



Reference Dependence in the Housing Market

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Introduction

- ▶ Housing—largest household asset; mortgages—largest liability.

(Campbell, 2006; Badarinza et al., 2016; Gomes et al., 2020)

- ▶ Rich source of insights into household preferences and constraints.

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 - ▶ Mapping facts to parameters requires an explicit model of reference dependence.
 - ▶ Such a model should incorporate realistic housing market features.
 - ▶ Harnessing observables in addition to prices (e.g., Kleven, 2016; Rees-Jones, 2018).
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 - ▶ Such a model should incorporate realistic housing market features.
 - ▶ Harnessing observables in addition to prices (e.g., Kleven, 2016; Rees-Jones, 2018).
 - ▶ Empirical confounds (unobservable quality, home equity constraints).
- ▶ Subsequent literature extends our knowledge, but issues remain open.
(e.g., Engelhardt, 2003; Anenberg, 2011; Bracke and Tenreyro, 2018; Hong et al., 2019; Clapp et al., 2020)

This paper

- ▶ Develops a structural model of house selling which flexibly embeds preferences and constraints.
 - ▶ Seller optimizes listing decision and listing price, internalizing effects on probability of sale and final sale price (i.e., demand).
 - ▶ Model predicts seller policy functions given parameters and state variables.

This paper


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- ▶ Studies Danish administrative data on housing stock, transactions, and listings, matched to mortgages and demographics.
 - ▶ Evaluates prior results using more granular data, and uncovers new facts.
 - ▶ New moments including bunching in transactions and extensive margin.
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 - ▶ Confronts measurement challenges and controls for numerous confounds.
- ▶ Model rationalizes data with reference dependence and modest loss aversion; exceptions point to future theoretical work.

Listing premia in the data

- Listing premium (ℓ) = $\ln(\text{Listing price}) - \ln(\text{Hedonic price})$.



- Potential gains = $\ln(\text{Hedonic price}) - \ln(\text{Reference price})$.
 - Assumption: Reference price is nominal purchase price.

Data and Facts

Data

- ▶ Universe of Danish housing transactions from 2009 to 2016.
 - ▶ Assessed sale values from the tax registry. Original purchase values post-1992.
 - ▶ Size, location, hedonics, sale, purchase time from the property registry.
- ▶ Matched to owner's personal ID, using property ID.
 - ▶ Data on household demographics: Age, education.
 - ▶ Data on household income, outstanding mortgage debt, net financial assets.
- ▶ Property ID used to match to (external) listings data.
 - ▶ All Danish electronic listings (matched to approx. 75% of all transactions).
 - ▶ Listing price, time on the market, retracted or sold.
- ▶ Merged data: 214,508 listings (70.6% sold, 29.4% retracted) of 181,020 properties by 193,850 households between 2009 and 2016.
 - ▶ Housing stock (5,540,391 observations of 807,666 unique properties) used to understand the extensive margin, i.e., propensity to list.

More details

Hedonic pricing model

- Predict prices using hedonic model:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln(P_{it}) = & \delta + \delta_t + \delta_m + \delta_{tm} + \beta_f \mathbb{1}_{i=f} + \beta_{ft} \mathbb{1}_{i=f} \mathbb{1}_{t=\tau} \\ & + \beta_x \mathbf{X}_{it} + \beta_{fx} \mathbb{1}_{i=f} \mathbf{X}_{it} + \Phi(v_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}.\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

- R^2 from estimating this model is 0.86. Results are robust to using a range of alternative models. [More details](#)

- Use predicted prices to calculate:

$$\begin{array}{l}\text{Potential gains} \\ \widehat{G} = \widehat{\ln P} - \ln R\end{array}$$

(note contrast with)

$$\begin{array}{l}\text{Realized gains} \\ G = \ln P - \ln R\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}\text{Potential home equity} \\ \widehat{H} = \widehat{\ln P} - \ln M\end{array}$$

