Globalization and Income Distribution: 
A Specific Factors Continuum Approach*

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Abstract
Does globalization widen inequality or increase income risk? In the specific factors continuum model of this paper, globalization widens inequality, amplifying the positive (negative) premia for export (import-competing) sectors. Globalization amplifies the risk from idiosyncratic relative productivity shocks but reduces risk from aggregate shocks to absolute advantage, relative endowments and transfers. Aggregate-shock-induced income risk bears most heavily on the poorest specific factors, while non-traded sectors are insulated. Heterogeneous shocks to firms induce Darwinian competition for sector specific factors that is harsher the more productive the sector. Wage bargaining implies within-sector wage dispersion that falls or rises with export intensity depending on the joint distribution of sectoral and firm shocks.

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Globalization is often thought to have increased inequality. The model of this paper implies that globalization raises inequality everywhere. Globalization is also commonly thought to have increased personal income risk. Foreign productivity shocks have increased effects on traded goods sectors while non-traded goods sectors risk the onset of trade. A contrasting economic intuition suggests that wider markets reduce the real income effects of aggregate shocks to relative productivity, relative endowments and international transfers. Both intuitive forces are combined and formalized here in a specific factors continuum model that isolates the key elements while abstracting from inessential details.

For thinking about income inequality and risk, the specific factors model has several advantages. First, random productivity draws across sectors combined with ex post immobility of ex ante identical factors readily rationalize the tremendous heterogeneity of wages across sectors, especially the premium for export sector employment.\(^1\) Second, when firms receive different productivity draws, a Darwinian gale blows through the sectoral factor market, reallocating the sector specific factor to the more productive firms. When paired with wage bargaining, the model can explain why larger and more productive firms within each sector pay higher wages for skilled labor. Depending on the joint distribution of sectoral and firm shocks, within-sector wage dispersion may increase or decrease with export intensity. The Darwinian force in this paper does not require fixed export costs to select firms, in contrast to the Melitz (2003) model. This may be an advantage in light of Besedes and Prusa’s (2006) finding that trade in highly disaggregated sectors winks on and off frequently, appearing inconsistent with fixed trade costs. Third, trade cost is linked to income distribution by the same mechanism as in the now-standard political economy of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; empirically confirmed by Goldberg and Maggi, 1999), pointing toward a political economy of the risk-sharing aspect of trade policy. See Eaton and Grossman (1985) for analysis of ‘optimal’ tariffs as insurance.

The model focuses on the distributional consequences of combining specificity, random productivity and globalization. After the endowment of potentially skilled labor is allocated across sectors, specific skills are acquired, productivity shocks are realized and the skilled labor combines with intersec-

\(^1\)This regularity was given prominence by Katz and Summers (1989). The export premium is well documented in the US and other developed countries. Sparser available evidence finds the same pattern in poorer countries as well — see Milner and Tandrayen (2006) on sub-Saharan Africa and Tsou, Liu and Huang (2006) on Taiwan.
torally mobile unskilled labor to produce output as efficiently as possible. All sectors have identical ex ante potential production functions. In contrast to the goods continuum Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977, 1980), trade is diversified, action occurs on both intensive and extensive margins, and the distributional consequences of globalization for import-competing sectors are prominent. As with its predecessor continuum models, sharp implications are obtained that appear likely to obtain in more general cases. The tractability of the model suggests that it is a good platform on which to build extensions. The Ricardian continuum model arises as the special case where the specific factor allocation is perfectly efficient ex post, effectively becoming a mobile factor able to move in response to realizations of shocks.

The paper first characterizes the ex post equilibrium production and trade patterns. Comparative static results with respect to shocks in relative endowments, relative technology (absolute advantage), transfers and trade costs are drawn and reported in the Appendix, echoing Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson. Based on the comparative statics, it is shown that globalization ordinarily reduces the magnitude of nominal and real income response to the shocks, hence globalization reduces aggregate risk.

Skilled workers choose their sectors prior to the realization of productivity shocks. Their combined actions act in equilibrium to equalize ex ante prospects, so that identical ex ante skilled wage distributions characterize each sector in equilibrium. The ex post returns differ across sectors due to differences in realized productivity shocks and the efficient allocation of the mobile factor that ensues.

The equilibrium skilled wage distribution exhibits higher skilled wages in export sectors (those receiving relatively high productivity realizations) than in import competing sectors (those receiving relatively low productivity realizations). Globalization widens income inequality in each country, raising the top, lowering the bottom and narrowing the middle. Within sectors, when firms have heterogeneous productivity shocks, the more productive firms expand, driving out those less fortunate. This force is stronger in more productive sectors. With wage bargaining, more productive firms pay higher skilled wages. Within-sector wage dispersion can be increasing or decreasing in export intensity, depending on the joint distribution of sectoral and firm shocks.

Viewed ex ante, the model captures the popular sense that personal incomes are more risky in a globalizing world due to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. But in contrast, the model also implies that globalization ordinarily reduces nominal income risk due to aggregate risk. This offsetting benefit of globalization is amplified in real income risk. The cost of living index moves with the factorial terms of trade, providing a damping effect on real income that is larger the higher the equilibrium proportion of traded goods in the consumption basket.

The effect of globalization on income distribution has previously been studied in models that miss some important empirical regularities. For example, the factor proportions model applications surveyed in Feenstra (2004) have income distributions of low dimension, in contrast to empirical distributions with high dimensionality characterized by export premia (and import-competing negative premia). In the Heckscher-Ohlin continuum model application of Feenstra and Hanson (1999), globalization raises the skill premium by increasing the average skill intensity of the production mix in North and South through reallocation on the extensive margin of production. The model of this paper is in contrast focused on sectoral wage premia. In the general case developed in the Appendix, globalization can raise or lower the average skill premium in both countries depending on whether the average skill intensity of production rises or falls, itself ordinarily determined by whether the elasticity of substitution is less or greater than one. The model in the text sets the elasticity of substitution equal to one, neutralizing globalization’s effect on the average skill premium.

New papers by Blanchard and Willman (2008) and Costinot and Vogel (2008) are similar to this paper in featuring continuum income distributions with heterogeneous workers who sort into industries of varying skill intensity. In contrast to the present paper these models do not explain locational rents to otherwise observationally identical factors. Moreover, they imply that globalization widens inequality in one economy while reducing inequality in the other economy, which is apparently counterfactual. Nevertheless, these two approaches should be viewed as complements in a fuller understanding of trade and income inequality. Also related is a new paper by Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008) that generates high dimensional income distributions due to workers’ differential abilities interacting with a costly screening technology used by heterogeneous firms to select from applicants. As in this paper, the introduction of trade raises inequality in both countries. The

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2The US rise in inequality is widely documented. For evidence on rising Mexican and Brazilian inequality see Calmon et al. (2002).
mechanism is different, however, being run by the selection effect of fixed export costs.

The model is also related to a literature featuring productivity shocks. Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive the equilibrium implications of the Ricardian continuum model with sectoral productivity shocks. They solve the many country Ricardian continuum model by imposing a Frechet distribution on the productivity shocks. The present paper derives for the first time the specific factors model’s implications for the general equilibrium pattern of production, trade and income distribution in a two country world with productivity shocks. Judiciously imposing further restrictions on technology yields a closed form characterization of equilibrium.

Section 1 presents the basic production model for given allocations of the specific factors. Section 2 derives the global equilibrium of the two trading countries. Section 3 deals with the comparative statics of the model. Section 4 derives the ex post distributional implications. Section 5 discusses the equilibrium ex ante allocation of the specific factor. Section 6 analyzes heterogeneous firms within sectors. Section 7 concludes with speculation on extensions to empirical work and dynamics. The Appendix shows that the results of the text hold for the general neoclassical production function.

1 The Production Model

Each good has an identical potential production function that is increasing, homogeneous of degree one and concave in skilled and unskilled labor. Maximal potential output in sector $z$ is reduced by the realization of a random productivity draw $1/a(z)$, the total factor productivity parameter, $a(z) \geq 1$. Until Section 6, all firms within a sector receive only the common productivity draw. The potential production function is $F[L(z), K(z)]$, where $L(z), K(z)$ are the amounts of unskilled labor and skilled labor respectively allocated to sector $z$.

A Cobb-Douglas potential production function is imposed at the end of this section and the remainder of the text to generate parametric results. The Appendix shows that the qualitative analysis holds with the general neoclassical production function. The setup also extends to any number of specific factor classes such as multiple skill types, each of which experiences income dispersion like that analyzed here for one skill type.
Output in sector $z$ is given by

$$y(z) = \frac{\lambda(z)K}{a(z)} f\left[\frac{L(z)}{\lambda(z)K}\right]$$

(1)

where $f(\cdot) \equiv F[L(z)/K(z), 1]$, $\lambda(z)$ is the fraction of skilled labor allocated to sector $z$ where it acquires sector specific skills, and $K$ is the total supply of skilled labor. Prior to allocation, labor skills are potential. The skill-acquisition phase is suppressed for simplicity.

