

Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market*

Stephanie Assad^a, Robert Clark^b, Daniel Ershov^c, Lei Xu^d

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Abstract

Economic theory provides ambiguous and conflicting predictions about the association between algorithmic pricing and competition. In this paper we provide the first empirical analysis of this relationship. We study Germany's retail gasoline market where algorithmic-pricing software became widely available by mid-2017, and for which we have access to comprehensive, high-frequency price data. Because adoption dates are unknown, we identify gas stations that adopt algorithmic-pricing software by testing for structural breaks in markers associated with algorithmic pricing. We find a large number of station-level structural breaks around the suspected time of large-scale adoption. Using this information we investigate the impact of adoption on outcomes linked to competition. Because station-level adoption is endogenous, we use brand headquarter-level adoption decisions as instruments. Our IV results show that adoption increases margins by 9%, but only in non-monopoly markets. Restricting attention to duopoly markets, we find that market-level margins do not change when only one of the two stations adopts, but increase by 28% in markets where both do. These results suggest that AI adoption has a significant effect on competition.

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1 Introduction

Pricing-algorithm technology has become increasingly sophisticated in recent years. Although firms have made use of pricing software for decades, technological advancements have created a shift from mechanically-set prices to AI-powered algorithms that can handle vast quantities of data and interact, learn, and make decisions with unprecedented speed and sophistication. The evolution of algorithmic-pricing software has raised concerns regarding the potential impact on firm behaviour and competition. In particular, the potential for the use of algorithms as a means to facilitate collusion, either tacit or explicit, has been a popular discussion-point among antitrust authorities, economic organizations, and competition-law experts in recent years (OECD 2017; Competition Bureau 2018; Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt 2019; UK Digital Competition Expert Panel 2019; Ezrachi and Stucke 2015, 2016, 2017; Varian 2018; Goldfarb et al 2019). Since the goal of reinforcement learning-based algorithms is to converge to an optimal policy, the concern arises that AI agents will learn to play a collusive strategy to achieve a joint-profit maximizing outcome. Whether these strategies are learned or programmed-in explicitly by users, the employment of algorithmic software can facilitate collusion through increased ease of monitoring and speed of detection and punishment of possible deviations.

The literature on algorithmic collusion is expanding, with contributions from the fields of economics, law, and computer science. Despite this growing attention, there is no theoretical consensus as to whether algorithms facilitate tacit collusion (Kühn and Tadelis 2018; Calvano et al 2019; Miklós-Thal and Tucker 2019; Brown and MacKay 2020). There are also questions about whether algorithmic collusion can arise in practice since there is no empirical evidence linking the adoption and use of pricing algorithms to market outcomes related to competition. The objective of this paper is to supplement existing theoretical literature by conducting the first empirical analysis of the impact of wide-scale adoption of algorithmic pricing software. We focus on the German retail gasoline market, where mass adoption allegedly occurred beginning in 2017 according to trade publications, and for which we have access to a high-frequency database of prices and characteristics for every retail gas station in the country.¹

We investigate the impact of algorithmic-pricing software adoption on competition by comparing the retail margins of adopting and non-adopting stations. There are many channels, other than

¹**Legal disclaimer:** This paper analyses the impact of adoption of algorithmic pricing on competition strictly from an economic point of view. We base our understanding of the facts on publicly-available data on prices from the German Market Transparency Unit for Fuels. To our knowledge, there is no direct evidence of anticompetitive behavior on the part of any algorithmic-software firms or gasoline brands mentioned in this paper.

through competition, that adoption of algorithmic-pricing software can change margins: an algorithm can better detect underlying fluctuations in wholesale prices or better predict demand. To isolate the effects of adoption on competition we focus on the role of market structure, comparing adoption effects in monopoly (one station) markets and non-monopoly markets. If adoption does not change competition, effects should be similar for monopolists and non-monopolists. We also perform a more direct test of theoretical predictions by focusing on duopoly (two station) markets. We compare market-level average margins in markets where no stations adopted, markets where one station adopted and markets where both stations adopted. In the first market type, competition is between human price setters. In the second it is between a human price setter and an algorithm, while in the last it is between two algorithms. By comparing all three market types we are able to identify the effect of algorithmic pricing on competition.

The decision to adopt algorithmic-pricing software is not directly observed in the data. To overcome this challenge we test for structural breaks in pricing behaviours that are thought to be related to the use of sophisticated pricing software: (i) the number of price changes made in a day, (ii) the average size of price changes, and (iii) the response time of a station’s price update given a rival’s price change. We focus on these measures since they capture the promised impacts of algorithmic software in the retail gasoline market.² As described on the website of a leading algorithmic pricing software provider, their pricing software collects data and performs high frequency analysis to “rapidly, continuously and intelligently” react to market conditions. Since we do not have exact adoption dates, we use a Quandt-Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test (Quandt 1960) to test for the best candidate break date when the break date is unknown. We test for structural breaks at each station for each week in a large window around the time of supposed adoption. The best candidate structural break for a given station is the week with the highest resulting F-statistic of each of these tests. To minimize false positives, we classify a station as an algorithmic-pricing adopter if it experiences a structural break in at least two out of three measures within a short time period, which we take to be eight weeks, but is robust to alternative specifications. We find that approximately 30% of stations in our data set structurally break in multiple measures of pricing behaviour within an eight week window. The majority of these breaks occur in mid-2017, just after algorithmic pricing software becomes widely available.

After identifying adopters, we compare outcomes linked to competition between adopters and

²Using rival responsiveness as a marker may over-state AI adoption if non-adopters who react to their AI-using competitors’ frequent price changes are automatically labelled as adopters. This does not appear to be the case in our data. When examining duopoly (two station) markets, we find asymmetric adoption (where one duopolist adopts and the other does not) in a large share of markets. More details are in Section 6.1.

non-adopters. We focus on the impact of adoption on mean monthly margins (above regional wholesale prices). In the gasoline retail market, margins are a clear indicator of profitability and market power: the ability of stations to mark-up retail prices above wholesale prices. Previous studies on coordination and collusion in this market use margins to evaluate competition (Clark and Houde 2013, 2014; Byrne and De Roos 2019). Theory papers on algorithmic competition also make clear predictions related to margins (Calvano et al 2019; Brown and MacKay 2020). We look at the effects of adoption on mean monthly margins and on the distribution of monthly margins (25th and 75th percentiles).³

Although we control for time and station-specific effects, as well as time-varying market level demographics, adoption is endogenous. Individual station adoption decisions are likely correlated with station/time specific unobservables (managerial skills, changing local market conditions, etc). OLS estimates are likely attenuated. We address this challenge by instrumenting for a station’s adoption decision. Our main IV is the adoption decision by the station’s *brand* (i.e., by brand headquarters). As demonstrated by previous technology-adoption episodes in the gasoline retail market, brands can facilitate adoption by their stations. “Adopting” brands provide support/subsidies/training to individual stations, reducing adoption costs.⁴ Brand-level decisions should not be correlated with individual station-specific unobservables, making this instrument valid. Since brand adoption decisions are also unobserved we use a proxy as our instrument: the fraction of a brand’s stations that adopt AI pricing. If only a very small fraction of a brand’s stations adopts AI, it is unlikely that the brand itself decided to adopt. If a large fraction adopts, it is likely that the brand itself adopted and facilitated adoption by the stations. As a robustness check, we also use an alternative set of instruments: annual measures of broadband internet availability and quality in the local area around each station. Most algorithmic pricing software are “cloud” based and require constant downloading and uploading of information. Without high speed internet, adoption will not be particularly useful. Conditional on local demographic characteristics broadband quality should not depend on station-specific unobservables, but stations should be more likely to adopt algorithmic pricing software once their local area has access to reliable high speed internet.⁵

Using brand-adoption as an IV we find that mean station-level margins increase by 0.7 cents per litre, or roughly 9%, after adoption.⁶ We observe heterogeneity in outcomes based on market

³We take the monthly average, 25th and 75th of daily margins above regional wholesale prices after subtracting German VAT.

⁴See Appendix B for an example from the adoption of electronic payments by gas stations in the 1990s.

⁵See Section 7.3.4 for additional discussion.

⁶Estimates using alternative broadband availability IVs are qualitatively similar to the main estimates and quan-

structure. Adopting monopolist stations with no competitors in their ZIP code see no statistically significant change in their margins. Adopting stations *with competitors in their ZIP code* see a statistically significant mean margin increase of 0.8 cents per litre and the distribution of their margins shifts right. These results suggest that algorithmic pricing software adoption raises margins only through its effects on competition.

To further investigate whether algorithmic pricing affects competition and to test predictions from the theoretical literature, we look at market-level adoption in duopoly (two station) markets. IV estimates suggest that relative to markets where no stations adopt, markets where both stations adopt see a mean margin increase of 2.2 cents per litre, or roughly 28%. Markets where only one of the two stations adopts see no change in mean margins. These results show that market-wide algorithmic-pricing adoption raises margins, suggesting that algorithms reduce competition. The magnitudes of margin increases are consistent with previous estimates of the effects of coordination in the retail gasoline market (Clark and Houde 2013, 2014; Byrne and De Roos 2019).

Finally, we explore the mechanism underlying algorithmic pricing and competition: are algorithms unable to learn how to compete effectively, or do they actively learn how not to compete (i.e., how to tacitly collude). To do so, we test whether margin changes happen immediately after adoption or arise gradually. If it is the former, we should see immediate increases in margins. If it is the latter, algorithms should take longer to train and converge to tacitly-collusive strategies (Calvano et al 2019). We find evidence that margins do not start to increase until about year after market-wide adoption, suggesting that algorithms in this market learn tacitly-collusive strategies. These findings are in line with simulation results in Calvano et al (2019).

The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. The next section discusses relevant literature. Section 3 provides a background discussion and an overview of the relevant players in the German market. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, discuss the data and methodology we use in our analysis. Sections 6 and 7 discuss, respectively, our results regarding (i) identifying adoption and (ii) the impacts of AI adoption on station and market outcomes. We also conduct a number of robustness checks. In Section 8 we provide evidence to support the idea that outcome results are driven by algorithms learning to tacitly collude. In Section 9, we discuss algorithmic pricing as a means to facilitate collusion, antitrust concerns over algorithmic collusion, and how these relate to German and European competition law. We also present policy recommendations drawing on our results. We conclude in Section 10.

tatively five times larger. See Section 7.3.4 for additional discussion of these results.

2 Related Literature

This paper most closely relates to the recent literature concerning the potential link between algorithmic pricing and collusion. Theoretical results remain ambiguous. Several papers have shown that when algorithmic-pricing competition is modelled in a repeated game framework collusive outcomes are inevitable under certain conditions (Salcedo 2015; Calvano et al 2019; Klein 2019); however, others argue that improved price response to demand fluctuations may provide increased incentives for firm deviation from a collusive price (Miklós-Thal and Tucker 2019; O’Connor and Wilson 2019). Klein (2019) and Calvano et al. (2019) use computational experiments to study the effect of Q-learning algorithms on strategic behaviour of competing firms. Both studies find that these repeated games will converge to collusive outcomes including supra-competitive pricing and profits, as well as punishment of competitor deviation. While Miklós-Thal and Tucker (2019) find that improved demand prediction may lead to the possibility of collusion in markets where it is previously unsustainable, in other markets it may create incentives for deviation that were absent with less prediction capabilities. O’Connor and Wilson (2019) come to similar conclusions. Brown and MacKay (2020) develop a model where firms compete in pricing algorithms (rather than prices) and show that prices may increase even without collusion. Overall, there is little certainty as to whether algorithmic competition will lead to collusive outcomes in reality. There is, as far as we are aware, no empirical research regarding this question in the economics literature.⁷

The question as to whether algorithm usage may result in coordinated behaviour is of widespread interest and has been studied in fields outside of economics such as law and computer science. There are several papers in the computer science literature studying coordination of algorithms in repeated games. A number of these papers, including Kaymak and Waltman (2006, 2008) and Moriyama (2007, 2008) have indicated that reinforcement learning algorithms can result in cooperative outcomes; however, these outcomes are not always the most likely and are dependent on various specifications of the algorithm. Legal scholars generally express more certainty that the use of algorithmic pricing can lead to collusive behaviour. Authors including Ezrachi and Stucke (2015, 2016, 2017) and Mehra (2015) have expressed concern over this issue and its implications for competition policy.

⁷Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019) find that common bidding intermediaries in online advertising markets lead to anti-competitive effects, reducing prices for bidders at the expense of the platform. Bidding in this market is done through algorithms, which leads to parallels with the algorithmic pricing literature and regulatory concerns about multiple competitors in a market adopting the same pricing algorithm. Their findings suggest that algorithms could serve as “hubs” in a hub-and-spoke cartel (Harrington 2018b). Unlike this paper, the primary focus of Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019) is on increasing intermediary concentration rather than on algorithmic pricing software behaviour and the mechanism through which bidding decisions are made.

We also relate to an extensive literature on the retail gasoline market.⁸ There have been a small number of papers looking specifically at the German market. See in particular Dewenter and Schwalbe (2016), Boehnke (2017), and Cabral et al (2018). There is also a literature on collusion in gasoline markets. Earlier work includes Borenstein and Shepard (1996), as well as Slade (1987, 1992). More recently Wang (2008, 2009), Erutku and Hildebrand (2010), Clark and Houde (2013, 2014), and Byrne and de Roos (2019) have all studied anti-competitive behaviour in the retail gasoline industry.

A related area of literature studies the impact of technological advancements on price discrimination. A consequence of the rapid expansion of Big data and AI driven market analysis by firms is that personalized pricing strategies may become increasingly feasible and sophisticated. As technology advances, it can be better used to learn more about consumer tastes as well as to more accurately price products as a function of these tastes. In particular, authors have noted that Big data may facilitate first-degree price discrimination, which has generally been seen as challenging to implement in many markets (Ezrachi and Stucke (2016)). It is possible that more accurate determination of optimal personalized pricing can increase firm revenues (Shiller and Waldfogel 2011; Shiller 2014). Kehoe, Larsen, and Pastorino (2018) find that firm profit, as well as consumer surplus, may increase or decrease under personalized pricing depending on consumers certainty regarding their product tastes. They also find that in every case, total welfare is higher under discriminatory pricing in comparison to uniform pricing.

