

# Optimal Policy Perturbations

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*Although contention about the appropriate model of the economy [...] continues, macroeconomic policy decisions have to be made.*

Blanchard and Fisher (1989)

- Policy makers use heuristics to decide on policy actions:
  - Combine insights from multiple models
  - Rely heavily on instinct and judgement calls
- How to know whether the policy choice is the best one?

## Illustrative example

The COVID crisis:

- Is the Fed doing enough?
- Should it be more aggressive with QE?
- ...

# This paper

- Start from high-level loss function *given by* policy maker
- Propose a statistic —the **Optimal Policy Perturbation (OPP)**— to detect **optimization failures** in policy process
- OPP does not rely on specifying an underlying model
- OPP informs whether chosen policy is optimal and, if not, which improvements can be made

## Two perspectives for the OPP

1. A researcher interested in assessing the historical performance of policy makers
2. A tool to help decision making in real time
3. A tool to articulate policy prescriptions around three concepts
  - 3.1 preferences
  - 3.2 economic outlook
  - 3.3 effects of policy

## Idea of policy perturbation

- Idea similar to Sufficient Statistic approach, but in a macro stabilization setting
- Explore whether a perturbation to the policy choice can lower the loss function
- Exploits idea that *at the optimum* perturbations should have no first-order effect on loss function

# Idea of policy perturbation

- Idea similar to Sufficient Statistic approach, but in a macro stabilization setting
- Explore whether a perturbation to the policy choice can lower the loss function
- Exploits idea that *at the optimum* perturbations should have no first-order effect on loss function
- OPP is a *well-chosen* perturbation that only requires
  1. **Forecasts** for the policy objectives given the policy choice
  2. **Impulse response** of policy objectives to changes in the policy instruments

- OPP can be applied to a broad range of macro policy problems
  - Monetary policy
  - Fiscal policy with stabilization vs budget deficit concerns
  - Exchange rate management
  - Foreign exchange reserve management
  - ...
- Today we illustrate the OPP for US monetary policy decisions



# This talk

1. Problem description
2. Optimal Policy Perturbation
3. Inference
4. US monetary policy

## Problem description

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# Environment policy maker

Policy maker has

- $m = 1, \dots, M$  mandates over  $h = 0, \dots, H$  horizons
- target variables  $y_{m,t+h}$  with objective  $y_m^*$
- $K$  policy instruments  $p_t = (p_{1,t}, \dots, p_{K,t})'$
- preference parameters  $\lambda_m$  and discount factors  $\beta_h$

# Policy maker's problem

Policy maker (under discretion) aims to solve

$$\min_{\mathbf{p}_t \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{L}_t$$

with loss function

$$\mathcal{L}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{h=0}^H \sum_{m=1}^M \lambda_m \beta_h (y_{m,t+h} - y_m^*)^2$$

where  $\mathbb{E}_t(\cdot) = \mathbb{E}(\cdot | \mathcal{F}_t)$ .

# Convenient static re-formulation (1)

- Stack targets

$$Y_{t:t+H} = [\sqrt{\lambda_j \beta_h} (y_{m,t+h} - y_m^*)]_{m=1,\dots,M, h=0,\dots,H}$$

- To ease on notations, refer to  $Y_{t:t+H}$  as  $Y_t$
- Postulate generic model

$$Y_t = f_t(p_t, X_t) + \xi_t ,$$

$f_t$  differentiable wrt  $p_t$ ,  $X_t$  is  $\mathcal{F}_t$  measurable,  $\xi_t$  future shocks

## Convenient static re-formulation (2)

- We obtain *static* description of the *dynamic* policy problem

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{p}_t \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{L}_t, \quad \mathcal{L}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t \|\mathbf{Y}_t\|^2 \\ \text{s.t. } \mathbf{Y}_t &= f_t(\mathbf{p}_t, \mathbf{X}_t) + \boldsymbol{\zeta}_t \end{aligned}$$

- $K$  instruments to hit  $(H + 1)M$  targets

# Policy maker's proposed solution

- Policy maker proposes  $p_t^0$  as the solution to the policy problem
- Goal of the paper:  
Verify whether  $p_t^0$  is optimal without knowing  $f_t$

