Non-Stationary Search Equilibrium*

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Abstract

We provide the first analysis of aggregate dynamics of a popular class of search wage-posting models (Burdett and Mortensen (1998), BM). We assume that firms offer and commit to time-dependent wage contracts. We show that, when all firms have the same productivity, they post different time-dependent contracts, paying workers a higher value at all points in time the larger is the initial size of the firm. That is, equilibrium exhibits a \textit{Rank-Preserving property}. The same property holds in equilibrium when firms have heterogeneous productivity, where more productive firms offer a larger value and employ more workers at all points in time, if (but not only if) they have more employees to begin with. Our characterization of the dynamics of the BM model opens the analysis of aggregate labor market dynamics at business cycle frequencies as a whole potential new field of application of search/wage-posting models.

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1 Introduction

We present the first analysis of aggregate dynamics in a popular class of search wage-posting models. We study the transitional dynamics of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998, henceforth BM) equilibrium search model. This framework was originally formulated to explain the well-known fact that seemingly identical workers are paid different wages. The BM model, and the vast theoretical and empirical literature on wage inequality that it generated, are invariably cast in steady state. They have, however, specific predictions also for variables of interest to business cycle theorists, such as (un)employment and productivity. Our characterization of the dynamics of the BM model opens the analysis of aggregate labor market dynamics as a whole potential new field of application of search/wage-posting models. We hope to contribute to a synthesis of the BM approach with the “other”, equally successful side of the search literature, organized around the matching framework (Pissarides, 1990; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) as a representative agent approach to understand labor market flows and equilibrium unemployment.

In a companion paper (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008) we document distinct comovements at business cycle frequencies among several key variables of the BM model: unemployment, job-to-job quits, labor productivity, labor share of income, wage distribution, size distribution of employers, and patterns of employment reallocation across employers. These comovements suggest a new view of how aggregate expansions evolve and mature. Following a positive aggregate shock to labor demand, wages respond little on impact, and start rising only when firms run out of cheap unemployed hires and start competing to poach and to retain employed workers. In the other paper, we show that a calibrated example of the dynamic wage posting model analyzed here replicates to a good extent the facts. A key insight is that the evolution of average wages and labor productivity, and more generally the propagation of aggregate shocks, rests on the shape and on the evolution of the distributions of wages and workers across employers. Therefore, BM’s non-representative agent approach can be fruitfully extended to shed new light on macroeconomic fluctuations.

As a contribution more specific to the wage posting literature, we study the robustness of the BM results, whose analysis crucially exploits steady-state restrictions. The first question is whether
the BM steady state equilibrium is at least locally stable. Our answer is a mildly qualified yes.

Ever since the inception of the BM model, job search scholars have regarded the characterization of its out-of-steady-state behavior as a daunting problem, essentially because one of the model’s state variables, which is also the main object of interest, is the endogenous distribution of wage (or job value) offers. Under the BM assumption of random search, this distribution determines the individual incentives of each firm to post and of each worker to search for wage offers. This is an infinite-dimensional object, endogenously determined in equilibrium as the distribution across a continuum of firms of strategies that are all best responses to one another.

We find a way around this problem by considering a class of equilibria satisfying what we call the Rank-Preserving property, i.e. equilibria in which the workers’ ranking of firms is time-invariant. We show that this class of equilibria is generic if all firms are equally productive. We further show that the same property holds in equilibrium when firms have heterogeneous productivity, where more productive firms offer a larger value and employ more workers at all points in time, if (but not only if) they have more employees to begin with. We view the fact that the workers’ ranking of firms also reflects the hierarchy of productivity in a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium in the presence of productive heterogeneity across firms as a very appealing property of the model. It parallels a similar property of BM’s static equilibrium, and in ensures constrained-efficient labor reallocation at all dates.

The paper has four sections after this Introduction and before a short Conclusion. In Section 2 we lay out the basic assumptions on the economic environment and state the typical firm’s optimization problem. Dynamic equilibria are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 further endogenizes labor demand by letting firms decide on an endogenous hiring effort.
2 Model and Individual Behavior

2.1 The Environment

The model is a near-exact replica of the BM wage posting model with heterogeneous firm types. Time is continuous. The labor market is populated by a unit-mass of workers who can be either employed or unemployed. It is affected by search frictions in that unemployed workers can only sample job offers sequentially at some finite Poisson rate $\lambda_0 > 0$. Employed workers are allowed to search on the job, and face a sampling rate of job offers of $\lambda_1 > 0$. Firm-worker matches are dissolved at rate $\delta > 0$. Upon match dissolution, the worker becomes unemployed. All workers are ex-ante identical: they are infinitely lived, risk-neutral, equally capable at any job, and they attach a common lifetime value of $U_t$ to being unemployed at date $t$.

Workers face a measure $N$ of active firms operating constant-return technologies with heterogeneous productivity levels $p \sim \Gamma(\cdot)$ among firms, and density $\gamma = \Gamma'$. The sampling of firms by workers is not necessarily uniform, in that a type-$p$ firm has a sampling weight of $q(p) > 0$. Sampling weights are normalized to ensure that their cumulated sum $\Phi(p) := \int_{\mathbb{R}} q(x) \gamma(x) \, dx$ is a (sampling) cdf, i.e. $\Phi(p) = 1$. The sampling density of a type-$p$ firm is therefore $\varphi(p) := q(p) \gamma(p)$. This naturally encompasses the conventional case of uniform sampling which has $q(p) = 1$ for all $p$.\footnote{There are three possible interpretations of sampling weights. First, they reflect the different visibility of employers of different sizes, due to informational spill-overs across workers connected in social networks. Alternatively, they are a shortcut for directed search: if search has any element of directness, people will apply more to high paying firms (which higher-$p$ firms will turn out to be in equilibrium). Finally, and perhaps most naturally, they may reflect the relative density of vacancies posted by a firm of productivity $p$, with random meetings between all vacancies and all job searchers mediated by a standard matching function. This last possibility endogenizes both sampling weights $q$ and arrival rates $\lambda_0, \lambda_1$, as we discuss it in detail in Section 5.}

At some initial date which we normalize at $t_0 = 0$, each firm of a given type $p$ commits to a wage profile $\{w_t(p)\}_{t \in [0, +\infty)}$ over the infinite future, the same wage to be paid to all workers. We generalize the BM restrictions placed on the set of feasible wage contracts to a non-steady-state environment by preventing firms from making wages contingent on anything else than calendar time.\footnote{Or, less stringently, we allow firms to index wages to any aggregate variable that evolves monotonically over time (e.g. the unemployment rate). We thus rule out, among other things, wage-tenure contracts (Stevens, 2004; Burdett and Coles, 2003), offer-matching or individual bargaining (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Dey and Flinn, 2005;}

\[\int_{\mathbb{R}} q(x) \gamma(x) \, dx\]
Any such profile \( \{w_t(p)\}_{t \in [0, +\infty)} \) offered by any type-\( p \) firm yields a continuation value of \( W_t(p) \) to any worker employed at that firm at any date \( t \). The (time-varying) sampling distribution of job values is denoted as \( F_t(\cdot) \), and its relationship to the sampling distribution of firm types \( \Phi(\cdot) \) will be discussed momentarily. Because from the workers’ viewpoint jobs are identical in all dimensions but the wage profile, employed jobseekers quit into higher-valued jobs only. This gradual self-selection of workers into better jobs implies that the distribution of job values in a cross-section of workers—which will be denoted as \( G_t(\cdot) \)—differs from the sampling distribution \( F_t(\cdot) \).

### 2.2 The Contract Posting Problem

Firms post wage profiles over an infinite horizon that solve the following problem:

\[
\Pi_0(L_0(p); p) = \max_{\{w_t\}} \int_0^{+\infty} (p - w_t) L_t(p) e^{-rt} dt \tag{1}
\]

subject to:

\[
\rho W_t(p) = \dot{W}_t(p) + w_t - \delta [W_t(p) - U_t] + \lambda_1 \int_{W_t(p)}^{+\infty} [x - W_t(p)] dF_t(x) \tag{2}
\]

\[
\dot{L}_t(p) = -[\delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p))] L_t(p) + \frac{\gamma(p)}{N} \left[ \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t(p)) \right] \tag{3}
\]

\[
w_t \geq \underline{w}, \tag{4}
\]

where \( L_t(p) \) denotes a type-\( p \) firm’s workforce at date \( t \),\(^3\) \( \underline{w} \) is the exogenous institutional minimum wage, \( U_t \) is the workers’ lifetime value of unemployment, \( r(p) \) is the firms’ (workers’) discount rate,\(^4\) and \( F_t(\cdot) = 1 - F_t(\cdot) \) designates the survivor function associated with \( F_t(\cdot) \). When solving (1), the typical firm of productivity \( p \) also is also constrained by its given initial size \( L_0(p) \).

The firm’s problem has two state variables that the firm controls through the wage. First, the chosen path of wages translates through the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (2) into a value \( W_t(p) \) for the worker of employment at that type-\( p \) firm. The worker’s opportunity cost \( \rho W_t(p) \) equals the capital gain plus the flow wage minus the capital loss when the match is destroyed.

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\(^3\)Incidentally, this implies that the density of firm types among workers at date \( t \) is given by \( N L_t(p) \gamma(p) / (1 - u_t) \).

\(^4\)Although in some of what follows we will occasionally comply with standard practice and impose a common discount rate on firms and workers (i.e. assume \( r = \rho \)), this restriction is by no means essential. Indeed other cases, such as the case of myopic workers that we analyze in detail, are of potential interest.
exogenously at rate $\delta$, plus the capital gain that occurs at rate $\lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p))$ when the worker receives and offer which also turns out to provide him with a higher value. This offer is drawn from the endogenous offer distribution $F_t(\cdot)$, which is the cross-section distribution at time $t$ of all such values offered by other firms.