After the skilled labor is allocated (a decision modeled in Section 5) and skills are acquired, productivity shocks are realized and unskilled labor is allocated. For simplicity, the range of productivity shocks is restricted such that skilled workers never choose to become mobile unskilled workers. This implies that even the sector with the worst shock continues to produce.\(^3\)

Equilibrium allocation of unskilled labor satisfies the value of marginal product conditions for each sector:

$$w = \frac{p(z)}{a(z)} f'[\frac{L(z)}{\lambda(z)K}],$$

(2)

where $w$ is the unskilled wage rate and $p(z)$ is the price of good $z$. It is convenient in what follows to work with efficiency prices $P(z) \equiv p(z)/a(z)$. Solving for the unskilled labor demand yields $L(z) = \lambda(z)Kh(P(z)/w); h' = -1/f'' > 0$. Substituting into the production function, the supply function is given by

$$y(z) = \frac{\lambda(z)K}{a(z)} f[h(P(z)/w)].$$

(3)

The supply side of the economy is closed with the labor market clearance condition. The aggregate supply of unskilled labor is given by $L$, hence market clearance implies:

$$\frac{L}{K} = \int_{0}^{1} \lambda(z)h(P(z)/w)dz.$$

(4)

At this point the continuum of sectors structure is imposed, with discrete concepts such as ‘share’ and ‘fraction’ being applied to densities at some cost.

\(^3\)De-skilling and the accompanying industry shutdown are interesting quantity-adjustment phenomena, but distract from the factor price adjustment focus of this paper. Treating the quantity-adjustment adds complexity because both factor endowments and the range of produced goods become endogenous.
to mathematical usage. Applying the implicit function theorem to (4), the equilibrium wage is
\[ w = W(\{P(z)\}, \{\lambda(z)\}, L/K). \]

Gross domestic product is given by \[ g = \int_0^1 p(z)y(z)dz. \] This becomes the GDP function
\[ g(\{P(z)\}, \{\lambda(z)\}, L, K) = K \int_0^1 \lambda(z)P(z)f[h(P(z)/W(\cdot)]dz \]
where \( W(\cdot) \) is substituted for \( w \) in (3) and the result used to substitute for \( y(z) \).\(^4\) The GDP share of sector \( z \) is given by
\[ s(z) = \frac{\lambda(z)P(z)f[h(P(z)/W(\cdot)]}{\int_0^1 \lambda(z)P(z)f[h(P(z)/W(\cdot)]dz}. \]

The GDP function is convex and homogeneous of degree one in prices, concave in \( K, L, \{\lambda\} \) and homogeneous of degree one in \( K, L \).

In the Cobb-Douglas case
\[ y(z) = [1/a(z)]L(z)\alpha K(z)^{1-\alpha}. \]
\( \alpha \) is labor’s share parameter.\(^5\) The gross domestic product function has a convenient closed form:
\[ g = L^\alpha K^{1-\alpha}G \]
where the GDP deflator \( G \) is given by
\[ G = \left[ \int_0^1 \lambda(z)(P(z))^{1/(1-\alpha)} \right]^{1-\alpha}dz, \]
‘Real GDP’ is given by \( R \equiv L^\alpha K^{1-\alpha} \). The Cobb-Douglas GDP function thus has the convenient constant elasticity of transformation (CET) form.\(^6\) The GDP production shares are given by
\[ s(z) = \lambda(z)\left\{ \frac{P(z)}{G} \right\}^{1/(1-\alpha)}. \]
A country produces all goods for which it has a positive specific endowment under the Cobb-Douglas assumption because the mobile factor has a very large marginal product in any sector where its level of employment is very small.

\(^4\)As allocation of the specific capital grows more efficient, the model converges onto a Ricardian model (since production functions are identical over \( z \)). Then in the limit \( g = L \max_z p(z)/a(z) \).

\(^5\)The identical Cobb-Douglas assumption is consistent with the well known empirical regularity of constant labor shares of GDP, despite shifting production shares.

\(^6\)The elasticity of transformation is equal to \( \alpha/(1-\alpha) \).
2 Global Equilibrium

There is a foreign economy with identical potential production functions in each sector, but differing productivity draws \(a^*(z)\) from a different productivity distribution. The foreign economy is also characterized by differing specific factor endowments \(K^*(z)\) and labor endowment \(L^*\).

The foreign economy has GDP function and GDP share equations generated analogously to the home economy, all foreign variables being denoted by \(*'s\). The foreign efficiency prices are denoted \(P^*(z)\). In the Cobb-Douglas case the foreign GDP function is

\[
g^* = (L^*)^\alpha (K^*)^{1-\alpha} G^*
\]

where

\[
G^* = \left[ \int_0^1 \lambda^*(z)(P^*(z))^{1/(1-\alpha)} \right]^{1-\alpha}.
\]

A crucial concept is the relative advantage of the home country \(A(z) \equiv a^*(z)/a(z)\). For any good \(z\), \(A(z)\) gives the absolute advantage of home producers. It will be convenient below to think of a shift in the entire \(A(z)\) schedule as a shift in absolute advantage. Define \(\Lambda(z) \equiv A(z)^{1/(1-\alpha)} \lambda(z)/\lambda^*(z)\), home relative labor productivity in \(z\). It is in principle possible that \(\Lambda(z)\) could have a different ordering from \(A(z)\), but Section 5 shows that the equilibrium allocation of skilled labor implies \(\lambda(z) = \lambda^*(z) = \gamma(z)\), hence \(\Lambda(z) = A(z)^{1/(1-\alpha)}\) has the same ordering as \(A(z)\). The slope of \(\Lambda(z)\) gives the comparative advantage ranking of sectors, with low \(z\) associated with high home relative efficiency.

Trade is costly, with parametric markup factor \(t > 1\). For goods exported by the home country, \(p^*(z) = p(z)t\). For goods exported by the foreign country, \(p(z) = p^*(z)t\). In terms of efficiency prices, \(P^*(z) = P(z)t/A(z)\) for home exports while \(P^*(z) = P(z)/tA(z)\) for home imports.

Tastes are identical across countries and characterized by a Cobb-Douglas utility function with parametric expenditure ‘share’ for good \(z\) given by \(\gamma(z)\). The cumulative expenditure share on goods indexed in the interval \([0, z]\) is given by \(\int_0^z \gamma(x)dx = \Gamma(z)\).

International trade occurs in equilibrium for a range of goods where relative productivity differences are large enough to cover the trade cost. Home exports are in the interval \(z \in [0, \bar{z}]\) and foreign exports in the interval \(z \in (\bar{z}^*, 1]\). Non-traded goods are in the interval \([\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*]\) where productivity differences are too small to overcome trade costs. The export cutoff points \(\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*\) are endogenous.
Equilibrium prices must clear markets for each good. Due to the Cobb-Douglas preferences and the iceberg trade costs, \( s(z)g + s^*(z)g^* = \gamma(z)(g + g^*) \). This implies for traded goods:

\[
\frac{s(z)}{\gamma(z)} \frac{g}{g + g^*} + \frac{s^*(z)}{\gamma(z)} \frac{g^*}{g + g^*} = 1. \tag{11}
\]

For non-traded goods \( s(z) = \gamma(z) = s^*(z); z \in [\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*] \). For traded goods, (11) implies that \( s < \gamma \iff s^* > \gamma \).

### 2.1 Goods Market Equilibrium

In the Cobb-Douglas case, it is convenient to choose the foreign GDP deflator as the numeraire, and interpret \( G \), the home GDP deflator, as the multifactoral terms of trade. The specification yields closed form solutions for goods prices given \( G \). Then in the next sub-section, the balanced trade condition is solved for the equilibrium multifactoral terms of trade \( G \).

Using (10) and (8) in (11), the equilibrium transform of the efficiency unit price for traded goods is given by

\[
P(z)^{1/(1-\alpha)} = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)} \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{G^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)}R/R^* + t^{1/(1-\alpha)/\Lambda(z)}}, z \in [0, \bar{z}); \tag{12}
\]

\[
P(z)^{1/(1-\alpha)} = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)} \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{G^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)}R/R^* + 1/t^{1/(1-\alpha)/\Lambda(z)}}, z \in (\bar{z}^*, 1]. \tag{13}
\]

For non-traded goods the transform efficiency price is given by

\[
P(z)^{1/(1-\alpha)} = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)} G^{1/(1-\alpha)}, z \in [\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*]. \tag{14}
\]

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7 The text expression for market clearance is built up from material balance using iceberg melting trade costs. For example, in the range \( z \in [0, \bar{z}] \), market clearance is given by

\[y(z) - x(z) = t[x^*(z) - y^*(z)]\]

where \( x(z), x^*(z) \) denote consumption of good \( z \) in the home and foreign countries. The equation implies that for each unit imported by the foreign economy, \( t > 1 \) units must be shipped from the home economy, \( t - 1 \) units melting away en route. Multiply both sides by \( p(z) \), use \( p^*(z) = p(z)/t \) and utilize the GDP and expenditure share definitions to obtain the text expression.

