True Cost of Immediacy

How large are opportunity costs of not trading?

Does selection bias in OTC trades provide a false impression of liquidity and stability?

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NBER Big Data
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Disclaimer: The views presented herein are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Motivation

- Owner wants to sell an asset and solicits bids \( \{B_i\}_{i=1}^{N} \) from \( N \) dealers
- Owner has a reserve price \( R \), would not sell if the highest bid is below \( R \)
- If trade is successful the dealer can liquidate the asset for \( A \geq \) winning bid
- Seller's expected profits:

\[
E[\Pi] = (1 - Pr(\text{Fail})) \times E[B|\text{Trade}] + Pr(\text{Fail}) \times R
\]

\( \text{Trade} \quad \text{Outside option} \)

- Cost of immediacy:

\[
TCI \equiv E[A - \Pi] = \underbrace{E[A - B|\text{Trade}]}_{\text{Observed bid-ask spread}} + \underbrace{Pr(\text{Fail}) \times \left(E[B|\text{Trade}] - R\right)}_{\text{Unobserved cost of trade failure}}
\]

This paper:

Estimates the True Cost of Immediacy, \( TCI \).
Issues with estimating the cost of immediacy

Firm quotes for all trade sizes enable precise measurement

OTC Markets
- No quotes and often sparse trades; data availability?
- ‘Roll’ models of transaction prices, very noisy

Centralized (Equity) Markets
- Continuous firm quotes, but for small sizes
- Large orders are broken up into small trades over time
- Institutional order data (Ancerno) does not capture unfilled orders
- Optimal trading strategies being price contingent downwardly biases trading costs because larger trades occur when price impact is lower
- Generally, opportunity costs of unfilled orders (Perold (1988))
CLO bid-ask spreads during the 2020 pandemic

- Bid-ask is dealer buy price minus dealer sell price for roundtrips < 1 day
- Spreads start low (5-10bp of par) then increase noticeably in March
- Spreads remain less than 40bp

Did the CLO market perform well under stress?
CLO TCI and bid-ask spreads during the 2020 pandemic

Bid-ask spreads are in red, TCI is in blue
Note different y-axis scales across tranches

- TCI and bid-ask vary in cross section and time series
- TCI increases to 2% (Senior), 3% (Mezzanine), 15% (Junior)
- Why different? Failures: rise to 60% in Junior
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) and Friewald et al. (2012)
- Corporate bond liquidity significantly decreased during 2007-2009

Kargar, Lester, Lindsay, Liu, Weill, and Zuniga (2020) and O’Hara and Zhou (2020) for corporate bonds and Foley-Fisher, Gorton, and Verani (2020) for CLOs
- Bid-ask spreads significantly widened in March 2020

Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, & Venkataraman (2018)
- Examine corporate bonds over time: trading costs fairly constant over time, but traditional dealers take on less inventory risk
- Consistent with a decrease in customers’ ability to trade and an increase in opportunity costs. However, they are not able to directly measure either of these.

Illiquidity may have been much worse than measured due to failures
Hendershott and Madhavan (2015)

▶ Study corporate bond trading via request for quote (RFQ) auctions
▶ RFQs fail often, result in higher costs; CLOs fails likely more costly
  ▶ corporate-bond RFQs are shorter lived (5-10mins)
  ▶ corporate bonds trade significantly more frequently than CLOs
  ▶ the number of corporate-bond dealers is substantially higher
  ▶ do not estimate the costs for attempted trades that fail to ever occur

Riggs, Onur, Reiffen, and Zhu (2020)

▶ Study index CDS RFQs and bilateral trades
  ▶ Inquiries almost always lead to trades, so cost of failure is less relevant

Harris and Hasbrouck (1996)

▶ Compare performance of limit versus market orders on NYSE; estimate opportunity cost of limit order as market order after 5min
  ▶ Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) extend this by examining opportunity costs for hidden limit orders
How collateralised loan obligations work

1. Banks sell the loans they have created to a CLO manager

2. The CLO divides the loans’ risk into various levels

3. As the loans are paid off, the income flows to the buyers of the CLO

4. Investors at the bottom of the pile stand to make higher returns but also run a higher risk of losing money
Who holds CLOs?

