The Dark Side of Circuit Breakers

Hui Chen  Anton Petukhov  Jiang Wang∗

March 20, 2017

Abstract

Market-wide trading halts, also called circuit breakers, have been proposed and widely adopted as a measure to stabilize the stock market when experiencing large price movements. We develop an intertemporal equilibrium model to examine how circuit breakers impact the market when investors trade to share risk. We show that a downside circuit breaker tends to lower the stock price and increase its volatility, both conditional and realized. Due to this increase in volatility, the circuit breaker’s own presence actually raises the likelihood of reaching the triggering price. In addition, the circuit breaker also increases the probability of hitting the triggering price as the stock price approaches it – the so-called “magnet effect.” Surprisingly, the volatility amplification effect becomes stronger when the wealth share of the relatively pessimistic agent is small.

∗Chen: MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER. Petukhov: MIT Sloan School of Management. Wang: MIT Sloan School of Management, CAFR and NBER. We thank Doug Diamond, Leonid Kogan, Steve Ross and seminar participants at MIT Sloan for comments.
1 Introduction

Large asset price swings in the absence of significant public news often raise questions about the confidence in financial markets from both market participants and policy makers. While the cause of this type of swings are far from being well understood, various measures have been proposed and adopted to interrupt trading during when facing extreme price movements in the hope to stabilize prices and maintain proper liquidity provision and price discovery. These measures, sometimes referred to as throwing sand in the gears, range from market-wide trading halts, price limits on the whole market or individual assets, to limits on order flow, positions, and transaction taxes. Yet, the merits of these measures, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, remain largely unclear.

 Probably one of the most prominent of these measures is the market-wide circuit breaker in the U.S., which was first advocated by the Brady Commission (Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, 1988) following the Black Monday of 1987 and subsequently implemented in 1988. It temporarily halts trading in all stocks and related derivatives when a designated market index drops by a significant amount.\(^1\) Following this lead, various forms of circuit breakers have been widely adopted by equity and derivative exchanges around the world.\(^2\) Since its introduction, the U.S. circuit breaker was triggered only once on October 27, 1997. At that time, the threshold was based on points movement of the DJIA index. At 2:36 p.m., a 350-point decline (4.54%) in the DJIA led to a 30-minute trading halt on stocks, equity options, and index futures. After trading resumed at 3:06 p.m., prices fell rapidly to reach the 550-point circuit breaker level at 3:30 p.m., leading to early market closure for the day (for a detailed review of this event, see Securities and Exchange Commission, 1998). But the market stabilized the next day. This event led to the redesign of the circuit breaker rules, moving from point

---

\(^1\) In its current form, a market-wide circuit breaker can be triggered at three thresholds: 7% (Level 1), 13% (Level 2), both of which will halt market-wide trading for 15 minutes when the decline occurs between 9:30 a.m. and 3:25 p.m. Eastern time, and 20% (Level 3), which halts market-wide trading for the remainder of the trading day (the triggers are based on the prior day’s closing price of the S&P 500 Index).

\(^2\) According to a 2016 report, “Global Circuit Breaker Guide” by ITG, over 30 countries around the world have rules of trading halts in the form of circuit breakers, price limits and volatility auctions.
Figure 1: **Circuit breakers in the U.S. stock market.** This graph plots the DJIA index on Oct 27, 1997, when the market-wide circuit breaker was triggered, first at 2:36 p.m., and then at 3:30 p.m. The blue circle denotes the closing price on Oct 24, 1997.

drops of DJIA to percentage drops of S&P 500, with a considerably wider bandwidth.

After experiencing extreme price movements in the Chinese stock market in 2015, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) introduced a market-wide circuit breaker in January 2016, with a 15-minute trading halt when the CSI 300 Index falls by 5% (Level 1) from previous day’s close, and market closure after a 7% decline (Level 2). On January 4, 2016, the first trading day after the circuit breaker was put in place, both thresholds were reached (Figure 2, left panel), and it took only 7 minutes from the re-opening of the markets following the 15-minute halt for the index to reach the 7% threshold. Three days later, on January 7, both circuit breakers were triggered again (Figure 2, right panel), and the entire trading session lasted just 30 minutes. On the same day, the CSRC suspended the circuit breaker rule.

These events have revived debates about the benefits and costs of circuit breakers. What are the justifications for interrupting or slowing down the market? What are the concrete goals for introducing circuit breakers? How to assess their success or failure?

---

3The CSI 300 index is a market-cap weighted index of 300 major stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, compiled by the China Securities Index Company, Ltd.
Figure 2: **Circuit breakers in the Chinese stock market.** The two panels plot the CSI300 index on January 4 and January 7 of 2016, when the circuit breaker was triggered. Trading hours for the Chinese stock market are 9:30-11:30 and 13:00-15:00. Level 1 (2) circuit breaker is triggered after a 5% (7%) drop in price from the previous day’s close (marked by the blue circles).

How may their effectiveness depend on the specific markets, the actual design, and specific market conditions?

Commonly stated rationales often started with a market with imperfections of various forms such as asymmetric information and inefficient liquidity provision (see, for example, Greenwald and Stein (1991) and Subrahmanyam (1994)). Under these circumstances, market mechanism may fail, which then calls for external intervention. Such an approach has several shortcomings. First, its starting point is very close to the end point. Second, it understates the benefits from the market in the first place, namely liquidity provision and price discovery. Third, in order to properly analyze the influence of market imperfections, one would need to start with a proper model capturing the most basic trading needs of market participants, which is liquidity or risk-sharing.

In this paper, we start with a market with no imperfections. We explicitly model investors’ intertemporal trading needs for liquidity/risk-sharing. We then examine how the introduction of a downside circuit breaker affects investors’ trading behavior and
the equilibrium prices. In particular, we show its impact on price levels, volatility, and dynamics. We show that a downside circuit breaker not only reduces welfare by reducing risk sharing, but also tends to lower price levels, increase conditional and realized volatility and increase the likelihood of hitting the triggering point. Moreover, our model not only demonstrates these potential costs of circuit breakers, but also provides a basic setting to further incorporate market imperfections and examine the full cost and benefits of circuit breakers.

In our model, two (classes of) investors have log preferences over terminal wealth and have heterogeneous beliefs about the dividend growth rate. Without circuit breakers, the stock price is a weighted average of the prices under the two agents’ beliefs, with the weights being their respective shares of total wealth.

However, the presence of circuit breakers makes the equilibrium stock price disproportionately reflect the beliefs of the relatively pessimistic investor. To understand this result, first consider the scenario when the stock price has just reached the circuit breaker threshold. Immediate market closure is an extreme form of illiquidity, which forces the relatively optimistic investor to refrain from taking on any leverage due to the inability to rebalance his portfolio and the risk of default it entails. As a result, the pessimistic investor becomes the marginal investors, and the equilibrium stock price has to entirely reflect his beliefs, regardless of his wealth share.

The threat of market closure also affects trading and prices before the circuit breaker is triggered. Compared to the case without circuit breakers, the relatively optimistic investor will preemptively reduce his leverage as the price approaches the circuit breaker limit. For a downside circuit breaker, the price-dividend ratios are driven lower throughout the trading interval. Thus, a downside circuit breaker tends to drive down the overall asset price levels.

In addition, in the presence of a downside circuit breaker, the conditional volatilities of stock returns can become significantly higher. These effects are stronger when the price is closer to the circuit breaker threshold, when it is earlier during a trading session. Surprisingly, the volatility amplification effect of downside circuit breakers is stronger
when the initial wealth share for the irrational investor (who tends to be pessimistic at the triggering point) is smaller, because the gap between the wealth-weighted belief of the representative investor and the belief of the pessimist is larger in such cases.

Our model shows that circuit breakers have multifaceted effects on price volatility. On the one hand, almost mechanically, a (tighter) downside circuit breaker limit can lower the median daily price range (measured by daily high minus low prices) and reduce the probabilities of very large daily price ranges. Such effects could be beneficial, for example, in reducing inefficient liquidations due to intra-day mark-to-market. On the other hand, a (tighter) downside circuit breaker will tend to raise the probabilities of intermediate price ranges, and can significantly increase the median of daily realized volatilities as well as the probabilities of very large conditional and realized volatilities. These effects could exacerbate market instability in the presence of imperfections.

Furthermore, our model demonstrates a “magnet effect.” The very presence of downside circuit breakers makes it more likely for the stock price to reach the threshold in a given amount of time than when there are no circuit breakers (the opposite is true for upside circuit breakers). The difference between the probabilities is negligible when the stock price is sufficiently far away from the threshold, but it generally gets bigger as the stock price gets closer to the threshold. Eventually, when the price is sufficiently close to the threshold, the gap converges to zero as both probabilities converge to one.

This “magnet effect” is important for the design of circuit breakers. It suggests that using the historical data from a period when circuit breakers were not implemented can lead one to severely underestimate the likelihood of future circuit breaker triggers, which might result in picking a downside circuit breaker limit that is excessively tight.

Prior theoretical work on circuit breakers primarily focuses on their role in reducing excess volatility and restore orderly trading by improving the availability of information and raising confidence among investors. For example, Greenwald and Stein (1991) argue that, in the presence of informational frictions, trading halts can help make more information available to market participants and in turn improve the efficiency of allocations. On the other hand, Subrahmanyam (1994) argue that circuit breakers
can increase price volatility by causing investors with exogenous trading demands to advance their trades to earlier periods with lower liquidity supply. Furthermore, building on the insights of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bernardo and Welch (2004) show that, when facing the threat of future liquidity shocks, coordination failures can lead to runs and high volatility in the financial market. Such mechanisms could also increase price volatility in the presence of circuit breakers. As mentioned above, by building a model to capture investors’ fundamental trading needs in an intertemporal setting, our work complements these studies in two important dimensions. First, it captures the cost of circuit breakers, in welfare, price level and volatility. Second, it provides a basic setting to further incorporate different forms of market imperfections such asymmetric information, strategic behavior, failure of coordination, which are needed to justify and quantify the benefits of circuit breakers.

In this spirit, our paper is very much related to Hong and Wang (2000), who study the effects of periodic market closures in the presence of asymmetric information. The liquidity effect caused by market closures as we see here is qualitatively similar to what they find. By modeling the stochastic nature of a circuit breaker, we are able to fully capture its impact on market dynamics.

While our model focuses on circuit breakers, our main result about the impact of disappearing liquidity on trading and price dynamics is more broadly applicable. Besides market-wide trading halts, other types of market interruptions such as price limits, short-sale ban, trading frequency restrictions (e.g., penalties for HFT), and various forms of liquidity shocks can all have similar effects on the willingness of some investors to take on risky positions, which results in depressed prices and amplified volatility. In fact, the set up we have developed here can be extended to examine these interruptions.

