Online Appendix for

"Belief Disagreement and Portfolio Choice"

by

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A.1 Political Contributions Data

We construct a measure of likely political party affiliation using publicly available campaign finance data from the Federal Election Commission. We consider individual contributions to party committees, campaign committees, and political action committees during the 2015-2016 election cycle and aggregate to the zip code level to calculate the zip code Republican share of donations.

Individual contributions. We use donations from the FEC individual contributions file and limit the sample to contributions of individuals with a valid zip code on record. We impose a standard filter to select actual contribution transactions (transaction types 10, 11, 15, 15E, 21Y, and 22Y) and impose transaction amounts for refunds (types 21Y and 22Y) to be negative.

Party committees. We consider individual contributions to the main party and candidate committees by selecting committees with at least \$20 million in contributions, supporting a party or presidential nominee. The restriction to more than \$20 million in contributions yields a set of 32 committees for a total of \$2.3 billion in individual contributions from 7.8 million transactions. Further restricting the list of committees to those not related to a senator or losing presidential primary candidate leaves 21 committees. Appendix Table A.1 provides an overview of the selected and discarded committees with more than \$20 million in contributions by individuals. The resulting individual contributions sample includes 1.0 million distinct donors with a total of \$1.8 billion in contributions. Of those donors, 672 thousand contribute to the Democratic party or candidate, 340 thousand contribute to the Republican party or candidate, and two thousand to both.

Republican contribution share. We select zip codes with at least 10 donors and construct the zip code Republican contribution share as the number of donors to the Republican party or candidate divided by the number of donors to either party. For robustness checks, we consider two alternative measures of likely party affiliations. First, we also construct the dollar-weighted version of the zip code Republican contribution share. Second, we calculate the county-level Republican vote share as the number of votes for the Republican candidate Donald J. Trump divided by the number of votes for either Trump or the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. Aggregating donations from zip codes to counties, the correlation between the Republican contribution share and the Republican vote share across counties is 0.68 (see Figure A.3). For the dollar-weighted contribution share aggregated to the county level, the correlation with the Republican vote share is 0.51.

Likely party affiliations in sample. Appendix Figure A.5a plots the distribution of likely political affiliations measured by the zip code Republican contribution share in our sample of RIs. Appendix Figure A.5b plots the distribution of county vote shares in the sample and population. Republican shares measured by donations are typically lower than Republican shares measured by votes. Relative to the population, our sample is tilted towards Democrats.

A.2 Household Portfolios Data

Asset classes. Investor portfolios consist of positions in funds, individual securities, and annuities. For some holdings (e.g. some annuities), we do not observe sufficient detail to categorize holdings. Average holdings in these assets are less than 1.3% of total (investable) assets. For 92% of all remaining assets in investor portfolios we observe the CUSIP, and for the other 13% we observe basic characteristics of the fund the wealth is invested in. We assign holdings to four different asset classes based on product descriptions: equity, long-term bonds, short-term bonds, and alternative assets. Equity holdings consist of pure equity funds, directly held equity, and the equity portion of funds that invest across asset classes. The bond category includes bond funds, individual government and corporate bonds, and the portion of funds that invest across asset classes that is not allocated to equity. The cash and cash-like securities category is composed of cash and money market mutual funds. Alternative assets include real estate (REITs), precious metals, and royalty funds.

We split mixed-assets funds, such as lifecycle funds, into equity and long-term bond holdings based on fund equity shares. We use quarterly data on fund asset compositions from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database if available, and complement this with internally available quarterly target equity shares on other mixed-asset funds. **International exposure.** To characterize international equity exposures in investor portfolios, we divide equity holdings into a domestic and an international component. Pure equity funds are characterized as either domestic or international based on internal product descriptions. We consider the equity portion of mixed-asset funds to be a domestic equity investment. For individual securities, we set the location to international if it is a foreign security (i.e., has a foreign ISIN) or if the company is incorporated outside of the US according to Compustat, and to domestic otherwise. We define the international share of equity as the ratio of international equity to total portfolio equity holdings.

Sector exposures. Investors can explicitly load on industries by investing in sector funds or by holding individual equities. We identify sector funds as funds that have a sector index as Morningstar benchmark. These sector indices are defined based on 11 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors: energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financials, information technology, telecommunication services, utilities, and real estate. For individual securities, we assign GICS industry codes to stocks by linking them to Compustat and CRSP data. If a stock can be linked to a Compustat record, we use the Compustat GICS sector code. If no Compustat record is available, we use the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code from CRSP and get the corresponding GICS code from a crosswalk table.³⁹

Returns. We link observed portfolio holdings at the CUSIP level to external data on realized returns from CRSP stock, treasury, and mutual fund return files, as well as WRDS corporate bond returns. When we do not observe an asset's return in external data, we use internal data to compute realized returns.

Market betas. To calculate CAPM market betas, we use all available return data from 2006 to 2019. We estimate betas from monthly regressions of excess asset returns on excess market returns. We assign a market beta to funds and securities that have at least 24 monthly return observations. We use public return data on funds and securities if available, and otherwise use returns computed from internal data.

³⁹We use the concordance from NAICS to GICS provided by Alison Weingarden available (July 2018) at sites.google.com/site/alisonweingarden/links/industries.

A.3 Additional Results

A.3.1 Sample Selection

Due to the size of the dataset with millions of investors and trillions in assets, our coefficients of interest are precisely estimated, even when we restrict our analysis to the sample of Retirement Investors (RIs) for whom we observe complete information on the full set of controls. However, since our final regression sample is selected on several dimensions, this raises the question of whether our point estimates extend to the full dataset or whether they are affected by the type of investors that are included in the regressions.

To address this question, we construct a non-selected and unbalanced sample by drawing a random sample of one million households that are between the ages of 25 and 84 and have positive asset holdings on October 31, 2015. As in the main dataset, we track the portfolios of these households over the year prior to the election and the year following the election.

