_{q,\tau} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + \chi \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^h \right] + \tilde{n}_t (1-\delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{t-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Now

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{X}_{t+h} - \tilde{X}_{t-1} &= \tilde{q}_{t+h} - \tilde{q}_{t-1} + \tilde{p}_{t+h}^x - \tilde{p}_{t-1}^x + \tilde{n}_{t+h} - \tilde{n}_{t-1} \\ &= \tilde{q}_{t+h} - \tilde{q}_{t-1} + \tilde{p}_{t+h}^x - \tilde{p}_{t-1}^x + \chi \eta_{q,\tau} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + \chi \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} \left[1 - (1-\delta)^h \right] + \tilde{n}_t (1-\delta)^h - \tilde{n}_{t-1} \end{aligned}$$

and regressing this on $(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1})$ gives

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\text{Cov}\left(\tilde{X}_{t+h} - \tilde{X}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)}{\mathbb{V}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)} \\
&= \frac{\text{Cov}\left(\tilde{q}_{t+h} - \tilde{q}_{t-1} + \tilde{p}_{t+h}^x - \tilde{p}_{t-1}^x + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}), \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)}{\mathbb{V}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)} \\
&= \frac{\text{Cov}\left(\tilde{q}_{t+h} - \tilde{q}_{t-1} + \tilde{p}_{t+h}^x - \tilde{p}_{t-1}^x, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)}{\mathbb{V}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)} + \frac{\text{Cov}\left(\chi\eta_{q,\tau}\delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} (\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}), \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)}{\mathbb{V}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)} \\
&= \varepsilon^0 + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \frac{\text{Cov}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+k} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)}{\mathbb{V}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)} \\
&= \varepsilon^0 + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \frac{k+1}{h+1}
\end{aligned} \tag{C.27}$$

where the last equality uses equation (C.25) above.

Next note that

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1-\delta)^{h-1-k} \frac{k+1}{h+1} &= (1-\delta)^{h-1} \frac{1}{h+1} + (1-\delta)^{h-2} \frac{2}{h+1} + \dots + (1-\delta) \frac{h-1}{h+1} + \frac{h}{h+1} \\
&= \frac{1}{h+1} [1] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{h+1} [1 + (1-\delta)] \\
&\quad + \dots \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{h+1} [1 + (1-\delta) + \dots + (1-\delta)^{h-2}] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{h+1} [1 + (1-\delta) + \dots + (1-\delta)^{h-2} + (1-\delta)^{h-1}] \\
&= \frac{1}{h+1} \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} \sum_{j=0}^k (1-\delta)^j \\
&= \frac{1}{h+1} \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} \frac{1 - (1-\delta)^{k+1}}{\delta}.
\end{aligned}$$

Plugging this expression into equation (C.27) gives

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\mathbb{C}ov\left(\tilde{X}_{t+h} - \tilde{X}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)}{\mathbb{V}\left(\tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+h} - \tilde{\tau}_{t-1}\right)} &= \varepsilon^0 + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\delta\frac{1}{h+1}\sum_{k=0}^{h-1}\frac{1-(1-\delta)^{k+1}}{\delta} \\
&= \varepsilon^0 + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\frac{1}{h+1}\sum_{k=0}^{h-1}\left[1-(1-\delta)^{k+1}\right] \\
&= \varepsilon^0 + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\frac{1}{h+1}\sum_{k=0}^h\left[1-(1-\delta)^k\right] \\
&= \frac{1}{h+1}\sum_{k=0}^h\varepsilon^k
\end{aligned}$$

where we used that $\varepsilon^h = \varepsilon^0 + \chi\eta_{q,\tau}\left(1 - (1 - \delta)^h\right)$, see equation (5.11) of Example 1.

□