CLO investor base as of end-2018

Per cent

Senior Tranches (Rated AAA and AA)
- Banks
- Institutional asset managers
- Insurance companies
- Pension funds and endowments

Mezzanine Tranches (Rated A/BBB/BB)
- Banks
- Hedge funds
- Institutional asset managers
- Insurance companies
- Pension funds and endowments
- Permanent-capital vehicles*
- Structured credit funds

Equity Tranches
- Banks
- CLO managers
- Family offices
- Hedge funds
- Institutional asset managers
- Insurance companies
- Pension funds and endowments
- Sovereign wealth funds
- Structured credit funds
- Permanent-capital vehicles*
- Private equity funds

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020)
First-price sealed bid auctions

- Via email (more flexible, less standardized), one day to several days
- Only seller and winner know high bid (trade price)
- For trade, information disseminated back to the market or the losing dealers is the “cover”, which is the second highest bid in the auction
- BWIC failure is disclosed as “DNT (Did Not Trade)” (no cover)

BWIC trade data from non-public TRACE

- 40% of Customer to Dealer trades can be matched to BWICs
- Typical CLO trades 11 times in our auction sample
  - Varies some by rating: 15 in senior, 9 in junior
- Relatively little interdealer trading
  - 0.33 of an interdealer trade for every dealer-buys trade
  - Comparable 2019 numbers are 1.7, 1.8, and 1.4 for munis, IG and HY corporate bonds
CLO averages and spreads (dealer round trips)

- Senior: Issue size $228M, trade size $2.8M, bid-ask spread 4bp
- Mezzanine: Issue size $34M, trade size $2.5M, bid-ask spread 10bp
- Junior: Issue size $23M, trade size $3.4M, bid-ask spread 12bp

Gray areas are 2012 euro debt, 2015-16 credit stress, 2020
Liquidity improves in second half of sample as market expands
CLO Market Conditions and Trading

- JPM LL spread (%)
- Dealer CDS spread (%)
- Volume ($M)

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020) True Cost of Immediacy
CLO BWICs and Failures

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020)

True Cost of Immediacy

December 2020
TCI estimation strategy

Want to estimate in the data:

\[
TCI = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[A - B|\text{Trade}]}_{\text{Observed bid-ask spread}} + \underbrace{\text{Pr}(\text{Fail}) \times (\mathbb{E}[B|\text{Trade}] - R)}_{\text{Unobserved cost of trade failure}}
\]

- \(\mathbb{E}[A - B|\text{Trade}]\) – observed bid-ask spread
- \(\text{Pr}(\text{Fail})\) – observed BWIC failure rate
- \(\mathbb{E}[B|\text{Trade}]\) – observed best bid \(B = \max\{B_n| n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}\}\)
- \(R\) – the lowest accepted bid and an upper bound on outside option:

\[
R = \inf_{(B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_N)} \{B^{1:N}|\text{Trade}\},
\]
Reserve value estimation

**STEP 1:**

Pool BWICs across sellers and parametrize $R(X_i, \varepsilon_{R,i})$ as a function of observable CLO, seller, and market characteristics, $X_i$, and an unobservable noise component, $\varepsilon_{R,i}$, as

$$R(X_i, \varepsilon_{R,i}) = \alpha_R + \beta'_R X_i + \varepsilon_{R,i}$$

**STEP 2:**

Use the “individual rationality” moment restriction:

$$\Pr(B_i^{1:N} < R_i) = \mathbb{E}[\mathbbm{1}(B_i^{1:N} \leq \alpha_R + \beta'_R X_i + \varepsilon_{R,i}) | X_i] = 0,$$

then relax it to:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tau^* - \mathbbm{1}(B_i^{1:N} < \alpha_R + \beta'_R X_i) | X_i] = 0,$$

where $\tau^* \in [0, 1)$ is the quantile that absorbs $\varepsilon_{R,i}$. This is quantile regression.

Manually vary $\tau^*$ between 1%, 5%, 10%. Later estimate optimal $\tau^*$ using GMM.
Empirical Implementation

Construct the in-sample average TCI across $I$ BWICs from the perspective of a typical CLO seller

$$\hat{\text{TCl}} = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \text{Bid-ask spread}_i + \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left( \text{BWIC fail rate}_i \times \text{Failure cost}_i \right)$$

- Linear model for bid-ask spreads: $\text{Bid-Ask spread}_{it} = \alpha + \alpha_t + \beta'X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$
- Probit for fail rate: $\Pr(\text{BWIC failure}_{it}) = \Phi(\alpha + \alpha_t + \beta'X_{it} + \epsilon_{it})$
- Linear model for expected best bid
- Quantile regression for $R$

- Similar control variables across these models, quarter fixed effects $\alpha_t$, characteristics of the trade, the CLO, market and dealer conditions
- Separately estimated for different tranches
TCI and Bid-Ask Spread

TCI shown for 1%, 5%, and 10% quantiles, dark line is 5%

$$\text{TCI} = \mathbb{E}[B-A|X] + \mathbb{E}[\text{Fail rate}|X] \times \mathbb{E}[\text{Fail cost}|X] + \text{Cov}(\text{Fail rate}, \text{Fail cost}|X)$$

$>0$: Amplification
TCI, Bid-Ask Spread, & Amplification (slopes $\gg 1$)