We estimate equation (3) of annual changes in price-constant equity shares on zip code political affiliation for various subsamples of this new random sample. As a basic set of controls, we include the lagged equity share, age, log wealth, and the lagged winning and losing sectors share of equity – these are the controls that are available for the full sample. We ask whether our main results are affected by the two key selection criteria for our baseline regression sample: (i) RIs of working age (25–64), for whom (ii) we observe complete observations on the control variables.

Table A.10 reports the estimated coefficients for various subsamples. We find that effect on political affiliation is robust to alternative and less restrictive samples. We report coefficients for the full sample, as well as subsamples restricted to age below 65 (88% of the full sample), the RI sample (70%), and the RI sample with observations of gender and marital status (57%), employer (47%), industry (46%), income over 2015–2017 (29%), and all controls (21%), respectively. In fact, we find that the point estimate is lowest under the baseline and most restrictive criteria: RI investors with complete observations on all control variables.

A.3.2 Zip-Code-Level Regressions

In our main analysis, we relate household portfolios to political affiliations that are measured at the zip code level, with individual-level controls to maximize the precision of our estimates. Since we are working off between-zip-code-level variation in political affiliations, we can only hope to explain between-zip-code variation in portfolios. As reported in Table 3 and later tables, political affiliation does not explain a large share of the overall variation in household portfolio changes over time. But neither do the other investor characteristics that we observe.

To examine the explained variation across zip codes and as a robustness check, we run a purely zip-code-level regression. We average individual portfolios and characteristics by zip code, and

estimate the following specification:

$$\Delta P_z = \beta R_z + \theta' X_z + \eta_z,\tag{7}$$

where variables observed at the individual level are averaged by zip code *z*. We weight zip codes by the number of individuals in our sample and estimate this regression on post-election annual changes. Note that this is a purely cross-sectional regression, so that we can immediately see how much of the post-election portfolio reallocation is explained by political orientation and by the control variables.

Table A.11 report the estimated coefficients for the post-election year. We uncover the same relation between portfolio changes and the zip code Republican contribution share as in householdlevel regressions. Between zip codes, political affiliation explains 3.5% of the variation in equity shares.⁴⁰ Due to strong mean reversion in portfolios, the average initial equity share explains 5.6% of the variation in equity share changes. All other demographic variables, such as age, financial wealth, and income, explain less of the post-election variation in portfolio changes across zip codes than political affiliation.

A.3.3 Education Controls

One limitation of the investor dataset is that we do not observe information on education. Since political affiliations may be correlated with education and investors with different educational attainment may face different wealth effects or hedging needs in response to the election outcome, education is a potential omitted variable. We therefore run a robustness check where we control for zip-code-level education measures from the 2015 American Community Survey in our baseline regression. We collect the share of the population without a high school diploma, the share of high school graduates, and the share of people with a college degree by zip code.

In Table A.12, we repeat the main regression of changes in price-constant equity shares on likely political affiliation with these additional zip-level controls for educational attainment. We pick having a high school diploma as the baseline and control for the share of people in the zip code without a high school diploma and the share of people with a college degree. Since the results are very similar to Table 3, our main findings are robust to including controls for education.

A.3.4 Instrumental Variables Approach

Political affiliation is not exogenously assigned and can be driven by whether a particular candidate and the candidate's policies financially benefit the voter personally more than the other

⁴⁰At the individual level, the share of explained variation is approximately zero due to idiosyncratic variation in individual portfolios.

party's candidate. Even after including detailed controls for households' economic exposures and hedging demands, it is therefore possible that we still pick up some residual responses of investors to direct financial effects of the change in governance.

As an alternative to controlling for observable heterogeneity, we consider an instrumental variables (IV) approach to address potential endogeneity, where we estimate our main regression specification by instrumenting for political affiliation. It is well known that after controlling for other observables like age, income, and education, average political affiliations differ by race. The explanation for these differences is more likely historical or due to non-economic issues so they are less likely to be driven by voters choosing a party based on who will help their financial situation. Since the investor dataset does not contain information on race, we collect data on the racial composition of zip codes from the American Community Survey. We use this composition to construct instrumental variables for political affiliation. As instruments, we use the zip code population shares of white, black, and Asian individuals, and the share of the population of Hispanic or Latino origin. Indeed, the first stage is highly significant, both under the baseline controls and with additional fixed effects.

Table A.13 reports the results when we instrument the zip code Republican contribution share by these zip code demographic variables. Without employer controls, we find effects with a very similar magnitude as our baseline estimates. With employer or employer–county fixed effects (by period), we even find larger point estimates that are still highly statistically significant.

A.3.5 Change in Equity Share Relative to Initial Share

In the frictionless Merton (1969) model with agents that have constant relative risk aversion preferences, the optimal portfolio share is the myopic allocation that scales by the expected excess return on the market. In that case, a change in expected returns would lead to a proportional change in the equity share.

To study relative changes in equity shares, we run a version of the main regression where the outcome variable is the log equity share (excluding the roughly 5% of households with zero equity share). The coefficient then directly gives the change in equity share as a percentage of the initial equity share. Table A.14 reports the estimated coefficients, comparing the sample of all households to the sample of active traders in the prior year. In the version with employer–county–year fixed effects, we find that Republicans increase their equity share by 1.4% more than Democrats, while for active traders the increase in equity share for Republicans is 4.8% more than for Democrats as a fraction of the initial equity share. Hence, we derive similar conclusions when looking at proportional changes across households.

A.3.6 Tails of Political Affiliation Measure

In our analysis, political affiliation is inferred probabilistically from party affiliations at the zip code level. Should we expect to find similar effect sizes if we had individual-level party affiliations? We provide suggestive evidence by measuring effects in the subsample of households that live in zip codes with a strong affiliation to either political party. For these zip codes, the measurement error of individual political affiliations is substantially smaller.

Table A.15 shows the results when we estimate the regression of annual portfolio changes on political orientation for households that live in zip codes with a pronounced political affiliation: zip codes that have a Republican contribution share below 35% or above 65%. We measure effects for this subsample that are very similar to those for the full sample. We would therefore expect to find that our estimated regression coefficients apply to individual-level affiliation data.




