The Missing Profits of Nations

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Introduction

How much profits move across countries because of differences in corporate tax rates today?

- ▷ Firms move capital to low-tax countries
- ▷ Firms shift paper profits to tax havens

If all countries had same corp tax rate (perfect coordinat^o)

- ▷ Which countries would gain/lose profits?
- ▷ How? Relocation of capital, or reduced profit shifting?

→ This paper: attempt at **quantifying these macro impacts of globalization**

A new global database on profits

Main contribution: produce first global map of where profits are booked using macro data. Key novelties:

- ▷ Systematic analysis of **national account data of tax havens** and other countries
- ▷ Exploit new foreign affiliates statistics to **break down profits into local vs foreign** firms in each country
- ▷ This **new database** allows to estimate profit shifting and track winners/losers transparently
- ▷ Goal is to update annually, making it possible to monitor changes (e.g., study effect of policies)

Main results

40% of multinational profits ($\approx$ \$600 billion) are shifted to tax havens each year:

- ▷ Main winners: Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, etc. (impose low rates of 2–3%, but on huge \$600bn base)
- ▷ Main loser: EU (20% of tax base shifted; US: 15%)
- ▷ Rise of capital share in US and EU since 1980s higher than in official data (e.g., twice as large in Europe)
- ▷ Profit shifting swamps real capital mobility

$\downarrow$

Financial globalization has **large redistributive effects,** welfare implications different than in textbook models

Global Profit Shifting

How multinationals shift profits offshore

Three ways firms shift profits to low-tax countries:

- ▷ Manipulation of intra-group export and import prices
- ▷ Intra-group interest payments (tax deductible)
- ▷ Strategic location of intangibles

We analyze a macro stat that **captures all shifting channels:**

- ▷ π **= pre-tax profits (after net interest) / wages**
- ▷ Compute π for foreign (π_f) vs. local firms (π_l) (foreign: $>$50% foreign-owned)

Global patterns in corporate profitability

Key finding: huge profit/wage ratio in foreign firms in some countries (tax havens) but not in other

- ▷ In tax havens: foreign firms are much more profitable than local firms ($\pi_f >> \pi_l$)
- ▷ In non-haven countries: foreign firms are less profitable than local firms ($\pi_f < \pi_l$)

$\rightarrow$ **Clear evidence in macro statistics of shifting** from high- to low-tax places

In havens: foreign firms report huge profit
In non-havens: they report low profits



In non-havens, foreign firms are less profitable than local firms



Our method to estimate the amount of profits shifted to tax havens

Set π_f in havens equal to profitability local firms π_l

Advantages:

- ▷ Simple and transparent
- ▷ Controls for country-level determinants of profitability in tax havens (e.g., anti-labor policies)
- ▷ Easy to track over time & space ($\sim$ debt/GDP): could be monitored by policymakers to implement sanctions

Potential concern:

- ▷ High capital intensity of foreign firms in tax havens?

Do machines move to low-tax places?

Testing the hypothesis that machines move to low-tax places

If havens attract highly capital-intensive industries:

- ▷ With Cobb-Douglas production, this does not affect π
- ▷ With CES production and $\sigma > 1$, high K/L $\rightarrow$ high π

Test using data on affiliates of US multinationals:

- ▷ US data more detailed than data of other countries (importantly: info on K)
- ▷ Large sample of US multinationals surveyed annually, universe every 5 years back to 1966

Tax haven affiliates of U.S. multinationals are abnormally profitable



Tax haven affiliates of US multinationals have been increasingly profitable



Globalization has been paper profits—not machines—moving to low-tax places



Who Loses?
Allocating the Shifted Profits

To study who loses, follow the money in the balances of payments of tax havens



How we allocate the shifted profits

We follow destination of tax havens' service exports and intra-group interest receipts

- ▷ Use bilateral balance of payments available since 2014
- ▷ Services: focus on royalties, management fees, ICT, fin. services $\rightarrow$ most conducive of shifting
- ▷ Advantage of using tax haven data: capture services better than importers' data ($\approx$ 30% gap)
- ▷ The excess profitability ($\pi_f - \pi_l$) in havens match the amount of excess high-risk transaction with them
- ▷ Distribute excess profits prop. to these transactions

The EU loses ≈ 20% of its corporate tax revenue, the US ≈ 15%



Which multinationals shift profits?

