Market Design Working Group Meeting
Organized by Parag A. Pathak and Susan Athey
October 19-20, 2012
1050 Mass Ave

Friday, October 19

1

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market

William Fuchs, UT Austin and Universidad Carlos III Madrid
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University

2

Dynamic Matchng in Overloaded Systems

Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago

3

Selecting Bidders Via Non-Binding Bids When Entry Is Costly

Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin - Madison
Kenneth Hendricks, University of Wisconsin - Madison and NBER

4

The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions

Noam Nisan, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

5

Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values

Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Jinwoo Kim, Mr., Seoul National University
Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University

6

Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"

Aditya Bhave, University of Chicago
Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER

7

Incentive Auction Rules Proposal

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland, College Park
Jonathan D. Levin, Stanford University and NBER
Ilya Segal, Stanford University

8

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets

Qingmin Liu, Columbia University
Marek Pycia, University of Zurich

9

Designing for Diversity in Matching

Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College

10

Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions

Elisa Celis, University of Washington
Gregory Lewis, Amazon, Inc.
Markus Mobius, University of Michigan
Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California

11

Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania
Mallesh Pai, Rice University
Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania
Jonathan Ullman, Harvard University

12

The Extent of Price Misalignment in Prediction Markets

David M. Rothschild, Microsoft Research
David Pennock, Microsoft Research