The value $W_t(p)$ offered by a type-$p$ firm translates into inflows and outflows of workers. The only friction in the model is search, so the boundaries of the firm are defined by attrition, retention and hiring. Equation (3), describes the evolution of the firm’s employment. Following standard practice, we impose a law of large numbers at the individual firm’s level and we treat the evolution of firm size as deterministic, although it is the result of various random events. These include separations—both exogenous at rate $\delta$ and endogenous at rate $\lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p))$ when a worker receives a better offer—which reduce employment, and accessions from both unemployment (at rate $\lambda_0$) and from other firms that are paying their workers less than $W_t(p)$.

At the individual firm’s level, the sampling and cross-sectional distributions of job values $F_t(\cdot)$ and $G_t(\cdot)$ are given macroeconomic quantities that no individual firm can affect with its choice. Given all firm’s choices of wages, and the implied worker values $W_t(p)$ and firm sizes $L_t(p)$, they are defined by

$$F_t(W) = \int_0^W \mathbb{1}\{W_t(x) \leq W\} q(x) d\Gamma(x)$$

$$G_t(W) = \frac{\int_0^W L_t(x) \mathbb{1}\{W_t(x) \leq W\} d\Gamma(x)}{\int_0^W L_t(x) d\Gamma(x)}$$

where $\mathbb{1}\{\cdot\}$ is an indicator function. Notice that both are normalized to be proper c.d.f.’s. Also notice an important restriction that was kept implicit so far: the definitions in (5) and (6) are only valid in symmetric equilibria where there is no dispersion in firm size conditional on $p$ (i.e. $p \mapsto W_t(p)$ and $p \mapsto L_t(p)$ are well-defined mappings for all $t$). Although this restriction will receive some further discussion below, we will essentially limit our attention to such equilibria in the rest of the paper.
Similarly, a single firm cannot affect the value of unemployment, which solves the HJB equation:

$$\rho U_t = \dot{U}_t + b + \lambda_0 \int_{U_t}^{+\infty} (x - U_t) \, dF_t(x)$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

with $b$ denoting the income flow in unemployment, or the unemployment rate $u_t$, which solves

$$\dot{u}_t = \delta (1 - u_t) - \lambda_0 u_t, \quad \text{with} \quad u_0 = 1 - N \int_{\mathbb{L}} L_0(x) \, d\Gamma(x) \text{ given.}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

### 2.3 An Equivalent Value-Posting Problem

The formulation of the contract-posting problem spelled out in equations (1) - (8) above can be simplified somewhat. First, to simplify notation, we redefine the firm’s employment by normalizing by its sampling weight

$$\ell_t(p) := \frac{N}{q(p)} L_t(p)$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

so that initial unemployment is derived from the initial distribution of employment $u_0 = 1 - \int_{\mathbb{L}} \ell_0(x) \, d\Phi(x)$ and

$$\dot{\ell}_t(p) = - \left[ \delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p)) \right] \ell_t(p) + \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t(p)).$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

The problem of the firm is then (1) subject to (2), (4), (7), (8), (10).

Next, the firm’s objective (1) can be recast as follows by substitution of the workers’ value function (2) and integration by parts using (10):

$$\int_0^{+\infty} (p - w_t) \ell_t(p) \, e^{-rt} \, dt = -W_0(p) \ell_0(p)$$

$$+ \int_0^{+\infty} \left\{ \left[ p + \lambda_1 \int_{W_t}^{+\infty} x dF_t(x) + (r - \rho) W_t \right] \ell_t(p) - W_t \left[ \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t) \right] \right\} e^{-rt} \, dt.$$

This formulation decomposes the discounted sum of future profits accruing to the firm into the sum of two terms: the total present value of the firm measured by the second (integral) term, less the

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5In formulating (1), we assume for simplicity that any job offer posted in equilibrium is preferred to unemployment, i.e. $\inf_p W_t(p) \geq U_t$ at all $t$. This is achieved by assuming that the minimum wage $w$ is sufficiently higher than $b$ for unemployed workers to find even the least valuable job offer worth accepting.
first term $W_0 (p) \ell_0 (p)$ which equals the total value transferred by the firm to its initial workforce at date $t = 0$.

For any given initial value $W_0 (p)$ (and temporarily ignoring the minimum wage constraint (4) for simplicity — we will reintroduce it later on), the initial contract posting problem (1)-(2) can be restated as the following mathematically equivalent problem:

$$
\Pi_0 (\ell_0 (p) ; p) = \max_{\{W_t \in \left[ \frac{b}{r}, \frac{p_r}{r} \right] \}} \int_0^{+\infty} \left\{ p + \lambda_1 \int_{W_t}^{+\infty} x dF_t (x) + \delta U_t + (r - \rho) W_t \right\} \ell_t (p) \\
- W_t [\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t)] e^{-rt} dt \quad (11)
$$

subject to (10) and $\ell_0 (p)$ given.

Notice that values can be chosen WLOG in the compact set $\left[ \frac{b}{r}, \frac{p_r}{r} \right]$. Any value strictly below $b/r$ will be declined by the workers, who will quit to unemployment as $U_t \geq b/r$, hence all such values yield and equivalent profit and can be ignored. Values above $p = p_r / (r + \delta)$ exceed what any firm can physically deliver. Therefore, this is a well-defined optimal control problem even ignoring the minimum wage constraint.

While control problems generally admit piece-wise continuous solutions, in this particular case we must further restrict the optimal path of worker values, say $\{W_t^* (p)\}_{t \geq 0}$ to be continuously differentiable at all dates and right-continuous at $t = 0$ as it has to solve the original HJB equation (2). Moreover, any such optimal path will turn out to be independent of the initial value $W_0 (p)$ (see below). As a consequence, the the initial contract posting problem (1) is literally equivalent to the reformulated problem (11) with the initial workers’ value being defined as $W_0 (p) = \lim_{t \to 0} W_t^* (p)$.

Couching the contract posting problem as the choice of a path of values as in (11) rather than the choice of a wage path as in (1) brings about an important simplification in that (11) is a problem featuring only one state variable, $\ell_t (p)$, with a fixed initial value.

Before we move on to solving (11), we should clarify that our formulation of the contract-posting game and the firm’s best-response problem contains the assumption that firms are bound by an equal treatment constraint: a firm must pay all of its workers the same wage, irrespective of when they were hired, from where, and of the outside offers that some of them may have received. In
particular, the firm does renege on its promised wage, cannot condition the wage on tenure or received outside offers, and more generally does not respond to outside offers to its employees, but lets them go if they are offered more.\footnote{As argued in Moscarini (2005), not responding to outside offers is a sequential equilibrium of an ascending (English) auction between the incumbent and the poacher, and the unique equilibrium which survives natural refinements. The more productive of the two firms wins without offering more than it does to its other workers, because it can always respond to any attempt by the competitor to outbid it, even if the competitor trembles. In this case, our assumption of no ex-post competition is not particularly restrictive. If the auction is instead simultaneous with either one bid or a sealed bid, as in Bertrand (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), then firms would bid their maximum valuation and our assumption has bite.}

### 2.4 Optimality Conditions

The current value Hamiltonian of problem (11) is defined by:

\[
\mathcal{H}_t (p) = \left[ p + \lambda_1 \int_{W_t}^{+\infty} x dF_t (x) + \delta U_t + (r - \rho) W_t \right] \ell_t (p) - W_t [\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t)] \\
+ \mu_t (p) \left\{ - \left[ \delta + \lambda_1 F_t (W_t) \right] \ell_t (p) + \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t) \right\},
\]

where \( \mu_t (p) \) is the costate variable. Denoting the optimal value offered by a type-\( p \) firm by \( W_t (p) \), the optimality conditions are:

\[
\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t (p)) + (\rho - r) \ell_t (p) \\
= \lambda_1 [\mu_t (p) - W_t (p)] [f_t (W_t (p)) \ell_t (p) + (1 - u_t) g_t (W_t (p))] \\
\mu_t (p) = [r + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t (W_t (p))] \mu_t (p) - \left[ p + \lambda_1 \int_{W_t (p)}^{+\infty} x dF_t (x) + \delta U_t + (r - \rho) W_t (p) \right] \\
\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-rt} \mu_t (p) \ell_t (p) = 0.
\]

Supplementing this latter set of conditions with the state equations (7), (8) and (10), we obtain a system of partial differential equations characterizing the solution to an individual firm’s maximization problem for a given path of sampling distributions \( \{F_t (\cdot)\}_{t \in [0, +\infty)} \). Given a solution to that system, the optimal wage path can be retrieved using (2). The main difficulty, however, lies in characterizing the equilibrium \( \{F_t (\cdot)\}_{t \in [0, +\infty)} \), i.e. the path of sampling distributions which is consistent with the above dynamic system simultaneously for the whole population of firms. This task will be carried out in the following section. Before we turn to that, however, it is worth spelling out some economic interpretation of the above optimality conditions.
As usual in economic applications of optimal control, the costate variable $\mu_t(p)$ is interpreted as the imputed (or shadow) unit value of the state variable $\ell_t(p)$ at date $t$. Because (1) is formally a maximization of the total value of the firm, $\mu_t(p)$ is indeed the shadow value to the firm-worker match (rather than to the firm) of the marginal unit of labor. The firm’s shadow value of the marginal unit of labor $\pi_t(p)$ is obtained by subtracting the worker’s value: $\pi_t(p) := \mu_t(p) - W_t(p)$ and solves the following Euler equation:

$$\hat{\pi}_t(p) = \left( r + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p)) \right) \pi_t(p) - (p - w_t(p))$$

(15)

which in turn was obtained by subtracting (2) from (13).