We track to which countries the profits booked in tax havens ultimately accrue:

- ▷ Allocate shifted profits prop. to direct investment equity income paid (dividends + retained earnings)
- ▷ Using new ultimate beneficial owner direct investment statistics
- ▷ Shows where the big shifters are headquartered

→ **U.S. multinationals are the biggest users of tax havens**

Who shifts most? The US.
Who loses most? EU & developing ctries



Explaining the rise of profit shifting

Beggar-thy-neighbor pays off

Incentives of havens can explain the rise of shifting:

- ▷ With source taxation & no coordinat^o or sanction, havens can earn revenue by attracting artificial bases
- ▷ Key result: revenue-max. rate $0 < \tau^* < 5\%$: havens with $\tau \approx \tau^*$ generate very large tax revenue
- ▷ Can explain the rise of the supply of tax avoidance schemes (e.g., tax rulings: Apple – Ireland)

Many havens collect a lot of tax revenue...



... By applying very low rates to the huge artificial tax base they attract



As profit shifting skyrocketed...



...Tax revenue rose in many havens, while they ↓ or stagnated in high-tax countries



The lower the rate, the higher the revenue



Explaining the persistence of profit shifting

The policy failure of high-tax countries

Why have high-tax countries failed to protect their tax base?

Incentives of tax havens can explain ↑ avoidance schemes, but not why high-tax countries have let their base shrink

Our explanation: **failure of tax enforcement**

- ▷ In current international tax system, tax authorities have **perverse incentives**
- ▷ They try to relocate base booked in other high-tax countries, not base shifted to havens

The incentive problem of tax authorities

€1 re-located to France is worth the same to France whether it comes from Germany or Bermuda

But much easier to relocate €1 booked in Germany:

- ▷ Feasible: information exists (Orbis)
- ▷ More likely to succeed: no push-back from firms
- ▷ Quick: cooperation via dispute settlement agreements

Crowds out enforcement on havens: hard (no data), costly (legal defense by firms), lengthy (lack of cooperation)

→ Analysis of transfer price corrections shows **most enforcement is against other high-tax countries**

Most transfer price enforcement is against other high-tax countries



Conclusion

Main findings

40% of multinational profits shifted to tax havens:

- ▷ Paper profits move; real capital not much
- ▷ EU is the main loser; US the main shifter
- ▷ High losses for the EU can be explained by failure of enforcement due to perverse incentives

Financial globalization has **large redistributive effects,** different than in textbook tax competition model

Rise of global capital share since 1980s higher than in official data (e.g., twice as large in Europe)

Next steps

1. **Introduce inequality dimension in the analysis:**
   - ▷ Compared to benchmark of perfect tax coordination, how much do shareholders of multinationals gain?
   - ▷ How much do workers and various income/wealth groups gain/lose in each country?
2. **Add non-tax-driven capital flows in the analysis:**
   - ▷ Size of tax-driven vs. non-tax driven capital flows?

$\rightarrow$ Ultimate goal is to offer a full-fledged **macro-distributional analysis of financial globalization**

Supplementary slides

Key challenge in the literature: Little data on profits in tax havens

No reference estimate of size of global profit shifting

Widely-used source (eg, by OECD 2015 for its official estimate): financial accounts micro-data (Orbis)

- ▷ $log(\pi_{ict}) = \alpha + \beta(1 - \tau_{ct}) + \delta Firm_{it} + \gamma Country_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}$
- ▷ Extrapolate global shifting from $\hat{\beta}$
- ▷ Problem: limited reporting in tax havens $\rightarrow$ **most shifted profits not visible in financial accounts**

$\rightarrow$ (i) $\hat{\beta}$ downward biased (ii) biased inferences about size and location of shifted profits

Most of Google's profits are invisible in available financial accounts data



Most of Apple's profits are invisible in available financial accounts data



None of Facebook's profits are visible in available financial accounts data



Most of Nike's profits are invisible in available financial accounts data



Only 17% of multinationals' profits are visible in financial accounts micro-data



Our approach: we combine and analyze global macro data in a systematic way

New national accounts data:

- ▷ **Key novelty:** exploit new foreign affiliates statistics to decompose profits into local vs. foreign firms
- ▷ Better than Orbis because relies on much more info. (including tax returns & census-like surveys)

Improved balance of payments data:

- ▷ Bilateral trade & intra-group payments $\rightarrow$ shows out of which countries profits are shifted
- ▷ Ultimate-owner direct investment statistics $\rightarrow$ shows which multinationals shift profits

A new global database on profits (2015)

	Billions of current US$	% of net corporate profits
Global gross output (GDP)	75,038	
Depreciation	11,940	
Net output	63,098	
Net corporate output	34,083	296%
Net corporate profits	11,515	100%
Net profits of foreign-controlled corp.	1,703	15%
Of which: shifted to tax havens	616	5%
Net profits of local corporations	9,812	85%
Corporate income taxes paid	2,154	19%

Previous macro approaches

A nascent literature takes a macro perspective:

- ▷ UNCTAD (2015) global estimate based on FDI data
- ▷ Clausing (2009), Zucman (2014), Guvenen et al. (2017) for U.S.
- ▷ Pro: does not suffer from Orbis limitations

Problems:

- ▷ Hard to infer amount of taxes avoided
- ▷ Hard to infer which countries lose/gain revenues

→ **Need to open the black-box of tax havens**

Foreign affiliates statistics

New data: **foreign affiliates statistics (FATS)**

- ▷ Main national accounts aggregates for affiliates of multinationals (inward and outward)
- ▷ Compiled for a long time in the US
- ▷ Introduced recently in a number of other countries, including EU havens
- ▷ When not available: use direct investment income statistics (BoP) and counterpart country FATS

Conceptual framework

Macro indicator of profit-shifting π

- ▷ Country's corporate output $Y = F(K, AL) = rK + wL$
- ▷ 2 types of corp: f (foreign) vs. l (local)
- ▷ Capital share $\alpha = rK/Y$
- ▷ Net interest paid $= p\%$ of rK
- ▷ Pre-tax profits/wage ratio: $\pi = (1-p) \cdot \alpha/(1-\alpha)$

$\rightarrow$ **We analyze π for f vs. l firms in each country**

Imputation of profits in foreign firms when no FATS exist

Compute profits in foreign firms using direct investment income flows

- ▷ 10% vs. 50% ownership threshold; pre-tax vs. post-tax $\rightarrow$ impute taxes
- ▷ Assume profits / wage same as for US affiliates

Imputation when no direct investment income data exist:

- ▷ Estimate direct investment income paid such that world DI income balances to 0
- ▷ Two reasons why global DI income > 0: missing US profits in Ireland etc.; missing BoP $\rightarrow$ we impute both

The huge profits of foreign firms make tax havens abnormally profitable overall



Anomalies in the world balance of payments



The unrecorded profits of U.S. affiliates in tax havens



Service imports from tax havens are under-estimated by importers (B2C sales)



At least 30% of the services exported by EU havens go unreported by the importer



Note: Service exports include exports to all EU22 countries (EU26 minus Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Malta, Cyprus).

Tax haven firms are abnormally profitable within each sector



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

Profits are offshore, losses are onshore



As settlement is facilitated, high-tax to high-tax disputes are growing



Can more cooperation and better information solve the problem?

Facilitating dispute settlement can backfire:

- ▷ Ongoing initiative to ↑ cooperation among OECD countries
- ▷ Problem: crowds out enforcement on non-OECD havens, where bulk of shifting takes place

Better information can help, but not enough:

- ▷ Even with perfect info, firms will always fight more to protect profits they book in low-tax places
- ▷ Internalizing this, tax authorities will keep going after high-tax places

Even when tax havens cooperate, tax authorities do not target them



Multinationals outspend tax authorities



Source is LinkedIn, but the government count is corroborated by the EY Transfer Pricing Tax Authority Survey (2014). The wage bill is estimated by applying the average salary of an EY Transfer Pricing Specialist (Source: Glassdoor).

Implications for future of taxes and inequality

Tax competition model: corporate tax rate $\rightarrow$ 0

- ▷ Capital moves $\rightarrow$ race to bottom inevitable
- ▷ Progressive income tax will disappear (impossible to enforce with low corp. tax rate: the rich incorporate)
- ▷ Globalization fuels inequality

Our results: corporate tax may rise in the future

- ▷ Capital does not move; paper profits do
- ▷ Policy failures explain this shifting
- ▷ Can be fixed $\rightarrow$ corp tax could $\uparrow$ even if no coordinat^o

Domestic policies, more than globalization, are key