3 Background

3.1 Algorithmic Pricing in the German Retail Gas Industry

The December 2017 issue of *Tankstop*, a trade publication for Germany’s retail gasoline sector, notes that *a2i* systems, a Danish artificial intelligence company, had begun to offer services to gas station operators within Germany (see Figure A1). *a2i* systems creates industry specific technology for retail gas markets, including an AI pricing technology software, *Pricecast Fuel*. The promise of *Pricecast Fuel* is to use BDI (belief-desire-intention) and Neural Network based algorithms to determine optimal pricing strategies for retail gas stations (Derakhshan et al 2016). Figure A2, reprinted from *The Wall Street Journal*, intuitively explains how such price algorithms work. For a given station the algorithm takes in historical data on transactions, competitors’ information (i.e., competitors’ prices) and other

⁸See Gelman et al (2016) among many others.

market conditions (i.e., weather) as inputs. Outputs are prices that maximize station profits.⁹ Initial training for the algorithm is done on historical data, but the algorithm can also take in additional “real-time” information such as current weather and traffic patterns. The algorithm uses these inputs and sets prices. Transactions resulting from these prices are fed back into the system and are used to re-optimize the algorithm.

a2i began offering Pricecast Fuel to Danish retail fuel companies in 2011, noting on their website that they have established long-term partnerships with other European retail fuel stations since 2012 (*a2i* Systems 2020). *Tankstop*’s December 2017 issue further notes that *a2i*’s services are supported by WEAT Electronic Data Service GmbH, a provider of cash-free payment systems and technical and logistical support for a number of petrol brands within Germany (WEAT.de). *a2i* also has a strategic partnership with Wincor Nixdorf, a retail technology company providing services such as Point of Sale (PoS) terminals and self-checkout solutions (DieboldNixdorf.com).

a2i’s Pricecast Fuel software has many of the characteristics over which legal experts and antitrust authorities express concern in regards to the possibility of algorithmic collusion. For one, the software involves large-scale and high-frequency collection of, interaction with, and response to competitor data (*a2i* systems 2020). This high-frequency interaction between competitors can make collusion easier to sustain due to increased ease of monitoring and quicker detection and punishment of deviations (Ezrachi and Stucke 2015; Mehra 2015). Additionally, although we do not know the exact specifications of the algorithms implemented by Pricecast Fuel, *a2i*’s website states it is based on “learning algorithms”. Such learning algorithms have been the focus of many antitrust discussions and economic theory papers regarding algorithmic pricing and collusion (Calvano et al 2019), due to the potential for such algorithms to learn and converge to a collusive strategy. Finally, according to their advertisements *a2i* offers their software to multiple stations and brands within the German retail gas market (Tankstop 2017). The adoption of the same software by numerous brands may lead to a concern for a hub-and-spoke scenario or a parallel use of individual algorithms scenario, depending on how individualized *a2i*’s algorithms are for each customer.¹⁰

We focus our discussion on *a2i* since they have been public about the contents of their algorithm and since we have direct anecdotal evidence of their availability and adoption in the German context. There are, however, several similar products available in the market. For example, *Kalibrate*, a UK

⁹Individual station owners can set other goals, such as market share maintenance, or constraints such as minimum price.

¹⁰Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019) find that the adoption of common bidding intermediaries by multiple competitors (who then presumably use the same bidding software) generates anti-competitive effects in online advertising markets. This is similar to how hub-and-spoke cartels operate (Harrington 2018b).

company, also offers an AI-powered pricing software for gasoline retail ([Kalibrate.com](https://www.kalibrate.com)). Their list of clients includes Nordic gasoline retail chains ST1 and Preem, as well as the Polish chain Orlen, which is also active in Germany ([Kalibrate.com](https://www.kalibrate.com)). Based on a limited description of their algorithm on the provider’s website, this competing algorithm works similarly to *a2i*’s algorithm. Our discussion above is representative of the general type of algorithms that are available in the retail gasoline market.¹¹

4 Data

The data we use come from the German Market Transparency Unit for Fuels. The data set contains price data for the most commonly used fuel types, Super E5, Super E10, and Diesel for every German petrol station in 1 minute intervals from 2014 to the end of 2019.¹² We also have characteristic information on each station, including their exact address, ZIP code, latitude and longitude coordinates, station name, and associated brand. In total, there is information on 16,027 stations.¹³

We combine retail price data with additional data sources. We obtain daily regional wholesale prices from Oil Market Report (OMR), a private independent German gasoline information provider. Regional wholesale prices are average daily ex-terminal prices in eight major German refinery and storage areas. We calculate the distance between each gas station and all refinery and storage areas and use wholesale prices from the nearest refinery.¹⁴ Prior to subtracting wholesale price, we also subtract German VAT (19%) from retail price. We compute station-level daily margins and take the monthly average, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for our station-month level analysis.

We merge in annual regional demographics from Eurostat. We include data on total population, population density, median age, employment (as a share of total population) and regional GDP. These data are at the “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 3” (NUTS3) level which is frequently used by EU surveys. A NUTS3 region is roughly equivalent to a county but is larger than a 5-digit ZIP code.

¹¹It is possible that providers sold algorithmic pricing software in Germany before 2016 (the start of our sample). We should not be observing any structural breaks for stations that adopted before the start of our sample. This means that we would be labelling some adopters as non-adopters. If adopters have higher average margins than non-adopters, this would bias our station-level estimates towards zero.

¹²Super E10 is an ethanol based fuel with 10% ethanol and 90% unleaded petrol. Super E5 is an ethanol based fuel with 5% ethanol and 95% unleaded petrol. E10 and E5 are similar to 95 and 98 octane rating fuels commonly used in North America.

¹³We drop 634 of these stations are missing location data. See Data Appendix for more details about our sample construction and data cleaning.

¹⁴This is a standard approach in the gasoline retail literature. We may be understating retail margins if stations belong to vertically integrated retailers.

We merge in daily weather information from the German Meteorological Service (DWD). These data are collected daily from thousands of local weather stations. We compute the average distance between each gas station and all local weather stations and use weather data from the nearest weather station. We include monthly means and standard deviations of temperature (in degrees Celsius) and precipitation (in mm).

Finally, we collect data on local fixed-line broadband internet from the EU Commission’s netBravo initiative ([netBravo](#)): whether the local area around the gas-station has widespread availability of 10 Mb/s, 15 Mb/s, 30 Mb/s internet in a given year,¹⁵ and the reliability of broadband signals in the area in that year. Reliability is computed by average signal strength (in dB) and the variance of signal strength.¹⁶

More details about data construction are in the Data Appendix.

4.1 Station-Level Descriptive Statistics

Gas stations in our data set belong to brands. The data set does not specify whether the stations are vertically integrated and directly owned by the brands, or whether they are owned by independent franchisees who entered into a licensing agreement in exchange for the brand name and some technical support. Both are common in retail gasoline markets ([Convenience.org](#)).

There are 258 distinct brands in the data. 239 brands have between 2 and 100 stations and 19 brands have more than 100 stations. The top 5 brands account for 43 percent of stations and the 19 largest brands (those with more than 100 stations) account for 71 per cent of total stations (11,752 stations total).¹⁷ ARAL and Shell are the dominant brands in the German retail gas market, with the largest number of stations, 2,417 and 1,852 respectively, together making up over 25 per cent of stations in the German retail gas market. There are a number of other large brands with over 350 stations each: Esso, Total, Avia, Jet, Star, BFT, Agip, Raiffeisen, and Hem.¹⁸ In terms of market shares, ARAL, Shell, Jet, BFT, Total and Esso together account for 84 per cent of fuel sales in the

¹⁵We define speed X to be widely available in an area if average speed-tests in that area in that year exceed that speed. As well, we assume that if an area has speed X widely available in a year, it also has the same speed widely available in every subsequent year. More details on the construction of these variables are in the Data Appendix.

¹⁶Raw data is available at the monthly frequency. We choose to aggregate to the annual level since the number of speed-test/quality observations at the monthly level is small. It is also more likely that stations make decisions based on larger average trends rather than monthly fluctuations.

¹⁷11% of stations are single-operator independents. With our IV strategy, these stations are not part of our final estimating sample.

¹⁸These brands operate 1,091, 933, 804, 689, 563, 430, 450, 440, and 387 stations respectively

German retail gas market.¹⁹

The market definition we use in the main text is a 5 digit ZIP code. In Europe, this is the most detailed ZIP code available. There are 5,781 5-digit ZIP codes in our data. 2,094 ZIPs have a single station (are monopoly markets). 1,307 ZIPs have two stations (are duopolies). The mean number of stations per ZIP code is around 3 and the median is 2. Only 81 ZIP codes have more than 10 stations.²⁰ The majority of stations are within 5KM of their closest competitors (about 94 per cent) and the average distance of a station to its closest competitor is 1.4KM.

Table 1: Station Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25%	75%	Max
Stations per Brand	258	57.6	227.0	2	2	19	2417
Stations per ZIP Code	5,781	2.77	2.15	1	1	4	17
Distance to nearest station (KM)	16,027	1.40	1.77	0	0.30	1.69	17.19
# of other stations within 1KM	16,027	1.09	1.34	0	0	2	17
# of other stations within 3KM	16,027	5.14	5.07	0	2	8	36
# of other stations within 5KM	16,027	10.91	10.96	0	3	17	64

4.2 Station/Month-Level Descriptive Statistics

The average price that a station charges per litre of E10 fuel is 1.34 Euros, but the mean monthly margin that the average station earns over wholesale regional price (after taking away VAT) is 7.9 cents per litre. The 75th percentile daily margin a station earns on average in a month is 8.3 cents, and the 25th percentile daily margin a station earns on average in a month is 6.6 cents.

The average station is located in a fairly dense NUTS3 region, with population density of 780 persons per square-km. The median age of the population around a station is 46 years and 53 percent of the population is employed. Over 85% of gas stations are located in areas with widely available 10Mb/s internet access, but less than 8% of stations are located in areas with widely available 30Mb/s internet access.

¹⁹As of 2019, taken from <https://www.bft.de/daten-und-fakten/kraftstoffmarktanteile>. Fuel market sales for each brand are 21 per cent for ARAL, 20 per cent for Shell, 16 per cent for BFT, 10.5 per cent for Jet, 9.5 per cent for Total, and 7 per cent for Esso.

²⁰ZIP codes reflect population patterns, so urban ZIP codes are much smaller in terms of area than rural ZIP codes.

Table 2: Station/Month Summary statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Prices and Margins			
Mean Monthly E10 Price (EUR/litre)	430,357	1.34	.084
Mean Monthly E10 Margin (EUR/litre)	430,357	.079	.031
25th Percentile Monthly E10 Margin (EUR/litre)	430,357	.066	.026
75th Percentile Monthly E10 Margin (EUR/litre)	430,357	.083	.027
Regional Demographics and Weather Controls			
ln(Total Regional Population)	430,357	12.433	.821
Regional Population Density (pop/ km^2)	430,357	777.427	1031.227
Regional Median Population Age	430,357	45.989	3.136
ln(Regional GDP)	430,357	9.1	.981
Regional Employment Share (employed/pop)	430,357	.529	.135
Mean Temperature (degrees Celsius)	430,357	10.357	6.781
Std. Dev. Temperature (degrees Celsius)	430,357	3.145	.734
Mean Precipitation (mm)	430,357	1.923	1.227
Std. Dev. Precipitation (mm)	430,357	3.747	2.315
Broadband Availability			
10 Mb/s Internet Available Dummy	314,798	.861	.345
15 Mb/s Internet Available Dummy	314,798	.493	.5
30 Mb/s Internet Available Dummy	314,798	.079	.27
Average Internet Signal Strength (dBm)	314,798	-83.478	3.984
Average Internet Signal Variance (dBm)	314,798	3.524	2.042

5 Methodology

Our empirical analysis of the effect of algorithmic pricing on competition in the German retail gas market proceeds as follows. First, we identify AI-adopting stations by performing Quant Likelihood Ratio (QLR) tests to establish structural breaks in the time series of pricing strategies of gas stations in our sample period. Second, we investigate the impact of AI adoption on market outcomes related to competition such as margins over wholesale prices. We compare outcomes for adopting and non-adopting stations. Selection bias coming from the differences between adopters and non-adopters, as well as endogeneity due to the timing of adoption would attenuate OLS estimates down from true effect of adoption. We use a rich set of controls for observables, station and time fixed effects and an instrument based on brand HQ-level adoption decisions to deal with endogeneity concerns. As a robustness check, we also use an alternative set of instruments related to the availability and quality of broadband internet in the local area around a gas station.²¹ We allow for heterogeneity of effects across different market structures (monopoly stations vs. non-monopolists) to test whether effects from the adoption of algorithmic pricing software on market outcomes are driven by competition.

We also perform a more direct test of theoretical predictions by focusing on duopoly markets (geographic markets with two stations). We compare market-level outcomes in markets where no stations adopted, markets where one station adopted and markets where both stations adopted. In the first market type, competition is between human price setters. In the second it is between a human price setter and an algorithm. In the last market type, competition is between two algorithms. This comparison allows us to capture the effect of algorithmic pricing on market competition.

5.1 Identifying Adoption Decisions

We assume that there are two levels of decision-making when it comes to adoption of AI technology: at the brand HQ (headquarters) level and at the individual station level. We address each in turn. There is substantial evidence that brands have entered into long-term strategic partnerships with AI pricing and analytics providers, either directly or indirectly. In Denmark, *a2i* directly entered into a partnership the large Danish retail fuel company OK Benzin (a2isystems.com). On its website, *a2i* also claims that by 2012 it had “established long-term partnerships with a number of European Retail Fuel companies” (a2isystems.com). Preem, a Swedish gasoline retailer, entered into a strategic partnership with Kalibrate, a provider of AI-based pricing software similar to *a2i* (Kalibrate.com).

²¹Estimates with these IVs are qualitatively similar to our main estimates. See Section 7.3.4 for additional discussion.

More indirectly, AI-pricing software providers enter into partnerships with IT companies that provide integrated services to brands. *a2i* has a strategic partnership with Wincor Nixdorf, a retail technology company providing services such as Point of Sale (PoS) terminals and self-checkout solutions (DieboldNixdorf.com). Wincor Nixdorf then enters into partnerships with brands. Also, as mentioned in Section 3, in Germany *a2i*'s software was at least partially implemented through WEAT - a technology company working with brands and providing technical and logistical support (WEAT.de).

However, as in other cases of corporate technology adoption (i.e., Tucker 2008), if a brand decides to “adopt,” or enter into a partnership with an AI pricing software provider, this does not necessarily mean that all of its stations automatically and instantaneously adopt. Rather it implies simply that the technology exists for mass-adoption. There are many reasons why not every station in a brand will adopt right away. One possibility is that the brand does not want to immediately change its pricing strategy across all of its stations, which sometimes can number in the hundreds or thousands. Brands may wish to perform some experimental tests to make sure that the pricing software works or delivers the desired outcomes, or release the software gradually. This has been the case with the very public adoption of *a2i*'s software by Denmark's OK Benzin (a2isystems.com).

Even if a brand wanted all of its stations to adopt immediately, not all of them could or would. Cloud-based AI-pricing software potentially requires substantial infrastructure investments. For example, high-speed internet *and* high-speed internet enabled Point of Sale (PoS) terminals and pumps are likely required for the software to work.²² Similarly, station operators also may require substantial training with the software to set its parameters and deal with potential errors. Brands may under-write or subsidise investments and training, but ultimately such costs fall on individual station owners. Not all station owners are in a position to incur these costs right when the technology becomes available, or possibly ever. This was the case for previous waves of gasoline retail technology adoption. For example, in the 1990s, Exxon Mobil (Esso's parent company) had a brand-wide roll-out for the Mobil Speedpass, a contactless electronic payment system. BusinessWeek reported that to actually adopt the technology individual station owners “have to install new pumps costing up to \$17,000—minus a \$1,000 rebate from Mobil for each pump” (BusinessWeek). In other words, individual station owners have discretion as to whether (and when) to invest in adopting AI software.²³

²²Other upgrading decisions by gas station owners include allowing for chip cards or automated payment at the pump (Chicago Tribune).