In summary, we provide a new competitive benchmark to demonstrate the potential costs of circuit breakers, including welfare, price level and volatility. Such a benchmark is valuable for several reasons. First, information asymmetry is arguably less important for deep markets, such as the aggregate stock market, than for shallow markets, such as markets for individual securities. Thus, the results we obtain here should be more definitive for market-wide circuit breakers. Second, we show that with competitive
investors and complete markets, the threat of (future) market shutdowns can have rich implications such including volatility amplification and self-predatory trading, which will remain present in models involving information asymmetry and strategic behavior. Third, our model sheds light on the behavior of “noise traders” traders in models of information asymmetry, where these investors trade for liquidity reasons but their demands are treated as exogenous. In fact, our results suggest that the behavior of these liquidity traders can be significantly affected by circuit breakers.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model for our analysis. Section 3 provides the solution to the model. In Section 4, we examine the impact of a downside circuit breaker on investor behavior and equilibrium prices. Section 5 discusses several extensions of the basic model to different types of trading halts. In Section 6, we illustrate that our results are robust with respect to some of our modelling choices such as continuous-time trading and no default. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are given in the appendix.

2 The Model

We consider a continuous-time endowment economy over the finite time interval $[0, T]$. Uncertainty is described by a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion $Z$, defined on a filtered complete probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}, \mathbb{P})$, where $\{\mathcal{F}_t\}$ is the augmented filtration generated by $Z$.

There is a single share of an aggregate stock, which pays a terminal dividend of $D_T$ at time $T$. The process for $D$ is exogenous and publicly observable, given by:

$$dD_t = \mu D_t dt + \sigma D_t dZ_t, \quad D_0 = 1,$$

where $\mu$ and $\sigma > 0$ are the expected growth rate and volatility of $D_t$.\(^4\) Besides the stock, there is also a riskless bond, which is in zero net supply. Each unit of the bond yields a

\(^4\)For brevity, throughout the paper we will refer to $D_t$ as “dividend” and $S_t/D_t$ as the “price-dividend ratio,” even though dividend will only be realized at time $T$.\)
terminal pays off of one at time $T$.

There are two competitive agents $A$ and $B$, who are initially endowed with $\theta$ and $1-\theta$ shares of the aggregate stock, with $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$. Both agents have logarithmic preferences over their terminal wealth at time $T$:

$$u_i(W^*_T) = \ln(W^*_T), \quad i = \{A, B\}.$$  \hfill (2)

There is no intermediate consumption.

The two agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the terminal dividend. Agent $A$ has the objective beliefs in the sense that his probability measure is consistent with $\mathbb{P}$ (in particular, $\mu^A = \mu$). Agent $B$’s belief about the growth rate is:

$$\mu^B_t = \mu + \delta_t,$$  \hfill (3)

where the difference in belief $\delta_t$ follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:

$$d\delta_t = -\kappa(\delta_t - \bar{\delta})dt + \nu dZ_t,$$  \hfill (4)

where $\kappa \geq 0$ and $\nu \geq 0$. Notice that $\delta_t$ is driven by the same Brownian motion as the aggregate dividend. Agent $B$ becomes more optimistic following positive shocks to the aggregate dividend, and the impact of these shocks on his belief decays exponentially at the rate $\kappa$. Thus, the parameter $\nu$ controls how sensitive $B$’s conditional belief is to realized dividend shocks, while $\kappa$ determines the relative importance of shocks from recent past vs. distant past. The average long-run disagreement between the two agents is $\bar{\delta}$. In the special case with $\nu = 0$ and $\delta_0 = \bar{\delta} > 0$, the disagreement between the two agents remains constant over time. In the case with $\bar{\delta} = 0$, the disagreement between the two agents is stochastic but mean-reverting to zero.

It is worth pointing out that allowing heterogeneous beliefs is a simple way to introduce heterogeneity among agents, which motivates trading. The heterogeneity in beliefs can easily be interpreted as heterogeneity in utility, which can be state dependent. For example, time-varying beliefs could represent behavioral biases (“representativeness”) or
a form of path-dependent utility that makes agent $B$ more (less) risk averse following negative (positive) shocks to fundamentals. Alternatively, we could introduce heterogeneous endowment shocks to generate trading (see, e.g., Wang (1995)). In all these cases, trading allows agents to share risk.

Agent $B$’s probability measure is $\mathbb{P}^B$, which we shall suppose is equivalent to $\mathbb{P}$. We assume that the two agents are aware of each others’ beliefs but “agree to disagree.” (We do not explicitly model learning here.)

Let the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the probability measure $\mathbb{P}^B$ with respect to $\mathbb{P}$ be $\eta$. Then from Girsanov’s theorem, we get

$$
\eta_t = \exp \left( \frac{1}{\sigma} \int_0^t \delta_s dZ_s - \frac{1}{2\sigma^2} \int_0^t \delta_s^2 ds \right). 
$$

(5)

Intuitively, since agent $B$ will be more optimistic than $A$ when $\delta_t > 0$, those paths with high realized values for $\int_0^t \delta_s Z_s$ will be assigned higher probabilities under $\mathbb{P}^B$ than under $\mathbb{P}$.

Because there is no intermediate consumption, we use the riskless bond as the numeraire. Thus, the price of the bond is always 1.

**Circuit Breakers.** To capture the essence of a circuit breaker rule, we assume that the stock market will be closed whenever the price of the stock $S_t$ falls below a threshold $(1-\alpha)S_0$, where $S_0$ is the endogenous initial price of the stock, and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is a constant parameter determining the bandwidth of downside price fluctuations during the interval $[0, T]$. Later in ??, we extend the model to allow for market closures for both downside and upside price movements, which represent price limit rules. The closing price for the stock is determined such that both the stock market and bond market are cleared when the circuit breaker is triggered. After that, the stock market will remain closed until time $T$. The bond market remains open throughout the interval $[0, T]$.

In practice, the circuit breaker threshold is often based on the closing price from the previous trading session instead of the opening price of the current trading session.

---

More precisely, $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{P}^B$ are equivalent when restricted to any $\sigma$-field $\mathcal{F}_T = \sigma(\{D_t\}_{0 \leq t \leq T})$. 

---
For example, in the U.S., a cross-market trading halt can be triggered at three circuit breaker thresholds (7%, 13%, and 20%) based on the prior day’s closing price of the S&P 500 Index. However, the distinction between today’s opening price and the prior day’s closing price is not crucial for our model. The circuit breaker not only depends on but also endogenously affects the initial stock price, just like it does for prior day’s closing price in practice.\(^6\)

Finally, we impose usual restrictions on trading strategies to rule out arbitrage.

3 The Equilibrium

3.1 Benchmark Case: No Circuit Breakers

In this section, we solve for the equilibrium when there are no circuit breakers. To distinguish the notations from the case with circuit breakers, we use the symbol “\(^\hat{\cdot}\)” to denote variables in the case without circuit breakers.

In the absence of circuit breakers, markets are dynamically complete. The equilibrium allocation in this case can be characterized as the solution to the following planner’s problem:

\[
\max_{\hat{W}_T^A, \hat{W}_T^B} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \lambda \ln (\hat{W}_T^A) + (1 - \lambda) \eta T \ln (\hat{W}_T^B) \right],
\]

subject to the resource constraint

\[
\hat{W}_T^A + \hat{W}_T^B = D_T.
\]

\(^6\)Other realistic features of the circuit breaker in practice is to close the market for \(m\) minutes and reopen (Level 1 and 2), or close the market until the end of the day (Level 3). In our model, we can think of \(T\) as one day. The fact that the price of the stock reverts back to the fundamental value \(X_T\) at \(T\) resembles the rationale of CB to “restore order” in the market.
From the first-order conditions and the resource constraint we then get:

\[ W_A T = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \eta_T} D_T, \quad (8a) \]

\[ W_B T = \frac{(1 - \lambda) \eta_T}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \eta_T} D_T. \quad (8b) \]

Thus, as it follows from the intuition we have for the Radon-Nikodym derivative \( \eta_t \), the optimistic agent \( B \) will be allocated a bigger share of the aggregate dividend under those paths with higher realized growths in dividend.

The state price density under agent \( A \)'s beliefs (i.e., the objective probability measure \( \mathbb{P} \)) is

\[ \hat{\pi}^A_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \xi u(\hat{W}_T^A) \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \xi (\hat{W}_T^A)^{-1} \right], \quad 0 \leq t \leq T \]

for some constant \( \xi \). Then, from the budget constraint for agent \( A \) we see that the planner’s weights are equal to the shares of endowment, \( \lambda = \theta \).

The following proposition summarizes the pricing results:

**Proposition 1.** When there are no circuit breakers, the price of the stock is:

\[ \hat{S}_t = \frac{\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_t}{\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_t e^{a(t,T)b(t,T) + b(t,T)\delta_t} D_t e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t)}}, \quad (10) \]

where

\[ a(t,T) = \left( \frac{\kappa \tilde{\delta} - \sigma \nu}{\nu - \kappa} \right) \left( T - t \right) - \frac{\nu^2}{4 \left( \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \right)^2} \left( 1 - e^{2 \left( \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \right) (T-t)} \right) \]

\[ + \left( \frac{\kappa \tilde{\delta} - \sigma \nu}{\nu - \kappa} \right) \left( \frac{\nu^2}{4 \left( \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \right)^2} \right) \left( 1 - e^{\left( \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \right) (T-t)} \right), \quad (11a) \]

\[ b(t,T) = \frac{1 - e^{\left( \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \right) (T-t)}}{\frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa}. \quad (11b) \]

From Equation (10), we can then derive the conditional volatility of the stock \( \hat{\sigma}_{S,t} \) in closed form, which we present in the appendix.

Next, we turn to the wealth distribution and portfolio holdings of individual agents.
At time $t \leq T$, the shares of total wealth of the two agents are:

$$\hat{\omega}_A^t = \frac{\hat{W}_A^t}{\hat{S}_t} = \frac{\theta}{\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta_t}, \quad \hat{\omega}_B^t = 1 - \hat{\omega}_A^t. \tag{12}$$

The number of shares of stock $\hat{\theta}_A^t$ and units of riskless bonds $\hat{\phi}_A^t$ held by agent $A$ are:

$$\hat{\theta}_A^t = \frac{\theta}{\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta_t} - \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)\eta_t}{\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta_t} \frac{\delta_t}{\hat{\sigma}_{S,t}^2} \hat{\omega}_A^t \left(1 - \hat{\omega}_B^t \frac{\delta_t}{\hat{\sigma}_{S,t}}\right), \tag{13}$$

$$\hat{\phi}_A^t = \hat{\omega}_A^t \frac{\delta_t}{\hat{\sigma}_{S,t}} \hat{S}_t, \tag{14}$$

and the corresponding values for agent $B$ are $\theta_B^t = 1 - \theta^A_t$ and $\phi_B^t = -\phi_A^t$.

