The Trend is the Cycle: Job Polarization and Jobless Recoveries

Nir Jaimovich  
*Duke University* and NBER  
nj41@duke.edu

Henry E. Siu  
*University of British Columbia* and NBER  
hankman@mail.ubc.ca

July 6, 2012

Abstract

Job polarization refers to the recent disappearance of employment in occupations in the middle of the skill distribution. Jobless recoveries refers to the slow rebound in aggregate employment following recent recessions, despite recoveries in aggregate output. We show how these two phenomena are related. First, job polarization is not a gradual process; essentially all of the job loss in middle-skill occupations occurs in economic downturns. Second, jobless recoveries in the aggregate are due to jobless recoveries in the middle-skill occupations that are disappearing.
1 Introduction

In the past 30 years, the US labor market has seen the emergence of two new phenomena: “job polarization” and “jobless recoveries.” Job polarization refers to the increasing concentration of employment in the highest- and lowest-wage occupations, as job opportunities in middle-skill occupations disappear. Jobless recoveries refer to periods following recessions in which rebounds in aggregate output are accompanied by much slower recoveries in aggregate employment. We argue that these two phenomena are related.

Consider first the phenomenon of job polarization. Autor et al. (2003), Autor et al. (2006), Goos and Manning (2007), and Goos et al. (2009) (among others) document that, since the 1980s, employment is becoming increasingly concentrated at the tails of the occupational skill distribution. This hollowing out of the middle has been linked to the disappearance of jobs focused on “routine” tasks – those activities that can be performed by following a well-defined set of procedures. The literature demonstrates that job polarization is due to progress in technologies that substitute for labor in routine tasks.1

In this same time period, Gordon and Baily (1993), Groshen and Potter (2003), and Aaronson et al. (2004) (among others) document the emergence of jobless recoveries. In the past three recessions, aggregate employment continues to decline for years following the turning point in aggregate income and output. No consensus has yet emerged regarding the source of these jobless recoveries.

In this paper, we demonstrate that the two phenomena are connected to each other. We make two related claims. First, job polarization is not a gradual phenomenon: the loss of middle-skill, routine jobs is concentrated in economic downturns. Specifically, 92% of the job loss in these occupations since the mid-1980s occurs within a 12 month window of NBER dated recessions (that have all been characterized by jobless recoveries). In this sense, the job polarization “trend” is a business “cycle” phenomenon. This contrasts to the existing literature, in which job polarization is depicted as a gradual phenomenon, though a number of researchers have noted that this process has been accelerated by the Great Recession (see Autor (2010); and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011)). Our first point is that polarization happens almost entirely in recessions.

Our second point is that jobless recoveries are due to job polarization. This argument is based on three facts. First, employment in the routine occupations identified by Autor et al. (2003) and others account for a large fraction of aggregate employment; averaged over the jobless recovery era, these jobs account for more than 50% of total employment. Second, almost all of the contraction in aggregate employment during NBER dated recessions can be attributed

1See also Firpo et al. (2011), Goos et al. (2011), and the references therein regarding the role of outsourcing and offshoring in job polarization.
to recessions in these middle-skill, routine occupations. Third, jobless recoveries are observed only in these disappearing, middle-skill jobs. The high- and low-skill occupations to which employment is polarizing either do not experience contractions, or if they do, rebound soon after the turning point in aggregate output. Hence, jobless recoveries are due to the disappearance of routine occupations in recessions. Finally, it is important to note that jobless recoveries were not observed in routine occupations prior to the era of job polarization and jobless recoveries.

In Section 2, we present data on employment to document our two principal findings. In Section 3, we present a search-and-matching model of the labor market in which “routine-biased technological change” is a trend phenomenon. Nonetheless, job polarization is concentrated in downturns, and recoveries from these events are jobless. Section 4 concludes.

2 Labor Market Data

2.1 Jobless Recoveries

Figures 1 and 2 plot the cyclical behavior of aggregate per capita employment in the US during the past six recessions and subsequent recoveries.\(^2\) Aggregate per capita employment is that of all civilian non-institutionalized individuals aged 16 years and over (seasonally adjusted), normalized by the population, from July 1967 to December 2011.\(^3\) Because the monthly employment data are “noisy”, the data are logged and band pass filtered to remove fluctuations at frequencies higher than 18 months (business cycle fluctuations are traditionally defined as those between frequencies of 18 and 96 months). On the x-axis of each figure, the trough of the recession, as identified by the NBER, is indicated as date 0; we plot data for two years around the trough date. The shaded regions indicate the NBER peak-to-trough periods. Employment is normalized to zero at the trough of each recession. Hence, the y-axis measures the percent change in employment relative to its value in the trough.

Figure 1 displays the 1970, 1975, and 1982 recessions. In each case, aggregate employment begins to expand within six months of the trough. The fact that employment recovers within two quarters of the recovery in aggregate output and income is typical of the business cycle prior to the mid-1980s (see for instance, Schreft and Singh (2003); Groshen and Potter (2003)).

This contrasts sharply from the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions. As is obvious in Figure 2, these recoveries were jobless: despite expansions in other measures of economic activity (such as

---

\(^2\)The 1980 recession is omitted since it is followed by a recession in 1982, limiting our ability to study its recovery. Throughout the paper, recessions are addressed by their trough year, e.g., the recession that began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 is referred to as the 2009 recession.

\(^3\)Data are taken from the Labor Force Statistics of the CPS, downloaded from http://www.bls.gov/data/ on February 2, 2012. We have obtained employment data, at the aggregate and occupational level, going back to 1958. We are in the process of incorporating this data, allowing us to study the 1961 recession as well. See Appendix A for detailed description of all data sources.
Figure 1: Aggregate Employment around Early NBER Recessions

Figure 2: Aggregate Employment around Recent NBER Recessions

Table 1: Measures of Recovery following Early and Recent Recessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early</th>
<th>Recent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>months to turn around</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>months to trough level</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half-life (in months)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Output</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>months to turn around</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>months to trough level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half-life (in months)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; and James Stock and Mark Watson. See Appendix A for details.

RGDP and real gross domestic income) following the trough, aggregate per capita employment continued to contract for many months. In 1991, employment continues to fall for 18 months past the trough before turning around; employment does not reach its pre-recession level until five years later, in 1996. In 2001, employment falls for 23 months past the trough before turning around; it does not return to its pre-recession level before the subsequent recession. Following the Great Recession of 2009, employment again takes 23 months to begin recovery. Hence, the jobless recovery is a phenomenon characterizing recent recessions.

Table 1 summarizes these differences, presenting several measures of the speed of recovery following early and recent recessions. Panel A concerns the recoveries in aggregate per capita employment. The first row lists the number of months it takes for employment to turn around, relative to the NBER trough date. The second row indicates the number of months it takes for employment to return to its level at the NBER trough. The third row lists a “half-life” measure: the number of months it takes to regain half of the employment lost from the NBER peak to trough.

