
Land Concentration and Long-Run Development in the Frontier United States

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July, 2020

High Land Inequality in Agrarian Economies



Sources: FAO, WDI, Frankema (2009), Atkinson, Hassell, Morelli, Roser (2017), author [two frontier counties]

Introduction

"[Landlords] grow richer, as it were in their sleep, (without working, risking, or economizing.)" — John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, (1848)

"In all the modes of occupying the land, the great evil is the smallness of farms)" — Arthur Young, *Travels in France*, (1792)

"The rich [landlords]... in spite of their selfishness... are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions" — Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, (1759)

How Does Land Concentration Affect Development?

Three modern perspectives

- Economies of scale are good (e.g. Allen 1988)
- Tenancy & contracting problems are bad
 - Sharecropping (e.g. Burchardi et al. 2018)
 - Coercion (e.g. Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2011)
- "Coasian" World: irrelevant, especially for the US (irrelevant)

► Today:

- Quasi-random variation from "railroad land grants" policy
- Concentration increased in alternate square miles of land ("checkerboard")
- Study effects on land values then &pprox150 years later

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▶ Land Concentration \rightarrow

- Low investment (historically)
- Low land values (today)
- Mechanisms
 - Tenancy, sharecropping (static)

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Mechanisms

• Tenancy, sharecropping (static)

Historical Background

Railroad Land Grants Were Important



Areas Allotted for Railroad Land Grants (Miller and Staebler 1999)

Historical Background

Railroad Grants and Land Concentration

Federal lands / 1862 Homestead Act:


- Goal: reduce land monopolization
- 160 acres max (no large farms)
- (Nearly) free if you lived on it
- \rightarrow Less concentrated land
- Railroad lands:
 - Goal: profit
 - As much land as you wanted
 - ...at market prices
 - \rightarrow <u>More concentrated</u> land

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
The Railroad "Checkerboard"



Note: Railroad lands in Nebraska; Each pixel is a "section"

Railroad Land Grants Created Large Farms

Figure 1: Land Concentration Over Time, Banner County



▶ Land Concentration \rightarrow

- Low investment (historically)
- Low land values (today)

Mechanisms

• Tenancy, sharecropping (static)

"[Landlord] ownership and tenancy (did not always result in the best use of the land...) [it] forced widespread dispersion of population and placed heavy tax burdens upon farmers whose improved lands could be more heavily assessed than the speculators' unimproved lands." (Gates 1942)

▶ More Quotes

Within the grant boundary, just compare even & odd sections.

$$y_i = \alpha \mathsf{R}\mathsf{R}_i + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

- Assumption: no systematic even/odd square difference
- Unit i is a (non-education) section
- ▶ y an outcome
- ▶ RR_i is whether the section should have been granted to the railroad (odd-numbered)
- ► X controls
- Standard errors generally spatial

	Historical (early 1900s)	Modern (2017)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(asinh)	(asinh)	(asinh) Value	(asinh) Value
	Improvements	Improvements	Assessor	Placebo
RR Effect	-0.77**	-0.23***	-0.044***	-0.0013
	(0.28)	(0.047)	(0.014)	(0.0050)
Sample	Morrill	All	All	Placebo
	1912	2017		
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Township	Spatial	Spatial	Spatia
N	101	132,463	132,463	230,483
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	\$3.2k	\$ 1,277k	\$2,185k	\$9,566k

Table 1: Effects on Investment and Population

Historically: Landlords Didn't Invest

Figure 2: Land Improvement in Morrill County, Nebraska






Figure 2: Land Improvement in Morrill County, Nebraska




Today: Similar to Small Farmers' Choices

Figure 2: Land Improvement in Morrill County, Nebraska



RR Grant Policy Negatively Impacted Nearby Land

Figure 3: (asinh) Total Property Value, Residuals



▶ Land Concentration \rightarrow

- Low investment (historically)
- Low land values (today)

Mechanisms

• Tenancy, sharecropping (static)

"The concentration of land ownership in large holdings is favorable to landlordism and tenancy."

- Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1923

"[One landlord] purchased 160,000 acres which he... rented to tenants...


(He refused to make improvements upon his land...) The result, of course, was that the buildings and fences were wretchedly poor and [his] lands came to be considered the 'most forlorn-looking estate in Illinois.' " (Gates 1941)

Table 2: Effects on Owner Distance to Land

	First Owners		Later Owners	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Non-Farm Home (%)	Other State (%)	Other County (%) Early 1900s	(log) Distance 2017
RR Effect	15.7***	10.6***	8.24***	0.037***
	(4.09)	(3.19)	(2.64)	(0.014)
log(RR Distance)	-3.37	4.63* [*]	-60.3	0.099***
	(2.48)	(1.82)	(37.8)	(0.024)
Sample	Lincoln	Lincoln	2 Counties	Non-gov
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Township	Township	Township	Spatial
Ň	1,239	1,591	614	34,221
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	47%	66%	88%	60 mi


Largest Effects in Sharecropping-prone Areas

Figure 4: Effects on Property Values by Fraction Sharecropping



▶ Exogenous Prediction

Mechanisms



Natural experiment in the American West

• Changed land concentration ${pprox}150$ years ago


Economic impact

- Less intensive, lower-value land use
- Tenant farming & sharecropping
- Markets resolve differences, but very slowly
- Different view of the American frontier

Appendix

Largest Effects in Sharecropping-prone Areas


Figure 5: Effects on Property Values by Geography-Predicted Share Tenancy





Which Type of Tenancy Matters?

