

Guiding Consumers through Lemons and Peaches: Analyzing the Effects of Search Design Activities

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Contribution

- Contribution: Assess the extent to which different information provision strategies affect consumer welfare and seller outcomes
 - ▶ Characterize consumer search for multiattribute products
 - ▶ Determine the empirical effects of endogenous search frictions in a mature Internet context
 - ▶ Determine how strategic consumers are while searching (Gabaix and Laibson 2006, Frazier et. al 2009, Powell 2010, Liang et. al 2017)

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 - ▶ Determine how strategic consumers are while searching (Gabaix and Laibson 2006, Frazier et. al 2009, Powell 2010, Liang et. al 2017)
- Challenge:
 - ▶ Assessing the effect of different information scenarios implies incorporating sophisticated consumer behavior
 - ▶ While go-to techniques (Weitzman, simultaneous search) are popular because they reduce the burden of estimating structural parameters...
 - ▶ ...they impose strict assumptions on consumer behavior, usually easily falsifiable

Research Goals

1. Propose a model of consumer search, which allows for the following innovations:
 - ▶ Allow for piecemeal search within each alternative
 - ▶ Allow for arbitrary relationships across observable characteristics
 - ▶ Allow for flexible search paths (while alleviating the resulting curse of dimensionality)
 - ▶ Identify and estimate an unobserved utility component (correlated with remaining characteristics)
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 - ▶ Allow for forward-looking consumers
2. Once the consumer behavior fundamentals are recovered, we:
 - ▶ Consider various information provision strategies
 - ▶ Measure their welfare effects for buyers and seller
 - ▶ Pitch our model against a popular myopic learning analogue

Preview of Results

- Parameters
 - ▶ Preference; Search costs; Covariance matrix of characteristics
- Counterfactual Analysis:
 - ▶ Search frictions hamper conversion rates significantly
 - ▶ Information provision policies carry at most modest seller gains
 - ▶ Effects of information design are directionally similar for consumers and seller
 - ▶ Myopic model provides a poor approximation to the full dynamic problem

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 - ▶ Online customers can browse vehicles and schedule test drives online
 - ▶ Seller takes vehicle to potential buyer's address
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 - ▶ Researchers have access to the data viewed by consumers
 - ▶ Access to all consumer clickstream data and test-drive requests

Vehicle Information

Website organized in two tiers: Main listing page and Vehicle detail page

- Main Listing Page:
 - ▶ Search Filters
 - ▶ Vehicle Picture; Make/Model; Price; Year; Mileage

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 - ▶ Search Filters
 - ▶ Vehicle Picture; Make/Model; Price; Year; Mileage
- Vehicle Detail Page:
 - ▶ Additional vehicle pictures
 - ▶ Vehicle history (number of previous accidents; number of previous owners)
 - ▶ Inspection reports (number of inspection notes)

Dataset

Dataset

- Click stream data of 24,116 users, browsing 1,573 (sedan) vehicles
- Every event that occurs on the website, February 2016 - September 2016
- All vehicle characteristics, histories, and inspection reports
- Conversion variable: Ordered a test drive


Summary Statistics - User Level

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vehicle Detail Pages Viewed	2.28	3.47	1	129
Number of Sessions	6.03	21.14	1	762
Photo Sets Browsed	1.63	2.65	0	74
Vehicle Histories Browsed	0.69	2.09	0	101
Inspection Reports Browsed	0.30	1.27	0	53
Average Session Duration (min.)	14.2	13.39	0.1	282.04
Activity Range (days)	18.67	38.5	0	232

Number of users: 24,116

Note: Statistics are per user. The event “Photo Sets Browsed” equals one for each user-vehicle observation whenever a user browsed more 20 or more pictures of a vehicle.