8 The Cobb-Douglas production function restriction is useful in getting sharp results that the Appendix shows extend more generally. In the general case, \( G \) is replaced by the home relative wage.
The equilibrium production shares, based on the equilibrium prices in (12)-(15), are as follows. For home traded goods shares:

\[
s(z) = \gamma(z) \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{GR/R^* + (Gt)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(z)} , z \in [0, \bar{z});
\]

\[
s(z) = \gamma(z) \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(z)} , z \in (\bar{z}^*, 1].
\]

Crucially, export intensity \( s(z) / \gamma(z) \) is decreasing in \( z \) for traded goods. For non-traded goods, \( s(z) = \gamma(z) = s^*(z), z \in [\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*]. \)

The margins of non-tradability are determined by \( s(\bar{z}) = \gamma(\bar{z}) \) and \( s^*(\bar{z}^*) = \gamma(\bar{z}^*). \) These solve for the trade cutoff equations

\[
G = \Lambda(\bar{z})^{1-\alpha} / t
\]

and

\[
G = \Lambda(\bar{z}^*)^{1-\alpha} t.
\]

\( \bar{z}^* \) is implicitly a function \( Z^*(\bar{z}, t) \) that is increasing in \( \bar{z} \) and \( t \) in equilibrium, by (18)-(19):

\[
Z^*(\bar{z}, t) = \bar{z}^* : \Lambda(\bar{z}^*) = \Lambda(\bar{z})/t^{2/(1-\alpha)}.
\]

### 2.2 Factoral Terms of Trade

The equilibrium home GDP shares (16) and (17) must add up to the expenditure shares on traded goods, by the international budget (balanced trade) constraint. Define the traded goods expenditure shares \( \Gamma(z) \equiv \int_0^z \gamma(x) dx \) and \( \Gamma^*(z^*) \equiv \int_{\bar{z}^*}^1 \gamma(x) dx \), where \( x \) is a variable of integration. Similarly define the traded goods GDP shares for exports \( X \) and imports \( M \) as

\[
S^X(z, G; R/R^*, t, \{\Lambda(z)\}) \equiv \int_0^z s(x) dx = \int_0^z \gamma(x) \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{GR/R^* + (Gt)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(x)} dx
\]

For foreign traded goods shares

\[
s^*(z) = \gamma(z) \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{G^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)t-1/(1-\alpha)}\Lambda(z)R/R^* + 1}, z \in [0, \bar{z});
\]

\[
s^*(z) = \gamma(z) \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{G^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)t/(1-\alpha)}\Lambda(z)R/R^* + 1}, z \in (\bar{z}^*, 1].
\]
and

\[ S^M(z^*, G; R/R^*; t, \Lambda(z)) \equiv \int_{z^*}^1 s(x)dx = \int_{z^*}^1 \gamma(x) \frac{GR/R^* + 1}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(x)} dx \]

The balanced trade constraint is

\[ S^X(z, \cdot) + S^M(z^*, \cdot) = \Gamma(z) + \Gamma^*(z^*). \tag{21} \]

Solve for \( G \) as an implicit function of \( z \): \( G = B(z, \cdot) \) using \( z^* = Z^*(z,t) \) in (21). Based on the properties of the model, \( B(z) \) rises to a maximum at the equilibrium \( \bar{z} \):

\[ \frac{B_z}{B} = \frac{s(z) - \gamma(z) - [s(z^*) - \gamma(z^*)]Z^*_z}{-S^X_G - S^M_G} \]

is equal to zero at \( \bar{z} \) using \( z^* = Z^*(z,t) \). \( B_z/B \) has the sign of the numerator because the denominator is positive: \( S^X \) and \( S^M \) are decreasing in \( G \).

(18), (19) and (21) are displayed in Figure 1. The intersection of (18) at the maximum of \( \ln B(z; \cdot) \) determines the equilibrium \( \bar{z}, \ln G \). The intersection of (19) with the tangent line at \( E \) gives \( \bar{z}^* \).

**Proposition 1** Provided trade costs are not too high, a unique trading equilibrium exists on \( z \in [0,1] \).

If equilibrium exists, it is unique because the properties of (21) imply that \( \ln B(z) \) has a unique maximum due to \( \Lambda(z) \) decreasing in \( z \). The equilibrium allocates home and foreign unskilled labor to maximize world income in terms of the numeraire, an instance of the invisible hand.

Nonexistence arises when the trade cost is too large. If \( t \) is too large for a given \( \Lambda(z) \) schedule, the two downward sloping schedules in Figure 1 are too

\[ \frac{S^X_G}{S^X} = \frac{GR/R^*}{GR/R^* + 1} - \int_{0}^{\bar{z}} \frac{s(z)}{S^X} \frac{GR/R^*}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(z)} dz \in (-1,0), \]

and

\[ \frac{S^M_G}{S^M} = \frac{GR/R^*}{GR/R^* + 1} - \int_{\bar{z}^*}^{1} \frac{s(z)}{S^M} \frac{GR/R^*}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(z)} dz \in (-1,0), \]

where the sign is due to the integrals being averages of elements that all exceed \( GR^*/(1 + GR/R^*) \) except at the limits \( \bar{z} \) and \( \bar{z}^* \) respectively.

11The straight line cutoff schedules are literally correct in the constant elasticity case for \( \Lambda(z) \).
far apart and there is no value of $\ln G$ for which both $\bar{z}$ and $\bar{z}^*$ are in the unit interval. If $\Lambda(z)$ is too large relative to a given $t$, both the downward sloping schedules in Figure 1 are shifted upward and there is no trade because the foreign disadvantage is too large to overcome the trade cost.\textsuperscript{12} Nonexistence also arises when country sizes are sufficiently unequal for given trade cost and $\Lambda(z)$. Drawing on a result proved in the next section, a rise (fall) in $R/R^*$ shifts $\ln B(z)$ down (up), and the range of exports of the foreign (home) country can vanish. Equilibrium $G$ is unable to fall (rise) enough to permit trade.

\textsuperscript{12}When the equilibrium allocation of skilled labor $\lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z)$ obtains, $\Lambda(z) = A(z)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$, hence $(1-\alpha) \ln \Lambda(z) = \ln A(z)$.
It is instructive to note the points of difference with the familiar Ricardian continuum model that is nested in the specific factors model of this pa-
per. The Ricardian (and Heckscher-Ohlin continuum) model(s) shut down import-competing production whereas the specific factors model ordinarily has diversified production. When ex post reallocation of skilled labor occurs, both types of labor are used in the same proportions in every sector that produces and low productivity sectors shut down. \((1 - \alpha) \ln \Lambda(z)\) is replaced by \(\ln A(z)\) in Figure 1, \(\ln G\) is replaced by \(w\), the home relative wage, and the balanced trade equilibrium condition (21) that implies \(\ln B(z)\) is replaced by \(\ln w = \ln \Gamma^*(z)R/\Gamma(z)R^*\). The Ricardian balanced trade equilibrium condition is upward sloping in \(z\) throughout, in contrast to the \(\ln B(z)\) function that reaches a maximum at \(\bar{z}\).\(^{13}\) The Ricardian model also emerges as a special case of the Cobb-Douglas model when \(\alpha = 1\). The endowments model is the opposite extreme where \(\alpha = 0\).

3 Aggregate Shocks, Real Incomes Risks and Globalization

The comparative static responses of the terms of trade and the extensive margins to shocks in relative factor endowments, absolute advantage, transfers and trade costs resemble those from Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977). The details are in the Appendix. New results shows that globalization — a fall in trade costs — ordinarily reduces the variance of the factoral terms of trade, hence aggregate income risk, due to these aggregate shocks.

Supply side shocks to national incomes are driven by shocks in relative country size due to differential growth rates, and relative productivity (absolute advantage) shifts while demand side shocks come from transfers (e.g. international capital flows). For transfers, globalization has a first order effect in damping the shock in \(\beta\) delivered to the terms of trade because \(\beta B\beta/B\) is proportional to \(1 - \Gamma - \Gamma^*\), the proportion of non-traded goods. For infinitesimal supply side shocks there is no first order effect. But for discrete changes in all cases:

**Proposition 2** Globalization ordinarily reduces the variance in \(G\) induced by shocks in relative endowments, absolute advantage and transfers.

The variance reduction arises because a fall in trade costs flattens the \(\ln B(z)\) function by reducing \(B_z\). A smaller slope implies that for every re-

\(^{13}\)\(B(z)\) need not be globally concave, but the portions to the left and right of \(B_z = 0\) must be upward and downward sloping respectively.
alization of the shock, the impact on $\ln G$ is less in absolute value. The qualification “ordinarily” arises because the change in trade costs has ambiguous second order impacts on the exogenous shifts in the $\ln B(z)$ function and on $B_z$.$^{14}$

The rationale is simple — lower trade costs increase the responsiveness of the extensive margin to aggregate shocks, hence changes in the extensive margin absorb more of the impact leaving less to fall on the factoral terms of trade. How large these variance dampening effects are will depend on hard-to-specify details such as the distributions of $\gamma$’s and $\Lambda$’s.

The aggregate-risk-damping property of globalization should obtain more generally than in the present model. The same mechanism is at work in the Ricardian model.$^{15}$ The Appendix shows that the same qualitative results obtain with the general neoclassical production function: lower trade costs increase the responsiveness of the extensive margin to aggregate shocks and thus damp down factoral terms of trade responses, all else equal.