Figure A.1: Probability of Party Winning the 2016 Presidential Election

Notes: This figure plots the betting market-implied probabilities of a Democratic versus a Republican win over time. It shows the prices of two contracts traded on UK-based betting exchange Betfair, obtained through PredictWise, that pay \$1 conditional on the respective party winning the election.





Figure A.2: Map of Republican Contribution Share

Notes: This figure shows the geographical distribution of the Republican contribution share over the 2015-2016 election cycle. The Republican contribution share is defined as the number of individuals with campaign donations to the main Republican party and candidate committees as a fraction of the total number of individuals with campaign donations to the main committees of either party. We aggregate zip-level donations to the county level for geographical illustration and include locations with at least 10 donors.

Figure A.3: Republican Contribution Share Versus Republican Vote Share by County



Notes: This figure plots the county-level Republican contribution share against the Republican vote share of the county. The county-level Republican contribution share is obtained by aggregating zip-code-level donations by county. The size of the point reflects the number of households that live in that county.




Figure A.4: Age Distribution in Comparison to SCF

Notes: This figure plots the age distribution in our sample compared to the equivalent sample of RIs in the public version of the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We select households with quasi-liquid retirement wealth and run quantile regressions of log retirement wealth on a second-order polynomial in age for households in the 2016 SCF. We use the fitted 10th and 90th percentiles by age as retirement wealth cutoffs in both datasets. We include households with age of the head between 25 and 64 and filter our sample on households that have portfolio holdings between 20% and 500% of initial assets in every month in the sample.






Figure A.5: Distribution of Likely Political Affiliation Measures

(a) Republican Contribution Share


(b) Republican Vote Share




Notes: These graphs plot the distribution of the zip code Republican contribution share and the county Republican vote share, respectively. Panel (a) plots the distribution of the zip code Republican contribution share, defined as the number of individuals with campaign donations to the main Republican party and candidate committees as a fraction of the total number of individuals with campaign donations to the main committees of either party, in our RI sample. We include zip codes with at least 10 donors. Panel (b) plots the county Republican vote share, defined as the number of votes for Republican candidate Donald J. Trump divided by the total number of votes for Trump and for the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, in the population and in our RI sample.




(a) Bond Share (Equally Weighted Across Households)




(b) Cash Share (Equally Weighted Across Households)





Notes: These graphs plot the average bond share and cash share, respectively, of household portfolio assets in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, relative to the share by the end of October 2016. The sample is our full set of RI households. Average shares by group are equally weighted across households.






(a) Bond Share (Value Weighted Across Households)







Notes: These graphs plot the average bond share and cash share, respectively, of household portfolio assets in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, relative to the share by the end of October 2016. The sample is our full set of RI households. Average shares by group are asset weighted across households.

Figure A.8: Portfolio Shares by Zip Code Party Affiliation for Previously Active Sample




(a) Bond Share (Equally Weighted Across Households)






Notes: These graphs plot the average bond share and cash share, respectively, of household portfolio assets in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, relative to the share by the end of October 2016. The sample is the subset of RI households with an active portfolio reallocation in the prior year (11.1% of all RIs). Average shares by group are equally weighted across households.

Figure A.9: Price-Constant Portfolio Shares by Zip Code Party Affiliation




(a) Bond Share of Price-Constant Portfolios

(b) Cash Share of Price-Constant Portfolios




Notes: These graphs plot the average bond share and cash share, respectively, of hypothetical price-constant household portfolios in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, relative to the share by the end of October 2016. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The sample is our full set of RI households. Average shares by group are equally weighted across households.

Figure A.10: Cumulative Excess Flows into Equity by Zip Code Party Affiliation





Notes: This figure plots cumulative excess flows into equity in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, starting from October 31, 2015. Excess flows are scaled by initial assets, and are defined as net equity flows minus the equity share from the previous month multiplied by total portfolio net flows. The sample is our full set of RI households. Average flow rates by group are equally weighted across households.






(a) Excess Bond Trades






Notes: These graphs plot cumulative excess flows into bonds and cash, respectively, in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, starting from October 31, 2015. Excess flows are scaled by initial assets, and are defined as net flows in the asset class minus the asset class share from the previous month multiplied by total portfolio net flows. The sample is our full set of RI households. Average flow rates by group are equally weighted across households.

Figure A.12: Portfolio Equity Share by Zip Code Party Affiliation for 2012 Election




(a) Equity Share

(b) Equity Share of Price-Constant Portfolios




Notes: These graphs plot the average equity share of realized household portfolios and of hypothetical price-constant portfolios, respectively, in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions for the 2012 presidential election, relative to the share by the end of October 2012. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The sample is the full set of RI households using our same procedure applied to the 2012 election. Average equity shares are equally weighted across households.

Figure A.13: Decomposition of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes by Zip Code Party Affiliation




(a) Average Change in Equity Share by Maximum Size of Change

(b) Cumulative Difference in Equity Share of Republicans Versus Democrats by Type of Adjustment




Notes: The graph in panel (a) breaks down changes in the equity share of hypothetical price-constant household portfolios over the year following the election, for five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions. We plot average changes in equity shares, only including changes that are smaller than k%, as a function of k. Changes bigger than k% are set to zero. In panel (b) we plot the average cumulative change in the equity share of price-constant portfolios after the election for households in zip codes with a Republican contribution share of at least 65% relative to the average cumulative change for households in zip codes with a Republican contribution share of at least 10% relative to the share at the end of October 2016 (and sets the change to zero otherwise), and the dashed line includes only the first change of at least 10% since October 2016. Price-constant equity shares are calculated for hypothetical portfolios that are insensitive to passive appreciations and are driven by trading only. The sample is our full set of RI households. Average shares by group are equally weighted across households.

Figure A.14: Trading Activity in US Markets



(a) US Equity Market Volume


(b) US ETF Market Volume




Notes: This figure plots total trading volume on US markets. The upper panel plots total US equity market volume. The lower panel plots the narrower ETF market volume. The data is sourced from the CBOE.

Figure A.15: Survey Evidence on Expenditures


(a) Conditions for Buying Major Household Items




(b) Conditions for Buying a House




Notes: These graphs plot survey evidence on spending behavior by political affiliation. The data is from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Confidence (SCC). The upper panel shows the average response to the question "Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or a bad time for people to buy major household items?" The lower panel shows the response to the same question on buying a house.





