Mindy Z. Xiaolan
University of Texas at Austin
2110 Speedway B6600
Austin, TX 78703
Institutional Affiliation: University of Texas at Austin
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2019||The U.S. Public Debt Valuation Puzzle|
with , , : w26583
The market value of outstanding federal government debt in the U.S. exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of U.S. GDP. When the pricing kernel fits U.S. equity and Treasury prices and the government surpluses are consistent with U.S. post-war data, a government debt valuation puzzle emerges. Since tax revenues are pro-cyclical while government spending is counter-cyclical, the tax revenue claim has a higher short-run discount rate and a lower value than the spending claim. Since revenue and spending are co-integrated with GDP, the long-run risk discount rates of both claims are much higher than the long Treasury yield. These forces imply a negative present value of U.S. government surpluses. Convenience yields for Treasuries mus...
|September 2016||Capital Share Dynamics When Firms Insure Workers|
with , : w22651
Although the aggregate capital share of U.S. firms has increased, the firm-level capital share of a typical U.S. firm has decreased. This divergence is due to mega-firms that now produce a larger output share without a proportionate increase in labor compensation. We develop a model in which firms insure workers against firm-specific shocks, where more productive firms allocate more rents to shareholders, while less productive firms endogenously exit. Increasing firm-level risk delays exit and increases the measure of mega-firms, which raises the aggregate capital share while lowering the average firm's capital share. An increase in the level of rents quantitatively magnifies this effect. We present evidence supporting this mechanism.
Published: BARNEY HARTMAN‐GLASER & HANNO LUSTIG & MINDY Z. XIAOLAN, 2019. "Capital Share Dynamics When Firms Insure Workers," The Journal of Finance, vol 74(4), pages 1707-1751.