Statements about nominal income changes in the model carry through to statements about real income changes, hence the remainder of the paper focuses on nominal incomes. The demonstration focuses on aggregate real income because personal real incomes are shares of aggregate income, with details analyzed in Section 4.

$^{14}$Differentiating $B_z/B$ with respect to $t$:

$$\frac{\partial B_z/B}{\partial t} \frac{1}{B_z/B} = -\frac{Z^*_t[s(z^*) - \gamma(z^*)]}{s(z) - \gamma(z) - Z^*_t[s(z^*) - \gamma(z^*)]} - \frac{S_X^G + S_M^G}{S_X^G + S_M^G}.$$

The first term is negative; differentiating (20), $Z^*_t = -2\Lambda(z)/[(1 - \alpha)\Lambda(z)^{2/(1-\alpha)}] < 0$. The second term is ambiguous in sign for the same reason $B_t$ is ambiguous in sign. Disregarding the influence of the second term, $B_{zt} < 0$.

$^{15}$The trade balance equation in the Ricardian case implies $w/w^* = \Gamma(z)L^*/\Gamma^*(z^*)L$ while the export cutoff equation is $w/w^* = A(z)/t$. Then for example the response to shocks to relative endowments is given by

$$\frac{d\ln w/w^*}{d\ln (L^*/L)} = \frac{A_z/A}{A_z/A - [\gamma(z)/\Gamma(z)] + Z^*_z\gamma(z^*)/\Gamma(z^*)} \in (0, 1).$$

Compared to

$$\frac{d\ln G}{d\ln R/R^*} = -\frac{(1 - \alpha)A_z/A}{(1 - \alpha)A_x/A - B_z/B} \in (-1, 0)$$

the Ricardian term $[\gamma(z)/\Gamma(z) + Z^*_z\gamma(z^*)/\Gamma(z^*)]$ is less complex than $B_z/B$ in the specific factors case. In both cases the responsiveness to shocks on the extensive margin is driven by $Z^*_z$, a response that is damped by higher trade costs.
The log of aggregate real income is defined by \( \ln R + \ln G - \ln C \) where the log of the true cost of living deflator \( \ln C = \int \gamma(z) \ln P(z)a(z)dz \). Substitute the logarithm of (12)-(14) into \( \ln C \) and differentiate with respect to \( \ln G \). The preceding comparative static shocks to nominal income via changes in \( G \) affect log real income by\(^{16} \)

\[
1 - \frac{d \ln C}{d \ln G} = 1 - (\Gamma + \Gamma^*) \frac{GR/R^*}{1 + GR/R^*} > 0.
\]

Thus real and nominal incomes move together as the factorial terms of trade change.

As for other sources of change in the cost of living index, changes in the extensive margin have no local first order effect. Technology shocks that alter \( a(z) \) affect real income through \( -\int \gamma(z) d\ln a(z) \). Trade cost shocks (i.e. distribution technology shocks) affect \( \ln C \) ambiguously at constant \( G \): a fall in \( t \) lowers buyer import prices but raises buyer export prices. Trade cost changes thus induce terms of trade effects that have the standard ambiguous impact on real income.

As for the variance of real income, \(^{15} \)

**Proposition 3** Globalization unambiguously reduces the real income risk due to factorial terms of trade risk.

Globalization increases the range of traded goods. This makes the cost of living index more responsive to the factorial terms of trade and thus makes real income less responsive to the factorial terms of trade. Formally, globalization lowers the right hand side of (22):

\[
\frac{d(1 - d \ln C/d \ln G)}{dt} = -\frac{d(\Gamma + \Gamma^*)}{dt} \frac{GR/R^*}{1 + GR/R^*} > 0.
\]

\(^{16} \)

\[
1 - \frac{d \ln C}{d \ln G} = 1 - (\Gamma + \Gamma^*) \left[ (1 - \alpha) \frac{GR/R^*}{1 + GR/R^*} + \alpha(\rho^X + \rho^M) \right] > 0,
\]

where

\[
\rho^X \equiv \int \gamma(z) \frac{GR/R^*}{GR/R^* + (Gt)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / \Lambda(z)}dz \in (0,1)
\]

and

\[
\rho^M \equiv \int \gamma(z) \frac{GR/R^*}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / \Lambda(z)}dz \in (0,1).
\]

Use (16)-(17) to substitute in \( \rho^X, \rho^M \) and simplify using (21) to obtain the expression below.
Proposition 3 in combination with Proposition 2 make a good case that
globalization reduces the real income risk due to aggregate shocks. This ob-
servation is related to that of Newbery and Stiglitz (1984), who note that
terms of trade responses to shocks tend to offset the direct impact of the
shock and thus provide a kind of insurance. In terms of the model, glob-
alization improves the coverage of this insurance. (In contrast to Newbery
and Stiglitz, the presence or absence of risk-sharing assets has no impact
on resource allocation here, so there is no impact of globalization that can
reduce the efficiency of trade.)\textsuperscript{17} Cole and Obstfeld (1991) note that this
partial insurance feature of terms of trade responses implies smaller scope
for international asset trade to provide gains from risk-sharing.

4 Income Distribution

The average skill premium in the Cobb-Douglas case is independent of inter-
national forces; the unitary elasticity of substitution conveniently neutralizes
Stolper-Samuelson distributional effects of globalization.\textsuperscript{18} The model im-
plies that the unskilled wage is

\[ w = g_L = \alpha \left( \frac{K}{L} \right)^{1-\alpha} G. \]

The average return to skilled labor (the value of marginal product of an
equiproportionate increase in all specific factors) is given by

\[ g_K = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{L}{K} \right)^{\alpha} G. \]

The skill premium is

\[ \frac{g_K}{g_L} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \frac{L}{K}, \]

independent of international forces. More general neoclassical production
functions in the specific factors setting imply that the average skill premium
may rise or fall in both countries due to globalization,\textsuperscript{19} depending on whether

\textsuperscript{17}I am grateful to Jonathan Vogel for pointing out this link.
\textsuperscript{18}In the 2x2 factor proportions model, globalization causes the skill premium to rise
in the skill abundant country and fall in the skill scarce country. In the Heckscher-Ohlin
continuum model, globalization causes the average skill intensity of production to rise in
both countries, driving up the skill premium.
\textsuperscript{19}Linkage between openness and capital accumulation or technology will also violate the
invariance property.
the average skill intensity of production rises or falls. The Appendix develops the details and argues that with CES production functions the average skill premium ordinarily rises (falls) as the elasticity of substitution is less (greater) than one. Empirical estimates suggest that the elasticity of substitution exceeds 1, so the strong evidence for globally rising skill premia is inconsistent with globalization in the model unless skill-biased technological change is also at work. Skill-biased technological change raises the skill premium, all else equal, represented in the Cobb-Douglas case by a fall in $\alpha$.

The distribution of equilibrium skilled wages across sectors and its comparative statics depend partly on the allocation of the potentially specific factors to sectors. The possible distributions are restricted by imposing the equilibrium skill allocation derived in Section 5, which equates the allocation of skilled workers $\lambda(z)$ to the allocation of expenditures $\gamma(z)$. Under this allocation the pattern of positive (negative) premia for export (import competing) sectors emerges. Moreover, the distribution of premia are ordered by export intensity $s(z)/\gamma(z)$. Intuitively this is because the highest comparative advantage sectors would have the largest premia even in the absence of a mobile factor, but their premia are increased by their ability to draw more of the mobile factor to their favored sector.

The analysis of distribution here focuses exclusively on the home country because the specific factor income distribution in the foreign country is the mirror image of the home distribution. In each sector, the specific return is residually determined as $r(z)\lambda(z)K = [1 - \alpha(z)]p(z)y(z)$ where $\alpha(z) = wL(z)/p(z)y(z)$. Relative to the average return,

$$\frac{r(z)}{g_K} = \frac{\gamma(z) s(z)}{\lambda(z) \gamma(z)} \frac{1 - \alpha(z)}{1 - \bar{\alpha}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

Here, $\bar{\alpha} \equiv \int_0^1 s(z)\alpha(z)dz$. In the Cobb-Douglas case, $r(z)/g_K = s(z)/\lambda(z)$.

Using (16) and (17) in (23) for the Cobb-Douglas case yields

$$r(z)/g_K = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)} \frac{(GR/R^* + 1)}{GR/R^* + (Gt)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(z)}, z \in [0, \bar{z}); \hspace{1cm} (24)$$

$$r(z)/g_k = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)}, z \in [\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*]; \hspace{1cm} (25)$$

$$r(z)/g_K = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)} \frac{(GR/R^* + 1)}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\Lambda(z)}, z \in (\bar{z}^*, 1]. \hspace{1cm} (26)$$

(24)-(26) show that export sectors tend on average to have higher returns and import competing sectors to have lower returns than non-traded goods.
sectors. The implication emerges cleanly with the ex ante equilibrium allocation of skilled labor \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z) \Rightarrow \gamma(z)/\lambda(z) = 1, \forall z \). In this case \( \Lambda(z) = a^*(z)/a(z) \), the home absolute advantage in good \( z \). Figure 2 illustrates the implications, formalized in words as:

**Proposition 4** With the equilibrium (efficient) allocation of skilled labor, the skilled wage is falling in \( z \) for traded goods and equals the average skilled wage for non-traded goods.

