Short- and Long-Run Effects of a Sizable Child Subsidy: Evidence from the "Maternity Capital" program in Russia.

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NBER, 2020

Research topic

Large-Scale Policy Experiment in Russia aimed to increase fertility:

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- Facing long-lasting period of low fertility and natural decline in population Russian government introduced conditional child subsidy(es)
- "Maternity Capital Programs"

Research questions

- Effect of fertility
 - Short Run? Long Run?
 - Milligan, 2011, Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov, 2013, Gonsales, 2013, Slonimczyk and Yurko, 2014, Adda et al, 2015 vs Malkova, 2019
- Policy Motivation:
- Many countries face decline in fertility
 - United States, all European countries and the most of the remaining: fertility is below the replacement level
 - Comes at costs: future ability to finance old-age benefits
- Expensive policies (3% of GDP in developed countries)
- ► The effectiveness of the policies aimed to increase fertility is uncertain

Research questions

General equilibrium effects of the this large scale policy (Acemoglu, 2015)

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- Family stability, Housing market
- Costs per induced birth?

Research Design

- Large-Scale Policy Experiment in Russia aimed to increase fertility
- "Maternity Capital Program"
- Facing long-lasting period of low fertility and natural decline in population Russian government introduced conditional child subsidy(es)

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Institutional Set Up: Maternity Capital program

Two waves:

- MAIN , 1st wave, Federal
- Started on 1st Jan, 2007
 - was introduced to the State Duma, and announced to public in October 2006
- Eligibility: family with second or more child born after 1st Jan 2007
- One-time benefit (once per family)
- Size: more than 10,000 dollars
 - more than average 18-month wage
 - Relative size is much bigger than that in most of the countries
- Restricted use: can spend only on 1) housing (88%) 2) child education
 3) mother pension

1st wave: Federal Maternity Program



Fertility in Russia: discontinuous change in birth rate 9 months after announcing subsidy

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2nd Wave: Regional Maternity Capital Programs

- 2nd wave, Regional MC programs
- Introduced at the end of 2011 and on Jan 1st of 2012
 - ▶ 85% of regions adopted subsidies in 2011- Jan 1st of 2012
 - ▶ 5% of regions adopted additional subsidies earlier, in 2008
 - 10% of regions do not have Regional MC program
- mainly for 3rd child, sometimes for 1st, also mostly restricted use (housing, education)
- average amount 2,500 dollars (varying from 1,000 to 10,000 dollars)

- on the top of federal money
- most programs started at 1st January 2012

Effect of two programs on birth rates (TFR)



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Data Sources for analysis

Aggregate data: monthly, quarterly

- Rosstat data: monthly births by Russian regions; on other outcomes
- HFD: monthly births by country
- Russian Fertility and Mortality Database (RFMD, Regional level data): annual data on various fertility measures
- 2010 Census data: monthly; various dimensions; retrospective data
- 2015 Micro-census data: quarterly; various dimensions; retrospective data

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- Individual data: (annual)
 - RLMS

Short Run Effect on Fertility: RD design

- ▶ RD look on small neighborhood within July, 2007 (Jan, 2012)
- Regression discontinuity approach RD specification:

 $Y_{rt} = \theta I(t \ge 0)_{rt} + f(t) + g(t) * I(t \ge 0)_{rt} + D'_{rt} \Gamma + u_{rt}$

- ▶ where t is date (year + (month 1/12)) normalized to be 0 at the month maternity capital was announced
- f(t) and g(t) the smooth function of time
- Y_{rt} stands for log births: for all, and by birth order (1st, 2nd, 3rd child)
- the set of controls D_{rt} includes the month fixed effects to control for seasonality
- use triangular kernel, f(t) is parameterized to be a first-order polynomial, and the error terms u_{rt} are clustered at date level
- bandwidth equals to 3 years
- the parameter of interest θ stands for the effect of maternity capital

RD Regression Results: 2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		log bir	th rate	
birth order:	all	1st	2nd	3rd
I(after 2007)	0.090***	0.072***	0.120***	0.150***
	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.018]
Other specs				
CCT	0.079***	0.086**	0.094***	0.120***
	[0.026]	[0.035]	[0.032]	[0.038]
bandwidth, CCT	1.16	0.97	0.94	0.9
bandwidth, Own	3	3	3	3