The first-order condition (12) reflects a balance between the firm’s present-value cost and benefit of marginally changing its posted value at date $t$. The RHS of (12) equals $\pi_t(p) \cdot \frac{\partial\hat{\ell}_t(p)}{\partial W_t}$ and clearly reflects the benefit of offering a marginally higher value stemming from the larger workforce achieved through the implied higher retention and hiring rates. To see how the LHS of (12) reflects the cost of a marginal increase in the value transferred to workers, it may help to view an employer’s commitment to transferring a certain value to its workers as that employer running up a debt to its employees. The (net) interest paid by the employer on a stock of debt of $W_t(p)$ to each of its workers equals the workers’ overall discount rate, $\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p))$ (which results from the combination of sheer time discounting at rate $\rho$ plus a “depreciation rate” of $\delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p))$ reflecting future match dissolution, either through job destruction or the worker quitting), less the firm’s discount (or interest) rate $r$. A unit increase in the value offered to all of the firm’s employees then adds $\ell_t(p)$ to the firm’s stock of debt. The marginal cost of such an addition to the stock of debt is an increase in the debt burden which in turn results from the net interest paid on that debt being raised by $\left[ r - \rho + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p)) \right] \ell_t(p)$ plus an extrinsic expansion/contraction term $\hat{\ell}_t(p)$ reflecting the fact that the stock of debt is by nature indexed to workforce size. The sum of these latter two terms is equal to Equation (12)’s LHS.

Equation (13) describes the dynamics of the shadow value of the marginal unit of labor. It has a straightforward asset-pricing-type interpretation, whereby the firm’s marginal employee is viewed as an asset priced at $\mu_t(p)$. The annuity value of the marginal employee, $(r + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t(W_t(p))) \mu_t(p),$
must then equal the return on the corresponding asset which is the sum of a dividend term (in square brackets) plus a capital gain term $\mu_t(p)$. That dividend term is the sum of a profit flow of $p - w_t(p)$ accruing to the employer (see Equation (15)) and an (expected) flow income of $w_t(p) + \delta U_t + \lambda_1 \int_{W_t(p)}^{+\infty} x dF_t(x)$ accruing to the worker (see Equation (2)).

3 Equilibrium Characterization

Definition 1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium of the dynamic contract-posting game is a vector of differentiable functions $[W_t(p), \mu_t(p), \ell_t(p), U_t, u_t]$ which solve the optimality conditions (12), (13) and (14), the state equations (7), (8) and (10), and the consistency conditions (5) and (6) given $\ell_0(p)$ and $u_0 = 1 - \int \ell_0(p) dp$.

Having defined the object of interest, we now return to the main hurdle that we face in describing it and solving the contract-posting dynamic game. We need to find strategies whose distributions across firms evolve according to $F_t$, induce a distribution $G_t$ of values across employed workers, and are all best-responses to each other.

This formidable problem has hampered the analysis of aggregate dynamics in wage posting models with random search. To gain some insight, we first observe that the complications derive entirely from the forward-looking aspect of workers’ behavior. In fact, in Appendix D we prove that when workers are myopic and only care about the current wage ($\rho = +\infty$), the only equilibrium is such that wages jump immediately to the same stationary wage distribution as in BM. This simple property is lost in the general, and interesting, case where workers care about future wages and the option of quitting to better-paying jobs.

We begin by arguing that $F_t$ and $G_t$ cannot have atoms in equilibrium at almost all points in time, so a density $f_t$ and $g_t$ indeed exists almost everywhere in $p$ and $t$. The argument is the same as in BM: if there was an atom of firms offering the same value for an interval of time of nonzero length, one of them could gain by deviating and offering an $\varepsilon$ more, winning the competition against the atom every time it arises, at an infinitesimal cost. Atoms in $G_t$ exist if and only if atoms in $F_t$ do. This argument, however, does not rule out atoms at countable points in time, where the paths
of values offered by a set of firms of positive productivity measure happen to cross simultaneously, an issue that did not arise in BM’s steady state analysis.

Next, we focus on a particularly tractable and natural class of equilibria, which satisfy what we call a Rank-Preserving (RP) property. We show conditions under which all equilibria must satisfy this property, implying uniqueness of equilibrium as an added bonus. The conditions have a natural economic interpretation. Finally, we fully characterize the dynamics of firm size, wage and value offers in a RP equilibrium.

3.1 The Rank-Preserving Property

A tractable class of equilibria, and in many cases the only type of equilibrium, has the following property:

**Definition 2 (Rank-Preserving Property)** An equilibrium is Rank-Preserving if firms post values that are strictly increasing in $p$ for all $t$.

A direct consequence of the above definition is that in a RPE workers rank firms according to productivity at all dates. The following two properties hold true at all dates under the RP assumption:

$$F_t(W_t(p)) \equiv \Phi(p) \quad \text{and} \quad (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t(p)) = \int_p^{\infty} \ell_t(x) \, d\Phi(x).$$

In addition to considerably simplifying equilibrium determination (see below), the RP assumption is theoretically appealing for at least two reasons. First, it parallels a well-known property of the static equilibrium characterized by BM, which is to have a unique equilibrium where workers rank firms according to productivity. Second, RPE feature constrained-efficient labor reallocation at all dates: if workers consistently rank more productive firms higher than less productive ones, then job-to-job moves will always be up the productivity ladder. We thank Pat Kline for pointing this out to us.

The following natural question is therefore to ask about the generality of these rank-preserving equilibria. Given the definition of a RPE spelled out above the following two propositions can be established:
Proposition 1 (Ranked Initial Firm Size Implies Rank-Preserving Equilibrium) If the initial state of the economy is such that \( \ell_0(p) \) is non decreasing in \( p \) (i.e. higher-\( p \) firms are no smaller in sampling-weight-adjusted terms), then any equilibrium of the dynamic value-posting game is necessarily rank-preserving.

The proof of this first proposition is in Appendix A. It builds on Caputo’s (2003) comparative dynamic characterization of optimal controls in infinite horizon problems, which itself is based on the second-order condition of the primal-dual problem corresponding to (11).

This Proposition has a simple economic intuition, thus it appears to be a robust conclusion. In BM’s steady state model, more productive firms offer higher wages due to a single-crossing property of their steady state profits, which in turn reflects two very basic economic forces. First, a higher wage implies a larger firm size, as a more generous offer makes it easier to poach workers and to fend off competition. Second, a larger firm size is more valuable to a more productive firm, because each worker produces more. Therefore, by a simple monotone comparative statics argument, it must be the case that more productive firms offer more, employ more workers, and earn higher profits. Simply put, a productive firm can afford paying more, and is willing to do so to attract workers, because its opportunity cost of not producing is higher. Key to this argument is the fact that firm size is an endogenous object, and BM look for an appropriate firm size distribution which guarantees a stationary allocation.

In our dynamic model, firm size is a state variable, and its initial value is a parameter of the model, arbitrarily fixed, not an endogenous object. Therefore, in order to get a start on monotone comparative statics, it is sufficient (but not necessary) that the initial size distribution shares the key property of BM’s steady state distribution; namely, it is increasing in productivity. In the proof, we begin by invoking Theorem 2 of Caputo (2003), which in this case is equivalent to a single-crossing property of the Hamiltonian of the value-posting problem. Given a ranked initial size, a more productive firm still wants and can afford to pay more, now in terms of values accruing to workers. The initial ranking of sizes by productivities is preserved throughout, so values offered to workers remain ranked by firm productivity at all points in the future, even if the firm were to
stop and re-optimize. This condition is only sufficient. We conjecture that it is not necessary, and we are exploring this issue.

**Proposition 2 (Rank-Preserving Stationary Allocations)** For \( r \) in a neighborhood of zero, the set of necessary optimality conditions for problem (1) has a unique steady-state symmetric solution which is “rank-preserving” in the sense that:

- steady-state worker value \( V_\infty (p) \) is non-decreasing in \( p \);
- steady-state firm size \( \ell_\infty (p) \) is non-decreasing in \( p \).

The proof is in Appendix B. This latter result should not come as a surprise to those familiar with the BM model: if \( r \to 0 \), then firms only care about steady-state profits and our initially dynamic optimization problem becomes confounded with the static BM problem, which has a unique solution that is RP in the sense indicated in Proposition 2.

Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 are statements about the generality of RPE. Specifically these propositions establish that RPE are generic within the set of dynamic equilibria such that there is no dispersion in firm size among firms of a common type \( p \). Note that steady-state symmetric equilibria are necessarily in that class—as can be seen from the steady-state version of (3) which shows that steady-state firm size only depends on the value offered in steady-state, \( V_\infty (p) \). The flip side of those arguments is that the RP property can transitionally break down because of the entry of new firms. For example an entrant firm with a productivity level somewhere in the interior of \( \Gamma \)’s support and an initial size of zero might be tempted to break ranks in one direction or the other, depending on the shape of \( f_t (\cdot) \) and \( g_t (\cdot) \). With this caveat in mind, we now proceed to a characterization of RPE.

**3.2 Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution in RPE**

Let us consider the stock of workers employed at a firm of type-\( p \) or less, \( \int_x^p \ell_t (x) \, d\Phi (x) \). In a RPE (assuming one exists), those firms hire workers from unemployment and lose workers to their more productive competitors (firms of type higher than \( p \)). The stock of workers under consideration
thus evolves according to:

\[
\int_{\mathbb{P}} \ell_t(x) d\Phi(x) = \lambda_0 u_t(p) - [\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)] \int_{\mathbb{P}} \ell_t(x) d\Phi(x).
\]

The latter equation now solves as:

\[
\int_{\mathbb{P}} \ell_t(x) d\Phi(x) = e^{-[\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)]t} \left( \int_{\mathbb{P}} \ell_0(x) d\Phi(x) + \lambda_0 \Phi(p) \int_{0}^{t} u_s e^{[\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)]s} ds \right) \tag{16}
\]

Now differentiating with respect to \( p \), on obtains a closed-form expression for the workforce of any type-\( p \) firm:

\[
\ell_t(p) = e^{-[\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)]t} \left[ \ell_0(p) + \lambda_1 \int_{\mathbb{P}} \ell_0(x) d\Phi(x) + \lambda_0 \int_{0}^{t} [1 + \lambda_1 (t - s) \Phi(p)] u_s e^{[\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)]s} ds \right]. \tag{17}
\]

The steady-state versions of (16) and (17) are:

\[
\ell_{\infty}(p) = \frac{\delta \lambda_0 (\delta + \lambda_1)}{(\delta + \lambda_0) [\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)]^2} \quad \text{and} \quad \int_{\mathbb{P}} \ell_{\infty}(x) d\Phi(x) = \frac{\delta \lambda_0 \Phi(p)}{(\delta + \lambda_0) [\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)]}. \tag{18}
\]

This is the point at which the necessity for sampling weights appears. Note from equation (18) that the steady-state size ratio of the largest to the smallest firm in the market in units of (non-normalized) employment is

\[
\frac{L_{\infty}(\mathbb{P})}{L_{\infty}(\mathbb{P})} = \frac{\ell_{\infty}(\mathbb{P}) q(\mathbb{P})}{\ell_{\infty}(\mathbb{P}) q(\mathbb{P})} = \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_1}{\delta} \right)^2 \frac{q(\mathbb{P})}{q(\mathbb{P})}.
\]

With uniform sampling (\( q(p) \equiv 1 \) throughout), this ratio would equal \( \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_1}{\delta} \right)^2 \), which is in the order of 25-30 given standard estimates of \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \delta \). Now of course the data counterpart of that size ratio is virtually infinite. More generally, it appears that the BM model requires a sampling distribution that is very heavily skewed toward high-productivity firms in order to replicate the observed distribution of firm sizes.

