

Trade Agreements and Trade Deficits: The Case of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement


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Both aggregate and bilateral



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
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The United States has an \$800 Billion Dollar Yearly Trade Deficit because of our "very stupid" trade deals and policies. Our jobs and wealth are being given to other countries who have taken advantage of us. We should laugh at what fools our enemies are more!

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South Korea is absolutely killing us on trade deals. Their surplus vs U.S. is massive - and we pay for their protection. WHO NEGOTIATES?

4:13 AM - 24 Apr 2014

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but macroeconomists have not answered it in a way that the general public accepts.

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 2. Ricardian structural/quantitative estimation

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
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- ▶ Are these reasonable assumptions?
- ▶ Our findings suggest: Yes, based on observed **trade diversion**.

The U.S. trade deficit with South Korea grew faster than the overall U.S. trade deficit after 2012-2015.



What we do

- ▶ Measure trade diversion (Romalis REStat 2007)

- ▶ M := imports, i := HS-6 good, j :=partner country, t := year

$$\ln \frac{M_{ijt}^{US}}{M_{ijt}^{CAN}} = \sigma \ln \frac{1 + \tau_{ijt}^{US}}{1 + \tau_{ijt}^{CAN}} - (\sigma - 1) \ln \frac{g_{ijt}^{US}}{g_{ijt}^{CAN}} + (\sigma - 1) \ln \frac{P_{it}^{US}}{P_{it}^{CAN}} + \ln \frac{b_{it}^{US} Y_t^{US}}{b_{it}^{CAN} Y_t^{CAN}}$$

$$\ln \frac{M_{ijt}^{US}}{M_{ijt}^{CAN}} = \beta_1 \ln(1 + \tau_{it}^{US, Korea}) + \beta_2 \ln(1 + \tau_{it}^{US, MFN}) + D_i + D_{jt} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

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- ▶ $\beta_1 > 0 \Rightarrow$ Trade Diversion: U.S. imports shift away from partner j toward South Korea when $\tau^{US, Korea} \downarrow$
- ▶ Import data from UN COMTRADE, tariff data from WTO Tariff Database (2010-2014)

Log of U.S.-reference country import ratio on U.S. tariff for South Korean goods

Reference Country	Canada		Australia	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\tau_{it}^{US, Korea}$	1.177*** (0.370)	0.740** (0.378)	1.195** (0.476)	1.443*** (0.426)
MFN Tariffs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Partner Country-Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-6 Product FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	99,456	99,456	73,248	73,248
R^2	0.174	0.214	0.230	0.434
No. Products	4,333	4,333	4,098	4,098

Note: Standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.

Log of U.S.-Canada import ratio on U.S. tariff for South Korean goods by region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\tau_{US, Korea}$	0.446 (0.384)	1.526*** (0.439)	1.515*** (0.440)	1.629*** (0.552)
FTA Partner $\times \tau_{ijt}^{US, Korea}$	1.793*** (0.418)			
Asia-Pacific $\times \tau_{ijt}^{US, Korea}$		-1.181*** (0.337)		
China $\times \tau_{ijt}^{US, Korea}$			-1.841*** (0.530)	-2.280*** (0.674)
Japan $\times \tau_{ijt}^{US, Korea}$			-1.158 (0.730)	0.009 (0.947)
Other Asia-Pacific $\times \tau_{ijt}^{US, Korea}$			-0.993*** (0.361)	-0.793* (0.418)
MFN Tariffs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partner Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
HS-6 Product FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	99,456	99,456	99,456	39,705
<i>R</i> ²	0.214	0.214	0.214	0.199
No. products	4,333	4,333	4,333	918

Note: Columns (1)-(3) contain the full sample, while Column (4) contains only HS-6 goods within the Consumption end-use category.

How much trade diversion occurred in total?

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Year	Estimated trade diversion	Δ U.S.-South Korea trade deficit (compared to 2011)
2013	\$10.3 billion	\$7.5 billion
2014	\$10.7 billion	\$11.8 billion

Appendix: Aggregation

$$\ln(M_{ijt}^{US}) = \beta_1 \ln(1 + \tau_{it}^{US, Korea}) + \beta_2 \ln(1 + \tau_{it}^{US, MFN}) + \ln(M_{ijt}^{CAN}) + D_i + D_{jt} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

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$$\ln \frac{M_{ijt}^{US}}{M_{ij,2011}^{US}} = \beta_1 \left(\frac{\ln(1 + \tau_{it}^{US, Korea})}{\ln(1 + \tau_{i,2011}^{US, Korea})} \right)$$

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$$\ln \frac{M_{ijt}^{US}}{M_{ij,2011}^{US}} = \beta_1 \left(\frac{\ln(1 + \tau_{it}^{US,Korea})}{\ln(1 + \tau_{i,2011}^{US,Korea})} \right)$$

$$Z_t = \sum_{i=1, j=1}^{I, J} Z_{ijt} = \sum_{i=1, j=1}^{I, J} \left[\exp \beta_1 \left(\frac{\ln \tau_{it}^{US,Korea}}{\ln \tau_{i,2011}^{US,Korea}} \right) - 1 \right] M_{ij,2011}^{US}$$