2017, No. 1
Abstracts of Selected Recent NBER Working Papers
Tort Reform and Innovation
Alberto Galasso, Hong Luo
Current academic and policy debates focus on the impact of tort reforms on physicians' behavior and medical costs. This paper examines whether these reforms also affect incentives to develop new technologies. We find that, on average, laws that limit the liability exposure of healthcare providers are associated with a significant reduction in medical device patenting and that the effect is predominantly driven by innovators located in the states passing the reforms. Tort laws have the strongest impact in medical fields in which the probability of facing a malpractice claim is the largest, and they do not seem to affect the amount of new technologies of the highest and lowest quality. Our results underscore the importance of con-sidering dynamic effects in the economic analysis of tort laws.
When Discounts Raise Costs: The Effect of Copay Coupons on Generic Utilization
Leemore Dafny, Christopher Ody, Matthew Schmitt
Branded pharmaceutical manufacturers frequently offer "copay coupons" that insulate consumers from cost-sharing, thereby undermining insurers' ability to influence drug utilization. We study the impact of copay coupons on branded drugs first facing generic entry between 2007 and 2010. To overcome endogeneity concerns, we exploit cross-state and cross-consumer variation in coupon legality. We find that coupons increase branded sales by 60+ percent, entirely by reducing the sales of bioequivalent generics. During the five years following generic entry, we estimate that coupons increase total spending by $30 to $120 million per drug, or $700 million to $2.7 billion for our sample alone.
Inattention and Switching Costs as Sources of Inertia in Medicare Part D
Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden, Joachim Winter, Amelie Wuppermann, Bo Zhou
The trend towards giving consumers choice about their health plans has invited research on how good they actually are at making these decisions. The introduction of Medicare Part D is an important example. Initial plan choices in this market were generally far from optimal. In this paper, we focus on plan choice in the years after initial enrollment. Due to changes in plan supply, consumer health status, and prescription drug needs, consumers' optimal plans change over time. However, in Medicare Part D only about 10% of consumers switch plans every year, and on average, plan choices worsen for those who do not switch. We develop a two-stage panel data model of plan choice whose stages correspond to two separate rea-sons for inertia: inattention and switching costs. The model allows for unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated across the two decision stages. We estimate the model using administrative data on Medicare Part D claims from 2007 to 2010. We find that consumers are more likely to pay attention to plan choice if overspending in the last year is more salient and if their old plan gets worse, for instance due to premium increases. Moreover, conditional on attention there are significant switching costs. Separating the two stages of the switching decision is thus important when designing inter-ventions that improve consumers' plan choice.
The Affordable Care Act as Retiree Health Insurance: Implications for Retirement and Social Security Claiming
Alan L. Gustman, Thomas L. Steinmeier, Nahid Tabatabai
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we examine the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on retirement. We first calculate retirements (and in related analyses changes in expected ages of retirement and/or Social Security claiming) between 2010, before ACA, and 2014, after ACA, for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement. This group experienced the sharpest change in retirement incentives from ACA. We then compare retirement measures for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement with retirement measures for two other groups, those who, before ACA, had employer provided health insurance both at work and in retirement, and those who had no health insurance either at work or in retirement. To complete a difference-in-difference analysis, we make the same calculations for members of an older cohort over the same age span. We find no evidence that ACA increases the propensity to retire or changes the retirement expectations of those who, before ACA, had coverage when working but not when retired. An analysis based on a structural retirement model suggests that eventually ACA will increase the probability of retirement by those who initially had health insurance on the job but did not have employer provided retiree health insurance. But the retirement increase is quite small, only about half a percentage point at each year of age. The model also suggests that much of the effect of ACA on retirement will be realized within a few years of the change in the law.
The Evolution of Health Insurer Costs in Massachusetts, 2010–12
Kate Ho, Ariel Pakes, Mark Shepard
We analyze the evolution of health insurer costs in Massachusetts between 2010-2012, a period in which the use of physician cost control incentives spread among insurers. We show that the growth of costs and its relationship to the introduction of cost control incentives cannot be understood without accounting for (i) consumers' switching between plans, and (ii) differences in cost characteristics between new entrants and those leaving the market. New entrants are markedly less costly than those leaving (and their costs fall after their entering year), so cost growth of those who stay in a plan is significantly higher than average per-member cost growth. Cost control incentives were used by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Relatively high-cost HMO members switched to Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) while low-cost PPO members switched to HMOs. As a result, the impact of cost control incentives on HMO costs is likely different from their impact on market-wide insurer costs.
