

The Long and Short (Run) of Trade Elasticities

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Motivation

- ▶ Trade elasticity central to international economics
 - Trade: size of the welfare gains
 - Macro: transmission of shocks
- ▶ Gravity-based estimation approaches

$$X_{i,j,t} \propto \phi_{i,j,t}^{\theta} \cdot S_{i,t} \cdot D_{j,t}$$

- ▶ Assume $\phi_{i,j,t} = \kappa_{i,j,t} \cdot \tau_{i,j,t}$, treat tariff variation as exogenous
 - ▶ Often no distinction between short and long run
 - Wide range of estimates
- ▶ This paper: propose new method to estimate elasticity at different horizons

This Paper

- ▶ Tackle endogeneity of tariff changes
 1. Instrument: MFN tariff changes
 - ▶ Treatment group: MFN tariff rate is binding and changing between $t - 1$ and t
 - ▶ Control group: Countries with preferential tariffs, countries outside the WTO
 - ▶ Refinement: Limit analysis to small trading partners
 2. Expanded fixed effects
- ▶ Dynamics/multiple horizons
 - Explicit distinction between short- and long-run
 - Internally consistent estimates at multiple horizons
 - ▶ Macro-econometric tools: Local projections (Jordà, 2005)
- ▶ Quantification
 - Long run: gains from trade
 - Short run: speed of adjustment and time-varying elasticities

Summary of Results

- ▶ Trade elasticities significantly different across horizons, increase over time
- ▶ Elasticities a year after impact ≈ -0.76
- ▶ Long run tariff-exclusive elasticity ≈ -1.75 to -2.25
 - “Long” run appears to be about 7-10 years
- ▶ Higher “conventional wisdom” numbers due to not controlling for omitted variables
- ▶ IV estimates larger than OLS at all horizons
- ▶ Implications:
 - Welfare gains from trade over 5-6X higher than under conventional values
 - Substantial curvature in the adjustment costs to exporting

Related Literature

- ▶ Alternative estimates:
 - **Gravity-based:** Head and Ries (2001), Romalis (2007), Caliendo and Parro (2015)
 - **Price-based:** Eaton and Kortum (2002), Simonovska and Waugh (2014), Giri, Yi, and Yilmazkuday (2020)
 - **Armington:** Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006), Soderbery (2015,2018), Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld and Russ (2019), Alessandria and Choi (2019)
 - **Firm-level:** Bas, Mayer, and Thoenig (2017), Fitzgerald and Haller (2018), Fontagne, Martin, and Orefice (2018)
- ▶ Implications/ Interpreting estimates:
 - **Welfare:** Arkolakis, Costinot, Rodriguez Clare (2012)
 - **Short vs long run:** Ruhl (2008), Alessandria, Choi and Ruhl (2018)
- ▶ Trade Policy:
 - **Institutional background:** Bown and Crowley (2016), Bagwell and Staiger (2016)
 - **Other tariff shocks:** Fajgelbaum et al (2020)

Estimation

Definition

The *horizon- h trade elasticity* ε^h is defined as

$$\varepsilon^h = \frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}} = \frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_h \ln \tau_{i,j,p,t}}$$

- ▶ $\Delta_h X_t$ is $X_{t+h} - X_{t-1}$
- ▶ $X_{i,j,p,t}$ trade volumes between countries i and j in product p at time t
- ▶ $\phi_{i,j,p,t} = \kappa_{i,j,p,t} \cdot \tau_{i,j,p,t}$, ad valorem trade costs
- ▶ Long-run elasticity is the limit:

$$\varepsilon = \lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}}$$

Estimating Equations: Local Projections

- ▶ Trade Volumes:

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p_6,t} = \beta_X^h \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p_6,t} + \delta_{i,p_4,t} + \delta_{j,p_4,t} + \delta_{i,j,p_4} + u_{i,j,p_6,t}^X$$

- ▶ Tariffs:

$$\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p_6,t} = \beta_\tau^h \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p_6,t} + \delta_{i,p_4,t} + \delta_{j,p_4,t} + \delta_{i,j,p_4} + u_{i,j,p_6,t}^\tau$$

- δ s fixed effects (country-product-time, country-pair-product)

- ▶ Horizon h Trade Elasticity: $\varepsilon^h = \frac{\beta_X^h}{\beta_\tau^h}$

Estimating Equations: One-Step Estimation

- ▶ 2SLS estimation (“OLS”):

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p_6,t} = \varepsilon^{h,OLS} \Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p_6,t} + \delta_{i,p_4,t} + \delta_{j,p_4,t} + \delta_{i,j,p_4} + u_{i,j,p_6,t}^X$$