As is obvious, there has been a marked change in the nature of employment recoveries. Averaged over the three early recessions, employment turns around four months after the NBER trough date; in the recent recessions, the average turnaround time is 21 months. Averaged over the early recessions, employment returns to its trough level within 10 months. In the 1991 and 2001 recessions, this takes 31 and 55 months, respectively; employment has yet to return to the trough level since the 2009 recession. Finally, while it takes at most 27 months to regain half of the employment lost in the three early recessions, it takes at least 38 months in the recent
recessions; indeed, employment never regained half of its loss following the 2001 recession, and has yet to do so after the Great Recession.

This contrasts with the nature of recoveries in aggregate output. Panel B presents the same recovery measures for per capita RGDP; to obtain monthly measures, we use the data of Stock and Watson (see Appendix A for details). As is obvious, there has been no marked change in the speed of recovery for aggregate output across early and recent recessions.\(^4\) Averaged across the early recessions, it takes seven months for output to regain half of its recessionary loss; in the recent recessions, the average time taken is nine months, only slightly greater.\(^5\) The differences in the speed of recovery in employment following recent recessions – without corresponding differences in the recovery of output – characterize the jobless recovery phenomenon.

### 2.2 Job Polarization

The structure of employment has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. One of the most pervasive aspects of change has been within the skill distribution: employment has become polarized, with employment shifting away from middle-skill occupations towards both the high- and low-skill tails of the distribution (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and the references therein).

To see this, we disaggregate total employment by occupational groups. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we delineate occupations along two dimensions: “cognitive” versus “manual”, and “routine” versus “non-routine”. These delineations are based on the skill content of the tasks performed in the occupation. The distinction between cognitive and manual jobs is straightforward, characterized by differences in the extent of mental versus physical activity. The distinction between routine and non-routine jobs is based on the work of Autor et al. (2003). If the tasks involved can be summarized as a set of specific activities accomplished by following well-defined instructions and procedures, the occupation is considered routine. If instead the job requires flexibility, creativity, problem-solving, or human interaction skills, the occupation is non-routine.

In this delineation, non-routine cognitive occupations include managerial, professional and

---

\(^4\)See also Gali et al. (2012) who conclude that the speed of recovery in both output and employment has slowed in the last three recessions. Their conclusion, however, is based on the strength of the recoveries – measured by growth rates in the four (or eight) quarters following NBER troughs – as opposed to the speed. It is not surprising that the strength of the recent recoveries has been weak, relative to those of the 1970s and early 1980s. The 1991 and 2001 recessions were themselves weak. Hence, the subsequent weak recoveries, as measured by Gali et al. (2012), still implied fast recoveries of output lost during the recessions, and importantly, much faster than the recovery of lost employment. In addition, as is well known, the recovery following the Great Recession has been prolonged. But importantly, there has been a recovery of half of the recessionary output loss (again, see Table 1), while even at present, employment is still near its 2009 trough level.

\(^5\)Because the monthly RGDP estimates of Stock and Watson are “noisy,” the data are band pass filtered to remove fluctuations at frequencies higher than 18 months (as with the employment data) in producing the half-life statistics.
technical workers, such as surgeons, construction managers, financial analysts, computer programmers, and economists. Routine cognitive occupations are those in sales, and office and administrative support; examples include cashiers, bank tellers, travel agents, mail clerks, and data entry keyers. Routine manual occupations are “blue collar” jobs, such as machine operators, mechanics, dressmakers, fabricators and assemblers, cement masons, and meat processing workers. Non-routine manual occupations are service jobs, including janitors, gardeners, bartenders, and home health aides.\(^6\)

These classifications, not surprisingly, correspond to rankings in the occupational income distribution. Non-routine cognitive occupations tend to be high-skill occupations and non-routine manual occupations low-skilled. Routine occupations – both cognitive and manual – are middle-skilled occupations (see, for instance, Autor (2010); and Firpo et al. (2011)). Given this, we combine the routine cognitive and routine manual occupations into one, middle-skill group.\(^7\)

Figure 3 displays data relating to job polarization. We present data by decade, as is common in the literature (see, for instance, Autor (2010)). Each bar represents the percent change in an occupation group’s share of total employment. Over time, the share of employment in high-skill (non-routine cognitive) and low-skill (non-routine manual) jobs has been growing. This

\(^6\)Our matching of occupations to occupational groups follows that of Acemoglu and Autor (2011); see that paper and Cortes (2011) for further discussion. See Appendix A for details.

\(^7\)See Appendix B for the analogs of all of our figures with the routine occupations split into two groups.
has been accompanied by a hollowing out of the middle-skill, routine occupations. This process has accelerated in the past 10 years, as both routine cognitive and routine manual occupational groups have seen noticeable losses in employment share. Hence, there has been a polarization in employment away from routine, middle-skill jobs toward non-routine cognitive and manual jobs. In 1981, routine occupations accounted for 58% of total employment; in 2011, this share has fallen to 44%.

2.3 Occupational Employment: The Bigger Picture

In this subsection, we ask how the process of job polarization has unfolded over time. In particular, has it occurred gradually, or is polarization “bunched up” within certain time intervals? To investigate this, Figure 4 displays time series for per capita employment in the three occupational groups at a monthly frequency from July 1967 to December 2011.

As is obvious from the figure, both of the non-routine occupational groups are growing over time. Non-routine cognitive employment displays a 52 log point increase during this period. After declining from 1967 to 1972, non-routine manual employment displays a 26 log point increase. Recessions have temporarily halted these occupations’ growth – to varying extents – but have not abated the trends.\(^8\)

This stands in stark contrast to the routine occupational group. Relative to total population, routine employment has been falling. Employment has fallen 28 log points from the local peak in 1990 to present. Given that these occupations occupy the middle of the income distribution, this represents the polarization towards the low- and high-skill tails.

What is equally evident in Figure 4 is that job polarization has not occurred steadily during the past 30 years. These data make clear that the decline in routine occupations is concentrated in economic downturns. This occurred in essentially three steps. Following the peak in 1990, per capita employment in these occupations fell 3.5% to the trough of the 1991 recession, and a further 1.8% during the subsequent jobless recovery. After a minor rebound, employment was essentially flat until the 2001 recession. In the two year window around the 2001 trough, this group shed 6.3% of its employment, before leveling off again. Routine employment has plummeted again in the Great Recession – 12.0% in the two year window around the trough – with no subsequent recovery.

To state this slightly differently, 92% of the 28 log point fall in routine employment that occurred in this period occurred within a 12 month window of NBER recessions (6 months prior to the peak and 6 months after the trough). Hence, job polarization is observed during recessions; it is a business cycle phenomenon.

\(^8\)The obvious caveat being that it is too early to speak definitively following the most recent recession.
Figure 4: Employment in Occupational Groups: 1967 – 2011

2.4 Occupational Employment: Business Cycle Snapshots

During the polarization period, per capita employment in routine occupations disappeared during recessions. Moreover, as Figure 4 makes clear, prior to job polarization, routine employment always recovered following recessions. In this subsection, we investigate whether job polarization has contributed to the jobless recoveries following the three most recent recessions. This is quantitatively plausible since routine occupations account for a large fraction of the total; as of 2011, routine jobs still account for 44% of aggregate employment.