Histograms and Scatter Plots of Vehicle Characteristics



Model - Utility and Beliefs

Search Model

- Ex-post consumption utility:

$$v_{ijt} = \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{jk} + \nu_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

$$v_{i0t} = \epsilon_{i0t} \quad (2)$$

- i : visitor
- j : vehicle
- k : vehicle characteristic
- x_{jk} : level of characteristic k vehicle j
- β_{ik} : consumers preference over characteristics
- ν_{ij} : unobservable utility component
- ϵ_{ijt} : idiosyncratic utility component

Beliefs

- Consumers' beliefs are consistent with the empirical joint distribution of characteristics

$$\mathcal{G}_{make_model, price, mileage, age, color, owners, accidents, notes} \quad (3)$$

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- Use a statistical copula to model the joint distribution of characteristics flexibly, and provide a first-stage estimate of consumer beliefs:

$$C(F_{X_1}(x_1), \dots, F_{X_K}(x_K))$$

- Challenges (in the paper):
 - ▶ Make/model and color are not ordinal variables
 - ▶ Some variables are discrete
 - ▶ Incorporating unobserved utility component ν_{ij}

Model: Search

Mapping between search actions and learned characteristics

Knowledge Level	Characteristic	Utility Component
Observable ex-ante	Ex-ante Characteristics	
	Make/Model	$make_model_j$
	Price	$price_j$
	Mileage	$mileage_j$
	Age	age_j
	Color	$color_j$
Learned upon visiting a vehicle's history	Vehicle History	
	# Previous Owners	$owners_j$
	# Accidents	$accidents_j$
Learned upon visiting inspection reports	Vehicle Status	
	# Inspection Notes	$notes_j$
Learned after browsing one photo set	Perceived Quality/Fit	
	Vehicle Photos	ν_{ij}

- State Variables:

- ▶ Ω_i : What a consumer has learned about vehicle characteristics: x and ν

Search Model

- At each decision point, consumer i solves problem:

$$V(\Omega_i, \epsilon_i) = \max \left\{ \underbrace{V_0(\Omega_i, \epsilon_1), \dots, V_J(\Omega_i, \epsilon_J)}_{\text{Terminal Decisions}}, \underbrace{V_{1,s}(\Omega_i, \epsilon_1), \dots, V_{J,s}(\Omega_i, \epsilon_J)}_{\text{Search Decisions}} \right\}_{s=1..S}$$

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- Upon stopping search, consumer earns utility:

$$V_j(\Omega_i, \epsilon_i) = E(v_{ij} | \Omega_i, \epsilon_i) \quad (4)$$

$$= E \left(\sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{jk} + v_{ij} \mid \Omega_{ij} \right) + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (5)$$

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- Utility of searching:

$$V_{j,s}(\Omega_i, \epsilon_i) = -c_s + E_{\epsilon'_i, \omega_{js}} (V(\Omega_i \cup \omega_{js}, \epsilon'_i) | \Omega_i) + \epsilon_{ij}^s \quad (6)$$

Estimation Approach


- Estimator needs to meet a few challenges:
 - ▶ Consumers take multiple actions, so likelihood of interest is of the search sequence
 - ▶ Each iteration solves as many value functions as consumers
 - ▶ State space is large ($\simeq 7.72 \times 10^{317}$ points; action space itself is 2^{3n})

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
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- State-Partitioning Estimator:
 - ▶ Take draws of characteristics from empirical distribution
 - ▶ Then, we assume the agent behaves as if she knew the drawn characteristics; she uses them to form beliefs
 - ▶ As agents search, they learn which drawn vehicles remain admissible, given what they have learned so far
 - ▶ The resulting tree is sparse and can be solved through backward induction
 - Estimator provides a feasible approximation to the complete problem

Example of Decision Tree (1 vehicle; 2 actions; 4 simulations)

Simulations			
#	x_1	x_2	freq.
1)	1	2	1
2)	1	3	2
3)	2	2	1



Example of Decision Tree from Data (1 vehicle; 50 simulations)



Partitioning Decision Tree

- Advantages
 - ▶ Decision tree admits sparse representation when taking action A followed by B leads consumer to same state as taking action B followed by A
 - ▶ Can handle arbitrarily correlated unobserved characteristic (support is based on a sparse grid, as in Heiss and Winschel, 2008)

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- Implementation aspects (aka, “nerd corner”)
 - ▶ Non-vectorizable and not GPU-friendly; tree is represented by pointers to objects
 - ▶ Core decision-tree code: ~3,000 lines in C++ code (~7,000 total)
 - ▶ Code is parallelizable