- Where $\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p_6,t}$ is instrumented by $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p_6,t}$

- ▶ 2SLS estimation with instrument (“IV”):

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p_6,t} = \varepsilon^h \Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p_6,t} + \delta_{i,p_4,t} + \delta_{j,p_4,t} + \delta_{i,j,p_4} + u_{i,j,p_6,t}^X$$

- Where $\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p_6,t}$ is instrumented by $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p_6,t}^{inst}$

- ▶ Horizon h Trade Elasticity: ε^h , correct standard errors

Tariff Changes are Likely Endogenous

- ▶ Omitted factors: e.g. business cycles, changes in governments (Bown and Crowley, 2013; Lake and Linask, 2016)
- ▶ Reverse causality: e.g. lobbying, domestic (Trefler, 1993) or foreign (Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins, 2006; Antràs and Padró i Miquel, 2011)
- ▶ **Implication:** need fixed effects to soak up destination-product-time variation, possibly partner-specific variation
- ▶ Even with fixed effects, tariff changes could be endogenous

Instrument

- ▶ Exogenous shocks to tariffs hard to find – trade agreements typically between large trading partners
- ▶ **Insight:** WTO MFN principle can provide basis for instrument

Institutional background:

- ▶ MFN bounds (maximum product-level tariffs) set upon WTO accession
- ▶ Not all products covered by bounds (US 100%, India 70%), bounds country-product specific
- ▶ Countries legally free to vary applied tariffs below bounds
 - India raises and lowers MFN tariffs every year across products
 - China lowered MFN tariffs on a range of products in response to US trade war
- ▶ **Key:** any MFN tariff change applies to *all* MFN partners, and about 60% of trade is MFN-basis

Instrument

- ▶ Insight: WTO MFN principle – apply same tariff to all partners


Baseline:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{instr} &= \mathbf{1} \left(\tau_{i,j,p,t} = \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right) \times \mathbf{1} \left(\tau_{i,j,p,t-1} = \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t-1 \text{ in aggregate} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t-1 \text{ at product level} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t \text{ in aggregate} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t \text{ at product level} \right) \\ &\times \left[\tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} - \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right]\end{aligned}$$

▶ Available Variation


Results

Impulse response function of tariffs to shock




► Tariff increase persistent; Use pre-trend controls for robustness

Impulse response function of trade to shock




► Impact on trade flows builds slowly

Trade elasticity



- ▶ OLS biased towards zero
- ▶ IV and OLS estimates increase over time

Trade elasticity: Sectoral Estimates



- ▶ Heterogeneous effects across HS-Sections, elasticities diverge over longer horizons
- ▶ Footwear, Textiles higher elasticities, Articles of Stone/Cement and Plastics/Rubber small elasticities

Comparison to Existing Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<u>Panel A: Log-levels, OLS</u>					
$\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.696	-4.468	-6.696	-2.734	-1.040
<u>Panel B: 5-year log-differences, OLS</u>					
$\Delta_5 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.882	-1.583	-0.664	-1.659	-0.518
<u>Panel C: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, instrumented w/ 1-year tariff change</u>					
$\Delta_5 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.337	-0.968	-0.470	-1.019	-0.448
<u>Panel D: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, baseline instrument</u>					
$\Delta_5 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.259	-2.206	-1.170	-2.000	-1.112
<u>Fixed effects</u>					
importer x hs4	no	yes	no	no	no
exporter x hs4	no	yes	no	no	no
importer x hs4 x year	no	no	yes	no	yes
exporter x hs4 x year	no	no	yes	no	yes
importer x exporter x hs4	no	no	no	yes	yes

- ▶ All estimates significantly different from 0 at the 1% level

Trade elasticity: Other Estimates and Robustness

- ▶ Alternative fixed effects, SEs
 - Twoway clustering of SEs – country-pair-HS4 and year
 - HS6 fixed effects (country-product-time, country-pair-product)
- ▶ Alternative samples
 - Balanced panel
 - Fixed effect groups with >50 observations
 - Alternative thresholds for major partners
 - Extensive margin with all zeros
 - Alternative pretrend controls
 - No tariff variation within HS6 product line
 - No tariff changes in the control group
- ▶ Alternative outcomes: Unit values
- ▶ Alternative estimation strategy: Distributed lag model