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- Goal of the paper:  
Verify whether  $p_t^0$  is optimal without knowing  $f_t$
- Not the goal of the paper:  
Derive an optimal policy rule



# Why would $p_t^0$ NOT be optimal?

- Mistake
- Mis-specification, if policy maker doesn't have access to true  $f_t(\cdot)$
- Complexity of  $f_t(\cdot)$  makes it very expensive to evaluate
  - Example: Board Fed production of Tealbook
  - Computing  $f_t(\cdot)$  involves many model iterations and judgment calls
  - Impossible to compute  $f_t(\cdot)$  for all possible  $p_t$
  - An incomplete grid search

# Optimal Policy Perturbation

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# Policy perturbations

## Main idea:

- Perturbate  $p_t^0$  with  $\delta_t = (\delta_{1,t}, \dots, \delta_{K,t})'$
- If  $p_t^0 + \delta_t$  generates lower loss, conclude  $p_t^0$  is not optimal
- Is there a smart choice for  $\delta_t$ ?

# Optimal policy perturbations (OPP)

We consider the perturbation

$$\delta_t^* = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$$

which depends on

- impulse responses

$$\mathcal{R}_t \equiv \mathcal{R}_t(p_t^0, X_t) = \left. \frac{\partial f_t(p_t, X_t)}{\partial p_t'} \right|_{p_t = p_t^0}$$

- forecasts

$$\mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0 \equiv \mathbb{E}_t f_t(p_t^0, X_t)$$

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- forecasts

$$\mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0 \equiv \mathbb{E}_t f_t(p_t^0, X_t)$$

Note:  $\delta_t^*$  is a function of  $\mathcal{F}_t$  not a shock


# Properties of OPP

What can we learn from OPP  $\delta_t^*$ ?


1. **Discarding optimality**: when  $p_t^0$  is not optimal
2. **Improving policy**: when  $p_t^0 + \delta_t^*$  improves  $p_t^0$
3. **Optimal policy**: when  $p_t^0 + \delta_t^*$  optimal

## Intuition: Discarding Optimality

$$\mathcal{L}_t = f_t(p_t)^2$$




## Intuition: Discarding Optimality





## Intuition: Discarding Optimality



## Intuition: Discarding Optimality

$$\delta_t^* = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$$

- At the optimum,

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial p_t} \right|_{p_t = p_t^0} = 2 \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0 = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \delta_t^* = 0$$

- Impulse responses (IR) should be orthogonal to forecasts  
 $\Rightarrow$  There is no adjustment to the instruments, i.e., no combination of the IRs, that can lower the loss function


## Intuition: Improving/Optimal Policy

$$\delta_t^* = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$$


- Optimization perspective:  
→ OPP as the first-step of a Gauss-Newton algorithm

## Intuition: Improving Policy


$$\mathcal{L}_t = f_t(p_t)^2$$




## Intuition: Improving Policy




## Intuition: Improving Policy



## Intuition: Optimal Policy



## Intuition: Optimal Policy





## Intuition: Optimization perspective

$p_t^0 + \delta_t^*$  is first step of Gauss-Newton (GN) optimization algorithm

- **Approximate linearity** ( $Y_t \approx \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + Y_t^0$ ): GN converges  
 $\Rightarrow$  OPP improves policy
- **Linearity** ( $Y_t = \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + Y_t^0$ ): GN converges in one step  
 $\Rightarrow$  OPP gives optimal policy

## Two comments related to Lucas critique

1. Assume we know  $\mathcal{R}_t$ 
  - Detecting an optimization failure  
 $\Rightarrow$  immune to Lucas critique ( $\nabla_{p_t} \mathcal{R}_t \neq 0$ )
  - Improve/optimal policy restricts  $\mathcal{R}_t(p_t)$   
 $\Rightarrow$  not fully robust to Lucas critique
2. Can we know/estimate  $\mathcal{R}_t$ ?
  - Same issue in Sufficient Statistics literature
  - Need sufficient data/experiments relevant for period  $t$

## A different viewpoint

Why is Discarding Optimality immune to Lucas critique?

