A Model of Cryptocurrencies*

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Abstract

The surge in the number of initial coin offerings (ICOs) in recent years has led to both excitement about cryptocurrencies as a new funding model for innovations in the digital age, and to anxiety about a potential bubble. This paper develops a model to address several basic questions: What determines the fundamental value of a cryptocurrency? How would market trading interact with its fundamentals in an uncertain and opaque environment? In our model, a cryptocurrency constitutes membership in a platform developed to facilitate transactions of certain goods or services. The complementarity in the households’ participation in the platform acts as an endogenous, yet fragile, fundamental of the cryptocurrency. There exist either two or no equilibria, and the two equilibria, when they exist, have disparate properties. When the transaction demand for the platform is unobservable, the trading price and volume of the cryptocurrency serve as important channels for not only aggregating private information about its fundamental, but also facilitating coordination on a certain equilibrium.

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Between 2015 to 2017, over 2000 initial coin offerings (ICOs) emerged to raise more than $4 billion from the public, and to exceed venture capital investments in funding innovative projects related to blockchain technology, according to a report issued by EY Research. Among these ICOs, 1,031 were in the U.S., followed by 310 in Russia, 260 in Singapore, 256 in mainland China, and 196 in Hong Kong. In 2017, the top three ICOs by Tezos, EOS.IO, and BANCOR raised $208 million, 200 million, and 153 million, respectively. These initial successes led to tremendous excitement about cryptocurrencies as a new funding model for innovation in the upcoming digital age. Rampant speculation and volatility in the trading of many cryptocurrencies, however, have also raised concern that they, both coins and tokens, represent potential bubbles. The failure of the DAO only a few months after its ICO raised $150 million in 2016, together with a number of other similar episodes, highlights the risks and potential abuses involved in investing in cryptocurrencies. In response to these concerns, China banned cryptocurrencies at the end of 2017 and South Korea has pursued stern regulatory policies, even though other countries, such as Switzerland and Singapore, remain amenable to them.

Cryptocurrency platforms launched by ICOs represent a unique business model in which initial investors are both future shareholders are potential customers. Often these platforms provide intrinsic benefit to their participants. These benefits can range from the provision of secure and verifiable peer-to-peer transaction services to protection against censorship, taxation, and expropriation by a sovereign, to the maintenance of smart contracts whose execution is governed by blockchain technology, to the support of crowdfunding activities and media content whose sales are brokered in the currency. In the case of cryptocurrency coins, the supporting blockchain architecture can be used to launch other ICO ventures through smart contracts, which provides additional benefit to holders of the coins accepted as payment in the ICOs. These benefits can be viewed as the dividends of investment in the cryptocurrency. In addition, a key innovation of these platforms, along with the adoption of blockchain technology for record-keeping, is that they are "trustless" decentralized networks that lack a sovereign or central intermediaries to steward the platform and the currency. Instead of intermediaries, a population of miners are compensated for processing activity on the blockchain with currency created through inflation according to a Proof of Work (PoW) protocol. Critics of PoW platforms often cite issues of scalability, in that the computing power required of miners grows with the size of the network, when championing
such alternatives as the Proof of Stake (PoS) protocol, in which a subset of currency owners with large "stakes" in the currency compete for fees from processing blockchain activity.

In order to properly assess the potential benefits and risks brought about by cryptocurrencies, and to establish a suitable regulatory framework for ICOs, it is important to understand how the dual role of ICO investors in decentralized digital platforms, as both shareholders and customers, and the "trustless" nature of cryptocurrency platforms impact participation in the platform, its performance, the price of the currency, and ultimately the success of the ICO.¹ These dual roles place ICOs for these platforms in sharp contrast with traditional project financing mechanisms, such as IPOs and VC financing, which usually separate investors from business customers. As they possess features of both a security and a medium of exchange, the decentralized networks underpinning cryptocurrencies may be more susceptible to fragility in their performance and feedback effects from prices to the real decisions of customers and shareholders than more conventional financial assets. Furthermore, the ample uncertainty and opacity associated with many of the ICOs, together with the typically observed frenzied trading of cryptocurrencies after their ICOs, raise questions regarding whether such trading serves any socially meaningful role, and whether the trading price and volume may affect the underlying behavior of cryptocurrencies.

To investigate these issues, we develop a model in which a cryptocurrency serves as membership to a platform, created by its developer to facilitate decentralized bilateral transactions of certain goods or services among a pool of households by using a blockchain technology. Households face difficulty in making such transactions outside the platform as a result of severe search frictions. The value of the platform, consequently, lies within its design in filling the households’ transaction needs, and in its capability in pooling together a large number of households with the need to trade with each other. We model a household’s transaction need by its endowment in a consumption good, and its preference of consuming its own good together with the goods of other households. As a result of this preference, households need to trade goods with each other, and the platform serves to facilitate such trading. Specifically, we assume that, when two households are randomly matched, they can trade their goods with each other only if they both belong to the platform. Consequently, each household’s desire to join the platform grows with the chance of meeting other

¹In addition to ICOs, cryptocurrency coins can be created from forks from existing currencies through airdrops by developers, while ICOs can create tokens that fund projects unrelated to the token platform. Our focus is on ICOs applies more generally to any ICO in which usage of the created currency is part of the project’s platform. In what follows, we do not make the distinction between coins and tokens.
households in the platform, and in the size of their endowments.

The cryptocurrency in our framework serves dual roles, one as the membership to transact goods with other members, and the other as the initial financing for the platform, covering both compensation to the developer for creating the platform and the fee to coin miners for providing clearing services for the decentralized goods transactions on the platform. To highlight these dual roles, our model features two periods. In the first period, a pool of households with random endowment shocks decide whether to join the platform by purchasing one unit of the cryptocurrency from a centralized market with coin miners supplying the cryptocurrency at a cost. During the second period, households that joined the platform are randomly matched to transact their goods for consumption. Each household’s decision to participate trades off the cost of paying for the cryptocurrency with the benefit from transacting goods on the platform. This benefit increases with both the household’s own endowment, which determines its own need to transact goods on the platform, and the average endowments of other households, which determine their transaction needs. We show that each household optimally adopts a cutoff strategy to purchase the cryptocurrency only if its endowment is higher than an equilibrium threshold, while the equilibrium cryptocurrency price is jointly determined by the common endowment of all households, and a supply shock reflecting the average computing cost for miners in providing accounting services to complete the transactions of households at the second date.

We analyze two settings, differing in whether the households’ aggregate goods endowment is observable, which captures the demand fundamental for the platform. In the first setting, where the demand fundamental is publicly observable, there exist either two or no cutoff equilibria. When there are two equilibria, they exhibit opposing behavior. One has a higher cryptocurrency price and a lower equilibrium cutoff for each household’s cryptocurrency purchase decision, and the other has a lower price and a higher equilibrium cutoff. These two equilibria are self-enforcing as a result of the complementarity among households’ trading needs—if more (less) households join the platform by choosing a lower (higher) cutoff strategy, they all benefit more (less) from trading goods in the platform, and are therefore willing to pay a high (low) cryptocurrency price. The presence of these two opposing equilibria suggests that one may observe entirely different dynamics of cryptocurrencies in practice, simply as a result of the endogenous and fragile nature of their business model, without necessarily involving any reckless speculation, abuse, or manipulation. In the absence of
a sovereign or central intermediaries to provide guidance and support the platform, large
investors may act as cryptocurrency whales to help coordinate participant expectations.

In our second setting, we introduce realistic informational frictions by assuming that the
platform fundamentals are not publicly observable to market participants. In this setting,
each household uses its own endowment and the publicly observed cryptocurrency trading
price and volume, which we interpret as activity on the blockchain ledger, as noisy signals
to infer the value of the aggregate household demand for the platform. Despite the inherent
non-linearity of the equilibrium cryptocurrency price and each household’s demand for the
currency, we construct a tractable log-linear noisy rational expectations equilibrium for the
cryptocurrency market. In the equilibrium, each household again follows a cutoff strategy, as
in the perfect-information setting, except that its equilibrium cutoff is determined by linear
summary statistics of the publicly observed cryptocurrency price and volume, rather than
the households’ aggregate endowment and the miners’ common mining cost, which are not
observable. Interestingly, there again exist two or no cutoff equilibria. The trading price
and volume of the cryptocurrency both serve as important channels for not only aggregating
private information about its fundamental value, but also facilitating coordination on the
high or low price equilibrium. As the two equilibria have very disparate behavior, the
currency price and equilibrium cutoff also have opposing reactions to news in these two
sources of public information, which makes it difficult for outsiders to diagnose the health of
the currency based on the price alone.

Our analysis demonstrates that cryptocurrencies are vulnerable to large price swings and
significant feedback from prices to the real decisions of platform participants. As a result, an
 ICOs with strong fundamentals may fail because the PoW protocol supporting the platform
can lead to coordination failure among initial investors. To illustrate this fragility, we consider
a Proof of Stake (PoS) extension of our model where, instead of a population of miners, there
is a population of forgers who compete for fees from completing household transactions by
purchasing stakes in the currency alongside households. In contrast to our PoW setting, there
is a unique cutoff equilibrium in which the developer, acting as a monopolist, chooses the level
of household participation through the transaction fee schedule it sets for the currency. While
the PoS protocol resolves the issues of fragility from coordination and scalability of computing
resources, the currency price is now subject to fluctuations in forgers’ cost of capital, as with

Lee, Li, and Shin (2018) provide extensive empirical evidence of asymmetric information among ICO
investors, and of the role of ICOs as aggregators of dispersed information.
fiat currencies and traditional intermediaries, and there is a wedge between maximizing revenue for the developer and maximizing household participation in the platform.

To highlight the additional instability informational frictions introduce, we then discuss a dynamic extension of our model in which a second generation of households, who trade with each other on a third date, purchases the currency from the first generation after the first finishes trading. When the demand fundamental is publicly observable, more households participate in the platform at the initial date than in the static model because of the additional benefit of reselling the currency at date two. When the fundamental is not observable, however, a cutoff equilibrium can fail to exist if the probability of a low price equilibrium on the second date is sufficiently high. This occurs because each household’s belief about the resell price for the currency at date two is negatively correlated with its belief about the fundamental at date one. As such, households with high endowments at the initial date enter the platform to benefit from trading with each other, while households with very low endowments expect to resell the currency at a high price tomorrow even if they do not benefit from trading. This causes the cutoff equilibrium to break down and, consequently, for feedback effects stemming informational frictions to be even more destabilizing in a dynamic setting.

Our work contributes to the emerging literature on cryptocurrencies. Easley, O’Hara, and Basu (2017) analyze the rise of transactions fees in Bitcoin through the strategic interaction of users and miners. Chiu and Koeppl (2017) consider the optimal design of a cryptocurrency, and emphasize the importance of scale in deterring double-spending by buyers. Athey et al (2016) models Bitcoin as a medium of exchange of unknown (binary) quality that allows users to avoid bank fees when sending remittances, and uses the model to guide empirical analysis of Bitcoin users. Cong and He (2017) investigate the tradeoff of smart contracts in overcoming adverse selection while also facilitating oligopolistic collusion, while Biais et al (2017) considers the strategic interaction among miners and Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018) of disciplining writers to a blockchain technology with static incentives. Schilling and Uhlig (2018) study the role of monetary policy in the presence of a cryptocurrency that acts as a private fiat currency. Cong, Li, and Wang (2018) construct a dynamic model of crypto tokens to study the dynamic feedback between user adoption and the responsiveness of the token price to expectations about the future growth in the platform. Pagnotta and Buraschi (2018) also model the cryptocurrency market in an equilibrium framework that admits multiple
equilibria, yet their focus is on a quantitative analysis of Bitcoin. Our analysis microfounds the intrinsic value of cryptocurrencies as facilitating household transactions in a general equilibrium framework, and explores the role of the cryptocurrency price as an aggregator of users’ dispersed information about the platform’s fundamentals.

Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on ICOs. Catalini and Gans (2018) investigate how ICOs differ from traditional equity financing, emphasizing how ICOs can aid entrepreneurs in discovering consumers’ valuation of the platform but are subject to issues of commitment when entrepreneurs control token inflation. Li and Mann (2018) also explore network effects in ICOs, yet their focus is on how dynamic dissemination can help overcome coordination failure when the platform requires a critical mass, and how ICOs aggregate useful information for the developer about its product. Chod and Lyandres (2018) study the extent to which ICOs can facilitate risk-sharing between entrepreneurs and investors, without transferring control rights, in the presence of agency issues. In contrast, our analysis attempts to understand what fundamentals determine the price and success of a crypto token and its ICO based on the platform’s subsequent performance, and emphasizes the role of participation as an endogenous, yet fragile fundamental. In addition, we characterize the disparate properties of the two equilibria that naturally arise in our setting, and embed informational frictions to study the informational role of prices and volumes.

Our work is also related to the literature on the role of currency. Samuelson (1958), in his pioneering work, studied the role of money as a bubble asset that acts as a store of value in dynamically inefficient economies. Search models, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Lagos and Wright (2005), frame money as a medium of exchange that facilitates bilateral trade when search frictions hinder the double coincidence of wants among trading parties. Cochrane (2005) frames money as a stock claim to the future surpluses of the issuing sovereign, while Kocherlakota (1998) views the history dependence of monetary balances as a primitive form of memory. In our framework, a cryptocurrency represents membership to a decentralized trading platform, and the price of this membership is pinned down by the endogenous expected benefit from participation of the marginal household. While search models such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Lagos and Wright (2005) can have multiple equilibria because of self-fulfilling expectations that the currency will be accepted in the future, multiple equilibria arise in our setting because the market-clearing price of the cryptocurrency reflects the marginal household’s expected surplus from future trade, and there
can be either two or zero marginal households that clear the market given the fundamentals. That cryptocurrencies also represents a security in our setting, in which the shareholders are also the customers, is conducive to the study of infantile currencies and ICOs.

Our work also adds to the literature on cutoff equilibrium with dispersed information. With risk-neutral investors and normally distributed payoffs, Morris and Shin (1998) and Dasgupta (2007) analyze coordination and delay in global games, Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013) investigate the feedback effects of learning by a manager to firm investment decisions, while Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014, 2015) focus on the role of asymmetry in security payoffs in distorting asset prices and firm investment incentives. Similar to our framework, Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2018) employ a Cobb-Douglas utility with lognormal payoffs to deliver tractable equilibria, yet their focus is on the dynamic distortion of informational frictions to housing and production decisions. In contrast, our setting features an interaction of search with centralized trading to explain ICOs. While Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013) also features multiple equilibria, it arises in their setting from the self-fulfilling nature of trading on investment decisions, while in our setting it occurs because the benefits of participating in the cryptocurrency are endogenous to the size of its membership.

1 The Model

Consider a cryptocurrency, which serves as the membership to a decentralized digital platform with a pool of households who share a certain need to transact goods with each other. The developer of the cryptocurrency designs the platform to reduce the otherwise severe search frictions among the households, and develops the infrastructure that supports the platform. The success of the cryptocurrency is ultimately determined by whether the platform can gather these households together. Households purchase the cryptocurrency as the membership to transact in the platform, with the payment for the currency purchase shared by the developer and platform miners, who provide settlement and accounting services for transactions in the platform.

We analyze this cryptocurrency with the model of two periods $t \in \{1, 2\}$ and three types of agents: households, miners, and the developer. At $t = 1$, households purchase the currency through a centralized exchange to join the platform. In practice, the coin prices during the Initial Coin Offers (ICOs) are often pre-fixed at given levels in order to secure some initial interests in the offerings, while more sales continue after the ICOs at market prices. For
simplicity, we include only one trading round in the model, which serves to capture not only the ICO but also trading that follows the ICO. By pooling these extended trading rounds into one trading period in the model\(^3\) we focus on analyzing how the currency price serves to aggregate the trading needs of the households and affects their participation in the platform. Nevertheless, we call the trading round in the model the ICO.

At \( t = 2 \), the households in the platform are randomly matched to trade endowments. This trade is supported by miners who act as the servicers of the decentralized platform, and whose servers compete to clear the transaction on a blockchain for the buyer and seller. We assume that there need to be as many miners as households to support the platform, and that their computing power is perfectly divisible to compete to clear transactions. Households then consume both their own good and their trading partner’s consumption good.

### 1.1 Households

We consider a pool of households, indexed by \( i \in [0, 1] \). These households are potential users of the cryptocurrency as a result of their trading needs. Each of them may choose to purchase a unit of the cryptocurrency. We can divide the unit interval into the partition \( \{N, O\} \), with \( N \cap O = \emptyset \) and \( N \cup O = [0, 1] \). Let \( X_i = 1 \) if household \( i \) purchases the cryptocurrency, i.e., \( i \in N \), and \( X_i = 0 \) if it does not. An indivisible unit of currency is commonly employed in search models of currency, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). If household \( i \) at \( t = 1 \) chooses to purchase the cryptocurrency, it purchases one unit at the equilibrium price \( P \) during the ICO.

Household \( i \) has a Cobb-Douglas utility function over consumption of its own good and that of a trading partner, household \( j \), that it randomly meets at \( t = 2 \) in the platform, according to:

\[
U(C_i, C_j; N) = \left( \frac{C_i}{1 - \eta_c} \right)^{1-\eta_c} \left( \frac{C_j}{\eta_c} \right)^{\eta_c},
\]

where \( \eta_c \in (0, 1) \) represents the weight in the Cobb-Douglas production function on its consumption of its trading partner’s good \( C_j \), and \( 1 - \eta_c \) is the weight on its own consumption good \( C_i \). A higher \( \eta_c \) means a stronger complementarity between the consumption of household \( i \) and its consumption of the good endowed to the other household with which it trades at \( t = 2 \). We assume that both goods are needed for the household to derive utility from consumption, and if it receives its endowment without trading then it receives zero

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\(^3\)See Li and Mann (2018) for a model of the trading rounds during ICOs.
utility from it. This utility specification implies that each household cares about the aggregate endowment of all other households in the platform, and this will ultimately define the currency’s fundamental.

The endowment of household \( i \) is \( e^{A_i} \), where \( A_i \) is comprised of a component \( A \) common to all households and an idiosyncratic component \( \varepsilon_i \):

\[
A_i = A + \varepsilon_i,
\]

where \( A \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{A}, \tau_{\bar{A}}^{-1}) \) and \( \varepsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1}) \) are both normally distributed and independent of each other. Furthermore, we assume that \( \int \varepsilon_i d\Phi(\varepsilon_i) = 0 \) by the Strong Law of Large Numbers. The aggregate endowment \( A \) is a key characteristic of the platform. A cleverly designed cryptocurrency serves to attract a platform of households with a high value of \( A \) so that the households in the platform have strong needs to trade with each other. One can thus view \( A \) as the demand fundamental for the cryptocurrency or the strength of the platform, and \( \varepsilon \) as a measure of dispersion between households in the platform.

In practice, \( A \) is usually not directly observed by the potential users as a result of realistic informational frictions. The ICO and the trading of the cryptocurrency serves to not only provide funding to support the platform but also to aggregate information directly from the households about the potential demands for transaction services provided by the cryptocurrency and the platform. To highlight this role, we will proceed with first analyzing a benchmark case when \( A \) is publicly observable, and then an extended case when informational frictions prevent \( A \) from being directly observed by all agents.

We start with describing each household’s problem at \( t = 2 \) and then go backward to describe its problem at \( t = 1 \). A realistic feature of decentralized digital platforms is that many transactions clear on decentralized servers that record the transaction on blockchains. At \( t = 2 \), household \( i \) is randomly matched with another household \( j \) and, if both households own the cryptocurrency, then they can trade their goods with each other. Mutual ownership of the cryptocurrency (i.e., membership to the platform) is necessary to transact because of realistic issues of fraud, asymmetric information, or transaction costs that make direct trade prohibitively costly. For instance, while goods inventories are harder to observe, payment through the cryptocurrency is difficult to falsify and can be verified on the blockchain. As only owners of the cryptocurrency can trade with each other, the probability of a currency owner to trade with another household increases with the ownership of the cryptocurrency.

We quote both the price of the cryptocurrency at \( t = 1 \) and the price of the goods at \( t = 2 \)
in terms of the numeraire good. As we only allow one round of trading of the cryptocurrency at \( t = 1 \), this avoids the complication of re-trading the cryptocurrency at \( t = 2 \) together with the goods trading.

A household who owns the currency \( \mathcal{N} \) maximizes its utility at \( t = 2 \) by choosing its consumption demand \( \{C_i, C_j\} \) conditional on a successful match:

\[
U_i = \max_{\{C_i, C_j\}} U(C_i, C_j; \mathcal{N})
\]

such that \( p_i C_i + p_j C_j = p_i e^{A_i} \),

where \( p_i \) is the price of its good. We assume that at \( t = 2 \), the platform strength \( A \) is publicly observed by all agents even in the case where \( A \) is not initially observable at \( t = 1 \). Households behave competitively and take the prices of their goods as given. We assume that households do not discount their final consumption at \( t = 1 \).

At \( t = 1 \), each household needs to decide whether to join the platform by buying the currency. In addition to the utility flow \( U_i \) at \( t = 2 \) from final consumption, we assume that households have quasi-linear expected utility at \( t = 1 \), and incur a linear utility penalty equal to the price of the cryptocurrency \( P \) if they choose to buy it and join the platform. Given that households have Cobb-Douglas preferences over their consumption, they are effectively risk-neutral at \( t = 1 \), and their utility flow is then the expected value of their final consumption bundle less the cost of the currency. Households choose whether to buy the currency subject to a participation constraint that their expected utility from the purchase \( E [U_i | I_i] - P \) must (weakly) exceed a reservation utility, which we normalize to 0. One can interpret the reservation utility as the expected value of finding another currency in which to exchange less the cost of search for that currency.

In summary, household \( i \) makes its purchase decision at \( t = 1 \):

\[
\max_{X_i} \{E [U_i | I_i] - P, 0\}. \tag{3}
\]

subject to its information set \( I_i \). In the perfect-information benchmark, each household observes not only its own \( A_i \) but also the platform fundamental \( A \). In the case with informational frictions, each household observes only its own \( A_i \) but not \( A \).

1.2 Miners

The cryptocurrency is supported by a Proof of Work (PoW) protocol for recording transactions on blockchains. There is a population of potential coin miners, indexed on a continuous
interval $[0, 1]$, who maintain the platform at $t = 2$. These miners mine the cryptocurrency by providing accounting and custodial services using its underlying blockchain technology, and facilitating the decentralized trades between households in the platform at $t = 2$. Several miners who participate are randomly drawn from a queue to compete to complete each household transactions to mine the currency. As in practice, we assume they pool their revenue to insure each other against the risk of not being selected.