As Equation (13) shows, there are several forces affecting the portfolio positions. First, all else equal, agent $A$ owns fewer shares of the stock when $B$ has more optimistic beliefs (larger $\delta_t$). This effect becomes weaker when the volatility of stock return $\hat{\sigma}_{S,t}$ is high. Second, changes in the wealth distribution (as indicated by (12)) also affect the portfolio holdings, as the richer agent will tend to hold more shares of the stock.

We can gain more intuition on the stock price by rewriting Equation (10) as follows:

$$\hat{S}_t = \left[\frac{1}{\theta + (1 - \theta)m} \mathbb{E}_t \left[D_T^{-1}\right] + \frac{(1 - \theta)m}{\theta + (1 - \theta)m} \mathbb{E}_t^B \left[D_T^{-1}\right]\right]^{-1} \left(\hat{\omega}_A^t \hat{S}_A^t + \hat{\omega}_B^t \hat{S}_B^t\right), \tag{15}$$

which states that the stock price is a weighted harmonic average of the prices of the stock in two single-agent economies with agent $A$ and $B$ being the representative agent, $\hat{S}_A^t$ and $\hat{S}_B^t$, where

$$\hat{S}_A^t = e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t)} D_t, \tag{16}$$

$$\hat{S}_B^t = e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t) - a(t,T) - b(t,T)\delta_t} D_t, \tag{17}$$

and the weights $(\hat{\omega}_A^t, \hat{\omega}_B^t)$ are the two agents’ shares of total wealth. For example, controlling for the wealth distribution, the equilibrium stock price is higher when agent $B$ has more optimistic beliefs (larger $\delta_t$).

One special case of the above result is when the amount of disagreement between the
two agents is the zero, i.e., \( \delta_t = 0 \) for all \( t \in [0, T] \). The stock price then becomes:

\[
\hat{S}_t = \hat{S}^A_t = \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_t[D_T^{-1}]} = e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t)}D_t, \tag{18}
\]

which is a version of the Gordon growth formula, with \( \sigma^2 \) being the risk premium for the stock. The instantaneous volatility of stock returns becomes the same as the volatility of dividend growth, \( \hat{\sigma}_{S,t} = \sigma \). The shares of the stock held by the two agents will remain constant and be equal to their endowments, \( \hat{\theta}^A_t = \theta, \hat{\theta}^B_t = 1 - \theta \).

Another special case is when the amount of disagreement is constant over time (\( \delta_t = \delta \) for all \( t \)). The results for this case are obtained by setting \( \nu = 0 \) and \( \delta_0 = \bar{\delta} = \delta \) in Proposition 1. In particular, Equation (10) simplifies to:

\[
\hat{S}_t = \frac{\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta_t}{\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta_te^{-\delta(T-t)}}e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t)}D_t. \tag{19}
\]

### 3.2 Circuit Breaker

In the presence of circuit breakers, there are two possible scenarios, (i) the circuit breaker is not triggered between 0 and \( T \); (ii) the circuit breaker is triggered at time \( \tau < T \). Thus, markets remain dynamically complete over the interval \([0, \tau \wedge T]\), and we can still characterize the equilibrium allocation at \( \tau \wedge T \) using the planner’s problem. Our solution strategy is to solve for the optimal allocation at \( \tau \wedge T \) for any exogenously given stopping time \( \tau \), and compute the corresponding stock price. The equilibrium is then the fixed point whereby the stopping time is consistent with the initial price \( S_0 \) (i.e., the stock price at the stopping time satisfies \( S_0 = (1 - \alpha)S_0 \)). Before doing so, we first characterize the agents’ indirect utility function at the time of market closure when \( \tau < T \).

Suppose agent \( i \) has wealth \( W^i_\tau \) at time \( \tau \). Since the two agents behave competitively, they take the stock price \( S_\tau \) as given and choose the shares of stock \( \theta^i_\tau \) and bonds \( \phi^i_\tau \) to maximize their expected utility over terminal wealth, subject to the budget constraint
and the constraint on non-negative terminal wealth:

\[ V^i(W^i_T, \tau) = \max_{\theta^i_\tau, \phi^i_\tau} \mathbb{E}_\tau [\ln(\theta^i_\tau D_T + \phi^i_\tau)] \]  
\[ s.t. \quad \theta^i_\tau S_\tau + \phi^i_\tau = W^i_\tau, \quad W^i_T \geq 0, \]

where \( V^i(W^i_\tau, \tau) \) is the value function for agent \( i \) at the time when the circuit breaker is triggered.

The market clearing conditions are for all \( \tau \):

\[ \theta^A_\tau + \theta^B_\tau = 1, \quad (21a) \]
\[ \phi^A_\tau + \phi^B_\tau = 0. \quad (21b) \]

For any \( \tau < T \), the non-negative terminal wealth constraint implies that \( \theta^i_\tau \geq 0, \phi^i_\tau \geq 0 \). That is, neither agent will take short or levered positions in the stock. This result is due to the inability to rebalance one’s portfolio after market closure, which is an extreme version of illiquidity. It then follows from the market clearing conditions above that in equilibrium neither agent will have any bond positions, which helps with the characterization of the equilibrium. The results are summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose the stock market closes at time \( \tau < T \). In equilibrium, both agents will hold all of their wealth in the stock, \( \theta^i_\tau = \frac{W^i_\tau}{S_\tau} \), and hold no bonds, \( \phi^i_\tau = 0 \). The market clearing price is:

\[ S_\tau = \min \{ \hat{S}^A_\tau, \hat{S}^B_\tau \} = \begin{cases} 
    e^{(\mu-\sigma^2)(T-\tau)} D_\tau, & \text{if } \delta_\tau > \hat{\delta}(\tau) \\
    e^{(\mu-\sigma^2)(T-\tau)-a(\tau,T)-b(\tau,T)\delta_\tau} D_\tau, & \text{if } \delta_\tau \leq \hat{\delta}(\tau)
\end{cases} \]

(22)

where \( \hat{S}^i_\tau \) denotes the stock price in a single-agent economy populated by agent \( i \),

\[ \hat{\delta}(t) = -\frac{a(t,T)}{b(t,T)}, \]

(23)

and \( a(t,T), b(t,T) \) are given in Proposition 1. Furthermore, \( S_\tau = S_\tau^{ast} \) is the unique
equilibrium in the limit of a sequence of economies with bond supply $\Delta$ going to zero.

We note that the market clearing prices $S_\tau$ only depends on the belief of one of the two agents — the relatively pessimistic agent. Due to the non-negative wealth constraint, the market clearing price must be such that the relatively pessimistic agent (the one with lower valuation of the stock) is willing to invest all his wealth in the stock. Here, having the lower expectation of the growth rate at the current instant is not sufficient to make the agent marginal. One also needs to take into account the two agents’ future beliefs and the risk premium associated with future fluctuations in the beliefs, which are summarized by $\delta(t)$.\(^7\)

It follows from the definition of the circuit breaker and the continuity of stock prices that the stock price at the time of the trigger must satisfy $S_\tau = (1-\alpha)S_0$. This condition together with Equation (22) implies that we can characterize the stopping time $\tau$ using a stochastic threshold for dividend $D_t$.

**Lemma 1.** Take the initial stock price $S_0$ as given. Define a stopping time:

$$\tau = \text{inf}\{t \geq 0 : D_t = D(t, \delta_t)\},$$

where

$$D(t, \delta_t) = \begin{cases} 
\alpha S_0 e^{-(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t)}, & \text{if } \delta_t > \bar{\delta}(t) \\
\alpha S_0 e^{-(\mu - \sigma^2)(T-t)+a(t, T)+b(t, T)\delta_t}, & \text{if } \delta_t \leq \bar{\delta}(t)
\end{cases}$$

Then, the circuit breaker is triggered at time $\tau$ when $\tau < T$.

Having characterized the equilibrium at time $\tau < T$, we plug the equilibrium portfolio holdings into (20) to derive the indirect utility of the two agents at $\tau$:

$$V^i(W^i_\tau, \tau) = E^i_\tau \left[ \ln \left( \frac{W^i_\tau}{S_\tau} D_T \right) \right] = \ln(W^i_\tau) - \ln(S_\tau) + E^i_\tau[\ln(D_T)].$$

---

\(^7\)Strictly speaking, with zero bond supply, any price $S'_\tau \leq S_\tau$ will clear the market. In fact, the price level $S_\tau$ is such that the marginal agent is indifferent between investing all his wealth or a bit more in the stock (if the no-leverage constraint is not binding). For any price $S'_\tau < S_\tau$, the marginal investor would prefer to invest more than 100% of his wealth in the stock, but is prevented from doing so by the no-leverage constraint. Thus, the market for the stock will still clear at these prices. However, these alternative equilibria are ruled out if the net bond supply $\Delta$ is small but nonzero. This is because the relatively pessimistic agent will need to hold the bonds in equilibrium, which means his no-leverage constraint is not binding. Thus, we will focus our analysis on $S_\tau$. 

15
The indirect utility for agent $i$ at $\tau \land T$ is then given by:

$$V^i(W^i_{\tau \land T}; \tau \land T) = \begin{cases} 
\ln(W^i_T), & \text{if } \tau \geq T \\
\ln(W^i_\tau) - \ln(S_\tau) + \mathbb{E}^i_t[\ln(D_T)], & \text{if } \tau < T 
\end{cases} \quad (27)$$

These indirect utility functions make it convenient to solve for the equilibrium allocation in the economy with circuit breakers through the following planner problem:

$$\max_{W^A_{\tau \land T}, W^B_{\tau \land T}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \lambda V^A(W^A_{\tau \land T}, \tau \land T) + (1 - \lambda)\eta T V^B(W^B_{\tau \land T}, \tau \land T) \right], \quad (28)$$

subject to the resource constraint:

$$W^A_{\tau \land T} + W^B_{\tau \land T} = S_{\tau \land T}, \quad (29)$$

where

$$S_{\tau \land T} = \begin{cases} 
D_T, & \text{if } \tau \geq T \\
(1 - \alpha)S_0, & \text{if } \tau < T 
\end{cases} \quad (30)$$

From the planner’s problem we get the wealth of agent $A$ at time $\tau \land T$:

$$W^A_{\tau \land T} = \frac{\theta S_{\tau \land T}}{\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta T}. \quad (31)$$

The SPD for agent $A$ at time $\tau \land T$ is proportional to his marginal utility of wealth,

$$\pi^A_{\tau \land T} = \frac{\xi}{W^A_{\tau \land T}} = \frac{\xi [\theta + (1 - \theta)\eta T]}{\theta S_{\tau \land T}} \quad (32)$$

for some constant $\xi$. The price of the stock at time $t \leq \tau \land T$ is:

$$S_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\pi^A_{\tau \land T}}{\pi^A_t} S_{\tau \land T} \right] = \left( \omega^A_t \mathbb{E}_t \left[ S^{-1}_{\tau \land T} \right] + \omega^B_t \mathbb{E}_t \left[ S^{-1}_{\tau \land T} \right] \right)^{-1}, \quad (33)$$

where $\omega^i_t$ is the share of total wealth owned by agent $i$. The expectations in (33) are straightforward to evaluate, at least numerically. Unlike in the case without circuit breakers, these expectations are no long simply the inverse of the stock prices from the
respective representative agent economies.