To do this, we “zoom in” on recessionary episodes; Figures 5 and 6 plot per capita employment for the three occupational groups around NBER recessions. These figures are constructed in the same manner as Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 5 displays the earlier recessions of 1970, 1975, and 1982. Contractions in employment are clearly observed in the routine occupations. In the non-routine occupations, employment was either flat or growing through these recessions and recoveries.\(^9\) Hence, the contractions in aggregate employment displayed in Figure 1, are due almost exclusively to the routine occupations. Measuring from NBER peak to trough, 97% of all job loss in both the 1970 and 1975 recessions was accounted for by job loss in routine occupations; in the 1982 recession, job loss in routine occupations accounted for more than 100% of the aggregate, as employment was actually growing in the non-routine groups.

Moreover, no jobless recoveries were observed in the routine occupational group. In all cases, employment begins recovering within 7 months of the trough. This mirrors the lack of jobless recoveries at the aggregate level displayed in Figure 1.

This contrasts sharply with the three recent recessions. As is clear from Figure 6, jobless recoveries are not experienced in all occupations. Consider first the non-routine occupations, both cognitive and manual. No severe contractions are observed in the 1991, 2001, or 2009 recessions. Per capita employment in these occupations is either flat or display mild contractions. Employment in routine occupations experience clear contractions. As with the early recessions, these occupations account for the bulk of the contraction in aggregate employment. In 1991, 2001, and 2009, routine occupations account for 87%, 89%, and 93% of all job loss, respectively.

More importantly, routine occupations show no recoveries in Figure 6. In 1991, employment in routine occupations falls 3.5% in the 12 months leading up to the trough; employment falls a further 1.8% in the following 24 months. A similar picture emerges for the 2001 recession: large employment losses leading up to the recession’s trough are followed by further large losses afterward. In 2009, these occupations are hit especially hard, falling 11.8% from the NBER peak to trough. Routine employment shows no recovery to date, down a further 2.5% from the

\(^9\) An exception is employment in non-routine manual occupations in 1970. As is clear from Figure 4, this was a medium-run phenomenon, and not due to the recession.
Figure 5: Occupational Employment around Early NBER Recessions

Figure 6: Occupational Employment around Recent NBER Recessions

To summarize, jobless recoveries are evident in only the three most recent recessions and they are due to jobless recoveries in routine occupations. In this occupational group, employment never recovers – in the short-, medium- or long-term. These occupations are disappearing. Hence, the jobless recovery phenomenon is due to job polarization.

### 2.5 A Counterfactual Experiment

To make this final point clear, we perform a simple counterfactual experiment to document the role of job polarization in accounting for jobless recoveries. This is an informative exercise since recessions in aggregate employment are due almost entirely to recessions in routine occupations, as discussed above. We ask what would have happened in recent recessions if the post-recession behavior of employment in routine occupations had looked more similar to the early recessions. Would the economy still have experienced jobless recoveries in the aggregate?

For the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions, we replace the per capita employment in routine occupations following the trough of each recession with their average response following the troughs of the 1970, 1975, and 1982 recessions. We do this in a way that matches the magnitude of the fall in employment after each recent recession, but follows the time pattern of the early recessions. In particular, we ensure that the turning point in routine employment comes 5 months after the trough, as in the average of those recoveries. We then sum up the actual employment in non-routine occupations with the counterfactual employment in routine occupations to obtain a counterfactual aggregate employment series. The behavior of these counterfactual series around the recent NBER trough dates are displayed in Figure 7. Further details regarding the construction of the counterfactuals is discussed in Appendix C.

Figure 7 makes clear that had it not been for the polarization of routine jobs that occurs during recessions, we would not have observed jobless recoveries. Aggregate employment would have experienced clear turning points 5, 5, and 7 months after the troughs of the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions, respectively. In the 1991 and 2001 recessions, employment would have exceeded its value at the NBER-dated trough within 12 months. In the case of the much more severe Great Recession, recovery back to the trough level would have taken 18 months; this is due to the fact that the most recent recession was experienced more broadly in all occupations. Nonetheless, employment would have recovered, as opposed to declining in the 24 months following the end of the recession.
Figure 7: Actual and Counterfactual Employment around Recent NBER Recessions

Notes: Actual data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; counterfactuals described in Appendix C.
2.6 Further Discussion

In this subsection, we offer a few points of clarification regarding job polarization and jobless recoveries. We first clarify the role of the manufacturing sector in accounting for these two phenomena. It is well-known that employment in manufacturing is more “routine-intensive” compared to the economy as a whole.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, employment dynamics in manufacturing, during both early and recent recessions, follow a similar pattern to that of routine occupations (across all sectors). Namely, manufacturing employment displayed strong cyclical rebounds prior to the mid-1980s; in the three recent recessions, employment has failed to recover following rebounds in manufacturing (and aggregate) output.

Here, we first demonstrate that job loss in manufacturing accounts for only a fraction of job polarization. Secondly, we show that the jobless recoveries experienced in the past 30 years cannot be explained by jobless recoveries in the manufacturing sector.

Regarding the first point, we note that across all sectors, routine employment has fallen 28 log points from 1990 to present, as displayed in Figure 4. In levels, this reflects a per capita employment loss of 0.081. But manufacturing aside, all other sectors of the economy have also experienced a pronounced polarization. Routine employment in sectors outside of manufacturing has fallen 21 log points during the same period. This represents a per capita employment loss of 0.050. Hence, manufacturing accounts for only $0.031/0.081 = 38\%$ of the observed job polarization.\textsuperscript{11}

With respect to the second point, while the post-recession behavior of employment in manufacturing mimics that of routine occupations, jobless recoveries in aggregate employment cannot be attributed to the manufacturing sector. This is due to the fact that manufacturing accounts for a quantitatively small share of total employment (approximately 18\% in the mid-1980s and 9\% in 2011). To demonstrate this, Figure 8 performs the same counterfactual experiment for the manufacturing industry as Figure 7 does for routine occupations. In each of the three jobless recoveries, we replace the employment in manufacturing following the trough with their average response following the troughs of the early recessions. We then sum up the actual employment in non-manufacturing industries with the counterfactual employment in manufacturing to obtain a counterfactual aggregate employment series.

Figure 8 displays the behavior of these counterfactual series around the 1991, 2001, and 2009 NBER trough dates.\textsuperscript{12} The figure makes clear that eliminating the jobless recoveries

\textsuperscript{10}For instance, as of 2011, routine occupations account for 68\% of total employment in manufacturing, as compared to 44\% economy-wide.

\textsuperscript{11}See also Acemoglu and Autor (2011) who demonstrate that job polarization is due largely to shifts in the occupational composition (away from routine, towards non-routine jobs) within industries; in contrast, shifts in industrial composition (from routine-intensive to non-routine-intensive industries) explain much less.

\textsuperscript{12}Note that the behavior of actual aggregate employment differs slightly from that depicted in 7. This is due to the fact that Figure 7 is constructed using CPS data, whereas Figure 8 is constructed using CES data.
Figure 8: Actual and Counterfactual Employment around Recent NBER Recessions: the Manufacturing case

Notes: Actual data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics Survey; counterfactuals described in Appendix C.
in manufacturing has little impact on the post-recession dynamics in aggregate employment. That is, jobless recoveries would still have been observed following each recessionary episode. Aggregate employment would still have been below the value at the trough, a full 24 months after the recession ended.\(^{13}\)

Finally, we clarify the role of education in accounting for job polarization and jobless recoveries. The share of low educated workers in the labor force (i.e., those with high school diplomas or less) has declined in the last three decades, and these workers exhibit greater business cycle sensitivity than those with higher education. It is thus reasonable to conjecture that the terms “routine” and “low education” are interchangeable. In what follows, we show that this is not the case.