²³We provide supporting evidence for staggered technology adoption in the gasoline market in Appendix B. We look at the adoption of electronic payments from 1991 to 2001 by Canadian gasoline retail stations. This is another

It is important to note that in our dataset we do not have information on either brand-level or station-level adoption. Our approach is to take advantage of the high-frequency price data to identify these decisions.

5.1.1 Identifying Station-Level Adoption

We currently focus on three measures of pricing behaviour (aggregated to a weekly level) to identify the adoption of algorithmic pricing at the station level: (i) number of price changes, (ii) average size of price changes, and (iii) rival response time. We focus on these measures as a means to capture the promised impacts of *a2i*'s pricing software, as well as to be consistent with the theoretical literature. As described on *a2i*'s website, their pricing software, PriceCast Fuel, uses the collection and high-frequency analysis of large quantities of data on consumers, competitors, and market dynamics to learn how previous pricing strategies have impacted consumer and competitor behaviour, and in turn station performance. The software is advertised to use these learned strategies to “rapidly, continuously, and intelligently react” to market conditions; automatically setting optimal prices in reaction to changes in demand or competitor behaviour or to maximize margins without eliciting a change in behaviour by consumers or competitors. We expect that after AI-adoption, stations may make more frequent and smaller updates of their prices, due to quicker and more precise detection of demand fluctuations or changes in competitor behaviour, as well as detection of small changes that could be made without impacting consumer or competitor behaviour. Along these same lines, with faster detection of, and response to, competitor behaviour, we expect to see stations reacting more quickly to changes in competitors' prices.

These measures of pricing behaviour line up with what is described in the economic and legal literature discussing algorithmic adoption. Ezechia & Stucke (2015) point out the ability for algorithmic software to increase the capacity to monitor consumer activities and the speed of reaction to market fluctuations. Mehra (2015) points out the ability of AI pricing agents to more accurately detect changes in competitor behaviour and more quickly update prices accordingly. Brown and MacKay (2020) note that two significant features of pricing algorithms are their ability to (i) lower the cost of more frequent price updates and (ii) react quickly to price changes of other firms in the market. Our measure of rival response time follows a similar intuition to the approach taken by

technology that clearly benefits brands and that brands would want stations to adopt. However, some stations may not want to adopt. Other stations are incapable of adopting since adoption of this technology requires a stable phone connection. We show that it took years after the first appearance of this technology for a substantial fraction of a brand's stations to adopt.

Chen et al. (2016) who identify algorithmic pricing users in Amazon Marketplace by measuring the correlation of user pricing with certain target prices, such as the lowest price of that given product in the Marketplace.²⁴

Structural breaks in pricing strategies are detected using Quandt-Likelihood Ratio (QLR) tests. Developed by Quandt (1960), with distributional properties established by Andrews (1993), the QLR tests for a structural break in a time-series measure for each period in some interval of time and takes the largest resulting test statistic. It is useful when an exact break date is unknown and has been suggested and used in previous work involving collusive behaviour (Harrington 2008; Clark and Houde 2014; Boswijk et al 2018; Crede 2019; Byrne and de Roos 2019). We conduct a QLR test for each station in our data set and for each variable of interest (number of price changes, average size of price changes, and rival response time) we run the following regression over a range of eligible break periods $\tau_0 \leq \tau \leq \tau_1$ (eligible break periods are measured by week):

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i D_t(\tau) + X_t \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is the variable of interest for station i in time t , $D_t(\tau)$ is a dummy variable equal to 0 if $t < \tau$ and 1 if $t \geq \tau$, and X_t is the crude oil price in time period t , which we use as a control variable. For each regression we test the null hypothesis $H_0 : \beta_i = 0$ and compute the F-statistic $F_i(\tau)$. The QLR statistic is the largest of these F-statistics over the range of eligible break dates:

$$QLR_i = \max[F_i(\tau_0), F_i(\tau_0 + 1), \dots, F_i(\tau_1)]. \quad (2)$$

The best candidate structural break period for station i is identified as the week τ^* that satisfies $QLR_i = F_i(\tau^*)$.²⁵ Structural breaks are identified as significant if they exceed a certain critical value.²⁶ For this analysis, we drop all stations from our data set that do not operate in every week

²⁴There are potential concerns that by looking at rival responses we may over-state adoption in the market if non-adopting firms will be automatically labelled as adopters if they react to the more frequent price changes of adopters. This does not appear to be the case in our data. When examining duopoly markets, we find asymmetric adoption in many markets where one duopolist adopts and the other does not. More details are in Section 6.1.

²⁵We refer to the QLR statistic as identifying the “best candidate” structural break period because if we look at a test for each time period τ individually, there may be multiple periods in which a structural break would be identified (i.e. has an F-statistic exceeding a certain critical value). The QLR statistic identifies the best candidate break period as it identifies the period with the most significant associated F-statistic.

²⁶The distribution of the QLR statistic is non-standard so we cannot use the usual critical values for F-statistics to determine significance. Critical values for QLR statistics are taken from Andrews (2003). Using these values we measure a structural break as significant at the 10% level if $QLR_i \geq 7.12$, at 5% level if $QLR_i \geq 8.68$, and at the 1% level if $QLR_i \geq 12.16$.

in 2017 (i.e. we keep stations that have 52 observations of a given measure in 2017). We also drop all dates before 2016 and after 2018, leaving us with a 3 year sample period.²⁷ We use 30% trimming for our test period, which is standard for QLR testing.²⁸

5.1.2 Identifying Brand-Level Adoption

We use brand HQ-level adoption decisions as an instrument for station level adoption decisions. We do not observe an indicator for whether a brand HQ decided to enter into a strategic partnership with an AI-pricing software provider. However, we can make use of the findings from the station-level classification to identify brand-level adoption. Using this approach, there are several possible ways to identify brand adoption. One possibility is to assume that stations cannot adopt if their brands do not adopt. We would then label a brand as an adopter as soon as any one of its stations is classified as an adopter (has structural breaks in two out of three possible measures). The problem with this approach is that it is likely not *necessary* for the brand to make an adoption decision for a station to adopt the software. There are many providers of algorithmic pricing software that offer their products to small or medium enterprises.²⁹ *a2i*'s 2017 advertisements are clearly targeted at individual station owners and emphasize that all stations can adopt their technology. It is also possible that a brand would run an experimental trial on a small set of stations without fully adopting the software. This way of identifying brand adoption would also be sensitive to outliers and would amplify any noise from our station-level adoption measure. For these reasons, we choose not to use this approach to measure brand level adoption.

The opposite would be to identify a brand as an adopter only if *all* of its stations are classified as adopters. This would reduce any false-positive identification of adopting brands. However, it would not be consistent with the history of technology adoption in gasoline retail markets. There are substantial underlying differences between gas stations in terms of their infrastructure, ownership and their contractual relationships with brands (i.e., whether they are directly owned by the brand or under a licensing agreement for the brand name). Since the adoption of any new technology is costly, it is very unlikely that every single station belonging to a sizeable brand would adopt simultaneously. Historical data on past retail gasoline technology adoption supports this statement. In Appendix B

²⁷We drop 2015 to avoid confounding effects from Shell's price matching program that was introduced in Germany in that year. Dewenter and Schwalbe (2016) and Cabral et al (2018) have shown that this price matching policy had an effect on pricing strategies of stations in the German market, which we do not want to capture in our analysis.

²⁸We use as our first eligible break date the 15th percentile week in our sample period and as our last eligible break date the 85th percentile week in our sample period.

²⁹See [Prism.com](https://www.prism.com) or [Comptera.net](https://www.comptera.net).

we provide data on the adoption of electronic payment systems in Canadian gasoline retail stations in the 1990s. We show that up to 10 years after the first appearance of this technology, less than 50% of stations belonging to leading brands had adopted.

A third and intermediate approach is a probabilistic one. We could compute the probability that a brand adopted by using our classification of station-level adoption decisions. This approach would still capture the effects of the underlying brand-level decisions. As mentioned in Section 5.1, brand-level decisions should facilitate the adoption by individual stations. According to this approach, a brand for which a small percentage of stations adopted by time t is unlikely to be an adopter at time t , while a brand for which a large percentage of stations adopted is more likely to be an adopter. This is the approach we take in this paper.

5.2 Evaluating the Impact of Adoption

5.2.1 Evaluating the Impact of Adoption on Station Outcomes

We want to capture the effects of station i adopting algorithmic pricing on the distribution of daily margins (above regional wholesale prices) in month t . We use three points in the margin distribution: (i) mean daily margin in month t , (ii) 25th percentile of daily margins in month t and (iii) 75th percentile of daily margins in month t . Our OLS specification is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta D_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where y_{it} is the outcome variable for station i in time t , α_i and α_t are, respectively, station and time fixed-effects, D_{it} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if station i has adopted algorithmic pricing in time t and 0 otherwise. X_{it} are time-varying station specific controls. Most importantly, X_{it} includes the number of other gas stations that are in the same postal code as station i . The key coefficient in this regression is β which captures the effect of AI adoption on y_{it} .

The OLS specification assumes that adoption is exogenous and as-good-as-random (conditional on observables). This is not necessarily the case. Algorithmic adoption could very much be endogenous and correlated with unobservable time-varying station characteristics. Stations with “high” unobservables (for example, better managed stations) could be more likely to adopt algorithmic pricing software and use it effectively.³⁰ These stations could also have very different market outcomes. This

³⁰In Table A4 in Appendix A we show that adopting and non-adopting stations vary along a wide range of observable characteristics. See additional discussion in Section 6.1.

would attenuate the adoption effect towards zero. Stations could also choose to adopt in response to unobservable station-specific shocks - once again, these would also affect both the adoption decision (D_{it}) and outcomes (y_{it}).

To address this issue we include station and time fixed effects and control for a rich set of station-level observable characteristics (i.e., local weather, regional demographics). We also use an instrument for D_{it} . We need a variable that is correlated with an individual station’s adoption decision but is not affected by station-specific unobservable shocks. We propose *brand-HQ level adoption* as an instrument.³¹ As explained in the previous section, we can measure brand-level adoption by computing the share of stations belonging to each brand that have been identified as AI adopters by month t . For station i at time t our IV is the share of stations in brand i ’s brand that adopted AI by time t . We exclude station i from this share. As discussed in Section 5.1, brand level decisions likely influence the adoption decisions of individual stations. Brands provide individual stations with employee training, technical support and maintenance ([Convenience.org](#)). This happens for both chain-operated stations as well as for more independent lessees. For previous waves of technology adoption (such as electronic payments) brands also directly subsidized some costs associated with required station upgrades. Such support is important for drastic technical changes such as AI adoption. At the same time, brand level decisions should not be influenced by station-level specific conditions.³² This identification assumption is similar in spirit to the one used in Hastings (2004) and Allen et al. (2014) to identify the effect of mergers. In both cases, the decision to merge is taken at the national/HQ level of the HQ making it exogenous relative to local market conditions.

Finally, we test whether any observed changes in prices and/or margins come from a reduction in competition and increased market power or from a better understanding of underlying fluctuations in wholesale prices and consumers’ demand elasticity. We look separately at stations that are monopolists in their ZIP code and stations that are not monopolists.³³ If the adoption of algorithmic

³¹As a robustness check, we propose an alternative set of instruments: the availability and quality of broadband internet in the local area around a gas station. As with *brand-HQ level adoption*, the availability of broadband internet should have an effect on a station’s decision to adopt algorithmic pricing software. Most algorithmic pricing software are “cloud” based and require constant downloading and uploading of information. Without high speed internet, adoption of such software will not be particularly useful for a station. However, the availability of broadband internet in the region should be uncorrelated with station unobservables after conditioning on observable local characteristics. Our estimates with these IVs are qualitatively similar to our main estimates. See Section 7.3.4 for additional discussion.

³²We provide evidence for this in Table A5, showing that conditional on brand size, brand adoption shares are uncorrelated with market characteristics. See additional discussion in Section 6.5.

³³We also experiment with alternative market definitions based on a 1km radius circle drawn around each station. See Section 7.3.2 for additional discussion.

pricing software does not change competition but benefits station operations in other ways, we should expect to see effects for monopolist adopters. If adoption also affects competition we should expect to see additional non-zero effects for non-monopolist adopters on top of the effects for monopolist adopters. If adoption *only* affects competition, we should expect to see zero effects for monopolist stations and non-zero effects for non-monopolists.

5.2.2 Evaluating the Impact of Adoption on Market-Level Outcomes

In a more direct test of theoretical predictions about the effects of AI on competition, we compare outcomes between adopting and non-adopting *markets*. We focus on duopoly station markets since most theoretical analysis is done for two firms (i.e., Calvano et al 2019, Miklós-Thal and Tucker 2019). In the main text of the paper, we define markets based on 5 digit German ZIP codes. A duopoly market is a ZIP code where there are only two stations.³⁴ For market m in month t , we use the following OLS specification:

$$y_{mt} = \alpha_m + \alpha_t + \beta_1 T_{mt}^1 + \beta_2 T_{mt}^2 + \epsilon_{mt}, \quad (4)$$

where y_{mt} is the outcome variable for market m at time t , α_m and α_t are, respectively, market and time fixed-effects. T_{mt}^1 is a variable equal to 1 if only one of the two stations in market m is labelled as an adopter.³⁵ T_{mt}^2 is a variable equal to 1 if both stations in market m are labelled as adopters.³⁶ The two key coefficients in this regression are β_1 and β_2 . β_1 captures the effects of AI adoption by *one of the two firms* in a duopoly market and β_2 captures the effects of AI adoption by *both firms* in a duopoly market.

As in the station-level regression, endogenous AI adoption by stations in response to market/time varying unobservables is a concern. Following the logic of our main station-level instruments, we construct market-level IVs using brand-level adoption decisions.³⁷ The instruments for T_{mt}^1 and T_{mt}^2

³⁴As a robustness check, we use an alternative market definition based on 1km radius circles drawn around each station. Stations are in the same market if their circles overlap. A duopoly market has only two stations within 1KM of one another. These two definitions do not necessarily capture the same stations. There may be two stations in different ZIP codes within 1KM of one another. There may also be two stations that are located more than 1KM apart but are in the same ZIP code. See Section 7.3.2 for additional discussion.

³⁵ $T_{mt}^1 = D_{1mt}(1 - D_{2mt}) + D_{2mt}(1 - D_{1mt})$, where 1 and 2 are the stations in market m .

³⁶ $T_{mt}^2 = D_{1mt}D_{2mt}$, where 1 and 2 are the stations in market m .