Since export intensity \( s(z)/\gamma(z) \) is decreasing in \( z \), Proposition 4 implies that skill premia rise with export intensity.

The comparative static implications of the model for income distribution can now be drawn. Consider first the effect of improvements in the factoral terms of trade \( G \). For example, two underlying drivers of such improvements are foreign relative growth and a transfer into the home country. \( r(z) \) varies directly with \( s(z) \). Examining (16) and (17), \( s(z) \) is decreasing in \( G \) for both exports and imports while for non-traded goods \( s(z) \) is independent of \( G \). Increases in the factoral terms of trade \( G \) thus redistribute specific factor income from traded goods to non-traded goods. As for redistribution within the traded sectors, it is convenient to focus first on returns relative to the mean (equal to the non-traded skilled wage), \( r(z)/g_K = s(z)/\lambda(z) \).

**Proposition 5** The relative returns of trade-exposed specific factors fall with \( G \) everywhere, and most for the least productive sectors.

\[
\frac{\partial \ln r(z)/g_K}{\partial \ln G} = \frac{\partial \ln s(z)}{\partial \ln G} = -\left( \frac{1}{1 + GR/R^*} \right) - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{H(z)}{GR/R^* + H(z)} < 0
\]

where \( H(z) \equiv \Lambda(z)/\Lambda(z) \in [0, 1], z \leq \bar{z}; H(z) \equiv \Lambda(z^*)/\Lambda(z) \geq 1, z \geq \bar{z}^*; \) and \( H' > 0 \). The export cutoff equations are used above to simplify the derivatives of (16) and (17). The implications are illustrated in Figure 2.

The intuition is that the skilled wage relative to the mean is given by \( s(z)/g_K \) and the responsiveness of supply shares to changes in the factoral terms of trade is biggest for the lowest share sectors because the general equilibrium supply elasticity is given by \( G_{ppp}/G = [1 - s(z)]\alpha/(1 - \alpha) \). Proposition 5 and its intuition extend from the Cobb-Douglas to the general neoclassical case, as the Appendix argues, but with mild qualification.

Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a rise in \( G \) and a fall in \( t \) (analyzed below) on the distribution of \( r \) for efficient skilled labor allocation \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z) \). A log-linear form for \( A(z) \) is imposed for simplicity. A 1 percent rise in \( G \) lowers the \( \ln r(z)/g_K \) schedules for traded goods by \(-1/[(1 - \alpha)(GR/R^* + 1)]\). A 1 percent fall in \( t \) raises export relative incomes by the (absolute value
of the expression on the right hand side of (4) and lowers import sector relative incomes by the expression on the right hand side of (4). The figure is drawn assuming that $G < t$ so that a one percent fall in $t$ has a bigger impact than a one percent rise in $G$ for import competing sectors, but this ranking is arbitrary and without significance for the analysis. The complication of non-uniform $\gamma(z)/\lambda(z)$ does not affect the elasticities of returns with respect to $G$, but it alters the one-to-one relationship between $r(z)$ and $s(z)$ imposed in Figure 2. The distribution profile in Figure 2 can be thought of as indicating central tendency, with a confidence interval enclosing it.
When aggregate risk is present, the ex post distribution in Figure 2 is shifted up or down and the cutoffs $\bar{z}$ and $\bar{z}^*$ shift back and forth depending on the realization of aggregate shocks to absolute advantage, country size or transfers, but the profile retains its shape.

Globalization is modeled as decreases in symmetric trade costs. On the extensive margin, globalization widens inequality as it narrows the range of
non-traded goods \([\bar{z}, \tilde{z}^*]\) that is sheltered from external competition. Thus globalization redistributes specific factor income to exports from both non-traded goods and imported goods and to non-traded goods from imported goods for any given factorial terms of trade \(G\).

The effect of a change in \(t\) on the distribution of specific factor income relative to the mean is given by

\[
\frac{\partial \ln r(z)/g_K}{\partial \ln t} = -\frac{1}{G^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)}t^{-1/(1-\alpha)}\Lambda(z)R/R^* + 1} \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} < 0, \ z \leq \bar{z};
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial \ln r(z)/g_K}{\partial \ln t} = \frac{1}{G^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)}t^{1/(1-\alpha)}\Lambda(z)R/R^* + 1} \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} > 0, \ z \geq \tilde{z}^*.
\]

For non-traded goods, sector specific factor incomes are invariant to \(t\). For exported goods, a fall in \(t\) increases relative income by more the more productive the sector, while for imported goods the relative income is reduced by more the less productive the sector. The results are illustrated in Figure 2. Thus

**Proposition 6** Globalization at given factorial terms of trade reduces the specific factor income of import-competing sectors by more the less relatively productive the sector, increases the specific factor income of exporting sectors by more the more productive the sector, while non-traded sectors are completely insulated from globalization.

Notice that inequality increases in both countries, and that this property does not require restricting the distributions of productivity draws. It is a feature of factor specificity and the assumed equilibrium allocation of factors. The effect of globalization on the factorial terms of trade is ambiguous, but any improvement due to the fall in trade costs will redistribute income to non-traded sector specific factors from traded sector specific factors.

Proposition 2 showed that globalization reduces the variance of the factorial terms of trade due to aggregate shocks, thus tending to offset the globalization-induced increase in exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Both forces hit the poorest skilled workers the hardest. The size of the reduction in exposure to aggregate income income risk varies by sector in proportion to the square of

\[
\frac{\partial \ln r(z)/g_K}{\partial \ln G}.
\]
With the efficient allocation, Proposition 6, illustrated by Figure 2, shows that this offset in aggregate risk is most important for the poorest factors, least important for the richest factors and irrelevant for the middle non-traded sector factors. Proposition 5, also illustrated by Figure 2, shows that globalization increases idiosyncratic risk and is likewise most important for the poorest factors ex post, least important for the richest factors and irrelevant for the middle income non-traded sector specific factors.

5 Equilibrium Skill Allocation

The rational expectations equilibrium allocation of skilled labor for the home and foreign economies is \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z) \). This follows because the production functions in all sectors are ex ante identical, and the only source of predictable difference across sectors is variation in \( \gamma(z) \). The two countries differ in their relative endowments \( L/K \) and \( L^*/K^* \), but this provides no useful information for the sectoral allocation problem facing skilled workers.

The relative return is given by (24)-(26). When \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z) \), the price prospects for every sector are identical ex ante. Then this is an equilibrium allocation because no agent has an incentive to deviate in his allocation. Any other allocation induces price variation that can be anticipated and arbitrated. Thus the equilibrium is unique. The point is simplest to see for non-traded goods. Away from the allocation \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z) \), the home non-traded goods market clears ex post with

\[
\left( \frac{P(z)}{G} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} = \frac{\gamma(z)}{\lambda(z)}.
\]

Consider a pair of sectors \( z', z'' \) with \( \gamma(z')/\lambda(z') > 1 > \gamma(z'')/\lambda(z'') \). Some agents can reallocate from \( z'' \) to \( z' \) and reap a certain gain in every realization of the random productivity draws that relocate the two sectors somewhere on \([\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*] \). Thus if \( \gamma(z')/\lambda(z') \neq 1 \) for any \( ' \), non-traded sectors do not present the same prospects and the allocation is not an equilibrium.

A more complex version of the same reasoning applies to the sectors that end up as tradable. \( \lambda(z')/\gamma(z') \neq 1 \) complicates the left hand sides of the market clearing equations with ratios \( \lambda(z)/\gamma(z) \) and \( \lambda^*(z)/\gamma(z) \) that multiply the expressions for \( s(z)/\gamma(z) \) and \( s^*(z)/\gamma(z) \). If home workers anticipate ‘structurally rational’ foreign allocations such that \( \lambda^*(z') = \gamma(z') \), then there are arbitrage gains unless \( \lambda(z') = \gamma(z'), \forall z' \). Symmetrically, if foreign skilled
workers anticipate home allocations \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) \), then there is arbitrageable variation in \( P(z)/A(z) \) unless \( \lambda^*(z) = \gamma(z) \). Thus the only allocation where such arbitrage is not possible is \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z) \).\(^{20}\)

Notice that no assumption is made about agents’ attitudes toward risk. Thus the setup is compatible with concerns about distribution amplified by declining marginal utility of income.

6 Heterogeneous Firms and Selection

Recent empirical research emphasizes that exporting firms are more productive, larger and pay higher wages for the same work. Including firm specific shocks can explain these patterns, and can explain within-sector wage dispersion that decreases or increases with export intensity. Idiosyncratic productivity draws combine a firm-specific component with the sector-specific component of previous sections. In each sector, firms compete for the specific factor, driving the least productive from the market. Productivity differences between export and import-competing industries are amplified because the severity of Darwinian selection rises with average productivity.