From the stock price, one can then compute the conditional mean \( \mu_{S,t} \) and volatility \( \sigma_{S,t} \) of stock returns, which are given by

\[
dS_t = \mu_{S,t} S_t dt + \sigma_{S,t} S_t dZ_t.
\]  

(34)

In Appendix A.3, we provide the closed-form solution for \( S_t \) in the special case with constant disagreements (\( \delta_t = \delta \)).

So far we have been taking the initial stock price \( S_0 \) as given when characterizing the threshold for the circuit breaker. Thus, the stock price \( S_t \) in (33) is a function of \( S_0 \) through its dependence on \( \tau \) and \( S_{\tau \wedge T} \), both of which depend on \( S_0 \). By evaluating \( S_t \) at time \( t = 0 \), we can finally solve for \( S_0 \) from the following fixed point problem,

\[
S_0 = F(\tau(S_0), S_{\tau \wedge T}(S_0)),
\]  

(35)

where \( F(\cdot) \) is the function implied by Equation (33).

**Proposition 3.** There is a unique solution to the fixed-point problem in (35) for any \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \).

Finally, we examine the impact of circuit breakers on the wealth distribution. The wealth shares of the two agents at time \( t \leq \tau \wedge T \) are the same as in the economy without circuit breakers,

\[
\omega_t^A = \frac{W_t^A}{S_t} = \frac{\theta}{\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_t}, \quad \omega_t^B = 1 - \omega_t^A.
\]  

(36)

However, the wealth shares at the end of the trading day (time \( T \)) will be affected by the presence of circuit breakers. This is because if the circuit breaker is triggered at \( \tau < T \), the wealth distribution after \( \tau \) will remain fixed due to the absence of trading. Since irrational traders on average lose money over time, market closure at \( \tau < T \) will raise their average wealth share at time \( T \). This “mean effect” implies that circuit breakers will help “protecting” the irrational investors in this model. How strong this effect is
depends on the amount of disagreement and the distribution of $\tau$. In addition, circuit breakers will also make the tail of the wealth share distribution thinner as they put a limit on the amount of wealth that the relatively optimistic investor can lose over time along those paths with low realizations of $D_t$.

4 Impact of Circuit Breakers on Market Dynamics

We now analyze the quantitative implications of our model. First, in Section 4.1 we examine the special case of the model with constant disagreement, i.e., $\delta_t = \delta$ for all $t$, which is more transparent in demonstrating the main mechanism through which circuit breakers affect asset prices and trading. Then, in Section 4.2 we examine a version of the model with time-varying disagreements that mimic the behavior of investors facing leverage constraints.

4.1 Constant Disagreements

For calibration, we normalize $T = 1$ to denote one trading day. We set $\mu = 10%/250 = 0.04\%$, which implies an annual dividend growth rate of 10%, and we assume daily volatility of dividend growth $\sigma = 3\%$. The circuit breaker threshold is set at 5% ($\alpha = 0.05$). For the initial wealth distribution, we assume agent $A$ (with rational beliefs) owns 90% of total wealth ($\theta = 0.9$) at $t = 0$. Finally, for the amount of disagreement, we set $\delta = -2\%$. Thus, the irrational agent $B$ is relatively pessimistic about dividend growth in this case.

In Figure 3, we plot the price-dividend ratio $S_t/D_t$ (left column), the stock holding for agent $A$ (middle column), and the bond holding for agent $A$ (right column). The stock and bond holdings for agent $B$ can be inferred from those for agent $A$ based on the market clearing conditions, namely $\theta_t^B = 1 - \theta_t^A$, $\phi_t^B = -\phi_t^A$. To demonstrate the time-of-day effect, we plot the solutions at three different points in time, $t = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75$. In each panel, the solid line denotes the solution for the case with circuit breakers, while the dotted line denotes the case without circuit breakers.
Let’s start by examining the price-dividend ratio. As shown in (15), the price of the stock in the case without circuit breakers is the weighted (harmonic) average of the prices of the stock from the two representative-agent economies populated by agent $A$ and $B$, respectively, with the weights given by the two agents’ shares of total wealth. Under our calibration, $\mu - \sigma^2$ is very close to zero, implying that the price-dividend ratio is close to one for any $t \in [0, T]$ in the economy with agent $A$ only (denoted by the upper horizontal dash lines in the first column), while it is approximately $e^{\delta(T-t)} \leq 1$ in the economy with agent $B$ only (denoted by the lower horizontal dash lines in the first column). Thus, the gap between the price-dividend ratios from the two representative-agent economies will be at most about 2% (since $\delta = -2\%$) under our calibration, which is fairly modest.

As the left column of Figure 3 shows, the price-dividend ratio in the economy without circuit breakers (red dotted line) indeed lies between the price-dividend ratios $\hat{S}^A_t / D^A_t$ and $\hat{S}^B_t / D^B_t$ for the two representative-agent economies (and thus always below 1). Since agent $A$ is relatively more optimistic, he chooses to hold levered position in the stock (see the plots for $\theta^A_t$ in the middle column of Figure 3), and his share of total wealth will become higher following positive shocks to the dividend. As a result, as dividend value $D_t$ rises (falls), the share of total wealth owned by agent $A$ increases (decreases), which make the equilibrium price-dividend ratio approach the value $\hat{S}^A_t / D^A_t$ ($\hat{S}^B_t / D_t$). Finally, the price-dividend ratio becomes higher (converges to one) as $t$ approaches $T$, as shorter horizon reduces the impact of agent $B$ is pessimistic beliefs on stock price.

In the case with circuit breakers, the price-dividend ratio (blue solid line) still lies between the price-dividend ratios from the two representative agent economies, but it is always below the price-dividend ratio without circuit breakers for a given level of dividend. The gap between the two price-dividend ratios is negligible when $D_t$ is sufficiently high, but it widens as $D_t$ approaches the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$.

The reason that the stock price declines more rapidly with dividend in the presence of circuit breakers is as follows. As explained in Section 3.2, upon triggering the circuit breaker, neither agent (agent $A$ in particular) will be willing to take a levered position in the stock due to the complete illiquidity of the stock. As a result, the relatively pessimistic agent (agent $B$ in this case) becomes the marginal investor. That is,
Figure 3: Price-dividend ratio and agent A’s (rational optimist) portfolio holdings. Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 
market clearing stock price has to be such that agent $B$ is willing to hold all of his wealth in the stock, regardless of his share of total wealth. As a result, we see the price-dividend ratio with circuit breakers converges to $\hat{S}_t^B/D_t$ when $D_t = D(t)$, while the price-dividend ratio without circuit breakers is still a weighted average of $\hat{S}_t^A/D_t$ and $\hat{S}_t^B/D_t$ at this point. The lower equilibrium stock valuation at the circuit breaker threshold also drives the value of the stock lower before reaching the threshold, although the effect dissipates as we move further away from the threshold. Furthermore, because the gap between $\hat{S}_t^A/D_t$ and $\hat{S}_t^B/D_t$ shrinks as $t$ approaches $T$, the impact of circuit breakers on the price-dividend ratio also becomes smaller as $t$ increases. For example, at $t = 0.25$, the price-dividend ratio with circuit breakers can be as much as 1.2% lower than the level without circuit breakers. At $t = 0.75$, the gap is at most 0.3%.

We can also analyze the impact of the circuit breakers on the equilibrium stock price by connecting it to how circuit breakers influence the equilibrium portfolio holdings of the two agents. Let us again start with the case without circuit breakers (red dotted lines in middle and right columns of Figure 3). The stock holding of agent $A$ ($\theta_t^A$) continues to rise as $D_t$ falls to $D(t)$ and beyond. This is the result of two effects: (i) with lower $D_t$, the stock price is lower, implying higher expected return under agent $A$’s beliefs; (ii) lower $D_t$ also makes agent $B$ (who is shorting the stock) wealthier and thus more capable of lending to agent $A$ to take on a levered position ($\omega_t^A$ becomes more negative).

With circuit breakers, while the stock position $\theta_t^A$ takes on similar values for large values of $D_t$, it becomes substantially lower than the value without circuit breakers when $D_t$ is sufficiently close to the circuit breaker threshold, and can eventually become decreasing as $D_t$ drops. Accordingly, the amount of borrowing by agent $A$ ($-\omega_t^A$) also eventually decreases as $D_t$ drops. This is because agent $A$ becomes increasingly concerned with the rising return volatility at lower $D_t$, which dominates the effect of the increase in the expected stock return (we analyze the expected return and volatility in more detail in Figure 4). Finally, $\theta_t^A$ takes a discrete drop to 1 when $D_t = D(t)$. The cutting back of stock position (deleveraging) by agent $A$ before the circuit breaker is triggered can be interpreted as a form of “self-predatory” trading, and the stock price in equilibrium has to fall enough such that agent $A$ has no incentive to sell more of his stock holdings.
Next, Figure 4 shows the conditional return volatility and the conditional expected returns under the two agents’ beliefs. Compared to the relatively modest effects on stock price levels, the impact of circuit breakers on the conditional volatility of stock returns can be much more sizable. Without circuit breakers, the conditional volatility of returns (red dotted lines in the left column) peaks at about 3.2%, only slightly higher than the fundamental volatility of $\sigma = 3\%$. The excess volatility comes from the time variation in the wealth distribution between the two agents, which peaks when the wealth shares of the two agents are about equal and is small in magnitude.

With circuit breakers, the conditional return volatilities (blue solid lines in the left column) are close in value to the conditional return volatilities without circuit breakers when $D_t$ is high, but it becomes substantially higher as $D_t$ approaches $D(t)$. Furthermore, the volatility amplification effect of the circuit breaker becomes stronger when the circuit breaker is triggered earlier during the day. When $t = 0.25$, the conditional volatility reaches 6% at the circuit breaker threshold, almost twice as high as the return volatility without circuit breakers. When $t = 0.75$, the conditional volatility peaks at 4.5% at the circuit breaker threshold, compared to the return volatility of 3% without circuit breakers.

The middle column of Figure 4 show the conditional expected returns for the stock under agent $A$’s beliefs (the objective probability measure). Again, we start with the case without circuit breakers. The expected returns (red dotted lines) are positive for the rational agent ($A$) and negative for the pessimist (agent $B$). Under agent $A$’s beliefs, the expected return is higher when $D_t$ is lower. This is because his share of total wealth is smaller and his leverage ratio is higher when the level of dividend is lower. As a result, his marginal value of wealth becomes more volatile, which leads to higher conditional Sharpe ratio. The higher Sharpe ratio, combined with relatively stable conditional return volatility, then implies higher expected returns for the stock.