Before going any further into characterizing Rank-Preserving Equilibria, we should notice that the analysis of firm size and employment dynamics carried out in this paragraph would apply to any job ladder model in which a similar concept of RPE can be defined. Indeed nothing in the
dynamics of $L_t$ or $u_t$ depends on the particulars of the wage setting mechanism, so long as this is such that employed jobseekers move from lower-ranking into higher-ranking jobs in the sense of a time-invariant ranking. Therefore, this model’s predictions about everything relating to firm sizes are in fact much more general than the wage- (or value-) posting assumption retained in the BM model.

3.3 Wage Contracts in RPE

We now go back to the dynamical system characterizing the behavior of the typical individual firm, and analyze it in a RPE. The system in question is comprised of the set of optimality conditions (12) - (14) plus the set of state equations (10), (2) and (8). For simplicity, we now assume equal discount rates for workers and employers from now on (i.e. $r = \rho$).

The RP assumption changes the system (12) - (14) into:

$$\left(\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 \int_p p \ell_t (x) d\Phi (x)\right) W'_t (p) = 2\lambda_1 \varphi (p) \ell_t (p) (\mu_t (p) - W_t (p))$$

(19)

$$\dot{\mu}_t (p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{\Phi} (p)) \mu_t (p) - \lambda_1 \int_p W_t (x) d\Phi (x) - \delta U_t - p$$

(20)

$$\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-rt} \mu_t (p) = 0.$$  

(21)

Differentiation of (20) w.r.t. $p$ yields (primes denote differentiation w.r.t. $p$ while dots denote time differentiation):

$$\dot{\mu}'_t (p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{\Phi} (p)) \mu'_t (p) - \lambda_1 \varphi (p) (\mu_t (p) - W_t (p)) - 1.$$  

(22)

This, together with (19) and the definition of the firm’s shadow value of the marginal worker $\pi_t (p) := \mu_t (p) - W_t (p)$, gives the following system of two PDEs in $(\mu'_t (p), \pi_t (p))$:

$$\dot{\mu}'_t (p) = R (p) \mu'_t (p) + R' (p) \pi_t (p) - 1$$

(23)

$$\mu'_t (p) = \pi'_t (p) + B_t (p) \pi_t (p).$$

where $R (p) := r + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{\Phi} (p)$ is the effective discount factor of the firm, and

$$B_t (p) := \frac{2\lambda_1 \varphi (p) \ell_t (p)}{\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 \int_p p \ell_t (x) d\Phi (x)}.$$
The system (23) can be solved numerically subject to some initial and boundary conditions. ‘Initial’ conditions are given by the steady-state solution to (23), which is characterized as:

\[ \mu'_{\infty} (p) = \frac{1 + \lambda_1 \varphi (p) \pi_{\infty} (p)}{r + \delta + \lambda_1 \Phi (p)} \]

\[ \pi_{\infty} (p) = \frac{[\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi (p)]^2}{r + \delta + \lambda_1 \Phi (p)} \left( \int_p^0 \frac{dx}{[\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi (x)]^2} + \frac{\pi_{\infty} (p) (r + \delta + \lambda_1)}{(\delta + \lambda_1)^2} \right). \]  

(24)

Now turning to boundary conditions, standard arguments prove that the lowest-type firms have no reason to pay more than the minimum wage: type \( p \) firms can only hire from unemployment and lose workers to poachers anyway, so trying to prevent poaching by raising wages is pointless for those firms in a RPE. While this implies that the minimum wage constraint (4) will bind at all dates for the lowest-type firm, it also implies that the following (time-invariant) boundary conditions are satisfied:

\[ \pi_t (p) = \frac{p - w}{r + \delta + \lambda_1} \]

\[ \mu'_{t} (p) = \frac{1 + \lambda_1 \varphi (p) \pi_{t} (p)}{r + \delta + \lambda_1}, \]  

(25)

where the second condition is obtained by combining the first one with the \( \mu'_{t} (p) \) equation in (23). These boundary conditions can be further simplified by imposing \( p = w \), a kind of free-entry condition holding throughout the adjustment toward the new steady state, which implies \( \pi_t (p) = 0 \). The minimum productivity \( p \) that can survive in the market is \( w \), as any firm with \( p > w \) can make positive profits by offering \( w \), and possibly even more by offering a higher wage while no firm with \( p < w \) can ever make any profits.

We note that (23) can also be written more compactly as one PDE in the firm’s shadow value of the marginal worker:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 \pi_t (p)}{\partial t \partial p} + \frac{\partial}{\partial t} [B_t (p) \pi_t (p)] = \frac{\partial}{\partial p} [R (p) \pi_t (p)] + R (p) B_t (p) \pi_t (p) - 1. \]  

(26)

Once either the PDE in (26) is solved for \( \pi_t (p) \) or (23) is solved for \( (\mu'_{t} (p), \pi_{t} (p)) \), wages can be
retrieved from (15) (written under the RP assumption):

\[ w_t(p) = p - (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p)) \pi_t(p) + \pi_t(p), \]

which has the following familiar steady-state solution:

\[ w_\infty(p) = p - (\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(p))^2 \left( \int_p^\infty \frac{dx}{(\delta + \lambda_1 \Phi(x))^2} + \frac{p - w}{(\delta + \lambda_1)^2} \right). \] (27)

This is exactly the BM solution for the heterogeneous firm case (see equation (47) in Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). This confirms that our contracts are consistent with the BM steady-state wage-posting equilibrium if the labor market is at a steady state. It is no longer the case off steady-state, however: posting a time-invariant wage is not, in general, a firm’s best response to all other firms posting time-invariant wages.\(^9\)

We now look back to the minimum wage constraint. The only firm for which the minimum wage constraint (4) is binding at the steady state characterized above is the lowest-type firm, \(p_\pi\). It may be the case, however, that the constraint temporarily binds for some higher-type firms over the transition to that steady state, in which case the economy no longer behaves according to (23) as this system was derived ignoring the minimum wage constraint (4). In our companion paper, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008), we describe an algorithm that constructs an equilibrium in which \(w\) is allowed to temporarily bind for some firms (at the lower end of the \(p\)-distribution) with the restriction that it only bind over some initial period. In other words, any firm can choose to post the minimum wage for a while right after the occurrence of the productivity shock, but once it ceases to do so it is not allowed to return to the minimum wage.

The aforementioned numerical algorithm can be used to numerically solve (23) and simulate our model’s dynamic equilibrium to study its quantitative properties. This is the objective pursued

\(^9\)A pedagogically interesting exception is the case of myopic workers \((\rho = +\infty)\), fully characterized and discussed in our companion paper Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008).

\(^{10}\)To see this, notice that (15) and (19) yield two different growth rates for \(\pi_t(p)\) if all wages are constant and the economy is off its steady state (so that firm sizes change over time). Under constant wages, Equation (15) gives a \(\pi_t(p)\) which evolves as an exponential of time. But then with a constant wage and constant wages offered elsewhere, \(W_t(p)\) is constant over time, so dividing (19) by \(\ell_t(p)\) tells us that \(\pi_t(p)\) is proportional to the gross hiring rate, and so \(\pi_t(p)\) cannot be exponential in time (because the hiring rate is not an exponential function of time in a RPE). All this implies that posting a constant wage in the face of competitors themselves posting constant wages violates the firm’s set of necessary optimality conditions.
in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008). As for the present theoretical analysis, we thus conclude our
equilibrium characterization with the following two remarks. First, as we already mentioned, our
constructive characterization of a RPE implies uniqueness within that class of equilibria. Second,
our analysis still leaves two open questions: (conditions for) existence of an equilibrium, which in
the RP case reduces to the relatively tractable problem of existence of a solution to a system of
PDEs; and the much harder issue of equilibrium play when our sufficient conditions for RP fails.

4 Discussion

4.1 Homogeneous Firms

The original motivation of the search literature exemplified by BM is to explain the large cross-
sectional variation in worker wages that remains even after controlling for observable and unob-
servable worker and firm characteristics. The hallmark of the BM research program is to produce
a robust failure of the law of one price, whereas identical agents make identical trades a different
prices. In the light, the most striking and meaningful version of the BM model is the simplest
setting where all firms and workers are identical. BM prove that the unique equilibrium must be
in asymmetric strategies and entail wage dispersion among identical workers.

The proof of Proposition 1 can be adapted to show that, in this case, whenever we start with
a continuous size distribution \( \ell_0 (p) \) with no atoms, equilibrium is always RP. The logic is simple.
Now \( p \) plays the role of the rank in the initial \( \ell_0 (p) \). An initially larger firm wants to offer more
to its workers, although they produce just as much as anywhere else, because the retention effect
of a more generous offer is more powerful the larger firm size. Since there exists always a ranking
of firms when \( \ell_0 (p) \) has no atoms, then the RP always holds in equilibrium.