Miners also face uncertainty about the aggregate strength of the cryptocurrency platform, and the ability of the supply side to respond to the demand for the transaction services. Specifically, miner $i$ provides the computing power to facilitate a trade between households subject to a cost to setting up the required hardware and software to mine the cryptocurrency: $e^{-\omega_i}S_i$, where $S_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is the miner’s decision to mine and

$$\omega_i = \xi + e_i,$$

is the miner’s productivity, which is correlated across builders in the currency through the common component $\xi$. It is realistic to assume heterogeneity in the technologies to which miners have access for mining the cryptocurrency, with less efficient miners employing more costly technologies. We assume that $\xi$ represents an unobserved, common supply shock to the mining costs of the cryptocurrency and, from the perspective of households and miners, $\xi \sim N(\bar{\xi}, \tau_\xi^{-1})$. Furthermore, $e_i \sim N(0, \tau_e^{-1})$ such that $\int e_i d\Phi(e_i) = 0$ by the Strong Law of Large Numbers.

Miners receive a fraction $1 - \rho \in (0, 1)$ of the proceeds from selling the cryptocurrency at $t = 1$ to households at price $P$, which serves as the fee for clearing transactions at $t = 2$. Miners in the currency at $t = 1$ maximize their revenue:

$$\Pi_i(S_i) = \max_{S_i} \left( (1 - \rho) P - e^{-\omega_i} \right) S_i. \quad (4)$$

Since miners are risk-neutral, it is easy to determine each miner’s optimal supply curve:

$$S_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (1 - \rho) P \geq e^{-\xi + e_i} \\ 0 & \text{if } (1 - \rho) P < e^{-\xi + e_i} \end{cases}. \quad (5)$$

4To focus on the broader implications of the cryptocurrency for households, we abstract from the strategic considerations that miners face in adding blocks to the blockchain to collect fees, such as consensus protocols and on which chain to add a block. See, for instance, Easley, O’Hara, and Basu (2017) and Biais et al (2017) for game theoretic investigations into these issues.

5In practice, many ICOs execute their platforms through smart contracts written on existing blockchain architecture, such as Ethereum. We consider payment to miners in the native currency to study a closed digital ecosystem.
In the cryptocurrency market equilibrium, the common mining cost $\xi$ represents the supply shock. Also note that when the platform strength $A$ is unobservable, $\xi$ may also affect the demand side by interfering the households’ learning about $A$.

We see that the Proof of Work protocol intimately links the price of the currency to the marginal cost of mining, since miner optimization imposes that $P = \frac{1}{1-\rho}e^{-\omega^*}$ for the marginal miner $\omega^*$. This feature highlights the issue of limited scalability of Proof of Work cryptocurrencies often emphasized among academics and practitioners, as both the price of the cryptocurrency and the computational resources devoted to supporting it must escalate with the size of the household population that participates. As the currency network grows, the price of the currency must rise to entice more miners to support it. This feature also distinguishes cryptocurrencies from fiat currencies, where the marginal social cost of printing money is zero. As a result, the conventional Friedman Rule does not apply: the nominal interest rate for Proof of Work cryptocurrencies should not be zero.$^6$

Each miner, in return for receiving payment for the cryptocurrency that it sells to households, provides computing power to facilitate potential transactions between households in the platform that are added to the chain at $t = 2$. To ensure there are enough servers to clear all household transactions, we assume the platform requires at least as many miners as households to prevent a failed transaction. We assume miners have commitment so that if they accept payment at $t = 1$, they agree to clear a transaction at $t = 2$ if needed.

### 1.3 Developer

The developer of the cryptocurrency creates the platform at $t = 1$. It establishes the code that specifies the protocol of how transactions in the platform of owners of the cryptocurrency are cleared and recorded on the blockchain, how more currency is created, such as through mining, and how it can be stored in virtual wallets. It receives a fraction $\rho$ of the revenue $P$ from the Initial Coin Offering (ICO), with $\rho$ fixed as part of the technology. The remaining revenue is paid to miners as part of the Proof of Work (PoW) protocol in exchange for their accounting services at $t = 2$. A lower $\rho$ can be viewed as a higher profitability of mining that entices more miners to support the platform.

$^6$This observation is also discussed in Schilling and Uhlig (2018), though their focus is on price stability rather than optimal monetary policy.
The developer receives the revenue from the ICO:

\[ \Pi_D = E \left[ \rho P \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} X_i d\Phi (\varepsilon_i) \right] . \]

1.4 Rational Expectations Cutoff Equilibrium

Our model features a rational expectations cutoff equilibrium, which requires clearing of the cryptocurrency market that is consistent with the optimal behaviors of households and miners, as well as clearing of each traded good between two matched households:

- Household optimization: each household chooses \( X_i \) at \( t = 1 \) to solve its maximization problem in (3) for whether to purchase the cryptocurrency, and then chooses \( \{C_i, C_j\} \) at \( t = 2 \) to solve its maximization problem in (2) for trading and consumption of the two goods with its matched trading partner.

- Miner optimization: each miner chooses \( S_i \) at \( t = 1 \) to solve his maximization problem in (4).

- At \( t = 1 \), the cryptocurrency market clears:

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} X_i (A_i, P) d\Phi (\varepsilon_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} S_i (\omega_i, P) d\Phi (\varepsilon_i) ,
\]

where each household’s demand \( X_i (A_i, P) \) depends on its productivity \( A_i \) and the currency price \( P \),\(^7\) and each builder’s housing supply \( S_i (\omega_i, P) \) depends on its productivity \( \omega_i \) and the currency price \( P \). The demand from households and supply from miners are integrated over the idiosyncratic components of their endowments \( \{\varepsilon_i\}_{i \in [0,1]} \) and costs \( \{e_i\}_{i \in [0,1]} \), respectively.

- At \( t = 2 \), the market for household \( i \)’s good between two matched trading partners clears:

\[ C_i (i) + C_j (i) = e^{A_i} . \]

2 The Perfect-Information Setting

In this section, we focus on the setting with the platform strength \( A \) and the miners’ mining cost \( \xi \) being publicly observable at \( t = 1 \).

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\(^7\)Note that each household’s demand for the cryptocurrency may also directly depend on the network strength \( A \) if it is publicly observed, as in the perfect-information benchmark.
2.1 Choices of Households

At \( t = 2 \), households that have chosen to purchase the cryptocurrency need to make their consumption decisions. Household \( i \) has \( e^{A_i} \) units of good \( i \) for consumption and for trading with another household. It maximizes its utility function given in (2). The following proposition describes each household’s consumption choice. Its marginal utility of goods consumption also gives the equilibrium goods price.

**Proposition 1** Households \( i \)’s optimal goods consumption at \( t = 2 \) are

\[
C_i(i) = (1 - \eta_c) e^{A_i}, \quad C_j(i) = \eta_c e^{A_j},
\]

and the price of its produced good is

\[
p_i = e^{\eta_c (A_j - A_i)}. \]

Furthermore, the expected utility benefit of household \( i \) at \( t = 1 \) is given by

\[
E[U(C_i, C_j; N)|I]\bigg| = e^{(1-\eta_c)A_i + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \epsilon^{-1}} E \left[ e^{\eta_c A} \Phi \left( \eta_c \tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}} \right) \bigg| I_i \right],
\]

and the ex ante utility of all households before observing their endowment is

\[
U_0 = e^{A + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \eta_c)^2 + \eta_c^2} \Phi \left( (1 - \eta_c) \tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}} \right) \Phi \left( \eta_c \tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}} \right) - \Phi \left( \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}} \right) P.
\]

Proposition 1 shows that each household spends a fraction \( 1 - \eta_c \) of its endowment (excluding housing wealth) on consuming its own good \( C_i(i) \) and a fraction \( \eta_c \) on goods produced by its trading partner \( C_j(i) \) if they match. When \( \eta_c = 1/2 \), the household consumes its own good and the goods of its neighbors equally. The price of each good is determined by its output relative to that of its partner to the extent that there is complementarity in their consumption. One household’s good is more valuable when the other household has a greater endowment, and consequently each household needs to take into account the endowment of its trading partner when making its own decision. The proposition demonstrates that the expected utility of a household in the platform is determined by not only its own endowment \( e^{A_i} \) but also the endowments of other households. This latter component arises from the complementarity in the household’s utility function.

We now discuss each household’s decision on whether to purchase the cryptocurrency at \( t = 1 \). As a result of its Cobb-Douglas utility, the household is effectively risk-neutral over
its aggregate consumption, and its optimal choice reflects the difference between its expected output if it buys the currency and is matched with a trading partner, and the cost of the cryptocurrency, which is the price $P$ to buy a unit of the currency. It then follows that household $i$’s purchase decision is given by

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } E[U(C_i, C_j; \mathcal{N})|\mathcal{I}_i] \geq P \\ 0 & \text{if } E[U(C_i, C_j; \mathcal{N})|\mathcal{I}_i] < P \end{cases}$$

This decision rule for its purchase supports our conjecture to search for a cutoff strategy for each household, in which only households with endowments above a critical level $A^*$ buy the currency. This cutoff is eventually solved as a fixed point in the equilibrium, and equates the currency price the expected dividend from joining the platform for the marginal household.

### 2.2 The Equilibrium

We now proceed to discuss the equilibrium at $t = 1$. We characterize each household’s cryptocurrency purchase decision and the currency price at $t = 1$, taking the choice of the developer as given. Households will sort into the cryptocurrency platform according to a cutoff equilibrium determined by the net benefit of owning the currency, which trades off the opportunity of trading with other households in the trading platform with the price of the decentralized digital platform membership (i.e., the cryptocurrency price). Despite the inherent nonlinearity of our framework, we derive a tractable cutoff equilibrium that is characterized by the solution to a fixed-point problem over the endogenous cutoff of the marginal household that purchases the cryptocurrency, $A^*$, as summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** In the perfect-information setting, there are generically two cutoff equilibria, with cutoffs $\bar{A}^*(A, \xi) < \bar{A}^*(A, \xi)$, respectively, in which the following hold:

1. Household $i$ follows a cutoff strategy in its cryptocurrency purchase decision:

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A_i \geq A^* \\ 0 & \text{if } A_i < A^* \end{cases}$$

where $A^* \in \{\underline{A}^*, \bar{A}^*\}$ solves:

$$e^{\left(1-\eta_c+\sqrt{\tau_c/\tau_e}\right)(A^*-A)}\Phi\left(\eta_c\tau_e^{-1/2} - \frac{A^*-A}{\tau_e^{-1/2}}\right) = e^{-\xi-\frac{1}{2}\eta_c^2\tau_e^{-1/2}\log(1-\rho)}$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the CDF function of normal distribution.
2. The cryptocurrency price takes a log-linear form:
\[
\log P = \frac{\tau e}{\tau e} (A - A^*) - \xi - \log (1 - \rho).
\]

3. In the high (low) price equilibrium $A^*$ ($\bar{A}^*$), the cryptocurrency price $P$, the developer’s revenue $\Pi_D = \rho \Phi \left( \frac{A - A^*}{\tau e} \right) P$, and the ex ante utility of households $U_0$ are increasing (decreasing) in $A$, and the number of households that purchases the currency is increasing (decreasing) in $A$ and $\xi$.

4. No household buys the cryptocurrency if $A$ or $\xi$ are sufficiently small.

Proposition 2 characterizes the cutoff equilibrium in the platform when $A$ is publicly observed at $t = 1$, and confirms the optimality of a cutoff strategy for households in their choice to purchase the cryptocurrency. Households sort based on their endowments into the platform, with those with higher endowments, who expect more gains from trade with other households in the platform, entering and participating in decentralized trading at $t = 2$. In this cutoff equilibrium, the cryptocurrency price is a correspondence of both the demand and supply fundamentals but, despite its log-linear representation, it is actually a generalized linear correspondence of $\sqrt{\tau e} A - \xi - \log (1 - \rho)$, since $A^*$ is an implicit function of $A$ and $\xi$.