- Sharecropping vs. other forms (e.g. cash)
- Observe at county level
- Predict from geographic characteristics, state lat × lon
- ► Spatial polynomial, better land → more share tenancy
 - Alston & Reid 1982
 - Tenants need more cash



◀ Back

Figure 6: Neighboring Concentrated Land








Figure 7: Distance of Property Expansions, Banner County



◀ Back

Appendix

Bandwidth Robustness



▲ Back

Appendix

Table 3: Spillover Effects on (asinh) Property Values

	(1) Base	(2) County	(3) Donut	(4) All odds
RR Effect	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.17**	-0.095***
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.074)	(0.034)
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatia	County	Spatia	Spatia
N	23,382	23,38Ž	19,845	25,142
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	\$1,755k	\$1,755k	\$1,806k	\$1,773k


▲ Back

"South of Loup City to the county line, were holdings of such extent that by 1884 they were known as ranches. Most extensive was Barker Estate ranch... [In 1880, they] purchased 3839.52 acres... from the C, B & Q railroad" ("A Brief History of Sherman County, Nebraska," Owens 1952) "The asking price [of railroad land] ranged between \$2 and \$8 per acre, amounts considerably above the traditional preemptive price of \$1.25. That the trace of the old railroad grant line is mirrored by the distribution of upper southerners in 1885 is strong evidence that these hard-pressed people chose their new homesites with finances more than politics or other concerns in mind."

(Shortridge 1997 on Kansas)

◀ Back


Historical Literature on Prices



(Source: Shortridge 1997)




Figure 4: Land Improvement in Morrill County, Nebraska



Today: Similar to Small Farmers' Choices

Figure 4: Land Improvement in Morrill County, Nebraska



"To gain their objectives the speculators [largeholders] were forced to enter politics... They favored grants for railroads and measures to make easier land accumulation. They were influential in local and state governments which they warped to suit their interests." (Gates 1941)

"The successful land dealer of one generation became the banker, the local political oracle, and office holder or the country squire of the next. Scarcely a city or country town in the West but had its first family whose fortune had been made by shrewd selection of lands and their subsequent sale or rental to later comers." (Gates 1942)

▲ Back

	Direct			Spillover			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Public Goods	Tax Ťime	Officeseeking	Public Goods	Tax Ťime	Officeseeking	
RR Effect	-0.024*	-0.17***	-3.61	-0.0021	-0.080	-4.46	
	(0.013)	(0.036)	(5.35)	(0.019)	(0.16)	(4.36)	
Samala	NE & KS	Perkins	Morrill	NE & KS	Perkins	Morrill	
Sample	1940	1900	1912	1940	1900	1912	
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y				
SEs / Clusters	Spatia	Township	Township	Spatial	Township	Township	
N	18,999	531	82	4,064	265	162	
N (clusters)	N/A	24	9	N/A	19	16	
$\mathbb{E}[y]$.13	2 yrs	5.5%	.12	2.5 yrs	4.9%	

Table 4: Impact on Political Outcomes

Back

Environmental Characteristics are Balanced

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Soil	Elevation	Slopes	Streams
Panel A: Direct	Effects			
RR Effect	-0.00045	-0.000098**	-0.0017	-0.00075
	(0.0010)	(0.000050)	(0.0018)	(0.0021)
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial
N	132,463	132,463	132,463	132,463
N (clusters)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
$\mathbb{E}[\hat{y}]$	046	.34	8.8	.26
Panel B: Spillov	er Effects			
RR Effect	-0.0065	-0.00081	0.0053	0.010
	(0.0092)	(0.0011)	(0.024)	(0.014)
Area	A	A	All	A
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs				
SEs / Clusters	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial
N	23,382	23,382	23,382	23,382
N (clusters)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
$\mathbb{E}[\hat{y}]$.026	.34	7.1	.22



Explanations that Don't Work: Agglomeration / Towns

	Direct		Spill	over
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Places	Towns	Places	Towns
RR Effect	0.00034	0.0010*	0.0045	0.00062
	(0.00024)	(0.00059)	(0.0034)	(0.0016)
Sample	RR	RR	All	All
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y		
SEs / Clusters	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial
N [′]	132,463	132,463	23,382	23,382
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 6: Effects on Town Formation



"Although the [Union Pacific] developers argued about how to get out of the Missouri Valley into the loess country intervening between Omaha and the Platte at Fremont, Nebraska, the route was chosen mainly from the viewpoint of cost"


"The characteristics of the country south of the Oregon Trail which led the engineers to favor building the railroad there may be presented briefly. Most important, at least most often cited, was greater directness... Next perhaps was the greater snowfall of the Sweetwater-South Pass line."