In particular, it is true that education is correlated with occupation. However, as discussed in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), educational attainment is more closely aligned with the distinction between cognitive versus manual occupations, with high (low) educated workers tending to work in cognitive (manual) jobs. As such, job polarization – the disappearance of employment in routine occupations relative to non-routine occupations – cannot be explained simply by the change in educational composition. To make this clear, consider the case of high school graduates, who make up the vast majority of low educated workers. In levels, their per capita employment has fallen 0.057 from 1990 to present. However, this fall is highly concentrated, with 91% of the loss occurring in routine occupations. In contrast, employment among high school graduates in non-routine jobs has remained essentially constant, falling by only 0.005 during the polarization period.\(^{14}\)

Similarly, jobless recoveries are not simply a phenomenon reflecting the post-recession dynamics of low education employment. In particular, business cycle fluctuations for high school educated workers differ greatly across occupational groups. In routine occupations, per capita employment fell 3.6%, 4.0%, and 13.2% in the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions, respectively.\(^{15}\) And indeed, it is this group that is disappearing and not recovering: averaged across the three recessions, employment is down a further 1.5% from the level at the NBER trough, a full 24 months into the economic recovery. In contrast, employment of high school graduates in non-routine occupations experience extremely mild contractions – of 0.9%, 0.2%, and 0.5% in the three recent recessions – and no polarization. Thus, among these low educated workers, jobless recoveries are only to be found in routine occupations.

\(^{13}\)See also Aaronson et al. (2004) for evidence that the recent jobless recoveries cannot be explained by “structural change” at the sectoral or industry level occurring around recessions.

\(^{14}\)The importance of the routine/non-routine distinction is further illustrated by the “some college” group – those with more than high school attainment, but less than a college degree. Per capita employment in this group has risen 7% since 1990. However, it has only risen in non-routine occupations (by 24%); routine employment has actually fallen 7% for the some college group, reflecting polarization among these relatively high educated workers.

\(^{15}\)Hence, while high school, routine occupational employment accounts for roughly 20% of aggregate employment during this period, it accounts for roughly 44% of total job loss across the three recent recessions.
3 A Simple Model

In this section, we present a simple analytical framework to highlight the key mechanisms in relating the phenomena of job polarization and jobless recoveries. In particular, our aim is to show qualitatively how routine biased technological change (RBTC) can lead to job polarization, and how recessions can accelerate this process. We also show how job polarization can result in recoveries from recessions that are jobless.

Our analytical framework is a search-and-matching model of the labor market with occupational choice and RBTC. RBTC is modelled as a trend increase in the productivity of non-routine occupations (both cognitive and manual) relative to routine occupations. The search-and-matching framework of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) (hereafter, the DMP framework) is well-suited for our analysis since it emphasizes the dynamic, multi-period nature of employment, unemployment, and occupational choice.

We first present a model with only non-routine cognitive (or “high-skill,” hereafter) occupations and routine (“middle-skill”) occupations. In the face of RBTC, middle-skill workers choose whether to remain in a routine occupation for which they are currently well-suited, or attempt to become a high-skill worker. If middle-skill workers choose to leave the market for routine work, then we have a disappearance of middle-skill occupations, in favour of high-skill occupations. We use this simple model to illustrate how a temporary, recessionary shock can accelerate this disappearance, and how job polarization in recessions can lead to jobless recoveries. We then discuss how the model can be extended to have middle-skill workers switch out of routine occupations for both high- and low-skill (i.e. non-routine manual) work.

3.1 Description

As emphasized in the DMP framework, the labor market features a search friction in the matching process between unemployed workers and vacancy posting firms. The ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers determines the economy’s match probabilities. Workers differ in their proficiency in performing occupational tasks, and this proficiency is reflected in the output or profitability in a worker-firm match. Workers are of three types: (1) “high-skill” workers who have the ability to perform non-routine cognitive tasks, (2) “middle-skill” workers who lack the ability to perform non-routine cognitive tasks but have the ability to perform routine tasks, and (3) middle-skill workers who are attempting to acquire the skills to do non-routine cognitive work. The process of gaining the proficiency to switch from a middle-skill to high-skill worker

---


17 See Cortes (2011) for evidence on the quantitative importance of switching from routine occupations to both high- and low-skill occupations, and the rise in switching probabilities during the job polarization period.
requires experience on the job, as emphasized in the learning-by-doing literature. Firms post
vacancies for workers of different type in separate markets.

We begin by describing the market for high-skill workers, which is identical to the standard
DMP model. Firms maintain (or “post”) vacancies in order to recruit these workers. Vacancy
posting must satisfy the following free entry condition:
\[
\kappa_H = \beta q(\theta_H) J_{Ht+1}.
\]  
(1)

Here, \(\kappa_H\) is the cost of maintaining such a vacancy, \(\beta\) is the one-period discount factor, \(q(\theta_H)\)
is the probability that the firm is matched with a worker (the job filling probability), \(\theta_H\) is the
tightness ratio in the \(H\) market, and \(J_H\) is the firm’s surplus from being matched with a high-
skill worker. We adopt the usual timing convention whereby matches formed at date \(t\) become
productive at date \(t + 1\).

Firm surplus is given by:
\[
J_{Ht} = f_{Ht} - \omega_H + \beta (1 - \delta) J_{Ht+1},
\]  
(2)

where \(f_H\) is the output (or revenue) produced in a high-skill worker-firm match, \(\omega_H\) is the
compensation paid to the worker, and \(\delta\) is the exogenous separation rate.

An unemployed, high-skill worker receives a flow value of unemployment, \(z\), and matches with
a firm with job finding probability, \(\mu(\theta_H)\).\(^{18}\) If a match occurs, the worker begins employment
in the following period; otherwise she remains unemployed. The present discounted value of
being unemployed for such a worker is:
\[
U_{Ht} = z + \beta [\mu(\theta_H) W_{Ht+1} + (1 - \mu(\theta_H)) U_{Ht+1}],
\]  
(3)

where \(W_H\) is the value of being a matched, high-skill worker. This value is given by:
\[
W_{Ht} = \omega_H + \beta [(1 - \delta) W_{Ht+1} + \delta U_{Ht+1}].
\]  
(4)

Worker compensation in a match is determined via generalized Nash bargaining. Letting \(\tau\)
represent the worker’s bargaining power, this implies that in equilibrium, firm surplus is a frac-
tion, \((1 - \tau)\), of total match surplus; worker surplus, defined as \(W_H - U_H\), is the complemen-
tary fraction, \(\tau\). Total surplus is defined simply as \(TS_H \equiv J_H + W_H - U_H\); this imposes the free entry
condition, with the firm’s value of being unmatched set to zero. We maintain the assumption of
Nash bargaining over compensation in all markets in the model.