Robust standard errors in brackets, data on regional*monthly cells; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

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RD Regression Results: 2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	log births rate				
Birth order:	all	1st	2nd	3rd	
I(after 2012)	0.043***	0.084***	0.011	0.101***	
	[0.015]	[0.026]	[0.019]	[0.033]	
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,					

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* p<0.1, data on region X quarterly cells

RD Regression Results

- 2007 Federal Maternity Capital results in SR increase in total fertility rate by 9%
- Higher effect for second and higher order children
 - birth rates of 1st child increase by 5 7 %
 - ▶ 2nd child: + 12%
 - ▶ 3rd child: + 15%
- ► 2012 Regional Maternity Capital results in further increase in total fertility rate by 4%

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- Higher effect for third and higher order children
 - 2nd child: no effect
 - ▶ 3rd child: + 12%

Effect of Family Stability and Housing Market

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Share of children that live with single parent



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Source: 2010 Census

Effect on Family

	log births:	log births:	share
	married	non married	non married
I(after 2007)	0.103***	0.067***	-0.004***
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.001]
Mean before (a	lways-takers)		.128
Predicted Mean	n After		.124
Mean for Com	pliers		.079

	log births:	log births:	share with
	both parents	single parent	single parent
I(after 2007)	0.107***	0.083***	-0.005**
	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.003]
Mean before (always-takers)			.29
Predicted Mean After			.284
Mean for Compliers			.225

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Effect on Family

- Also: decrease in share of mother with college degree, increase in average age of mother, no difference between urban an rural
- 5% 2010 Census Micro-Sample: annual data on births, but can control for everything simultaneously

	I(give birth)		
I(after 2007)× I(non married)	-0.062***		
	[0.001]		
I(after 2007)× I(single parent)		-0.077***	
		[0.002]	

Regressions include year age, regional FE, mother education, I(urban area), regional characteristics and their interaction with I(after 2007).

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Regional Housing Markets and Heterogeneity in RD (2007) effect

- 2007 reform
- relative size of maternity capital to price of real estate in a region
 - ► if family buys apartments using maternity capital, then children by the law also became owners of the apartments
 - some families that bough expensive apartments prefer not to use maternity capital
 - ▶ In Moscow can buy 2.4 sq.m. of apartments, in North Osetia 20 sq.m.

$$Y_{mt} = \theta I(t \ge 0)_{rt} + \gamma I(t \ge 0)_{rt} (Z_{rt0} - \overline{Z_{rt0}}) + \mu Z_{rt0} + f(t) + g(t) * I(t \ge 0)_{rt} + D'_{rt} \Gamma + u_{rt}$$

- Z_{rt0} stands for pre-reform regional characteristics (in year 2006),
- the availability of housing is average size of living area (per person) in a region
- the affordability of housing is defined as the size of apartments that can be bought using maternity capital

Regional Heterogeneity: Estimates

-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES		all births		1st child	2nd child
After ×	0.007***		0.002	0.017***	0.019***
meters per MC	[0.002]		[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.002]
After×		-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.024***	-0.014***
living area		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]
After	0.081***	0.080***	0.081***	0.083***	0.131***
	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.016]
Observations	6,240	6,396	6,240	8,468	8,468
R-squared	0.246	0.461	0.497	0.496	0.341

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Maternity Capital and Local Housing Markets



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Panel A: Housing prices. Panel B: Construction of new houses

MC may affect Housing market, but part of the effect may come from development of mortgage market

Maternity Capital and Local Housing Markets

- Regional-level Regressions:
- After controlling for extensive set of characteristics regional credit market, average mortgage characteristics, local mortgage markets, regional economy characteristics, time trend and regional fixed effects, time trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)
			log const-
	log real pri	ce, 1 sq.m	ruction of
	new	secondary	housing
I(after 2007)	0.160***	0.196***	0.116***
	[0.037]	[0.034]	[0.029]

▶ Prices increase by 16-20%; construction rises by 12%

Long and Medium Run Effects on Fertility

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RD:

- local (Short Run) Effect
- ► Can say more?

