Market Design Working Group Meeting
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Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim, Michael Sinkinson, Peichun Wang
Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction -
Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal
Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation -
Jacob D. Leshno, Irene Y. Lo
The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice -
Esen Onur, David Reiffen, Lynn Riggs, Haoxiang Zhu
Mechanism Selection and Trade Formation on Swap Execution Facilities: Evidence from Index CDS -
Lawrence Ausubel, Christina Aperjis, Oleg V. Baranov
Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction -
Juan Camilo Castillo, Dan Knoepfle, Glen Weyl
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase -
Parag A. Pathak, Peng Shi
How Well Do Structural Demand Models Work? Counterfactual Predictions in School Choice -
Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Michael A. Rees, Paulo J. Somaini, Daniel C. Waldinger
An Empirical Framework for Sequential Assignments: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys -
Jean-François Houde, Terence R. Johnson, Molly Lipscomb, Laura A. Schechter
Using Market Mechanisms to Increase the Take-up of Improved Sanitation in Senegal -
Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christos Tzamos
Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue? -
Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, Yinghua He
Strategic `Mistakes': Implications for Market Design Research -
Albert "Pete" Kyle, Jeongmin Lee
Toward a Fully Continuous Exchange -
Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz
Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars -
Eric Budish, Robin S. Lee
Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Market Competition and Innovation -
Peter Cramton, Richard Geddes
Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-Time Road Pricing -
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
Information and Market Power -
Reshmaan N. Hussam, Natalia Rigol, Benjamin N. Roth
Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field -
Yusuke Narita
Experimental Design as Market Design: Billions of Dollars Worth of Treatment Assignments -
Haluk Ergin, Tayfun Sönmez, Utku Unver
Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange
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