In the presence of circuit breakers, the conditional Sharpe ratio for agent $A$ rises even faster with lower $D_t$ than without circuit breakers. Since the conditional return volatility also rises faster in this case, we get the conditional expected return (blue solid lines) under agent $A$’s beliefs to rise more rapidly with lower $D_t$. However, as $D_t$ gets
Figure 4: Conditional volatility and conditional expected returns under the two agents’ beliefs. Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 

Wealth share of agent A PDF

Wealth share of agent B PDF

Figure 5: **Distribution of terminal wealth share.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$.

sufficiently close to $D(t)$, the threat of market closure leads agent $A$ to reduce his stock holdings since the increase in conditional volatility is large enough to dominate the effect of higher conditional expected return.

We now turn the impact of circuit breakers on the wealth distribution. As shown in Equation (36), at any time before market closure ($t < \tau$), the wealth shares of the two agents ($\omega^A_t, \omega^B_t$) are only functions of $\eta_t$ and will thus be identical to the wealth shares in the economy without circuit breakers (given the same initial wealth distribution and the same history of dividend shocks). However, after market closure, the wealth shares in the economy with circuit breakers will remain fixed, whereas the wealth shares in the economy without circuit breakers will continue to evolve due to dynamic trading. As a result, the wealth distribution at the end of the trading day $T$ can become different with
circuit breakers.

In particular, the mean of the terminal wealth share for the irrational (rational) agent should become higher (lower) with circuit breakers, as market closure helps protect the irrational agents by preventing them from betting on the wrong beliefs. Additional differences in the terminal wealth distribution depend on the distribution of $\tau$, specifically how frequently and when the circuit breaker will be triggered.

In Figure 5, we plot the distribution of terminal wealth share for the two agents without (red dotted line) and with (blue solid line) circuit breakers. Recall that agent $A$ starts the trading day with 90% total wealth. In the economy without circuit breakers, the distribution of agent $A$’s terminal wealth share, $\hat{\omega}_A$, is unimodal, with the mean (0.9043) and the median (0.94) above 0.9 due to the fact that agent $A$ has correct beliefs and gains wealth on average from agent $B$.

With circuit breakers, the distribution of agent $A$’s terminal wealth share, $\omega_A$, does have a lower mean (0.9036). In addition, the distribution becomes bimodal, with the new mode resulting from the circuit breaker trigger. Notice that the new mode is more than 10% below the initial wealth share, which is a significant amount of loss in wealth for agent $A$ in just one trading day. In addition, the left tail of the distribution for $\omega_A$ becomes thinner. Thus, the presence of circuit breakers eliminates the possibility of extreme losses for the rational agent, but at the cost of substantially increasing the likelihood of significant losses. Correspondingly, circuit breakers will increase the likelihood of significant gains in wealth for the irrational agent $B$. These states with significant wealth gains for agent $B$ are also the states with large price distortions. Thus, while circuit breakers do protect the irrational agents from losing too much wealth, which might be a justifiable objective for a paternalistic social planner (regulator), our model shows an additional side effect of circuit breakers on price distortion.

Through its impact on the conditional price-dividend ratio, conditional volatility, and the wealth distribution post market closure, circuit breakers also affect the distribution of daily average price-dividend ratios, daily price ranges (defined as daily high minus low prices), and daily return volatilities (the square root of the quadratic variation of
log($S_t$) over $[0, T]$). We examine these effects in Figure 6. The top panel shows that the distribution of daily average price-dividend ratio is shifted to the left in the presence of circuit breakers, which shows that circuit breakers indeed lead to more downside price distortion in this model.

Next, the results for the daily price range distribution show that circuit breakers can reduce the probabilities of having very large daily price ranges (those over 6.5%), but they would raise the probabilities of daily price ranges between 4.5 and 6.5%. Moreover, circuit breakers generate significant fatter tails for the distributions of daily realized volatilities (in addition to the larger conditional volatilities shown earlier). The results of these two volatility measures both show that the effect of circuit breakers on return volatility is far more intricate than what the naive intuition would suggest.

“The Magnet Effect” “The magnet effect” is a phenomenon that is often associated with circuit breakers and price limits. Informally, it refers to the acceleration of price movement towards the circuit breaker threshold (price limit) as the price approaches the threshold (limit). We try to formalize this notion in our model by considering the conditional probability that the stock price, currently at $S_t$, will reach the circuit breaker threshold $(1 - \alpha)S_0$ within a given period of time $h$. In the case without circuit breakers, we can again compute the probability of the stock price reaching the same threshold over the period $h$. As we will show, our version of “magnet effect” refers to the fact that the very presence of circuit breakers increases the probability of the stock price reaching the threshold in a short period of time, with this effect becoming stronger when the stock price is close to the threshold.

In Figure 7, we consider three different horizons, $h = 10, 30, 90$ minutes. When $S_t$ is sufficiently far from $(1 - \alpha)S_0$, the gap between the conditional probabilities with and without circuit breakers indeed widens as the stock price moves closer to the threshold, which is consistent with the “magnet effect” defined above. This effect is caused by the significant increase in conditional return volatility in the presence of circuit breakers. However, the gap between the two conditional probabilities eventually starts to narrow,

---

8Realized volatility is measured as the square root of the quadratic variation in log price.
because both probabilities will converge to 1 as $S_t$ reaches $(1 - \alpha)S_0$. Looking at different horizons $h$, we see that the largest gap in the two conditional probabilities occurs closer to the threshold when $h$ is small. Moreover, the increase in probability of reaching the threshold is larger earlier during the trading day.

The volatility amplification effect and the initial wealth share $\theta$  In our benchmark calibration, we assume the rational agent initially owns $\theta = 90\%$ of total wealth. It appears quite intuitive that allocating more wealth initially (smaller $\theta$) to the irrational agent should increase their price impact through the trading day. While this intuition is correct for the price level, the effects on return volatility is just the opposite, especially near the circuit breaker threshold.

In the left panel of Figure 8, we examine the volatility amplification effect of circuit breakers by plotting the ratio of conditional return volatilities for the cases with and without circuit breakers at the threshold $D(t)$ as a function of $\theta$. As the graph shows, the amplification effect is in fact stronger the less wealth the irrational agent owns initially.

This seemingly counterintuitive result is due to the extreme illiquidity caused by market closure. Recall that the stock price with circuit breakers will be close to the price without circuit breakers when $D_t$ is sufficiently far away from $D(t)$, and the latter is a wealth-share weighted average of the price-dividend ratios under the two agents’ beliefs. Upon triggering the circuit breaker, the inability to rebalance the portfolio prevents the rational agent $A$ from holding a levered position in the stock, and the stock price has to fully agree with the pessimistic agent $B$’s beliefs in order to clear the market. Thus, the less wealth the irrational agent has initially, the more abruptly the stock price’s change will be from mostly reflecting the beliefs of agent $A$ (when $D_t$ is large) to entirely reflecting the beliefs of agent $B$ (at $D(t)$). This elevated sensitivity of stock price to changes in $D_t$ then translates into a stronger volatility amplification effect.

The impact of circuit breaker limit $\alpha$  So far we have considered a single level of circuit breaker limit of $\alpha = 5\%$. In Figure 9, we examine how different levels of circuit
breaker limits affect the distributions of price-dividend ratios and volatility. We see that tighter circuit breaker thresholds tend to reduce price-dividend ratios, which corresponds to larger price distortions. Furthermore, while tighter circuit breaker thresholds do tend to reduce daily price ranges, they can significantly increase realized volatilities.

Finally, in Panel D, we examine the probability of triggering the circuit breaker within the trading day as the limit changes. The probability of the stock price falling to a given threshold is a nonlinear function of the limit. Importantly, this probability rises more rapidly as the threshold becomes tighter when there is a circuit breaker than when there is not. This result suggests that using historical data from a period when circuit breakers have not been implemented can lead one to underestimate the likelihood of triggering a circuit breaker, especially when the threshold is relatively tight.

4.2 Time-varying Disagreements

So far we have been studying the setting with constant disagreement between the two agents. To illustrate the impact of time-varying disagreements, we consider the case where the difference in beliefs $\delta_t$ follows a random walk, i.e., $\kappa = 0$ and $\nu = 0.5\sigma$, and we set $\delta_0 = 0$ such that initially there is no bias in agent $B$’s belief.

Agent $B$’s belief under this calibration resembles the “representativeness” bias in the behavioral finance literature. He adjusts his belief excessively by extrapolating short-term trends in fundamentals, becoming overly optimistic following large positive dividend shocks and panicking following large negative dividend shocks. Such beliefs could also represent the behavior of constrained investors, who become effectively more (less) pessimistic or risk averse as the constraint tightens (loosens).

Figure 10 shows the price-dividend ratio and portfolio holdings, while Figure 11 shows the conditional return volatility and expected returns. We again start with the results for the case without circuit breakers. First, the price-dividend ratio has a wider range than in the constant disagreement case. Agent $B$ becomes more optimistic (pessimistic) as $D_t$ rises (falls) from the initial level, and $\delta_t$ can take on a wide range of values as a result. Naturally, the effect of time-varying disagreement becomes more limited as $t$ approaches
and the price-dividend ratio eventually converges to 1.

Second, the conditional return volatility now reflects the joint effects of the wealth distribution and the changes in the amount of disagreement. It not only tends to become higher when the distribution of wealth between the two agents is more even, but also when the amount of disagreement is high (large $|\delta_t|$). The result is a U-shaped conditional volatility as function of $D_t$, which is more pronounced when $t$ is small.

Next, in the presence of circuit breakers, when $D_t$ is above the circuit breaker threshold, the price-dividend ratio is again lower than the value without circuit breakers. This is consistent with our finding in the constant disagreement case. However, the circuit breaker does rule out some extreme values for the price-dividend ratio during the trading session. This result could have significant consequences when there are intra-day mark-to-market requirements for some of the market participants, as a narrower range of price-dividend ratio can help lower the chances of forced liquidation when the stock price falls by a large amount. Thus, one of the benefits of having circuit breakers could be to limit the range of price-dividend ratio in this case.

Similar to the constant disagreement case, circuit breakers in the case of time-varying disagreement amplify the conditional volatility by a significant amount when $D_t$ is close to the threshold $D_t$, especially when $t$ is small. A difference is that the conditional volatility is lower with circuit breakers than without when $D_t$ is sufficiently large. As $D_t$ becomes large, so does $\delta_t$, which makes return more volatile. However, the optimistic agent $B$ is made less aggressive by the threat of market closure and loss of liquidity, which is why volatility is dampened in the presence of circuit breakers.