³⁷As a robustness check for station-level estimates, we propose an alternative set of instruments: the availability and quality of broadband internet in the local area around a gas station. These instruments would only work for market level data if the two duopolists are in the same ZIP code but also have different broadband access/quality conditions. Our broadband access/quality data is calculated at a coarser geographical level than 5 digit ZIP codes, so

are functions of the brand-level adoption decisions for the brands in market m :

$$\begin{aligned} IV_{mt}^1 &= B_{1mt}(1 - B_{2mt}) + B_{2t}(1 - B_{1mt}) \\ IV_{mt}^2 &= B_{1mt}B_{2mt}, \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where B_{1mt} is the share of other stations belonging to market m first station’s brand that have been identified as AI adopters in month t . B_{2mt} is share of other stations belonging to market m second station’s brand that have been identified as AI adopters in month t .

6 Results – AI Adoption

In this section we present results regarding the identification of adopters. In the first subsection we discuss station-level adoption before then describing brand-level adoption in the second subsection. With these results in hand, in the Section 7 we will study the effect of adoption on outcomes related to competition.

6.1 Station-level adoption

As outlined in Section 5, we calculate QLR statistics for each station and each of the three adoption markers: (i) *number of price changes*, (ii) *average size of price changes*, and (iii) *rival response time*. We find that a large number of stations experience structural breaks in each of the three markers. Out of 13,426 candidate stations, 12,402 experience a significant structural break in the number of price changes at the 5% confidence level.³⁸ Out of the stations that experience significant breaks, over 50% of the breaks occur in the spring and summer of 2017 (see Appendix A and Figure A3 for the full distribution and additional discussion).³⁹ We test stations for structural breaks in *rival response time*, excluding all stations without rivals within 1km as well as stations that do not operate in each week of 2017. Out of 5,908 stations satisfying these conditions, 5,449 experience significant structural breaks. Out of stations with significant breaks (at at least the 5% level), over 25% break in the summer of 2017 (see Appendix A and Figure A4 for the full distribution and additional discussion).

we are unable to use these instruments for market level data. See additional discussion in Section 7.3.4.

³⁸The QLR statistic for these stations are greater than or equal to the 5% critical value 8.68

³⁹We take the structural break as the date with the highest associated F-statistic. There may be some concern that other structural breaks may occur at significantly different dates if we considered F-statistics that are not the maximum, but close to it. We investigate the distribution of F-statistics for stations in the appendix and find that generally stations do not have significantly different dates that may be identified as a structural break.

For the *average size of price changes*, we find that out of over 13,426 candidate stations, 11,264 experience a statistically significant structural break. Once again, over 25% of the best candidate breaks occur in the summer of 2017 (see Appendix A and Figure A5 for the full distribution and additional discussion).

We also find that that the changes in pricing strategies captured by these breaks are substantial. For the number of *price changes*, on average, a station that experienced a structural break changes their prices 5 times a day before the break and 9 after the break. *Rival response time* decreases from 80 minutes to 50 minutes on average after a structural break, a drop of about 35%. Similarly, the *average size of price changes* falls from 4.1 cents to 3.4 cents. Additional summary statistics and discussion are in Appendix A and Tables A1, A2 and A3.


Classification: Since there are many factors that may influence a single adoption measure on its own, to confidently identify a station’s decision to adopt algorithmic-pricing software, we look for stations that experienced structural breaks for at least two measures of pricing behaviour within a short period of time. In our main specification, we label a station as an adopter if it experiences a structural break in at least two of the three measures within 8 weeks.⁴⁰ Currently, our analysis of adoption is based on data for Super E10 gasoline.⁴¹ Our results are robust to alternative stricter definitions of adoption.⁴²

We observe 3,104 stations break in both number of price changes and average size of price change within 8 weeks. Of the stations that break in rival response time, there are 1,062 that break in the number of price changes within 8 weeks and 812 that break in average size of price change within 8 weeks. There are also 250 stations that break in all 3 measures within an 8 week period. Together, we classify 4,441 stations as adopters as some stations break in more than one pair of measures. This constitutes approximately 30% of stations in our final estimating sample.


⁴⁰Any combination of two measures will result in a station being classified as an adopter.

⁴¹As a robustness check, we look at structural breaks in each measure for Diesel gas and find the resulting break period distributions are similar for those using E10 gas, see Figure A11. Additionally, we find that the majority of stations that experience structural breaks, experience breaks in both E10 and Diesel gas (between 80-95% of stations experience a structural break in either gas type, experience structural breaks in both types). The timing of structural breaks for each gas type is similar, with the median time difference for E10 and Diesel gas structural breaks being 1 (number of price changes), 2 (rival response time), and 3 (average price change size) weeks.

⁴²In Section 7.3.3 we change the definition of “a short period of time,” requiring stations to experience structural breaks in at least two of the three measures within 4 or 2 weeks. We also include an additional definition that only labels stations as adopters if they experience multiple structural breaks in *both* E10 and Diesel. See Section 7.3.3 for more.



(a) Number of Price Changes and Average Size of Price Change (3,104 stations) (b) Number of Price Changes and Rival Response Time (1,062 stations)



(c) Average Price Change Size and Rival Response Time (812 stations) (d) All 3 Measures (250 stations)

Figure 1: Frequency of Average Break Date for Measures Breaking Within 8 Weeks

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the average break date for each combination of measures, where the average break date is the average year-week between each measure’s break date. For each measure pair, the largest frequency of average break dates occur in mid-2017. We do see a number of stations that break in both average price change size and rival response time in mid-2016, however about 45% of these stations belong to ARAL and Shell, so it is likely that these breaks may be related to prevailing effects of Shell’s 2015 price matching policy. Overall, the fact that we see the largest frequency of multiple measure breaks in mid-2017, the suspected period of large scale adoption, provides some confidence that these measures accurately represent changes related to adoption of algorithmic pricing.

In addition to station-level, our main empirical analysis considers the effects of market-level adoption in duopoly markets. These markets can have zero adopters, one adopter or two adopters.

A concern with our definition of adoption and our adoption measures is that non-adopters may mistakenly be labelled as adopters because their optimal responses to an adopter's pricing makes them appear as though they also adopted. We observe a large number of duopoly markets where one station adopts without its competitor adopting. Out of over 1,300 duopoly ZIP markets in our sample, approximately 700 markets had no adopters at any point in our sample. 450 markets have only at most one adopter station throughout the sample period. 120 duopoly markets had one adopter station followed by subsequent adoption by the second duopolist.⁴³ More generally, Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of adoption shares in ZIP codes with more than one station in December 2018 (the last month in our data). This figure shows there are relatively few ZIP codes where adoption shares are higher than 50%. This suggests that we do not automatically label stations as adopters when their neighbours adopt.

⁴³There are approximately 40 ZIP codes where both duopolists are labelled as adopters in the same month. This could potentially reflect such concerns about mis-labelled adoption. Practically, this is a small number of markets and they are not driving our main results. We replicated our analysis from Section 7.2 and 8 without these markets and results remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same.




Figure 2: December 2018 ZIP-level Adoption Shares

Adopter and non-adopter stations are different. In Table A4 we compare market characteristics for adopter and non-adopter stations before any adoption takes place (in 2016). We find statistically significant differences between the two. Adopter stations are located in denser areas with different demographic profiles. Adopter stations also face more competition. This suggests that the adoption decision is likely endogenous, with stations deciding to adopt in response to market conditions. Although we control for observable characteristics and include station and time fixed effects, if adopters and non-adopters are dissimilar in their observables they are also likely dissimilar in time-varying unobservable characteristics (e.g., managerial quality, demand and cost shocks). These findings confirm the need to use an IV strategy to address the endogeneity.

6.2 Brand-Level Adoption

In this section we display the distribution of adoption dates for different brands and the evolution of the share of adopting stations by leading brands over time. Table 3 present summary statistics regarding the share of a brand’s stations that adopt by the end of each calendar year. We separately show statistics for the largest five brands and smaller brands (those with two stations or more).

Table 3: Share of Stations Classified as Adopters

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median
<i>December 2016</i>			
Top 5 Brands	0.053	0.034	0.040
Other Brands	0.037	0.082	0
<i>December 2017</i>			
Top 5 Brands	0.264	0.098	0.250
Other Brands	0.197	0.207	0.180
<i>December 2018</i>			
Top 5 Brands	0.337	0.110	0.350
Other Brands	0.246	0.231	0.250

This table confirms that AI adoption does not happen instantaneously across stations belonging to a given brand. Although we find evidence of station-level adoption as early as 2016 and brand-level adopter shares grow over time, by the end of 2018 only slightly more than 33% of stations belonging to the 5 largest brands in Germany are classified as AI adopters. Summary statistics also capture heterogeneity in adoption based on brand size. On average, a smaller share of non top-5 brand stations adopts than of the top 5 brands.⁴⁴ The mean adopter share in 2018 for non top-5 brands is 25%. This likely reflects the better support that larger brands can provide to their stations, which would reduce their cost of adoption. Within non-top 5 brands, there is substantial heterogeneity in adoption shares. By the end of 2018, 20% of non-top 5 brands have adoption rates of over 40%, which is higher than adoption rates for top 5 brands. At the same time, there are 25% of non-top 5 brands with zero AI adoption. This is especially the case for very small brands. The median brand

⁴⁴We find similar patterns in the distribution of structural breaks for individual adoption measures (i.e., number of price changes) in Figure A8 in Appendix A.

with less than 10 stations has zero AI adoption in 2018.




Figure 3: Share of AI Adopters Among Top 5 Brands

In addition to heterogeneity across large and small brands in terms of their adoption speed, there is also heterogeneity within the large brands. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the share of adopting stations for the Top 5 brands in our data throughout our sample period. Notably, none of these brands have adoption rates over 50% by the end of the sample period. Adoption clearly happens at a staggered rate that is different across brands. All brands experience spikes in adoption patterns that happen around early/mid 2017. This likely reflects the increased availability of the technology. However, some adoption happens beforehand or afterwards. Total overtakes the relatively early adopter Aral in 2017 and 2018. Esso’s adoption rate increases at a steadier (albeit slower) pace as compared to other brands. The heterogeneity in adoption rates across brands suggests that there is a brand-specific component to AI adoption. As mentioned in Section 5.1, it is likely that some brands were more likely to support the new technology (or adopt at the “HQ” level).

The pattern in Figure 3 is similar to previous patterns of technology adoption in gasoline markets. In Appendix B, we use data from Ontario (Canada) to look at the adoption of electronic payments by retail gasoline stations in the 1990s. Figure B1 shows the share of adopting stations from 1991 to 2001 for the Top 5 brands in Ontario. Despite the differences in time, geography and technology,

the patterns are remarkably similar. In that setting we also find a staggered pattern of technology adoption that appears to be highly brand specific. This suggests that our AI adoption measures do indeed capture technology adoption.

A reasonable question is whether the heterogeneity in brand-level adoption probability can be explained by observable brand characteristics. We find that unlike for station-level adoption, brand level adoption is not correlated with brand-level observables after controlling for brand size (the number of stations in the brand). Table A5 shows that conditional on the number of stations in the brand, the share of brand adopters is uncorrelated with the average demographic characteristics of a brand’s stations. It is also uncorrelated with a brand’s stations competitors. This makes intuitive sense. Brands with more than a few stations will also be spread out across different local markets. Local characteristics will inevitably average out. Brands also make broad strategic decisions that should not be influenced by local market conditions. The only statistically significant correlate of adoption probability at the brand level seems to be brand size. Because of this, we control for brand size in our IV estimates presented below.

7 Results – Effects of AI Adoption

7.1 Impact of Adoption on Station Outcomes

We use OLS and 2SLS regressions to measure the impact of algorithmic-pricing adoption on mean, 25th and 75th percentiles of daily station margins. For each station and day in our sample we compute an average station/day price and subtract an average regional wholesale price, German gasoline taxes and VAT. This provides us with daily station-level margins. We define mean station-level margins by taking an average of these daily station-level margins for each station for each month. We define the 25th percentile of margins by finding the *25th percentile* of daily margins for each station within a month. We define the 75th percentile of margins by finding the *75th percentile* of daily margins for each station within a month. We label a station as an adopting station if (1) it experiences a structural break in at least two out of three of (i) number of price changes, (ii) average size of price change, and (iii) rival response time, and if (2) these breaks occur within a period of 8 weeks. To identify the time period of adoption, we use the average year-week between the break weeks for each measure. Non-adopters break in zero or one of the three measures.⁴⁵

⁴⁵This is a conservative approach. We may be “missing” some adopters, either due to measurement errors in our measures or due to other signals of adoption that we did not consider. In practice, this means that some of the

Station-level estimates are presented in Table 4. In each regression we control for the number of competitors in the station’s ZIP code, as well as region/year demographics and the number of stations in station i ’s brand. Columns (1)-(3) display OLS regression results. Column (4) shows the first stage of the IV regression, and Columns (5)-(7) show the 2SLS estimates. Results from the OLS specification suggest that adoption has a negligible impact on margins.

Table 4: Station-Level Results

Outcome:	(1) Mean Margin OLS	(2) 25th Percentile Margin OLS	(3) 75th Percentile Margin OLS	(4) Adopter 1st Stage	(5) Mean Margin 2SLS	(6) 25th Percentile Margin 2SLS	(7) 75th Percentile Margin 2SLS
Adopter	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.007*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Share Brand Adopters				0.648*** (0.033)			
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.013** (0.006)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Non-Adopter Mean Outcome	0.079	0.065	0.083		0.079	0.065	0.083
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	451,457	451,457	451,457	430,357	430,357	430,357	430,357

Notes: Sample is gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. Margins are computed above wholesale gasoline prices at a regional terminal nearest to station j . Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline prices. 25th Percentile Margin is the 25th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline prices for station j in month t . 75th Percentile Margin is the 75th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline price for station j in month t . “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Share Brand Adopters” is the excluded instrument used in the 2SLS regression. It is equal to the share of stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. We also control for the number of stations belonging to station i ’s brand in month t . Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The endogeneity of adoption decisions likely biases OLS estimates and attenuates estimated coefficients down.⁴⁶ To correct for this endogeneity problem, we turn to our IV/2SLS estimates. The first stage of the 2SLS regression (in Column 4) is very strong (the F-statistic is 36.6). A 10% increase in the number of other stations affiliated with station i ’s brand that adopt by period t increases the probability that i adopts by period t by 65%. This is consistent with our intuition that adoption of algorithmic pricing is at least in part a brand-level decision.

2SLS estimates show considerable differences relative to OLS estimates. Column (5) shows that mean margins increase by 0.7 cents on average after AI adoption. This is an increase of about 9% adopters are labelled as non-adopters. This would bias our station-level estimates towards zero and under-states the true effects of adoption.

⁴⁶As discussed in Section 6.4 and shown in Table A4, adopter and non-adopter stations are very different in their local market demographics and in their competitive environment. They are also likely to be different in their unobservable characteristics.

relative to the average non-adopter margin of 7.9 cents.⁴⁷ Column (6) shows that the 25th percentile of margins increases by 0.9 cents after algorithmic adoption. Column (7) shows that the 75th percentile of margins remains the same for adopters and non-adopters. Results suggest substantial endogeneity concerns with OLS estimates that are at least partially solved by IVs.