Long Run Analysis: DID

Cross-Regional DID

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- $Y_{art} = \gamma S_{rt} + \delta_t + \delta_a + t * \delta_a + \delta_r + t * \delta_r + D'_{rt}\Gamma + u_{art}$
- S_{rt} = ratio of the regional subsidy to the federal subsidy
- Also: in regions with higher real price of federal MC
- DID for families with different family structure: birth rates of 2+ parity versus 1st

$$Y_{apt} = \gamma_{21}I(year \ge 2007)I(parity \ge 2) + \gamma_{22}I(year \ge 2012)I(parity \ge 2)$$

 $\delta_t + \delta_{ap} + t * \delta_{ap} + u_{apt}$

- Triple Differences (DDD)
- Both variations (by regions and by family structure)

Long Run Analysis: DID

	Log Fertility Rate		
Cross-regional DiD			
S _{rt}	0.073***	0.055***	
	[0.023]	[0.020]	
$I(year \ge 2007) imes$		0.012***	
meters per MC		[0.004]	

(2+ parity) vs (1st) DiD		
$I(2012 \ge year \ge 2007) \times$	0.116***	
$I(parity \geq 2)$	[0.035]	
$I(year \ge 2012) imes$	0.177***	
$I(parity \ge 2)$	[0.037]	
DDD		
$S_{rt} \times I(parity = 3)$	0.258**	

[0.116]

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Long Run Regional Analysis: cumulative effect

$\begin{aligned} Y_{artb} = \theta_1 I(year \geq 2007)_{rt} + \theta_2 I(year \geq 2012) + \gamma S_{rt} \\ + \delta_{art} + t * \delta_{art} + D'_{rt} \Gamma + u_{art} \end{aligned}$

Check that two Short-Run effects (2007 and 2012) survive in the long run

- With and without various time trends
- On the top of this additional cross-regional DID variation
 - S_{rt} ratio of the regional subsidy to the federal MC subsidy
- Years: data till 2017 i.e. 10 years of the program

Long Run Regional Analysis: cumulative effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	all	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Panel A: Regio	nal Level data	ı			
I(after 2007)	0.128***	0.098***	0.189***	0.166***	0.113***
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.023]
I(after 2012)	0.064***	0.061***	0.079***	0.183***	0.181***
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.015]
S _{rt}	0.081*	0.042		0.185*	0.236*
	[0.046]	[0.059]		[0.102]	[0.125]
Controls	Age and Regional fixed effects, Age-specific time				
trends, log average income and housing availability					

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Note: Results are slightly higher than RD estimates

Completed Cohort Fertility Rate

- If look on of two RD (short run) estimates over 2007-2017 (and over 2012-2017)
- ► In the unrealistically pessimistic scenario where Russian women who are of age 35-45 in 2017 stop giving birth completely, the average number of children that they will have at the end of the fertility age (55) will exceed that of the control group
- ► In a region with an average regional subsidy, we document an increase in completed fertility for a cohort of women aged 38 to 55 in 2017.
- ► In a region with a maximum subsidy level, the increased completed fertility is documented for ages 35 to 55.
 - Note: this is pessimistic scenario: indeed we see larger increase for 25-35 yo women

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WTP

- How much government is willing to pay for an birth that have been induced by this program?
- ► Family receives 10,000 dollars for a child
- The Maternity Capital subsidy results in an increase in fertility rates by 7% and 13% for the first and for higher order children correspondingly
- ► For this increase in fertility the government pays to 100% of second order child (10,000 dollars per child).
- There are approximately equal numbers of births of first and of 2nd (or higher) order children.

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► Thus, WTP equals to 10,000*(100/(7+13)) or **50,000 dollars.**

Overview of main Results

- ► Over 10 years of reform TFR in Russia grew up from 1.3 to 1.78 (by 37%)
- Already see increase in completed cohort fertility for females of age 35-40 in 2017
- Sizable Effects on other markets
 - Housing
 - Family Stability
- Program is tremendously expensive
- Paper is available in SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3416509

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Thank you!