Market Design Working Group Meeting
Organized by Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak
October 19-20, 2018
SIEPR, Stanford University, Koret-Taube Conference Center, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA
Friday, October 19
8:30 am
Continental Breakfast
9:00 am
Olivier Terceiux, Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Markets, a synthesis of:

Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Matching: An Irrelevance of Priorities in Large Markets

Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics

Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University and NBER
Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER
Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics
9:45 am

Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India

Surender Baswana, IIT Kanpur
Partha Pratim Chakrabarti, IIT Kharagpur
Sharat Chandran, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
Yash Kanoria, Columbia University
Utkarsh Patange, Columbia University
10:30 am
Break
11:00 am

Efficient and Incentive Compatible Mediation: An Ordinal Market Design Approach

Onur Kesten, The University of Sydney
Selcuk Ozyurt, York University
11:45 am

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
Benjamin A. Brooks, University of Chicago
Stephen Morris, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
12:30 pm
Lunch
Speaker: Michael Schwarz, Microsoft

Market Design, Reputation Systems, UX, and the Cost of User Time

Michael Schwarz, Microsoft Research
2:00 pm

The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market

Xiao Liu, Tsinghua University
Zhixi Wan, The University of Hong Kong (HKU)
Chenyu Yang, University of Maryland, College Park
2:45 pm

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms

Hongyao Ma, Columbia University
Fei Fang, Carnegie Mellon University
David Parkes, Harvard University
3:30 pm
Break
4:00 pm

A Monetary Market for Kidneys

Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University
Farshad Fatemi, Sharif University of Technology
Negar Matoorian, Stanford University
4:45 pm

Recent Developments in Kidney Exchange: Market Design in a Large World

Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER
5:30 pm
Adjourn
6:30 pm
Dinner
Joya Restaurant
339 University Avenue
Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, October 20
8:30 am
Continental Breakfast
9:00 am

Impact Evaluation in Matching Markets with General Tie-Breaking

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University and NBER
Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Yusuke Narita, Yale University
Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
9:45 am

Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (slides)

Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University
Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University
10:30 am
Break
11:00 am

Trading Networks with Frictions

Tamas Fleiner, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University
Zsuzsanna Jankó, Corvinus University
Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford
11:45 am

Redistribution through Markets

Piotr Dworczak, Northwestern University
Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University
12:30 pm
Adjourn