Algorithmic pricing can increase station margins through a reduction in competition and increased market power. But there can also be other reasons for such changes. An algorithm could better understand underlying fluctuations in wholesale prices, or identify how price elasticity of demand changes over the day or the week and adjust prices accordingly. We test for these different explanations by allowing for heterogeneous effects across different market structures. We separate our sample into two: one sub-sample of stations that are monopolists in their ZIP code, and one sub-sample of stations that are not.

Results of our 2SLS regression for the two subsamples are presented in Table 5.⁴⁸ We find that non-monopolist stations are driving the increase in margins, with mean margins increasing for non-monopolist adopters by 0.8 cents post-adoption (10%), in comparison to a small and non-statistically significant increase for monopolist adopters. Non-monopolist adopters also experience an increase in both 25th and 75th percentile of margins, with increases of 0.9 and 0.7 cents respectively post-adoption. The entire distribution of non-monopolist adopters' margins shifts right. In Table A6 in the Appendix we also show that price effects are similar to margins. Average monthly retail gasoline prices for non-monopolist adopters increase after adoption. Average prices of monopolist adopter stations do not change. The statistically null effects on monopolist outcomes and positive effects on non-monopolist outcomes imply that adoption of algorithmic pricing software increases margins as a result of changes in competition rather than other changes such as better understanding of underlying wholesale price fluctuations and consumers' demand elasticity.

7.2 Impact of Adoption on Market-Level Outcomes

Table 6 presents estimates of regressions at the ZIP market-level, looking at all duopoly (two-station) ZIP codes.⁴⁹ Column (1) shows OLS estimates of Equation (4), using mean market-level margins as

⁴⁷2SLS regressions using alternative instruments based on broadband availability and quality also show that mean margins and mean prices increase after adoption (see Table A16 in Appendix A). See Section 7.3.4 for additional discussion of these instruments and results.

⁴⁸Results using the alternative 1KM radius market definition are in Table A7 in the Appendix. See additional discussion of alternative market definitions in Section 7.3.2.

⁴⁹Results at the 1km radius market-level are in Table A8 in Appendix A. See Section 7.3.2 for additional discussion of alternative market definitions.

Table 5: Station-Level Results by ZIP Market Structure

Outcome:	(1) Mean Margin 2LSL	(2) 25th Percentile Margin 2SLS	(3) 75th Percentile Margin 2SLS
Sample: Monopoly ZIP Stations			
Adopter	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Non-Adopter Mean Outcome	0.079	0.066	0.084
Station FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	65,543	65,543	65,543
Sample: Non-Monopoly ZIP Stations			
Adopter	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Non-Adopter Mean Outcome	0.079	0.065	0.083
Station FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	364,735	364,735	364,735

Notes: Sample is gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019, split up into two subsamples: one subsample only includes stations that have no competitors in their ZIP code. The other subsample includes only stations that have one or more competitors in their ZIP code. Margins are computed above wholesale gasoline prices at a regional terminal nearest to station j . Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline price. 25th Percentile Margin is the 25th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline prices for station j in month t . 75th Percentile Margin is the 75th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline price for station j in month t . “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t-1\}$. “Share Brand Adopters” is the excluded instrument used in the 2SLS regression. It is equal to the share of stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. We also control for the number of stations belonging to station i ’s brand in month t . Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

the outcome. Market-level margins are calculated as the monthly average of daily differences between pump prices for stations in market m in month t and wholesale price. Columns (2)-(4) show 2SLS estimates of Equation (4) using the instruments defined in Equation (5). First-stage estimates of the 2SLS are in Table A9 in Appendix A. As was the case with the station-level instruments, the partial

correlation between market-level instruments and the endogenous variables is strong.

2SLS estimates suggest that AI adoption by **one** station in a duopoly market **does not** change the distribution of market-level margins relative to a duopoly market where no stations adopted. However, AI adoption by **both** stations in a duopoly market changes the distribution of market level margins relative to a duopoly market where no stations adopted. The entire distribution of margins shifts to the right (increases).⁵⁰ Mean market-level margins increase by 2.2 cents after market-wide AI adoption. This is a substantial increase of 29% relative to the baseline. The 25th and 75th percentiles of market-level average margins also shift up. The 25th percentile of daily margins increases by nearly 3 cents and the 75th percentile increases by 2 cents.

A possible reason for not seeing changes in mean market-level margins after asymmetric adoption (when one station adopts and the other does not) could be because the adopter’s margins increase and the non-adopter’s margins fall, cancelling out on average. We test this hypothesis by looking at non-adopter stations in duopoly markets and comparing their monthly mean, 25th and 75th percentiles of margins before and after their rival adopts (as before, we instrument for the rival’s adoption with the rival brand’s adoption decision). Results from these regressions are in Table A11 in the Appendix. We do not see a decrease in margins following a rival’s AI adoption. This suggests that asymmetric adoption appears to have no statistically significant effects on margin distributions in duopoly markets.

These results serve as a direct test of theoretical hypotheses about the effects of AI adoption on market outcomes. In Calvano et al (2019), algorithms set prices directly and learn collusive strategies. In Miklós-Thal and Tucker (2019), algorithms do not set prices directly but provide better demand predictions for price-setting human agents. Their results suggest that, in most cases, improving demand prediction allows duopolists to maintain higher collusive prices.⁵¹ We cannot be sure exactly which algorithms station-owners are using in Germany and whether they fully turn over pricing decisions to algorithms.⁵² We also do not observe the “counterfactual” competitive or purely collusive prices for a given market. Nonetheless, lack of margin changes from partial/asymmetric adoption and substantial increases in margins after complete adoption is suggestive of algorithms facilitating tacit-collusion. The magnitude of margin increases in duopoly markets is consistent with

⁵⁰We similarly find that mean prices increase in two-adopter markets relative to no-adopter markets. Table A10 in the Appendix shows estimates of the price (rather than margin) effects of AI adoption in duopoly markets.

⁵¹The exception is moving from *very good prediction* to *excellent/perfect* prediction.

⁵²If multiple stations in a market turn over their pricing decisions to a common algorithmic software provider, our results are in line with the findings of Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019). Algorithms in this case would serve as the “hubs” of a hub-and-spoke cartel (Harrington 2018b).

previous findings on coordination in retail gasoline markets (Clark and Houde 2013, 2014; Byrne and De Roos 2019). We present additional evidence on the mechanism through which algorithms affect margins in Section 8.

Table 6: ZIP Duopoly Market Results

Outcome:	(1) Mean Mkt Margin OLS	(2) Mean Mkt Margin 2SLS	(3) 25th Percentile Mkt Margin 2SLS	(4) 75th Percentile Mkt Margin 2SLS
Market Definition:	ZIP Code			
One Station Adopted	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)
Both Stations Adopted	0.001 (0.001)	0.022** (0.009)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.020** (0.009)
Zero-Adopter Mean Outcome	0.079	0.079	0.066	0.084
IVs	NO	YES	YES	YES
ZIP FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	43,372	38,656	38,656	38,656

Notes: The sample includes duopoly market/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. A duopoly market is defined as a ZIP code with two gas stations. Outcome variable Mean Market Margin is the monthly average of mean market daily differences of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale price. 25th Percentile Market Margin is the 25th percentile of observed mean market daily difference of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale gasoline price. 75th Percentile Market Margin is the 75th percentile of observed mean market daily difference of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale gasoline price. “One Station Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if one of the two stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Both Stations Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if both stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. Regressions in Columns (2)-(4) instrument for adoption using the “share of brand adopters” of the two stations in the market. 1st stage regression results are in Table A9 in the Appendix. Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. We also control for the sizes of the brands of the two stations at time t . Standard errors clustered at market level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

7.3 Robustness

7.3.1 Alternative Estimation Samples

We perform a number of estimation-sample based robustness checks in Table A13. The first two robustness checks deal with concerns about the impact of Shell’s 2015 price matching guarantees. The introduction of price matching in 2015 appears to have changed pricing strategies (Cabral et al 2018). These changes in strategies may still be ongoing in 2016. This would confound our results.

Shell stations may be mistakenly labelled as algorithmic pricing software adopters. Section A.2.3 in Appendix A shows some evidence that Shell stations have a different distribution of structural breaks for one of our measures (average size of price changes) than other brands, with a large number of stations experiencing breaks in early 2016.⁵³ Shell stations and their competitors may also set higher prices due to the the price matching guarantee rather than due to the adoption of algorithmic pricing software.

Column (1) in Table A13 deals with this concern by dropping all observations belonging to ZIP codes where the price matching guarantees would be relevant. This includes all Shell stations and stations that are in the same ZIP codes as Shell stations. Results from this sample are slightly smaller but still highly statistically significant and qualitatively similar to the main estimates. Even without including any markets where Shell price matching guarantees would have an effect, we find that adoption of algorithmic pricing software increases average margins above wholesale prices by 0.5 cents (6%). Column (2) drops all observations from 2016 (where the Shell effects would be most prominent). Results here are qualitatively similar to the main results but larger in magnitude. This is because it takes time for stations to increase their margins after adoption (see discussion in Section 8).

We perform additional robustness checks to address concerns that our main results are driven by entry and exit of stations from the sample - either through the entry of high-quality and high-margin adopters, or through the exit of weak non-adopting stations. In Column (3) we look at a balanced sample of stations. We only include stations that are present in every month of the three year sample period. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our main estimates. But even these stations can be affected by entry and exit of other stations in their market. In Column (4), we look at a balanced sample of stations and markets that do not change over time. We only include stations that are present in every month of the three year sample period *and* we drop every market where the number of stations changes over time. Results from this subsample are also qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our main results.

7.3.2 Alternative Market Definitions

There are many possible geographic definitions of “markets.” A commonly used definition takes advantage of existing geographic designations such as Census tracts, DMAs, or ZIP codes. This is

⁵³See Figure A6 and Section A.2.3 for additional discussion about structural breaks in the average size of price changes. Our other two structural break measures (average number of price changes and rival response time) do not have the same differences between Shell and other brands.

the approach we use in our main results. defining markets based on ZIP code (Tables 5 and 6). Another commonly used definition in the literature looks at the direct distance between stations. Table A7 replicates the analysis in Table 5 (as well as looking at average prices) but using the following definition of a monopoly: a station that has no competitors within a 1KM radius. Non-monopoly stations then are those that have one or more competitors within a 1KM radius. Using this alternative definition yields results that are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 5: monopoly station’s margins change less than non-monopoly station margins.⁵⁴ We also find that only non-monopolist stations increase their prices after adoption. The biggest difference between results using different market definitions is that under the 1KM definition, monopoly stations increase their mean margins after adopting AI (although the average non-monopoly station increase is 25% bigger).

Differences in estimates are caused by the fact that the two market definitions label different stations as “monopolists.” While a 1KM definition does not vary across different regions, rural area ZIPs are larger than urban area ZIPs. The ZIP definition is more conservative. In rural areas, there are many stations that do not have a competitor within 1KM (on the same intersection, or an intersection away), but that do have a competitor somewhere nearby (in the ZIP code). Table A12 shows a comparison of the number of stations that are labelled monopolists. Using the 1KM definition over 6,000 stations are classified as monopolists, whereas only 2,300 stations are when using the ZIP definition. Only 1,800 of those stations overlap, meaning that many of the stations the 1KM definition classifies as “monopolists” have some competitors nearby (perhaps 1.5 or 2KM away). If there is some competition at ranges beyond 1KM, this definition is too lax and would over-state effects for 1KM monopolist stations.

To a lesser extent, this is also the case for duopoly markets. Approximately 3,000 stations are classified as belonging to a duopoly market based on their ZIP codes. The alternative definition based on a 1KM radius around each station defines a duopoly market as two stations that are within 1KM of one another and that have no other stations within 1KM. 3,800 stations are labelled as belonging to a 1KM-radius duopoly market. Only 1,100 stations belong to a duopoly market according to both definitions.

Table A8 in the Appendix replicates the analysis in Table 6 using this definition of duopoly markets. Mean margin results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ZIP code definition.⁵⁵ This is likely because gasoline stations compete closely with their nearest rivals. Our results in Sec-

⁵⁴Non-monopolist stations have increases of over 10% in all three of mean, the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of station margins. Monopolist stations do not.

⁵⁵75th and 25th margin percentile results are statistically zero for the 1KM radius market definition.

tion 8 suggest that algorithmic adoption by both stations in a duopoly market increases margins by reducing competition. This would also be the case in markets where there are two stations within 1KM of one another and other stations further away.⁵⁶ The two nearby stations compete more with one another than with stations that are further away. If both nearby competitors adopt, they will be able to compete less aggressively and increase margins. In that sense, even though the 1km duopoly market definition may be too lax for many (particularly rural) markets, it confirms our baseline results suggesting that what we find is an effect of AI adoption on competition.

7.3.3 Alternative Adoption Definitions

Tables A14 and A15 replicate Column (1) from Table 5 and Column (2) from Table 6 using alternative definitions of AI adoption. We consider three alternative definitions. Recall that our baseline definition classifies a station as an adopter if, within a period of 8 weeks, it experienced a structural break in at least two out of three measures - number of price changes per day, average size of price changes per day and the speed of response to a rival’s price change. Our first two alternative definitions are stricter: we label a station as an adopter if they experienced a structural break in any two out of three measures but within a period of (i) 4 weeks or (ii) 2 weeks. Results for these definitions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to baseline results.

We also consider a stricter alternative adoption measure that relates to a station experiencing multiple structural breaks in different fuel types. Under this definition, a station has to experience structural breaks in at least two out of our three adoption measures in **both** E10 and Diesel within a period of 8 weeks. As market structure and demand for E10 and Diesel are fundamentally different, if a station experiences changes in pricing strategy in both fuel types at the same time, it is highly likely to be driven by the adoption of new pricing software. We take the adoption date to be the average between the adoption date of E10 and the Diesel adoption date. Column (6) in each of Tables A14 and A15 present results using this definition of adoption. We find that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as the baseline results at the station level. At the market level, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively very close, but standard errors are larger. We have a much smaller sample at the duopoly-market level than at the station level and with stricter definitions of adopters we lose power.⁵⁷

⁵⁶For example, consider a ZIP code with two stations within 500m of each other, and two other stations 3-5KM away. This is not a duopoly ZIP market, but the two stations within 500m of each other would constitute a 1KM duopoly market.

⁵⁷Only 61 of 1,300 markets in our sample have both stations adopting algorithmic pricing under the “E10 and Diesel” definition, as compared to 179 markets under our baseline definition.