As a result of the complementarity in the households’ decision to buy the cryptocurrency, there are generically two equilibria in the cryptocurrency market: one with a high price and a lower cutoff $A^*$, in which a larger population enter the platform, and one with a low price and a higher cutoff $\bar{A}^*$, in which few households enter the platform. This occurs because households have backward-bending demand curves and, consequently, a high or a low price equilibrium can be self-confirming.\(^8\) The household with the highest endowments enter first but, if too few others enter, then the marginal benefit of trading in the platform is low, since the probability of meeting another household in the platform is low. This leads to a low price. That the low price is not zero distinguishes it from a fiat currency, and reflects our stance that the currency has intrinsic value to households. If instead many households enter, then the marginal benefit of entering the platform is high, sustaining a high price. It

---

\(^8\)Backward-bending demand curves can also arise from portfolio insurance motives, as in Gennette and Leland (1990), learning by less informed investors, as in Barlevy and Veronesi (2000,2003), and Yuan (2005), and from endogenous collateral margins for arbitrageurs, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
is also possible that no household buys the cryptocurrency if \( A \) or \( \xi \) are sufficiently small.\(^9\)

We illustrate the intuition for this multiplicity with a numerical example, in which we choose the following parameters:

\[
\tau_A = \tau_\xi = 1, \tau_\epsilon = \tau_\zeta = .5, \bar{A} = \bar{\xi} = 0, \eta_\epsilon = .3, \text{ and } \rho = .5.
\]

The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (6), which determines the cutoff, is bell-shaped in \( A^*(A, \xi) - A \), and corresponds to the backward-bending demand curve of households, while the right-hand side (RHS) is the straight line \( \exp(-A - \xi - \log(1 - \rho)) \). The dotted line is the RHS when \( A = \xi = 0 \), while the lower, dashed line sets \( A = \tau_\epsilon^{-1/2} \) at one standard deviation away from 0. The y-intercept of the flat line is decreasing in both \( A \) and \( \xi \). As one can see, the flat lines intersect the bell-shaped curve generically at two points, with the intersection on the left side of the bell corresponding to the high price equilibrium with the lower cutoff, while the intersection on the right side is the low price equilibrium with the higher cutoff. As \( A \) increases, then intersections shift down the y-axis, and correspond to a lower cutoff \( A^*(A, \xi) - A \) in the high price equilibrium, and a higher cutoff \( \bar{A}^*(A, \xi) - A \) in the low price equilibrium. Whenever, the flat line is above the bell-shaped curve, corresponding to very low realizations of the demand and supply fundamentals, no cutoff equilibrium exists, and no households purchase the cryptocurrency.

\(^9\)It is important to note that the discreteness of the household entry decision is not sufficient for multiplicity of equilibria. The models of Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014, 2015) and Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2018) also have economic agents face a discrete choice problem, yet in their settings the cutoff equilibrium is unique.
The existence of the two equilibria is directly related to the ICO funding model. In this model, buyers of the cryptocurrency are also the customers that the funded business (i.e., the platform) aims to serve, in sharp contrast to the typical models of funding new business projects by venture capitalists or by IPOs, in which investors and customers are usually different. As a result of this direct overlap between investors and customers of cryptocurrencies, there is a strong interaction between the funding cost and the business operation, which ultimately underlies the multiple equilibria.\footnote{Treating equation (6) as a functional fixed-point equation that iterates over the cutoff $A^*$, one can show that the high price equilibrium is stable while the low price is unstable, in the sense that the market returns to the equilibrium following small perturbations to the cutoff.}

Proposition 2 also provides several comparative statics of the two equilibria. Due to the nature of the two equilibria, they behave exactly opposite in many ways. As the demand and supply fundamentals increase, the cryptocurrency price increases and more households join the platform by buying the cryptocurrency in the high price equilibrium, while the opposite happen in the low price equilibrium with the cryptocurrency price dropping and less household joining the platform.

The multiplicity of equilibria can cause a viable cryptocurrency platform, and its associated ICO, to fail. Even a decentralized digital platform with a strong demand fundamental $A$ may attract little interest from investors, and this is self-sustaining, even though it could support a much larger subscriber base. Since the revenue from developing the platform in the high price equilibrium, $\frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \Phi \left( \frac{A-A^*}{\tau e^{1/2}} \right) e \sqrt{\frac{A}{\tau e} (A-A^*)^{-\frac{1}{2}}} \xi$, is strictly higher than in the low price equilibrium, $\frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \Phi \left( \frac{A-A^*}{\tau e^{1/2}} \right) e \sqrt{\frac{A}{\tau e} (A-A^*)^{-\frac{1}{2}}} \xi$, the developer also prefers the high price equilibrium, since the currency would then be both viable and more profitable. The existence of multiple equilibria also motivates large traders, such as the so-called coin whales in practice, to take on strategic positions to push the price of a cryptocurrency to its high price equilibrium. To the extent that all agents involved in the platform, including the developer, the households, and the miners, benefit from the high price equilibrium, such strategic trading may be socially beneficial.

While much of the current media and policy debate about cryptocurrencies emphasizes that they do not fall within the purview of any government regulatory agency, such as the SEC, that could protect consumers, our analysis suggests that less attention is given to another important feature that distinguishes cryptocurrencies from national currencies and
other financial instruments: the lack of a central authority, such as a sovereign in currencies or intermediaries in financial markets, that provides policy interventions to stabilize markets and promote economic activity. The government, as a large player that internalizes how economic actors make decisions and how prices are determined, for instance, plays a pivotal role in setting agent expectations on the future path of the economy, and helps stabilize prices and exchange rates by committing to act to ensure this path. In the absence of such guidance and policy interventions, however, it is not so surprising that cryptocurrencies are often associated with large price swings, confusion, and potentially self-fulfilling traps that lead to their failure. The absence of a stabilizing hand also explains why large investors have an incentive to act like cryptocurrency whales.\footnote{Consistent with this, Figure 4 of Lee, Li, and Shin (2018) shows that large investors purchase a sizable percentage of tokens during the initial days of successful ICOs.}

The multiplicity of equilibria also underscores and exacerbates the challenges in evaluating the fundamental value of a cryptocurrency in practice, and helps to rationalize a wide spectrum of observed dynamics of different cryptocurrencies. When the price of a cryptocurrency rises, it may have opposite implications about the underlying platform depending on whether the market is in the high price or low price equilibrium. This problem becomes particularly relevant when realistic informational frictions about the platform makes its fundamental not directly observable to the public, which we analyze in the next section.

3 The Setting with Unobservable Fundamentals

Motivated by realistic informational frictions, we now assume that both the households’ common endowment $A$ and the miners’ ming cost $\xi$ are not observable to households at $t = 1$ when they need to make the decision of whether to purchase the cryptocurrency and join the platform. Instead, each household observes its own endowment $A_i$. Intuitively, $A_i$ combines the aggregate endowment of the relevant households $A$ and the household’s own attribute $\varepsilon_i$. Thus, $A_i$ also serves as a noisy private signal about $A$ at $t = 1$. The parameter $\tau_\varepsilon$ governs both the dispersion in endowments and the precision of this private signal. As $\tau_\varepsilon \to \infty$, the households’ signals become infinitely precise and the informational frictions about $A$ vanish. Households care about the aggregate endowment because of complementarity in their demand for consumption. Consequently, while a household may know its own endowment, complementarity in consumption demand motivates it to pay attention to
the price of the cryptocurrency to learn about the level of aggregate endowment \( A \), which eventually determines the chance of trading with another household in the platform.

In addition to their private signals and the market-clearing price of the cryptocurrency, households also observe a noisy signal \( V \) about the number of other households that have joined the platform at \( t = 1 \). An advantage of the blockchain technology that cryptocurrencies employ is that it acts as an indelible and verifiable ledger that records the decentralized transactions that take place in the cryptocurrency. As such, it provides a history of public information about the volume of trade in the cryptocurrency. Since households buy the currency for decentralized trading with each other at \( t = 2 \); this volume is akin to the demand fundamental in our setting. Anticipating a cutoff equilibrium in which households with endowment signals above \( A^* \) buy the cryptocurrency, we construct a volume signal:

\[
V = \Phi \left( \sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} (A - A^*) + \varepsilon_V \right),
\]

where \( \Phi (\cdot) \) is the CDF of normal distribution and \( \varepsilon_V \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau_\varepsilon^{-1}) \) independent of all other shocks in the economy. This specification has the appeal that the volume signal is always between 0 and 1 for plausibility, and is highly correlated with the number of decentralized transactions that are added to the ledger at \( t = 2 \), which, by the weak LLN, is \( \Phi \left( \sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} (A - A^*) \right)^2 \). This volume signal can also be viewed as the number of coins in active circulation.

The noise in the signal reflects that, in practice, blockchains from the ledger are an imperfect signal about the demand for trade in the cryptocurrency. Only a fraction of transactions, for instance, hit the blockchain, where they are recorded, because of how costly it is to pay transaction fees to miners in Proof of Work (PoW) coins. As such, many transactions, such as the purchase and sale of coins with another currency, take place on exchanges and never hit the blockchain. In addition, the anonymous nature of the transactions makes it difficult to assess the effective supply of cryptocurrencies in circulation, since transferring cryptocurrencies across wallets, in which no actual currency is traded between two parties, is a transaction that hits the blockchain.\(^{12}\) Furthermore, while the underlying code of cryptocurrencies records the total supply of coins, even as new coins are mined, the effective supply of coins in circulation is estimated in a manner similar to asset float for stocks. Some currency developers, for instance, retain ownership of a fraction of the total supply of coins in escrow accounts, and some coins sit in accounts that are no longer active. We parameterize

\(^{12}\)Some cryptocurrencies are now adopting “no knowledge proof” encryption to be able to verify transactions without having to disclose any of the underlying details of the transaction recorded on the chain.
the residual uncertainty arising from these issues as measurement error.

Since the CDF of the normal distribution is a monotonically increasing function, we can invert $V$ to construct an additive summary statistic $v$:

$$v = \tau_{\xi}^{-1/2} \Phi^{-1}(V) + A^* = A + \tau_{\xi}^{-1/2} \xi_v,$$

which, in the sequel, serve as the volume signal about the cryptocurrency. Interestingly, the precision of the volume signal is $\tau_{\xi, V}$, so that the less dispersed the endowments of households, the more informative is the history of transactions recorded in the ledger. In contrast to Kocherlakota (1998), in which memory implicitly encoded in monetary balances is used for individual monitoring, memory encoded in the ledger is explicit and serves as an aggregate signal about the currency’s fundamentals.

To forecast the platform fundamental $A$, each household’s information set $\mathcal{I}$, now includes its own endowment $A_i$, the volume signal $V$, and the equilibrium cryptocurrency price $P$. As in the perfect-information setting, each household would still use a cutoff strategy, and the equilibrium cryptocurrency price would still be a nonlinear correspondence of $A$, which poses a challenge to our derivation of households’ learning about $A$. It turns out that the information content of $P$ can be summarized by a summary statistic $z$ that is linear in $A$ and the supply shock $\xi$:

$$z = A - \sqrt{\frac{\tau_{\xi}}{\tau_{\xi}}} \xi.$$

In our analysis, we shall first conjecture this linear summary statistic for the equilibrium price and then verify that it indeed holds in the equilibrium. This conjectured linear statistic helps to ensure tractability of the equilibrium despite that the equilibrium cryptocurrency price is highly nonlinear.

By solving for the learning of households based on the conjectured summary statistic from the housing price and the volume statistic, and clearing the aggregate cryptocurrency demand of the households with the supply from miners, we derive the cryptocurrency market equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the price and each household’s cryptocurrency demand in this equilibrium.

