Are Judges Like Umpires? Political Affiliation and Corporate Prosecutions

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Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them... my job is to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat. – Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 2005

RESHAPING THE COURTS FOR YEARS TO COME: The judges appointed by President Trump will make a lasting impact on the courts for decades to come.

- https://www.whitehouse.gov/

and the research shows...

- Republican-appointed judges systematically reach different outcomes in most contexts, e.g. Sunstein et al. (2006) and Epstein et al. (2013)
- For example, Republican-appointed judges giving longer sentences to all defendants (Schanzenbach & Tiller 2007, 2008), with particularly long sentences for Black defendants (Cohen and Yang, 2018)
- Considerable variation in judge decisions generally, e.g. Kling (2006), Dobbie & Song (2015), Arnold, Dobbie, & Yang (2018), many more
- But the literature has focused on criminal cases to exploit random assignment and the large number of cases within court x time cells
- The literature has also focused on binary tests of importance rather than quantifying exactly how important judge characteristics are

This Paper

- Extends prior work to corporate prosecutions using a design that does not require random assignment or a large number of cases
- Develop a difference-in-differences specification compares cases with a Democrat/Republican tilt assigned to Democrat/Republican judges:

 $Y_{ijklt} = \beta Democrat_j \times Democrat Tilt_k + \alpha_j + \alpha_k + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{ijklt}$ (1)

controlling for judge, crime, and year fixed effects

- Eq. (1) does **not** exploit random assignment without court x time effects, which are infeasible here given the number of cases
- Can add judge age/race/gender interactions to Eq. (1) to explore the "mechanisms" driving any effects

This Paper

- Democrat-appointed judges impose larger fines for environmentaland labor-related crimes, while Republican-appointed judges impose larger fines for crimes related to hiring undocumented workers
- No effects on the probability of guilt, with suggestive evidence that results stronger when vacancies exist on a higher court
- All in all, an interesting paper that was a lot of fun to read!

Next Steps: 1/4

- One of the key contributions is developing a design that does not rely on random assignment or a large sample of cases
- Highlight this contribution and explain how the reliance on random assignment has limited prior work to criminal cases in subset of courts
- The coding of Democrat/Republican tilt also interesting and could be further developed and highlighted, as likely to be used in future work

- Cohen and Yang (2018) is the most similar paper in the literature; suggest building on their approach more explicitly
- Most importantly, show results with and without judge fixed effects and show the "Democrat" main effect when judge effects omitted
- While I agree that the interaction of a Democrat judge and tilt is your most important contribution, the main effect is also interesting!

Next Steps: 3/4

- Currently drop a relatively large number of cases where fines = 0
- Potentially better options include:
 - Show results for both the extensive and intensive margins together
 - Binary outcomes for different fine thresholds that include all cases
 - Arcsin?

Next Steps: 4/4

- Likely beyond the scope of this paper, but the next frontier is quantifying the percent of variation explained by judges
- Few believe that judges are neutral at this point, but little consensus on just how important judges are compared to other factors