In the market for routine, middle-skill workers, firms post vacancies such that the free entry
condition holds:
\[
\kappa_M = \beta q(\theta_{Mt}) J_{Mt+1}.
\]  
(5)

\(^{18}\)We assume that the matching process has the usual properties, so that \(\mu(\theta)\) is a strictly increasing function
of the tightness ratio, \(\theta\); \(q(\cdot)\) is a strictly decreasing function of \(\theta\); and \(q(\theta) = \mu(\theta)/\theta\).
Note that we allow the vacancy cost in this market, \( \kappa_M \), to differ from that of the high-skill occupation. Also, the tightness ratio and firm surplus in this market is marked with an \( M \) to denote the fact that these workers have the choice to search either in the current market or in an alternative, “switching market” to become a high-skill worker (described below).

Firm surplus in such a match is given by:

\[
J_{Mt} = \max \left\{ f_{Mt} - \omega_{Mt} + \beta(1 - \delta)J_{Mt+1}, 0 \right\}.
\]  
(6)

Here, \( f_M \) is the output produced in a middle-skill match, and \( \omega_M \) is the compensation paid to the worker. The firm may choose to separate from the match, if the surplus is non-positive.\(^{19}\)

The value function for a middle-skill worker while employed is:

\[
W_{Mt} = \max \left\{ \omega_{Mt} + \beta \left[ (1 - \delta)W_{Mt+1} + \delta U_{Mt+1} \right], U_{Mt} \right\}.
\]  
(7)

The worker can choose to separate from the match if the value of being an unemployed job searcher, \( U_M \), exceeds the value of remaining in the match. With Nash bargaining, separations are efficient since firm and worker surplus in a match are proportional.

When unemployed, the middle-skill worker faces an occupational choice. Firstly, it may choose to remain in the market for routine work. In this case, the value of unemployment is given by:

\[
U_{Mt} = z + \beta \left[ \mu(\theta_{Mt})W_{Mt+1} + (1 - \mu(\theta_{Mt}))U_{Mt+1} \right],
\]  
(8)

where \( \mu(\theta_M) \) is the job finding rate in the market for routine work. On the other hand, the worker may choose to search for a job which allows for the switching from routine to non-routine occupations:

\[
U_{MSt} = z + \beta \left[ \mu(\theta_{St})W_{St+1} + (1 - \mu(\theta_{St}))U_{Mt+1} \right].
\]  
(9)

Here, \( \mu(\theta_S) \) is the job finding rate in the “switching market”, and \( W_S \) is the value of being employed in such a match. The unemployed middle-skill worker chooses where to search according to:

\[
U_{Mt} = \max \left\{ U_{MMt}, U_{MSt} \right\}.
\]  
(10)

Note that in the case of an unsuccessful job search at date \( t \), the worker is free to search in either market at date \( t+1 \).

It remains to define the value functions associated with the switching market.\(^{20}\) The value of being employed is given by:

\[
W_{St} = \omega_{St} + \beta \left[ (1 - \delta)W_{Ht+1} + \delta U_{Ht+1} \right].
\]  
(11)

\(^{19}\)This is technically a possibility in the high-skill market as well; however, we ensure parameter values are such that this uninteresting case does not occur.

\(^{20}\)For a detailed analysis of labor market dynamics in a model with on-the-job learning very similar to that presented here, see Gervais et al. (2011).
When employed in a switching match, workers receive compensation $\omega_S$ and acquire skills towards becoming a high-skill worker. For simplicity, we assume the worker becomes proficient at performing non-routine cognitive tasks after one period on the job. If the match remains intact, with probability $(1 - \delta)$, the worker continues as a high-skill worker with value $W_H$. If the match is separated, with probability $\delta$, she enters the next period as an unemployed high-skill worker, with value $U_H$. Skills that the worker acquires on-the-job are retained when unemployed and can be applied to future matches; in other words, occupational skill is not firm- or match-specific.

To close the model, the free entry condition in the switching market is given by:

$$\kappa_S = \beta q(\theta_{St}) J_{St+1},$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

where

$$J_{St} = f_{St} - \omega_{St} + \beta(1 - \delta) J_{Ht+1}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Again, $\kappa_S$ is the vacancy cost, and $f_S$ is match output in the learning market, which can differ from those in the $H$-market and $M$-market.

### 3.2 Results

Occupational choice, job polarization, and jobless recoveries in this model are easy to understand. To begin, consider a steady state equilibrium. Equilibrium in any market is summarized by the free entry condition:

$$\kappa_i = q(\theta_i) \beta (1 - \tau) T S_i,$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

for $i \in \{H, M, S\}$. The term $(1 - \tau) T S_i$ is simply firm surplus (given Nash bargaining). Hence, the number of vacancies firms post per unemployed worker today, $\theta_i$, is increasing in the profit conditional on being matched tomorrow, $\beta (1 - \tau) T S_i$.

Steady state total surplus in a high-skill match is given by:

$$T S_H = \frac{f_H - z - \hat{\tau} \kappa_H \theta_H}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta)},$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

with $\hat{\tau} \equiv \tau/(1 - \tau)$. The contemporaneous surplus from a match consists of the output ($f_H$), net of the flow value ($z$) and option value ($\hat{\tau} \kappa_H \theta_H$) that is foregone when a worker is employed relative to being unemployed. The total surplus is simply the present discounted value of contemporaneous surpluses. The value of being an unemployed high-skill worker in steady state is given by:

$$U_H = \frac{z + \hat{\tau} \kappa_H \theta_H}{1 - \beta}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

For middle-skill workers, these expressions depend on which market the unemployed search in. Consider the case when middle-skill workers search in the routine market, so that $U_M =$
Steady state total surplus in a middle-skill match is:

$$TS_M = \frac{f_M - z - \hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)},$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

and the value of an unemployment is:

$$U_M = \frac{z + \hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M}{1 - \beta}. \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

These have the same interpretations given above for the $H$-market.

In a steady state with unemployed middle-skill workers searching in the switching market ($U_M = U_{MS}$), the value of unemployment is:

$$U_M = \frac{z + \hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M}{1 - \beta}. \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

The expression for total surplus is best understood in the following form:

$$TS_S = f_S - z - \hat{\tau}\kappa_S\theta_S + \beta \left[ (1 - \delta)TS_H + (U_H - U_M) \right]. \hspace{1cm} (20)$$

Relative to the expressions for $TS_H$ and $TS_M$, $TS_S$ differs in two ways. First, the continuation value is $\beta(1 - \delta)TS_H$, reflecting the learning of high-skill tasks that takes place in the first period of a switching match. Second, total surplus involves the additional term, $\beta(U_H - U_M)$, which we refer to as the value of learning. This reflects a capital gain due to the learning of high-skill tasks that occurs in the first period of a switching match.\(^{21}\)

Unemployed workers will search in the routine market if $U_{MM} > U_{MS}$. From equations (18) and (19), this occurs when the option value of unemployment in that market, $\hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M$, exceeds the option value in the switching market, $\hat{\tau}\kappa_S\theta_S$. Conversely, workers will search in the switching market whenever $\hat{\tau}\kappa_S\theta_S > \hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M$.