(Vance 1961)

▲ Back (formula description) ▲ Back (switchboard)

Indivisibilities: Properties are Rarely Split

Figure 5: Banner County Unsplit 1900 Properties



Excluding Housing Value

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(asinh) Value				
	Assessor	Assessor	Assessor	Assessor	Assessor
RR Effect	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.033***	-0.034***	-0.041***
	(0.0094)	(0.0088)	(0.0088)	(0.0085)	(0.0094)
RR imes Low					0.027***
					(0.0078)
Sample	All	All	All	All	All
State FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs		Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs			Y	Y	Y
Geo Controls				Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatia	Spatia	Spatia	Spatia	Spatia
N	132,463	132,463	132,463	132,463	132,463
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	\$2,185k	\$2,185k	\$2,185k	\$2,185k	\$2,185k

Table 7: Effects on Total Property Value (Except Housing)

▲ Back (value results)

	Main			Placebo			
	(1) (asinh) Investment	(2) Improved %	(3) (asinh) Farmst eads	(4) (asinh) Investment	(5) Improved %	(6) (asinh) Farmsteads	
RR Effect	-0.77**	-9.93**	-0.26***	0.042	-0.45	-0.015	
	(0.28)	(4.30)	(0.012)	(0.052)	(0.67)	(0.012)	
log(RR Distance)	-20.6*	-184.4	-0.021	-6.42**	-51.1	-0.22**	
. ,	(9.59)	(132.9)	(0.013)	(2.88)	(40.5)	(0.10)	
Sample	Morri∥ 1912	Morrill 1912	NE 1940	Placebo	Placebo	Placebo	
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
SEs / Clusters	Township	Township	Spatial	Township	Township	Spatia	
N	101	101	18,999	1,229	1,229	8,836	
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	\$3.2k	13%	2	\$2.2k	22%	1.5	

Table 8: Direct Effects on Historic Population, Physical Investment

▲ Back (investment results) ▲ Back (switchboard)


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(asinh)	Investment	(asinh)	(asinh)	(asinh)
	Investment	> 0 (%)	Housing	Non-Housing	Pop (NE)
RR Effect	-0.23***	-3.68***	-0.22***	-0.16***	-0.094***
	(0.047)	(1.00)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.026)
log(RR Distance)	-0.48***	-4.31***	-0.45***	-0.42***	-0.36***
	(0.049)	(0.71)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.026)
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial	Spatial
N	132,463	132,463	121,906	132,463	17,713
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	\$1,277k	43%	\$1,004k	\$412k	18

Table 9: Direct Effects on Modern Population, Physical Investment

▲ Back (investment results) ▲ Back (switchboard)

Table 10: Impacts on Land Use

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Num. Uses	Crop Farm (%)	Grass Farm (%)	(asinh) Value Satellite (ag)
RR Effect	-0.093***	-1.68***	0.49	-0.027***
	(0.022)	(0.50)	(0.92)	(0.0094)
RR imes Low	0.089***	1.45***	6.53***	0.052***
	(0.018)	(0.49)	(1.69)	(0.014)
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatial	Spatia	Spatial	Spatial
N	132,462	132,462	94,571	132,462
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	4.2	40%	81%	3.2%



Adjusting for Census Block Attenuation

 $y_i = [\text{overlap}]_i \times RR_i + \gamma [\text{overlap}]_i + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_i$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(asinh)	(asinh)	(asinh)
	Farmsteads	Pop Adjusted	Pop Ünadjusted
RR Effect	-0.25***	-0.16***	-0.096***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.030)
Blocks	. ,	0.45	. ,
		(.)	
log(RR Distance)	-0.030**	-0.34 ^{***}	-0.35***
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Sample	Nebraska 1940	Nebraska 2000	Nebraska 2000
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatia	Spatia	Spatia
N	15,550	15,550	15,550
N (clusters)	N/A	N/A	N/A
$\mathbb{E}[\hat{y}]$	1.1	1.6	1.6

Table 11: Direct Effects on Population



Table 12: Modern Owner Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(asinh) Land Owned	(asinĥ) ́Land Owned	(log) Owner Distance	Company (%)	Government (%)
RR Effect	-0.15	0.041***	0.037***	6.46***	-8.27**
	(0.20)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(2.41)	(3.49)
Sample	All	Non-gov	Non-gov	All	All
Geo Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Township FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SEs / Clusters	Spatial	Spatial	Spatia	Spatia	Spatia
N [′]	131,543	35,670	34,221	131,543	131,543
$\mathbb{E}[y]$	262 mi ²	11 mi ²	60 mi	27%	21%

A Back (regressions) A Back (switchboard)