4.2 Comparison with BM’s Steady State Analysis

The exact relationship between our and BM’s analyses is subtle and an explicit comparison is now
in order. In our approach, a choice of parameters \( \ell_0 (p) \), \( \lambda_0 \), \( \delta \) implies a unique initial unemployment
rate \( u_0 \) and stationary unemployment rate \( \bar{u} \):

\[
u_0 = 1 - \int \ell_0 (x) \gamma (x) dx \lesssim \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda_0} = \bar{u}
\]
Notice the initial distribution of employment \( \ell_0(p) \), thus the initial unemployment rate, are parameters that can be fixed arbitrarily. That is, they are given initial conditions, inherited somehow from past history. In contrast, BM assume steady state: given \( \delta \) and \( \lambda_0 \), they choose (solve for) the only possible employment distribution \( \ell^{BM}(p) = \ell_0(p) \) which replicates itself and thus makes the initial unemployment rate stationary: \( u_0 = \bar{u} \). This equilibrium distribution \( \ell^{BM}(p) \) turns out to be RP.

If we also impose steady state, after solving for the optimal time-dependent contracts, we get the same employment distribution as BM: we need to choose \( \ell_0(p) = \ell^{BM}(p) \) to obtain stationarity. That is, a best-response time-dependent wage is constant if the economy is in steady state. However, if we fix \( \ell_0(p) \) arbitrarily, so generically the economy is not in steady state \( u_0 \neq \bar{u} \), but moves, then no equilibrium can have constant wages: the best-response to constant wages paid by all firms is not a constant wage when unemployment changes over time.

Finally, if \( r \) is small and thus close (but not necessarily identical) to the \( r = 0 \) assumed by BM, in any equilibrium of our model the size distribution converges necessarily to a RP stationary limit \( \ell_{\infty}(p) \), which is the same as BM’s steady state \( \ell_{\infty}(p) = \ell^{BM}(p) \).

4.3 Time Consistency of Equilibrium Contracts

As well known, wage- (or, in this case, contract-) posting models of frictional markets require a credible commitment by firms to fulfill the terms of the promise. Taking advantage of job search frictions and imperfect recall of past offers, a firm is tempted to exploit its bargaining power and to renege on the contract right after the worker accepts the offer, to drive down the wage to its reservation value. Coles (2001) provides an equilibrium reputational foundation for commitment to the wage offer. In our dynamic context, a time-consistent contract should set to zero the firm’s shadow marginal value of the workforce \( \pi_t(p) = \mu_t(p) - W_t(p) = 0 \), in order to align the marginal value of the match \( \mu_t(p) \) to that of the worker \( W_t(p) \). As pointed out by Stevens (2004), the firm should effectively sell itself to the worker, extracting all rents, and then let the worker appropriate all the flow output. Besides the obvious issue of credibility, liquidity constraints are a powerful counter argument. Stevens proposes wage-tenure contracts, that Burdett and Coles (2003) develop
further. We return later to this extension of the contract space.

Similarly, a firm would like to fight outside offers to its own employees, and counter-offer when its offer is not sufficient to poach a worker. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002, 2004) investigate this idea. The same tension exists in our setting. Moscarini (2004) illustrates an alternative reputational mechanism to enforce this kind of commitment not to respond to outside offers to own employees.

In our model, the optimal contract is in open-loop form, a pre-determined function of time. By the principle of optimality, however, for any given time path of $F_t$ and $G_t$, no firm wants to deviate from the initially chosen contract if this deviation has no impact on those aggregate paths. If firms could coordinate and re-optimize collectively, they would want to deviate, but this is not an issue under a Nash equilibrium concept. For sequential equilibrium one needs to specify the continuation strategies of all firms after such a deviation. If firms’ actions are observed only by the parties involved, the worker and at best a competing firm, then any deviation will trigger a cascade of reactions that will involve at best a countable number of firms and workers down the road, a zero measure set. Therefore, a firm should not expect to change the continuous distribution of values offered and earned at any time in the future. Hence, our equilibrium is also sequential, thus contracts are time-consistent, given the commitment power vis-a-vis workers. This argument breaks down if all actions are publicly observed.

5 Vacancy Creation [in progress]

5.1 The Firm’s Extended Problem

So far, we have taken the arrival rates of offers $\lambda_0$ and $\lambda_1$, and the sampling weight $q$ as given constants, thus shutting down an important part of labor demand. Suppose instead that a firm $p$ needs to post vacancies in order to hire. Suppose that posting $v_t$ vacancies has a flow cost $c(v_t)$, where $c$ is convex and smooth. Let $v_t(p)$ be the measure of vacancies posted by $p$—firms at time $t$. Let $v_t = \int p v_t(p) d\Gamma(p)$ denote the aggregate stock of vacancies.$^{11}$ Suppose that a random CRS matching function $m$ mediates meetings between unemployed and employed job searchers with open

$^{11}$To avoid cluttering the notation, we normalize the total mass of firms, $N$, at 1 throughout this section. Amending this normalization is straightforward.
vacancies, where the latter type of job seeker have a relative search intensity of $\sigma$. Then contact rates are endogenous and time-dependent:

$$\lambda_{0t} = \frac{m (u_t + \sigma (1 - u_t), \bar{v}_t)}{u_t + \sigma (1 - u_t)} \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_{1t} = \sigma \lambda_{0t},$$

and so are sampling weights: $q_t (p) = v_t (p) / \bar{v}_t$.\(^{12}\) Note that $\Phi_t (p) = \int_p^Q q_t (x) d\Gamma (x)$ remains a proper cdf at all points in time.

The choice of vacancies must be added to the control problem. While it cannot affect the arrival rate of offers to workers, as each firm is too small to make itself easily visible, it does affect the chance that the job application will land on a particular firm type, namely, the sampling distribution. Indeed the law of motion of employment at a type-$p$ firm, given an implemented path of worker values and posted vacancies $\{W_t, v_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ writes down as:

$$\dot{L}_t (p) = - \left[ \delta + \lambda_{1t} \bar{F}_t (W_t) \right] L_t (p) + \frac{v_t}{\bar{v}_t} \cdot \left[ \lambda_{0t} u_t + \lambda_{1t} (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t) \right].$$

Note that the firm size normalization in (9) is no longer convenient with time-varying sampling weights. We therefore revert to the original notation, where $L_t (p)$ is really the “number” of workers employed at a type-$p$ firm.

The current-value Hamiltonian of the modified firm’s problem, which the firm now maximizes with respect to the pair of control variables $(W_t, v_t)$, now writes as:\(^{13}\)

$$\mathcal{H}_t (p) = \left[ p + \lambda_{1t} \int_{W_t}^{+\infty} x dF_t (x) + \delta U_t \right] L_t (p) - W_t \cdot \frac{v_t}{\bar{v}_t} \cdot \left[ \lambda_{0t} u_t + \lambda_{1t} (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t) \right]$$

$$- c (u_t) + \mu_t (p) \left\{ - \left[ \delta + \lambda_{1t} \bar{F}_t (W_t) \right] L_t (p) + \frac{v_t}{\bar{v}_t} \cdot \left[ \lambda_{0t} u_t + \lambda_{1t} (1 - u_t) G_t (W_t) \right] \right\}.$$\(^{12}\)Note that we are treating both types of job seekers as perfectly substitutable inputs into the matching process (up to the constant relative search intensity $\sigma$). A possible alternative would have been to model vacancies as completely directed toward a given type of job seeker, with separate search markets and different matching functions for employed and unemployed workers. While the available evidence seems to buttress the latter option (Van Ours, 1995), we have opted for a theoretically slightly simpler route.

\(^{13}\)Again to streamline the following derivations we focus on the case of equal discount rates, $r = \rho$. This is inconsequential.
Optimality conditions are:

\[ c'(v_t(p)) = [\mu_t(p) - W_t(p)] \cdot \frac{1}{v_t} \cdot [\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_{1t} (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t)] \] 

(29)

\[ \frac{v_t(p)}{v_t} \cdot [\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_{1t} (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t)] \]

(30)

\[ \frac{v_t(p)}{v_t} \cdot [\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_{1t} (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t)] \]

\[ = \lambda_{1t} [\mu_t(p) - W_t(p)] \left[ f_t(W_t(p)) L_t(p) + (1 - u_t) g_t(W_t(p)) \frac{v_t(p)}{v_t} \right] \]

\[ \mu_t(p) = [r + \delta + \lambda_{1t} F_t(W_t(p))] \mu_t(p) - \left[ p + \lambda_{1t} \int_{W_t(p)}^{+\infty} x dF_t(x) + \delta U_t \right] \]

(31)

\[ \lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-rt} \mu_t(p) \ell_t(p) = 0. \]

(32)

5.2 Rank-Preserving Equilibria

We now focus on RPE with endogenous vacancies. Such equilibria are characterized by the set of conditions derived in the previous subsection, together with the condition \( W'_t(p) > 0 \) for all \((t, p)\), which now implies:

\[ F_t(W_t(p)) = \int_p^1 \frac{v_t(x)}{v_t} d\Gamma(x) = \Phi_t(p) \quad \text{and} \quad (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t(p)) = \int_p^1 L_t(x) d\Gamma(x). \]

First substituting into the law of motion of \( L_t(p) \), (28), and proceeding as we did in Subsection 3.2, it is easy to establish the following:

\[ \int_p^1 L_t(x) d\Gamma(x) = e^{-\int_0^t [\delta + \lambda_{1t} \bar{F}_s(p)] ds} \left( \int_p^1 L_0(x) d\Gamma(x) + \int_0^t \lambda_{0s} u_s \Phi_s(p) e^{-\int_0^t [\delta + \lambda_{1t} \bar{F}_s(p)] ds} ds \right), \]

(33)

which can be differentiated w.r.t. \( p \) to obtain an expression for \( L_t(p) \).

Now turning to what the RP assumption implies for the necessary conditions (29)-(31) and re-introducing the firm’s shadow value of the marginal worker \( \pi_t(p) := \mu_t(p) - W_t(p) \), some straightforward algebra leads to:

\[ c'(v_t(p)) = \frac{\pi_t(p)}{v_t} \left( \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_{1t} \int_p^1 L_t(x) d\Gamma(x) \right) \] 

(34)

\[ \mu_t(p) = \pi_t(p) + \frac{2 \lambda_{1t} L_t(p) \gamma(p) \pi_t(p)}{\lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_{1t} \int_p^1 L_t(x) d\Gamma(x)} \]

(35)

\[ \dot{\mu}_t(p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_{1t} \bar{F}_t(p)) \mu_t(p) - \lambda_{1t} \gamma(p) \frac{v_t(p)}{v_t} \pi_t(p) - 1. \]

(36)
Note that (36) is a differentiated version of (31) (following the same steps as in Subsection 3.3), and that (35) can be slightly simplified by appealing to the relationship between contact rates, $\lambda_{t} = \sigma \lambda_{0t}$.