(a) Share of Equity in Winning Sectors

(b) Share of Equity in Losing Sectors



Notes: These graphs plot the average price-constant shares of household equity in winning and losing sectors, respectively, in five groups by zip code party affiliation measured from political contributions, relative to the share by the end of October 2016. The price-constant portfolio measures are calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. Winning (losing) sectors are sectors that did relatively well (poorly) between the election and the end of 2016. The sample is our full set of households. Averages by group are equally weighted across households.

A. Included committees	
Name	Amount (in USD)
HILLARY VICTORY FUND	418,127,519
HILLARY FOR AMERICA	281,412,789
PRIORITIES USA ACTION	151,702,351
TRUMP VICTORY	106,907,122
NEXTGEN CLIMATE ACTION COMMITTEE	90,834,927
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE	89,493,374
DSCC	74,197,205
SENATE LEADERSHIP FUND	74,165,450
DCCC	73,561,758
TRUMP MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN COMMITTEE	68,604,341
SENATE MAJORITY PAC	58,688,399
HILLARY ACTION FUND	45,522,557
NRSC	44,563,979
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP FUND	44,138,600
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC.	43,918,500
DNC SERVICES CORP./DEM. NAT'L COMMITTEE	41,855,861
HOUSE MAJORITY PAC	36,078,425
FUTURE45	24,555,649
REBUILDING AMERICA NOW	23,071,271
NRCC	22,773,247
MAKE AMERICA NUMBER 1	20,126,000
B. Excluded committees	

Table A.1: F	arty Committees
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Name	Amount (in USD)
RIGHT TO RISE USA	91,047,726
BERNIE 2016	73,961,700
TEAM RYAN	53,432,005
CRUZ FOR PRESIDENT	47,481,222
CONSERVATIVE SOLUTIONS PAC	46,066,194
JEB 2016, INC.	31,080,894
MARCO RUBIO FOR PRESIDENT	30,833,321
VAN HOLLEN FOR SENATE	25,652,235
CARSON AMERICA	24,901,494
INDEPENDENCE USA PAC	21,665,124
UNINTIMIDATED PAC INC	20,717,593

Notes: This table lists all 32 campaign committees with at least \$20 million in contributions during the 2015–2016 election cycle from individuals with a valid zip code on record. To construct our Republican contribution share measure for the 2016 presidential election at the zip code level, we include the subset of 21 committees that support a party or presidential nominee and exclude committees that are related to a senator or losing presidential primary candidate.

			Equity	share (in 🤅	%), all hou	seholds		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.221	0.031	0.043	0.030	0.091	0.041	0.236	0.209
\times Pre 3 quarters	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.057
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.277	0.166	0.179	0.176	0.113	0.087	0.171	0.183
imes Pre 2 quarters	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.116	0.056	0.071	0.026	0.071	0.080	0.127	0.124
\times Pre 1 quarter	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.035
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.361	0.397	0.392	0.365	0.358	0.384	0.334	0.297
\times Post 1 quarter	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.043
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.550	0.619	0.612	0.546	0.575	0.587	0.554	0.50
\times Post 2 quarters	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.052
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.460	0.602	0.603	0.594	0.621	0.570	0.623	0.540
\times Post 3 quarters	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.058
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.397	0.695	0.709	0.725	0.702	0.599	0.671	0.622
\times Post 4 quarters	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.065
Household fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls by quarter								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2016-17			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2015-17			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y		
County							Y	
Employer \times County								Y
R^2	0.924	0.928	0.980	0.928	0.930	0.928	0.928	0.93

Table A.2: Regressions of Equity Share on Likely Political Affiliation

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of quarterly household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, interacted by quarterly dummies, for various sets of controls. We report the full set of results for the three quarters prior to the election and the four quarters following the election, relative to allocations just before the election. The baseline controls are the initial equity share, age, gender, marital status, log initial financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the initial winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by quarterly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample is our full set of RI households between October 2015 and October 2017, for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

		Price	e-constant	equity sha	are (in %),	all houseł	nolds	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.203	0.151	0.153	0.090	0.095	0.133	0.272	0.220
\times Pre 3 quarters	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.055
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.209	0.155	0.158	0.122	0.097	0.138	0.208	0.190
imes Pre 2 quarters	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.046
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.137	0.112	0.113	0.091	0.079	0.106	0.129	0.136
\times Pre 1 quarter	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.034
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.348	0.375	0.374	0.404	0.389	0.340	0.284	0.302
\times Post 1 quarter	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.042
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.622	0.681	0.672	0.658	0.639	0.612	0.553	0.52
\times Post 2 quarters	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.05
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.661	0.742	0.735	0.707	0.700	0.671	0.638	0.56
\times Post 3 quarters	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.05
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.728	0.855	0.850	0.816	0.808	0.779	0.764	0.693
\times Post 4 quarters	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.06
Household fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls by quarter								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2016-17			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2015-17			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y		
County							Y	
Employer \times County								Y
R^2	0.927	0.929	0.929	0.930	0.930	0.929	0.930	0.93

Table A.3: Regressio	ons of Price-Constar	t Equity Share or	on Likely Political Affiliation

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of quarterly price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, interacted by quarterly dummies, for various sets of controls. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. We report the full set of results for the three quarters prior to the election and the four quarters following the election, relative to allocations just before the election. The baseline controls are the initial equity share, age, gender, marital status, log initial financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the initial winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by quarterly indicators. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by a full set of quarterly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer × county indicators. The sample is our full set of RI households between October 2015 and October 2017, for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