It is easy to see that either steady state can emerge. To illustrate this most simply, suppose that $f_S = f_H$ and $\kappa_S = \kappa_H$. This way, the high-skill and switching markets are identical, so that the equilibrium conditions summarizing the switching market are identical to equations (15) and (16), thus simplifying the analysis. To see how unemployed middle-skill workers would choose to search in the switching market is straightforward. Suppose that $\kappa_M = \kappa_S(= \kappa_H) = \kappa$ and $f_S > f_M$. In this case, output in a switching match exceeds that in a routine match. Since vacancy costs are the same, the free entry condition implies that market tightness in the switching market must be greater: $\theta_S > \theta_M$. It follows that $\hat{\tau}\kappa\theta_S > \hat{\tau}\kappa\theta_M$, so that the value of search in the switching market exceed that in the routine market.

\(^{21}\)Specifically, after one period on the job, there is an upgrade to a high-skill match in the next period. Hence, the total surplus includes the change in the worker’s and firm’s values, weighted by $\beta$. With probability $(1 - \delta)$ the match survives, so that upgrading reflects a change in the matched value of both the worker and the firm. With probability $\delta$ the match is separated, and the upgrading is reflected only in a change in the unemployed worker’s value.
It is also possible that unemployed middle-skill workers would search in the routine market, even when $f_S > f_M$. This occurs when $\kappa_M < \kappa_S$, and specifically, when the vacancy cost in the routine market is sufficiently smaller than that in the switching market. We discuss this in detail in Appendix D. Intuitively, $f_S > f_M$ implies that the value of being employed in a switching match exceeds that in a routine match. However, the value of being unemployed also depends on the probability of entering into a match, the job finding rate. If $\kappa_S$ is large (relative to $\kappa_M$), this implies a low incentive for job creation in the $S$-market, translating into a low job finding rate for workers. Hence, when $f_S > f_M$, there exists a cutoff value of the relative vacancy costs such that for all values of $\kappa_M/\kappa_S$ less than the cutoff, $U_{MM} > U_{MS}$.

Given the assumptions and discussion provided above, it is possible to study the effects of RBTC. In particular, continue to assume that $f_S = f_H$ at each point in time, and $f_S > f_M$ so that productivity in switching matches is greater than in routine matches; $\kappa_M$ is sufficiently smaller than $\kappa_S$ so that, initially, the $S$-market is not operative. That is, we suppose the economy starts in a steady state where middle-skill workers work and search in the routine market, $U_{MM} > U_{MS}$.

At some date, agents learn that $f_S$ (and $f_H$) rises over time to a new value due to RBTC, so that unemployed middle-skill workers eventually prefer to search in the $S$-market. From this, we can map out the model’s perfect foresight dynamics.

As $f_S$ rises over time, so too does the total surplus in $S$-matches. From the free entry condition, this implies that the tightness ratio, $\theta_S$, rises too. This in turn implies a rise in the value of unemployed search in the switching market, $U_{MS}$. Given that RBTC has no effect on productivity in routine matches, $f_M$, there is little effect on total surplus, $TS_M$, early on and unemployed middle-skill workers continue to search in that market, $U_M = U_{MM}$. But as RBTC progresses, and the value of unemployed search in the switching market rises, we reach a point when $U_{MS} > U_{MM}$; unemployed middle-skill workers begin searching in the switching market. This initiates the disappearance of routine employment. As $\theta_S$ continues to rise, so too does the job finding rate in that market, $\mu(\theta_S)$, and the upgrading of middle-skill to high-skill workers. In the long-run, routine employment disappears, and the entire workforce becomes high-skill.

Figures 9 and 10 illustrate an example of polarization dynamics. In the initial steady state of this example, $f_H = f_S > f_M$ so that output in non-routine matches is greater than in routine matches. We set $\kappa_S > \kappa_M$ so that initially, unemployed middle-skill workers search in the market for routine occupations. However, unlike the analytical example discussed above, we set $\kappa_H < \kappa_S$.\footnote{If $\kappa_H = \kappa_S$, the $H$- and $S$-markets would be identical. Hence, the initial steady state would feature $U_{MM} > U_{MS} = U_H$; unemployed high-skill workers would prefer to search in the routine, middle-skill market. Since we would like an example where high-skill workers prefer to remain high-skill, and yet maintain simplicity (namely, $f_H = f_S$), we set $\kappa_H < \kappa_S$ so that the job finding rate in the $H$-market is high.} This implies that the $H$-market and $S$-market are no longer analytically identical. Given that the vacancy cost in the high-skill market is lower, the job finding probability in that
market is higher. In particular, $\kappa_S$, $\kappa_H$ and $\kappa_M$ are such that $U_H > U_{MM} > U_{MS}$ in the initial steady state. Finally, the initial steady state has half of all workers are (working or searching) in the $H$-market, and the remaining half in the $M$-market (again, the $S$-market is initially not operative).

Figure 9 depicts the perfect foresight paths for $U_{MM}$ and $U_{MS}$. Agents in this example learn at period 1 that RBTC causes both $f_S$ and $f_H$ to grow at a constant rate over time, reaching a new steady state level in period 200. Accordingly, RBTC causes the value of unemployment to rise over time. Initially, unemployed middle-skill workers prefer to search for work in the routine market. In period 75, this switches, and workers begin searching in the switching market. In this example, total surplus in routine matches, $TS_M$, remains positive, even in the terminal steady state. Hence, from period 76 to 200, middle-skill workers gradually move to the $S$-market at rate $\delta$, as they exogenously separate from routine matches.

Figure 10 depicts the share of $H$-, $S$-, and $M$-type workers in the economy. In periods 1 through 75, the composition of worker types remains unchanged: high-skill workers remain as such, and routine workers have no incentive to switch. But in period 75, all unemployed middle-skill workers leave the routine market and begin searching in the switching market. In all subsequent periods, workers who separate from routine matches also choose to search in the switching market; the market for routine workers gradually disappears.  

---

23In this example, total surplus in routine matches, $TS_M$, remains positive during the entire transition path, so
Notes: The process of RBTC begins in period 1. Job Polarization begins in period 75, as middle-skill workers leave the routine market for the switching market, and eventually become high-skill workers.

It is also possible to see how a recession accelerates the disappearance of routine employment. In the context of our model, a recession can be viewed as an unanticipated, temporary fall in aggregate productivity (i.e., a fall in the productivity of all matches).

Suppose the process of RBTC is at a stage where $U_M = U_{MS} > U_{MM}$, so that unemployed middle-skill workers prefer to search in the switching market. If the fall in productivity is sufficiently large, total surplus in routine matches becomes non-positive, $TS_M \leq 0$, while total surplus in all other matches remain positive. When $TS_M \leq 0$, workers in routine matches that in the long-run, exit from the routine market occurs at the constant rate, $\delta$, due to the exogenous separation of routine matches. Note that it is also possible that $TS_M$ becomes non-positive along the transition path. In this case, there would be a sudden exit out of the routine market due to endogenous separation of routine matches.