Dynamic RPE are characterized by the solution to the above system of PDEs, (34)-(36), combined with (33) and the law of motion of unemployment, $\dot{u}_{t} = -\lambda_{0t} u_{t} + \delta (1 - u_{t})$. While there is little hope to derive a closed-form solution to that system, a simple fixed-point algorithm can be used to obtain numerical solutions. Details of that algorithm are given in Appendix C.

5.3 Steady-state RPE and Model Calibration

Characterization of steady-state RPE with $exogenous$ vacancies is essentially contained in equations (18) and (24), which are the steady-state versions of (28), (33), (35) and (36). We repeat those equations here, using the now-familiar notation $q_{\infty}(p) = v_{\infty}(p)/\pi_{\infty}$ and $\varphi_{\infty}(p) = \Phi_{\infty}(p) = q_{\infty}(p) \gamma(p)$:

$$L_{\infty}(p) = \frac{\delta \lambda_{0\infty} (\delta + \lambda_{1\infty}) q_{\infty}(p)}{(\delta + \lambda_{0\infty}) [\delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)]^2}$$ and $$\int_{p}^{\infty} L_{\infty}(x) d\Gamma(x) = \frac{\delta \lambda_{0\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)}{(\delta + \lambda_{0\infty}) [\delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)]},$$

$$\mu'_{\infty}(p) = \frac{1 + \lambda_{1\infty} \varphi_{\infty}(p) \pi_{\infty}(p)}{r + \delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)}$$

$$\pi_{\infty}(p) = \left[\frac{\delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)}{r + \delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)}\right]^2 \left(\int_{p}^{\infty} \frac{dx}{[\delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(x)]^2} + \pi_{\infty}(p) \frac{(r + \delta + \lambda_{1\infty})}{(\delta + \lambda_{1\infty})^2}\right).$$

Now characterization of steady-state RPE with $endogenous$ vacancies is obtained from the above system of steady-state conditions together with the steady-state version of the FOC describing the firm’s optimal vacancy-posting, (34):

$$c'_{\infty}(v_{\infty}(p)) = \frac{\pi_{\infty}(p)}{\bar{v}_{\infty}} \frac{\delta \lambda_{0\infty}}{\delta + \lambda_{0\infty} \delta + \lambda_{1\infty} \Phi_{\infty}(p)} \frac{\delta + \lambda_{1\infty}}{(\delta + \lambda_{1\infty})^2}$$

(with $\bar{v}_{\infty} = \int_{p}^{\infty} v_{\infty}(p) d\Gamma(p)$).

We are now in a position to calibrate the model based on its predicted steady-state wage and firm size distributions. Note that this calibration strategy can be carried out recursively: we begin by calibrating the model ignoring endogenous vacancy creation (thus following similar steps to
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008), and then use (39) together with a specification of the vacancy cost function to deduce the equilibrium distribution of vacancies.

\[
\rho = r \quad \delta \quad \lambda_{0,\infty} \quad \lambda_{1,\infty}
\]

0.0043 0.025 0.40 0.12

Baseline parameterization (steady state monthly values)

Specifically, we begin by picking values for the discount rate \( r \) and the (steady-state) transition parameters \( \lambda_{0,\infty}, \lambda_{1,\infty} \) and \( \delta \) as explicated in the table above. (The time unit is one month. The value of \( r = \rho \) reflects an annual discount rate of five percent. Note that the relative value of \( \lambda_{0,\infty} \) and \( \lambda_{1,\infty} \) implies a relative search intensity of employed workers of \( \sigma \approx .3 \).) A steady-state sampling distribution of firm types \( \Phi_{\infty} (\cdot) \) is then calibrated following the Bontemps et al. (2000) procedure in such a way that the predicted steady-state wage distribution fits the business-sector wage distribution observed in the CPS. Specifically, Equation (37) implies that the steady-state cross-section CDF of wages, \( G_w (\cdot) \) (say), is defined by:

\[
\Phi_{\infty} (p) = \frac{\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty}}{\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty} G_w (w (p))} \Rightarrow \varphi_{\infty} (p) = \frac{\delta (\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty}) g_w (w (p)) w' (p)}{(\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty} G_w (w (p)))^2}.
\] (40)

Differentiation of (27) then yields:

\[
w' (p) = 2 \lambda_{1,\infty} \varphi_{\infty} (p) \frac{p - w (p)}{\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty} \Phi_{\infty} (p)} \Rightarrow p (w) = w + \frac{\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty} G_w (w)}{2 \lambda_{1,\infty} g_w (w)}.
\]

A lognormal distribution is fitted to a sample of wages from the 2006 CPS and then used to construct a sample of firm types using the above relationship. The sampling distribution \( \Phi_{\infty} (\cdot) \) that rationalizes this sample in a steady state (and given values of \( \delta \) and \( \lambda_{1,\infty} \)) is then retrieved using (40).

Once a sampling distribution has been obtained, the underlying distributions of firm types \( \gamma (p) \) and sampling weights \( q_{\infty} (p) \) are calibrated based on the employment-share/firm-size relationship observed in the Business Employment Dynamics data (see Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008, for details). That relationship is found to be well fitted by the following parametric form:

\[
\Gamma (p) = \left( \frac{1 - e^{-\alpha_1 G_w (w (p))}}{1 - e^{-\alpha_1}} \right)^{\alpha_2},
\]
with \( \alpha_1 = 8.0661 \) and \( \alpha_2 = 0.5843 \). Sampling weights are finally retrieved as \( q_\infty (p) = \varphi_\infty (p) / \gamma (p) \).

The final step in our calibration procedure consists of specifying and calibrating both a matching function \( m (\cdot) \) and a vacancy-posting-cost function \( c (\cdot) \). We use a conventional Cobb-Douglas, CRS specification for the matching function:

\[
m (u + \sigma (1 - u), \bar{v}) := M \cdot (u + \sigma (1 - u))^{1-\alpha} \bar{v}^\alpha,
\]

where \( \alpha = 0.6 \) (a conventional value; see for instance Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2006) and \( M \) is a scale parameter to be determined. Using the definition of the contact rate \( \lambda_{0,\infty} \) at a steady state, together with the steady-state relationship \( u_{\infty} + \sigma (1 - u_{\infty}) = \frac{\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty}}{\delta + \lambda_{0,\infty}} \), one obtains the following relationship between \( M \) and \( \tau_\infty \):

\[
\lambda_{0,\infty} = M \left( \frac{\delta + \lambda_{0,\infty}}{\delta + \lambda_{1,\infty}} \right)^\alpha.
\]

Finally specifying the vacancy cost function as \( c (v) := Cv^\xi \), where \( \xi = 2 \) and \( C > 0 \) is another scale parameter, inversion of (39) yields:

\[
v_{\infty} (p) = \left( \frac{1}{C\xi} \cdot \frac{\tau_\infty (p) \delta \lambda_{0,\infty} \delta + \lambda_{1,\infty}}{\tau_\infty (p) \delta + \lambda_{0,\infty} \delta + \lambda_{1,\infty}} \right)^{1/(\xi-1)}.
\]

The integral of the thus obtained vacancy function \( v_{\infty} (p) \) over \([\bar{p}, \bar{p}]\) w.r.t. \( d\Gamma (p) \) must equal \( \tau_\infty \), which yields a relationship between \( C \) and \( \tau_\infty \). It is now clear from the last two equations that the only thing that is jointly determined by the pair of scale parameters \( M \) and \( C \) is the unit of measurement of vacancies (i.e. the scale of \( \tau \)). In other words, we have to normalize either \( C \), \( M \), or \( \tau_\infty \) in the absence of outside information on any of those quantities. We choose the normalization \( C = 1/\xi \).

5.4 Simulating an Expansion

[IN PROGRESS]

6 Conclusions

Our characterization of the dynamics of the BM model opens the analysis of aggregate labor market dynamics as a whole potential new field of application of search/wage-posting models. So
far, our analysis of non-stationary equilibrium in wage posting models has been limited to trans-
sitional dynamics. Our next objective is to characterize the rational expectations equilibrium of
the same economy in the presence of aggregate productivity shocks. The familiar hurdle arises: a
key state variable for individual policies is the evolving distribution of wage offers and payments,
an infinitely-dimensional object. We have proposed an approach to resolve this problem and we
will pursue it for this extension too. More troubling is the tension between firms’ commitment
to contract offers (the “posting” part of the model) and the need for firms to adapt to a stochas-
tically evolving environment. We are currently pursuing what we deem to be a natural avenue,
the assumption that firms offer and commit to wage policies that depend on two aggregate state
variables, unemployment and aggregate productivity. We plan to characterize equilibrium under
the Rank-Preserving restriction, and then to extend the RP proof illustrated in this paper to the
stochastic environment.
References


A Proof of Proposition 1

Consider the following generic dynamic optimization problem:

\[
\Pi_t (\ell_t; p) = \max_{\{W_s\}} \int_t^{+\infty} \left\{ \left[ p + \lambda_1 \int_{W_s}^{+\infty} x dF_s (x) + \delta U_s + (r - \rho) W_s \right] \ell_s - W_s \left[ \lambda_0 u_s + \lambda_1 (1 - u_s) G_s (W_s) \right] e^{-r(s-t)} ds \right\} (P)
\]

subject to: \[\dot{\ell}_s = - (\delta + \lambda_1 F_s (W_s)) \ell_s + \lambda_0 u_s + \lambda_1 (1 - u_s) G_s (W_s)\]
\[\ell_t \text{ given.}\]

By the optimality principle, a solution to (P) coincides with a solution to the contract posting problem (11) over \([t, +\infty)\) provided that the initial condition for \(\ell_t\) in (P) is set at the value taken on by \(\ell_t\) along the optimal path in the sense of the solution to problem (11).

