



Markets for Transport

Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-time Pricing

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- Global congestion costs \$1 trillion/year
- Los Angeles congestion costs \$23 billion/year

The Boston Globe

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2017

CLOGGED STREETS, UNHAPPY TOURISTS



BARRY CHIN/GLOBE STAFF

A duck boat approached Leverett Circle on Tuesday. Boston Duck Tours is considering cutting Charlestown from its routes.

By Beth Teitell

GLOBE STAFF

Boston traffic has been driving locals berserk for years. But now it's become so toxic that it's taking aim at our guests — and threatening Boston and Cambridge's \$13 billion tourism industry.

Every major sightseeing firm contacted by the Globe has made or is mulling changes to deal with paralyzing congestion that never seems to end, and frustration is so intense that even PR types aren't trying to sugarcoat the situation.

"It just stinks to tour Boston right now," said Steven Grasso, president of North American Traveler, a North Reading-based travel-planning firm. One of his groups recently spent 35 minutes in a coach traveling from Faneuil Hall to the Boston Opera House — a 0.9-mile trip, according to Google Maps. "You can't move," he said.

As Bostonians know, no app in the world is capable of outsmarting local traffic. That leaves sightseeing companies to do what little is under their control.

They're cutting major destinations from itineraries — who needs to see Harvard, Charlestown, the Seaport, or

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Proposals

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Transport market

- Open access
- Scheduled/routed transport
- Efficient congestion pricing

No congestion

The time is right

- Advances in mobile communications enable
 - Precise (to 1 cubic meter) location of vehicles
 - Easy communication of preferences, prices, schedules
- Advances in computers and markets enable efficient scheduling/routing and pricing of transport

And case for innovation gets stronger each year

Autonomous vehicles are here



Trade-offs in transport



University of Maryland
 7860 Tysons Corner Center, Tysons, VA


Arrive by ▼ OPTIONS
 9:00 AM ◀ ▶ 📅 Tue, Oct 10 ◀ ▶

Send directions to your phone

via I-495 W typically 40 min - 1 h 15 min
DETAILS Leave around 7:45 AM
 22.4 miles

via I-66 W typically 1 h - 1 h 50 min
 Leave around 7:10 AM
 27.8 miles


7:12 AM–8:48 AM 1 h 36 min
 > F6 > M Green > M Silver >



University of Maryland
 7860 Tysons Corner Center, Tysons, VA
 Add destination

Arrive by
 9:00 AM

OPTIONS



Vehicle: MD 012 ABC [Edit](#)

via I-495 W **28 min**
 Fastest route, the usual traffic 22.4 miles
 Leave around 8:30 AM

\$3.42↑

Tip: Prices typically increase in late afternoon.

via I-66 W **38 min**
 27.8 miles

\$3.78↑

4:21 AM–6:32 AM 2 h 11 min

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via I-495 W typically 40 min - 1 h 15 min
Leave around 7:45 AM
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via I-66 W typically 1 h - 1 h 50 min
Leave around 7:10 AM
27.8 miles

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
Arrive by 9:00 AM

Value of time \$75/hour
Vehicle: MD 012 ABC

via I-495 W 28 min
Fastest route, the usual traffic
22.4 miles
Leave around 8:30 AM
\$3.42 ↑
Tip: Prices typically increase in late afternoon.

via I-66 W 38 min
27.8 miles
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4:21 AM—6:32 AM 2 h 11 min
R1 > 64 > M Silver



Today's transport is mostly free, but comes at the cost of uncertain congestion delays

Our market puts a price on transport, but avoids delays (and improves throughput)

Both regimes cause some drivers to leave early, late, or not at all, or to switch roads ...

Transit and Congestion Pricing

A PRIMER



U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration

“The number of vehicles that get through per hour can drop by as much as 50 percent when severe congestion sets in. At high-traffic levels, the freeway is kept in this condition of ‘collapse’ for several hours after the rush of commuters has stopped.”

Behavioral research questions

Do *individuals* pick departure time and roads rationally?

