## On Her Own Account: How Strengthening Women's Financial Control Impacts Labor Supply and Gender Norms




नार- आधार अधिनियम 2016 के अनुसार, प्रत्येक ना। संग्रेटर में नागरिक की अनिवार्ष सहमति आर तर का करने बदलते आर खाता चक करते रह व तिकॉर्ड रखने के लिए SMS अलर्ट सुविधा लें जि हुए कार्ड के बारे में बैंक को जल्दी से जल्दी सुन्ति

न न बनाएं भी पिन न बताएं मार्ड को एक साथ न रखें मीत पर कार्ड और पिन की जानकारी न

मनकारी होनी चाहिए कि माइक जानकारी > जिस्सार

Erica Field, Rohini Pande, Natalia Rigol, Simone Schaner, Charity Troyer Moore NBER Summer Institute – Gender Study Group A Puzzle: Why Aren't More Indian Women Working?

#### India is Below Trend on FLFP Relative to Its GDP



## Latent Labor Supply and Social Norms

Over **30%** of Indian housewives would like a job (Fletcher et al 2017)

**Baseline FLFP of 21%** (IL0 2020): bringing latent workers into the labor force would **double FLFP** 

**Norms costs** (actual and perceived) may keep women from working

- *Directly internalized by women* (Akerlof and Kranton 2000)
- Indirectly channel through men (Bertrand et al 2015)

"Every man's responsibility is to take care of his family. A good husband can take care alone."

- man in rural Madhya Pradesh



# RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Can public policy that strengthens women's bargaining power and income control help norms-constrained women work more?

Can this in turn reshape social norms?

## Study Design and Conceptual Framework

## **Experimental Context**

The Policy

The People

#### **The Problem**

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)

Guarantee 100 days of work at a fixed wage to any household that requests employment 197 gram panchayats (GPs) in rural northern Madhya Pradesh

Conservative gender norms (more later), limited female mobility

Couples where at least one member is a workfare beneficiary, the woman is unbanked Payments directly transferred to beneficiaryowned bank accounts Wage payments for all household members sent to bank account owned by male household head Women have little-to-no wage control



## Measuring Norms: Aligning on Concepts

Actual norms: beliefs held by a 1 social group about what is or is not appropriate



Perceived norms: individuals' 2 *perceptions* of others' beliefs about what is or is not appropriate





Actual and perceived norms may not align (Bursztyn et al. 2018)

#### Innovation

We measure norms costs borne by men and women separately, to understand who bears cost of women working

Actual Norms in Sample Men More Opposed to Female Work





Perceived Norms in Sample Men See **Greater Social** Costs to Female Work

## Intervention 1 Offer Women Village Bank Accounts







Intervention 2 Complement Accounts with Basic Training


Intervention 3 Sign Women Up for NREGS "Direct Deposit"

**Submit paperwork** to request new accounts get linked to women's wages in NREGS payment system


**Follow-up** with local officials to ensure request processed

No change to wage deposits for any other household members


## Putting it All Together: Study Design



Conceptual Framework: Bargaining, Income Control, and Norms Costs



Conceptual Framework: Positive Impacts Most Likely Among "Constrained" Non-Workers



## **Empirical Results**

 $y_{ig} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DT_g + \beta_2 D_g + \beta_3 T_g + \beta_4 C_g + \mu_s + \lambda_d + \eta_t + x'_{ig} \delta + \epsilon_{igt}$ 

- All main effects relative to accounts only ("bare bones" financial inclusion)
- $x_{ig}$  per PAP (+ survey round, survey month, and district FE)
- Cluster standard errors at the GP level
- Aggregate outcomes into standardized indices to address multiple testing concerns (Kling et al. 2007)
- Heterogeneous effects by baseline labor force attachment (best proxy: ever worked for MGNREGS)

First Stage: High Levels of Takeup

• Non-control GPs: 74% of eligible women opened accounts

- **Training GPs**: **75%** of eligible women attended the training
- Direct deposit GPs: 82% of new account holders enrolled in direct deposit