		One-ye	ar differen	ce in equit	y share (in	%), all hou	useholds	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.367	-0.104	-0.119	-0.041	-0.129	-0.212	-0.093	-0.166
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.039)	(0.061)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	0.764	0.803	0.829	0.802	0.736	0.868	0.824	0.795
	(0.077)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.089)	(0.060)	(0.091)
Lagged equity share		-12.025	-12.025	-12.123	-12.040	-12.080	-12.313	-12.304
		(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Lagged equity share \times Post		-4.800	-4.803	-4.751	-4.795	-4.720	-4.682	-4.693
		(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.092)
Age		-0.147	-0.147	-0.146	-0.147	-0.147	-0.143	-0.143
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Age \times Post$		-0.039	-0.038	-0.040	-0.040	-0.039	-0.044	-0.045
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female		0.148	0.150	0.113	0.141	0.139	0.093	0.096
Female \times Post		(0.013) -0.373	(0.013) -0.366	(0.014)	(0.013) -0.367	(0.013) -0.383	(0.014)	(0.016) -0.368
remale × rost		(0.020)	(0.020)	-0.421 (0.021)	(0.020)	-0.383	-0.375 (0.021)	(0.024)
Married		0.055	0.055	0.049	0.062	0.020)	0.055	0.024)
Wallieu		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.049)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Married \times Post		0.091	0.092	0.089	0.078	0.078	0.089	0.093
Mullicu / 1000		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Log wealth		-0.074	-0.076	-0.083	-0.077	-0.077	-0.110	-0.113
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Log wealth \times Post		0.554	0.555	0.558	0.554	0.551	0.602	0.601
0		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Log labor income 2015		0.088	0.083	0.107	0.107	0.117	0.132	0.133
-		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Log labor income $2015 \times Post$		0.266	0.279	0.172	0.267	0.231	0.087	0.050
		(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Controls by year								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2016-17			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2015-17			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y		
County							Y	
Employer \times County								Y
R^2	0.012	0.099	0.100	0.101	0.100	0.101	0.121	0.227

Table A.4: Regressions of Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample is our full set of RI households between October 2015 and October 2017, for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

Table A.5: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity	Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation for
Alternative Political Affiliation Measures	

A. Donation measures	One-year difference in price-constant equity share (in %)						
	Zip donations (nbr)	Zip donations (amt)	County donations (nbr)	County donations (amt)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Republican share	-0.073 (0.043)	-0.072 (0.032)	0.054 (0.061)	-0.020 (0.048)			
Republican share \times Post	0.857 (0.068)	0.374 (0.049)	0.707 (0.096)	0.424 (0.076)			
Controls by year							
Baseline Employer × State	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y			
<i>R</i> ²	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108			
B. Voting measures	One-		e in price-cor are (in %)	nstant			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
County Republican vote share 2016	0.059 (0.057)						
County Republican vote share 2016 \times Post	0.776 (0.091)						
County Republican vote share 2012 County Republican vote share $2012 \times Post$		0.063 (0.065) 0.912		0.058 (0.069) 0.933			
County Republican vote share 2012 × 10st		(0.103)	0.116	(0.109) 0.066			
County Republican vote share 2016-2012 \times Post			(0.219) 0.539 (0.346)	(0.232) -0.279 (0.365)			
Controls by year Baseline	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Employer \times State	Y	Y	Y	Y			

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code or county Republican share, before and after the election, for various measures of party affiliations: the zip code share of contributions in numbers (1) and in dollars (2), the corresponding contribution measures at the county level (3–4), and the county shares of votes in 2016, 2012, or the difference between 2016 and 2012 (5–8). The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. In addition, we control for employer × state × period fixed effects. The sample is our full set of RI households between October 2015 and October 2017, for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

0.108

0.108

0.108

0.108

 R^2

			One-year o 201		in equity sl all househ		,	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.041	0.237	0.223	0.278	0.062	0.029	0.086	0.099
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	-0.603	-0.436	-0.381	-0.264	0.084	-0.208	-0.084	0.014
	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Lagged equity share		-11.537	-11.545	-11.679	-12.105	-11.558	-11.582	-12.165
		(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.069
Lagged equity share $ imes$ Post		-2.966	-2.967	-2.878	-2.741	-2.942	-2.960	-2.787
		(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.097
Age		-0.102	-0.102	-0.098	-0.098	-0.103	-0.103	-0.098
0		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001
Age imes Post		-0.019	-0.018	-0.024	-0.025	-0.018	-0.017	-0.026
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002
Female		-0.056	-0.053	0.044	-0.003	-0.045	-0.047	0.001
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019
Female $ imes$ Post		-0.292	-0.298	-0.312	-0.247	-0.299	-0.333	-0.276
remare × 1 65t		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.029
Married		0.108	0.101	0.073	0.054	0.119	0.118	0.035
Warried		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020
Married \times Post		-0.112	-0.107	-0.043	-0.010	-0.130	-0.128	0.004
Warneu × rost								
r 1.1		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031
Log wealth		0.208	0.207	0.168	0.106	0.205	0.203	0.092
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010
Log wealth \times Post		0.159	0.158	0.210	0.301	0.155	0.149	0.296
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016
Log labor income 2011		0.134	0.154	0.107	0.107	0.159	0.135	0.108
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022
Log labor income 2011 $ imes$ Post		0.293	0.257	0.437	0.374	0.250	0.209	0.323
		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.034
Controls by year								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2012-13			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2011-13			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State					-	Y		
County						-	Y	
Employer \times County							-	Y
Employer × County								1
R^2	0.021	0.100	0.101	0.103	0.131	0.101	0.104	0.229

Table A.6: Regressions of Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation for 2012 Election Cycle

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in household portfolio equity shares around the 2012 election on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2011, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2006–2011), interacted by annual indicators. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2012–2013) and house price growth (2011–2013), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample is the full set of RI households between October 2011 and October 2013, constructed using our same procedure four years earlier, for which we observe the complete set of controls (26.6% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

Table A.7: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation for 2012 Election Cycle