7.3.4 Alternative Instruments (Broadband Availability)

We propose an alternative set of instruments that correct for endogeneity in station adoption decisions without relying on unobservable brand HQ decisions. The instruments capture the quality of broadband access in station j 's region. There is well documented heterogeneity in broadband access and quality in Germany, with some areas and regions receiving sub-par services and speeds that are compared to the “old dial-up days” (NPR.org). In 2017, the second year of our sample, 29% of German users reported internet speeds less than half of those promised by providers (dw.com). A fast and reliable internet connection is a key requirement for the effective use of algorithmic pricing software. Computation is done in “the cloud,” so gas stations need fast internet connections to access necessary price information in a timely manner. They also need reliable internet connections to upload their own data and feed and update the software.

Based on data obtained from the EU Commission’s netBravo initiative, we have two measures of broadband performance in the local area around each gas station: whether the local area around the gas-station has widespread access to high speed internet in a particular year, and the reliability of broadband signals in that year. We use three indicator variables for high speed internet availability, capturing whether a 10 Mb/s, a 15 Mb/s or a 30 Mb/s connection is widely available in the local area.⁵⁸ Reliability is based on average signal strength (in dB) and the variance of signal strength. The intuition behind these instruments is that a gas station should be more likely to adopt algorithmic pricing software once its local area has access to high speed internet. It should also be more likely to adopt algorithmic pricing software if internet signals in its local region are reliable. The availability of internet in the area should not be correlated with station specific unobservables conditional on all other local demographics (income, population density, etc).

There are two downsides to this identification strategy relative to our main approach. First, variation at the region-year level is relatively limited as compared to variation at the brand-month level. Second, because an important source of the variation comes from regional geographic conditions, it is difficult to extend these instruments from station-level analysis to duopoly market level analysis. Duopoly markets, by definition, consist of stations that are close together in geographic space. There are no stations that we consider to be in the same market but that have different broadband conditions.

Table A16 in the Appendix presents results from regression using these instruments. Qualitatively,

⁵⁸We define speed X to be widely available in an area if average speed-tests in that area in that year exceed that speed. As well, we assume that if an area has speed X widely available in a year, it also has the same speed widely available in every subsequent year. More details on the construction of these variables are in the Data Appendix.

the results are similar to those derived using our primary identification strategy. IV estimates show that the adoption of algorithmic pricing software increases mean station margins above wholesale prices. Mean station prices also go up. We once again find that adoption by monopolist stations has no effect on mean margins.

Quantitatively, point estimates of the effects of adoption are substantially (5x) larger than our main estimates. Results from the first stage suggest why this is the case. The instruments shift the adoption variable in expected directions - a reduction in signal quality and increase in signal variance reduce the probability that a station adopts. The availability of 10, 15, and especially 30 Mb/s broadband increases adoption. But compared to the brand-level instruments the instruments do not shift adoption probabilities by as much as the brand level instruments. As mentioned previously, there is also less variation in these instruments than in our brand-month instruments.

7.3.5 Rural/Urban Stations

There is a potential concern about market definition of urban markets. ZIP codes in urban markets cover less area than in rural markets since population density is higher. This could lead to competitive spillovers and measurement error of the competitive environment. A station may be in a different ZIP code than a competitor but still be geographically close. To address this concern we consider a subsample of stations belonging to rural areas that have population density less than 300 persons per km^2 (Eurostat). Column (1) in Table A17 shows results for this sub-sample only. We replicate our results, showing that on average adoption increases mean margins for rural stations. We also show that adoption does not increase mean margins for rural stations that are monopolists.

Separately considering urban and rural markets also helps us investigate our main instrument, the share of brand adopters. The main assumption behind the validity of this instrument is that brand-HQ level decisions are made based on some aggregate conditions without considering individual stations. Since urban stations are located in high-traffic and dynamic areas, it is possible that the brand-HQ level adoption decision is made based on aggregate *urban* market conditions. This would make the adoption decisions of urban stations an especially valid instrument for rural stations. We test this assumption with an alternative IV specification: for rural station j at time t , we define an instrument as the share of *highly urban* stations (i.e., stations belonging to urban areas with population density more than 800 persons per km^2) belonging to its brand that adopted by period t . Column (2) in Table A17 uses this instrument and finds a stronger effect for the average station as compared to Column (1). The effect for monopolist rural stations with this instrument is still

statistically zero. We also test the reverse version of this instrument - the share of rural stations of a brand that adopted by period t . Under the assumption that brands make decisions with urban stations in mind, this instrument should not be valid. In Columns (3) and (4) of Table A17 we show that this instrument does not generate results that are different than the baseline OLS results in Table 4.

8 Mechanism

There are two main explanations for why pricing algorithms could reach margins above competitive levels. Pricing algorithms could *fail to learn to compete effectively* (Cooper et al 2015, Hansen, Misra and Pai 2020). For example, algorithms may not fully incorporate rivals’ prices or may not best respond to these prices. Alternatively, algorithms could fully incorporate rivals’ prices and best respond to them, but they could also *learn how not to compete* (i.e. how tacitly collude). For example, algorithms may learn to punish competitors for reducing prices or other tacitly-collusive strategies. The two explanations have very different implications for competition policy, which should mostly be concerned with algorithms actively learning *not to compete*.

The two explanations also have different predictions regarding how quickly prices and margins increase after algorithmic adoption. If the first explanation holds we would expect to see high margins throughout the post-adoption period.⁵⁹ If the second explanation holds, we would expect to see no initial effects followed by an eventual convergence towards tacitly-collusive price levels and increased margins. Echoing statements made by AI experts, Calvano et al (2019) show in simulations that it takes a long time for algorithms to train and converge to stable strategies. Without “offline” training, their results suggest that training should take several years. Even with offline training, it could take up to a year for their algorithms to converge to stability.

We provide some evidence in favour of the second explanation by examining the timing of adoption effects. Figure 4 shows estimates of time-specific effects of both stations adopting on mean market margins (i.e. the “Both Stations Adopted” dummy variable, T_{mt}^2 , from Equation 4), in a regression that includes the controls from Table 6, market and time FE and controls for whether one station adopted (T_{mt}^1). Time-specific adoption variables are instrumented by time-specific versions of IV_{mt}^2 from Equation (5). We start the timing in the month both stations adopt and go until the latest post-adoption period we observe in the sample - 29 months after adoption.

⁵⁹Or high initial margins followed by lower margins if algorithms learn how to compete more effectively over time.

In Panel (a) of Figure 4 we show 2SLS coefficient estimates of the “Both Stations Adopted” variable on average monthly market-level margins. Consistent with simulation results in Calvano et al (2019), we find that for roughly the first year after both duopolist stations in a ZIP code market adopt AI there are no statistically significant changes in average market margins at the 95% confidence level.⁶⁰ However, starting 12 months after both duopolists adopt we find a persistent upward trend in average market-level margins. This trend peaks 20-22 months after both duopolists adopt at around a 3 cent increase in margins above the baseline. After 23 months, our estimates start fluctuating widely due to statistical power issues - there are only 84 observations with “Both Stations Adopted” = 1 in months 24-29. Nonetheless, the average of point estimates for 24-29 months after adoption is higher than the average of point estimates from 0-12 months after adoption. These results are similar to previous findings on transitions to collusive strategies in other markets. Igami and Sugaya (2019) show that 1990s Vitamin cartels took several years to increase their prices and margins. Clark, Hortsmann and Houde (2020) also show a lengthy adjustment period to high prices for a Canadian bread cartel, as do Byrne and de Roos (2019) in the Australian retail gasoline market.

We provide additional supporting evidence of algorithms learning to *not to compete* by looking at the average number of price changes in duopoly markets. The number of price changes per day is one of our main markers of adoption, but, conditional on both stations adopting, it is possible that increases or decreases in competition will play out through changing the “speed” of interactions. Panel (b) of Figure 4 displays coefficient estimates from the same type of regression as Panel (a), but with a different outcome variable: the average number of daily price changes in market m at time t . The average number of price changes is higher in markets in which both stations adopted than in markets where none did.⁶¹ However, during the period when margins increase there is a *downward pattern* in the average number of daily price changes. This is not a statistically significant change but it is fairly large - the point estimates fall from around 4 price changes per day (above the baseline) in the 13th period after both stations adopt to 3 price changes per day (above the baseline) in the 23rd

⁶⁰Figure 10 in Calvano et al (2019) shows that profit margins for algorithms do not substantially change for over 500,000 simulation “periods.” Under the assumption that a simulation period lasts for a few minutes, Calvano et al (2019) suggest that this would correspond to at least a year (if not several years). In our estimates, there are some small statistically significant margin increases at the 90% confidence level in the first year after market-wide adoption. 7 months after adoption, for example, margins increase by about 1 cent (8%) above the average outcome for markets where no stations adopted.


⁶¹ In part, this is a mechanical effect that comes from our definition of adoption. Even in period 0 the number of daily price changes in a duopoly market where both adopt is larger than in a duopoly market where none adopt. This is because markets generally follow a progression - one station adopts, and then another adopts. This means that in period 0 when both stations adopt, one station has already adopted and the average number of price changes is higher than in a market where no stations adopted.

month after both stations adopt. Similarly, during a fall in average margins (24 to 27 months after adoption), there is a mirror *increase* in the number of mean daily price changes. Once again, the last pattern is driven by a small number of observations and is noisy. These findings are consistent with the number of price changes capturing more or less competitive behaviour.

Brown and MacKay (2020) present a third possible explanation for why prices and margins may increase in response to algorithmic adoption that is neither about algorithms failing to learn to compete nor about algorithms learning to tacitly-collude. In their model, the adoption of algorithmic software transforms the game that firms play from a standard simultaneous Bertrand pricing game to a stage game. This increases prices and margins relative to a simultaneous Bertrand-Nash equilibrium without firms resorting to tacitly-collusive strategies. Our data allow us to test an important prediction from their model: in cases of asymmetric adoption (when one firm adopts technology that allows it to respond more quickly to a rival’s price changes and the other one does not) the non-adopting firm should have higher prices and margins than the adopter. In general, the bigger the asymmetry in pricing technology, the higher market prices and margins should be. We observe a large number of duopoly markets that feature asymmetric adoption of algorithmic pricing technology. Table A11 shows results from a regression of a non-adopting stations’ margins on a dummy variable of whether its rival has adopted algorithmic pricing technology (instrumented by the rival brand’s adoption share). We find that there are no statistically significant changes in margins following a rival’s adoption.⁶² Although the Brown and MacKay (2020) model appears to fit well certain settings (such as cold medicine markets), in our context it does not seem to apply. Instead we find more support for the Calvano et al (2019) framework.

Overall, our results suggest that algorithmic adopters learn tacitly-collusive strategies over time.

⁶²Point estimates on the non-adopter’s mean margins are negative.



(a) Average Market Margins

(b) Average Market Number of Daily Price Changes

Figure 4: Timing Tests for Duopoly ZIP Market Outcomes

9 Discussion: Algorithmic Collusion, Competition Law and Policy

Our results present the first systematic evidence of the effects of algorithmic pricing software adoption on competition. From the perspective of competition and antitrust authorities, they are troubling. We find that algorithmic pricing software can learn tacitly-collusive strategies, suggesting that widespread adoption of such software can facilitate tacit collusion and raise prices and markups. To the best of our knowledge, this occurs without explicit communication between competitors, making it legal according to current competition laws in many countries.

Our findings have important implications for antitrust authorities around the world and for competition law. Multiple antitrust authorities and economic organizations (OECD 2017; Competition Bureau 2018; Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt 2019; UK Digital Competition Expert Panel 2019) have released reports on algorithmic collusion and competition law. The reports agree that explicit algorithmic collusion would not require any changes to existing competition laws, but would change how competition authorities monitor for and investigate collusive practices. Increased tacit collusion through algorithms could change the legal status of such forms of collusion (in addition to monitoring and investigative practices). Currently, tacitly collusive behaviour is difficult to prove and prosecute as it does not rely on explicit communication. The UK Digital Competition

Expert Panel states that with “further evidence...of pricing algorithms tacitly co-ordinating of their own accord, a change in the legal approach may become necessary” (p.110, 2019).

If antitrust authorities were to amend laws to account for tacit algorithmic collusion, they would encounter considerable difficulties in doing so. As in all cases of tacit collusion, it is difficult to establish a collusive agreement absent explicit communication. With algorithms, the definition of what constitutes a formal agreement and what constitutes communication should change. For example, repeated interactions between competing algorithms could be a form of communication. There is also an issue of liability when it comes to algorithmic collusion. Antitrust authorities must determine who is at fault in these cases: the algorithm creator, the user, or the algorithm itself.⁶³

In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) is the competition authority charged with regulating and protecting competition.⁶⁴ Germany also has an independent advisory board, the Monopoly Commission (Monopolkommission), tasked with advising the German Federal Government on competition related issues.⁶⁵ The Monopolkommission’s 2018 report on competition issues in Germany included a discussion on the issue of algorithms and collusion. The report states that further monitoring and evidence is needed to determine whether changes need to be made. If evidence does arise that algorithms lead to the further development of collusive markets, the report suggests that potential revisions could include (i) in cases of prohibited competitive behaviour, imposing the burden of proof that algorithmic usage has not contributed to infringement, and (ii) supplementation of the liability regimen under Article 101 of the TFEU to include review and potential regulation of third parties (i.e. those that contribute IT expertise to algorithms) in cases of collusive behaviour.

While our evidence is particular to retail gasoline markets in Germany (where high frequency pricing data are available), the same algorithmic pricing software is adopted in gasoline retail markets around the world. At a minimum, our results suggest that competition authorities in Germany and elsewhere should undertake a census of retail-gasoline pricing software to understand the market structure of the algorithmic software market and the extent of adoption. Such a census can help separate whether the main effect of algorithmic pricing software on competition comes from multiple stations in a market adopting *the same* or *different* algorithms. We do not directly observe which algorithm competitors adopt and the two possibilities have different implications for regulators and

⁶³See Harrington (2018b) for further discussion.

⁶⁴The Bundeskartellamt’s tasks are in accordance with legal provisions provided on both a national and European level. Relevant provisions regarding collusion are articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Act against Restraints of Competition (Competition Act - GWB) (The Bundeskartellamt, 2020).

⁶⁵The tasks of the Monopolkommission are regulated by a number of legislative acts including sections 42(5) and 44 to 47 of the GWB (Monopolkommission, 2020).

policy-makers.⁶⁶

Our focus in this paper is on the retail gasoline market, but custom-made and “off-the-shelf” algorithmic pricing software is widely available to use for online and offline retailers. Adoption of such algorithms is growing: Brown and MacKay (2019) present evidence of algorithmic pricing by pharmaceutical drug retailers online. *Vendavo*, an AI based retail pricing software reports over 300 global deployments in manufacturing, chemicals, distribution and high tech industries ([Vendavo.com](https://www.vendavo.com)). *PerfectPrice*, another AI retail pricing software, provides specialized solutions for airlines, car rental and vacation rental companies ([PerfectPrice.com](https://www.perfectprice.com)). Our results suggest that competition authorities should investigate the relationship between algorithmic pricing software adoption and competition in these and other contexts.