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020)
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TCI: “Endogenous” quantile regressions

### Additional moments for cover prices, $B^{2:N}$:

Cover prices are reported if they are above the seller’s reserve price

$$\Pr(B_i^{2:N} < R_i) = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{1}(B_i^{2:N} < \alpha_R + \beta'_R X_i + \varepsilon_{R,i})|X_i] = 0.\)$$

### Assumption:

The probability of BWIC success and $\tau$ can be parametrized as:

$$\Pr(\text{Trade}_i) = h(S_i) = h(\alpha_S + \beta_S' X_i),$$

$$\tau^j(\hat{S}_i) = \tau^j_0 + \tau^j_1 \hat{S}_i, \quad j = \{\text{Best Bid,Cover}\}.$$

### GMM moment conditions:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tau^j_0 + \tau^j_1 \hat{S}_i - \mathbb{1}(B_i^{j:N} < \alpha_R + \beta'_R X_i)|X_i] = 0, \quad j = \{\text{Best Bid,Cover}\}.$$

Estimates for $\tau^*$ using above GMM are < 1% for senior, 1 – 2% for mezzanine, and 2% junior.
2020 Pandemic: Market Conditions and Volume

JPM LL spread (%)

Dealer CDS spread (%)

Volume ($M)

Senior

Mezzanine

Junior

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020) True Cost of Immediacy December 2020
2020 Pandemic: Failure Cost, TCI and Bid-Ask Spread

Failure cost (%)

TCI (%)

Senior
Mezzanine
Junior

January 2020
February 2020
March 2020
April 2020

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020)
True Cost of Immediacy

December 2020
Conclusions

- Challenges of measuring liquidity in OTC markets
  - If traders choose not to sell when bids are low
    - Related issues in centralized markets

- Use “endogenous” quantile regressions to estimate costs of failure to trade in CLOs

- Bid-ask spreads and TCI in CLOs
  - TCI can be spread, gap is higher in lower-rated CLOs and in stressful market conditions when failure rates exceed 50%.
  - Senior CLOs: average observed trade cost is 4 bps, TCI is 13bps
  - Junior tranches: average bid-ask spread is 12bp; 25bps in stressful periods; fail rates double (20-30% to 50-60%): TCI increases from < 3% to over 15% under stress
  - Co-movement of failure rate and costs amplifies underestimation

- Is illiquidity generally underestimated in illiquid assets? in crises?
- How stable are CLOs?
Discussion of TCI and $R$

$R$ as the outside option

- If $R$ is above the outside option, TCI is biased down
  - Seller would never set $R$ below their valuation

- In dynamic model
  - Seller would never set $R$ below what they would expect to get if they try to sell again, although evidence is that failed BWICs rarely lead to a subsequent trade
  - Why would bidders bid above $R$ in subsequent auctions?

Does using $A$ as benchmark price capture the full spread?

- Buyer likely has more bargaining power with the dealers than seller
- For riskless principle trades, the dealer is only charging a fixed mark up and the compensation for liquidity provision accrues to the final buyer
Collateral Pool Interest Proceeds

Trustee and Administrative Fees

Senior Management Fee

If coverage tests are met

Interest on Senior Notes

If coverage tests are not met

Interest on Mezzanine Securities

Redemption of Senior Notes

Subordinated Management Fee

Redemption of Mezzanine Securities

Residual to Subordinated Notes

Interest on the mezzanine securities may be deferred and compounded into the tranches’ principal balance if cash flow is not available to pay current interest due. This is referred to as PIKing (payment in kind).

If coverage tests are still not met after partial redemption of mezzanine notes, cash flows will continue to be used to redeem mezzanine notes, and no payment will be given to the equity tranche before the tests are cured.

If coverage tests are still not met after senior notes being fully redeemed

- If the coverage tests are passing again after partial redemption of senior notes
- If the coverage tests are passing again after partial redemption of mezzanine notes
CLO Credit Spreads Versus Comparably Rated Corporate Bonds

- AAA: US CLO (101 bps), Corp/HY LIBOR OAS (120 bps), CLO Relative Value (189 bps)
- AA: US CLO (152 bps), Corp/HY LIBOR OAS (189 bps), CLO Relative Value (243 bps)
- A: US CLO (189 bps), Corp/HY LIBOR OAS (243 bps), CLO Relative Value (300 bps)
- BBB: US CLO (446 bps), Corp/HY LIBOR OAS (604 bps), CLO Relative Value (750 bps)
- BB: US CLO (604 bps), Corp/HY LIBOR OAS (900 bps), CLO Relative Value (1000 bps)

Hendershott, Li, Livdan, Schürhoff (2020)
However, in April 2020 a record 11 leverage loans defaulted.