Market Design Working Group Meeting
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Tayfun Sönmez, M. Bumin Yenmez
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations -
Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Machine Learning-Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions -
Joshua Angrist, Parag A. Pathak, Roman Zarate
Choice and Consequence: Assessing Mismatch at Chicago Exam Schools -
Mohammad Akbarpour, Julien Combe, Yinghua He, Victor Hiller, Robert Shimer, Olivier Tercieux
Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money -
Christina Aperjis, Lawrence Ausubel, Oleg V. Baranov
Supply Reduction in the Broadcast Incentive Auction -
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan, Assaf Romm
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements -
Daniel C. Waldinger
Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation -
Marek Pycia
Evaluating with Statistics: Which Outcome Measures Differentiate Among Matching Mechanisms? -
Amanda Y. Agan, Bo Cowgill, Laura K. Gee
Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study -
Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Yunan Ji, Neale Mahoney
Voluntary Regulation: Evidence from Medicare Payment Reform -
Nick Arnosti, Peng Shi
Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation -
Nicole Immorlica, Jacob D. Leshno, Irene Y. Lo, Brendan Lucier
Information Acquisition Costs in Matching Markets
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