

From Good to Bad Concentration? U.S. Industries over the past 30 years


Matias Covarrubias, Germán Gutiérrez
and Thomas Philippon

NYU, NBER, CEPR

April 2019, NBER Macro Annual


Stylized Fact: Concentration

Panel A. Cumulative Change in CR8 (%)




Source: U.S. Economic Census for all Businesses. Dashed lines because of changes in industry classification from SIC to NAICS.


Stylized Fact: After-Tax Net Profit Margins




Stylized Fact: Labor Share



US vs EU: Concentration




US vs EU & Asia: Profit Rates



Source: OECD STAN. Pre-Tax Gross Operating Surplus over Revenues.

US vs EU: Labor Shares



Source: EU KLEMS 2017. See also Cette et al. (2019).

Theory: Good vs Bad Concentration


- Ex-post profits: $\pi = \frac{\mu}{1+\mu} \left(\frac{a}{A}\right)^{\sigma-1} \frac{PY}{N} - \phi$
- Free entry: $\frac{\mathbb{E}[\pi]}{r+\delta} \leq \kappa$
- Number of firms (symmetric)

$$N = \frac{\mu}{1+\mu} \frac{PY}{(r+\delta)\kappa + \phi}$$

- Bad concentration: barriers to entry κ , regulatory capture
- Good concentration: efficient response to TFP, competition
- Selection effect $a^*(\sigma) \nearrow$


$$(r+\delta)\kappa = (1 - F(a^*)) \times E[\pi \mid a > a^*].$$

China Shock: N, Import-Adj. CR8







Notes: Compustat, NBER-CES and Peter Schott's data.

China Shock: Evaluating Measures



Notes: Compustat, NBER-CES and Peter Schott's import data. Plots show β_t from regressions
$$y_{i,j,t} = \beta_t \times NTR\ Gap_j + \delta_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}.$$

SALE/COGS vs Gross Profit Rates



— SALE/COGS —○— GOS/PROD

Testable Prediction: Dynamics of Market Shares

- Market shares

$$s_{i,j,t} = \frac{h_{i,j,t}}{N_j} \left(\frac{(1 + \mu_j) a_{i,j,t}}{(1 + \mu_{i,j}) A_{j,t}} \right)^{\sigma_j - 1}$$


- Prop.** *All else equal, an increase in σ leads to an increase in the volatility of market shares.*

$$\Sigma_{\log s}^2 = \Sigma_{\log h}^2 + (\sigma_j - 1)^2 \Sigma_{\log a}^2$$

Testable Predictions


	Theories	
	Good σ	Bad κ
Turnover / Exit	+	-
Investment / K Growth	+	-
Corr($\Delta CR, \Delta TFP$)	+	-
Corr($\Delta CR, \Delta P$)	-	+

Declining Turnover



Source: Compustat NA, following BEA industries. Measure is 1- 5-year ahead correlation of ranks within industry.

Investment: Growth in K vs. Q




Notes: Q for Non-Financial corporate sector from FRED; Capital stock from BEA

TFP, Prices and Markups

	$\Delta_5 \log(TFP)$		$\Delta_5 \log(P)$		$\Delta_5 \log(\mu)$	
	(1) Pre-00	(2) Post-00	(3) Pre-00	(4) Post-00	(5) Pre-00	(6) Post-00
$\Delta_5 \log(CRA)$	0.174* (0.066)	-0.049 (0.050)	-0.090 (0.061)	0.092 (0.091)	-0.102* (0.042)	0.121+ (0.067)
Cons	0.017 (0.014)	0.027** (0.009)	0.073** (0.013)	0.095** (0.010)	0.052** (0.012)	0.046** (0.011)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	.12	.11	.049	.074	.049	.083
Observations	92	138	92	138	92	138


Source: BLS multifactor and Compustat.

σ vs κ ? Principal Component Loadings




Components over Time

Average scores for PC1 and PC2



Lobbying?





Four prominent explanations

- **Rising Capital Share** (α).
 - Alexander and Eberly (2016), Crouzet and Eberly (2018), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017)
- **Rising Elasticity** (σ).
 - Autor et al. (2017)
- **Increasing Returns to Scale** (γ).
 - Aghion et al. (2018)
- **Rising Barriers to Competition** (κ).
 - Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018), Jones et al. (2018), Gutiérrez and Philippon (2019)

Summary of Theories and Measures


		Theories				
		Data	α	σ	γ	κ
1. Intern. Evidence	Common global trends	-	+	+	+	-
2. Entry, Exit and Turnover	Leader turnover	-	?	+	-	-
	Elast. of Entry to Q	-	?	+	+	-
	Exit Rate	-	?	+	+	-
3. Corr. of CR , TFP and prices	Corr($\Delta CR, \Delta TFP$)	+..-	?	+	+	-
	Corr($\Delta CR, \Delta P$)	-..+	?	-	-	+
4. Inv. & profits by leaders	Agg. inv. rate	-	+	?	?	-
	Leader inv. rate	-	-	+	+	-
	Leader profits	+	?	?	+	+
5. Ret. to Scale	Estimated RS*	0+	0	-	+	?

Airlines and Telecom




Source: BLS multifactor and Compustat.

Turnover of Leaders



Change in Profits - Within or Between Firms?



Source: Compustat NA. Regression: $\pi_{i,j,t} = \beta_t \times Lead_{i,j,t} + \delta_j + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{jt}$. Average: γ_t . Leader: $\gamma_t + \beta_t$.




Increasing Harm at High CR?

	$\Delta_5 \log(\mu)$			$\Delta_5 \log(\mu)$		
	(1) All	(2) Mfg	(3) NonMfg	(4) All	(5) Mfg	(6) NonMfg
$\Delta_5 \log(CR4_{jt})$	0.00 (0.01)	0.09** (3.73)	0.00 (0.01)	0.12* (2.06)	0.10** (3.35)	0.12* (2.01)
$\Delta_5 \log(CR4_{jt}) \times 1_{>2002}$	0.26** (3.70)	0.14* (2.16)	0.26** (3.62)			
$\Delta_5 \log(CR4_{jt}) \times \text{High CR}$				0.40** (2.87)	0.10 (1.61)	0.40** (2.81)
High CR				-0.01 (-0.40)	0.07** (2.95)	-0.01 (-0.39)
Cons	0.03** (3.42)	0.10** (7.18)	0.03** (3.35)	0.02+ (1.92)	0.07** (11.97)	0.02+ (1.88)
Sec x Yr FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R2	.36	.33	.36	.35	.36	.35
Observations	3,141	2,743	398	3,141	2,743	398

Why After 2000? Returns to Scale?


- Why is bad concentration more prevalent after 2000?
- Perhaps returns to scale have increased?
 - Using the approach of Basu and Fernald (1997), we find a moderate increase from 0.78 to 0.80.
 - De-Loecker et al. (2019) estimate increase from 1.03 to 1.08 in US. Diez et al. (2018) reach similar conclusions globally.
 - There is no evidence that returns to scale have increased significantly in recent years

Estimates




First Principal Component: Intangibles


PC1: "Intangibles"



Second Principal Component: Barriers to Entry



PC2 scores (“Barriers to Entry”) vs Import Shares



Sources: BEA. Imports from Peter Schott's data. Notes: Only manufacturing.

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Jones, C., G. Gutiérrez, and T. Philippon (2018). Declining competition and investment in the us. Working Paper.