- Simple competitive markets are known to work well (e.g., Smith 1962), but few lab studies look at behavior along different dimensions in competitive markets, such as time and space
- Economic traffic experiments focus on simple, repeated coordination games without prices (Selten et al. 2007, Chmura/Pitz 2004a,b, Schneider/Weimann 2004, Rapoport et al. 2004), or include a simple toll (Gabuthy et al. 2006, Hartman 2009); almost all experiments induce identical driver preferences, inelastic demand and deterministic supply (but see Lopez 2017)

Are *markets* more efficient and acceptable than the status quo?

Which market design effectively promotes participation & acceptance?

Privacy



Equity



VS



Market objectives


- Efficiency
- Transparency
- Simplicity
- Fairness

Draw on best practice from existing time and locational markets

Key market principle: open access

- Transport network is open to all
 - Nondiscriminatory terms
 - Network capacity cannot be withheld
- ⇒ Efficient congestion pricing
- Basis for restructured electricity markets in US, Europe, ...

ERCOT Load with Real Time and Day Ahead Prices





STP-to-Whitepoint 345-kV transmission structures



- **52 inches** of rainfall in southeast Texas
- Harvey made landfall **multiple times**
 - **Category 4** near Port Aransas, Texas
 - **Tropical storm** in Cameron, Louisiana
- More than **42,000** lightning strikes
- Record number of tornado warnings in southeast Texas



Tatton Substation

Transmission Damage

Players

- Independent System Operator (ISO)
 - Runs market
- ISO or service providers
 - Develop user app for expression of demand
 - Aggregate user demand
 - Guide user (scheduling/routing)
 - Establish user plans and settle payment
- Users
 - Provide fundamental demand for road use


Product design

- Slot on congested road segment at particular time (e.g. 10 minute time interval)

Important features of setting

- Limited number of congested road segments
 - Bridges, tunnels, and other bottlenecks
- Congested segments are highly predictable
- Demand *does* respond to price even close to real time
 - Time shifters: shift transport to less congested time
 - Route shifters: shift route to less congested route
 - Mode shifters: take train, bus, bike or work-at-home

How today's apps would change




Uber Lyft

\$22	\$30	\$87
POOL	uberX	UberBLACK

5 min wait

[CONTINUE](#)



American Express ••• 03 ▾

\$26-\$35
uberX · 8 min away

[BOOK](#)


The transaction will be processed by Uber.

Sequence of auctions



- Multiple opportunities to trade
 - Reduces risk of service provider
 - Facilitates planning of service provider
 - Provides price transparency
 - Mitigates market power

Sample demand for bidder Manhattan (peak) monthly



ForwardTransport, Inc. ... *lock in prices and drive with confidence!*

Type	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
Daily trip	●	●	●	●	●		

Round trip	One way	Multi-stop	Vehicle
Home		Work	MD 0123

Begin	End
Wed, 1 Nov 2017	Thu, 30 Nov 2017

	Depart	Arrive
Home to Work	8:00am	8:28am
Work to Home	5:00pm	5:28pm

Cost per trip
\$ 3.76

Add to Cart

Alternatives and Price Change

	Later	Earlier
+10 min	\$ 0.45	-10 min \$ 0.32
+20 min	\$ (0.20)	-20 min \$ (0.33)
+30 min	\$ (0.46)	-30 min \$ (0.59)
+40 min	\$ (1.11)	-40 min \$ (1.24)
+50 min	\$ (1.21)	-50 min \$ (1.34)
+60 min	\$ (1.40)	-60 min \$ (1.53)
+70 min	\$ (1.56)	-70 min \$ (1.69)
+80 min	\$ (1.82)	-80 min \$ (1.95)
+90 min	\$ (2.01)	-90 min \$ (2.14)

Investment

- Transparent pricing provides detailed information for network investment
- Revenues provide essential funds for investment

Conclusion

- Assures transport network is used efficiently
- Eliminates congestion through scheduling/routing and congestion pricing
- Transparent pricing motivates network investment and provides much needed funds