5 Upper and Lower Boundary

In this section we extend our analysis to the case of the two-sided circuit breakers; i.e. the circuit breaker is triggered when the stock price reaches either $(1 - \alpha^D) S_0$ or $(1 + \alpha^U) S_0$ (whatever happens first); $\alpha^U, \alpha^D > 0$. We assume that agents have constant disagreement in beliefs and consider the same numerical parameters as in Section 4.1 with $\alpha^U = \alpha^D = 5\%$. 

29
Figure 12 is the counterpart of Figure 3 for the two-sided circuit breaker case. As before in the left column we present the plots of the price-dividend ratio $S_t/D_t$ as a function of $D_t$. In the two-sided circuit breaker case the $S_t/D_t$ ratio still lies between the price-dividend ratios $\hat{S}_t^A/D_t$ and $\hat{S}_t^B/D_t$ for the two representative-agent economies. Now, however, it has an inverse ‘U’ shape. For small and intermediary values of $D_t$ price-dividend ratio is an increasing function of $D_t$. As in one-sided circuit breaker case $S_t/D_t$ equals $\hat{S}_t^B/D_t$ when $D_t = D(t)$ and approaches the price-dividend ratio in the economy without circuit breakers for intermediate values of $D_t$. For higher values of $D_t$ though, $S_t/D_t$ decreases with $D_t$ and again equals $\hat{S}_t^B/D_t$ when the dividend reaches the boundary value that triggers the circuit breaker. Interpretation of this behavior of the price-dividend ratio for high values of $D_t$ is similar to the one-sided circuit breaker case. When the circuit breaker is triggered none of the agents is willing to hold either leveraged or short position in stock. In this situation the most pessimistic agent is the marginal investor regardless of whether the stock price has reached the upper or lower boundary.

This behavior of the price-dividend ratio manifests itself in the dependence of conditional volatility on dividend presented in the left column of Figure 13 (the counterpart of Figure 4 in the one-sided circuit breakers case). Conditional volatility is the highest for low values of $D_t$ when $S_t/D_t$ is increasing in $D_t$. Conditional volatility gradually decreases with $D_t$ as the slope of $S_t/D_t$ decreases. Finally conditional volatility approaches its lowest value when $D_t$ equals its highest (boundary) value.

This analysis reveals similarities and differences between circuit breakers imposed on the stock price from below and circuit breakers imposed on the stock price from above. In both cases in the presence of circuit breakers price-dividend ratio declines relative to the complete markets economy. The impact on volatility is asymmetric though: lower price boundary tends to amplify volatility, while upper boundary dampens it.

6 Is Continuous Time Special?

In our model, time is continuous and the dividend follows a geometric Brownian motion. Thus, in a finite time interval $\Delta$, $D_{t+\Delta}$ can in principle take any value on the interval
(0, ∞), as does the stock price \( S_{t+\Delta} \), no matter how small \( \Delta \) is. This feature along with logarithmic utility imply that the agents in our model need to completely deleverage and close out any short positions the moment the circuit breaker is triggered to ensure that their wealth remains positive. As discussed above, the complete de-leveraging by the relatively optimistic agents is critical for the pessimists to become the marginal investors upon market closure. This is also why the volatility amplification effect is the strongest when the wealth share of pessimists is approaching zero.

In this section, we examine the robustness of the above results. On the one hand, if shocks to dividend have a finite range in a given time interval (e.g., from the time of circuit breaker trigger \( \tau \) to \( T \)), then the optimistic (pessimistic) agents will be able to maintain some levered (short) positions during market closures. On the other hand, the size of the cumulated shocks becomes larger over an extended period of market closure, which will put a constraint on the leverage/short positions.

One way to capture such a feature is to consider a binomial tree setting. Specifically, we consider a discrete time setting where \( D_t \) is modeled using a binomial tree with finite number of steps between 0 and \( T \), and the tree is calibrated to match the mean and volatility of dividend growth of our continuous time model.\(^9\) We consider a tree with 500 steps. As a result, the minimum and maximum values that \( D_T \) can take are 0.51 and 1.95 correspondingly.

Before presenting the full solution of this binomial tree model, we first consider the problem at the instant before market closure. Suppose the stock market will close at (an exogenously given) time \( \tau \) with fundamental value \( D_\tau \). We allow trading at time \( \tau \), but after that the agents have to hold onto their portfolios until time \( T \). We then calculate equilibrium price of the stock at \( \tau \).

In Figure 14, we plot the equilibrium price as a function of the wealth share of agent A (relatively more optimistic agents) for \( \tau = 0.25 \) and \( D_\tau = 0.95 \) (the solid lines). For comparison, we also plot the price under complete markets (dash lines). The left panel is for the case with dividend volatility \( \sigma = 3\% \), the same as in the continuous time model.

\(^9\)This economy converges to the continuous time model when the number of steps in the binomial tree goes to infinity.
The right panel is for the case with higher volatility.

When the optimist’s share of total wealth is not too high, the incomplete markets price is lower than its complete markets counterpart, but the opposite occurs when the optimist’s wealth share is sufficiently high. The intuition is as follows. As is the case in continuous time, the equilibrium price under complete markets is a weighted average of the optimist and pessimist valuations, with the weight determined by their respective wealth shares. When markets are incomplete, even though agent A will no longer deleverage completely in this binomial model, his leverage is limited by the largest amount the dividend (and price) can drop from \( \tau \) to \( T \). Similarly, agent B can now take on some short positions, but the short positions are limited by the largest increase in dividend from \( \tau \) to \( T \).

When the optimist’s wealth share \( \theta \) is sufficiently low, his leverage constraint is binding, as he will not be able to hold all the stocks even at maximum leverage. Then the market clearing price has to agree with the pessimist’s private valuation, just as in the continuous time model. One difference from the continuous time model is that the valuation of the pessimist in the binomial tree model increases slowly with \( \theta \) (instead of remaining constant). This is because the pessimist’s portfolio becomes less risky (the fraction of riskless bonds increases relative to the stock) as the optimist becomes wealthier, leading him to value the stock more. Next, when the optimist’s wealth share becomes sufficiently high, his leverage constraint is no longer binding. He would hold more than the entire market, while the pessimistic agent takes on a short position. There is an intermediate range of wealth share such that both agents become marginal, as neither is facing a binding constraint (on leverage or short position). Finally, as the optimist’s wealth share continues to increase, the constraint on the pessimist’s short position eventually binds, and the market clearing price has to agree with the optimist’s private valuation.

The above analysis offers much of the intuition regarding the impact of circuit breakers on the stock price in the binomial tree setting. It is easy to see what might move the binomial model closer to the continuous time model in terms of its implication on stock price. Either when the number of steps in the binomial tree or the volatility of the
dividend process becomes large, the minimal realization of $D_T$ gets closer to 0. As a result, agent A’s leverage constraint in incomplete markets tightens, and the equilibrium price in that case will converge to the pessimist valuation. For example, the effect of high volatility is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 14.

In Figure 15, we plot the price-dividend ratios (left column) and conditional return volatility (right column) as a function of $D_t$ for three different values of optimist wealth share at time $t = 0$: $\theta = 0.3$, $\theta = 0.6$ and $\theta = 0.9$. Red dotted line corresponds to the complete markets case, solid blue line – to the case with circuit breakers on a binomial tree with $n = 500$ steps, dashed orange – to the case with circuit breakers for the baseline model in continuous time (we present it here again for easier comparison). The presented graphs exactly reflect the intuition discussed in the static example. For $\theta = 0.3$ and $\theta = 0.6$ circuit breakers both in discrete and continuous time tend to dampen the prices and amplify volatility. When $\theta = 0.9$ circuit breakers in the continuous time model and discrete time model have qualitatively opposite effect price level and volatility.

In summary, when the share of wealth owned by the optimist is not too high, circuit breakers will lower price level (relative to complete markets) and increase conditional volatility. The magnitude of the effects is also similar to that in the continuous time model. The opposite happens when the share of wealth owned by the optimist becomes sufficiently high. In that case, circuit breakers can actually inflate prices relative to the complete markets case and reduce return volatility. Taken together, these results suggest that the results about the impact of circuit breakers from the continuous time model are robust when the wealth share of the optimistic agents is not too high so that they face binding leverage constraint upon market closure.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we build a dynamic model to examine the mechanism through which market-wide circuit breakers affect trading and price dynamics in the stock market. As we show, circuit breakers tends to lower the price-dividend ratio, reduce daily price ranges, but increase conditional and realized volatilities. They also raise the probability
of the stock price reaching the circuit breaker limit as the price approaches the threshold (a “magnet” effect). The effects of circuit breakers can be further amplified when some agents’ willingness to hold the stock is sensitive to recent shocks to fundamentals, which can be due to behavioral biases, institutional constraints, etc. Finally, using historical data from a period when circuit breakers have not been implemented can lead one to underestimate the likelihood of triggering a circuit breaker, especially when the threshold is relatively tight.
Appendix

A  Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

When there are no circuit breakers, the stock price is

\[
\hat{S}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\tilde{\pi}_T D_T}{\mathbb{E}_t [\tilde{\pi}_T]} \right] = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t [\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_T]}{\mathbb{E}_t [D_T^{-1} (\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_T)]} = \frac{\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_t}{\theta \mathbb{E}_t [D_T^{-1}] + (1 - \theta) \mathbb{E}_t [D_T^{-1} \eta_T]},
\]

(37)

where

\[
\mathbb{E}_t [D_T^{-1}] = D_t^{-1} e^{-(\mu - \sigma^2)(T - t)},
\]

(38)

and

\[
\mathbb{E}_t [D_T^{-1} \eta_T] = \eta_t \mathbb{E}_t [D_T^{-1} \frac{\eta_T}{\eta_t}] = \eta_t \mathbb{E}_t^B [D_T^{-1}].
\]

(39)

Define the log dividend \( x_t = \log D_t \). Under measure \( \mathbb{P}^B \), the processes for \( x_t \) and \( \delta_t \) are

\[
dx_t = \left( \mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \delta_t \right) dt + \sigma dZ_t^B,
\]

\[
d\delta_t = \left( \kappa \delta + \left( \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \right) \delta_t \right) dt + \nu dZ_t^B.
\]

(40a)

(40b)

Define \( X_t = [x_t \delta_t]' \), then \( X_t \) follows an affine process,

\[
dx_t = (K_0 + K_1 X_t) dt + \sigma_X dZ_t^B,
\]

(41)

with

\[
K_0 = \begin{bmatrix} \mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \\ \kappa \delta \end{bmatrix}, \quad K_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & \frac{\nu}{\sigma} - \kappa \end{bmatrix}, \quad \sigma_X = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma \\ \nu \end{bmatrix}.
\]

(42)

We are interested in computing

\[
g(t, X_t) = \mathbb{E}_t^B \left[ e^{\rho_1 X_T} \right], \quad \text{with} \ \rho_1 = [-1 \ 0]'.
\]

(43)

