Rents and Intangibles: a Q+ Framework by Crouzet and Eberly

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- Worrying trends in US macroeconomy
 - Declining labor shares in output (e.g., Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013))
 - ▶ Rise of markups (e.g., De Loecker et al. (2020))
 - ▶ Rise of concentration in product markets (e.g., Autor et al. (2020))
 - ▶ Rise of monopsony power in labor markets (e.g., Benmelech et al. (2018))
- \Rightarrow Common theme: rise of corporate market power

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This paper explores instead the role of intangible capital

What the paper does: theory

Extends Hayashi (1982) to include intangibles:

- Rents &1 type of capital: $V = qK + \text{NPV}(\text{profits-}K \times \text{marginal profits})$
- No rents, 2 types of capital: $V = K^{\text{physical}}q^{\text{physical}} + K^{\text{intangible}}q^{\text{intangible}}$
- Rents & 2 types of capital:
 - $V = K^{\text{phy}}q^{\text{phy}} + K^{\text{int}}q^{\text{int}} + \underbrace{\text{NPV}(\text{profits-}K^{\text{phy}} \times \text{marginal profits in } K^{\text{phy}} K^{\text{int}} \times \text{marginal profits in } K^{\text{int}})}_{= \text{NPV}(\text{rents on physical capital}) + \text{NPV}(\text{rents on intangible capital})}$

What does the paper do: empirics

■ Investment gap: difference between average Q and marginal q (for physical capital):

$$Q^{\text{phy}} - q^{\text{phy}} = \underbrace{\frac{K^{\text{int}}}{K^{\text{phy}}}q^{\text{int}}}_{\text{(I)}} + \underbrace{\frac{NPV(\text{rents on physical})}{K^{\text{phy}}}}_{\text{(I)}} + \underbrace{\frac{K^{\text{int}}}{K^{\text{phy}}}NPV(\text{rents on intangible})}_{\text{(I)}}$$

Combine parametric, balanced-growth path assumptions with:

- 1. Aggregate data on K^{int}, K^{phy}, i^{int}, i^{phy}, V, and corporate profits
- 2. Calibration for adjustment costs ($\gamma^{\text{phy}}, \gamma^{\text{int}}$)

to calculate investment gap and relative contributions of (1), (2) and (3)

Result (1)







Discussion

- I really enjoyed this paper:
 - ► First-order topic
 - Very elegant empirical work
 - Provocative finding: markups not so important in explaining investment behavior

My discussion: some more skepticism on the role of markups

- 1. Q-theory works really well post-1995
- 2. Reasonable measures of intangibles leave little role for markups

Lackluster investment

Paper's starting point: post-2000, investment has been lackluster relative to valuations

Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017)'s methodology:

regress
$$\frac{i_t}{k_{t-1}}$$
 on $\frac{Q_{t-1}}{k_{t-1}}$ in 1990-2000

■ forecast investment in post-2000

compare with actual investment



Net investment per unit of capital

Comment 1: empirical performance of basic Q-theory

In a world of rising markups, with no other structural change:

- Coefficient estimate of regression of $\frac{i_t}{k_{t-1}}$ on Q_{t-1} should decrease over time
 - Q becomes a poorer proxy for q over time
- R^2 should decrease over time

Over 1990-2015, Q-theory works remarkably well

Andrei, Mann and Moyen (2019):



Coefficient estimate over time

10-years rolling regressions of $\frac{i_t}{k_{t-1}}$ on Q_{t-1} for private sector and physical capital:



• Coefficient \nearrow since 1990s. Same for R^2 .

 \Rightarrow Would be great for the paper to use these facts as additional model restrictions

Comment 2: do we need rents?

- Consider basic q-theory:
 - ▶ No rents, no intangibles.
 - marginal adjustment $\cos t \approx 1 + \gamma \left(\frac{i_t}{k_{t-1}} \delta\right) = q = Q.$
- Estimate model over entire 1995-2015 period (when Q theory actually works):
 - Only physical capital (structure and equipments)
 - Quarterly data

Investment gap using simple model



No intangibles while we know there are large share of capital inputs!
Use total capital instead of structure & equipment in previous analysis

Investment gap using simple model



- No intangibles while we know there are large share of capital inputs!
- Use total capital instead of structure & equipment in previous analysis

Even better fit using simple model and total capital



Implications

- Previous model leaves little role for rents from 1995 to 2013.
 - Post-2013: basic Q-theory works less well and large > 0 investment gap
- Is this a reasonable model?
 - Estimated parameters: $\delta = 6.3\%$, $\gamma = 12$ (high)
 - ▶ But it fits aggregate investment for both physical and intangibles well from 1995 to 2013.

Comment 3: measuring intangibles

■ Main aggregate result measures intangibles using:

- ▶ BEA's measure: R&D; own-account software; and artistic originals
- \Rightarrow Low measured intangible intensity in 2000-2017:

$$S^{2000-2017} = \frac{K^{\text{intangible}}}{K^{\text{physical}}} = .164$$

S in Compustat data (Peters and Taylor (2017))



 \Rightarrow post-2000, S could well be at least .5 or more.

Implied markups with alternative intangible intensity (post-2000)



If S > 40%, implied markups are basically 0
Consistent with analysis in the paper (fig 2), but could be more emphasized

Conclusion

- Important debate on role of rising markups for macro-economic outcomes
 - Corporate finance side of this debate: lackluster investment?
- This paper offers an elegant look at the data to entertain markup and intangible hypotheses:
 - Find limited effect of markups on investment
 - ▶ There may be additional reasons to be even more skeptic given the data
- Highly recommend reading this paper and the whole literature!

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