**Proposition 3** If the platform fundamental $A$ is not publicly observable at $t = 1$, there are generically two cutoff equilibria, in which the following hold:

1. The cryptocurrency price takes a log-linear form:

$$\log P = \sqrt{\frac{\tau_{\xi}}{\tau_{\xi}}} (A - A^*) - \xi - \log (1 - \rho). \quad (7)$$
2. The posterior of household $i$ conditional on the summary statistic of the cryptocurrency price $z$, the volume signal summary statistic $v$, and its own endowment $A_i$ is Gaussian with the conditional mean $\hat{A}_i$ and variance $\hat{\tau}_A$ given by

$$
\hat{A}_i = \hat{\tau}_A^{-1} \left( \tau_A \bar{A} + \tau_v v + \frac{\tau_\xi}{\tau_e} A_i \right),
$$
$$
\hat{\tau}_A = \tau_A + \tau_v + \frac{\tau_\xi}{\tau_e} \tau_\xi + \tau_e.
$$

3. Household $i$ follows a cutoff strategy in its cryptocurrency choice:

$$
X_i = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } A_i \geq A^* \\
0 & \text{if } A_i < A^*
\end{cases},
$$

where $A^*(z, v)$ solves equation (17) in the Appendix.

4. There are either two or no equilibria. When the two equilibria exist, in response to a positive shock $\varepsilon_v$ to the volume signal, the equilibrium cutoff $A^*$ decreases, and both the cryptocurrency price and the number of households that purchase the cryptocurrency increase in the high price equilibrium, while shock has the opposite impact in the low price equilibrium.

Proposition 3 confirms even when the platform fundamental $A$ is not publicly observable, the equilibrium cryptocurrency price in (7) takes exactly the same log-linear form as in the perfect-information setting, as shown by Proposition 2. The only difference is the equilibrium cutoff $A^*$ used by the households. With the fundamental variables $A$ and $\xi$ being unobservable, each household has to make its decision based on its own endowment $A_i$, together with the publicly observed price and volume signals, as captured by the two summary statistics $z$ and $v$. While each household continues to use the cutoff strategy, the equilibrium cutoff $A^*$ now becomes a correspondence of $z$ and $v$. Being the only difference in the equilibrium price correspondence from the perfect-information setting, $A^*(z, v)$ is also the only channel through which the households’ learning of $A$ through the price and volume signals affects the market.

As in the perfect-information setting, there are again either two equilibria or no equilibria. This situation arises from solving $A^*(z, v)$ from its fixed-point condition given in equation (17), which is similar to equation (6) and may have either two or no real solution. When two equilibria exist, one has a lower equilibrium cutoff for households’ cryptocurrency purchase decision and a higher cryptocurrency price, while the other has a higher equilibrium cutoff.
and a lower price. These two equilibria again behave in opposite ways. Proposition 3 formally shows that in response to a shock to the volume signal, the equilibrium cutoff $A^*$ and cryptocurrency price $P$ have opposite reactions across the two equilibria.

![Figure 2: Responses of $A^*(z,v)$ to $v$ and $z$ in the high-price and low-price equilibria across different values of $\tau_\xi$.](image)

To further illustrate the key properties of these two equilibria, Figure 3 depicts the responses of the equilibrium cutoff $A^*(z,v)$ to shocks to both $v$ and $z$, as measured by $\frac{\partial A^*}{\partial v}$ and $\frac{\partial A^*}{\partial z}$, across the high-price and low-price equilibria. The left panel shows that in the high-price equilibrium, the equilibrium cutoff $A^*$ moves down in response to an increase in $v$, a positive signal about the platform fundamental, indicating that more households join the platform. In contrast, $A^*$ reacts positively to $v$, causing a smaller population to enter the platform. Interestingly, the reactions in both equilibria diminish as $\tau_\xi$ increases. This is because the reactions in $A^*$ are driven by the households’ learning about the platform fundamental $A$ from the volume signal $v$. As $\tau_\xi$ rises, the price of the cryptocurrency becomes more informative about $A$ and, as a result, crowds out the learning effect of $v$.

The right panel illustrates how the cutoff $A^*$ responds to a unit impulse to the sufficient statistic in the price $z$. For $\tau_\xi$ close to 0, the currency price contains little information about the demand fundamental, and consequently the cost effect dominates the impact of an increase in $z$. As a result, less households enter the platform in the high price equilibrium, in
response to the higher price of entry, while more households enter in the low price equilibrium, as the low price equilibrium features an opposite reaction to prices. As \( \tau_{\varepsilon} \) increases, however, the role of a higher \( z \) in reflecting a higher demand fundamental becomes more pronounced, and the learning effect begins to offset the cost effect of a higher price. As a result, less households are crowded out by a higher price in the high price equilibrium, as they believe the higher price also reflects a higher benefit from joining the platform. Interestingly, the learning effect dominates in the low price equilibrium for sufficiently high \( \tau_{\varepsilon} \): less households enter the platform because of the increased optimism about the demand fundamental, as a higher \( A \) raises the cutoff in the low price equilibrium.

In traditional asset market models with dispersed information, in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) paradigms, trading volume plays no role in learning,\(^{13}\) and is often studied only for its empirical predictions, as in, for instance, Wang (1994) and He and Wang (1995).\(^{14}\) In our setting, households learn from both the cryptocurrency price and volume when deciding whether to purchase the cryptocurrency. As such, volume provides a complementary source of information to the cryptocurrency price and, as can be seen in the left panel of Figure 2, any noise in the volume signal distorts households’ participation decisions. Since the precision of the volume signal is increasing in the precision of each household’s private information \( \tau_{\varepsilon} \), it mitigates the information asymmetry more than an exogenous public signal: when households know more (high \( \tau_{\varepsilon} \)), the volume signal is more informative, and similarly when households know less (low \( \tau_{\varepsilon} \)). In addition, households substitute toward (away) from this source of information the less (more) informative is the price. Consequently, our model suggests that market participants should pay more attention to the records of the decentralized ledgers the more homogeneous are the users of the currency.

An important implicit assumption underlying our analysis with informational frictions is that market participants can coordinate on a high or low price equilibrium. This separates the inference and coordination problems, enabling market participants to glean successfully...

\(^{13}\)This is, in part, an artifact of the CARA-Normal paradigm, in which trading volume is the expectation of a folded normal random variable. This makes learning intractable if a noisy version of trading volume were observed. An advantage of our focus on a cutoff equilibrium is that we are able to incorporate a noisy measure of volume while still maintaining tractability.

\(^{14}\)Notable exceptions are Blume, Easley, and O’Hara (1994) and Schneider (2009). In the former, past prices and volumes trivially reveal the sufficient statistics of all past trader private information (which still contain residual uncertainty because of correlated signal error). In the latter, trading volume provides a signal about how informative prices are about an asset’s fundamentals.
the sufficient statistics from the price and volume signals. Once they correctly recover the linear summary statistics \( z \) and \( v \), they can reconstruct the trading price \( P \) and volume \( V \) according to:

\[
P = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} \exp \left( z - \sqrt{\frac{\tau_{\varepsilon}}{\tau_{\varepsilon}}} A^* \right),
\]

\[
V = \Phi \left( v - \sqrt{\tau_{\varepsilon}} A^* \right),
\]

since \( A^*(z, v) \in \{ A^*(z, v), \bar{A}^*(z, v) \} \), which are what is actually observed by market participants.\(^{15}\) From the proof of Proposition 3, each \((z, v)\) pair maps to two \((P, V)\) pairs, one corresponding to a high price equilibrium, \( A^*(z, v) \), and the other to a low price equilibrium, \( \bar{A}^*(z, v) \). By similar logic, each \((P, V)\) pair maps to two \((z', v')\) pairs, one rationalizing \((P, V)\) as a high price equilibrium \( a^*(P, V) \), and the other as a low price equilibrium \( \bar{a}^*(P, V) \), with the lower case \( a^* \) denoting a different cutoff mapping than \( A^* \). While there is only one fixed point, i.e. either \( A^*(z, v) = a^*(P, V) \) or \( \bar{A}^*(z, v) = \bar{a}^*(P, V) \), it is not clear to an outsider from just observing the price on which equilibrium market participants are coordinating. Consequently, the nature of the market makes it difficult for outsiders and regulators to interpret market conditions, which is particularly problematic since the response of the market to changes in fundamentals is very different across the high and low price equilibria.

This potential confusion introduces a secondary role for volume as a signal about coordination in conjunction with prices. While any given cryptocurrency price could be rationalized as corresponding to a high or low price equilibrium, the volume signal provides a second piece of information. A high price with a high volume signal is indicative of a high price equilibrium, while a low price with low volume suggests the market has coordinated on a low price equilibrium. In practice, we view this volume signal as being analogous to the volume of transactions recorded on the ledgers of the cryptocurrency, and our analysis emphasizes the importance of examining both prices and quantities in cryptocurrency markets. Consequently, any fundamental analysis of the cryptocurrency should look beyond prices and to volumes as an anchor.

Our analysis also suggests that, in the presence of informational frictions, the dual inference problem makes it particularly difficult for outsiders to infer both the fundamental and the nature of the equilibrium from prices. This may lead to erratic trading behavior by outside investors based on technical analysis. In particular, a rising price is positively

\(^{15}\) In technical terms, we implicitly assumed the equivalence of \( \sigma(\{v, z\}) \) and \( \sigma(\{P, V\}) \) without modeling the coordination device, i.e. sunspot. We did this for parsimony of exposition.
correlated with higher fundamental in the high price equilibrium, while indicative of lower fundamental in the low price equilibrium. As a consequence, depending on an investor’s assessment of which equilibrium the market is currently in, it may adopt either a trend-chasing or the opposite contrarian strategy. Furthermore, the investor may choose to dramatically reverse its strategy if it speculates that the market is switching regimes.

4 Extensions

In this section, we consider two extensions of our model. In the first, we investigate an ICO on a blockchain supported by a Proof of Stake (PoS) protocol to explore how an alternative protocol for clearing transactions impacts the performance of the ICO and the platform. In the second, we discuss how adding dynamics to our model impacts the stability of the platform in the presence of informational frictions.

4.1 Proof of Stake Protocol

Much of the recent debate about cryptocurrencies is about the potential transition from the Proof of Work (PoW) protocol, which underlies most cryptocurrency coins and tokens that exist, to a Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus protocol. Many platforms with ICOs, for instance, are designed as smart contracts written onto existing blockchain architecture, such as Ethereum, which employ a PoW protocol. In a PoS protocol, owners of the currency act as intermediaries, and clear transactions for fees with a likelihood proportional to their latent stake in the currency. This stake is often measured as coins or tokens in a wallet that have been inactive for a certain period of time. While PoS networks do not suffer from the scalability issue of PoW, in that more intensive computing power of miners is required as the network grows, it is unclear if they suffer from the same coordination fragility.

In this subsection, we consider a slightly modified setting to explore the tradeoffs of PoS. Instead of having miners supply accounting services in exchange for currency, or payment by inflation, we have a unit continuum of intermediaries called "forgers" that purchase a fraction of the currency, which we normalize to be in unit supply, as their stakes. A stake of size $p_i$ in the currency will entitle an intermediary to a fraction $(\int_0^1 p_j dj)^{-1} p_i$ of the total fees from providing accounting services to clear household transactions at $t = 2$. The fee, set by the developer, is a fraction $\theta$ of the endowment of each household that trades at $t = 2$, while completing each transaction costs a forger a fraction $\lambda \in (0,1)$ of this value. Since
households intend to trade on the platform, their currency account is considered active and, as such, they are not entitled to participate in clearing transactions.