An influential alternative model of firm selection due to fixed export costs is Melitz (2003). The fixed unskilled labor cost of exports for each firm is combined with a variable iceberg cost of trade \( t \). A fall in \( t \) causes upward pressure on wages throughout the economy because more unskilled labor is devoted to entering exporting. The wage increase causes low productivity firms to exit, raising average productivity. Thus globalization increases the severity of Darwinian competition.

Comparing the two models, trade does not cause average productivity changes in the specific factors model, but export intensity is correlated with winnowing intensity. Selection due to fixed export costs potentially complements the specific factors mechanism and can explain the important observation that only some firms export in each sector. Fixed export costs in the specific factors model might naturally be specified either as a lump of sectoral skilled labor, or a lump of output (generalized iceberg costs). A full development is beyond the scope of this paper.

The constant returns to scale assumption means that each skilled worker can be treated as a ‘firm’ when making an ex ante location choice. In each

\(^{20}\)Multiple equilibria may be possible when expectations about foreign allocations do not settle down to ‘structural rational expectations’ as assumed here.
sector, the better firms subsequently compete for the pool of specific skilled labor available from the weaker firms. To preserve some heterogeneity of firms within sectors in equilibrium, assume (realistically) that skilled worker movement is costly. Formalizing the cost simply, one unit of original skilled labor becomes $\phi < 1$ units of usable skilled labor in the hiring firms. Provided that $\phi$ is not too small, this process drives the lowest productivity firms out of business.$^{21}$

Assume initially that the (inverse) productivity draw of a firm is the sum of a sectoral component and an idiosyncratic component: $a(z, h) = a(z) + b(h)$ for firm $h$ in sector $z$, both independently drawn. Suppose that the firm productivity draws are ordered such that $b_h > 0$. In any sector $z$, the ex post value of marginal product of the specific factor is thus decreasing in $h$. In equilibrium, the least productive surviving firm, located at $h_{max}$, can pay enough to offset the value of marginal product of the specific skilled labor transferred to the most productive firm $b(0)$. This implies

$$\phi = \frac{a(z) + b(h_{max})}{a(z) + b(0)}. \quad (27)$$

All draws of productivity $b(h) \geq b(h_{max})$ result in the skilled labor moving to the top firm with draw $b(0)$. This results in an average productivity of surviving firms equal to

$$\bar{a}(z) = a(z) + D(h_{max})b(0) + [1 - D(h_{max})]E[b|h \leq h_{max}],$$

where $D$ is the probability of an idiosyncratic draw with worse productivity than the marginal firm.

To sort out the implications for endogenous productivity and trade, sharp results emerge under a plausible additional ordering condition $a_z > 0$. $a_z > 0$ is consistent with the general equilibrium ordering convention $A_z < 0$ under the overly strong condition $a_{z}^* \geq 0$, productivity shocks are perfectly positively correlated internationally.$^{22}$ Under $a_z > 0$, differentiating (27)

$^{21}$More realistic reallocations from a set of low productivity to a set of high productivity firms occur when there are diminishing returns to the transfer due to either a fixed managerial input for the firm or convex adjustment costs. Alternatively, more firms expand if there are heterogeneous adjustment costs ($\phi$’s) not perfectly negatively correlated with productivity.

$^{22}$The comparative advantage schedule becomes $A(z) = \bar{a}^*(z)/\bar{a}(z)$ when sectoral productivity becomes endogenous. $\bar{A}_z < 0 \Rightarrow \bar{a}_z/\bar{a} > \bar{a}_z^*/\bar{a}^*$ by the equilibrium ordering convention.
yields

\[ h_{z}^{\text{max}} = -\frac{a_{z}}{b_{h}}(1 - \phi) < 0, \forall z. \]

Then the endogenous productivity effect is most powerful in the most productive sectors. The lower tail of firms is truncated more in export sectors than in non-traded or import competing ones. Selection effect in this model operates independently of trade costs.

Turning to the distributional implications, the endogenous productivity effect amplifies the sectoral dispersion of productivity and therefore amplifies the dispersion of ex post factor incomes. While plausible, the result is sensitive to specification. If the productivity penalty is multiplicative, \( a(z)b(h) \), then \( h_{z}^{\text{max}} \) is implicitly defined by \( b(h_{z}^{\text{max}}) = \phi b(0) \), invariant to \( z \).

A further twist on the model explains the well documented within-sector link between productivity, firm size and wages. The highest productivity firms in each sector earn quasi-rents relative to the lowest productivity firm that remains in business. Suppose that the firms are subject to wage bargaining such that the rents\(^{23}\) are shared with the skilled workers of each firm. Then the highest productivity (and biggest) firms will pay the highest skilled wages within each sector. The dispersion of within sector wages will be least in the highest productivity sectors because the stronger Darwinian force compresses the productivity distribution of the surviving firms. Formalizing these points, the zero profit condition for the least productive firm in sector \( z \) implies that it can pay skilled workers

\[ r_{\text{min}}(z) = \left( \frac{p(z)}{a(z) + b(h_{\text{max}}(z))} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} w^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)}. \]

The more productive firms share their profits with the skilled workers according to

\[ r(z, h) = r_{\text{min}}(z) + \theta[p(z) - (a(z) + b(h))w^{\alpha}r_{\text{min}}(z)^{1-\alpha}]; \theta \in [0, 1]. \]

The higher is \( r_{\text{min}}(z) \), smaller is the within-sector dispersion of skilled wages.

Other patterns relating within-sector skilled wage dispersion to export intensity can be generated from other joint distributions of productivity draws \( a(z, h) \). Wage dispersion independent of export intensity is associated with \( a(z, h) = a(z)b(h) \). Wage dispersion that increases with export intensity can

\(^{23}\)The 'owner' gets the residual, over and above his skilled wage.
be produced if high sectoral productivity coincides with bigger clusters of high productivity firms. Such patterns are usually rationalized by knowledge transmission externalities. Formally the left-skewness of the inverse productivity draws of firms conditional on $z$ decreases with $z$. This pattern creates space for the productivity distribution of surviving firms to have more dispersion the higher the average productivity. Verhoogen (2008) reports evidence of such a pattern in Mexico, explaining it with a quality differentiation mechanism.

7 Conclusion

The combination of specific factors and productivity shocks explains the export earnings premium observed in many economies. Globalization necessarily increases the ex post dispersion of factor incomes in this setting. Viewed ex ante, idiosyncratic productivity shocks make specific factor incomes more risky. In contrast, globalization damps the income risk from aggregate shocks. Globalization reduces incomes of the poorest specific factors the most, but also reduces their income risk from aggregate shocks the most.

The complementary work of Blanchard and Willman (2008) and Costinot and Vogel (2008) on income distribution based on worker heterogeneity suggests that a combination of ex ante heterogeneity and ex post locational premia can go far toward fitting the extremely rich empirical regularities of actual income distributions. Matching frictions are a promising way to dig more deeply into the structure of random productivities. The analytic simplicity of their models and the specific factors continuum model suggests that analytic solutions may be feasible.

The static analysis of this paper is a platform for interesting dynamics. The specificity of factors is transitory. Adjustment to a longer run equilibrium will have interesting and important economic drivers. An earlier literature (for example, Neary, 1978) provides an analysis of adjustment to a one time shock. In the present setup it is natural to think of productivity draws arriving each period. Serial correlation in the draws would induce persistence in comparative advantage with potentially interesting implications for investment patterns and income distribution. Labor market evidence reveals that young workers are more likely to relocate in response to locational rents, suggesting overlapping generations models.
8 References


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9 Appendix: Supporting Results

The supporting results are in two sub-sections. First, the comparative statistics in the background of Section 3 are derived. Second is a demonstration that the income distribution results hold for a general neoclassical production function identical across sectors. Differing production functions across sectors brings in Heckscher-Ohlin influences on distribution but also all the complexities of behavior towards risk and the availability and type of risk-sharing.

9.1 Comparative Statics

9.1.1 Relative Growth Shocks

Relative endowment growth induces a rise in the growing country's export share of GDP, its world GDP share and a less than unit elastic fall in its factorial terms of trade.

Non-neutral growth changes $R/R^*$. The effect on $\ln B$ is given by

$$\frac{(R/R^*)B_{R/R^*}}{B} = -\frac{(R/R^*)S_{R/R^*}^X + (R/R^*)S_{R/R^*}^M}{G_{S^X} + G_{S^M}^M} = -1.$$  

The reason is plain: $G$ and $R/R^*$ enter (21) multiplicatively. When $R/R^*$ rises discretely, the change in $\bar{z}$ has an impact on $\ln G$, hence:

$$\frac{d\ln G}{d\ln (R/R^*)} = -\frac{(1 - \alpha)\Lambda z/\Lambda}{(1 - \alpha)\Lambda z/\Lambda - Bz/B} \in (-1, 0)$$

since at the lower value of $\ln G$ and initial value of $\bar{z}$, $Bz/B$ is positive. Thus for discrete changes, $GR/R^*$ increases with $R/R^*$ in equilibrium.