The proof of Proposition 1 involves an application of Caputo’s (2003) comparative dynamic results. In order to apply those results we let \(W^*_t (\ell_t; p)\) denote the closed-loop optimal control to problem (P), and we also take up Caputo’s (2003) notation \(D_{xy} [W^*_t (\ell_t; p), (\ell_t, t; p)]\) for the \((x, y)\) element of the Hessian matrix of the primal-dual problem associated with (P) (see Caputo, 2003, equations 14-23 and Theorem 2).

We begin by establishing two intermediate results, from which the proposition will follow.

Lemma 1 Along the optimal path, for all \(t \geq 0:\)

\[\frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial p} (\ell_t; p) \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial p \partial \ell_t} (\ell_t; p) > 0.\]

Proof. We apply Theorem 2 in Caputo (2003), which is a statement of the second-order necessary condition for the primal-dual problem corresponding to (P_s). That second-order condition implies, inter alia, the following:

\[-D_{pp} [W^*_t (\ell_t; p), (\ell_t, t; p)] : \frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial p} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial p \partial \ell_t} \cdot [\lambda_1 f_t (W^*_t) \ell_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t (W^*_t)] \geq 0. \quad (42)\]

Thus \(\partial W^*_t / \partial p\) has the same sign as \(\partial^2 \Pi_t / \partial p \partial \ell_t.\)

Application of the Dynamic Envelope Theorem (e.g. Caputo, 1990) next establishes that:

\[\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial p} (\ell_t; p) = \int_t^{+\infty} \ell_s e^{-r(s-t)} ds,\]

implying:

\[\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial p \partial \ell_t} (\ell_t; p) = \int_t^{+\infty} \frac{\partial \ell_s}{\partial \ell_t} e^{-r(s-t)} ds. \quad (43)\]

14Although problem (P) is nonautonomous, it can be reexpressed as an autonomous problem by treating time as an additional predetermined state variable \(\tau_s\) such that \(\tau_s = 1\) and \(\tau_t = t\). This is the generic type of problem analyzed by Caputo (2003).
The proof of the proposition is then completed by establishing the following:

**Claim:** $\partial \ell_s / \partial t_t > 0$ for $s \geq t$ along the optimal path.

To prove this claim, we go back to the law of motion of $\ell_s$ along the optimal path which is given by:

$$\dot{\ell}_s = -(\delta + \lambda_1 F_s (W^*_s (\ell_s; p))) \ell_s + \lambda_0 u_s + \lambda_1 (1 - u_s) G_s (W^*_s (\ell_s; p)).$$

Differentiation w.r.t. $t_t$ yields:

$$\frac{\partial \dot{\ell}_s}{\partial t_t} = \left\{ - (\delta + \lambda_1 F_s (W^*_s)) + [\lambda_1 f_s (W^*_s) \ell_s + \lambda_1 (1 - u_s) g_s (W^*_s)] \cdot \frac{\partial W^*_s}{\partial \ell_t} \right\} \cdot \frac{\partial \ell_s}{\partial t_t}$$

$$\equiv \Psi_s (W^*_s, \ell_s) \cdot \frac{\partial \ell_s}{\partial t_t}.$$

Given the initial condition $\partial \ell_s / \partial t_t = 1$ at $s = t$, the differential equation above can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{\partial \ell_s}{\partial t_t} = \exp \int_t^s \Psi_x (W^*_x (\ell_x; p), s) \, dx > 0. \quad (44)$$

Lemma 1 is not sufficient to establish that the RP property must hold in equilibrium: for that we need to determine how the optimal $W^*_s$ responds to differences in the state variable, i.e. firm size ($\ell_t$). This is what the next proposition is about.

**Lemma 2** Along the optimal path, for all $t \geq 0$:

$$\frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial t_t} (\ell_t; p) \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t^2} (\ell_t; p) > 0.$$

**Proof.** We apply Theorem 2 in Caputo (2003) again, which also implies:

$$- D_{\ell \ell} [W^*_t (\ell_t; p), (\ell_t, t; p)] = \frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial t_t} \cdot \left\{ \lambda_1 f_t (W^*_t) \cdot \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial t_t} - W^*_t \right] 
+ \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t^2} \cdot [\lambda_1 f_t (W^*_t) \ell_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t (W^*_t)] + (r - \rho) \right\} \geq 0. \quad (45)$$

Next, the Euler equation for problem ($P$) (which can also be viewed as one of the envelope conditions for the HJB equation associated with ($P$); see e.g. Caputo, 2003) writes down as:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t \partial t_t^2} + \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t^2} \cdot \dot{t}_t = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t (W^*_t)) \frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial t_t} - p - \lambda_1 \int_{W^*_t}^{+\infty} x dF_t (x) - \delta U_t - (r - \rho) W^*_t. \quad (46)$$

Differentiating w.r.t. $t_t$ along the optimal path yields:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t_t} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t \partial t_t^2} + \frac{\partial}{\partial t_t} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t^2} \cdot \dot{t}_t - (\delta + \lambda_1 F_t (W^*_t)) \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t^2}$$

$$\cdot \frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial t_t} = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 F_t (W^*_t)) \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t_t^2} - \lambda_1 f_t (W^*_t) \frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial t_t} \cdot \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial t_t} - W^*_t \right] - (r - \rho) \frac{\partial W^*_t}{\partial t_t}.$$

\[15\] Note that $\partial \Pi_t / \partial t_t$ is the shadow joint value to the firm and the worker of the marginal match in the specific firm considered, which coincides with $\mu_t$ in the main text.
Rearranging:
\[
\frac{d}{dt} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t^2} = (r + 2\delta + 2\lambda_i \mathcal{F}_t(W_t^*)) \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t^2} - \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial t} \left\{ \lambda_1 f_t(W_t^*) \cdot \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial t} - W_t^* \right] \ight. \\
\left. + \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t^2} \cdot [\lambda_1 f_t(W_t^*) \ell + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t(W_t^*)] + (r - \rho) \right\}, \quad (47)
\]
which can be integrated as:
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t^2} = \int_t^{+\infty} \frac{\partial W_s^*}{\partial s} \cdot \left\{ \lambda_1 f_s(W_s^*) \cdot \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi_s}{\partial s} - W_s^* \right] \ight. \\
\left. + \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_s}{\partial s^2} \cdot [\lambda_1 f_s(W_s^*) \ell_s + \lambda_1 (1 - u_s) g_s(W_s^*)] + (r - \rho) \right\} \cdot e^{-\int_s^t (r + 2\delta + 2\lambda_i \mathcal{F}_s(W_s^*))ds} ds \geq 0,
\]
where the positive sign follows from (45). Lemma 2 then follows from (45) again, the positive sign of \(\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial t^2}\) just established and the fact that \(\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial t} - W_t^* > 0\) (which is directly implied by the first order condition for problem (P) and otherwise reflects the fact that any given firm makes a positive profit on its marginal worker).

We are now in a position to complete the proof of Proposition 1. Going back to the law of motion of \(\ell_t\) along the optimal path for a given firm type \(p\):
\[
\dot{\ell}_t = -\left( \delta + \lambda_i \mathcal{F}_t(W_t^*) \ell_t + \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t^*) \ell_t \right) + \lambda_0 u_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) G_t(W_t^*) \ell_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t(W_t^*) \ell_t,
\]
and differentiating w.r.t. \(p\), we obtain:
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{d\ell_t}{dp} = \left\{ -\left( \delta + \lambda_i \mathcal{F}_t(W_t^*) \right) + [\lambda_1 f_t(W_t^*) \ell_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t(W_t^*)] \cdot \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial \ell_t} \right\} \cdot \frac{d\ell_t}{dp} \\
\quad + [\lambda_1 f_t(W_t^*) \ell_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t(W_t^*)] \cdot \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial p} \\
\equiv \Psi_t(W_t^*, \ell_t) \cdot \frac{d\ell_t}{dp} + [\lambda_1 f_t(W_t^*) \ell_t + \lambda_1 (1 - u_t) g_t(W_t^*)] \cdot \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial \ell_t} \cdot \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial p}, \quad (48)
\]
which can be integrated as:
\[
\frac{d\ell_t}{dp} \bigg|_{t=0} = \frac{d\ell_t}{dp} + \int_0^t \lambda_1 f_x(W_x^*) \ell_x + \lambda_1 (1 - u_x) g_x(W_x^*) \cdot \frac{\partial W_x^*}{\partial \ell_t} \cdot \frac{\partial W_x^*}{\partial p} dx ds,
\]
which is positive from Lemma 1 and the assumption about the initial condition. Firm size \(\ell_t(p)\) is thus increasing in \(p\) throughout, which proves the proposition as:
\[
\frac{dW_t^*}{dp} = \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial p} + \frac{\partial W_t^*}{\partial \ell_t} \cdot \frac{d\ell_t}{dp}, \quad (49)
\]
where all terms are positive from the result above and Lemmas 1 and 2.

**B Proof of Proposition 2**

In this appendix we only prove that a steady-state solution for \(\tau\) not too large is necessarily RP. Uniqueness is established by construction later in the main text. Also in this proof we take up some of the notation introduced in Appendix A and drop all time subscripts when alluding to steady-state quantities.
The steady-state version of (48) writes as:

$$\frac{d\ell}{dp} = \frac{\lambda_1 f (W^*) \ell + \lambda_1 (1 - u) g (W^*)}{\Psi (W^*, \ell)} \cdot \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p}.$$ 

Substitution into (49) yields (using the definition of $\Psi(\cdot)$):

$$\frac{dW^*}{dp} = -\frac{\delta + \lambda_1 \tilde{F} (W^*)}{\Psi (W^*, \ell)} \cdot \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p}.$$ 

Showing that $\Psi (W^*, \ell) \leq 0$ is therefore necessary and sufficient to prove the proposition (as $\partial W^*/\partial p \geq 0$ from Lemma 1 in Appendix A). This is what we now do.