It is easy to see that there always exists a negative productivity shock such that this happens. For simplicity, consider a one-period shock that occurs in the last period before the $U_{MS} > U_{MM}$ switch. This allows us to disregard the $S$ market, which is not yet operative. The total surplus in the two active markets is given by:

$$TS_M = f_M - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_M + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_M,$$
$$TS_H = f_H - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_H + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_H.$$

The fact that $f_H > f_M$ (and that the gap is increasing due to RBTC) implies that $TS_H > TS_M$ at all points in time. Hence, for an additive productivity shock (dropping $f_H$ and $f_M$ by the same amount in level terms), it is easy to find a shock that causes $TS_M \leq 0$, leaving $TS_H > 0$. In the case of a multiplicative shock, one simply needs to find a factor, $x$, such that $xf_M - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_M + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_M = 0$. Applied to the $H$-type match, it must be that $xf_H - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_H + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_H > 0$. 

24 It is easy to see that there always exists a negative productivity shock such that this happens. For simplicity, consider a one-period shock that occurs in the last period before the $U_{MS} > U_{MM}$ switch. This allows us to disregard the $S$ market, which is not yet operative. The total surplus in the two active markets is given by:

$$TS_M = f_M - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_M + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_M,$$
$$TS_H = f_H - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_H + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_H.$$

The fact that $f_H > f_M$ (and that the gap is increasing due to RBTC) implies that $TS_H > TS_M$ at all points in time. Hence, for an additive productivity shock (dropping $f_H$ and $f_M$ by the same amount in level terms), it is easy to find a shock that causes $TS_M \leq 0$, leaving $TS_H > 0$. In the case of a multiplicative shock, one simply needs to find a factor, $x$, such that $xf_M - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_M + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_M = 0$. Applied to the $H$-type match, it must be that $xf_H - z - \bar{\tau}k\theta_H + \beta(1 - \delta)TS'_H > 0$.
endogenously separate to unemployment. Middle-skill workers previously employed in these matches switch occupations, and start searching for a match in the $S$-market.

This is depicted in Figure 11. As in Figures 9 and 10, the disappearance of the routine market begins in period 75. To make things exceedingly clear, we introduce a temporary, negative shock to aggregate productivity in exactly period 75 that lasts for 10 periods. At this point, all middle-skill workers move to the switching market.

Productivity returns to its non-recession level in period 85. At this point, the values of employment, unemployment, firm surplus, and total surplus in all markets return to their non-recession, perfect foresight paths. In particular, total surplus in routine matches returns to positive. However, this is irrelevant as the economy has already entered the job polarization phase where $U_{MS} > U_{MM}$. Despite positive total surplus in routine matches, there are no employed routine workers and, importantly, no unemployed middle-skill workers choose to search in the $M$-market. Hence, in this example, all of the disappearance of routine employment occurs in recessions. More generally, during an era of job polarization (i.e., after period 75 in our example, when $U_{MS} > U_{MM}$), recessions accelerate the disappearance of routine jobs. This is obvious in comparing Figure 11 to Figure 10.

Moreover, the recovery from such a recession can be jobless. In period 85, aggregate produc-
Figure 12: Job Polarization and a Jobless Recovery

Notes: The blue line denotes aggregate output (left scale), the red line aggregate employment (right scale). Both are normalized to 1 in the initial period of recession. A temporary fall in aggregate productivity in period 75 generates a recession. Productivity returns in period 85, generating a jobless recovery.

Activity returns to its pre-recession level. This implies an immediate jump in output in non-routine matches; as a result, there is an immediate rebound in aggregate output.

However, this is not accompanied by a rebound in employment. In the recession, $T_{SM} \leq 0$, and the job loss was concentrated among the middle-skill, routine workers; the employment status of all other workers was unaffected. The recovery in aggregate employment depends, then, on the post-recession job finding rate of these separated workers in the $S$-market. If this job finding rate is low, the rebound in employment will be sluggish: the economic recovery is jobless.

This is precisely the case in our example. Figure 12 depicts the dynamics of aggregate output and employment around the recession. Both are normalized to unity in the initial period of the recession, period 75. When productivity rebounds in period 85, output recovers. However, there is no corresponding rebound in employment, as the middle-skill workers who became unemployed in the recession face low job finding rates in their preferred search market, the $S$-market.

This low job finding rate is achieved in our model in a very straightforward way: by setting the vacancy cost, $\kappa_S$, high.\textsuperscript{25} We view this as a simple, yet informative, stand-in for the many real-world factors that cause workers – whose jobs have disappeared due to job polariza-

\textsuperscript{25}Note that this is the same mechanism that ensures $U_{MM} > U_{MS}$ in the initial steady state, despite the fact that $f_S > f_M$.\textsuperscript{25}
tion – to have difficulty in finding employment in new occupations. For example, firms may be risk-averse (as opposed to risk neutral, as in the DMP framework) and reluctant to create vacancies to attract workers without experience in the advertised occupation following a recession. Alternatively, imperfect information may cause workers to spend time searching in vain for employment in occupations that are no longer hiring, before eventually moving on to search for a new occupation. As well, relocation or re-training costs may add to unemployment durations for workers looking to switch occupations.

It is worth noting that our model is consistent with the facts regarding the cyclical behavior of aggregate labor market flows. First, as documented in Section 2.4, the bulk of the job loss in recessions is in routine occupations. In our model, this is precisely the case as all endogenous separations occur in $M$-type matches in the recession. Second, as documented in Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Elsby et al. (2009), the onset of US recessions feature a spike in the aggregate separation rate; this too occurs in our model. Finally, after the initial spike in separations, unemployment dynamics are determined by those of the job finding rate. In the data, as in our model, jobless recoveries are characterized by slow recoveries in the aggregate job finding rate, ones that are much more persistent than the recoveries following the recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s.26

In summary, our model makes clear the two mechanisms required to generate a jobless recovery. First, it requires a rebound in productivity among the employed following a recession. In our model, this occurs in the $H$- and $S$-type matches.27 The second feature is a low job finding rate among those who are displaced following a recession. This feature is easily envisioned for those whose jobs are destroyed due to job polarization. In our model, we express this in a straightforward way, by specifying a high job creation cost for workers looking to switch occupations. Indeed, absent job polarization, workers would not switch to the $S$-market in a recession. As a result, the recovery would not be jobless.

This is illustrated in Figure 13. Here we consider a model that is identical to that in Figure 12, except there are no underlying trends in $f_H$ and $f_S$. As a result, unemployed high-skill workers search in the $H$-market and unemployed middle-skill workers search in the $M$-market. There are no workers who search in the low job finding rate $S$-market. As Figure 13 makes clear, absent the force for job polarization (and occupation switching), there would be no jobless recovery. Employment rebounds along with output; and indeed, employment leads output out of the recession due to the fact that we are studying perfect foresight paths, and job creation is forward-looking.

26See, for instance, Figure 5 of Shimer (2005), and Figure 6 of Elsby et al. (2010).
27Of course, this is not the only way to achieve this; any heterogeneity among routine workers (e.g., in the form of individual-level match productivities) could prevent a complete disappearance of routine employment in recessions. And indeed, such a feature is obviously relevant empirically as, in the data, we do not observe complete polarization. In such a case, the productivity rebound would affect the $H$-, $S$-, and remaining $M$-type matches.
Figure 13: No Job Polarization Means No Jobless Recovery

Notes: The blue line denotes aggregate output (left scale), the red line aggregate employment (right scale). Both are normalized to 1 in the initial period of recession. A temporary fall in aggregate productivity in period 75 generates a recession. Productivity returns in period 85, generating a recovery.