## Measuring Financial Inclusion and Autonomy



- *Self reported*: individual account ownership, use in past 6 months, account balance
- *MGNREGS admin*: any, value deposits into individual account
- *Bank admin (subset)*: number transactions, average daily balances

- Self-reported (long run only): Aggregates dummies for whether respondent has heard of the bank kiosk and what types of transactions she knows about
- Self-reported (long run only): Aggregates dummies for whether woman visits bank alone or without male supervision and is comfortable doing so; whether woman believes women can visit bank kiosk without male supervision

Deposit and Training Boosted Financial Inclusion and Autonomy

Direct

#### Aggregate Account Use (2) (1)(3) (4) Full Bank Bank Kiosk Banking Knowledge Sample Subsample Autonomy Index Index Index Index Panel A: Treatment Effects $\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training 0.286\*\*\* 0.268\*\*\* 0.163\* 0.130\*\* (0.049)(0.050)(0.090)(0.057) $\beta_2$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit 0.109\*\* 0.075 -0.065 -0.033 (0.055)(0.054)(0.089)(0.056) $\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training -0.002-0.041-0.0730.026 (0.048) (0.051)(0.088)(0.057)-0.198\*\*\* $\beta_4$ : Control -0.513\*\*\* -0.224\*\*\* (0.036)(0.075)(0.049)Accounts Only Mean -0.023 0.000 -0.000-0.004Ν 4118 2464 4118 4118 Panel B: P-values from F-Tests 0.000\*\*\* 0.000\*\*\* 0.000\*\*\* 0.000\*\*\* $\beta_1 = \beta_4$ 0.000\*\*\* 0.164 0.000\*\*\* 0.000\*\*\* $\beta_2 = \beta_4$ 0.000\*\*\* 0.000\*\*\* 0.000\*\*\* $\beta_3 = \beta_4$ 0.427

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \*  $p \le 0.10$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.10$ .

Treatment Effects on Long-Run Outcomes

Public Labor Supply

- Worked in past month/year (self-report and admin data)
- Wages in past month/year (admin data)

Private Labor Supply

- Self-reported occupation as worker
- If worked for pay past year
- Annual private earnings

General Labor Supply

- If worked for pay in past month
- Earnings past month
- Months worked past year

Measuring Labor Supply

## **Direct Deposit and Training Increased FLFP**

	A	ggregate Lal Supply Inde		General Labor Supply Sub-Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Pooled	Short-Run	Long-Run	Pooled	Short-Run	Long-Run	
Panel A: Treatment Effects							
$\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training	0.108***	* 0.159***	0.058	0.101*	0.130**	0.112	
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.072)	
β <sub>2</sub> : Accounts + Direct Deposit	-0.012	0.016	-0.042	0.021	0.066	-0.015	
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.075)	
$\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training	0.017 (0.044)	0.026 (0.049)	0.006 (0.054)	0.009 (0.051)	0.029 (0.058)	0.016 (0.066)	
β <sub>4</sub> : Control	0.009	0.050	-0.022	-0.005	-0.002	0.030	
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.063)	
Accounts Only Mean	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	
N	8297	4179	4118	8297	4179	4118	
Panel B: P-values from F-Tests							
$\beta_1 = \beta_4$	0.006***	* 0.010***	0.051*	0.023**	0.013**	0.179	
$ \begin{array}{l} \beta_2 = \beta_4 \\ \beta_3 = \beta_4 \end{array} $	0.586	0.424	0.648	0.627	0.189	0.474	
	0.844	0.608	0.570	0.759	0.573	0.792	

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \*  $p \le 0.10$ , \*\*  $p \le 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.10$ .