Writing (47) in steady-state, we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial \ell^2} \cdot \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial p \partial \ell} \cdot \left( \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \ell} \right)^2 \cdot \frac{\lambda_1 f (W^*) \ell + \lambda_1 (1 - u) g (W^*)}{r + 2\delta + 2\lambda_1 \tilde{F} (W^*)}. $$

Substitution into (45) (written in steady-state) yields:

$$\frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p} \cdot \lambda_1 f (W^*) \cdot \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \ell} - W^* \right] + \frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial p \partial \ell} \cdot \left( \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \ell} \right)^2 \cdot \frac{[\lambda_1 f (W^*) \ell + \lambda_1 (1 - u) g (W^*)]^2}{r + 2\delta + 2\lambda_1 \tilde{F} (W^*)} + (r - \rho) \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p}$$

$$= \frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial \ell^2} \cdot \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p} \cdot \left[ \lambda_1 f (W^*) \ell + \lambda_1 (1 - u) g (W^*) \right].$$

(50)

Now substituting (44) into (43) and time-differentiating leads to:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial p \partial \ell_t} = -1 + (r - \Psi_t) \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_t}{\partial p \partial \ell_t},$$

so that in steady state:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial p \partial \ell} = \frac{1}{r - \Psi}.$$  

(51)

First note that from Lemma 1, which establishes that $\partial^2 \Pi_t/\partial p \partial \ell_t > 0$ throughout in a dynamic equilibrium, the only consistent steady-state solution thus has $\Psi < r$. Then once again substituting into (50) and rearranging yields the following quadratic equation in $\Psi$:

$$\Psi^2 - [r + A (r + 2\Delta)] \Psi - \Delta (r + \Delta) + r A (r + 2\Delta) = 0,$$

(52)

where $\Delta := \delta + \lambda_1 \tilde{F} (W^*)$ and $A := \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial p} \cdot (r - \rho + \lambda_1 f (W^*) \cdot \left[ \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \ell} - W^* \right]).$ As $r \to 0$, (52) has one strictly positive and one strictly negative root (the product of which equals $-\Delta^2$), the consistent one being the latter from the remark after Equation (51) above. Because all the coefficients of (52) are continuous functions of $r$, so are its roots, which proves the proposition.

\[ \square \]

**C Computation of RPE with Endogenous Vacancies**

To compute a dynamic equilibrium with endogenous vacancies, we proceed as follows:
Step 0. Guess an initial path of vacancies in each firm, \( \{ v_i^{(0)} (p) \} \) \( t \geq 0, p \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}] \), for example, a constant path \( v^{(0)}(p) \). We start with \( i = 0 \).

Step 1. Given \( \{ v_i^{(i)} (p) \} \) \( t \geq 0, p \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}] \) with \( i = 0 \) and the (given) state of the economy at time 0, construct 
\[ v_i^{(i)} = \int_\underline{w}^p v_i^{(i)} (p) \, d\Gamma (p) \]
and compute the time path of unemployment from:
\[ \dot{u}_i^{(i)} = \delta \left( 1 - u_i^{(i)} \right) - m \left( u_i^{(i)} + \sigma \left( 1 - u_i^{(i)} \right) \right) \frac{u_i^{(i)}}{u_i^{(i)} + \sigma \left( 1 - u_i^{(i)} \right)} \]
and deduce the time paths for contact rates, 
\[ \lambda_i^{(i)} = \sigma \lambda_i^{(i)} + m \left( u_i^{(i)} + \sigma \left( 1 - u_i^{(i)} \right) \right) \frac{u_i^{(i)}}{u_i^{(i)} + \sigma \left( 1 - u_i^{(i)} \right)} \]
for \( t \geq 0 \).

Next construct the time path for the sampling distribution: 
\[ \Phi_i^{(i)} (p) = \int_\underline{w}^p \frac{u_i^{(i)} (x)}{v_i^{(i)}} \, d\Gamma (x) \]
and use all those initial guesses in the RHS of (33) to solve for the implied time path of firm sizes, 
\[ \{ L_i^{(i)} (p) \} \] \( t \geq 0, p \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}] \).

Step 2. Use the time paths obtained at Step 1 to substitute in the RHS of (35) and (36), and solve the resulting system of PDEs for \( \{ \pi_i^{(i)} (p), \mu_i^{(i)} (p) \} \) \( t \geq 0, p \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}] \). This is achieved using a solution algorithm similar to the one described in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008).

Step 3. Finally solve (34) for vacancies:
\[ v_i^{(i+1)} (p) = c^{-1} \left( \frac{\pi_i^{(i)} (p)}{v_i^{(i)}} \left( \lambda_i^{(i)} u_i^{(i)} + \lambda_i^{(i)} \int_\underline{w}^p L_i^{(i)} (x) \, d\Gamma (x) \right) \right) \]
and check consistency with the initial guess (i.e. \( v_i^{(i+1)} (p) \) “close to” \( v_i^{(i)} (p) \) for all \( p, t \)). If inconsistent, start over at step one using \( \{ v_i^{(i+1)} (p) \} \) \( t \geq 0, p \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}] \) as an initial guess.

D The Case of Myopic Workers: \( \rho = +\infty \)

If workers are (infinitely) impatient, they only care about current wages and the firm’s original problem simplifies to:
\[ \Pi_i^* (p) = \max_{\{w_i\}} \int_0^{+\infty} (p - w_i) L_i (p) \, e^{-rt} \, dt \]
subject to:
\[ \hat{L}_i (p) = - \left( \delta + \lambda_i \mathcal{F}_i (w_i) \right) L_i (p) + \frac{g (p)}{N} (\lambda_0 u_i + \lambda_1 (1 - u_i) G_i (w_i)), \]
which has one less state variable \( (V_i (p)) \) than the original problem (1). (Readers will pardon the notational abuse whereby \( F (\cdot) \) and \( G (\cdot) \) now take \( w_i \), rather than \( V_i \), as an argument.)
Denoting the costate associated with \( L_t(p) \) (i.e. the firm’s shadow value of the marginal worker) as \( \pi_t(p) \), the optimality conditions for (53) write down as:

\[
1 = \pi_t(p) \times \left[ \lambda_1 f_t(w_t(p)) + \lambda_1 \frac{q(p)}{N L_t(p)} (1 - w_t) g_t(w_t(p)) \right] \\
\pi_t(p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}_t(w_t(p))) \pi_t(p) + w_t(p) - p,
\]

(55) \hspace{1cm} (56)

\[
\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-rt} \pi_t(p) = 0.
\]

(57)

Now focusing on RPE’s, where \((1 - w_t) g_t(w_t(p)) = NL_t(p) f_t(w_t(p))/q(p) = NL_t(p) \gamma(p)/w'_t(p)\), the first order condition (55) becomes:

\[
w'_t(p) = 2\lambda_1 \varphi(p) \pi_t(p).
\]

(58)

Substitution into (56) delivers the following PDE in \( w_t(p) \):

\[
w'_t(p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(p)) w'_t(p) + 2\lambda_1 \varphi(p) (w_t(p) - p).
\]

(59)

This has a simple time-invariant solution, which is rank preserving (it is the customary steady-state wage equation in the BM model with heterogeneous firms):

\[
w_\infty(p) = p - (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(p))^2 \int_p^p \frac{dx}{(r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(x))^2} - (p - w_\infty(p)).
\]

(60)

This time-invariant solution satisfies the RP property and the optimality conditions (55) - (57). It is therefore an RPE, in which all firms jump right on to the new steady-state wage policy after a shock. Firm sizes then evolve according to (17) and the cross-section distribution of wages also gradually shifts toward its new steady-state shape as labor gets reallocated between firms.

The model can be closed by assuming the free-entry condition \( p = w \). Under this assumption, \( w_t(p) = p = w \) for all \( t \). To show that the invariant solution is unique, integrate equation (59) between \( p \) and \( p':

\[
\int_p^{p'} \dot{w}_t(x) \, dx = (r + \delta) [w_t(p) - w_t(p')] + \lambda_1 \int_p^{p'} \overline{F}(x) \, w'_t(x) \, dx + 2\lambda_1 \int_p^{p'} \varphi(x) (w_t(x) - x) \, dx.
\]

Integrating by parts the middle term on the RHS yields (using \( dw/dt = 0 \)):

\[
\dot{w}_t(p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(p)) w_t(p) - (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(p) p) + 3\lambda_1 \int_p^{p} w_t(x) \varphi(x) \, dx - \int_p^{p} x \varphi(x) \, dx,
\]

and

\[
\dot{w}_t(p) = (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(p)) \dot{w}_t(p) + 3\lambda_1 \int_p^{p} \dot{w}_t(x) \varphi(x) \, dx.
\]

We now establish that the invariant distribution is the unique solution, so the equilibrium jumps right away to the new steady state. Since \( \dot{w}_t(p) \) is differentiable in \( p \), there exists \( \hat{p} > p \) such that \( \dot{w}_t(p) \) preserves the sign for \( p \in [\hat{p}, \hat{p}] \). If this sign is zero, \( \dot{w}_t(p) = 0 \) for all \( p \): we have the stationary solution. If it is weakly positive with strict inequality on a set of positive measure, then from the above equation \( \dot{w}_t(p) > 0 \). But then \( \dot{w}_t(p) \) rises and becomes even more positive on some set of \( p \)'s. By induction, \( \dot{w}_t(p) \) and thus \( w_t(p) \) grow unbounded, ultimately make profits negative, and cannot converge to the new steady state. By the same reasoning, if \( \dot{w}_t(p) \leq 0 \) for all \( p \in [\hat{p}, \hat{p}] \) with strict inequality on a set of positive measure, then \( w_t(p) \) grows unbounded below on some set of productivities, violating the minimum wage requirement and any reservation wage. Using the entry condition, wages are

\[
w_t(p) = p - (r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(p))^2 \int_p^{p} \frac{dx}{(r + \delta + \lambda_1 \overline{F}(x))^2}.
\]