We assume intermediaries of each type are atomistic and identical. Each buys a fraction \( p_i \) of the currency subject to a common noisy cost of capital \( \psi \) where \( \psi \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{\psi}, \tau^{-1}) \). is normally distributed. Forger \( i \) solves the optimization program:

\[
\Pi_i^0 = \sup_{p_i} \left[ \int_0^1 p_j d j \frac{\theta - \lambda}{p_j} e^{A + \frac{1}{2}((1 - \eta_c)^2 + \eta_c^2)\tau^{-1}} \phi \left( (1 - \eta_c)\tau^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau^{-1/2}} \right) \Phi \left( \eta_c\tau^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau^{-1/2}} - e^{\psi} \right) \right] p_i,
\]

subject to the market-clearing condition for the currency:

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} X_i(A_i, P) d\Phi(\varepsilon_i) + \int_0^1 p_i d\varepsilon = 1.
\]

Assuming a cutoff strategy for households, we can solve the market-clearing condition to relate the total stake of forgers to the marginal household with type \( A^* \):

\[
\int_0^1 p_i d\varepsilon = \Phi \left( \frac{A - A^*}{\sqrt{\tau}} \right).
\]

Define \( A^* = A + \tau^{-1/2} s \). Furthermore, since the program for forgers is linear in \( p_i \), it follows that the expression in parentheses must be zero, and therefore that \( s \) solves:

\[
e^{-(1 - \eta_c)\tau^{-1/2} + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \eta_c)^2\tau^{-1}} \frac{\phi \left( (1 - \eta_c)\tau^{-1/2} - s \right)}{\Phi (-s)} = \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda} e^{\psi}.
\]

for them to be indifferent to the size of their stake.\(^{16}\) Consequently, \( s = h \left( \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda} e^{\psi} \right) \). Since the LHS satisfies:

\[
\frac{d\log LHS}{ds} = -(1 - \eta_c)\tau^{-1/2} + \frac{\phi (-s)}{\Phi (-s)} - \frac{\phi \left( (1 - \eta_c)\tau^{-1/2} - s \right)}{\Phi \left( (1 - \eta_c)\tau^{-1/2} - s \right)},
\]

which attains its maximum as \( s \to \infty, \frac{d\log LHS}{ds} \to 0 \), and therefore the LHS is (weakly) monotonically decreasing in \( s \) from \( \infty \) to \( 1 \). It then follows that \( s \) exists and is unique, provided that \( \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda} e^{\psi} \geq 1 \), and that \( h' \left( \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda} e^{\psi} \right), h'' \left( \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda} e^{\psi} \right) \geq 0 \).

\(^{16}\) A corner solution in which all households buy the currency \( (p_i = 0 \ \forall \ i) \) can be ruled out a.s. since the currency price would have to collapse to zero to ensure all households, even those with extremely low endowments, participate. Then, however, the cost of acquiring a stake is zero, while transaction fees are positive, violating the choice of forgers not to buy a stake.

If forgers bought all the currency \( (\int_0^1 p_i d j = 1) \), then the currency price would also collapse to zero. We can rule out this outcome by considering a sequence of platforms that provide an \( \varepsilon_n > 0 \) (arbitrarily small) benefit to each household for participating, and taking the limit as this small benefit approaches zero. Such a refinement would not, in contrast, resolve the multiplicity in the PoW setting.
Substituting the marginal household cutoff $A^*$ into the price of the currency, given by the utility of the marginal household, we arrive at:

$$P = (1 - \theta) e^{(1 - \eta_c)\tau_{\varepsilon}^{1/2}h\left(\frac{\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda}e^\psi}{\theta - \lambda}\right) + A + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} \Phi \left(\eta_c \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} - h \left(\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda}e^\psi\right)\right)},$$

which is unique given a choice of fees $\theta$. As $A^*$ is increasing in $\psi$, it follows that the currency price is decreasing in $\psi$ for a fixed choice of fees $\theta$.

Suppose that the developer chooses $\theta$ to maximize its expected revenue, internalizing its impact on household and forger participation:

$$\Pi^D_0 = \sup_{\theta} (1 - \theta) e^{(1 - \eta_c)\tau_{\varepsilon}^{1/2}h\left(\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda}e^\psi\right) + A + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} \Phi \left(\eta_c \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} - h \left(\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda}e^\psi\right)\right)}.$$ 

It then follows from the FONC that at an interior solution that the optimal $\theta = \frac{1 - \psi}{1 + x}$ satisfies:

$$\frac{\phi \left(\eta_c \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} - h \left(xe^\psi\right)\right)}{\Phi \left(\eta_c \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} - h \left(xe^\psi\right)\right)} - (1 - \eta_c) \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2} = \frac{1}{h' \left(xe^\psi\right) e^\psi x (1 + x)}.$$

Since the LHS is monotonically increasing from $-(1 - \eta_c) \tau_{\varepsilon}^{-1/2}$ to $\infty$, while the RHS is monotonically decreasing from $\infty$ to $0$, it follows an interior optimal choice of $x$, and consequently $\theta$, exists and is unique. Consequently, their is an optimal fee that the developer can set to maximize its revenue from the ICO. Interestingly, the optimal choice of $\theta$ is independent of the platform’s demand fundamental $A$, and only a function of the cost of capital of forgers $\psi$. As $A^*$ tends to $\infty$ when $\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta - \lambda}e^\psi \to 1$, earning zero revenue for the developer, it follows that at the optimum $\theta$ will be such that $\frac{1 - \psi}{1 + x} > 1$.

In the PoS network, there is no issue of fragility in the cryptocurrency, despite the dual nature of ICO investors. Since the price of the cryptocurrency scales with the expected transaction fees paid to forgers, it is the inverse relationship between the aggregate stake of forgers, $p$, and the population of households that participates in the platform that leads to a unique cutoff for households $A^*$. As a result, the currency price is also no longer linked to the marginal cost of mining, as in the PoW protocol; instead, it depends on the forger’s cost of capital $\psi$, similar to the role of financial frictions in fiat currencies intermediated by traditional intermediaries, as in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). When the opportunity cost to providing accounting services increases, a higher $\psi$, forgers requires a higher return

\[^{17}\text{Notice that } \theta - \lambda = \frac{1 - \lambda}{1 + x} > 0, \text{ and therefore forgers will always earn a positive revenue from transaction fees at an interior optimal choice of } x.\]
to participate, and this reduces the entry of households to lower the currency price and, consequently, the cost of acquiring their stake.

In addition, the currency developer can maximize its profits from the ICO through the appropriate choice of fees $\theta$, which trades off participation by households in the platform with participation by forgers. With the PoS protocol, the developer also does not have to be concerned about the potential for coordination failure by households, as it did with PoW. While the platform no longer suffers from fragility, however, PoS does introduce a different distortion: maximizing developer revenue is not necessarily equivalent to maximizing household participation in the platform, as the currency is sold to both households and forgers, while it is with PoW because price and quantity are both increasing in the number of participating households. Such a wedge may not be desirable from a social perspective because the expected social surplus from the platform is equal to the total endowment of participating households less the fraction $\lambda$ burned to complete the transactions. As such, the fees given to forgers represent zero-sum transfers for which forgers compete by acquiring stakes in the currency that can potentially crowd out households.

4.2 Dynamics

In this subsection, we discuss the implications of introducing dynamics into our setting that incorporates a retrade motive for households. While our static model highlights the potential for intratemporal fragility arising from coordination failure among households participating in the ICO, dynamics introduces an intratemporal layer to this instability in the presence of informational frictions. Since the currency price and the platform fundamentals have the opposite relation across the high and low price equilibria, expectations of a low price equilibrium in the future can unravel the existence of a cutoff equilibrium today. As a consequence, a small shift in beliefs about participation in the platform tomorrow can cause dramatic swings in currency prices.

To illustrate this additional instability, suppose that there is an additional date and an additional round of trading on the platform among a new generation of households whose aggregate endowment is correlated with that of the first. These new households purchase the cryptocurrency at date 2 from the initial participants in the ICO. As a result, the first generation at date 1 must now forecast not only the expected benefits from trading on the platform at date 2, the dividend yield from buying the currency, but also the price at which it
sells the currency to future platform participants, which represents the capital gains. Since the second round of trading among new households is similar to the currency market in our static model, there can either be a high price or a low price equilibrium for the same fundamentals at date 2 when both exist. As such, households must form rational beliefs about the probability that a high or low equilibrium occurs, which, to facilitate discussion, is the outcome of a random coordination device or sunspot.

With perfect information, as beliefs about the future price of the currency are symmetric among households, this source of intertemporal uncertainty from coordination at date 2 only impacts the fraction of additional households, with marginally worse endowments, who participate in the platform at date 1 because of the added benefit of the resale of the currency. The perfect-information setting highlights the feedback from intratemporal coordination, as in our static model, to intertemporal incentives through retrading. Coordination tomorrow better facilitates coordination today by raising the expected profit of initial households from selling the currency at $t = 2$, even though the households across generations do not directly trade with each other, as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Lagos and Wright (2005). Since the currency price scales with the size of the network to compensate miners for committing more computing power, speculation on future currency prices is intimately linked to speculating on the future subscription to the platform.$^{18}$

Informational frictions, however, complicate the analysis. Initial households at date 1 may be unable to follow a cutoff strategy the probability of a low price equilibrium at date 2 is sufficiently high. This can occur because the currency price is decreasing in the demand fundamental in the low price equilibrium. Since a household’s type cannot be separated from its private signal about the demand fundamental, households most optimistic about the dividend yield from trading in the platform are not those most optimistic about the capital gains from reselling the currency to future households at date 2. As such, a cutoff equilibrium at date 1 can cease to exist. This tension highlights the inherent intertemporal fragility of coordination that arises with informational frictions. As a result, a small shift in the probability of a low price equilibrium tomorrow can cause massive fluctuations in market outcomes as cutoff equilibria in the cryptocurrency break down.

$^{18}$With the Proof of Work protocol, there is also scope to speculate on the energy costs to miners of future computational power if one wants to profit from higher currency prices.
5 Conclusion

Since the shareholders who participate in ICOs are also the customers that use the currency to trade goods and services, cryptocurrencies and their underlying platforms are subject to more pronounced feedback from financial market outcomes to real decisions than traditional financial assets. As a result, there is an intimate link between the success of the ICO and the viability of the currency as membership to a network. This link gives rise to the possibility of coordination failure, whereby the currency price and the volume of coins in active circulation reflect whether the market is in an equilibrium in which the currency price is high (low) and many (few) households participate. As these two equilibria have very disparate properties, observing the same price and volume fluctuations have very different implications for diagnosing the health of the currency depending on the equilibrium.

Since cryptocurrencies are not supported by a sovereign or central intermediaries that can help coordinate participants along an equilibrium path, multiplicity of equilibria has a destabilizing impact on the currency. Furthermore, it can invite manipulation from large investors. While having stake holders in the currency act as intermediaries with the Proof of Stake protocol helps resolve the issues of multiplicity and scalability of the platform, it makes the currency susceptible to fluctuations in their cost of capital, and introduces a wedge for the developer between maximizing revenue from the ICO and maximizing household participation.

In the presence of realistic informational frictions, the currency price and volume take on an additional dimension as useful signals about the demand fundamental underlying the cryptocurrency. Coordination issues also extend to this incomplete information setting, and the market reacts very differently to news stemming from these signals depending on whether the market is in the high or low price equilibrium. One cannot, therefore, easily disentangle inference about the fundamental from that about coordination, and there are many ways to rationalize any price fluctuations from the perspective of an outsider. Analyzing measures of quantities, such as the volume of transactions recorded on its ledgers, can provide helpful insight when trying to tether valuations of these cryptocurrencies, while technical analysis can worsen price fluctuations. In addition, the market becomes even more susceptible to instability once dynamics are introduced.

