Market Design Working Group Meeting
Organized by Susan Athey and Parag A. Pathak
October 25-26, 2013
Stanford University

Friday, October 25

1

The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response

Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER
Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, College Park
John Shim, University of Notre Dame

2

An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

3

Optimality versus Practicality in Market Design: A Comparison of Two Double Auctions

Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University
Steven Williams, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Konstantinos Zachariadis, Queen Mary University of London

4

Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Koch Industries

Bo Cowgill, Columbia University
Eric Zitzewitz, Dartmouth College and NBER

5

Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications

Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University
Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University

6

Optimal Design for Social Learning

Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Johannes Hörner, Yale University

7

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets

Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University
Yashodhan Kanoria, Columbia University
Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago

8

How to Control Controlled School Choice

Federico Echenique, University of California, Berkeley
M. Bumin Yenmez, Washington University in St. Louis

9

Land Openings on the Georgia Frontier and the Coase Theorem in the Short- and Long-Run

Hoyt Bleakley, University of Michigan and NBER
Joseph P. Ferrie, Northwestern University and NBER

10

Social Status and the Design of Optimal Badges

Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research
Gregory Stoddard, Northwestern University
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Stanford University