(note contrast with)


$$\begin{array}{l}\text{Realized home equity} \\ H = \ln P - \ln M\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}\text{Listing premium} \\ \ell = \ln L - \widehat{\ln P}\end{array}$$

(note contrast with)

$$\begin{array}{l}\text{Realized premium} \\ rp = \ln P - \widehat{\ln P}\end{array}$$

Listing premia, potential gains, and potential home equity




Summary statistics

Moments: Listing premia

Bunching

- Loss aversion predicts “bunching” of transactions at prices just above reference point R . (As sellers aim for realized gain $G = 0\%$.)




Methodology

Listing prices

Robustness


Extensive margin

- Predict prices for the entire housing stock, plot propensity to list as a function of potential gains.




Demand: Probability of sale and final prices

Probability of sale within 6 months



Realized premium vs. listing premium



Unobserved quality

Estimated patterns are robust to:

- ▶ Alternative pricing models, e.g., property-specific FEs for \hat{P} ($R^2 = 0.9$).

- ▶ OOS hedonic predictions; renovation tax exemptions (in process).

Repeat sales model

Out-of-sample simulations

Alternative spec.

Model fit

- ▶ Shire-level house prices as estimate of \hat{P} .

- ▶ 2136 shires. Smallest unit: $\approx 1,500$ property-years and ≈ 45 listings.

More details

- ▶ Regressing premium on demographics, municipality, & year FE.

More details

- ▶ Genesove and Mayer (2001) bounding approach.

More details

- ▶ Regression Kink Design (RKD).

- ▶ Significant change in slope in narrow neighbourhood around kink, while other characteristics smooth around $\hat{G} = 0$ ($\ell = 0$ in sale probability).

More details


Theory

Reference dependence and loss aversion


- Utility function with reference dependence and loss aversion:

$$u = P + \eta G(\lambda 1_{G < 0} + 1_{G \geq 0})$$

- Note: defined over *realized* prices P and gains G .




Optimal listing premia (ℓ^*)





Bunching

- Distinct implications of reference dependence and loss aversion:
 - Excess mass in gain domain when $\eta > 0$; bunching at $G = 0\%$ when $\lambda > 1$, plus even less mass in loss domain.



Concave demand



- Concave demand is a confound: Non-linear listing premia even with no loss aversion.



- Exploit regional variation in housing markets with differing degrees of demand concavity for identification.

Structural estimation: Work in progress

Model fit and estimated parameters



Reference dependence	η	=	0.948***	(0.344)
Loss aversion	λ	=	1.576***	(0.570)
Down-payment constraint	μ	=	1.060***	(0.107)
Distrib. of moving shocks	θ_{\min}	=	0.217	(0.165)
	θ_{\max}	=	1.005***	(0.197)
Cost of listing/search	φ	=	0.037	(0.011)
Adjustment to concavity	δ	=	-0.097***	(0.009)

► λ in the literature: 2 to 2.5 (Kahneman et al. 1990, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). When we shut down concave demand channel: $\lambda = 3.29$.



Linear demand

Identification

Sensitivity analysis

Discussion and Conclusions

Interactions



- Model fails to explain lower response to losses when home equity constraint is tighter.
- Similarly, it appears as if downsizing aversion kicks in at higher potential home equity levels when potential gains are high.

Discussion

Conclusions

- ▶ We set up a structural model of house listing behavior, and document the importance of the following ingredients:
 - ▶ Reference dependence plus loss aversion.
 - ▶ Seller optimization in the presence of “demand concavity.”
 - ▶ Penalty for realized home equity less than down-payment constraint thresholds.
 - ▶ Gains from trade for a successful sale and costs of listing.
- ▶ Acquire new estimates of key behavioral parameters from an important high-stakes household decision in a search and matching market.
- ▶ However, the model cannot completely match some new facts which we identify in the data.
 - ▶ Potential new target for behavioral economics theory.