- Estimating the optimal policy is hard (Lucas critique)
- Discarding Optimality is easier, because assessing  $\delta_t^* = 0$  is like a score test
  - You can impose the null  $p_t^0 = p_t^{opt}$  and use the score at  $p_t^0$
  - No need to estimate optimal policy as it is fixed under the null

## Intuition: Econometrics perspective

- OPP formula looks like OLS regression of  $\mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$  on  $\mathcal{R}_t$

$$\delta_t^* = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0.$$

- With linearity assumption, get

$$Y_t^0 = -\mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + Y_t$$

- Goal of  $\delta_t^*$  is to use  $\mathcal{R}_t$  to minimize  $\mathbb{E}_t \|Y_t\|^2$ : an OLS reg.!

## Illustration: simple example I

- Suppose policy maker has 1 mandate and 1 instrument





$$\min_{p_t} \mathcal{L}_t \quad \text{with} \quad \mathcal{L}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \|Y_t\|^2$$

where  $Y_t = (y_t - y^*, y_{t+1} - y^*, \dots, y_{t+H} - y^*)'$

- Two scenarios:
  - (a) Failing to disregard optimality
  - (b) Discarding optimality

# Illustration: simple example I

$$\delta_t^* = - \left( \mathcal{R}_t^{y'} \mathcal{R}_t^y \right)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t^{y'} \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$$



(a) Failing to discard optimality

(b) Discarding optimality





## Illustration: simple example II

- Suppose policy maker has 2 mandates and 1 instrument

$$\min_{p_t} \mathcal{L}_t \quad \text{with} \quad \mathcal{L}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \|Y_t\|^2 + \mathbb{E}_t \|Z_t\|^2$$

- Now there are two types of trade-offs
  - Across horizons
  - Across mandates

# Illustration: simple example II



$$\delta_t^* = \omega \delta_t^{Y*} + (1 - \omega) \delta_t^{Z*} < 0$$



## Inference for OPP

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# Inference for OPP

- Computation of OPP requires two statistics
  - Impulse response  $\mathcal{R}_t$
  - Conditional expectation  $\mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$
- In practice
  - $\mathcal{R}_t$  is estimated: **IR estimation uncertainty**
  - Policy maker does not know  $\mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$  (the optimal forecast) and only produces  $\hat{Y}_{t|t}$ : **Model uncertainty**

## Avoiding type-1 (false positive) error

- We do not want that researcher rejects optimality because of
  - noise in impulse responses
  - model mis-specification (incorrect forecasts)
- Therefore we compute confidence bands around the OPP
- Conservative inference: reject optimality if the confidence bands exclude zero

- IR estimation uncertainty

$$\hat{r}_t = \text{vec}(\widehat{\mathcal{R}}_t) \sim N(r_t, \Omega_t)$$

- Conditional expectation uncertainty

$$\hat{Y}_{t|t} \sim N(\mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0, \Sigma_{t|t})$$

- Simulate/delta method to get distribution of

$$\delta_t^* = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$$

## A Brainard conservatism principle for the OPP

- Denote by  $\hat{\delta}_t$  the mean of the distribution of  $\delta_t^*$
- Can show

$$\hat{\delta}_t = (\hat{\mathcal{R}}_t' \hat{\mathcal{R}}_t + \tilde{\Omega}_t)^{-1} \hat{\mathcal{R}}_t' \hat{Y}_{t|t} ,$$

- $\tilde{\Omega}_t$  captures an **attenuation bias** coming from measurement error in the IRs

## **Applications of OPP**

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## Two applications of OPP

1. A retrospective analysis of Fed policy
2. A tool to help decision making in real time

# Two data requirements


1. Forecasts for  $\pi$  and  $u$ 
    - Survey of Economic Projections from FOMC (1980-2020)
  2. Impulse responses to monetary shocks
    - Fed instruments:
      - 2.1 Fed funds rate
      - 2.2 Slope of yield curve (LSAP, QE)
- Eberly, Stock and Wright (2019)



