## A Model of Scientific Communication

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## **Classical Model of Statistics (Wald 1950)**

- Analyst observes data  $X \in \mathcal{X}$
- Uses X to form estimate of unknown parameter  $\theta \in \Theta$
- · Estimate is "good" if close to true value of parameter
- · Formalized by imagining a decision problem in which
  - estimate is a decision  $d \in \mathcal{D}$
  - want to minimize loss  $L(d, \theta)$
- Dominant paradigm for point estimation
  - e.g.,  $L(d, \theta) = (d \theta)^2$  gives MSE criterion
  - Foundation of most optimality claims

#### **Classical Model of Statistics (Wald 1950)**



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• Example: Analyst works for a firm that must make a pricing decision

#### Alternative Model of Statistics in Science



### Alternative Model of Statistics in Science



• Example: Analyst reports to scientists with diverse opinions, policymakers with diverse objectives

## Today

- Argue that these two models represent fundamentally different, and at times conflicting, views of the analyst's goal
- Can lead to very different recommended procedures
- (Time permitting) Discuss possible implications for empirical research

# Setting

## Timing

- Analyst publicly commits to a rule  $c : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{D}$
- Analyst observes data  $X \in \mathcal{X}$ , where  $X \sim F_{\theta}$
- Analyst makes report c(X) to an audience A
- Each agent  $a \in A$  selects decision d and realizes loss  $L(d, \theta)$

### Audience

- Agents  $a \in A$  have different priors on  $\theta$ 
  - Write  $E_a[\cdot]$  for expectation under *a*'s prior
  - Identify each agent with their prior, so  $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \Delta(\Theta)$
- All disagreement expressed via priors
- Paper shows that nests cases with disagreement over
  - Loss function L
  - Likelihood  $F_{\theta}$

- Analyst tries to minimize expected loss (i.e. risk) for the agents
  - Benevolent analyst: no conflict of interest between analyst and agents
- Consider two possible definitions for the risk of rule c for agent a
  - Decision risk (classical model)

 $\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[L\left(c\left(X\right),\theta\right)\right],$ 

as if analyst makes decision on agent's behalf

• Communication risk (alternative model)

$$\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[\min_{d\in\mathcal{D}}\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[L\left(d,\theta\right)|c\left(X\right)\right]\right],$$

as if agent makes optimal decision given report

- In special case of squared-error loss  $L(d, \theta) = (d \theta)^2$ 
  - Decision risk (classical model)

$$\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[L(c(X),\theta)\right]=\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[\left(c(X)-\theta\right)^{2}\right],$$

is mean squared error

• Communication risk (alternative model)

$$\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[\min_{d\in\mathcal{D}}\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[L\left(d,\theta\right)|c\left(X\right)\right]\right]=\mathsf{E}_{a}\left[\mathsf{Var}_{a}\left(\theta|c\left(X\right)\right)\right],$$

is expected posterior variance

- Decision/communication distinction irrelevant when  $\left|\mathcal{A}\right|=1$ 
  - Benevolent analyst will pick  $c(X) = E_a[\theta|X]$ , so coincide
- Distinction can matter when  $|\mathcal{A}| > 1$

## Example

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
- Analyst conducts a randomized trial with a binary outcome
- Goal is to learn the success probability θ = (θ<sub>1</sub>,...,θ<sub>J</sub>) at each of a finite set of ordered treatments {1,...,J}
  - e.g., Probability of purchase at a set of prices
  - e.g., Probability of callback at a set of unemployment spell lengths
- Success probabilities known to be decreasing,  $\theta_1 \ge \theta_2 \ge ... \ge \theta_J$ 
  - e.g., Demand slopes down
  - e.g., Longer unemployment spells deter employers
- Quadratic loss  $L(d, \theta) = \sum_{j} (d_j \theta_j)^2$


## Example

- n independent observations for each treatment
- Data  $X = (X_1, ..., X_J)$  are fraction of successes for each
- Decision space  $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{X}$  rich enough to communicate full data
- Audience  $\mathcal{A} = \Delta(\Theta)$  includes all possible priors
  - Everyone agrees that  $\theta_j \ge \theta_{j+1}$  for all j
  - ...but may disagree about everything else


### **Two Rules**

- Consider two possible rules
  - Full data:  $c_j(X) = X_j$ 
    - Reports success fraction for each treatment j
  - Rearranged data:  $c_{j}^{*}(X) = j$ th highest element of  $\{X_{1}, ..., X_{J}\}$ 
    - · Sorts success fractions in descending order








#### **Decision Risk Perspective**




- Rearranged data *c*\* dominates full data *c* in decision risk
  - · Achieves weakly lower risk for all agents, strictly lower for some
  - Intuitively, gets closer to true parameter
  - cf. Chernozhukov et al. (2009)
- Classical model would recommend *c*\* over *c*










#### **Communication Risk Perspective**



- Full data *c* dominates rearranged data *c*\* in communication risk
  - Intuitively, preserves decision-relevant information

- So far, we've shown that different models made different selections from the pair of rules {c, c\*}
- A stronger statement is true
- **Definition**: A rule is admissible (in a given notion of risk) if it is not dominated by another rule
- In this example, any rule that is admissible in decision risk is inadmissible in communication risk, and vice versa
  - No choice of rule resolves conflict between two notions of risk

- Shows conflict between goals of decision and communication
- Recommendations of classical model may not achieve goals of scientific analyst who cares about communication
- In this example, communication-optimal rules seem more in line with empirical practice
  - e.g. we're not aware of any unemployment audit studies that report only the sorted data, though many report unsorted results
  - Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) report both unsorted and sorted versions

## Generalizations, and Implications

## Generalizations

- Paper considers more general settings
  - Focus on discrete  $\mathcal{X},\,\Theta,\,\mathcal{D}$
  - Results for some continuous cases in supplement
- Provide sufficient conditions for admissibility conflict
- Intuition is the same: good decision rules discard useful information

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- We also provide results for other optimality criteria
  - Weighted average of risk over the audience
  - Worst-case risk over the audience

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- We also provide results for other optimality criteria
  - Weighted average of risk over the audience
  - Worst-case risk over the audience
- Negative results extend to weighted average case
- For worst case risk, get a positive result

- In example, analyst concerned with communication can solve problem by reporting *X*
- Doesn't seem fully satisfactory in general
  - Otherwise, why does anyone write papers?
- Suggests communication or information processing constraints
- Raises question of optimal constrained communication
  - · Optimal rules will depend on details of how model constraints
- Less ambitious: short of optimal rules, can we find simple, practical ways for analyst to reduce communication risk?
  - Andrews, Gentzkow, Shapiro (2020), "Transparency in Structural Research" discusses a range of practices
  - e.g. showing sensitivity to misspecification in the spirit of Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012), Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017)

## Summary

- Focusing on communication rather than decision-making changes understanding of the goals of empirical scientist
- Leads to very different recommendations than classical decision-theoretic model in some cases
- Hope that change in perspective may help suggest good procedures for communicating scientific results

# Thank you!