## Work in the Private Sector Increased

	S	Public Labo upply Sub-In		Private Labor Supply Sub-Index			
	(1) Pooled	(2) Short-Run	(3) Long-Run	(4) Pooled	(5) Short-Run	(6) Long-Run	
Panel A: Treatment Effects							
$\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training	0.106	0.160*	0.025	0.117**	0.188***	0.035	
	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.070)	
$\beta_2$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit	-0.119**	-0.137**	-0.107	0.063	0.119**	-0.003	
	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.063)	
$\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training	-0.004	0.001	-0.034	0.047	0.046	0.037	
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.060)	
$\beta_4$ : Control	-0.004	0.062	-0.078	0.036	0.089**	-0.018	
	(0.061)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.055)	
Accounts Only Mean	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	
Ν	8297	4179	4118	8297	4179	4118	
Panel B: P-values from F-Tests							
$\beta_1 = \beta_4$	0.064*	0.248	0.084*	0.055*	0.047**	0.341	
$\beta_2 = \beta_4$	0.032**	0.007***	0.644	0.479	0.502	0.775	
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$	0.999	0.459	0.672	0.737	0.301	0.263	

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \*  $p \le 0.10$ , \*\*  $p \le 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.10$ .


## Other key results:

 Impacts for constrained women persist in the long run (<u>>see</u>)

2. Male labor supply in public sector increased in direct deposit and training GPs (<u>>see</u>)

## Intervention "Catch Up" May Explain Fade Out

Share NREGS Workers Paid Into Individual Accounts



Also consistent with an income effect (test: empowerment)

## **Measuring Empowerment**

Economic Agency

Purchases of daily food, clothing for herself, children's health, home improvement, festivals, and food/drink outside the home (any purchase, with own money) Mobility

Visited village market, market outside of village, natal home, anganwadi, and health center in the past year, past 30 days Has a say in how to spend earnings Has a say in whether she take employment

Decision

Making

No Overall
Impacts on
Empowerment
But Constrained
Women Benefit
<u>(≫see)</u>

	Aggregate Empowerment Index				
	(1) (2) (3)				
	Pooled	Short-Run	Long-Run		
Panel A: Treatment Effects					
$\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training	0.027	0.022	0.027		
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.040)		
$\beta_2$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit	-0.006	-0.020	-0.001		
	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.033)		
$\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training	0.016	-0.026	0.049		
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.040)		
$\beta_4$ : Control	-0.008	-0.018	-0.001		
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.032)		
Accounts Only Mean	0.001	0.000	0.002		
Ν	8276	4179	4097		
Panel B: P-values from F-Tests					
$\beta_1 = \beta_4$	0.119	0.112	0.410		
$\beta_2 = \beta_4$	0.902	0.938	0.988		
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$	0.345	0.763	0.127		

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \* p $\leq$  0.10, \*\* p $\leq$  0.05, \*\*\* p $\leq$  0.10.

Personal Beliefs • Should women be able to work

 Whether respondent wants sons/daughters to end up in households where woman works

Accepts Working Women  Vignette judgements of whether the working woman is the better wife, better mother, cares more about the family

Accepts Husband of WW  Vignette judgements of whether husband to housewife or working woman is better provider, better husband Measuring Actual Norms

# Direct Deposit and Training Liberalized Actual Norms for Women, But Not Men

	Female Reports						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
	Aggregate Actual	Personal Beliefs	Working Women	Husbands			
	Norms Index	Sub-Index	Acceptance Sub-Index	Acceptance Sub-Index			
$\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training	0.101***	0.112***	0.084	0.107**			
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.052)			
$\beta_2$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit	-0.030	0.018	-0.035	-0.072			
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.049)			
$\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training	0.018	0.000	0.025	0.030			
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.064)			
$\beta_4$ : Control	-0.015	-0.011	-0.031	-0.002			
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.049)			
Accounts Only Mean	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000			
Ν	4118	4118	4118	4118			
P-values from F-Tests							
$\beta_1 = \beta_4$	0.000***	0.001***	0.008***	0.009***			
$\beta_2 = \beta_4$	0.597	0.489	0.928	0.087*			
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$	0.364	0.767	0.144	0.586			

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \*  $p \le 0.10$ , \*\*  $p \le 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.10$ .

