

Macroeconomic Dynamics and Reallocation in a Pandemic

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

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
July 6, 2020

Motivation: The CoViD-19 Crisis



Private Response to CoViD-19

The Day Before Closures, Restaurant Reservations Had Fallen 73 Percent on Average
Percent change in 2020 OpenTable reservations in 37 states compared to same day 2019



Source: OpenTable

Paper in a Nutshell

- **Broad Question about COVID 19 Epidemic:**

- ▶ Trading off **health v/s econ.** Re-opening debate.
- ▶ **Specific Question: how much will people do on their own?**

- **What we do:**

- ▶ Starting point: Eichenbaum-Rebelo-Trabandt [ERT] (2020).
- ▶ Neoclassical economic model cum SIR epidemiological model.
- ▶ Agents can be **susceptible**, **infected**, **recovered**, or dead.
- ▶ People get **infected when they consume**.
- ▶ Key innovation: **consumption sectors** differ in infection risk.
- ▶ Susceptible agents make conscious decisions. **Shift consumption** towards low-infection sectors.
- ▶ Key margins: elasticity of substitution η ; rel. contagiousness ϕ .

- **What we find:**

- ▶ Output decline, infection rates **reduced substantially** compared to a homogeneous-sector economy [ERT].

The Model, Macro: Neoclassical, no k .

- Continuum of agents $i \in [0, 1]$. Changing health status $j \in \{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{i}, \mathbf{r}, d\}$
- **Preferences** over differentiated (by sector k) consumption, hours:

$$U = E \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u^j(c_t^j, n_t^j) \right]$$

where

$$c_t^j = \left(\int (c_{tk}^j)^{1-1/\eta} dk \right)^{\eta/(\eta-1)}$$

and where for $j \in \{s, i, r\}$,

$$u^j(c, n) = \ln c - \theta \frac{n^2}{2}$$

while for dead agents: $u^d \equiv 0$ and $c_t^d = 0, n_t^d = 0$.

- **Technology**: one unit of labor $\Rightarrow A$ units of goods in each sector.
- Competitive frictionless labor and goods **markets**. Wage $w = A$
- **Household budget constraint**:

$$\int c_{tk}^j dk = A n_t^j$$

The Model, Epidemiology: SIR with Cons Dependency.

- Agents can be **s**usceptible, **i**nfected, **r**ecovered, or dead.
Population fractions: S_t , I_t , R_t .
- Infection** is transmitted while **consuming** (or autonomously).
 - Probability for a susceptible agent s to become infected:

$$\tau_t = \pi_s I_t \int \phi(k) c_{tk}^s c_{tk}^i dk + \pi_a I_t,$$

- (π_s, π_a) are contagion parameters.
- Sector-specific relative contagiousness $\phi(k)$,

$$\int \phi(k) dk = 1$$

- $T_t = \tau_t S_t$ is the number of new infections.
- Similar mechanics if infections occur in **workplace** (see paper).
- **Dynamics of the pandemic**: $I_0 = \epsilon, S_0 = 1 - \epsilon, R_0 = 0$ and

$$S_{t+1} = S_t - T_t$$

$$I_{t+1} = I_t + T_t - (\pi_r + \pi_d) I_t$$

$$R_{t+1} = R_t + \pi_r I_t$$

Analysis: Choices of Infected and Recovered Agents

- Infected and recovered $j \in \{i, r\}$ face no further health risks.
- Value variety of consumption if elasticity of substitution $\eta < \infty$.
- \Rightarrow spread consumption evenly across sectors: $c_{tk}^j \equiv c_t^j, \forall t, k, j$.
- Intratemporal optimality condition and budget constraint imply **optimal labor, consumption choice** for $j \in \{i, r\}$:

$$n_t^j = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\theta}}, c_t^j = \frac{A}{\sqrt{\theta}}$$

Analysis: Choices of Susceptible Agents.

- Recall **infection probability**:

$$\tau_t = \pi_s I_t \int \phi(k) c_{tk}^s c_{tk}^i dk + \pi_a I_t,$$

where $c_{tk}^i \equiv c_t^i = \frac{A}{\sqrt{\theta}}$.