9.1.2 Absolute Advantage Shocks

Aggregate relative productivity (absolute advantage) risk is introduced as a shift variable $\mu$ multiplying $\Lambda(z)$. $\mu$ is the ratio of a domestic productivity advance $\epsilon$ to a foreign productivity advance $\epsilon^*$: $\mu = \epsilon/\epsilon^*$. Thus $a(z, \epsilon) = \bar{a}(z)/\epsilon$ and $a^*(z, \epsilon^*) = \bar{a}^*(z)/\epsilon^*$. 

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In terms of Figure 1, ln Λ(\(z\)) is shifted by ln µ, hence both the cutoff schedules shift in the same direction. As for \(B(\cdot)\):\(^{24}\)

\[
\frac{\mu B_\mu}{B} = -\frac{\mu S^X_\mu + \mu S^M_\mu}{GS^X_G + GS^M_G} \in (0, 1).
\]

For discrete changes,

\[
\frac{d \ln G}{d \ln \mu} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)\Lambda_z/\Lambda - B_z/B}{\Lambda - B_z/B} \left( \frac{\mu B_\mu}{B} - \frac{B_z/B}{(1 - \alpha)\Lambda_z/\Lambda} \right)
\]

9.1.3 Transfers

Transfers alter the balance of payments equilibrium condition (21) to

\[
[\Gamma(\bar{z}) + \Gamma^*(\bar{z}^*)] - [1 - \Gamma(z) - \Gamma^*(z^*)] \beta = S^X(\bar{z}, \cdot) + S^M(\bar{z}^*, \cdot)
\]

where \(\beta = b/g\) is the ratio of the transfer to income and \(b\) is the international transfer in home prices.\(^{25}\) A rise in \(\beta\) due to borrowing shifts up the ln \(B\) function in Figure 1. In the neighborhood of equilibrium \(\bar{z}\):

\[
\frac{\beta B_\beta}{B} = -\frac{1 - \Gamma - \Gamma^*}{GS^X_G + GS^M_G} > 0.
\]

\(^{24}\)The sign and magnitude restrictions come from

\[
\mu S^X_\mu = S^X \int_0^{\bar{z}} s(z) \frac{(G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\mu \Lambda(z)}{S^X GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\mu \Lambda(z)} dz
\]

\[
= S^X - S^X \int_0^{\bar{z}} \frac{s(z)}{S^X GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\mu \Lambda(z)} GR/R^* dz.
\]

The second expression implies that \(\mu S^X_\mu < -GS^X_G\). Also

\[
\mu S^M_\mu = S^M \int_{\bar{z}}^1 s(z) \frac{(G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\mu \Lambda(z)}{S^M GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\mu \Lambda(z)} dz
\]

\[
= S^M - S^M \int_{\bar{z}}^1 \frac{s(z)}{S^M GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)}/\mu \Lambda(z)} GR/R^* dz.
\]

The second expression implies that \(\mu S^M_\mu < -GS^M_G\). Taken together the inequalities imply that \(\mu B_\mu/B \in (0, 1)\).

\(^{25}\)The balance of payments constraint is given by \(b = \Gamma(b + g) - S^M g - [S^X g - \Gamma^*(g + b)]\).

This solves for the text expression.
Higher trade costs raise $1 - \Gamma - \Gamma^*$ and thus increase the response of the factorial terms of trade to given transfers.

For discrete changes there is also an effect of transfers on the trade cutoff equations $(1 + \beta)\gamma(\bar{z}) = s(\bar{z})$ and $(1 + \beta)\gamma(\bar{z}^*) = s(\bar{z}^*)$. There is no longer a closed form solution for $\ln G$. The implicit solution is $\ln G = \bar{Z}(z, \beta, \cdot)$ and

$$\bar{\beta} = \frac{-\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \left[ \frac{\beta GR/R^*}{1 + (1 + \beta)GR^*/R^* - \beta/(1 + \beta)} \right] < (>) 0$$ as $GR/R^* > (<) 1$.

$$\frac{d\ln G}{d\ln \beta} = \frac{\beta B_\beta}{B} + \frac{B_z B_\beta}{B} \frac{-\bar{\beta} B \bar{Z} \beta}{(1 - \alpha)\Lambda_z / \Lambda} \in (\beta B_\beta/B, 0)$$ ordinarily.

9.1.4 Fall in Trade Costs

A one percent fall in symmetric trade costs shifts the export cutoff schedule $\ln \Lambda - \ln t$ down by one unit in Figure 1 while shifting the import cutoff schedule up by one unit. As for $\ln B$,

$$\frac{tB_t}{B} = \frac{tS^X_t + tS^M_t}{-GS^X_t - GS^M_t}.$$

Differentiating $S^i, i = X, M$ yields

$$\frac{tS^X_t}{S^X} = \frac{-1}{1 - \alpha} \int \bar{z} s(z) \frac{(Gt)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / \Lambda(z)}{GR/R^* + (Gt)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / \Lambda(z)} dz,$$

$$\frac{tS^M_t}{S^M} = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \int \bar{z} s(z) \frac{(G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / \Lambda(z)}{GR/R^* + (G/t)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / \Lambda(z)} dz. \quad (28)$$

Since $-tS^X_t/S^X < tS^M_t/S^M$ and $S^X > S^M$ ordinarily, $B_t$ can have either sign. As a benchmark case $B_t = 0$, a fall in $t$ simply shifts $\ln B$ to the right along with the cutoff schedule. $\bar{z}$ rises and $\bar{z}^*$ falls while $\ln G$ stays constant.

9.2 General Production Function Case

Replace the Cobb-Douglas production function with the general neoclassical degree one homogeneous and concave, twice differentiable potential production function $F(K(z), L(z))$.

Let the foreign wage be the numeraire. Multiply and divide by the home wage rate in (6) to obtain prices in terms of home labor units $\tilde{P}(z) = P(z)/w$. 31
Then home GDP is given by $w_g(\{\tilde{P}(z)\}, \cdot)$. The GDP shares are given by (6) after dividing through by the unskilled wage $w$:

$$s(z) = \frac{\lambda(z)\tilde{P}(z)f[h(\tilde{P}(z))]}{\int_0^1 \lambda(z)\tilde{P}(z)f[h(\tilde{P}(z))]dz}.$$ 

The arbitrage conditions imply $\tilde{P}(z)t/wA(z) = P^*(z), z \in [0, \bar{z})$ and $\tilde{P}(z)/wA(z)t = P^*(z), z \in (\bar{z}^*, 1)$. Finally, impose the equilibrium allocation $\lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z)$.

For given $w$, (11) determines the traded goods prices. Imposing the ex post ordering of sectors such that $A' < 0$, (11) yields the implication that equilibrium $\tilde{P}(z)$ is falling in $z$ and $\tilde{P}(z)/A(z)$ is rising in $z$, hence by properties of (6) home shares are falling and foreign shares are rising in $z$. For nontraded goods $s(z) = \gamma(z)$ determines home prices $\tilde{P}(z)$ and $s^*(z) = \gamma(z)$ determines foreign prices $P^*(z)$. Finally, the entire schedule of equilibrium $\tilde{P}(z)$ is increasing in $w$ with elasticity less than one.

The factorial terms of trade $w$ is determined by the trade balance equation. The shares are implicit functions of the factorial terms of trade and the exogenous shift variables along with $A(z)$. The analog to $B(z)$ is the solution for the wage $w = \omega(z, \cdot)$ from the balance of trade constraint $S^X(w, z; \cdot) + S^M(w, z, \cdot) - \Gamma(\bar{z}) + \Gamma^*(\bar{z}^*) = 0$. As with Figure 1, the export cutoff equation $w = A(z)/t$ must slice through $\omega(z, \cdot)$ at a maximum.

The forces that shape the comparative static derivatives such as $\omega_\beta$ are different and more complex than in the Cobb-Douglas case. But the property that globalization enhances the responsiveness of the extensive margin of trade and thereby reduces the variance of income due to aggregate shocks carries through. The comparative static derivative with respect to exogenous variable $x$ is solved from differentiating the trade balance and export cutoff equations

$$\frac{d\ln w}{d\ln x} = \frac{\partial \ln \omega}{\partial \ln x} \frac{dz}{d\ln x} + \frac{\partial \ln \omega}{\partial z} \frac{dz}{d\ln x}$$

and

$$\frac{d\ln w}{d\ln x} = \frac{A_z}{A} \frac{dz}{d\ln x}.$$ 

The solution is

$$\frac{d\ln w}{d\ln x} = \frac{\partial \ln \omega}{\partial \ln x} \frac{A_z/A}{\partial \ln x A_z/A - \partial \ln \omega/\partial z}.$$ 

\(^{26}\)Division by $w$ is needed to convert prices to foreign efficiency units from home labor efficiency units.

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The relevant coefficient for discrete changes is the second fraction on the right hand side. Compared to its counterpart in the Cobb-Douglas case, efficient allocation implies \((1 - \alpha)A_z/A\) is replaced by \(A_z/B\) and \(B_z/B\) is replaced by \(\partial \ln \omega/\partial z\). The latter has exactly the same structure as in the Cobb-Douglas case. Recalling the Cobb-Douglas case, differentiating \(B_z/B\) with respect to \(t\):

\[
\frac{\partial B_z/B}{\partial t} \frac{1}{B_z/B} = \frac{Z^*_z s(z^*) - \gamma(z^*)}{s(z) - \gamma(z) + Z^*_z [s(z^*) - \gamma(z^*)]} - \frac{S^X G_t + S^M G_t}{S^X G + S^M G}.
\]

The first term is negative while the second term is ambiguous in sign for the same reason \(B_t\) is ambiguous in sign. Disregarding the influence of the second term, \(B_{zt} < 0\). The general case replaces \(B\) with \(\omega\) and \(G\) with \(w\), all other elements of the expression remaining the same qualitatively.