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 - ▶ Relationship between characteristics and purchase rates

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- Covariance parameters
 - ▶ Variance of unobservable utility component is normalized to one
 - ▶ Covariance parameters are identified by search rates conditional on known characteristic levels

Results

Results: Preference Parameters

Table: Model Estimates: Preference Parameters

Vehicle Characteristics	Parameter Estimates
<i>price</i>	-0.372** (0.000)
<i>mileage</i>	-0.19** (0.000)
<i>notes</i>	-0.36** (0.000)
<i>age</i>	-0.01 (0.348)
<i>accidents</i>	0.032 (0.434)
<i>owners</i>	-1.611** (0.000)

Log-Likelihood: -38,937.35

Make-Model and Color Dummies ✓

N= 12,887

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$.

Results: Search Costs

Table: Model Estimates: Search Cost Parameters

	Parameter Estimates
Segment 1	
c_{photos}	2.306** (0.031)
$c_{vehicle\ history}$	0.248** (0.048)
$c_{insp.\ report}$	5.255** (0.094)
Segment 2	
c_{photos}	0.034* (0.02)
$c_{vehicle\ history}$	4.382** (0.05)
$c_{insp.\ report}$	3.309** (0.022)
Other Parameters	
α	-0.732** (0.01)
Make-Model and Color Dummies N= 12,887	✓

Note: Significance levels: † $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$. Size of segment 1, implied by $\hat{\alpha}$, is 67.5%.

Results: Variance-Covariance Parameters

Table: Estimated Variance-Covariance Matrix


$$\hat{\Sigma}_0 = \left(\begin{array}{ccccccc} 1 & -0.66 & -0.31 & -0.73 & -0.07 & -0.21 & \mathbf{-0.44} \\ -0.66 & 1 & 0.37 & 0.71 & 0.08 & 0.27 & \mathbf{0.76} \\ -0.31 & 0.37 & 1 & 0.41 & 0.07 & 0.14 & \mathbf{0.67} \\ -0.73 & 0.71 & 0.41 & 1 & 0.09 & 0.24 & \mathbf{0.61} \\ -0.07 & 0.08 & 0.07 & 0.09 & 1 & 0.021 & \mathbf{0.1} \\ -0.21 & 0.27 & 0.14 & 0.24 & 0.021 & 1 & \mathbf{0.55} \\ \mathbf{-0.44} & \mathbf{0.76} & \mathbf{0.67} & \mathbf{0.61} & \mathbf{0.1} & \mathbf{0.55} & 1 \end{array} \right) \left| \begin{array}{l} \textit{Price} \\ \textit{Mileage} \\ \textit{Insp.notes} \\ \textit{Vehicle age} \\ \textit{No.accidents} \\ \textit{No.owners} \\ \nu \end{array} \right)$$

Note: In bold, cross-correlation elements induced by estimated parameters $s_1..s_6$. Rightmost vector shows the corresponding characteristics. Non-bold estimates all significant at 1% level.

Coefficients in bold: † $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$.

% Utility Variance Explained by each Characteristic

Figure: Utility Variance Decomposition



Note: Above, values obtained by simulating $Var_{x_j} [E(u|x_j)] \div Var(u)$.

Results: Model Fit

Table: Search Moments from Dataset and Model

	Data				Model Prediction			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Conversion Rate	0.047	0.213	0	1	0.055	0.228	0	1
N. Searches	1.639	3.22	1.082	9	1.433	1.153	0.5	6.054
Vehicle Histories	0.441	0.743	0	4	0.397	0.316	0.108	1.844
Inspection Reports	0.175	0.496	0	4	0.161	0.184	0	1.157
Photo Sets	1.023	0.873	0	4	0.875	0.664	0.268	3.376

N: 12,887 consumers

Counterfactual Analyses

Counterfactual Analyses

- ① Effects of different information design policies
- ② Comparison with myopic search policy

Counterfactual Analysis: Information Design and Conversions

Table: Conversion Effects of Exchanges of Attribute Visibilities

Front Page Attribute	Vehicle Detail Page Attribute	
	Vehicle History	Inspection Report
Mileage	+0.36% (+6.58%)**	-0.11% (-1.91%)
Age	+0.36% (+6.55%)**	-0.02% (-0.33%)
Price	+0.63% (+11.34%)**	-0.00% (-0.03%)

N: 12,887 consumers

Note: Above, impact of exchanging attributes in the front page with the ones in the vehicle detail page on mean conversions. Relative changes in parentheses.