		One-ye	ar differen 201	ce in price 2 election,			re (in %),	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.390	0.002	-0.005	0.065	0.055	-0.017	0.061	0.109
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.061)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	0.005	0.013	0.032	0.110	0.123	0.043	0.058	0.010
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.092)
Lagged equity share		-10.507	-10.511	-10.605	-10.962	-10.526	-10.569	-11.032
		(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.068)
Lagged equity share $ imes$ Post		-2.672	-2.684	-2.710	-2.681	-2.672	-2.682	-2.692
		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.078)
Age		-0.090	-0.099	-0.098	-0.098	-0.099	-0.099	-0.098
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age \times Post		-0.016	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016	-0.016	-0.015	-0.016
Female		(0.002) 0.080	(0.002) 0.082	(0.002) 0.043	(0.002) 0.012	(0.002) 0.078	(0.002) 0.062	(0.002) 0.018
remaie		(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.043)	(0.012)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.018)
Female \times Post		-0.342	-0.342	-0.332	-0.332	-0.344	-0.362	-0.357
Tentale × 1 Ost		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Married		0.031	0.028	0.022	0.016	0.040	0.037	0.004
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Married \times Post		0.042	0.037	0.036	0.037	0.034	0.034	0.040
		(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Log wealth		-0.155	-0.156	-0.167	-0.200	-0.160	-0.165	-0.205
0		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Log wealth \times Post		0.252	0.249	0.258	0.272	0.248	0.246	0.255
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Log labor income 2011		0.159	0.169	0.156	0.173	0.183	0.159	0.156
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Log labor income 2011 $ imes$ Post		0.394	0.395	0.397	0.392	0.375	0.347	0.356
		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Controls by year								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2012-13			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2011-13			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y		
County							Y	
Employer \times County								Y
R^2	0.001	0.069	0.069	0.070	0.081	0.069	0.070	0.183

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares around the 2012 election on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2011, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2006–2011), interacted by annual indicators. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2012–2013) and house price growth (2011–2013), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample is the full set of RI households between October 2011 and October 2013, constructed using our same procedure four years earlier, for which we observe the complete set of controls (26.6% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

Table A.8: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation for Active Investors (Alternative Definitions)

		One-year diffe	erence in price-co	onstant equity sl	hare (in %)	
_	All	TDF share < 50%	Contribution not default	Trade any past 5 years	Trade past year	Trade all past 3 years
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.160 (0.059)	-0.228 (0.103)	-0.170 (0.093)	-0.356 (0.134)	-0.350 (0.191)	-0.356 (0.320)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	0.859 (0.091)	1.366 (0.160)	1.173 (0.146)	1.500 (0.202)	1.617 (0.279)	1.404 (0.489)
Controls by year						
Baseline	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Employer \times County	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.189	0.233	0.220	0.272	0.322	0.386
Share of observations	100.0%	52.4%	55.3%	37.4%	23.8%	10.3%

	One-year difference in price-constant equity share (in %)									
	Trade in empl. acc. any past 5 years	Trade in empl. acc. past year	Trade in empl. acc. all past 3 years	Portfolio change any past 5 years	Portfolio change past year	Portfolio change all past 3 years				
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)				
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.258 (0.167)	-0.299 (0.266)	-0.407 (0.506)	-0.554 (0.200)	-0.533 (0.443)	-1.356 (1.848)				
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	1.432 (0.247)	1.627 (0.382)	1.850 (0.761)	1.765 (0.295)	1.850 (0.638)	4.046 (2.783)				
Controls by year										
Baseline Employer × County	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y				
R^2	0.294	0.367	0.469	0.313	0.417	0.589				
Share of observations	28.3%	15.3%	5.1%	24.2%	9.5%	1.7%				

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, in various subsamples of the population: households with less than 50% of assets in target date funds (TDFs, column 2), households with prior-year contributions that are not invested fully in either a TDF or a fixed-income fund (column 3), households with trading only in preceding years (columns 4–6), households with trading only in employer-linked accounts in preceding years (columns 7–9), and households with active portfolio reallocations in preceding years (columns 10–12). The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. In addition, we control for employer × county × period fixed effects. The sample period is October 2015 to October 2017, and we include RIs for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

				ce in price 1 active all				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-3.370	-2.025	-2.003	-1.182	-1.921	-1.954	-1.241	-1.614
	(0.365)	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.329)	(0.384)	(0.480)	(0.344)	(0.638)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	10.268	6.123	6.085	5.161	5.505	5.096	4.927	4.615
	(0.573)	(0.426)	(0.428)	(0.433)	(0.500)	(0.638)	(0.461)	(0.851)
Lagged equity share		-60.358	-60.359	-60.579	-60.433	-60.587	-61.168	-60.591
		(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.280)	(0.367)
Lagged equity share \times Post		-10.024	-10.000	-9.948	-9.965	-9.859	-9.388	-9.062
		(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.324)	(0.333)	(0.436)
Age		-0.486	-0.485	-0.487	-0.487	-0.487	-0.486	-0.474
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Age \times Post		0.011	0.014	0.009	0.011	0.012	0.007	-0.013
E-male		(0.010) 2.077	(0.010) 2.086	(0.010) 1.309	(0.010) 2.002	(0.010) 1.909	(0.010)	(0.013) 1.058
Female							1.061	
Female \times Post		(0.118) -2.692	(0.118) -2.689	(0.122) -1.927	(0.118) -2.622	(0.119) -2.502	(0.126) -1.624	(0.169) -1.404
Telliale × 1 OSt		(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.232)
Married		-0.381	-0.380	-0.335	-0.338	-0.334	-0.185	-0.094
Married		(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.181)
Married \times Post		0.889	0.884	0.788	0.841	0.817	0.621	0.447
		(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.187)	(0.246)
Log wealth		-0.939	-0.938	-0.819	-0.921	-0.898	-0.726	-0.755
		(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.086)
Log wealth \times Post		-0.531	-0.528	-0.656	-0.532	-0.563	-0.828	-0.693
0		(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.121)
Log labor income 2015		0.625	0.640	0.554	0.667	0.666	0.649	0.763
		(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.116)	(0.163)
Log labor income $2015 \times Post$		0.173	0.148	0.339	0.137	0.164	0.424	0.327
		(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.160)	(0.220)
Controls by year								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2016-17			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2015-17			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y		
County							Y	
Employer \times County								Y
R^2	0.023	0.346	0.347	0.349	0.347	0.353	0.391	0.563

Table A.9: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation Conditional on Active Rebalancing during the Year