- Bellman equation:

$$U_t^s = u(c_t^s, n_t^s) + \beta[(1 - \tau_t)U_{t+1}^s + \tau_t U_{t+1}^i]$$

- First-order condition wrt consumption $\mathbf{c}_{t\mathbf{k}}^s$ of variety k :

$$u_1(c_t^s, n_t^s) \cdot \left(\frac{c_t^s}{\mathbf{c}_{t\mathbf{k}}^s} \right)^{1/\eta} = \lambda_{bt}^s + \lambda_{\tau t} \pi_s \frac{A}{\sqrt{\theta}} I_t \phi(\mathbf{k})$$

- λ_{bt}^s : Lagrange multiplier the budget constraint: common across k .
- $\lambda_{\tau t}$: Lagrange multiplier on **infection constraint**. Higher $\phi(\mathbf{k})$ rises price of good k . Lowers consumption $\mathbf{c}_{t\mathbf{k}}^s$.

Three Theoretical Results

- ① $\eta = 0$ (Leontief): Back to homogeneous-sector ERT case.
- ② $\eta \rightarrow \infty$: Substitution mechanism becomes maximally potent.
Susceptible agents only consume least contagious goods.
- ③ $\eta = \infty$: Multiple equilibria.



Numerical Illustration: Choice of Parameter Values

- Most parameters **borrowed from ERT**.
- For this presentation, autonomous infections $\pi_a = 0$.
- Mostly two equally-sized sectors. Clarifies the mechanisms.
- **Relative contagiousness:** $\phi_1 = 0.2$, $\phi_2 = 1.8$.
- **Substitution elasticity** $\eta = 10$. Also: $\eta = 3$.
- Compare to ERT scenario: $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = 1$ (homogeneous sectors).
- Choose π_s to get 10% consumption decline in ERT scenario.
- **Robustness Analysis:**
 - ▶ $\pi_a > 0$ to obtain 50% susceptible in the limit.
 - ▶ 9 sectors.
 - ▶ Vary η .
 - ▶ Somewhat lower π_s .


Numerical Results: Parameter Values

Param.	$\pi_a = 0$	$\pi_a \neq 0$	Description
π_s	4.05×10^{-7}	1.77×10^{-7}	Infection from cons.
π_r	0.387	0.387	Recovery
π_d	1.944×10^{-3}	1.944×10^{-3}	Death
π_a	0	0.34	Autonomous infection
η	10	10	Elasticity of substitution
θ	1.275×10^{-3}	1.275×10^{-3}	Labor supply parameter
A	39.835	39.835	Productivity
β	$0.96^{1/52}$	$0.96^{1/52}$	Discount factor
ϕ_1	0.2	0.2	Rel. contagiousn., sect. 1
ϕ_2	1.8	1.8	Rel. contagiousn., sect. 2


Results: Key Results



Results: Aggregate Consumption Decline




Numerical Results: Baseline Comparison




Basic Reproduction Number, \mathcal{R}_0


$$\mathcal{R}_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1 - \pi_r - \pi_d)^t \times \frac{T_0}{I_0} = \frac{T_0/I_0}{\pi_r + \pi_d}$$




Results: Aggregate Consumption Decline, Various ϕ_1



Results: Sectoral Shifts, 9 sectors




Anecdotal Data for Sectoral Shifts: NYT 2020-04-14



The chart shows the percentage change in spending from the beginning of the year. Each line is an average of the previous two weeks, which smooths out weekly anomalies. | Source: Earnest Research

Anecdotal Data for Sectoral Shifts: NYT 2020-04-14




Change in spending from 2019 for the week ending April 1. Bubbles are sized by industry sales.


Social Planner Solution

- Model has an **externality**. Equilibrium inefficient.
- What constraints does **social planner** face?
 - ▶ Agents in the model know whether they are susceptible, infected or recovered (or dead).
 - ▶ Give the social planner the same knowledge (needs widespread testing). Can discriminate between **s** and **i,r** when allocating **c**.
 - ▶ But: planner cannot change the consumption/infection technology
- Intuition for **efficient allocation**:
 - ▶ The social planner will seek to minimize the infection via infected agents ...
 - ▶ ... while still having to feed them.

Numerical Results: Social Planner



Numerical Results: Social Planner



Conclusions

- **COVID 19 epidemic**: lockdown and re-opening debate.
- **Key question**: how much will private reallocation do?
- Neoclassical economic-SIR model. Infections while consuming.
 - ▶ **Sectoral variety choices**: sectors differ in infectuousness.
 - ▶ Susceptible agents reduce consumption and **shift towards low-infection sectors**.
- Result: output decline and infection rates reduced substantially compared to homogeneous-sector [ERT] version.
- Even **reversal** rather than just flattening of curve is possible.
- Plus: an extreme social planner result.
- Next step: **serious quantification of reallocation mechanism!**

Thank you!