Quantification


Welfare Relevant Long-Run Elasticity

1. Our estimation allows for autocorrelated, non-permanent tariff shocks
 - Transitional dynamics depends on tariff process, ε response of trade flows after tariffs converge
2. Theoretical gravity relates spending by agents *inclusive* of tariffs to trade cost
 - We are estimating a tariff-exclusive elasticity

Approach:

- ▶ ACR formula
- ▶ Estimated tariff process stabilizes in 2-3 years, trade in 7-10 years
- ▶ Long-run welfare relevant trade elasticity: $\varepsilon^{10} - 1 \approx -1$

Gains from Trade – Single Sector



► Our estimate: large welfare losses from reducing trade/output ratios ► Multiple Sectors

Dynamics of Trade Elasticities: Simple Model

Setup

- ▶ Exports

$$X_t = p_t^x q_t n_t$$

- ▶ Exporter price $p_t^x = p^x(\tau_t)$, define $\eta_{p,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln p}{\partial \ln \tau}$
- ▶ Demand $q_t = q(p_t^x, \tau_t)$, with $\eta_{q,p} := \frac{\partial \ln q}{\partial \ln p^x} < 0$, $\eta_{q,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln q}{\partial \ln \tau} < 0$
- ▶ Flow profits $\pi_t = \pi(\tau_t)$, with $\eta_{\pi,\tau} := \frac{\partial \ln \pi}{\partial \ln \tau} < 0$
- ▶ Mass n_t and value v_t
 - Krugman (1980): n_t mass of exporters; v_t value of exporting, Melitz (2003) similar
 - Arkolakis (2010): n_t mass of customers; v_t marginal value of customer

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- ▶ *Dynamics*

$$\begin{aligned}v_t &= \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E}_t [\pi_{t+1} + (1-\delta) v_{t+1}] \\n_t &= n_{t-1} (1-\delta) + G(v_{t-1})\end{aligned}$$

- interest rate r , “depreciation” rate δ , “investment” $G(v_{t-1})$
- one period “time-to-build”

Short and Long-run Elasticities

► Short-run trade elasticity

$$\varepsilon^0 := \frac{d \ln X_{t_0}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = (1 + \eta_{q,p}) \eta_{p,\tau} + \eta_{q,\tau}$$

- reflects static quantity and price response
- n_t predetermined, drops out
- $-\sigma$ in standard CES-monopolistic competition framework

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▶ Long-run trade elasticity

$$\varepsilon := \frac{d \ln X}{d \ln \tau} = \varepsilon^0 + \frac{d \ln n}{d \ln \tau} = \varepsilon^0 + \chi \eta_{\pi,\tau}$$

- compares steady states
- $\eta_{\pi,\tau} < 0$: elasticity of flow profits w.r.t tariffs
- $\chi > 0$: elasticity of n wrt v
 - Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003): probability mass at the margin of entry
 - Arkolakis (2010): inverse curvature of cost of adding new customers

Dynamics of Trade Elasticities

- ▶ Horizon- h trade elasticity

$$\epsilon^h = \underbrace{\epsilon^0}_{\substack{\text{"static"} \\ \text{quantity and} \\ \text{price response}}} + \underbrace{\frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} / \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}}}_{\text{"dynamic" response}}$$

- ▶ Proposition 1:

$$\frac{d \ln n_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \frac{\delta + r}{1 + r} \delta \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-1-k} \mathbb{E}_{t_0+k} \left[\sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^{\ell} \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+k+\ell+1}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \right]$$

Dynamics of Trade Elasticities

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- ▶ Geometric convergence for one time permanent tariff change: $\varepsilon^h = \chi \eta_{\pi, \tau} \left(1 - (1 - \delta)^h \right) + \varepsilon^0$

- ▶ Proposition 2: If $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \frac{d \ln \tau_{t_0+h}}{d \ln \tau_{t_0}} \neq 0$ and is finite, then $\lim_{h \rightarrow \infty} \varepsilon^h = \varepsilon$

Dynamics of Trade Elasticities

- ▶ Horizon- h trade elasticity



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- ▶ Proposition 3: The model delivers the estimating equations used above


Quantification



Conclusion


- ▶ New estimates of trade elasticities
 - Causality: new instrument to tackle endogeneity of tariff changes
 - Multiple horizons: internally consistent; time series methods
- ▶ Short-run: about -0.76
- ▶ Long-run [7-10 years]: about -1.75 to -2.25
- ▶ Implications: large welfare gains from trade, market access costs, dynamics of adjustment to trade shocks...

Gains from Trade – Multiple Sectors




► Single Sector

Identifying Variation




Countries




HS Sections

Explaining Country Variation



Control



Treatment