### 9.2.1 Income Distribution

The average skilled wage is related to the factorial terms of trade by \(\bar{r} = w(1 - \bar{\alpha})/\bar{\alpha}\) where \(\bar{\alpha} \equiv \int_0^1 s(z) \alpha(z) dz\) is the average unskilled labor share in the economy. At a constant unskilled labor share, the average skilled wage is unit elastic with respect to the factorial terms of trade. Aggregate shocks will ordinarily change the average unskilled share, and general analytic results are precluded. More analysis follows below at the end of this section in the context of evaluating the effect of globalization on the average skill premium.

Nominal income and real income move together in the general case, as in the Cobb-Douglas case. The log of the true cost of living index is \(\ln C = \int_0^1 \gamma(z) [\ln \tilde{P}(z) + \ln a(z)] dz + \ln w\). The cost of living index has elasticity with respect to the factorial terms of trade equal to

\[
1 - \Gamma \int_0^z \frac{\gamma(z) d \ln \tilde{P}(z)}{\Gamma} dz - \Gamma^* \int_z^1 \frac{\gamma(z) d \ln \tilde{P}(z)}{\Gamma^*} dz \in (0, 1)
\]

because \(\tilde{P}(z)\) has elasticity with respect to \(w\) between 0 and 1. The real unskilled wage thus has elasticity with respect to the factorial terms of trade between 0 and 1, and the average real skilled wage will as well unless the skill premium is sufficiently responsive to the factorial terms of trade. Globalization increases \(\Gamma\) and \(\Gamma^*\) and by this channel it raises \(d \ln C d/\ln w\). In contrast to the Cobb-Douglas case, however, a change in \(t\) has effects on the distribution of \(d \ln \tilde{P}(z)/d \ln w\) that are difficult to sign. On balance, globalization should ordinarily raise \(d \ln C d/\ln w\) and damp the real income response to underlying aggregate shocks, as it does in the Cobb-Douglas case.
Now turn to the idiosyncratic income distribution properties of the model. Ex post dispersion is induced by realizations of the productivity shocks. For simplicity in thinking about the ex ante personal income risk that is associated, suppress aggregate risk. The return to skilled labor is residually determined in each sector. Thus \( r(z) = (1 - \alpha(z))[1 - \alpha(z)]p(z)y(z)/\lambda(z)K \) is the sector specific return in \( z \), where \( \alpha(z) \equiv wL(z)/p(z)y(z) \) is labor’s share in \( z \). Replace \( p(z)y(z) \) with \( s(z)g \). The average skilled wage is \( g_K = (g/K) \int_0^1 [1 - \alpha(z)]s(z)dz = (1 - \bar{\alpha})g/K \). Then the sector \( z \) return relative to the mean is:

\[
\frac{r(z)}{g_K} = \frac{s(z) [1 - \alpha(z)]}{\lambda(z) [1 - \bar{\alpha}]}.
\] (30)

Using the value of marginal product conditions, \( \alpha(z) = wh(\tilde{P}(z))\lambda(z)K/s(z)g \). Replace \( s(z) \) with \( \tilde{P}(z)f[h(\tilde{P}(z))]\lambda(z)K/g \) in the labor share and relative returns conditions to yield:

\[
\frac{r(z)}{g_K} = \frac{1}{1 - \bar{\alpha}} \left( \tilde{P}(z)f[h(\tilde{P}(z))]\frac{K}{g} - \frac{h(\tilde{P}(z))K}{g} \right).
\]

This simplifies to

\[
r(z) = \tilde{P}(z)f[h(\tilde{P})] - h(\tilde{P}).
\] (31)

The distribution of skilled labor returns across sectors is characterized by

\[
\frac{dr(z)}{dz} = h'\tilde{P}_z \leq 0.
\]

For tradable goods sectors \( \tilde{P}_z < 0 \) while for nontraded goods, \( \tilde{P}_z/\tilde{P} = 0 \). The return in the non-traded goods sectors is equal to the cutoff sector returns \( r(\bar{z}) = r(\bar{z}^*) \). Thus Proposition 4 holds for the general case.

Next, consider the effect of changes in \( w \), the factorial terms of trade, on the profile of specific factor returns. Differentiating (30) with respect to \( \ln w \) at the efficient allocation \( \lambda(z) = \gamma(z) \), the components that change are \( s(z)/\gamma(z) \) and \( [1 - \alpha(z)]/(1 - \bar{\alpha}) \). As for the change in \( s(z)/\gamma(z) \), differentiating (6),

\[
\frac{\partial \ln s(z)/\gamma(z)}{\partial \ln w} = [1 - s(z)][1 + \tilde{P}(z)\alpha(z)\eta(z)] > 0.
\]
where $\eta(z) = h'(\cdot)\tilde{P}(z)/h(\cdot) = -d \ln L(z)/d \ln w$, the elasticity of demand for labor in sector $z$. The first term on the right hand side $1 - s(z)/\gamma(z)$ is increasing in $z$. The second term may be increasing or decreasing in $z$ in general. The change in $[1 - \alpha(z)]/(1 - \bar{\alpha})$ due to change in $w$ is similarly ambiguous in its impact on the distribution of response of $r(z)/g_K$ to change in $w$. The Cobb-Douglas case removes the ambiguity, yielding the implication in Proposition 5 that the poorest sectors are hit the hardest by changes in the factorial terms of trade. The Cobb-Douglas logic remains active in the general case but qualified by possible offsetting influences from changes in the distribution of unskilled labor shares and demand elasticities.

Next, consider the comparative statics of globalization. A fall in $t$ raises $\bar{z}, \bar{z}^*, \Gamma(\bar{z})$ and $\Gamma^*(\bar{z}^*)$. It generally has ambiguous effects on $w$. As for the ex post distribution of skilled labor income, the dispersion of returns relative to the average are increased. This arises for two reasons. First, export sectors experience a price rise while import competing sectors experience a price fall due to the fall in trade costs at constant factorial terms of trade. Second, the expansion of the extensive margin of trade raises the sector specific incomes of newly exporting sectors while lowering the sector specific incomes of newly import-competing sectors. Thus Proposition 6 holds for the general case. Globalization intensifies the impact of good or bad luck in the choice of jobs by skilled labor. This is true for both countries. Viewed ex ante, personal income is made more risky by globalization when there is no aggregate productivity risk.

Globalization ordinarily would have some effect on the average skill premium, but general analytic results are precluded. For the CES production function with $\sigma > 1$, globalization at constant terms of trade ordinarily raises both $\bar{\alpha}$ and $\bar{\alpha}^*$ and thus the average skill premium ordinarily falls in both North and South. This property arises from consideration of

$$\bar{\alpha} = \int_0^{\bar{z}} s(z)\alpha(z)dz + \int_{\bar{z}}^{\bar{z}^*} \gamma(z)\alpha(z)dz + \int_{\bar{z}^*}^1 s(z)\alpha(z)dz.$$ 

Export sectors experience rising $s$ and rising $\alpha$ while contracting sectors experience falling $s$ and falling $\alpha$. So the first and third terms on the right hand side of the above equation must rise. The middle term should ordinarily not change much because the mobile factor flows from import-competing to

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27 The expression on the right uses $1 + \tilde{P}(z)\alpha(z)\eta(z) = 1 + h'(\cdot)\tilde{P}(z)/f(\cdot)$ where the right hand expression is obtained from differentiating (6).
export sectors mainly. Finally, the fall in $t$ should intuitively raise $\bar{z}$ and lower $\bar{z}^*$, further raising $\bar{a}$. For the case of $\sigma < 1$, the effects through $s$ and $\alpha$ in the first and third terms reverse in sign, and the effect of globalization should ordinarily raise the average skill premium in North and South.

Skill biased technological change has been suggested as the cause of a worldwide rise in the skill premium. In contrast, the neutral technological change used here suggests that a rise in the skill premium in both countries might be associated with globalization if elasticities of substitution are greater than one. But allowing for skill-biased technological change introduces an important added determinant of skill premium distribution that interacts with the previously analyzed forces.

Finally, relaxing the identical production functions assumption introduces a host of complications that might greatly qualify the results. The key mechanism of the paper that allows simple results is that the allocation of skilled labor can be derived as $\lambda(z) = \gamma(z) = \lambda^*(z)$ because all industries then give the skilled worker equal prospects. Once the production functions differ, it is no longer possible to allocate such that there are identical prospects across sectors. The risk aversion of the skilled workers and the availability and quality of risk sharing instruments then become crucial to characterizing the equilibrium allocation. In some circumstances, globalization might lower efficiency (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). See Helpman and Razin (1978) for an analysis of allocation with risk-sharing with limited assets.