## Measuring Perceived Norms

Perceived Acceptance Women



- How many (out of 10) community members would not speak badly of working woman
- Thinks working woman gets less respect in vignette

- *How many (out of 10)* community members would not think husband of working woman is bad provider
- Thinks husband of working woman gets more community respect in vignette

## Direct Deposit and Training Liberalized Perceived Norms Among Both Genders

		Female Reports		Male Reports			
	(1) (2) (3)		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Aggregate Perceived Norms Index	Perceived Working Women Acceptance Sub-Index	Perceived Husbands Acceptance Sub-Index	Aggregate Perceived Norms Index	Perceived Working Women Acceptance Sub-Index	Perceived Husbands Acceptance Sub-Index	
$\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training	0.077**	0.075*	0.080*	0.086*	0.045	0.127**	
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.054)	
$\beta_2$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit	-0.023	-0.039	-0.007	0.064	0.047	0.080	
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.051)	
$\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training	0.049	0.065	0.032	0.086*	0.052	0.121**	
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.054)	
$\beta_4$ : Control	0.021	-0.005	0.048	0.071*	0.058	0.084*	
	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.046)	
Accounts Only Mean	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.236	-0.138	-0.334	
Ν	4116	4116	4116	3813	3813	3813	
P-values from F-Tests							
$\beta_1 = \beta_4$	0.073*	0.022**	0.388	0.693	0.766	0.314	
$\beta_2 = \beta_4$	0.210	0.393	0.170	0.826	0.794	0.912	
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$	0.499	0.087*	0.717	0.626	0.853	0.319	

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \*  $p \le 0.10$ , \*\*  $p \le 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.10$ .

## Mechanisms We Rule Out

#### Savings Constraints

All get accounts No meaningful effects on non-NREGS deposits

#### GE Wage Effects

No shifts in private sector wages for men or for women Other Fixed Costs

No evidence that other fixed costs (childcare, finding work) matter

# Final Thoughts

**Insight into Household Decisions:** Results not compatible with models of efficient household bargaining (absent fixed costs)

**Norms matter:** Women and men bear social costs when women work. Social costs to men may be larger, more binding (see also Bernhardt et al. 2018).


#### Changing behavior can change

**norms:** our intervention changed norms without directly targeting them.

• Scope for sustained impact, Pareto improvements

Appendix Material

### Direct Deposit and Training Has Persistent Impacts on Constrained Women's Labor Supply



#### Direct Deposit and Training Increased Male Labor Supply in the Public Sector

	General Labor Sub-Index		Publ	Public Sector Sub-Index			Private Sector Sub-Index		
	(1) Pooled	(2) Short-Run	(3) Long-Run	(4) Pooled	(5) Short-Run	(6) Long-Run	(7) Pooled	(8) Short-Run	(9) Long-Run
Panel A: Treatment Effects									
$\beta_1$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training	-0.051	0.078	-0.103	0.173**	0.157*	0.166*	-0.024	0.047	-0.068
	(0.067)	(0.090)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.043)
$\beta_2$ : Accounts + Direct Deposit	0.074	0.155	0.055	-0.132*	-0.142*	-0.131	0.062	0.107	0.034
• -	(0.077)	(0.099)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.049)
$\beta_3$ : Accounts + Training	0.077	0.111	0.069	-0.038	-0.015	-0.073	0.068	0.108	0.024
	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.074)	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.062)	(0.087)	(0.051)
β <sub>4</sub> : Control	-0.037	0.007	-0.058	-0.017	0.025	-0.040	0.043	0.096	-0.009
	(0.065)	(0.089)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.042)
Accounts Only Mean	0.648	0.690	0.605	0.173	0.159	0.188	0.647	0.641	0.652
Ν	7771	3957	3814	7771	3957	3814	7771	3957	3814
Panel B: P-values from F-Tests									
$\beta_1 = \beta_4$	0.830	0.422	0.474	0.016**	0.155	0.016**	0.175	0.500	0.110
$\beta_2 = \beta_4$	0.117	0.112	0.094*	0.095*	0.042**	0.291	0.718	0.885	0.299
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$	0.139	0.271	0.069*	0.795	0.662	0.740	0.647	0.884	0.432


*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. \*  $p \le 0.10$ , \*\*  $p \le 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p \le 0.10$ .

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**Direct Deposit** and Training Boosts Empowerment Among Constrained Women

#### Purchase Sub-Index Aggregate Empowerment Index Mobility Sub-Index Decision Making Sub-Index 4. 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9. 9 0 0 4 4 4 4 Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run

B. Unconstrained



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#### A. Constrained