Finally, we note that because our simple model considers only two skill levels (middle and high), we do not obtain true “polarization,” with workers moving to both high- and low-skill occupations. However, it is easy to extend the model in such a direction, by incorporating heterogeneity among middle-skill workers. Specifically, assume there is heterogeneity in the ability to acquire the skills to become a non-routine cognitive worker: suppose some people find it impossible to become proficient at high-skill tasks. Then, RBTC, modelled as a trend increase in the productivity in both high- and low-skill matches relative to routine matches, would generate polarization in both directions. None of the substantive implications of our model would be altered.

4 Conclusions

In the last 30 years the US labor market has been characterized by job polarization and jobless recoveries. In this paper we demonstrate how these are related. Specifically, we first show that the loss of middle-skill, routine jobs is concentrated in economic downturns. In this sense, the job polarization trend is a business cycle phenomenon. Second, we show that jobless recoveries are due to job polarization. This argument is based on the fact that almost all of the contraction in aggregate employment during recessions can be attributed to job losses in middle-skill, routine
occupations (that normally account for a large fraction of total employment), and that jobless recoveries are observed only in these disappearing routine jobs since job polarization began. We then propose a simple search-and-matching model of the labor market with occupational choice to rationalize these facts. We show how a trend in routine-biased technological change can lead to: (i) job polarization that is concentrated in downturns, and (ii) recoveries from these recessions that are jobless.

A Data Sources

The population measure is the civilian non-institutional population, 16 years and over, taken from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Aggregate employment is total employment within this population. Estimates of RGDP at a monthly frequency are those of James Stock and Mark Watson (http://www.princeton.edu/~mwatson/mgdp_gdi.html). These data end in June 2010; data for July 2010 to December 2011 are interpolated from quarterly RGDP data, taken from the FRED Database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Data on employment at the occupation group level from July 1967 to December 1982 is taken from the Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various issues. Non-routine cognitive workers are those employed in “professional and technical” and “managers, officials, and proprietors” occupations. Routine cognitive workers are those classified as “clerical workers” and “sales workers”. Routine manual workers are “craftsmen and foremen”, “operatives”, and “nonfarm labourers”. Non-routine manual workers are “service workers”. “Farm workers” (farmers, farm managers, farm labourers and farm foremen) are excluded from the employment data at the occupational level. Data for January 1983 to December 2011 are taken from FRED. Non-routine cognitive workers are those employed in “management, business, and financial operations occupations” and “professional and related occupations”. Routine cognitive workers are those in “sales and related occupations” and “office and administrative support occupations”. Routine manual occupations are “production occupations”, “transportation and material moving occupations”, “construction and extraction occupations”, and “installation, maintenance, and repair occupations”. Non-routine manual occupations are “service occupations”.

In subsection 2.6, data for industrial employment are from the Current Employment Statistics survey of the BLS, taken from the FRED Database. Aggregate employment refers to “all employees: total nonfarm” and manufacturing employment is “all employees: manufacturing”. Data for employment delineated by education and occupation from 1989 to present are from the Basic Monthly Files of the CPS, taken from the NBER website.

B Figures with Routine Occupations Delineated
Figure 14: Percent Change in Employment Shares by Occupation Group

Figure 15: Occupational Employment around NBER Recessions
C Counterfactuals

Using the data for routine occupations displayed in Figure 5, we derive the average percentage deviation in employment for the 24 months following the trough. We refer to this as the “average response”, and this is displayed as (last half of) the solid line in the upper-left panel of Figure 17. In the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions, we replace the post trough dynamics of routine occupational employment with a re-scaled version of the average response. In particular, we re-scale the average response to match the magnitude of the fall in actual employment within the first 5 months of the trough. We choose 5 months, since this is the turning point of the average response.

The counterfactual for routine employment is displayed for the example of the 2009 recession as the hatched line in the upper-left panel of Figure 17. Because the actual fall after the 2009 trough was greater than that observed in the average of the early recessions, the average response had to be magnified. After 11 months, the average response turns positive. The magnification factor would then imply a very sharp rebound in the counterfactual. Hence, to be conservative, we set the counterfactual for months 12 through 24 to be exactly the average response. In the cases of the 1991 and 2001 recessions, the average response fell more sharply than did actual routine employment. In these cases, the counterfactual was derived by attenuating the average response by the appropriate factor. To be conservative on the strength of the recovery, after the average response turns positive, we maintained the attenuation factor.

These counterfactuals in log deviations were then used to derive counterfactuals for routine employment levels. These were then added to the actual employment levels in non-routine
occupations to obtain counterfactual aggregate employment series. These counterfactuals in the aggregate were then expressed as log deviations from their value at the recession troughs to obtain Figure 7.

Finally, in the upper-right, lower-left panel, and lower-right panels of Figure 17, we present the results of the same counterfactual experiment for the 1970, 1975, and 1982 recessions. These panels demonstrate that the nature of the early recoveries – which were not jobless – are not fundamentally altered by the exercise. That is, they continue to display recoveries in aggregate employment with roughly the same magnitude and timing.

**D Vacancy Costs and the Tightness Ratio**

Here we demonstrate how variation in the vacancy cost affects the equilibrium tightness ratio. From equations (14) and (17), the zero profit condition in steady state can be expressed as:

$$\kappa_M = q(\theta_M)\beta(1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{f_M - z - \hat{\tau}K_M\theta_M}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)} \right].$$

(21)

Assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching function (as is standard in the literature), $q(\theta_M) = \theta_M^{\alpha-1}$, $0 < \alpha < 1$. With this, the zero profit condition can be rewritten as:

$$\kappa_M\theta_M = \theta_M^{\alpha} \beta(1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{f_M - z - \hat{\tau}K_M\theta_M}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)} \right].$$

(22)
Consider a fall in $\kappa_M$. Condition (22) requires a rise in $\theta_M$: in equilibrium, a lower vacancy cost induces a fall in the firm’s job filling probability through a rise in the tightness ratio, $\theta_M$.

Moreover, maintaining zero profits requires a larger than proportionate rise in $\theta_M$. To see this, suppose to the contrary that the rise in $\theta_M$ is proportionate to the fall in $\kappa_M$, so that the product $-\kappa_M\theta_M$ remains unchanged. This would imply that the LHS of (22) remains unchanged, as does the total surplus (the term in square brackets) on the RHS. Hence, equality would not be maintained as $\theta_M^2$ on the RHS would rise. Given that $\alpha < 1$, this implies that $\theta_M$ must rise more than proportionately to the fall in $\kappa_M$, i.e. that $\kappa_M\theta_M$ rises.

As a result, a lower vacancy cost results in a higher option value of unemployment, $\hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M$, and thus, a higher value of unemployed search in the routine market. Hence, holding the option value of unemployment in the $S$-market constant, there exists a $\kappa_M$ such that $\hat{\tau}\kappa_M\theta_M = \hat{\tau}\kappa_S\theta_S$. For any values of $\kappa_M$ smaller than this, unemployed middle-skill workers would search in the routine market, even when $f_S > f_M$. 

35
References