By applying standard results for the conditional moment-generating functions of affine processes.
(see, e.g., Singleton 2006), we get

\[ g(t, X_t) = \exp \left( A(t, T) + B(t, T)' X_t \right), \quad (44) \]

where

\[
0 = \dot{B} + K_1' B, \quad B(T, T) = \rho_1 \quad (45a)
\]
\[
0 = \dot{A} + B'K_0 + \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( BB'\sigma_X'\sigma_X' \right), \quad A(T, T) = 0 \quad (45b)
\]

Solving for the ODEs gives

\[
B(t, T) = \left[ -1 \frac{1 - e^{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)(T-t)}}{\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa} \right]', \quad (46)
\]

and

\[
A(t, T) = \left( \mu - \sigma^2 - \kappa \frac{\eta\delta - \sigma \nu}{\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa} - \frac{\nu^2}{2 \left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^2} \right) (t - T) - \frac{\nu^2}{4 \left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^3} \left( 1 - e^{2\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)(T-t)} \right)
\]
\[
+ \left( \kappa \frac{\eta\delta - \sigma \nu}{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^2} + \frac{\nu^2}{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^3} \right) \left( 1 - e^{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)(T-t)} \right), \quad (47)
\]

After plugging the above results back into (37) and reorganizing the terms, we get

\[
S_t = \frac{\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_t}{\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta_t H(t, \delta_t)} D_t e^{\left(\mu - \sigma^2\right)(T-t)}, \quad (48)
\]

where

\[
H(t, \delta_t) = e^{a(t, T) + b(t, T) \delta_t}, \quad (49a)
\]
\[
a(t, T) = \left( \kappa \frac{\eta\delta - \sigma \nu}{\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa} + \frac{\nu^2}{2 \left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^2} \right) (T - t) - \frac{\nu^2}{4 \left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^3} \left( 1 - e^{2\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)(T-t)} \right)
\]
\[
+ \left( \kappa \frac{\eta\delta - \sigma \nu}{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^2} + \frac{\nu^2}{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)^3} \right) \left( 1 - e^{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)(T-t)} \right), \quad (49b)
\]
\[
b(t, T) = \frac{1 - e^{\left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa\right)(T-t)}}{\frac{\eta}{\sigma} - \kappa}. \quad (49c)
\]
Finally, to compute the conditional volatility of stock returns, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{d}S_t &= \tilde{\mu}_{S,t} \tilde{S}_t dt + \tilde{\sigma}_{S,t} \tilde{S}_t d\tilde{Z}_t \\
&= o(dt) + \tilde{S}_t \frac{dT_t}{D_t} \\
&\quad + \eta kD_t e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T - t)} \frac{\theta (1 - \theta) (1 - H(t, \delta_t))}{(\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta t H(t, \delta_t))^2} d\eta_t \\
&\quad - D_t e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T - t)} \frac{(\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta t H(t, \delta_t)) b(t, T)}{(\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta t H(t, \delta_t))^2} d\delta_t.
\end{align*}
\]

After collecting the diffusion terms, we get

\[
\tilde{\sigma}_{S,t} = \sigma + \frac{D_t e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)(T - t)}}{\tilde{S}_t} \left( \frac{\theta (1 - \theta) (1 - H(t, \delta_t)) \delta \eta_t}{(\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta t H(t, \delta_t))^2} \right)
- \frac{(\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta t) (1 - \theta) \eta t b(t, T) H(t, \delta_t)}{(\theta + (1 - \theta) \eta t H(t, \delta_t))^2} \nu.
\]

\[\text{(50)}\]

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Suppose market closes at time \(\tau\). Since bonds are zero net supply,

\[W_{1,\tau} + W_{2,\tau} = S_\tau\]

Then the agents’ problems at time \(\tau\) are

\[
V^1(W_{1,\tau}) = \max_{\theta_1, b_1} E^1_\tau [\ln (\theta_1 D_T + b_1)]
\]
\[s.t. \quad \theta_1 S_\tau + b_1 \leq W_{1,\tau} \]
\[\theta_1 \geq 0, \quad b_1 \geq 0\]

and

\[
V^2(W_{2,\tau}) = \max_{\theta_2, b_2} E^2_\tau [\ln (\theta_2 D_T + b_2)]
\]
\[s.t. \quad \theta_2 S_\tau + b_2 \leq W_{2,\tau} \]
\[\theta_2 \geq 0, \quad b_2 \geq 0\]
The Lagrangian:

\[ L = E^1_\tau [\ln (\theta_1 DT + b_1)] + \zeta^1_1 (W_{1,\tau} - \theta_1 S_\tau - b_1) + \xi^1_a \theta_1 + \xi^1_b b_1 \]

FOC:

\[ E^i_\tau \left[ \frac{DT}{\theta_i DT + b_i} \right] - \zeta^i S_\tau + \xi^i_a = 0 \]
\[ E^i_\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_i DT + b_i} \right] - \zeta^i + \xi^i_b = 0 \]

Suppose agent 1 is less optimistic than agent 2. Then we can quickly examine following three cases:

1. It could be an equilibrium when the price is sufficiently low such that both agents want to take levered positions (putting more than 100% of their wealth in the stock) but are constrained from borrowing. In this case, both agents submit demands proportional to their wealth,

\[ \theta^*_i = \frac{W_{i,\tau}}{S_\tau} \]
\[ \xi^1_a = \xi^2_a = 0 \]
\[ \xi^1_b > 0, \xi^2_b > 0 \]

and the market for the stock clears. In this case,

\[ S_\tau = \frac{E^1_\tau \left[ \frac{DT}{\theta_1 DT + b_1} \right]}{E^1_\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_1 DT + b_1} \right] + \xi^1_b} = \frac{1}{E^1_\tau \left[ \frac{1}{DT} \right] + \xi^1_1 \theta_1} < \frac{1}{E^1_\tau \left[ \frac{1}{DT} \right]} = S^*_\tau. \]

2. It could be an equilibrium when agent 1 (pessimist) finds it optimal to hold all his wealth in the stock, while agent 2 (optimist) is constrained from borrowing:

\[ \theta^*_i = \frac{W_{i,\tau}}{S_\tau} \]
\[ \xi^1_a = \xi^2_a = 0 \]
\[ \xi^1_b = 0, \xi^2_b > 0 \]
Then from agent 1,

\[
E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{D_T}{\theta_1 D_T + b_1} \right] - \zeta^1 S_\tau = 0
\]

\[
E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_1 D_T + b_1} \right] - \zeta^1 = 0
\]

This implies

\[
S_\tau = \frac{E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{D_T}{\theta_1 D_T + b_1} \right]}{E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_1 D_T + b_1} \right]} = \frac{E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_1 D_T} \right]}{E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right]} = D_\tau e^{(\mu-\sigma^2)(T-\tau)} = S_\tau^*
\]

The latter follows from the fact that market clearing for bonds implies that \( b_1^* = b_2 = 0 \), and \( \theta_1^* > 0 \) as long as \( W_{1,\tau} > 0 \). Let’s check whether this is this consistent with agent 2.

\[
E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{D_T}{\theta_2 D_T + b_1} \right] - \zeta^2 S_\tau = 0
\]

\[
E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_2 D_T + b_1} \right] - \zeta^2 + \xi^2_b = 0
\]

\[
S_\tau = \frac{E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{D_T}{\theta_2 D_T + b_2} \right]}{E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_2 D_T + b_2} \right] + \xi^2_b} = \frac{E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{\theta_2 D_T} \right]}{E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right] + \xi^2_b} = \frac{1}{E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right] + \xi^2_b}.
\]

Since agent 2 is more optimistic,

\[
E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right] > E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right],
\]

which implies

\[
\xi^2_b = \frac{E_1^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right] - E_2^\tau \left[ \frac{1}{D_T} \right]}{\theta_2^*} > 0.
\]

3. For any \( S_\tau > S_\tau^* \), agent 1 will prefer to hold less than 100% of the wealth in the stock.
This would require agent 2 to take levered position, which cannot be an equilibrium.

We will restrict our attention to equilibriums of type 2.
A.3 Special Case: Constant Disagreement

The stock price can be computed in closed form in the case of constant disagreement, $\delta_t = \delta$. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case where agent $B$ is relatively more optimistic, $\delta \geq 0$. The results are summarized below.

**Proposition 4.** Take $S_0$ as given. With $\delta \geq 0$, the stock price time $t \leq \tau \wedge T$ is

$$S_t = \left( \omega_t^A E_t[S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} - \omega_t^B E_t[S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1}] \right)^{-1},$$

(51)

where

$$E_t[S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1}] = \frac{1}{\alpha S_0} \left( N \left( \frac{d_t - \sigma(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) + e^{\sigma d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t + \sigma(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) \right) + D_t^{-1} e^{-(\mu-\sigma^2)(T-t)} \left( N \left( \frac{d_t + \sigma(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) - e^{\sigma d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t - \sigma(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) \right),$$

(52)

$$E_t^B[S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1}] = \frac{1}{\alpha S_0} \left( N \left( \frac{d_t - (\frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2})(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) + e^{(\sigma+\frac{\delta}{\sigma})d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t + (\frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2})(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) \right) + D_t^{-1} e^{-(\mu-\sigma^2+\delta)(T-t)} \left( N \left( \frac{d_t + (\frac{\delta}{\sigma} - \frac{\sigma}{2})(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) - e^{(\frac{\delta}{\sigma}-\sigma)d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t + (\frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2})(T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) \right),$$

(53)

and

$$d_t = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \log \left( \frac{\alpha S_0}{D_t} \right) - \left( \mu - \sigma^2 \right) (T-t) \right).$$

(54)

**Proof.** As show in Section 3.2, the stock price at time $t \leq \tau \wedge T$ is

$$S_t = \frac{E_t \left[ \pi_{\tau \wedge T}^A S_{\tau \wedge T} \right]}{\pi_t^A} = \frac{\theta + (1-\theta)\eta_t}{\pi_t^A} E_t \left[ \frac{\theta + (1-\theta)\eta_t}{\eta_t} S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta + (1-\theta)\eta_t} E_t \left[ S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right] + \frac{(1-\theta)\eta_t}{\theta + (1-\theta)\eta_t} E_t \left[ \frac{\eta_t}{\eta_t} S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta + (1-\theta)\eta_t} E_t \left[ S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right] + \frac{(1-\theta)\eta_t}{\theta + (1-\theta)\eta_t} E_t^B \left[ S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right].$$

(55)

The second equality follows from Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem, while the last equality follows from Girsanov’s Theorem.
Now consider the case when $\delta_t = \delta$. Taking $S_0$ as given and imposing the condition for stock price at the circuit breaker trigger, we have

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \left[ S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right] = \frac{1}{\alpha S_0} P_t (\tau \leq T) + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ D_T^{-1} 1_{\{\tau > T\}} \right], \quad (56)
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}_t^\mu \left[ S_{\tau \wedge T}^{-1} \right] = \frac{1}{\alpha S_0 \eta_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \eta_t 1_{\{\tau \leq T\}} \right] + \frac{1}{\eta_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \eta_t D_T^{-1} 1_{\{\tau > T\}} \right], \quad (57)
\]

The following standard results about hitting times of Brownian motions are helpful for deriving the expressions for the expectations in (56)–(57) (see e.g., Jeanblanc, Yor, and Chesney, 2009, chap 3). Let $Z^\mu$ denote a drifted Brownian motion, $Z^\mu_t = \mu t + Z_t$, with $Z^\mu_0 = 0$. Let $T^\mu_y = \inf \{ t \geq 0 : Z^\mu_t = y \}$ for $y < 0$. Then

\[
\Pr (T^\mu_y \leq t) = N \left( \frac{y - \mu t}{\sqrt{t}} \right) + e^{2\mu y} N \left( \frac{y + \mu t}{\sqrt{t}} \right), \quad (58)
\]

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-\lambda T^\mu_y} 1_{\{T^\mu_y \leq t\}} \right] = e^{(\mu - \gamma) y} N \left( \frac{y - \gamma t}{\sqrt{t}} \right) + e^{(\mu + \gamma) y} N \left( \frac{y + \gamma t}{\sqrt{t}} \right), \quad (59)
\]

where $\gamma = \sqrt{2\lambda + \mu^2}$.