Our work, consequently, cautions any attempt at valuation or regulation of cryptocurrencies that fails to account for their dual role as securities and mediums of exchange.
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Appendix  Proofs of Propositions

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

The first order conditions of household \( i \)'s optimization problem in (2) respect to \( C_i(i) \) and \( C_j(i) \) at an interior point are:

\[
C_i(i) : \frac{1 - \eta_i}{C_i(i)} U(C_i(i), C_j(i); N) = \theta_i p_i,
\]

(8)

\[
C_j(i) : \frac{\eta_i}{C_j(i)} U(C_i(i), C_j(i); N) = \theta_j p_j,
\]

(9)

where \( \theta_i \) is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. Rewriting (9) as

\[
\eta_i U(C_i(i), C_j(i); N) = \theta_j p_j C_j(i).
\]

Dividing equations (8) by this expression leads to

\[
\frac{1}{C_i(i)} U(C_i(i), C_j(i); N) = \frac{\eta_i}{p_i C_i(i)} C_j(i).
\]

(10)

Furthermore, given equation (1), it follows since \( C_i(i) = (1 - \eta_i) e^{A_i} \) and \( C_j(i) = \eta_i e^{A_j} \) that:

\[
U(C_i(i), C_j(i); N) = e^{(1-\eta_i)A_i} e^{\eta_i A_j} = p_i e^{A_i},
\]

from substituting with the household's budget constraint at \( t = 2 \).

It then follows that, conditional on meeting another holder of the crypto currency, then the expected utility of investor \( i \) conditional on \( I_i \) and a successful match (given by the dummy \( M \)) is:

\[
E[U(C_i(i), C_j(i); N) | I_i, M] = e^{(1-\eta_i)A_i} e^{\eta_i A_j} \Phi \left( \frac{\eta_i \tau_i^{-1/2} + \frac{A-A_i^*}{\tau_i^{-1/2}}}{\tau_i^{-1/2}} \right),
\]

where

\[
\Phi \left( \frac{A-A_i^*}{\tau_i^{-1/2}} \right)
\]

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and, since the probability of meeting another holder of the crypto currency is $\Phi \left( \frac{A-A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{1/2}} \right)$, the expected utility of investor $i$ is:

$$E \left[ U \left( C_i (i), C_j (i); N \right) \mid I_i \right] = e^{(1-\eta_c)A_i + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_\varepsilon^{-1}} E \left[ e^{\eta_c A} \Phi \left( \frac{\eta_c \tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2} + A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}} \right) \mid I_i \right].$$

Finally, the ex ante expected utility of a household before it learns its endowment $A_i$ is:

$$U_0 = E \left[ \max_{A_i} \left\{ E [U_i \mid I_i] - P, 0 \right\} \right] = E \left[ e^{(1-\eta_c)A_i + \eta_c A + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_\varepsilon^{-1}} \Phi \left( \frac{\eta_c \tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2} + A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}} \right) - P \mid A_i, \xi \right] = e^{A + \frac{1}{2} \left( (1-\eta_c)^2 + \eta_c^2 \right) \tau_\varepsilon^{-1}} \Phi \left( 1 - \eta_c \right) \tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon} \Phi \left( \eta_c \tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2} + A - A^* \right) - P \Phi \left( \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}} \right) = u_0 - P \Phi \left( \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}} \right),$$

where $u_0$ is the utility benefit of entering the currency platform.

### A.2 Proof of Proposition 2

When all households and builders observe $A$ directly, there are no longer information frictions in the economy. From Proposition 1, the expected utility of household $i$ at $t = 1$ who chooses to buy the currency is:

$$E \left[ U_i \mid I_i \right] = e^{(1-\eta_c)A_i + \eta_c A + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_\varepsilon^{-1}} \Phi \left( \frac{\eta_c \tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2} + A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}} \right),$$

Since the household with the critical productivity $A^*$ must be indifferent to its neighborhood choice at the cutoff, it follows that $E \left[ U_i \mid I_i^* \right] - P = 0$, which implies:

$$e^{(1-\eta_c)A_i} \Phi \left( \frac{\eta_c \tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2} + A - A^*}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}} \right) = e^{-\frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_\varepsilon^{-1} - \eta_c A} P, \text{ with } A_i = A^*$$

which implies the benefit of living with more productive households is offset by the higher cost of living in the neighborhood.

Fixing the critical value $A^*$ and price $P$, we see that the LHS of equation (11) is increasing in monotonically in $A_i$, since $1 - \eta_c > 0$. This confirms the optimality of the cutoff strategy that households with $A_i \geq A^*$ enter the neighborhood, and households with $A_i < A^*$ choose to live somewhere else. Since $A_i = A + \varepsilon_i$, it then follows that a fraction $\Phi \left( -\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} (A^* - A) \right)$ enter the neighborhood, and a fraction $\Phi \left( \sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} (A^* - A) \right)$ choose to live somewhere else. As one can see, it is the integral over the idiosyncratic productivity shocks of households $\varepsilon_i$ that determines the fraction of households in the neighborhood.
From the optimal supply of housing by builder \(i\) in the neighborhood (5), there exists a critical value \(\omega^*\):

\[
\omega^* = - \log P - \log (1 - \rho),
\]

(12)
such that builders with productivity \(\omega_i \geq \omega^*\) build houses. Thus, a fraction \(\Phi (-\sqrt{\tau_e} (\omega^* - \xi))\) build houses in the neighborhood. Imposing market-clearing, it must be the case that

\[
\Phi (-\sqrt{\tau_e} (A^* - A)) = \Phi (-\sqrt{\tau_e} (\omega^* - \xi)).
\]

Since the CDF of the normal distribution is monotonically increasing, we can invert the above market-clearing conditions, and impose equation (12) to arrive at

\[
\log P = \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau_e}} (A - A^*) - \xi - \log (1 - \rho).
\]

(13)

By substituting for \(P\) in equation (11), we obtain an equation to determine the equilibrium cutoff \(A^* = A^* (A, \xi)\):

\[
e^{(1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\tau_e/\tau_e}) A^*} \phi \left( \eta_c \tau_e^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \right) = e^{(\sqrt{\tau_e/\tau_e} - \eta_c) A - \xi - \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_e^{-1} \log (1 - \rho)}
\]

(14)

Let the log of the LHS of equation (14) be \(f (A^*)\) as a function of \(A^*\). Taking the derivative of \(f (A^*)\) with respect to \(A^*\) gives

\[
\frac{df}{dA^*} = 1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau_e}} - \frac{1}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \phi \left( \eta_c \tau_e^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \right)
\]

\[
= 1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau_e}} - \frac{1}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \phi \left( \eta_c \tau_e^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \right).
\]

Notice as \(A^* \to -\infty\), \(\frac{df(A^*)}{dA^*} \to 1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau_e}} > 0\), while as \(A^* \to \infty\), then:

\[
\frac{df}{dA^*} \bigg|_{A^* \to \infty} \to 1 + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau_e}} + \lim_{A^* \to \infty} \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1}} \to -\infty.
\]

Furthermore, we recognize that:

\[
\frac{d^2 f}{dA^*} = - \frac{1}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \left( \eta_c + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1}} + \frac{1}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \phi \left( \eta_c \tau_e^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \right) \right) \phi \left( \eta_c \tau_e^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \right),
\]

which achieves its maximum at \(A \to \infty\), where \(\frac{d^2 f}{dA^*} = 0\). Consequently, \(\frac{d^2 f}{dA^*} \leq 0\), and therefore \(f (A^*)\) is concave and therefore hump-shaped in \(A^*\). Furthermore, the LHS of (14) tends to 0 as \(A^* \to -\infty\) and \(A^* \to \infty\). Therefore, the LHS of (14) is quasiconcave in \(A^*\).

Notice that we can rewrite equation (14) as:

\[
e^{(1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\tau_e/\tau_e}) A^*} \phi \left( \eta_c \tau_e^{-1/2} - \frac{A - A^*}{\tau_e^{-1/2}} \right) = e^{-A - \xi - \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_e^{-1} \log (1 - \rho)}
\]

(15)
where \( s = A^* - A \) determines the population that buys the currency. Notice that the LHS of equation (15) is log concave, since the pdf and CDF of the normal distribution is log concave and the exponential function is log-linear. Consequently, \( \frac{d^2 \log LHS}{ds^2} < 0 \).

Notice that the properties of the LHS of equation (15) are the same as for \( A^* \) in equation (14), and, importantly, the LHS is now independent of \( A \). The LHS is then a quasiconcave bell curve as a function of \( s \), while the RHS is a horizontal line. Given that the LHS is quasiconcave in \( s \), it achieves a maximum at \( \hat{s} \) such that \( \frac{d \log LHS}{ds} \bigg|_{s = \hat{s}} = 0 \). Since the RHS of (15) is fixed, it follows that the LHS and RHS of equation (15) intersect generically twice, with once being a knife-edge case when the equilibrium \( s \) is \( \hat{s} \). Therefore, there are generically two cutoff equilibrium. It can occur, however, that the RHS of equation (15) is above the LHS evaluated at \( \hat{s} \), and then the cost of buying the currency always exceeds its value for the marginal household. From the RHS, this can occur if \( A \) or \( \xi \) are sufficiently small, and then no household buys the currency.

In what follows, let the high price equilibrium, corresponding to a lower cutoff threshold, for \( s \) be \( \underline{s} \) and the low price equilibrium for \( s \) be \( \bar{s} \), which correspond to cutoffs \( A^* \) and \( \bar{A}^* \). If we increase \( A \) or \( \xi \), then the RHS of equation (15) decreases, and this implies for the high price equilibrium that \( \underline{s} \) decreases, while for the low price equilibrium \( \bar{s} \) increases. Since the population that purchases currency, \( \Phi \left(-\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} s\right) \), is strictly increasing in \( s \), our comparative statistics for \( -s \) consequently also apply to the population.

In addition, since \( P = \exp \left(-\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} s - \xi - \log (1 - \rho)\right) \), it further follows that the currency price is increasing in \( A \) for the high price equilibrium \( \underline{s} \), and is decreasing in \( A \) and \( \xi \) for the low price equilibrium \( \bar{s} \). Since the developer’s revenue from the ICO \( \Pi_D \) is \( \rho \Phi \left(-\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} s\right) P \), it follows that:

\[
\frac{d}{dA} \Pi_D = -\rho \tau_\varepsilon \frac{d\Phi \left(-\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} s\right)}{dA} \left(1 + \sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} \frac{\phi \left(-\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} s\right)}{\Phi \left(-\sqrt{\tau_\varepsilon} s\right)}\right) > 0,
\]

In the high price equilibrium, \( \frac{ds}{dA} < 0 \), and therefore the developer’s revenue is increasing in \( A \), while in the low price equilibrium, \( \frac{ds}{dA} > 0 \), and the developer’s revenue is instead decreasing in \( A \).