# Estimation of $\mathcal{R}$

- Estimation by LP-IV
- IVs based on surprises to bond market during 30min window around FOMC announcements Kuttner(2001), Eberly, Stock and Wright (2019)
  - $r_t^0$  shock: difference between  $r_t^0$  decision and current-month fed funds futures contract  $FF1$
  - slope shock: Surprise to  $r_t^{10yr} - r_t^0$  spread, holding  $r_t^0$  shock constant

# Estimation of $\mathcal{R}$





# A first application of OPP


## A retrospective analysis of Fed policy

- Fed balanced approach:  $\lambda = 1$
- Instruments
  - FFR alone until 2007
  - Slope policy alone over 2008-2013
  - FFR and slope policy over 2014-2018


# Retrospective analysis of Fed policy



OPP: FFR instrument







OPP: Slope instrument







# Should the Fed have lowered FFR faster in 2008?

SEP: 2008-M4



# Should the Fed have used more slope policy in 2010?

SEP: 2010-M4




# Another application of OPP

## A tool for decision making in real time

- Take the FOMC as of June 2020
- Summarize SEP forecasts with **two** parameters:
  - Second COVID wave?:  $\mathbb{E}_t u_{2020q4}$
  - Speed of recovery in 2021-2022 (**half-life**)
- Capture model uncertainty from SEP dispersion
- **Question**: Should Fed use its slope policy more aggressively?
- **Warning**: This is an illustration. Yield curve is already very close to flat

# Slope policy in 2020-M6

SEP: 2020-M6







## A decision map:

- Show results of “test”  $\delta_t^* = 0$  over forecast space  
→ captures effect of IR uncertainty on test
- Show uncertainty “rectangle” around SEP median forecast  
→ captures effect of model uncertainty on “test”


# A decision map using SEP “central tendency” around forecast




# With higher model uncertainty: using range of SEP



# With higher IR uncertainty



# With even higher IR uncertainty



## Take-away (1)

- Given the large uncertainty today, we cannot reject that Fed slope policy is appropriate
- How about the new instruments?  
(e.g., Fed lending to small/medium businesses)
- Uncertain effects (high IR uncertainty) makes OPP less informative

## Take-away (2)

$$\delta_t^* = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \mathcal{R}_t' \mathbb{E}_t Y_t^0$$

- **OPP** helps policy makers articulate/communicate their prescription around three concepts:
  1. **preference** between different objectives
  2. assessment of the **economic outlook**
  3. views on the **effects of policy**

# Conclusion

- A framework to help decision making in real life setting
- OPP helps detect optimization failures when
  - Underlying model is complex and costly to compute
  - Policy makers use heuristics to decide on policy



# Two perspectives on literature (1)

- Identification of structural IRs (Ramey, 2016)
  - Impulse responses can be used to test optimality

## Two perspectives on literature (2)

- **Forecast Targeting:** *“select a policy-rate path so that the forecasts of the target variables **look good**, meaning appears to **best** fulfill the mandates and return to their target at an **appropriate** pace”* Svensson (1999, 2017, 2019)
- Captures operational procedure of most  $\pi$ -targeting central banks
- **Limitation:** no quantitative criterion for “**appropriate**”
- $\Rightarrow$  OPP provides such a quantitative criterion

- OPP can be applied to broad range of policy problems
  - Monetary policy
  - Fiscal policy with stabilization vs budget deficit concerns
  - Exchange rate management
  - Foreign exchange reserve management
  - ...

## A forecast-targeting rule

*The Fed has a rule. The Fed's rule is that we will go for a 2percent inflation rate; we will go for the natural rate of unemployment; we put equal weight on those two things; we will give you information about our projections, our interest rate. That is a rule and that is a framework that should clarify exactly what the Fed is doing.*

Bernanke (2015)

*If the FOMC is going to have a forecast-based framework, it is not enough to say “eventually we will get back to 2 percent”. The FOMC needs to talk about a time horizon over which it is planning to hit 2%.*

Kocherlakota (2016)

# Formalizing the OPP properties

## Proposition

1. *Discarding optimality*: Given smoothness of  $f_t$ , we have that  $\delta_t^* \neq 0$  implies  $p_t^0 \neq p_t^{\text{opt}}$ , where  $p_t^{\text{opt}} = \arg \min_{p_t \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{L}_t$ .