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample is the subset of households with an active portfolio reallocation during the year, covering 9.3% of the full regression sample. The sample period is October 2015 to October 2017, and we include RIs for which we observe the complete set of controls. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

Table A.10: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation Across Samples

			One-y	ear difference	in equity sha	re (in %)		
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.078	0.041	-0.055	-0.040	-0.098	-0.082	-0.062	0.075
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.104)	(0.124)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	1.030	0.981	1.025	1.104	0.891	0.868	0.796	0.606
	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.161)	(0.193)
Lagged equity share	-7.563	-7.929	-8.979	-9.199	-10.114	-10.148	-10.263	-10.330
	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.167)	(0.198)
Lagged equity share \times Post	-1.766	-1.873	-1.975	-2.043	-2.965	-2.845	-3.436	-3.555
	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.247)	(0.292)
Age	-0.059	-0.069	-0.073	-0.075	-0.095	-0.096	-0.101	-0.104
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age \times Post	-0.018	-0.017	-0.018	-0.019	-0.018	-0.016	-0.024	-0.022
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Log wealth	0.046	0.080	0.020	0.041	-0.123	-0.121	-0.216	-0.242
-	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Log wealth \times Post	0.155	0.176	0.180	0.174	0.351	0.348	0.350	0.370
-	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Lagged winning sectors share of equity	-0.138	-0.332	-0.652	-0.663	-0.289	-0.303	0.030	-0.020
	(0.089)	(0.099)	(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.196)	(0.218)
Lagged winning sectors share of equity \times Post	0.076	0.021	0.084	0.182	-0.308	-0.323	-0.341	-0.248
	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.193)	(0.206)	(0.240)	(0.241)	(0.289)	(0.325)
Lagged losing sectors share of equity	-0.768	-0.986	-1.890	-1.775	-1.445	-1.401	-0.650	-0.657
	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.161)	(0.174)	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.296)	(0.344)
Lagged losing sectors share of equity \times Post	1.079	0.847	1.454	1.424	1.014	0.959	0.003	-0.097
	(0.157)	(0.174)	(0.249)	(0.266)	(0.354)	(0.356)	(0.462)	(0.523)
Sample	All	Age < 65	RI sample	RI sample,	RI sample,	RI sample,	RI sample,	RI sampl
•		0	-	observed	observed	observed	observed	observe
				gender &	employer	industry	income	complet
				marital			2015-17	controls
				status				
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.042	0.044	0.049	0.050	0.057	0.056	0.066	0.066
Share of observations	100.0%	88.3%	69.5%	57.3%	46.7%	45.9%	29.1%	21.3%

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, with a basic set of controls and for various subsamples of a non-selected and unbalanced sample. This new sample is constructed by drawing a random sample of one million households that are between the ages of 25 and 84 and have positive asset holdings on October 31, 2015. We report coefficients for the full sample, as well as subsamples restricted to age below 65, the RI sample, and the RI sample with observations of gender and marital status, employer, industry, income over 2015–2017, and all controls, respectively. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The sample period is October 2015 to October 2017. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

Table A.11: Zip-Code-Level Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Demographics

	One-year difference in average price-constant equity share (in %), post election, by zip code										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.724 (0.041)		0.574 (0.041)					0.718 (0.046)			
Lagged average equity share	()	-6.253 (0.289)	-5.529 (0.296)	-7.830 (0.344)	-5.653 (0.283)	-6.181 (0.285)	-6.432 (0.287)	-8.797 (0.351)			
Average age		· /	· /	-0.038 (0.004)	. ,	· · /	· · ·	-0.101 (0.006)			
Share female				(111)	-0.740 (0.079)			-0.139 (0.081)			
Share married					0.464 (0.090)			0.855 (0.109)			
Average log wealth					(0.07.0)	0.078 (0.021)		0.162			
Average log labor income 2015						(0.0-1)	0.202 (0.031)	0.104 (0.061)			
R^2	0.035	0.056	0.078	0.066	0.075	0.058	0.062	0.129			

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of the average annual post-election change in price-constant household portfolio equity shares by zip code on the zip code Republican contribution share, for various sets of controls. Variables observed at the individual level are averaged over RI households at the zip code level. We weight zip codes by the number of individuals in our sample and estimate the regression on post-election annual changes. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. We report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A.12: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation with Zip-Level Education Controls

	One-y	vear differe	ence in pri	ce-constar	nt equity s	hare (in %), all hous	eholds
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.225	-0.290	-0.298	-0.192	-0.256	-0.307	-0.175	-0.247
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.060)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	1.061	1.046	1.062	0.958	0.925	0.940	0.935	0.853
	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.064)	(0.094)
Zip code share no high school diploma		-0.955	-0.949	-1.072	-1.077	-0.918	-0.946	-0.768
		(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.156)	(0.172)	(0.135)	(0.177)
Zip code share no high school diploma \times Post		-0.816	-0.808	-0.564	-0.928	-0.802	-0.670	-0.627
		(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.206)	(0.227)	(0.262)	(0.211)	(0.281)
Zip code share college degree		-0.223	-0.239	-0.333	-0.384	-0.367	-0.409	-0.496
		(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.071)	(0.093)
Zip code share college degree $ imes$ Post		-0.031	-0.003	0.170	0.048	0.103	0.263	0.337
		(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.141)	(0.111)	(0.145)
Controls by year								
Baseline	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2016-17			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2015-17			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y		
County							Y	
Employer \times County								Y
<i>R</i> ²	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.068	0.067	0.068	0.080	0.189

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010-2015), interacted by annual indicators. Here, we also control for educational attainment by zip code: we set the base to having a high school diploma and control for the share of people in the zip code without a high school diploma and the share of people with a college degree from the American Community Survey. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer × county indicators. The sample is our full set of RI households between October 2015 and October 2017, for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

Table A.13: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political AffiliationInstrumented by Zip Code Demographic Composition