10 Conclusion

We investigate potential links between algorithmic pricing and competition by looking at the widespread introduction of AI-pricing software in the German retail gas market. First, we identify which stations have adopted this pricing software through structural break tests in various measures of behaviour during a sample period of 2016-2018. We then analyze the impact of algorithmic-pricing adoption by comparing competition measures for adopting stations vs. non-adopting stations.

To identify algorithmic-pricing adoption, we focus on stations that experience structural breaks in at least two out of three measures of pricing behaviour within an 8 week period. Comparing breaks in (i) the number of price changes, (ii) the average size of price changes, and (iii) rival response time, we find that the vast majority of breaks occur in mid-2017, the time at which the AI software became widely available.

Having identified adopting stations we investigate the effects of algorithmic adoption on mean, 25th and 75th percentiles of daily margins. Due to the potential endogeneity of station-level adoption decisions, we instrument for station i 's adoption using the share of stations in i 's brand that have adopted. Results indicate that, overall, AI-adopters with nearby competitors increase mean margins by 9% on average in comparison to pre-adoption levels. These stations also experience higher levels of both 25th and 75th percentiles of margins post-adoption. In contrast, adopters that are a monopolist in their ZIP code do not see changes in their mean margins or the margin distribution. Looking at

⁶⁶If multiple stations in a market turn over their pricing decisions to a common algorithmic software provider, our results are in line with the findings of Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019). Algorithms in this case serve as the “hubs” of a hub-and-spoke cartel (Harrington 2018b).

duopoly (two station) markets exclusively, we find that there is no difference in market-level margins between markets in which no stations adopted and markets in which one of the two stations adopted. However, markets in which both stations adopted show a mean margin increase of nearly 30% and the entire distribution of margins shifts to the right (increases). These estimates are lower-bounds on the true effects, since measurement errors in the first step of the analysis likely result in labelling some AI adopters as non-adopters.

We investigate the mechanism behind the increases in margins by looking at the timing of effects. If algorithms *fail to learn to compete effectively* we should see immediate increases in margins after both stations in duopoly markets adopt AI. If algorithms *learn how not to compete*, we should see no initial effects followed by eventual convergence to high prices and margins. This is what we find in the data - margins in markets where both duopolists adopt do not change for about a year after adoption and then increase gradually. This is suggestive of algorithms learning tacitly- collusive strategies over time. Overall, the results indicate that the adoption of algorithmic pricing has affected competition and facilitated tacit-collusion in the German retail gas market.

Our findings suggest that regulators should be concerned about the mass-adoption of algorithmic pricing software in markets. That said, while we identify that adoption has an effect on tacit-collusion between stations, we do not observe *which* algorithm or algorithms stations and brands adopt. We have information about the mass availability of one particular algorithm in Germany but there are other software providers active in this market and stations or brands could have adopted different algorithms. Whether our estimated effects come from multiple stations in a market adopting *the same* or *different* algorithms should have different implications for regulators and competition policy.

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A Appendix A

A.1 Algorithms in Gasoline Retail Markets

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Buchen Sie unser 14-wöchiges Proof-of-Concept Programm, bei dem Sie an einer Auswahl Ihrer Tankstellen den Effekt von „PriceCast Fuel“ überprüfen und nachvollziehen können.

Der Zugewinn an Marge während des Programms übertrifft oft die Kosten für das Proof-of-Concept. Sie werden erleben, wie das tägliche Pricing mit „PriceCast Fuel“ transparenter und effizienter wird, denn Sie bekommen mit „PriceCast Fuel“ einen besseren Überblick, eine bessere Steuerung und Sie benötigen weniger Zeit. Das Proof-of-Concept Programm bietet wir Ihnen als einfachen Cloud-Service an, d.h. ohne Änderungen an Ihrer bestehenden IT-Infrastruktur.

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Intelligente Preisstellung leichtgemacht

Das Nachfrageverhalten und die Preisempfindlichkeit der Käufer in Abhängigkeit von Tageszeit, Wochentagen, Feiertagen, Ferienzeiten sowie auch aktuellen Preisen der Wettbewerber werden von „PriceCast Fuel“ ständig analysiert. Fortgeschrittene Algorithmen berechnen daraus optimale Preisempfehlungen für die jeweils nächsten 24 Stunden. Die Schnelligkeit und die Genauigkeit des Systems, was Timing und Preisleistung betrifft, ist dabei unübertroffen im Vergleich zu bisherigen regelbasierten Methoden.

Je nach Ihrer Positionierung am Markt und Ihren Geschäftszielen können Sie mit „PriceCast Fuel“ unterschiedliche Strategien einstellen. Am übersichtlichen Kontrollzentrum (Dashboard) des Systems haben Sie jederzeit alle Ihre Tankstellen im Blick am Ampelsystem – grün, gelb, rot – erkennen Sie sofort, ob Ihre Tankstellen Ihre Kennzahlenvorgaben erreichen und welche Ihre Aufmerksamkeit benötigen.

Seit vergangener Sommer bietet „a2i systems AIS“ nun auch unabhängigen mittelständischen Tankstellenbetreibern in Deutschland das hoch innovative Pricing-System als einfach zu nutzende Cloud-Lösung an. Die Beratung, die Anbindung und der Support des Systems werden von „WEAT Electronic Datenservice GmbH“ geleistet. Damit ist ein branchenkanonisches und vertrautes Unternehmen als Distributionspartner an Bord, das mit technischer Kompetenz, bundesweiter Reichweite und sehr reaktionsfähigen, deutschsprachigen Support glänzt.

Mit einem 14-wöchigen Proof-of-Concept Programm lässt sich der Effekt und der Nutzen von „PriceCast Fuel“ an einer Auswahl von Tankstellen überprüfen und nachvollziehen. In der Regel ist der Zugewinn an Marge während des Programms sogar höher als der Preis für das Proof-of-Concept Programm. In jedem Fall kann man damit erfahren, wie mit „PriceCast Fuel“ das tägliche Pricing einfacher, transparenter und effizienter wird.

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Torben Lauridsen, Business Consultant
Mobil: +49 160 9770 6739
Mail: tlb@a2isystems.com

28 INDUSTRIEPARTNER

Figure A1: December 2017 TANKSTOP Trade Magazine Cover and a2i Advertisements




Figure A2: How Algorithms Work (wsj.com)

A.2 Tests for Structural Break in the Three Adoption Markers

A.2.1 Number of Price Changes

For each station we construct a variable measuring the number of times it changes its price for each date in our sample period. For structural break testing, we aggregate this variable to the weekly level.⁶⁷ Figure A3 shows the overall distribution of significant breaks.




Figure A3: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Number of Price Changes (12,402 stations included)

We compare the number of price changes before and after structural breaks for stations that experienced structural breaks in Table A1. We also include stations that did not experience structural breaks. Adopting stations change their prices more frequently than non-adopting stations, suggesting that our structural breaks do manage to pick out large changes in pricing strategy. On average, a station that experienced a structural break changes their prices 5.5 times a day before the break and 9.2 after the break. There is also a general rightward shift in the distribution of the number of daily price changes after the break.⁶⁸ Stations that do not experience breaks experienced 6 changes per day, which is close to the number of changes for breaking stations in the pre-break period.

⁶⁷Any stations that do not have a weekly observation for average number of price changes in every week of 2017 are dropped. See more details in the Data Appendix.

⁶⁸At the 25th percentile of number of price changes, a station only changes their prices 4 times per day before the break but 7 times a day after the break.

Table A1: Daily Number of Price Changes

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Post Structural Break Stations	9.2	3.1
Pre Structural Break Stations	5.5	2.5
No Structural Break Stations	6.3	3.4

A.2.2 Rival Response Time

We define a rival for station i as the closest station j that is within a 1KM radius of station i but that belongs to a different brand.⁶⁹ Rival response time for station i is calculated as the number of minutes between the time of a price change by rival j and the subsequent price change by station i . If station j changes its price more than once before station i makes a price change, rival response time is taken as the average of the time gaps between each of station j 's price changes and station i 's subsequent change. When testing for structural breaks in rival response time, we take into account the fact that changes in response time will be mechanically impacted by changes in number of price changes. To identify structural changes separately from this mechanical effect, we control for the number of price changes when running Equation (1) for this measure. Figure A4 shows the overall distribution of significant breaks.

⁶⁹This reflects the average distance of stations in the data.




Figure A4: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Rival Response Time (5,449 stations included)

We compare average rival response times (in minutes) for stations that adopted before and after adoption in Table A2. We find that the structural break captures substantial changes in the measure. On average rival response time decreases from 80 minutes to 52 minutes after the structural break, a drop of about 35%. There are also decreases at other points in the response time distribution, especially in the right tail.⁷⁰ Stations that did not experience a structural break in this measure look more like the stations in the pre-break period, having average response times of over one hour.

Table A2: Rival Response Time (Minutes)

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Post Structural Break Stations	52	38
Pre Structural Break Stations	80	73
No Structural Break Stations	73	69

⁷⁰At the 75th percentile, response time falls from an hour and a half to an hour. At the 95th percentile, response time falls by 100 minutes.

A.2.3 Average Size of Price Change

For the average size of price changes, we calculate the average size of price changes made in a day for each station and then average this measure to a weekly level.⁷¹ We look at the distribution of weekly break periods for stations with a QLR statistic that is significant at the 5% level. Results are presented in Figure A5. Although there is a spike of stations experiencing structural breaks in average price change in Spring 2017, there is a large number of breaks in mid-2016 and a number of stations experiencing structural breaks throughout 2018. The occurrence of breaks in 2016 may be due to prevailing effects of Shell’s 2015 price-matching policy, which induced changes in pricing behaviour for some German retail gas stations. In particular, during this time, Shell and ARAL began to interrupt the previously observed price cycles in the market with upward price jumps around midday. Medium and small retail gas brands would follow these increases, although the extent of the midday price jumps for these stations was not as large of those of Shell and ARAL (Cabral et al. 2018).




Figure A5: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Average Size of Price Change (11,264 stations included)

Looking at stations that experience structural breaks in 2016, ARAL and Shell stations make up over 40% of these occurrences. Figure A6 shows the distribution of break periods for Shell and ARAL stations in comparisons to all other stations. The figure makes it clear that Shell and ARAL

⁷¹See more details in the Data Appendix.

stations drive the observed spike in break frequency in 2016. For all brands, over 15% of stations still experience structural breaks in the spring/summer of 2017. Importantly, we do not use this measure alone to define adoption of algorithmic pricing. As discussed in the main text, we focus on stations that experience structural breaks in at least two measures within a relatively short window of time. We also directly address concerns about Shell in a robustness check, dropping all markets where Shell is present and where the price matching guarantees would have any effect. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our main estimates (see Section 7.3.1 for additional discussion).




Figure A6: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Average Size of Price Change for Shell and Aral stations vs. other stations)

Table A3 shows differences in average sizes of daily price changes (in cents) before and after the structural breaks. For stations that experience a structural break, the average size of price changes falls from 4.1 cents to 3.4 cents. The standard deviation in the average size of price changes falls as well, suggesting that price fluctuations become more targeted after the structural break.⁷² Unlike for the other two measures, the average measure for stations that did not experience a structural break is more similar to stations that have already had a structural break than to those that did not. This reflects the underlying heterogeneity between stations that adopt and stations that do

⁷²Changes at other points in the distribution are less stark than for the other measures. Partly this is because there is a lower bound to the amount by which stations can change their price (0.1 cents). Both before and after the structural break, at the bottom of the distribution stations are actually fairly close to this lower bound. Nonetheless, there are changes at the top end of the distribution after the break. At the 95th percentile, stations reduce their price change size from 7.2 cents to 5.2 cents, a decrease of nearly 30%.

not adopt. We address this concern in two ways in our main analysis on the effects of adoption on market outcomes. We include *station-level fixed effects* to control for time-invariant station specific characteristics. We also use an instrumental variables approach to address potential endogeneity because of unobservable time and station varying heterogeneity.

Table A3: Average Daily Price Change Size (cents)

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Post Structural Break Stations	3.4	1.6
Pre Structural Break Stations	4.1	2.2
No Structural Break Stations	3.7	3.0

A.3 Alternative Structural Breaks

We look at the distribution of F-statistics for structural break tests in the number of price changes for stations over the sample period for a few representative stations. We find that generally, stations display a uni-modal distribution in their F-statistics, meaning we are unlikely to find structural breaks at a significantly different date if we were to, for example, take the second highest F-statistic rather than the maximum. A few examples are shown in A7 of what a typical distribution would look like for a station's F-statistics for structural break tests in the number of price changes.




Figure A7: Distribution of F-statistics for Structural Break Tests in Number of Price Changes

To take a more systematic approach to test whether there may be significantly different alternative break dates, for each station, we look at the dates associated with the 2 highest F-statistics for structural break tests in the number of price changes. We find that for 90% of stations, these dates are 1 week apart meaning that the next alternative break date would be occur either 1 week before or after the break associated with the highest F-statistic. We find only 5% of stations have difference of 4 or more weeks between the dates associated with the highest and second highest F-statistic.