► details

2. *Improving policy*: Given  $\mathcal{R}_t(p_t)$  not too non-linear we have there exists  $\epsilon > 0$  such that for all  $p_t^0 \in \mathcal{N}(p_t^{\text{opt}}, \epsilon)$ , and

$$\|p_t^0 + \delta_t^* - p_t^{\text{opt}}\| \leq \|p_t^0 - p_t^{\text{opt}}\|$$

► details

3. *Optimal policy*: Given  $\mathcal{R}_t$  independent of  $p_t$  we have

$$p_t^0 + \delta_t^* = p_t^{\text{opt}}$$

## Assumption: Discarding optimality

### Assumption

Let  $X_t \in \mathcal{X}$  and  $\xi_t \in \Xi$  be random vectors and  $\mathcal{D}$  an open convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}^K$ . We assume that

1.  $f_t : \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{M(H+1)}$  is continuous and there exists a random variable  $Z_t$  such that  $\|f_t\| \leq Z_t$  uniformly with  $\mathbb{E}(Z_t) < \infty$ .
2. there exists a function  $R_t \equiv \partial f_t / \partial \mathbf{p}_t$  such that uniformly we have  $R_t$  has full column rank.

## Assumption: Improving policy perturbation

### Assumption

We assume that

1.  $\|(R_t(\mathbf{p}_t, X_t) - R_t(\mathbf{p}_t^{\text{opt}}, X_t))' \mathbb{E}_t \left( f_t(\mathbf{p}_t^{\text{opt}}, X_t) + \xi_t \right) \| \leq c \|\mathbf{p}_t - \mathbf{p}_t^{\text{opt}}\|$ , with constant  $c < \mu_{\min}(R_t' R_t)$  for all  $(\mathbf{p}_t, X_t) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{X}$
2.  $R_t$  is Lipschitz continuous with respect to  $\mathbf{p}_t$  on  $\mathcal{D}$  with parameter  $\gamma$ .

## Assumption: Optimal policy perturbation

### Assumption

$R_t$  is independent of  $p_t$ .



# The Lucas critique as an omitted variable bias

- In our context, the Lucas critique can be understood as

$$\nabla \mathcal{R}_t = \left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_t(p_t)}{\partial p'_t} \right|_{p_t} \neq 0$$

# The Lucas critique as an omitted variable bias

- In our context, the Lucas critique can be understood as

$$\nabla \mathcal{R}_t = \left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_t(p_t)}{\partial p'_t} \right|_{p_t} \neq 0$$

- If the data is generated according to

$$Y_t = Y^0 + \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + \frac{1}{2} \nabla \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t^2$$

- Then the OPP should be

$$\delta_t^* = \arg \min \| Y^0 + \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + \frac{1}{2} \nabla \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t^2 \|^2$$

but we calculate

$$\tilde{\delta}_t = \arg \min \| Y^0 + \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t \|^2$$

- $\tilde{\delta}_t$  is a biased estimate of  $\delta_t^*$  unless  $\nabla \mathcal{R}_t = 0$  or  $\delta_t^* = 0$ .

## Background: optimization (1)

- Step of a Newton line search algorithm

$$\delta_t = -(\nabla^2 \mathcal{L}_t)^{-1} \nabla \mathcal{L}_t$$

- Gauss-Newton (GN) is a modification of Newton for problems of the form

$$\mathcal{L}_t = \frac{1}{2} \min_{p_t} Y_t' Y_t$$

- GN step is

$$\delta_t = -(\mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t)^{-1} \nabla \mathcal{L}_t$$

## Background: optimization (2)

- GN approximates Hessian with first-derivatives

$$\nabla^2 \mathcal{L}_t = \mathcal{R}_t' \mathcal{R}_t + \underbrace{\nabla \mathcal{R}_t' Y_t^0}_{\simeq 0}$$

- Equivalent to minimizing the linear-quadratic model

$$\min_{\delta_t} (\mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + Y_t^0)' (\mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + Y_t^0)$$

- **GN step maximizes a quadratic approximation of the loss function** using

$$Y_t \approx \mathcal{R}_t \delta_t + Y_t^0$$