Geographical Distribution of Emergency Department Closures and Consequences on Heart Attack Patients
Yu-Chu Shen, Renee Y. Hsia
We develop a conceptual framework and empirically investigate how a permanent emergency department (ED) closure affects patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI). We first document that large increases in driving time to closest ED are more likely to happen in low-income communities and communities that had fewer medical resources at baseline. Then using a difference-in-differences design, we estimate the effect of an ED closure on access to cardiac care technology, treatment, and health outcomes among Medicare patients with AMI who lived in 24,567 ZIP codes that experienced no change, an increase of
`<`10 minutes, 10 to `<`30 minutes, and `>=`30 minutes in driving time to their closest ED. Overall, access to cardiac care declined in all communities experiencing a closure, with access to a coronary care unit decreasing by 18.64 percentage points (95% CI -30.15, -7.12) for those experiencing `>=`30-minute increase in driving time. Even after controlling for access to technology and treatment, patients with the longest delays experienced a 6.58 (95% CI 2.49, 10.68) and 6.52 (95% CI 1.69, 11.35) percentage point increase in 90-day and 1-year mortality, respectively, compared with those not experiencing changes in distance. Our results also suggest that the predominant mechanism behind the mortality increase appeared to be time delay as opposed to availability of specialized cardiac treatment.
The Long-Run Effects of Childhood Insurance Coverage: Medicaid Implementation, Adult Health, and Labor Market Outcomes
This paper exploits the original introduction of Medicaid (1966-1970) and the federal mandate that states cover all cash welfare recipients to estimate the effect of childhood Medicaid eligibility on adult health, labor supply, program participation, and income. Cohorts born closer to Medicaid implementation and in states with higher pre-existing welfare-based eligibility accumulated more Medicaid eligibility in childhood but did not differ on a range of other health, socioeconomic, and policy characteristics. Early childhood Medicaid eligibility reduces mortality and disability and, for whites, increases extensive margin labor supply, and reduces receipt of disability transfer programs and public health insurance up to 50 years later. Total income does not change because earnings replace disability benefits. The government earns a discounted annual return of between 2 and 7 percent on the original cost of childhood coverage for these cohorts, most of which comes from lower cash transfer payments.
Bombs and Babies: U.S. Navy Bombing Activity and Infant Health in Vieques, Puerto Rico
Gustavo J. Bobonis, Mark Stabile, Leonardo Tovar
We study the relationship between in utero exposure to military exercises and children's early-life health outcomes in a no-war zone. This allows us to document non-economic impacts of military activity on neonatal health outcomes. We combine monthly data on tonnage of ordnance in the context of naval exercises in Vieques, Puerto Rico, with the universe of births in Puerto Rico between 1990 and 2000; studying this setting is useful because these exercises have no negative consequences for local economic activity. We find that a one standard deviation increase in exposure to bombing activity leads to a three per thousand point (70 percent) increase in extremely premature births; a three to seven per thousand point — 34 to 77 percent — increase in the incidence of congenital anomalies; and a five per thousand point increase in low APGAR scores (38 percent). The evidence is generally consistent with the channel of environmental pollution. Given the well-documented relationship between neonatal health and later life outcomes, there is reason to believe that our substantial short-term effects may have longer-term consequences for this population.
Older Peoples' Willingness to Delay Social Security Claiming
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell
We have designed and fielded an experimental module in the 2014 HRS which seeks to measure older persons' willingness to voluntarily defer claiming of Social Security benefits. In addition, we evaluate the stated willingness of older individuals to work longer, depending on the Social Security incentives offered to delay claiming their benefits. Our project extends previous work by analyzing the results from our HRS module and comparing findings from other data sources which included very much smaller samples of older persons. We show that half of the respondents would delay claiming if no work requirement were in place under the status quo, and only slightly fewer, 46%, with a work requirement. We also asked respondents how large a lump sum they would need with or without a work requirement. In the former case, the average amount needed to induce delayed claiming was about $60,400, while when part-time work was required, the average was $66,700. This implies a low utility value of leisure foregone of only $6,300, or under 20% of average household income.
Agricultural Fires and Infant Health
Marcos A. Rangel, Tom Vogl
Fire has long served as a tool in agriculture, but this practice's human capital consequences have proved difficult to study. Drawing on data from satellites, air monitors, and vital records, we study how smoke from sugarcane harvest fires affects infant health in the Brazilian state that produces one-fifth of the world's sugarcane. Because fires track economic activity, we exploit wind for identification, finding that late-pregnancy exposure to upwind fires decreases birth weight, gestational length, and in utero survival, but not early neonatal survival. Other fires positively predict health, highlighting the importance of disentangling pollution from economic activities that drive it.