A.4 Adopter/Non-Adopter Heterogeneity

Table A4: Adopter and Non-Adopter Station Characteristics in 2016

Outcome:	(1) Will Station j Adopt AI?
Population Density	0.00003*** (6.67e-06)
ln(Population)	0.011 (0.035)
Median Population Age	0.004** (0.002)
Employment Share	0.079 (0.079)
ln(region GDP)	-0.005 (0.032)
N Competitors in ZIP	0.005*** (0.002)
Observations	155,898

Notes: The sample for this regression includes gas station/month observations from January 2016 until December 2016 that are not labelled as AI adopters during this period. The outcome is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the station will eventually be labelled as an adopter in 2017 or 2018, and zero otherwise. Population Density, ln(Population), Median Population Age, Employment Share and ln(regional GDP) are all computed at the NUTS3-year level. “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j in month t . We include month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

A.5 Heterogeneity in Structural Breaks/Adoption by Brand Size




Figure A8: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Number of Daily Price Changes by Brand Size




Figure A9: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Rival Response Time by Brand Size




Figure A10: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Average Price Change Size by Brand Size

Table A5: Correlates to Brand-Level Adoption Probability

Outcome:	(1) Share Brand Adopters
Mean Brand Population Density	0.00002 (0.00003)
Mean Brand ln(Population)	-0.052 (0.143)
Mean Bran Median Age	0.010 (0.008)
Mean Brand Employment Share	0.065 (0.323)
Mean Brand ln(region GDP)	0.075 (0.127)
Mean Brand N Competitors in ZIP	0.008 (0.006)
N Brand Stations	0.0004*** (0.00001)
Observations	6,853

Notes: The sample for this regression includes brand/month observations from January 2016 until December 2018 for brands with two stations or more. The outcome is the share of a brand's stations that are labelled as adopters by month t . The variable "Mean Brand X " is a simple average of variable X across all brand b stations in month t . Population Density, ln(Population), Median Population Age, Employment Share and ln(regional GDP) are all computed at the NUTS3-year level. "N Competitors in ZIP" is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j in month t . We include year-month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the brand level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

A.6 Diesel Gas Structural Breaks




Figure A11: Frequency of Significant Structural Breaks in Number of Price Changes, Rival Response Time, and Average Size of Price Change (Diesel Gas)

A.7 Additional Estimates and Robustness

Table A6: Station-Level Price Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample:	All Stations	All Stations	ZIP Monopolists	ZIP Non-Monopolists
Outcome:	Mean Price	Mean Price	Mean Price	Mean Price
	OLS	2LSL	2SLS	2SLS
Adopter	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.006*** (0.002)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)
Non-Adopter Mean Outcome	1.339	1.339	1.340	1.339
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	451,457	430,357	65,543	364,735

Notes: Column (1) and (2) sample includes all gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. Columns (3) and (4) are two subsamples: Column (3) only includes stations that have no competitors within their ZIP code. Column (4) includes only stations that have one or more competitors within their ZIP code. Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline prices. “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Share Brand Adopters” is the excluded instrument used in the 2SLS regression. It is equal to the share of stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors are clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A7: Station-Level Results by 1km Market Structure

Outcome:	(1) Mean Margin 2LSL	(2) 25th Percentile Margin 2SLS	(3) 75th Percentile Margin 2SLS	(4) Mean Price 2SLS
Sample: Monopoly 1km Radius Stations				
Adopter	0.006** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES	
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	180,951	180,951	180,951	180,951
Sample: Non-Monopoly 1km Radius Stations				
Adopter	0.008*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES	
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	249,406	249,406	249,406	249,406

Notes: Sample is gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019, split up into two subsamples: one subsample only includes stations that have no competitors within a 1km radius. The other subsample includes only stations that have one or more competitors within a 1km radius. Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline prices. 25th Percentile Margin is the 25th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline prices for station j in month t . 75th Percentile Margin is the 75th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline price for station j in month t . Mean Price is the average pump price for station j in month t . “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Share Brand Adopters” is the excluded instrument used in the 2SLS regression. It is equal to the share of stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors are clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A8: 1km Duopoly Market Results

Outcome:	(1) Mean Mkt Margin OLS	(2) Mean Mkt Margin 2SLS	(3) 25th Percentile Mkt Margin 2SLS	(4) 75th Percentile Mkt Margin 2SLS
One Station Adopted	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.030)	-0.009 (0.010)
Both Stations Adopted	-0.003* (0.001)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.004 (0.045)	0.024 (0.016)
IVs	NO	YES	YES	YES
Market FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	41,527	38,489	38,489	38,489

Notes: The sample includes duopoly market/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. A duopoly market is defined as two stations that are within 1km of each other and have no other stations within 1km. Outcome variable Mean Market Margin is the average of mean market daily differences of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale price. 25th Percentile Market Margin is the 25th percentile of observed mean market daily difference of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale gasoline price. 75th Percentile Market Margin is the 75th percentile of observed mean market daily difference of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale gasoline price. “One Station Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if one of the two stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Both Stations Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if *both* stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. Regressions in Columns (2)-(4) instrument for adoption using the “share of brand adopters” of the two stations in the market. 1st stage regression results are in Table A9 in the Appendix. Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at market level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A9: 1st Stage Results for Duopoly Markets

Outcome: Market Definition	(1) One Station Adopted ZIP Code	(2) Both Stations Adopted	(3) One Station Adopted 1km Radius	(4) Both Stations Adopted
IV1	0.691*** (0.160)	-0.094 (0.089)	0.782*** (0.179)	-0.023 (0.095)
IV2	-0.580* (0.308)	1.254*** (0.229)	-0.881*** (0.314)	0.993*** (0.248)
Market/ZIP FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	38,656	38,656	38,489	38,489

Notes: The sample includes duopoly market/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. Columns (1)-(2) define a duopoly market as a ZIP code with two gas stations. Columns (3)-(4) define a duopoly market as two stations that are within 1km of each other and have no other stations within 1km. “One Station Adopted ” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if one of the two stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Both Stations Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if *both* stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. $IV1$ and $IV2$ use the “share of brand adopters” of the two stations in the market as follows: for market m at time t , $IV1_{mt} = B_{1t}(1 - B_{2t}) + B_{2t}(1 - B_{1t})$, where B_{jt} is the share of brand adopters for station j in this market. Similarly, $IV2_{mt} = B_{1t}B_{2t}$. Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age a the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at market level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A10: Duopoly Market Price Results

Outcome:	(1) Mean Mkt Price 2SLS	(2) 25th Percentile Mkt Price 2SLS	(3) 75th Percentile Mkt Price 2SLS
Market Definition:		ZIP Code	
One Station Adopted	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)
Both Stations Adopted	0.020** (0.010)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.018* (0.011)
IVs	YES	YES	YES
ZIP FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	38,656	38,656	38,656
Market Definition:		1km Radius	
One Station Adopted	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.015* (0.009)
Both Stations Adopted	0.026* (0.015)	0.026* (0.015)	0.029* (0.016)
IVs	YES	YES	YES
Market FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	38,489	38,489	38,489

Notes: The sample includes duopoly market/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. The top panel defines a duopoly market as a ZIP code with two gas stations. The bottom panel defines a duopoly market as two stations that are within 1km of each other and have no other stations within 1km. Outcome variable Mean Market Margin is the average of mean market daily pump prices for stations in market m in month t . 25th Percentile Market Price is the 25th percentile of observed market daily pump prices for stations in market m in month t . 75th Percentile Market Price is the 75th percentile of observed mean market daily pump prices for stations in market m in month t . “One Station Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if one of the two stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. “Both Stations Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if both stations in the market experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. Regressions in Columns (2)-(4) instrument for adoption using the “share of brand adopters” of the two stations in the market. 1st stage regression results are in Table A9 in the Appendix. Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at market level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A11: Rival Adoption Effects

Outcome	(1) Mean Margin 2SLS	(2) 25th Percentile Margin 2SLS	(3) 75th Percentile Margin 2SLS
Rival Adopted	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
IVs	YES	YES	YES
Station FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	65,938	65,938	65,938

Notes: The sample includes all station/month observations belonging to duopoly markets from January 2016 until January 2019 where zero or one of the duopolists adopted AI. Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale price. 25th Percentile Margin is the 25th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline prices for station j in month t . 75th Percentile Margin is the 75th percentile of the daily difference of pump price and wholesale gasoline price for station j in month t . “Rival Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the duopoly rival of station j in market m experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. Regressions in Columns (1)-(3) instrument for a rival’s adoption using the “share of brand adopters” of the rival in the market. Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A12: Monopoly and Duopoly Market Definition

N ZIP Monopoly Stations	2,323	N ZIP Duopoly Stations	3,093
N 1km Monopoly Stations	6,072	N 1km Duopoly Stations	3,800
N Overlap	1,857	N Overlap	1,126

Table A13: Sample Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample:	No Shell Markets	Dropping 2016 Data	Balanced Sample	Market-Level Balanced Sample
Outcome:	Mean Margin	Mean Margin	Mean Margin	Mean Margin
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Adopter	0.005** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	248,482	286,548	348,479	264,329

Notes: Sample in Column (1) includes gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019 that do not belong to a market where a station by a Shell brand is present. Sample in Column (2) includes gas station/month observations from January 2017 until January 2019 (dropping 2016 data). Column (3) includes all gas station/month observations belonging to gas stations that are present in every month of the sample. Column (4) includes all gas station/month observations belonging to gas stations that are present in every month of the sample and are in markets where the number of stations does not vary across the sample period. Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline prices. “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t-1\}$. “Share Brand Adopters” is the excluded instrument used in the 2SLS regression. It is equal to the share of stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors are clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A14: Station Level Results with Alternative “Adopter” Definitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sample: Non-Monopoly ZIP Stations			
Adopter Measures:	Breaks within 4 weeks	Breaks within 2 weeks	E10 + Diesel
Outcome: Mean Margin			
Adopter	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)
Station FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	435,899	435,899	435,899
	1st Stage Results		
Outcome: Adopter Dummy			
Share Brand Adopters	0.682*** (0.039)	0.655*** (0.043)	0.661*** (0.044)
Station FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Control	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	364,735	364,735	364,735

Notes: Sample is gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019 that have one competitor or more in their ZIP code. Outcome variable Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale prices. In Column (1) “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures within 4 weeks in any previous period. In Column (2) “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures within 2 weeks in any previous period. In Column (3) “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures for both *E10* and *Diesel* gasoline within 8 weeks in any previous period. “Share Brand Adopters” is the excluded instrument used in the 2SLS regression. It is equal to the share of stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. We also control for the number of stations belonging to station i 's brand in month t . Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors are clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A15: Duopoly ZIP Market Level Results with Alternative “Adopter” Definitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Adopter Measures:	Breaks within 4 weeks	Breaks within 2 weeks	E10 + Diesel
Outcome: Mean Market Margin			
One Station Adopted	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.012 (0.011)
Both Stations Adopted	0.020** (0.010)	0.029* (0.016)	0.033 (0.021)
IVs	YES	YES	YES
Market FE	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	38,656	38,656	38,656

Notes: The sample includes duopoly market/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. A duopoly market is defined as a ZIP code with two gas stations. Outcome variable Mean Market Margin is the monthly average of mean market daily differences of pump prices for stations in market m in month t from wholesale price. In Column (1) a station is labelled as an adopter if it experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures within 4 weeks in any previous period. In Column (2) a station is labelled as an adopter if it experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures within 2 weeks in any previous period. In Column (3) a station is labelled as an adopter if it experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures for both *E10* and *Diesel* gasoline within 8 weeks in any previous period. “One Station Adopted ” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if one of the two stations in the market adopted in any previous period. “Both Stations Adopted” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if *both* stations in the market adopted in any previous period. We use the “share of brand adopters” of the two stations in the market as instruments for adoption. 1st stage regression results are in Table A9 in the Appendix. Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. We also control for the sizes of the brands of the two stations at time t . Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors clustered at market level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A16: Station Level Results with Alternative Instruments

Sample: Outcome:	(1) All Stations Adopter	(2) All Stations Mean Margin	(3) ZIP Monopolists Mean Margin	(4) ZIP Non-Monopolists Mean Margin	(5) All Stations Mean Price
Adopter		0.039*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.013)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.013)
N Competitors in ZIP	0.005 (0.007)	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.001)
10 Mbps Internet Available	0.028** (0.013)				
15 Mbps Internet Available	0.031** (0.015)				
30 Mbps Internet Available	0.133*** (0.041)				
Average Internet Signal Strength (dB)	0.002* (0.001)				
Average Internet Signal Variable (dB)	-0.005** (0.002)				
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Broadband Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	314,820	314,820	45,408	269,363	269,363

Notes: Samples in Columns (1), (2) and (5) include gas station/month observations from January 2016 until January 2019. Column (3) only includes stations that have no competitors within their ZIP code. Column (4) includes only stations that have one or more competitors within their ZIP code. Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline prices. Mean Price is the average retail price for station j in month t . “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. Excluded instruments used in the 2SLS regressions in Columns (2)-(5) include annual internet speed and signal quality measures: a dummy for whether 10/15/30 Mbps internet was available in that year in that region, and two measures of average broadband signal strength. “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors are clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A17: Rural Station Level Results

Outcome:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Instrument:	Mean Margin Share Brand Adopters	Mean Margin Share Urban Brand Adopters	Mean Margin Share Rural Brand Adopters	Mean Margin Share Rural Brand Adopters
Sample:	All Rural Stations	All Rural Stations	All Rural Stations	All Urban Stations
Adopter	0.005** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.004)
N Competitors in ZIP	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	224,497	214,685	238,189	115,157
Sample:	Monopolist Rural Stations	Monopolist Rural Stations	Monopolist Rural Stations	Monopolist Urban Stations
Adopter	0.003 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.007)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.012)
Station FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Annual Regional Demographics	YES	YES	YES	YES
N Brand Stations Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weather Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	47,232	45,353	50,124	10,014

Notes: Samples in Columns (1)-(3) use 2016-2019 gas station/month observations belonging to rural NUTS3 areas with population density less than 300 persons per km^2 . Sample in Column (4) uses 2016-2019 gas station/month observations belonging to urban NUTS3 areas with population density more than 800 persons per km^2 . Mean Margin is the monthly average of daily differences of pump price for station j in month t and wholesale gasoline prices. “Adopter” is a dummy equal to 1 in month t if the gas station experienced a structural break in any 2 of 3 relevant measures in any previous month $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$. The excluded instrument in Column (1) is the share of *all* stations that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . The excluded instrument in Column (2) is the share of *urban* stations (i.e., stations in NUTS3 areas with population density more than 800 persons per km^2) that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . The excluded instrument in Columns (3) and (4) is the share of *rural* stations (i.e., stations in NUTS3 areas with population density less than 300 persons per km^2) that belong to the brand of station j that adopted by period t . “N Competitors in ZIP” is equal to the number of other stations present in postal code of station j . Regional demographics include GDP, total population, population density, share of population employed and median age at the NUTS3/year level. Weather controls include the mean and standard deviation of monthly temperature and precipitation near station j in month t . Standard errors are clustered at gas station level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

B Appendix B

We use annual data from Kent Marketing, a leading survey company in the Canadian gasoline market.⁷³ It captures annual data from 1991 to 2001 for all retail gasoline stations in seven medium-sized markets in Ontario: Brantford, Cornwall, Guelph, Hamilton, Kingston, St. Catharines and Windsor. The 5 brands with most stations in this data are PetroCanada (98 stations), Esso (84 stations), Shell (61 stations), Sunoco (56 stations) and Pioneer (36 stations). The data includes station characteristics including whether the station accepts “electronic payments.”

This is a good benchmark technology for AI adoption. Both could improve station performance as electronic payments allow for a wider set of consumers to purchase gasoline (and larger quantities of gasoline). As for AI, electronic payment companies also have HQ-level deals with retail gasoline brands, but individual station owners had to bear some of the costs of upgrading their equipment. For example, in 1997, Exxon Mobil (Esso’s parent company) rolled out the Mobil Speedpass, a contactless electronic payment system. BusinessWeek reported that after the brand-wide rollout, individual Mobil station owners “have to install new pumps costing up to \$17,000—minus a \$1,000 rebate from Mobil for each pump” (BusinessWeek).

The first appearance of electronic payments at any gas station in the data is in 1993 (the third year of the dataset). Among the five largest brands, no one reached 50% adoption rates of this technology by 2001. The largest share of adopting stations is for Pioneer, where 46% of stations adopted by 2001. Figure B1 shows adoption rates by the top 5 brands (by the number of stations) in this data. It suggests that electronic payment adoption follows a highly staggered pattern. Of the 5 biggest brands, by 1998 (5 years after the technology became available) only two of the brands had *any* adoption. It is also brand specific. Some brands, such as Esso, appear to be continuously upgrading (or supporting the upgrade) of their stations. Stations by other brands, like Pioneer, adopt faster but later. This likely reflects brand-specific strategies.

⁷³This is a subset of data used in Clark, Houde and Carranza (2015).




Figure B1: Share of Electronic Payment Adopters Among Top 5 Brands in Canada