	One-year difference in price-constant equity share (in %), all households								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
Zip code Republican contribution share	0.025 (0.137)	0.042 (0.148)	0.350 (0.127)	-0.124 (0.095)	-0.334 (0.127)	0.165 (0.114)	-0.290 (0.138)		
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	0.815 (0.191)	0.760 (0.204)	0.645 (0.190)	(0.090) 1.277 (0.143)	1.690 (0.196)	1.020 (0.177)	(0.100) 1.606 (0.215)		
Zip code share no high school diploma	-0.593 (0.202)	-0.580 (0.206)	-0.450 (0.188)	-0.933 (0.183)	-0.941 (0.193)	-0.575 (0.176)	-0.804 (0.201)		
Zip code share no high school diploma \times Post	-1.082 (0.287)	-1.137 (0.290)	-0.923 (0.288)	-0.544 (0.267)	-0.174 (0.301)	-0.578 (0.277)	-0.006 (0.324)		
Zip code share college degree	0.003 (0.114)	0.021 (0.127)	0.034 (0.105)	-0.301 (0.094)	-0.378 (0.102)	-0.202 (0.093)	-0.513 (0.102)		
Zip code share college degree \times Post	-0.197 (0.162)	-0.235 (0.178)	-0.042 (0.159)	0.269 (0.140)	0.402 (0.156)	0.315 (0.146)	0.622 (0.161)		
Political affiliation instrumented	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Controls by year Baseline Labor income growth 2016-17	Y	Y Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Zip code house price growth 2015-17 Employer industry Employer		Y	Y	Y					
State County Employer × County					Y	Y	Y		
<i>R</i> ²	0.067	0.067	0.068	0.067	0.068	0.080	0.189		

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The zip code Republican contribution share is instrumented by the zip code population shares of white, black, and Asian individuals and the share of the population of Hispanic or Latino origin, from the American Community Survey. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. Here, we also control for educational attainment by zip code: we set the base to having a high school diploma and control for the share of people in the zip code without a high school diploma and the share of people with a college degree from the American Community Survey. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample is our full set of RI households between October 2015 and October 2017, for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs). Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

	One-year difference in price-constant log equity share (in %)									
	All	Active	All	Active	ve All	Active	All	Active		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.362 (0.113)	-0.984 (0.664)	-0.110 (0.155)	-0.993 (0.968)	0.032 (0.112)	-0.169 (0.713)	-0.020 (0.167)	-0.389 (1.334)		
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	2.034 (0.141)	6.613 (0.856)	1.403 (0.209)	5.744 (1.283)	1.731 (0.151)	5.177 (0.934)	1.356 (0.231)	4.803 (1.777)		
Controls by year										
Baseline	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
County Employer Employer × County			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
<i>R</i> ²	0.124	0.261	0.126	0.268	0.136	0.304	0.238	0.489		

Table A.14: Regressions of Price-Constant Log Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in the logarithm of price-constant household portfolio equity shares (conditional on positive) on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for the full sample and for the subsample of households with an active portfolio reallocation in the prior year, and for various sets of controls. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. In specifications (2)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include county indicators, employer indicators, and employer \times county indicators. The sample period is October 2015 to October 2017, and we include RIs for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs), 97.3% of which have strictly positive equity shares. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

			ar differen Republica					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Zip code Republican contribution share	-0.300	-0.247	-0.263	-0.134	-0.281	-0.401	-0.144	-0.341
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.086)	(0.048)	(0.094)
Zip code Republican contribution share \times Post	1.074	1.045	1.056	0.947	1.084	1.266	0.982	1.133
	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.125)	(0.075)	(0.140)
Lagged equity share		-10.346	-10.347	-10.455	-10.363	-10.414	-10.879	-10.856
		(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.100)
Lagged equity share \times Post		-3.616	-3.618	-3.586	-3.611	-3.597	-3.550	-3.512
		(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.127)
Age		-0.099	-0.099	-0.100	-0.099	-0.100	-0.102	-0.101
A set y Dest		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age \times Post		-0.022 (0.002)	-0.021 (0.002)	-0.022 (0.002)	-0.023 (0.002)	-0.022 (0.002)	-0.023 (0.002)	-0.023 (0.002)
Female		0.309	0.309	0.198	0.302	0.293	0.169	0.168
Telliale		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Female \times Post		-0.482	-0.476	-0.415	-0.474	-0.464	-0.394	-0.375
Tentale A Tost		(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Married		0.035	0.035	0.043	0.040	0.042	0.044	0.055
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Married \times Post		0.093	0.094	0.064	0.078	0.066	0.061	0.037
		(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Log wealth		-0.232	-0.233	-0.223	-0.232	-0.227	-0.212	-0.209
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Log wealth \times Post		0.236	0.236	0.224	0.236	0.227	0.217	0.212
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Log labor income 2015		0.077	0.071	0.104	0.084	0.097	0.131	0.133
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Log labor income $2015 \times Post$		0.224	0.231	0.185	0.221	0.203	0.128	0.093
		(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.038)
Controls by year								
Baseline		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Labor income growth 2016-17			Y					
Zip code house price growth 2015-17			Y					
Employer industry				Y				
Employer					Y			
State						Y	Y	
County							Ŷ	Y
Employer \times County								ĭ
R^2	0.001	0.065	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.067	0.084	0.217

Table A.15: Regressions of Price-Constant Equity Share Changes on Likely Political Affiliation for Likely Republicans or Democrats

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients of annual changes in price-constant household portfolio equity shares on the zip code Republican contribution share, before and after the election, for various sets of controls. The sample consists of households that live in zip codes that have a Republican contribution share below 35% or above 65%. The price-constant equity share is calculated for a hypothetical portfolio that is insensitive to passive appreciations and is driven by trading only. The baseline controls are the lagged equity share, age, gender, marital status, log lagged financial wealth, log labor income in 2015, the lagged winning and losing sectors shares of equity, and zip code house price growth (2010–2015), interacted by annual indicators. In specifications (3)–(8) we consider additional sets of controls (interacted by yearly dummies) that include ex post income growth (2016–2017) and house price growth (2015–2017), employer industry indicators (3-digit NAICS), employer indicators, state indicators, county indicators, and employer × county indicators. The sample period is October 2015 to October 2017, and we include RIs for which we observe the complete set of controls (27.7% of all RIs), 50.7% of which live in zip codes in the tails of the measured political affiliation distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.