Finally, expressing the ex ante expected utility of a household before it learns its endowment \( A_i \), \( U_0 \), as:

\[
U_0 = u_0 - P \Phi \left(-\frac{s}{\tau_\varepsilon^{-1/2}}\right).
\]

Then, given that:

\[
\frac{ds}{dA} = -\frac{1}{d^2 \log \text{LHS}} \frac{d \log \text{LHS}}{ds},
\]

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where:
\[
d \log LHS = 1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} - \frac{1}{\tau^{-1/2}} \Phi \left( \eta_c \frac{\tau^{-1/2}}{\tau} - \frac{s}{\tau^{-1/2}} \right),
\]
it follows, with some manipulation, that:
\[
\frac{dU_0}{dA} = - \frac{ds}{dA} \left( 1 - \eta_c + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} \right) u_0 - \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} P \Phi \left( - \frac{s}{\tau^{-1/2}} \right).
\]
Since \( U_0 = E \left[ \max_{X_i} \{ E[U_i|I_i] - P, 0 \} \right] \), it follows that \( E[U_i|I_i] - P \geq 0 \), and therefore \( u_0 \geq P \Phi \left( - \frac{s}{\tau^{-1/2}} \right) \). Consequently, since \( \frac{ds}{dA} < 0 \) in the high price equilibrium:
\[
\frac{dU_0}{dA} > 0,
\]
while, since \( \frac{ds}{dA} > 0 \) in the low price equilibrium:
\[
\frac{dU_0}{dA} > 0.
\]

### A.3 Proof of Proposition 3

Given our assumption about the sufficient statistic in housing price, each household’s posterior about \( A \) is Gaussian \( A|I_i \sim N(\hat{A}_i, \hat{\tau}_i^{-1}) \) with conditional mean and variance:
\[
\hat{A}_i = \hat{A} + \hat{\tau}_i^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \tau^{-1}_A + \tau^{-1}_v \tau^{-1}_A & \tau^{-1}_v \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A & \tau^{-1}_v \tau^{-1}_A + \tau^{-1}_z \tau^{-1}_z \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A \\ \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_v \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A & \tau^{-1}_A + \tau^{-1}_z \tau^{-1}_z \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A \\ \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_v \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A & \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_v \tau^{-1}_A + \tau^{-1}_z \tau^{-1}_z \tau^{-1}_A \tau^{-1}_A \\ \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} v - \hat{A} \\ z - \hat{A} \\ A_i - \hat{A} \end{bmatrix},
\]
Note that the conditional estimate of \( \hat{A}_i \) of household \( i \) is increasing in its own productivity \( A_i \). This completes our characterization of learning by households and the currency developer.

By substituting the expressions for \( K_i \) and \( l_i \) into the utility of household \( i \) given in Proposition 1, we obtain:
\[
E[U_i|I_i] = e^{(1-\eta_c)A_i + \eta_c A_i^* + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau_{\epsilon}^{-1}} E \left[ e^{\eta_c (A - A_i^*)} \Phi \left( \eta_c \frac{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}}{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}} + \frac{A - A_i^*}{\tau_{\epsilon}^{-1/2}} \right) \right] I_i.
\]
Since the posterior for \( A - A_i^* \) of household \( i \) is conditionally Gaussian, it follows that the expectations in the expressions above are functions of the first two conditional moments.
\( \hat{A}_i - A^* \) and \( \hat{\tau}_A \). Let

\[
G\left( \hat{A}_i - A^*, \hat{\tau}_A \right) = E \left[ e^{\eta_c (\hat{A}_i - A^*)} \Phi \left( \eta_c \tau^{-1/2} + \frac{A - A^*}{\tau^{1/2}} \right) \right] = e^{\eta_c (\hat{A}_i - A^*) + \frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau^{-1} \Phi \left( \eta_c \tau^{-1/2} + \frac{\hat{A}_i + \eta_c \tau^{-1} \hat{A}^*}{\tau^{1/2}} \right) \sqrt{1 + \frac{\tau}{\tau_A}}}
\]

Define \( x = \frac{A - A^*}{\tau^{1/2}} \), and the function \( g(x) \):

\[
g(x) = e^{\eta_c \tau^{-1/2} x} \Phi \left( \eta_c \tau^{-1/2} + x \right),
\]

as the term inside the bracket. Then, it follows that:

\[
\frac{d \log g(x)}{dx} = \eta \tau^{-1/2} + \frac{\phi \left( \eta \tau^{-1/2} + x \right)}{\Phi \left( \eta \tau^{-1/2} + x \right)} > 0,
\]

and therefore \( \frac{dg(x)}{dx} > 0 \), since \( g(x) \geq 0 \). Consequently, it follows that \( \frac{dG}{dx} \left( x, \hat{\tau}_A \right) > 0 \), since this holds for all realizations of \( A - A^* \). That the inequality is strict comes from recognizing, as \( x \to -\infty \), by L’Hospital’s Rule:

\[
\lim_{x \to -\infty} \frac{d \log g(x)}{dx} = \lim_{x \to -\infty} \frac{\phi \left( \eta \tau^{-1/2} + x \right)}{\Phi \left( \eta \tau^{-1/2} + x \right)} = 0.
\]

Since the household with the critical productivity \( A^* \) must be indifferent to its currency choice at the cutoff, it follows that \( U_i - P = 0 \), which implies:

\[
e^{\frac{1}{2} \eta_c^2 \tau^{-1} + (1 - \eta_c) A_i + \eta_c A^*} G \left( \hat{A}_i - A^*, \hat{\tau}_A \right) = P, A_i = A^*
\]

(16)

which does not depend on the unobserved \( A \) or the supply shock \( \xi \), and we have substituted for \( u_0 \). As such, \( A^* = A^* \left( \log P, v \right) \). Furthermore, since \( \hat{A}_i^* \) is increasing in \( A_i \) and \( G \left( \hat{A}_i^* - A^*, \tau_A \right) \) is (weakly) increasing in \( \hat{A}_i \), it follows that the LHS of equation (16) is (weakly) monotonically increasing in \( A_i \), confirming the cutoff strategy assumed for households is optimal. Those with the RHS being nonnegative purchase the currency, and those with it being negative choose to refrain.

It then follows from market-clearing that:

\[
\Phi \left( -\sqrt{\tau} (A^* - A) \right) = \Phi \left( -\sqrt{\tau} (\omega^* - \xi) \right).
\]

Since the CDF of the normal distribution is montonically increasing, we can invert the above market-clearing condition, and impose equation (12) to arrive at:

\[
\log P = \sqrt{\frac{\tau}{\tau_A}} (A - A^*) - \xi - \log (1 - \rho),
\]
from which follows that:
\[ z = \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} \left( \log P + \log (1 - \rho) + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} \xi \right) + A^* = A - \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} (\xi - \bar{\xi}) , \]
and therefore \( z_\xi = \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} \). This confirms our conjecture for the sufficient statistic of the currency price and that learning by households is indeed a linear updating rule.

As a consequence, the conditional estimate of household \( i \) is:
\[
\hat{A}_i = \hat{\tau}_A^{-1} \left( \tau_A \bar{A} + \tau_v v + \frac{\tau_e}{\tau} \tau_\xi z + \tau_\xi A_i \right),
\]
\[
\hat{\tau}_A = \tau_A + \frac{\tau_e}{\tau} \tau_\xi + \tau_\xi.
\]
Substituting for prices, and simplifying \( A^* \) terms, we can express equation (16) as:
\[
e^{(1+\sqrt{\tau_e/\tau})} G_1 \left( \hat{A}_i^* - A^*, \hat{\tau}_A \right) = e^{z - \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} \xi - \frac{1}{2} \eta^2 \tau_\xi^{-1} \log(1 - \rho)},
\]
where
\[
\hat{A}_i^* = \hat{\tau}_A^{-1} \left( \tau_A \bar{A} + \tau_v v + \frac{\tau_e}{\tau} \tau_\xi z + \tau_\xi A^* \right),
\]
is the posterior belief when \( A_i = A^* \). Notice that the LHS of equation (17) is continuous in \( A^* \).

Now let us rewrite equation (16) as:
\[
\exp (h (A^*)) = e^{\sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} z - \frac{1}{2} \eta^2 \tau_\xi^{-1} \log(1 - \rho)},
\]
where:
\[
h (A^*) = \left( 1 + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} \right) A^* + \log G_1 \left( \hat{A}_i^* - A^*, \hat{\tau}_A \right),
\]
and it follows that:
\[
\frac{dh}{dA^*} = 1 + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_e}{\tau}} + \frac{1}{G_1 (\hat{A}_i^* - A^*, \hat{\tau}_A)} \frac{dG_1 (x, \hat{\tau}_A)}{dz} \bigg|_{x = \hat{A}_i^* - A^*} \frac{d (\hat{A}_i^* - A^*)}{dA^*}.
\]
Since \( \frac{dG_1 (x, \hat{\tau}_A)}{dx} \geq 0 \), by the above arguments, and:
\[
\frac{d (\hat{A}_i^* - A^*)}{dA^*} = \hat{\tau}_A^{-1} \frac{d}{dA^*} \left( \tau_A (\bar{A} - A^*) + \tau_v (v - A^*) + \frac{\tau_e}{\tau} \tau_\xi (z - A^*) \right)
\]
\[
= -\hat{\tau}_A^{-1} \left( \tau_A + \frac{\tau_e}{\tau} \tau_\xi \right) < 0,
\]
since \( z \) is independent of \( A^* \), it follows that the second term in \( \frac{dh}{dA^*} \) is negative.
As $A^* \to -\infty$, since $\Phi \left( \eta \tau^{-1/2} + \frac{A-A^*}{\tau \tau^{-1/2}} \right) \to 1$, we see, by rewriting $h (A^*)$ as:

$$h (A^*) = \left( 1 - \eta + \sqrt{\frac{\tau \tau^{-1}}{\tau \tau^{-1/2}}} \right) A^* + \log \left[ e^{\eta \tau^{-1/2} + \frac{A-A^*}{\tau \tau^{-1/2}}} \right] \mathcal{T}_i$$

that:

$$\lim_{A^* \to -\infty} \frac{dh}{dA^*} = 1 - \eta + \sqrt{\frac{\tau \tau^{-1}}{\tau \tau^{-1/2}}} = 1 - \eta = 0,$$

while as $A^* \to \infty$, one has that:

$$\lim_{A^* \to \infty} \frac{dh}{dA^*} = 1 + \sqrt{\frac{\tau \tau^{-1}}{\tau \tau^{-1/2}}} - \hat{\tau}_A^{-1} \left( \tau_A + \frac{\tau \tau^{-1}}{\tau \tau^{-1/2}} \right) \lim_{A^* \to \infty} \frac{d}{dx} \log \left( \frac{\tau_A}{\tau} \right) \left| \frac{x}{A^*} \right| = -\infty,$$

since $\lim_{x \to -\infty} \frac{d \log g (\tau)}{dx} = \infty$, and $G (E [x], \hat{\tau}_A)$ is an expectation over $g (x)$.

As $A^* \to -\infty$, we also notice that:

$$\lim_{A^* \to -\infty} \exp (h (A^*)) = 0,$$

and, by the Continuous Mapping Theorem, one also has that:

$$\lim_{A^* \to -\infty} \exp (h (A^*)) = 0.$$

In addition, similar arguments to those in Proposition 2, suitably modified, reveal that $\frac{d^2 h}{dA^2} \leq 0$. As such, $\exp (h (A^*))$ is quasiconcave in $A^*$. Since the RHS of equation (16) is fixed as a horizontal line, while the LHS is bell-shaped, it follows that generically there are two cutoff equilibria in the economy, when a cutoff equilibrium in the economy with informational frictions exists.

Notice now that, since $G \left( \hat{A}_i^* - A^*, \hat{\tau}_A \right)$ is monotonically increasing in its first argument, and $\hat{A}_i^*$ is increasing in $\nu$, it follows that the bell-shaped curve of the LHS of equation (16) shifts up for each value of $A^*$ from an increase in the noise shock $\varepsilon_v$ to $\nu$. Given that the RHS of equation (16) is fixed with respect to the noise in the volume signal $\varepsilon_v$, it follows that $A^*$ shifts down in the high price equilibrium after a positive shock to $\varepsilon_v$, and shifts up in the low price equilibrium. Since this noise impacts $A^*$ and not $A$ or $\xi$, it follows that the currency price and population that buy the currency increases in the high price equilibrium, and decreases in the low price equilibrium.