NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Cuicui Chen

Building 25 Room 257A
SUNY Albany
Albany, NY 12222

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Institutional Affiliation: SUNY Albany

NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2016Collective Action in an Asymmetric World
with Richard J. Zeckhauser: w22240
A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly challenging because of the strong asymmetries among nations. We identify a solution, the Cheap-Riding Efficient Equilibrium, that defines the relative contributions of players in differing size (or preference intensity) to reflect cheap riding incentives, yet still achieves Pareto optimality. Players start by establishing the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium as a base point. From that point they apply either the principles of the Nash Bargaining Solution or the Lindahl Equilibrium to proceed to the Pareto fr...

Published: Cuicui Chen & Richard Zeckhauser, 2018. "Collective Action in an Asymmetric World," Journal of Public Economics, . citation courtesy of

 
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