Significance levels: † $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$.

Counterfactual Analysis: Information Design and Welfare

Table: Welfare Effects of Exchanges of Attribute Visibilities

Front Page Attribute	Vehicle Detail Page Attribute	
	Vehicle History	Inspection Report
Mileage	+1.65% (+1.73%)**	-0.39% (-0.41%)**
Age	+1.76% (+1.85%)**	-0.11% (-0.12%)
Price	+2.35% (+2.48%)**	+0.02% (+0.01%)*


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Note: Above, impact of exchanging attributes in the front page with the ones in the vehicle detail page on the number of searches. Relative changes in parentheses. Significance levels: † $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$.

- Conversions can increase moderately through information design
- Consumer welfare effects are low, but are often in line with the seller's own welfare
- Contrasts with ideas related to price obfuscation activities:
 - ▶ *...Internet tools will help consumers to find and to process information, but retailers may simultaneously harness the power of the Internet to make information processing problems more formidable...* - Ellison and Ellison, 2012
- We may be at a point where prices are nonetheless competitive, and so there is little incentive to not provide better matches, from the seller's point of view

Alignment between Consumer and Firm preferences

Figure: Information Design Effects: Consumer Welfare and Profits



Note: High correlation found between consumer and seller welfares

Myopic Policy

- Knowledge gradient approach (Frazier et. al 2009, Powell 2010); Myopic policy (Liang et. al 2017)
 - ▶ Decision makers are assumed to look 'one period' ahead
 - ▶ They search only if the immediate option value is high enough
 - ▶ Otherwise, pick a terminal action

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 - ▶ Decision makers are assumed to look 'one period' ahead
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 - ▶ Otherwise, pick a terminal action
- Model:

$$V_j(\Omega_i, \epsilon_i) = E(v_{ij} | \Omega_i, \epsilon_i) \quad (7)$$

$$V_{j,s}(\Omega_i, \epsilon_i) = -c_s + E_{\epsilon'_i, \omega_{js}} \left[\max \left\{ v_{i0}, V_1(\Omega_i, \epsilon'_i), \dots, V_j(\Omega_i \cup \omega_{js}, \epsilon'_i), \dots, V_J(\Omega_i, \epsilon'_i) \right\} \middle| \Omega_i \right] + \epsilon_{ij}^s \quad (8)$$

Assumption of Strategic Behavior Fits Data Best

Table: Consumer Behavior Statistics Compared with Myopic Model

	Data				Knowledge Gradient			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Conversion Rate	0.047	0.213	0	1	0.057	0.233	0	1
N. Searches	1.639	3.22	1.082	9	1.16	0.65	0.46	4.319
Vehicle Histories	0.441	0.743	0	4	0.279	0.163	0.057	1.143
Inspection Reports	0.175	0.496	0	4	0.119	0.084	0	0.694
Photo Sets	1.023	0.873	0	4	0.762	0.428	0.257	2.699

N: 12,887 consumers

- Vuong (1989) non-nested test rejects that both models are “at the same distance” from true model, $p < 0.01$

Conclusion

- Propose a flexible model of search, which allows for the following distinctive features:
 - ▶ Incremental search over multiple characteristics
 - ▶ Rich joint distribution of characteristics
 - ▶ Flexible search paths
 - ▶ Unobserved utility component
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 - ▶ Rich joint distribution of characteristics
 - ▶ Flexible search paths
 - ▶ Unobserved utility component
 - ▶ Forward-looking consumers
- Assessed implications of search frictions and search design
 - ▶ Search design has moderate conversion effects ($\simeq 6\%$)
 - ▶ Search design tends to make sellers more better off, when compared to buyers (influence takes place on the margin)
 - ▶ In our setting, search design has similar directional effects for seller and consumers, in contrast with early predictions (e.g., Ellison and Ellison 2012)

Thank you