Recall the definition of the stopping time $\tau$ in Equation (24), which simplifies in the case with constant disagreement,

\[
\tau = \inf \left\{ t \geq 0 : D_t = \alpha S_0 e^{-\frac{\sigma^2}{2} (T - t)} \right\}. \quad (60)
\]

Through a change of variables, we can redefine $\tau$ as the first hitting time of a drifted Brownian motion for a constant threshold. Specifically, define

\[
y_t = \frac{1}{\sigma} \log \left( e^{-\frac{\sigma^2}{2} t} D_t \right), \quad (61)
\]

then $y_0 = 0$,

\[
y_t = Z^\sigma_t = \frac{\sigma}{2} t + Z_t. \quad (62)
\]

Moreover,

\[
T^\sigma_d = \inf \left\{ t \geq 0 : y_t = d \right\} \overset{a.s.}{=} \tau, \quad (63)
\]

41
where the threshold is constant over time,

\[
d = \frac{1}{\sigma} \log \left( \alpha S_0 e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 \right) T} \right).
\]  

(64)

Conditional on \( y_t \) and the fact that the circuit breaker has not been triggered up to time \( t \), the result from (58) implies

\[
P_t (\tau \leq T) = P_t \left( \frac{d_t - \sigma (T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \leq T - t \right) = N \left( \frac{d_t + \sigma (T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) + e^{\sigma d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t - \sigma (T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right),
\]

(65)

where

\[
d_t = d - y_t = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \log \left( \frac{\alpha S_0}{D_t} \right) - (\mu - \sigma^2) (T - t) \right).
\]

(66)

The threshold \( d_t \) is normalized with respect to \( y_t \) so as to start the drifted Brownian motion \( Z_{\sigma T} \) from 0 at time \( t \).

Next,

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \left[ D_T^{-1} 1_{\{\tau > T\}} \right] = D_t^{-1} e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 \right)(T-t)} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ e^{-\sigma (Z_T - Z_t)} 1_{\{\tau > T\}} \right] = D_t^{-1} e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 \right)(T-t)} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ e^{-\sigma (Z_T - Z_t)^2} 1_{\{\tau > T\}} \right] = D_t^{-1} e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 \right)(T-t)} \mathbb{E}_t^Q \left[ 1_{\{\tau > T\}} \right] = D_t^{-1} e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 \right)(T-t)} \left[ N \left( -\frac{d_t + \sigma (T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) - e^{\sigma d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t - \sigma (T-t)}{\sqrt{T-t}} \right) \right].
\]

(67)

The third equality follows from Girsanov’s Theorem, and the fourth equality again follows from (58). Under \( Q \), \( Z_t^{\sigma} = Z_t + \sigma t \) is a standard Brownian motion, and

\[
y_t = -\frac{\sigma}{2} t + Z_t^{\sigma}.
\]

(68)

Next, it follows from (61) and the definition of \( \tau \) that

\[
y_{\tau} = y_t + \frac{\sigma}{2} (\tau - t) + (Z_{\tau} - Z_t) = d.
\]

(69)
Thus,

\[ Z_\tau - Z_t = d_t - \frac{\sigma}{2} (\tau - t). \]  

(70)

With this result, we can evaluate the following expectation,

\[ E_t [\eta \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau \leq T\}}] = E_t \left[ \eta e^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}(Z_\tau - Z_t) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\sigma^2} (\tau - t)} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau \leq T\}} \right] \]

\[ = \eta e^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma} t} E_t \left[ \exp \left( - \left( \frac{\delta}{2} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2\sigma^2} \right) (\tau - t) \right) \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau \leq T\}} \right] \]

\[ = \eta t \left( N \left( \frac{d_t - \left( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2} \right) (T - t)}{\sqrt{T - t}} \right) + e^{\left( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right) d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t - \left( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2} \right) (T - t)}{\sqrt{T - t}} \right) \right), \]

where the last equality follows from an application of (59).

Finally,

\[ E_t [\eta T D_{T - 1} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau > T\}}] = E_t \left[ \eta e^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}(Z_\tau - Z_t) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\sigma^2} (T - t)} D_{t - 1} e^{-\left( \mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right) (T - t) - \sigma (Z_\tau - Z_t)} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau > T\}} \right] \]

\[ = \eta D_{t - 1} e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 + \delta \right) (T - t)} E_t \left[ e^{\left( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} - \sigma \right) (Z_\tau - Z_t) - \left( \frac{\delta}{2} - \sigma \right)^2 (T - t)} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau > T\}} \right] \]

\[ = \eta D_{t - 1} e^{-\left( \mu - \sigma^2 + \delta \right) (T - t)} \left( N \left( - \frac{d_t - \left( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2} \right) (T - t)}{\sqrt{T - t}} \right) \right) \]

\[ - e^{\left( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right) d_t} N \left( \frac{d_t - \left( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{2} \right) (T - t)}{\sqrt{T - t}} \right) \right). \]

The third equality follows from Girsanov’s Theorem, and the fourth equality follows from (58).

Under $\tilde{Q}$, $Z_t^{\sigma - \frac{\delta}{\sigma}} = Z_t + (\sigma - \frac{\delta}{\sigma}) t$ is a standard Brownian motion, and

\[ y_t = \left( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} - \frac{\sigma}{2} \right) t + Z_t^{\sigma - \frac{\delta}{\sigma}}. \]  

(71)

A.4 Proof of Proposition 3

Sketch of the proof: Consider the function $f(s)$ as the time 0 stock price in an economy where the stock market closes the first time when the stock price reaches some exogenous threshold $s$. 
When \( s = 0 \), there are effectively no circuit breakers. Thus,

\[
f(0) = \hat{S}_0 \geq \min \left( D_0 e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)T}, D_0 e^{(\mu - \sigma^2)T - a(0,T) - b(0,T)\delta_0} \right) \equiv \tilde{s}.
\]

The inequality follows from the fact that \( \hat{S}_0 \) is the weighted harmonic average of the prices of the stock in two single-agent economies. Next, it can be shown that \( f(s) \) is a continuous function and moreover is decreasing in \( s \). The intuition is that as \( s \) increases, the circuit breaker constraint becomes more binding, making it more likely for the stock price to converge to the lower valuation between the two agents. Finally, when \( s \) rises to \( \tilde{s} \), the stock market will close immediately, which means \( f(\tilde{s}) = \tilde{s} \). Now it is easy to see that \( f(s) \) and \( \frac{a}{\alpha} \) will have a single crossing in the region \((0, \tilde{s})\) for any \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \).

### B  Constant Disagreements: \( \delta > 0 \)

Analogous to Figure 3 - Figure 6, Figure 16 - Figure 19 present the set of results for the case of constant disagreement with \( \delta = 2\% \).
Figure 6: Distributions of price-dividend ratio, daily price range, and realized volatility. Solid line: circuit breaker is on; dashed line: complete markets.
Figure 7: The “magnet effect”. Probabilities for the stock price to reach the circuit breaker limit within 10 and 30 minutes.
Volatility ratio

\[ \frac{t}{t} = 0.25 \]
\[ \frac{t}{t} = 0.5 \]
\[ \frac{t}{t} = 0.75 \]

Median of day average \( S_t / D_t \)

Figure 8: **Comparative statics for the initial wealth distribution.** The left panel plots the ratio of conditional return volatilities for the with-CB and no-CB cases at \( D_t = D(t) \) as a function of \( \theta \), the initial wealth share for the rational agent. The right panel plots the median of daily average price-dividend ratio as a function of \( \theta \).
Figure 9: **Comparative statics for the circuit breaker limit** $\alpha$. This figure plots the daily average price-dividend ratio, the daily realized volatility, daily price range, and daily probability of reaching the circuit breaker threshold as a function of the circuit breaker limit $\alpha$. In Panels A–C, the dash lines denote 95% percentiles, and the solid lines denote the median values across simulations. In Panel D, the dash line denotes complete markets, while the solid line denotes the circuit breaker case.
Figure 10: **Price-dividend ratio and agent A’s portfolio in the case of time-varying disagreements.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 
Figure 11: Conditional volatility and conditional expected returns in the case of time-varying disagreements. Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 

Fundamental value: $D_t \sigma_{S,t}(\%)$ 

$t = 0.25$ 

$t = 0.5$ 

$t = 0.75$
Figure 12: **Price-dividend ratio and agent A’s (rational optimist) portfolio holdings.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 
Figure 13: **Conditional volatility and conditional expected returns under the two agents’ beliefs.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 


Figure 14: **Stock price upon market closure: binomial tree model.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. Left panel is for the case with dividend volatility $\sigma = 3\%$. Right panel is for the case with $\sigma = 9\%$. 

\[\tau = 0.25, \quad \sigma = 3\%\]

\[\tau = 0.25, \quad \sigma = 9\%\]
Figure 15: **Price-dividend ratio and conditional volatility.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 
Figure 16: Price-dividend ratio and agent A’s (rational pessimist) portfolio holdings. Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D_t$. 
Figure 17: Conditional volatility and conditional expected returns under the two agents’ beliefs. Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold $D(t)$. 
Figure 18: **Distribution of terminal wealth share.** Blue solid lines are for the case with circuit breakers. Red dotted lines are for the case without circuit breakers. The grey vertical bars denote the circuit breaker threshold \( D(t) \).
Figure 19: Distributions of price-dividend ratio, daily price range, and realized volatility. Solid line: circuit breaker is on; dashed line: complete markets.
References


